



Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR's activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.

This project is part of UNIDIR's Weapons of Societal Disruption programme, which works towards limits and controls on the weapons that tear the fabric of societies, such as small arms, cluster munitions, landmines and explosive remnants of war. The programme focuses on generating ideas and practical initiatives to address the security challenges related to the illicit flow, uncontrolled accumulation and misuse of various types of weapons and ammunition that threaten public safety, pose risks to society and impede efforts to achieve sustainable development.

Note

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

Contents

Acknowledgements	iv
About the Authors	iv
Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop, Mogadishu, Somalia	v
Executive Summary	vi
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Somalia's security situation as it relates to weapons and ammunition management ...	2
1.2 Partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia	3
1.2.1 Reporting requirements under resolution 2093 (2013)	4
1.2.2 Updates from resolution 2142 (2014)	4
1.2.3 Imports of weapons and ammunition since the partial lifting of the arms embargo	5
1.2.4 Arms embargo implications for weapons and ammunition management	5
2 International, regional, and national instruments	6
2.1 International conventions and agreements (arms control)	6
2.2 Regional conventions and agreements (arms control)	7
2.3 National legislation and instruments (arms control)	7
3 Weapons and ammunition management achievements	8
3.1 National policy coordination	8
3.1.1 The development of national WAM institutional structures	8
3.2 Rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure	12
3.2.1 Armouries (SALW only)	12
3.2.2 Weapons and ammunition storage facilities	12
3.3 Weapons and ammunition management systems	12
3.3.1 Weapons marking	12
3.3.2 Weapons registration	13
3.4 Ongoing WAM-enhancement activities (February 2014).....	13
3.4.1 Refurbishment of two police armouries in Baidoa.....	13
3.4.2 Construction/refurbishment of two police armouries in Belet Weyn.....	13
3.5 Envisaged WAM-enhancement activities (April 2014–March 2017)	13
3.5.1 Rehabilitation or reconstruction of armouries across Somalia (WAM TWG)	13
3.5.2 SPF and NISA armoury construction.....	13
3.5.3 National Armoury Network.....	14
3.5.4 National storage facility—site clearance and refurbishment.....	14
3.5.5 Marking and registration	14
4 Weapons management—current status and ways forward	14
4.1 Physical infrastructure	15
4.1.1 General requirements	15
4.1.2 Measures to prevent the storage of explosive ammunition	15
4.1.3 Construction in conformity with international standards	15
4.1.3.1 Wall construction	16
4.1.3.2 Roof/ceiling construction	16
4.1.3.3 Floor construction	16
4.1.3.4 Standardized layout	16
4.2 Accounting systems	16
4.2.1 General requirements	17
4.2.2 Marking	17
4.2.3 National registries	18
4.2.4 Local registries	19
4.2.5 Movement of weapons and ammunition	19
4.2.6 Appropriate accounting systems	20
4.2.7 Harmonizing a national accounting system	20
4.3 Preconditions	21

4.3.1	Force structure	22
4.3.2	Personal versus government-owned weapons	22
4.4	International standards and support	22
4.4.1	International Small Arms Control Standards	22
4.4.2	International Small Arms Control Standards Assessment Tool	23
5	Ammunition management—current status and ways forward	23
5.1	General requirements	23
5.1.1	Climate and weather effects on ammunition and explosives	24
5.1.2	Special effects—propellants	25
5.2	Explosive safeguarding	25
5.3	Licensing	27
5.4	International standards and support	28
5.4.1	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines	28
5.4.2	IATGs implementation support—United Nations SaferGuard Interactive Implementation Support Toolkit	28
6	FGS storage facilities—National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)	28
7	FGS storage facilities—Somali National Army (SNA)	29
8	FGS storage facilities—Central police armouries	30
9	Priorities	31
9.1	Priority 1—clarification of FGS force structures	31
9.1.1	What?	31
9.1.2	How?	31
9.1.3	Why?	31
9.2	Priority 2—arms and ammunition registration and accounting systems	31
9.2.1	What?	31
9.2.2	How?	31
9.2.3	Why?	32
9.3	Priority 3—ammunition storage infrastructure and stockpile management	32
9.3.1	What?	32
9.3.2	How?	32
9.3.3	Why?	32
	Annex A Weapons and ammunition movement using issue and receipt vouchers	33
	Abbreviations	34

