

# Peace and Security Council Report

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Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda

## Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

## Early warning issues for March 2014

During March, election campaigns, often an opportunity for protest and civil unrest, will gather momentum in Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, South Africa and Malawi. With Egypt's army chief Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi contesting the coming presidential elections in this highly polarised country, amid fears by many, well-founded or not, of a return to the practices of the Mubarak era, unrest there is likely to continue. The ongoing violence in South Sudan, due mainly to schisms within the government and military establishment as well as between ethnic groups, needs to be brought under control. Events in Mali, the Central African Republic and

Mozambique have to be closely watched and the continuing murderous rampage by Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria must be stopped.

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### ► Current PSC Chair

**Bio data:** H.E. Mr Manuel Goncalves

**Current posts:** Mozambique's Ambassador to Ethiopia Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA and Chair of the PSC

## Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

## Country analysis

### SOUTH SUDAN

#### Previous AU and PSC communiqués

In its meeting held on 18 December 2013, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) was briefed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Sudan to the AU on the situation in South Sudan. In a subsequent communiqué PSC/PR/BR.(CDIX) the Council expressed its deep concern at developments in South Sudan, where a political crisis has evolved into violent clashes between groups within the leadership of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and at the humanitarian consequences of the violence. The Council called for an urgent solution to the upheaval to avoid a long-term crisis in both South Sudan and neighbouring countries, and rejected the use of force to settle political differences. The PSC also reminded the parties to the conflict of the critical importance of respect for human rights, rule of law and constitutional legality, and commended and endorsed the initiative by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to resolve the crisis.

The 410<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Council PSC/PR/BR.(CDX), held on 24 December 2013, was briefed by the AU Commission (AUC) on the evolution of the situation in South Sudan. The Council warned that the crisis, which had evolved from a political dispute into an armed conflict, could rapidly deteriorate further into ethnic clashes and a fully-fledged civil war. The meeting also discussed the deepening humanitarian crisis and the suffering of civilians exposed to attacks and violence by armed groups. The PSC strongly condemned the attacks on innocent civilians, including the 'targeting of ethnic groups and other communities, as well as other violations of human rights, notably against women, children and other vulnerable groups'. The attack on a camp of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in Akobo on 19 December 2013, which resulted in the deaths of two peacekeepers, was also condemned by the Council, which stressed the importance and urgency of an inclusive political dialogue on all relevant issues.

The PSC meeting PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CDXI)-Rev.1 held at the level of heads

of state and government in Banjul, Gambia, on 30 December 2013, called on parties involved in the crisis in South Sudan to immediately and unconditionally cease hostilities and engage in unconditional and inclusive dialogue to address the current conflict and its underlying causes. The communiqué also called for an immediate end to the mobilisation of armed groups along ethnic and tribal lines.

The Commissioner for Peace and Security briefed the 413<sup>th</sup> meeting of the PSC on 16 January 2014 on the situation in South Sudan and the efforts of IGAD mediators to resolve the armed conflict. Representatives of South Sudan, Rwanda, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), France, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and Norway also addressed the meeting. The meeting emphasised political dialogue as the sole option for resolving the crisis in South Sudan and called for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities. It also stressed the need for greater efforts to prevent further loss of life and continuing escalation of conflict, including deepening ethnic mobilisation and inter-ethnic antagonism.

In a press statement dated 23 January 2014, the Chairperson of the AUC, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, commended the signing of Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities and the Status of Detainees by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – SPLM/A (in opposition), under the auspices of IGAD in Addis Ababa. The Chairperson hailed the signing as a first and significant step towards the search for a lasting solution to the conflict in South Sudan and urged the parties to 'faithfully and fully implement the commitments they have made'.

On 23 July 2013, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir Mayardit had declared the dissolution of his government, including the removal of Vice President Riek Machar, all members of his cabinet, and all deputy ministers. The declaration had also announced the removal of Pagan Amum, the Secretary General of the SPLM. A day after the decision, on 24 July 2013, the AUC and representatives of IGAD, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the UK and the US met in Addis Ababa to discuss this development and its implications.