Acknowledgements

This report was made possible through the facilitation and cooperation of the Federal Government of Somalia. UNIDIR would like to express its appreciation to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Mine Action Service in Somalia which provided exceptional support on the Weapons and Ammunition Workshop and consulted with us on this report at various stages, encouraged us to continue this work, and contributed their valuable inputs. Further, UNIDIR expresses its gratitude to the United Nations Development Programme and the International Small Arms Control Standards Inter-Agency Support Unit for providing guidance on this report. Additionally, UNIDIR extends appreciation to the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, and the Mines Advisory Group in Somalia for their contributions to the workshop. The weapons and ammunition workshop and this report would not have been possible without the support and close cooperation of all partners mentioned above.

At UNIDIR, this project was managed by Himayu Shiotani.

Support from UNIDIR's core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute's activities. In addition, dedicated project funding was received from the Government of Finland.

About the Authors

James Bevan

James Bevan has more than a decade of experience in tracking weapons in armed conflicts across Africa. Formerly a field researcher with the Small Arms Survey, he later headed the United Nations Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire during the 2010–2011 civil war. He is now the Director of Conflict Armament Research, a United Kingdom-based organization, which identifies and tracks conventional weapons used in armed conflicts.

Jonah Leff

Jonah Leff is the Director of Operations at Conflict Armament Research. Prior to this, he was the Project Coordinator of the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, a multi-year project that aims to support armed violence reduction and arms control initiatives in Sudan and South Sudan. Between 2009 and 2011, he served on United Nations Security Council sanctions expert monitoring groups, investigating arms embargo violations in Darfur, Eritrea, and Somalia. Before joining the United Nations, Jonah worked as a researcher at the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, where he conducted extensive desk and field research on armed violence. He holds a Masters of Public Administration in International Management from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California, and has authored numerous publications.

Ian Ruddock

Ian Ruddock is an independent consultant, specializing in ammunition management. He has served over 20 years in the military, including with the British and New Zealand Army. He is trained as a Logistics Officer and specialized as an Ammunition Technical Officer, responsible for all aspects of land service ammunition. For over 11 years he has worked as a weapons and ammunition consultant for various United Nations organizations and NGOs in the African and Latin American regions, providing assistance in physical security and stockpile management, as well as destruction of both weapons and ammunition.

Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop, Mogadishu, Somalia

On 21–22 January 2014, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) hosted a Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop in Mogadishu, in cooperation with UNDP, UNIDIR, UNMAS and UNSOM. This workshop aimed to highlight weapons and ammunition management (WAM) requirements, to review the scope of existing WAM activities, and to identify WAM capacity-building requirements. The workshop also had two key objectives—first, to clarify the obligations and responsibilities of the FGS in relation to WAM; second, and on this basis, to profile international partners and resources that are available to assist the FGS in meeting these obligations and responsibilities.

The workshop was structured along several themes. First, it provided a general introduction to WAM, including existing standards and practices. This part of the workshop featured presentations by a range of international partners, which focused on a broad set of measures to enhance WAM. The measures presented included the legal basis for WAM, accounting and inventory management principles, considerations for the safe and secure storage of weapons and ammunition, and decisions regarding the siting, construction, and safe management of weapons and ammunition storage facilities. Presenters made extensive reference to existing global frameworks to tackle illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons, including the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, the International Tracing Instrument, and the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), which each provide extensive guidance on international best practice in the field of WAM. This part of the workshop also drew heavily on regional experience, including inputs from the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSEA) on the Nairobi Protocol and its applicability to Somalia.

Second, the workshop provided the FGS with a platform to present its existing achievements, current objectives, and ongoing needs in relation to WAM. FGS presenters provided a rich analysis of their existing requirements, with a notable focus on the need for enhanced storage infrastructure (particularly in relation to explosive ammunition). FGS officials, and notably those of the Somali National Army (SNA), also outlined ongoing activities related to WAM, including the design of accounting and inventory management systems, and protocols and procedures for the issuing of weapons. Importantly, FGS presentations also outlined developments in Somalia's WAM administrative structure, which is a necessary precondition for effective WAM in the country.