In a subsequent statement, the AU and other members of the group urged the various South Sudanese parties to

maintain calm and prevent violence. The meeting also called on the leaders of South Sudan to accelerate the formation of a new cabinet 'in a manner that reflects the diversity of the South Sudanese people and in conformity with its Transitional Constitution and the democratic ideals the new country has espoused'. The group further emphasised that the national vision of the two-year-old state could only be realised through 'sustained commitment to democracy and good governance, justice and accountability, and respect for rule of law and the human rights of all of South Sudan's people'.

#### Crisis escalation potential

The fighting that started in Juba on 15 December quickly spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, leading to divisions in the national army among different factions and creating an alliance formed mostly along ethnic lines. As feared and speculated about by many observers, the fragile accord signed in Addis Ababa did not last long. The Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities and the Status of Detainees have not worked due to various reasons. The long and bitter power struggle between individuals and groups has resulted in deep animosities beyond the immediate political crisis, which started in December 2013. The inability of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities to immediately respond to the deep-seated underlying issues has made it difficult for the factions and armed groups to respect it as a framework for dealing with their reasons for resorting to violence. The relevant groups and mediators also failed to address the underlying structural problems affecting the state and society of South Sudan. The opposition is fragmented and many doubt whether Machar controls the movement against the Juba-based government. The absence of a structured opposition could make it difficult to realise a peace deal, in spite of the political will to do so.

The two parties have accused each other of provocation and breaching the terms of the agreement signed in Addis Ababa. The SPLA's spokesperson, Philip Aguer, said opposition forces had attacked a military base at Gadiang, while the opposition military spokesperson, Lul Ruai Koang, blamed the government for starting the fighting in the town by attacking rebel-held positions, in contravention of the provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement.

The conflict continues in different states, in many places, making the delivery of

humanitarian relief supplies and efforts to help the up to 500 000 displaced people to return to their homes almost impossible. According to the latest estimates by the International Crisis Group, more than 10 000 people have died in the conflict. Humanitarian agencies claim that 3,7 million South Sudanese are now facing severe food shortages.

The crisis in South Sudan, which started as a political upheaval, is becoming extremely complicated. The violence and the rapid ethnicisation of the conflict are spiralling out of control. Both sides are accused of committing serious crimes, including mass killings, rape and the targeting of civilians along ethnic lines. There have been reports that hundreds of bodies of mostly Dinka civilians are lying in mass graves in Bor, while thousands of Nuer have died in the capital, Juba. The mass killings of civilians along ethnic lines are rupturing the social fabric, complicating the crisis and worsening the existing animosity between ethnic groups.

South Sudan, one of the poorest countries in the world, is at a critical juncture that will determine not only the future security of its people but also its continued existence as a state. The root causes of the conflict seem to have been overlooked by the parties to the conflict. Impunity has become the order of the day. Thousands of civilians are being killed along ethnic lines, thereby aggravating age-old ethnic hatreds and increasing deep-seated animosity between the dominant ethnic groups. The country could descend into a prolonged civil war and anarchy, with resultant serious political and security implications for central and eastern Africa.

### Key issues and internal dynamics

The deep-rooted divisions among the leadership of the SPLA and tensions within the government of South Sudan came to a head when President Kiir declared the dissolution of his government in July 2013. Although his actions were legally sound, the political implications of firing his vice president and dismissing the lead negotiator in talks with the SPLM's Amum highlighted the deep-seated fault lines in the political leadership of the country.

In an ethnicised country like South Sudan, the political power struggle is heavily dependent on ethnic identity. President Kiir is from the Dinka ethnic group while the leader of the opposition and former vice president, Machar, comes from the Nuer community, the second largest ethnic group in South

Sudan. There has been a history of animosity between the Dinka and the Nuer since the guerrilla days of the SPLA. Machar left the SPLA and created an alliance with Khartoum in the 1990s following infighting among the leadership of the SPLA. This division gave rise to a brutal and horrendous chapter in the SPLA's history, which is referred to by historians as the 'civil war within the civil war'. The current violence has exacerbated ethnic tensions and historical wounds.

In early December 2013, senior members of the SPLA accused the government of becoming increasingly dictatorial and called for the transformation of the SPLM and the South Sudanese state. Most of the people who participated in the press conference were subsequently arrested and accused of having been part of an attempted coup against President Kiir on 15 December 2013. The exact moment that transformed political tension and rivalry into a security crisis and a civil war is contested. However, the violence that started in Juba quickly spread to the various regions of the new nation, dividing communities, the army and the ruling party. Some view the division in the SPLM as the continuation of a rift between two individuals (Kiir and Machar), and among certain factions in the party, while others have sought to understand the crisis through the lens of ethnic identities in the country.

According to the UN, both sides are committing atrocities. Government forces and rebels have been accused of committing crimes against civilians during the past two months. Members of the security services reportedly targeted several Nuer civilians during the violence. The Dinka community in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states was also allegedly targeted by forces allied to Machar. It is feared that reprisal attacks against civilians by both sides could lead to a prolonged and devastating human security crisis.

President Kiir has been uncompromising in resisting the opposition's demand that he departs. It has been reported that he intends to remain in power beyond 2015. Machar also has presidential ambitions, making it difficult to reach a compromise in the form of a unity government. The proposal by some groups that a transitional government should be formed without either President Kiir or Machar has been rejected by both factions. The two sides have also accused one another of corruption, incompetence and tribalism.

Many analysts cite the failure to transform the SPLA as being one of the major reasons for the recent developments in South Sudan. The military is unmanageable and costly in what is effectively a corrupt and poor state that is still unable to provide basic services to its population. Unverified reports claim that the military is the largest institution in South Sudan, consuming up to 60 per cent of the national budget. The government's continuing practice of integrating rebel and opposition militias into the army without proper training and structure has created a security apparatus 'without ethos or shared values'. Experts claim that the security apparatus in South Sudan is a patronage system that 'serves to maintain the power (of) ... political elites (and to enrich them)'.

President Kiir's government has also been accused of not reflecting the diversity of the country. The ethnic mix of the army has always been controversial, with claims of domination by the Dinka. South Sudan has failed to implement a critical element of the CPA, which foresaw the demobilisation of different militias and the establishment of a new integrated army. The SPLA, according to organisations working on security sector reform (SSR), 'consists of units that can be attributed more often to a certain ethnic group and that, more importantly, remain loyal to their respective commanders. Even though South Sudan's military budget per capita is one of the highest in Africa, the country is still far from having a modern, multi-ethnic army committed to the protection of the entire population.'

The woeful economy is another major challenge Juba faces. The country is very poor and underdeveloped and almost its entire budget depends on oil and aid. According to a petroleum ministry official, oil production has fallen by one-third to about 170 000 barrels per day since the start of the latest crisis. The violence in Malakal also raises concerns over the security of South Sudan's northern oil wells, an economic lifeline for Juba. Both the production and sale of oil are unstable, mostly because of Juba's relations with Khartoum and now because of the war. The poor economy could further worsen the delivery of basic state services to civilians. The government has also failed to employ the youth, who make up over 70 per cent of the population, making them susceptible to calls to take up arms to improve their lives.



## Geo-political dynamics

### *Africa and RECs*

IGAD took the lead in mediating between the two rival groups. A mediation team, led by a former foreign minister of Ethiopia, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, negotiated a ceasefire deal between the warring parties in South Sudan. He also dispatched a joint technical committee of 11 observers to witness the implementation of the agreement. The joint technical committee comprised members representing the South Sudanese government and the rebels (the SPLM/A in Opposition). The committee also included representatives from Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, the AU and the international community. Despite violations of the terms of agreement and resumption of war, IGAD leaders pushed for another round of peace talks to halt the violence and find a mediated solution to the crisis.