Third, a wide range of international partners presented their WAM enhancement activities in Somalia, including the construction or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, efforts to develop weapon accounting systems, and general support provided to the FGS in terms of future WAM planning. These presentations provided a detailed description of the types of international assistance available to support WAM activities in Somalia and drew strongly on best practice instituted elsewhere in Africa (notably with respect to the design and construction of arms and ammunition storage infrastructure).

Finally, and of critical importance to future WAM achievements in Somalia, the workshop encompassed the inauguration of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee. This is a high-level body designed to provide strategic guidance to the FGS on the management of arms and ammunition. The Steering Committee, which is chaired by the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia, is composed of representatives of the FGS,¹ the United Nations,² the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (military and police), the European Union, bilateral partners, and non-governmental implementing partners.

Throughout, the workshop was punctuated by open discussion periods, which allowed for the free exchange of ideas, experiences, and best practices. The views and experiences shared in this workshop are reflected in this report with the aim to contribute to the future enhancement of WAM in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

¹ The Ministries of National Security and of Defence, Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, Custodial Corps, and the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

² UN Assistance Mission in Somalia and UN Mine Action Service.

Executive Summary

The hosting by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) of a capacity-building technical workshop in Mogadishu on 21 and 22 January 2014³ and a weapons stockpile visit on 23 January 2014 provided international observers, including various United Nations agencies and the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, an invaluable opportunity to view first-hand the status of weapons and ammunition management (WAM) policies and practice under the FGS. This report reflects the observations of UNIDIR during these events.

Overall, UNIDIR found that the FGS demonstrated a sustained and active commitment to the enhancement of WAM within Somalia, and notes the progress made to date. In particular, UNIDIR found that the FGS demonstrated an improved organizational capacity, emerging technical competence, and proved that there is support of international partners for the implementation of incremental WAM enhancement measures in line with relevant international standards and guidelines. Nevertheless, it is evident that there remains a large body of work to be undertaken for the country to achieve effective compliance with relevant international standards, and to establish appropriate and robust processes and protocols in accordance with WAM best practice. Though Somalia faces significant and various challenges in achieving this goal, UNIDIR considers that these are not insurmountable and that Somalia is well-placed and willing to achieve strong WAM outcomes with the ongoing assistance of the international community. The United Nations partners, including UNIDIR, stand ready to assist in this regard.

The following section summarizes the key initial observations offered by UNIDIR on the WAM capacity of the FGS. These observations are detailed in this report.

- National WAM institutional structures—A key outstanding governance challenge and urgent priority for the FGS is the clarification of relevant institutional structures for the management of weapons and ammunition in Somalia, particularly as these relate to the custodians throughout the chain of supply of state-owned munitions. Clear roles and responsibilities for WAM are critical to the establishment of effective registration and accounting systems as well as WAM generally in Somalia. It is noted that the FGS has to date taken a number of important steps to this end including most notably to establish an institutional structure and work plan for 2014 to 2017 to better coordinate national policy, reporting, and conduct as it relates to WAM, including in preparation for the possible revision or lifting of existing partial arms embargos.
- Physical security and stockpile management—Significant progress has been made in cooperation with various international partners to improve the (re)construction, according to international standards, of appropriately planned and sited ammunition and weapon storage facilities across Somalia following the destruction of most such sites during the years of conflict in the country. As of November 2013, 66 State armouries⁴ have been rehabilitated/(re)constructed. Further 18 sites are earmarked for similar work in 2014. The sites generally accord with international standards on stockpile management (ISACS 05.20), albeit to varying degrees. Management improvements continue to be made at these sites. Plans are in place for the development of nationally harmonized weapons and ammunition registry and accounting systems, supported by robust marking and tracing procedures to effectively control the import, storage, transport, and issuance/dissemination of weapons and ammunition to mitigate the risk of illicit diversions. International partners have provided guidance and technical training to government officials to assist in this regard. Such training and support is ongoing.
- Regulatory framework—Somalia has in place a national legislative framework (1963 Public Order Law) to regulate the civilian possession of weapons and ammunition. However, it is

³ The workshop was developed by UNIDIR in partnership with UNSOM and UNMAS.