One of the most debatable and controversial issues has been Uganda's continued presence and role in South Sudan. The SPLM-in-opposition repeatedly warned that the deployment of Ugandan troops in South Sudan was an obstacle to the South Sudan talks, and alleged that Uganda was involved in military attacks against them. Machar accused Uganda of interfering in the country's internal affairs and called for the immediate withdrawal of its troops. IGAD, which described the problem in South Sudan as a political one needing a political dialogue, called for the withdrawal of all invited forces from South Sudan. However, IGAD failed to make an official and specific demand for the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops. The opposition in Uganda criticised its government for the troop deployment and accused it of making mercenaries of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) troops after revelations that South Sudan was paying Uganda for using its troops to help fight the rebellion. Uganda's Foreign Minister, Sam Kutesa, announced that the country's troops would be withdrawn from April. There are concerns that the subject of the Ugandan troops will remain an issue of contention during the coming peace talks.

In late February, Kenya also ordered that 300 more troops be sent to join the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan, making its total contribution 1 000 troops. Nairobi has also been pushing the two sides toward the negotiation table. Ethiopia, which is also taking an active role in the peace talks, is trying to maintain a more neutral stance, unlike

Uganda. However, countries in the region are already feeling the spillover impact of the conflict. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the number of South Sudanese migrants coming to Ethiopia is increasing at an alarming rate. The total number of migrants since the conflict started in South Sudan on 15 December 2013 is over 40 000, taking the total number of South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia to over 86 000. There are also reports of violent clashes between the Dinka and Nuer refugees in the Ethiopian refugee camp in the south-western region of Gambella.

### *United Nations*

Relations between the UN and the government of South Sudan have deteriorated in the past two months. South Sudanese government officials claim that UNMISS allowed rebels to enter several of its protection sites without restriction. The government accused the UN mission of being a refuge for defeated rebel forces. It further warned that it would not tolerate any behaviour or action attempting to directly or indirectly subordinate the authority of the president or the country to the UN. In a strongly worded and unprecedented statement, President Kiir said: 'I think the UN wants to be the government of South Sudan and ... fell short of naming the chief of the UNMISS as the co-president of the Republic of South Sudan ... And if that is the position of Ban Ki-Moon, they should make it clear that the UN wants to take over South Sudan.' President Kiir also told the UN that it should not act like 'a government within a government nor is it a parallel government', but rather as an organisation of member states to which South Sudan is a party. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon downplayed the accusations and condemned government officials' attempted forced entry into UN premises.

On 24 December 2013, the UN Security Council temporarily increased the number of peacekeepers deployed in South Sudan to 13 823 military and police personnel. The decision was justified by the need to protect civilians and prevent further atrocities. UNMISS has accused both parties to the conflict of committing serious crimes against civilians. The mission stated that it was investigating alleged crimes by both sides and had conducted more than 300 patrols in the capital, Juba, and Jonglei state to collect evidence and document alleged abuses.

## *International community*

The international community has been putting pressure on the government of South Sudan and the opposition to mediate a negotiated end to the conflict. Most countries, including the US, have opposed any attempts to forcefully remove an elected government. The EU has provided financial support of a little more than €1 million to assist the mediation process in South Sudan that is being facilitated by IGAD.

### *Scenarios*

Given developments in South Sudan, the following are potential scenarios:

#### *Scenario 1*

Continuation of the violence and atrocities committed by the relevant warring factions result in South Sudan descending into a fully fledged civil war, paving the way for more crimes against humanity and the destruction of the country's social fabric and state infrastructure.

#### *Scenario 2*

An agreement to create a transitional unity government helps to stop the violence and provides a platform to address the root causes of the conflict in the state and society of South Sudan.

#### *Scenario 3*

A prolonged civil war and failure to reach a negotiated end to the conflict produce a stalemate that gradually crushes the state, thereby negatively affecting regional integration and peace and security.

### *Options*

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to improve security and stability in South Sudan:

#### *Option 1*

The PSC, in tandem with IGAD, could continue to push for a negotiated end to the crisis in South Sudan.

#### *Option 2*

The PSC could work with the AU's commission of inquiry in South Sudan in order to ensure that individuals and groups responsible for perpetrating human rights violations are held accountable for their actions.

# Country analysis

## GUINEA-BISSAU

### Previous AU/PSC communiqués

At its 408<sup>th</sup> meeting, held on 13 December 2013 in Addis Ababa, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) expressed concern 'at the acts of violence registered in recent months against both citizens of Guinea-Bissau and foreigners, repeated violations of human rights and the persistence of the culture of impunity in Guinea-Bissau'. It asked the transitional and military authorities to make every effort to protect people, including foreigners, and property. The statement followed the lynching of a Nigerian national and an attack on the Embassy of Nigeria on 8 October 2013. The PSC also warned 'all those involved in these acts that they will be held accountable'.

The Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC), Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in a statement issued on 18 September 2013, urged member states of the AU and international partners to provide 'financial support and other necessary support to enable the organization to hold, within the time considered, free, transparent, credible and fair elections, marking the completion of the process of restoring the constitutional order'. She also stressed 'the importance of continued and narrow coordination between the concerned international actors'.

The PSC and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), in a joint statement issued after their 6<sup>th</sup> annual consultative meeting held on 11 June 2013 in Addis Ababa, noted the appointment of a new inclusive transitional government in Guinea Bissau. The respective PSCs stressed the need for reform of the defence and security sectors, as well as a 'more effective fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal fishing, the protection of human rights and the rule of law and putting an end to impunity'. They also focused on the crucial importance of the preservation and sustainable management of natural resources in Guinea-Bissau, including the sustainable use of marine and land resources.

### Crisis escalation potential

The crisis in Guinea-Bissau is essentially political and stems from the military coup of 12 April 2012 against the regime of Prime Minister

Carlos Gomes Junior. Potential risks should be considered in the light of the general elections intended to end the political transition that have once again been postponed, from 16 March to 13 April 2014.

First, with the exception of the main political force in the country, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*, or PAIGC), which proposed 4 May for the elections, all other political parties and civil society actors have agreed on 13 April 2014 and accepted shortening the legal deadlines in order to maintain the agreed electoral calendar.

An outbreak of violence linked to the rejection of the date proposed by the PAIGC seems unlikely, even if the PAIGC, given its weight on the political scene, should seek to block or slow down the process. The UN Security Council's threat of sanctions against any actor seeking to obstruct the electoral process further reduces this risk. The main negative consequences of this postponement are the extension of the transition period, the embezzlement and corruption practices associated with it, and the continuation of the suspension of development aid to Guinea-Bissau, a situation that has so far not led to a popular uprising.

The election date has already been postponed several times due to financial, technical and political reasons. Originally intended to take place before the end of the first year of the transition, it was then scheduled first for 24 November 2013 and then 16 March 2014 before being postponed to 13 April 2014.

The second risk deserving of analysis is the participation of Gomes Junior in these elections. He is reluctant to return to Guinea-Bissau due to fears for his safety. Although he came first in the first round of the presidential elections held in March 2012, he was subsequently arrested and forced to leave the country following the coup that took place in-between the two election rounds. While in exile, Gomes Junior filed his application via his lawyer, on 22 February 2014, to participate in the PAIGC primaries. He could also choose to stand as an independent if his application to be the PAIGC presidential candidate were rejected. However, among the criteria for eligibility as a presidential candidate is the issue of residence within the national territory, which Gomes Junior does not meet due to his exile.