⁴ Rehabilitation and new construction that commenced in South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland in 2012 are already completed and meet international standards.

understood that this regulatory framework has not been amended since its introduction. Moreover, enforcement of this regulation in the current national security environment remains a significant challenge.

- International confidence-building measures—To bolster international confidence in the FGS’s commitment to international arms control norms, the FGS is encouraged to sign and ratify key international arms control instruments as well as to establish relevant national reporting systems.
- Other observations—An initial observation of Somalia’s weapons management practices and procedures with regard to the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) indicates progress in some areas, with a number of requirements already being met across the areas of physical security and stockpile management of weapons. It was observed, however, that there are at present no qualified armourers, storekeepers, or specialist ammunition-trained personnel. The FGS is strongly encouraged to refer to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) for guidance on ammunition management, including on physical security, storage, and other relevant procedures.

1 Introduction

This UNIDIR report presents the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its international partners towards achieving effective weapons and ammunition management in Somalia.⁵ It follows a two-day technical workshop and one-day stockpile site visit conducted in Mogadishu in late January 2014. It recognizes a high degree of political will within the FGS to enhance weapons and ammunition management (WAM) with significant steps already taken in this regard. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the FGS has the proven organizational capacity, emerging technical competence, and international partner support to successfully implement the WAM-enhancement measures outlined in this report. Despite these undeniably positive developments, WAM in Somalia is nascent and the conditions for its effective implementation are extremely challenging.

Years of war have left Somalia with very few intact weapons and ammunition storage facilities. All of Somalia's purpose-built ammunition and explosive stores have been damaged by war and insurgency. Most have been destroyed beyond repair and the few remaining facilities are out of use due to disrepair, or sited in insecure locations. While the FGS's international partners have built a number of armouries to house small arms and small-calibre ammunition, none of these facilities is designed to accommodate explosive ammunition. As a result, Somalia's defence and security forces store ammunition and explosives in a range of unsuitable facilities. Most of these are situated in urban areas, whose populations and infrastructure would suffer grievously in the event of an accidental explosion.

Although the FGS's international partners have begun to develop local weapons registries and accounting systems in selected armouries, Somalia has yet to develop a national registration and accounting system. While Somalia remains without an effective system to manage its weapons and ammunition, its chances of maintaining control over government weapons will remain slight. The FGS is currently unable to account for the location or custody of numerous recently imported weapons. Furthermore, unless rectified, the inability to account for weapons across the national stockpile will undermine the operational efficacy of Somalia's defence and security forces and lead to excessive expenditure on defence acquisitions—primarily to replace diverted weapons and ammunition.

The FGS has clearly made great advances in clarifying its institutional structure—particularly in relation to weapons and ammunition management. However, the structure of the FGS defence and security forces remains opaque. This is a fundamental obstacle to the effective management of weapons and ammunition. Unless the FGS can identify units of the defence and security forces precisely, it stands very little chance of implementing a registry and accounting system that could account for the weapons held by those units. Clarifying the FGS defence and security force structure is a prerequisite to effective WAM in the country.

The FGS moved very quickly to define an institutional framework for WAM oversight and implementation. It is very likely that this institutional framework, and the infrastructure, management protocols, and oversight mechanisms it adopts now, will serve Somalia well into the future. For this reason, potential future developments, such as the consolidation and enlargement of Somalia's armed forces, or a lifting of the arms embargo, need to be accommodated into today's WAM architecture. In this respect, it is important to note that, in the future, the FGS may have to manage a far larger national weapons and ammunition stockpile than it does today—one that is composed of a greater number of weapons and a higher tonnage of explosive ordnance. WAM solutions adopted today must consequently prepare Somalia for safe and effective WAM well into the future. This should be a primary responsibility, not only for the FGS, but also for the international partners that are deeply involved in store construction and WAM planning.

⁵ This is the public, redacted version of the report. A more detailed report was produced for the FGS and its relevant international partners.

This report situates its findings within a framework of questions: What challenges does the FGS face in terms of WAM and how are these changing? What has been achieved in terms of WAM enhancements in the recent past? What specific challenges does the FGS face for weapons management and, at the same time, what particular challenges do the storage and management of explosive ammunition pose?

The report concludes by outlining three priority areas for attention, which arguably hold the keys to effective WAM in Somalia: 1) The urgent need to clarify the structure of the FGS defence and security forces, which is a precondition for 2) the development of an effective national weapons and ammunition registry and accounting system and, concurrently, 3) the construction, according to international standards, of carefully planned and appropriately sited ammunition and explosives storage facilities.

1.1 Somalia's security situation as it relates to weapons and ammunition management

Somalia is at a critical juncture in its effort to achieve sustainable security and stability. The FGS faces numerous security challenges as it seeks to end more than 20 years of conflict. While the Somali Armed Forces, with the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has made significant progress in stemming the threat of Al Shabaab and related clan-based militias, insecurity persists in vast areas of the country. Further, since Somali forces have taken greater control of the capital Mogadishu over the last few years, insurgents have adapted to this new reality by moving from urban combat to increased asymmetrical warfare tactics such as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices. Despite the closing of the Bakaara arms market, once the central artery for weapons in Mogadishu, arms, ammunition, and related explosives are readily available through underground sources.

Al Shabaab and its affiliates rely on a steady flow of illicit arms and ammunition, which flow into and throughout Somalia unchecked. Significant quantities of weapons continue to flow illegally from external sources by land, air, and sea to areas in Somalia not under FGS control.⁶ These weapons supplies, often intended for Al Shabaab, not only threaten peace and security in Somalia, but fuel conflicts in other countries throughout the region and subregion. Inadequate law enforcement, port, and border controls, and an overall lack of monitoring enables this phenomenon to continue unabated.

Old and abandoned stockpiles of munitions left from the time of Siad Barre's regime are also sources of explosives for insurgents. With the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia and the concomitant supply of weapons and ammunition to Somalia's armed forces, adequate physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), which includes proper storage, transport, and accounting for arms and ammunition, will prevent unintentional diversion from state stockpiles. In the context of the arms embargo modification, the Somali authorities face many challenges including limited systems of management, a near total absence of infrastructure (such as armouries and safe storage facilities for arms and ammunition), as well as a lack of general technical capacity. In light of an increasingly growing weapons arsenal the FGS lacks adequate storage facilities and mechanisms to safely and effectively transport, store, and account for its inventory. Proper PSSM reduces the likelihood that weapons will be diverted from state stockpiles. In the absence of a comprehensive record-keeping and inventory system, as is the case in Somalia, weapons can easily go missing, either through deliberate or unintentional leakage from government stocks.

⁶ See United Nations Security Council. 2013. *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia*. S/2013/413 of 12 July.

A related and no less significant hazard that can result from poor stockpile management is the potential for unplanned explosions at munitions sites. Although no serious explosions of this type have recently occurred in Somalia, the risk of such an event is real. Given the current conditions in which ammunition is stored in Mogadishu, an accidental explosion could have severe humanitarian and economic consequences. The 4 March 2012 explosion at an ammunition depot in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo is a sobering example. The explosion resulted in more than 250 deaths, 2,300 injuries, and nearly 14,000 destroyed homes.⁷ An incident of this magnitude would likely have similar devastating effects in a city as densely populated as Mogadishu.

1.2 Partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia

In an effort to cement peace in the aftermath of the overthrow of Siad Barre's government in 1991, the United Nations Security Council drew up resolution 751 (1992) to impose a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia.⁸ This meant the prohibition for the transfer of military equipment both in and out of Somalia. The Security Council subsequently reinforced and in some cases reformed this decision with the passing of numerous resolutions during 1992–2013.⁹ When the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expired on 20 August 2012,¹⁰ paving the way for the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia, members of the international community sought to ease the arms embargo on Somalia to enhance the FGS's ability to provide security.¹¹

With the passage of resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council amended the general and complete "embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia" imposed by resolution 733 (1992) and elaborated in resolution 1425 (2002). Specifically, paragraph 33 of resolution 2093 (2013) stipulates that the arms embargo:¹²

[S]hall not apply to deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and to provide security for the Somali people ...