In a letter dated mid-February, Gomes Junior asked the UN Secretary-General to ensure his security so that he could participate in the upcoming elections. The UN Integrated Office for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), located in the city of Buba, received a visit from Guinea-Bissau's security forces on 16 January 2014, in the wake of rumours that Gomes Junior had entered Guinea-Bissau by road and found refuge at the UN office. In view of the threats to his personal safety, the chances of Gomes Junior's return are slight, but should not be ruled out completely. Gomes Junior is perceived as a threat by the country's military elite and key political actors. This is because of his close ties to Luanda and the presence in Guinea-Bissau of the Angolan Military Mission for Technical Assistance and Reform of (the) Defence and Security Sector (MISSANG) during the period immediately preceding the coup.

Gomes Junior has clearly antagonised many regional and national stakeholders, including within his own party, the PAIGC, and the military elite. His presidential candidacy would further complicate an already tense situation. Therefore, his participation could undermine the electoral process that is supposed to end the current crisis, while his absence could undermine the inclusiveness of the elections.

The upcoming anniversary of the 12 April coup serves as a reminder of the possibility of military actors' returning to the political scene if the winning candidates do not serve their interests. These concerns have been revived by recent human rights abuses and breaches of freedom of expression perpetrated by some military actors, such as the abduction of the artist 'Masta Tito' and restrictions imposed on Radio Jovem after it broadcast the speech of the Chief of Defence Staff.

Regarding this third risk, it is important to keep in mind that army leaders are currently preoccupied with the US' indictment of General António Injai, the Chief of Defence Staff, for alleged narco-terrorism conspiracy. Injai's main concern for now is to avoid the fate of the former Chief of Staff of the Navy, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who was arrested in April 2013 during an operation led by the US' Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The military elite has an interest in keeping a low profile and forming new alliances within the international community. The best way to do so

would be not to interfere in the electoral process.

### Key issues and internal dynamics

The process that should end the current crisis involves the dynamics at play on the political scene and the logistical and financial problems related to the electoral process. The PAIGC, the main political force in the country, faces internal power struggles. These tensions caused delays in organising the party congress. Held from 30 January to 11 February 2014 in Cacheu, the congress eventually led to the election, on 9 February, of the former executive secretary of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Domingos Simões Pereira, as the party chairman. As such, he also heads the PAIGC list for the legislative elections and in the event of victory would hold the position of Prime Minister. By late February 2014, the PAIGC had not yet nominated its candidate for the presidential election. The deadline for the submission of applications is 5 March 2014.

As for the Party for Social Renovation (*Partido para a Renovação Social*, or PRS), the second strongest political force in Guinea-Bissau, it appears divided and weakened. Often accused of being an ethnic party and relying primarily on a Balanta electorate, the majority group in Guinea-Bissau, the PRS, could face division during the coming elections between the official PRS candidate, nominated by the party, and the independent candidate supported by its former leader, Kumba Yalá. The latter, who announced on 1 January 2014 that he was withdrawing from political life and would not be a candidate in the upcoming elections, then declared he was supporting an independent candidate, Nuno Nabiam, who also comes from the Balanta ethnic group. Nabiam is also supported by the Chief of Staff, António Injai, a fellow Balanta.

The governing body of the PRS elected Abel Incada, the only Balanta competing in the primaries, as its presidential candidate. Afterwards, the unsuccessful candidates, in particular two vice-presidents from different ethnic groups (Jorge Malù and Ibrahima Sory Djalo), announced they would stand as independents, denouncing tribalism in the party. Although in this context the PRS's chances of winning the presidential election appear rather low, it might nonetheless remain the second strongest political force in parliament.

Twenty parties that are unrepresented or underrepresented in the National Assembly joined forces on 10 January 2014, under the umbrella of the Forum of Guinea-Bissau. The members of this coalition are also strongly represented in the transitional government, particularly in strategic positions such as the ministry tasked with organising the elections. Their candidates are Afonso Té, a former military officer, for the position of President, and Fernando Vaz, Minister in charge of the Council of Ministers and Spokesperson of the Transitional Government, to head the legislative list.