The decision to partially lift the 20-year-old arms embargo on Somalia was adopted to strengthen the FGS's ability to provide security and to combat insurgent threats. While this is a worthwhile goal, it has presented new challenges to the FGS in its effort to effectively manage the sudden influx of legally supplied arms and ammunition. In 2011, the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) documented the prevalence of arms and ammunition that the then TFG forces were selling to Bakaara market as well as to small-scale arms dealers in and around Mogadishu.¹³ Although the government has taken measurable steps to ameliorate this problem, diversion from Somali armed forces persists.

⁷ Mbakouo, Robert. 2012. *Congo Will Pay 3 Million Francs to Blast Victims' Families*. Bloomberg News. 8 March.

⁸ United Nations Security Council. 1992. *Resolution 751 (1992)*. S/RES/751 of 24 April.

⁹ See <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/>.

¹⁰ The TFG was established in 2004 following a conference in Addis Ababa that brought together several factions of the Islamic Courts Union.

¹¹ What's in Blue. 2014. *Resolution Extending Partial Lifting of the Somalia Arms Embargo*. 4 March. <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/03/resolution-re-authorising-partial-lifting-of-the-arms-embargo-in-somalia.php>.

¹² In the annex of the resolution, the Security Council provided a list of arms, ammunition, and military equipment and materials which are not covered by this modification of the arms embargo. United Nations Security Council. 2013. *Resolution 2093 (2013)*. S/RES/2093 of 6 March; United Nations Security Council. 2002. *Resolution 1425 (2002)*. S/Res/1425 of 22 July.

¹³ See United Nations Security Council. 2011. *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 1916 (2010)*. S/2011/433 of 18 July.

1.2.1 Reporting requirements under resolution 2093 (2013)

The 2013 Security Council decision was not without conditions. In order to promote accountability and transparency on the part of the FGS and to keep abreast of Somalia's weapons imports, the Security Council imposed a series of reporting requirements that the FGS is obligated to fulfil for submission to the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

Paragraphs 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) outlines the following requirement with regard to reporting on deliveries of weapons, military equipment, and the provision of assistance for the Somalia's security forces:¹⁴

[T]he Federal Government of Somalia shall notify the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), for its information, at least five days in advance, of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance intended solely for the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, as permitted in paragraph 33 of this resolution, providing details of such deliveries or assistance and the specific place of delivery in Somalia ... and stresses the importance that such notifications contain all relevant information, including, where applicable, the type and quantity of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment and materiel to be delivered, and the proposed date of delivery ...

Beyond solely reporting on the importation of military goods and services, the Security Council requires the FGS to report every six months on the following three areas:

- (a) The structure of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- (b) The infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- (c) The procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and on training needs in this regard ...

1.2.2 Updates from resolution 2142 (2014)

On 5 March 2014, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2142 (S/RES/2142) re-authorizing a partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia until 25 October 2014.¹⁵ The new resolution imposes more stringent reporting requirements on the FGS than the previous resolutions (2093 and 2111). The FGS is required to notify the Security Council Sanctions Committee of upcoming arms transfers,¹⁶ the confirmation of delivery on arms shipments, and the distribution of imported arms.¹⁷ Similarly to resolution 2093, the new resolution further requests the FGS to report to the Security Council by 13 June 2014 and then again by 13 September 2014 on 1) the structure, strength, and composition of the Security Forces; 2) the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance, and distribution of military equipment; and 3) the procedures and codes of conduct in place for these purposes.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council. 2013. *Resolution 2093 (2013)*. S/Res/2093 of 6 March.

¹⁵ See United News Centre, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11307.doc.htm>. Small arms and ammunition and other military equipment, as well as advice, assistance, and training intended for the development of security forces of the FGS, are included in the extension of the arms embargo suspension, while exceptions exist in relation to deliveries of items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013). See paragraph 2, S/RES/2142; and annex, S/RES/2111.

¹⁶ The Security Council decided that the FGS had the primary responsibility to notify the Committee at least five days ahead of any such deliveries, and further, that the State, or international, regional, or subregional organizations delivering such assistance, could make such a notification. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 2142.

¹⁷ Notifications concerning the provision of weapons or military equipment should include, among other things, details of the manufacturer and supplier of the arms and ammunition, as well as a description of such materiel. No later than 30 days after the delivery of arms and ammunition, Somalia should submit to the Committee written confirmation of the delivery's completion and within five days of its distribution, inform it, also in writing, of the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or place of storage. See requirements as set out in paragraphs 3 to 7.

The resolution also requests the United Nations Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations on United Nations and other technical assistance to the FGS within 30 days.¹⁸ Finally, the resolution stressed that the decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the FGS shall take into consideration the FGS's compliance with the requirements of resolution 2142.

1.2.3 Imports of weapons and ammunition since the partial lifting of the arms embargo

As of January 2014, the FGS had submitted three advance notifications of imports—and one notification of delivery¹⁹—of arms and ammunition to the Security Council Sanctions Committee. An additional delivery of arms and ammunition was not notified to the Sanctions Committee, but was later submitted as part of the 6 February 2014 FGS report to the Committee.²⁰ In accordance with resolution 2093, the FGS provided information regarding the exporter, the type and quantity of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment, and materiel to be delivered, and the proposed date of delivery.²¹

On 23 January 2014 various United Nations agencies including the SEMG and several independent arms experts conducted a site visit of a Somalia National Army (SNA) armoury in Halane. In addition to viewing SNA's arms and ammunition within the store, the SNA availed logbooks, which included detailed records of incoming and outgoing arms and ammunition. The logbooks also listed the exporting State of each delivery of arms and ammunition.

A comparison of quantities of arms and ammunition noted in the FGS's notifications to the Security Council Sanctions Committee and quantities recorded in logbooks at the SNA armoury reveals a number of discrepancies. The FGS explained that it had only received partial deliveries and that future deliveries of arms and ammunition were still expected.²²

1.2.4 Arms embargo implications for weapons and ammunition management

With the Security Council decision to extend the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, the FGS will continue to procure weapons and ammunition. There are three distinct yet related challenges related to WAM in Somalia: 1) lack of structure, control, and command of various Somali Armed Forces; 2) absence of record-keeping and registration systems for the import, storage, and dissemination of arms and ammunition; and 3) inadequate infrastructure for safely storing and transporting weapons and ammunition.

The FGS faces a number of challenges as it endeavours to build its structural and operational capacity within its security forces. Although efforts are underway with support from international partners to train and equip the SNA and Somali Police Force, in particular, the FGS's capacity to maintain oversight and properly account for its forces is a reason for concern with regard to WAM. Without a measured understanding of the numerical makeup of its armed forces, and as a result, limited knowledge of their military equipment needs, the FGS cannot devise a suitable weapons procurement strategy. Further, the FGS force structure is not entirely clear, and its inability to identify and maintain command over its personnel precludes any attempt to account for the weapons held by its forces.

¹⁸ See paragraph 10 of resolution 2142. See Secretary-General's letter to the President of Security Council (S/2014/243) for recommendations and options provided.

¹⁹ This delivery was notified in advance of delivery and after delivery. Details on notifications are correct as of 6 February 2014.

²⁰ Author correspondence with Senior FGS Official, 5 February 2014.

²¹ Official correspondence from the FGS to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee.

²² Author correspondence with Senior FGS Official, 5 February 2014.

The FGS has yet to institute an adequate record-keeping system for the systematic storage and issuance of its arms and ammunition. In the absence of such a system arms and ammunition are likely to be diverted into the wrong hands. The 2011 final report of the SEMG, for example, details a strong correlation between ammunition issued to the then TFG forces and ammunition that was routinely captured from Al Shabaab.²³ There is little indication that this pattern of diversion has changed. Developing a comprehensive accounting and record-keeping system for Somalia's national stockpiles would institute the necessary checks and balances to prevent the deliberate or accidental leakage of arms and ammunition into the illicit sphere. Section 5 of this report outlines specific requirements for effective record-keeping.