There are also independent candidates, such as Paulo Gomes, Domingos Quadé and Nuno Nabiam. In addition, PRS candidates who were unsuccessful in the primaries might stand as independents. Parties associated with the Forum of Guinea-Bissau as well as independent candidates hope to take advantage of the divisions within the major parties and expand their electoral support during the forthcoming elections.

Technical and financial problems affected the counting process, which finally came to an end on 10 February having reached 93 per cent of the voting population (estimated at 810 000 voters). The start of the voter registration period required the mobilisation of sufficient funding for both this operation and the holding of the elections. It was not until September 2013 that the government presented a budget amounting to \$19,3 million, with most of the funding being covered by external partners.

In August 2013, after lengthy discussions and debates, parliament decided to replace the outdated electoral registration system with a new 'improved manual and electronic' system. Under the new system, voters now present plastic cards containing individual serial numbers and bearing their photographs and fingerprints. The new system was the result of a compromise, as most parties wanted a fully biometric system that would have required more funding and a longer registration process.

After the elections, exiting the crisis in Guinea-Bissau will depend on the new political dispensation and the ability of the elected authorities to create the right conditions for the implementation of institutional reforms. This will require significant support from the international community. In this context, redefining relations between the political and military spheres will be critical for stabilising the country over time.

## Geopolitical dynamics

### Africa and RECs

The 33rd meeting of the Committee of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Chiefs of Staff was held in Guinea-Bissau from 17 to 19 February 2014. The Chiefs of Staff 'commended the political actors of Guinea-Bissau for setting the date of 13 April 2014 for the holding of the next parliamentary and presidential elections'. They also focused on the strengthening of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) troops and 'commended the excellent relations prevailing between the ECOMIB and Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces'.

ECOWAS's commitment to the electoral process has resulted in valuable financial, logistical and technical support. ECOWAS has contributed up to \$13 million, with \$6 million provided by Nigeria, which has also donated vehicles and voter registration materials.

On the security front, ECOWAS has also committed, through ECOMIB, to providing \$63 million as part of the implementation of the reform programme in the defence and security sectors (DSSR). ECOMIB was deployed on 18 May 2012 to ensure the withdrawal of the MISSANG, which was completed on 9 June 2012. With more than 500 personnel (police, military and civilian), ECOMIB is also tasked with securing the transition environment and the electoral process itself.

The efforts of ECOWAS in resolving the crisis were influenced by some of its member states, in particular Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal, based on their respective national interests. All three were concerned at the presence of Angolan troops in West Africa. Unlike the AU, which suspended Guinea-Bissau and called for a return to the situation prior to the coup, ECOWAS supported the establishment of a transition, contrary to the principle of zero tolerance enshrined in its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

### United Nations

From 20 to 23 January 2014, the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration in the Peacebuilding Commission, Brazil's Ambassador Antonio Patriota, led a mission to Guinea-Bissau. It was aimed at refining the re-engagement strategy of the Commission in the post-election period. The support of the UN and international partners will be central to the implementation of the major reforms that Guinea-Bissau will need to implement in the post-election phase.



In a presidential statement on 9 December, the UN Security Council expressed its concern about the insecurity and the climate of impunity prevailing in the country. It urged 'politicians and leaders of the army to refrain from any action likely to interfere with the electoral process and the implementation [of] reforms essential for the long-term stability of Guinea-Bissau'. As such, the UN Security Council declared it was willing to consider targeted sanctions, as per Resolution 2048 establishing the Sanctions Committee on Guinea-Bissau.

### **International community**

Actors in the international community were sharply divided in the aftermath of the coup. However, since the formation of the inclusive government, in June 2013, positions have narrowed and stakeholders have supported the timely organisation of elections.

Appointed on 14 January 2014, the Special Representative of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in Guinea Bissau, Carlos Moura, announced his organisation's support for the transitional government in order to allow the holding of elections on the announced date. East Timor, a member of the CPLP, was also heavily involved in the voter registration process. Its financial, technical and logistical support is estimated at \$6 million.

The EU, which suspended its development aid to Guinea-Bissau after the coup, has now agreed to fund the electoral process by up to €2 million through the UN Development Programme basket fund for elections. The International Organisation of the Francophonie has also supported the process by seconding experts to electoral bodies.

### **Scenarios**

#### **Scenario 1**

To avoid compromising the electoral process, Gomes Junior decides not to stand as a candidate, or his candidacy is rejected either during the primaries of the PAIGC or at the level of the Supreme Court. His absence from the political arena allows for a peaceful election in spite of protests by his supporters, through legal means, denouncing an exclusive ballot.

#### **Scenario 2**

The Supreme Court accepts the candidacy of Gomes Junior as a PAIGC candidate or as an independent candidate. He participates in the

elections after having consulted with all national stakeholders and reassuring national and international actors. The elections take place in a peaceful atmosphere, but the politico-military balance remains precarious.

#### **Scenario 3**

Gomes Junior participates in elections on behalf of the PAIGC or as an independent candidate. The electoral process takes place in a tense environment and makes the reactions of actors unpredictable, especially military stakeholders who feel he threatens their interests.

### **Options**

#### **Option 1**

The PSC should encourage the AU's representation in Guinea-Bissau to continue meetings with all political actors, in collaboration with other members of the international community, to ensure the peaceful nature of the electoral process. A mission by the Panel of the Wise could be considered as the election approaches, to remind all national stakeholders of the importance of these elections for the future stabilisation of Guinea-Bissau.

#### **Option 2**

Although attention is currently focussed on the coming electoral process, the PSC should not lose sight of the extent of the post-election challenges facing Guinea-Bissau, notably regarding institutional reforms. The PSC could require the AU Commission to organise a joint assessment mission to better guide and coordinate the post-electoral support of the international community in this country. This mission should be organised along the same lines as joint missions initiated by the AU in December 2012 and July 2013, which were aimed at achieving a shared understanding of the situation between various actors.

#### **Option 3**

The PSC should support a change in the ECOMIB mandate so it can make the reformation of the defence and security sectors its main mandated task after the election. Despite ECOWAS's lack of experience in this area, given the working relations it has forged with the army, the sub-regional organisation appears to be the actor most likely to give impetus to the reform process, provided it benefits from financial support and technical expertise.

### **Documents**

#### **AU Documents**

- Communiqué PSC CPS PSC/PR/COMM.1(CDVIII), 408<sup>th</sup> meeting, Addis Ababa, 13 December 2013
- Communiqué AU Commission, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013
- Joint Communiqué UAPSC and UEPSC, Addis Ababa, 11 June 2013

#### **ECOWAS Documents**

- Communiqué N° 024/2014, 33<sup>rd</sup> meeting of West African Defence Chief, Bissau, 19 February 2014
- Communiqué Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, Dakar, 3 May 2012
- Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security

#### **UN Documents**

- S/PRST/2013/19, statement of the Security Council, 9 December 2013
- Report on restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, 19 November 2013
- Resolution 2048 (2012), adopted by the Security Council at its 6774<sup>th</sup> meeting, 18 May 2012

## Important dates to diarise

8	March	International Women's Day
21	March	International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
22	March	World Water Day
25	March	International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade
7	April	Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Rwandan Genocide
25	April	World Malaria Day
29	April	Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Chemical Warfare
7-9	May	World Economic Forum on Africa 2014, Abuja, Nigeria

Country	Election	Date *
Guinea-Bissau	Presidential National Assembly	13 April 2014 13 April 2014
Egypt	Presidential	March / April
Algeria	Presidential	17 April 2014
South Africa	Presidential National Assembly Provincial	7 May 2014 7 May 2014 7 May 2014
Malawi	Presidential National Assembly Local	20 May 2014 20 May 2014 20 May 2014

*\*could change, dependent on circumstances*

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