Somalia's inability to store its armaments safely is another concern in light of the potential for the expansion of its military arsenal over the coming years. Ammunition, in particular, can be extremely hazardous if stored in inadequate conditions. As the FGS take measures to construct new armouries, it must also carefully consider the type and quantity of ammunition to be stored at a site in relation to its safety distance from buildings that are vulnerable, inhabited by civilians, or nearby public traffic routes with civilian access, in order to minimize the risks posed to people and buildings in case of an UEM event (see section 5).

2 International, regional, and national instruments

The following sections provide information on relevant national laws, in addition to regional and international instruments, that are applicable to WAM in Somalia. As of January 2014, a number of international, regional, and national laws and instruments on arms and ammunition management apply to Somalia. There remain opportunities for review of the relevant national law, and improvements in reporting on existing international instruments. The FGS is encouraged to join the existing international and regional arms control agreements and to participate in relevant reporting exercises in order to bolster international confidence in the FGS's commitment to arms control norms.

2.1 International conventions and agreements (arms control)

At the international level, Somalia is party to the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (signed 16 April 2012, entry into force 1 October 2012),²⁴ while it has signed but not ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions²⁵ (signed on 3 December 2008). Somalia is not a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons²⁶, the United Nations Firearms Protocol,²⁷ and has yet to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty.²⁸ Further, Somalia has not yet established regular reporting under the United Nations Programme of Action against the illicit trade in small arms,²⁹ the International Tracing Instrument,³⁰ and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.³¹

²³ United Nations Security Council. 2011. *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 1916 (2010)*. S/2011/433 of 18 July.

²⁴ *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*. Ottawa. 18 September 1997.

²⁵ *Convention on Cluster Munitions*. Dublin. 30 May 2008.

²⁶ *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects*. (As amended on 21 December 2001).

²⁷ *United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. (A/RES/55/255). (Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001, entered into force on 3 June 2005).

²⁸ Somalia voted in favour of the Arms Trade Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April 2013. At the time of writing, the Arms Trade Treaty has not yet entered into force.

²⁹ *United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects*. (A/CONF.192/15). 2001.

³⁰ *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons*. (Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005).

³¹ For more information, visit United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, <http://www.un-register.org/Background/Index.aspx>.

Table 1: International conventions and agreements

Legislation / Agreement	State Party		Details	
	Yes	No		
Extant Conventions and Protocols				
Arms Trade Treaty	-	-	Signatory Date: Entry into Force:	
Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention	X		Signatory Date: Entry into Force:	16 Apr 12 01 Oct 12
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons		X	Signatory Date: Ratification Date:	
Convention on Cluster Munitions		X	Signatory Date: Ratification Date:	03 Dec 08
United Nations Firearms Protocol		X	Signatory Date: Ratification Date:	

International Instrument	Reported		Details	
	Yes	No		
Extant International Agreements				
International Tracing Instrument		X	Submission dates over the last five years.	n/a
United Nations Programme of Action		X	Submission dates over the last five years.	n/a
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms		X	Submission dates over the last five years.	n/a

2.2 Regional conventions and agreements (arms control)

At the regional level, Somalia is a signatory to the Nairobi Protocol³² (signed 24 April 2004) but has yet to ratify the agreement. The FGS is encouraged to continue its dialogue with the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSEA) with a view to ratify the Nairobi Protocol.

Table 2: Regional conventions and agreements

Legislation / Agreement	State Party		Details	
	Yes	No		
Nairobi Protocol ³³		X	Signatory Date: Ratification Date:	24 Apr 04

2.3 National legislation and instruments (arms control)

Somalia's Public Order Law of 26 August 1963 (Law No. 21) establishes the regulatory framework for the management of arms, ammunition and explosives in the country. However, this legislation is outdated and requires review. There have been no known amendments to national legislation since the date indicated on the Public Order Law. National legislation applicable to weapons, ammunition, and explosives is shown in Table 3.

³² Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Nairobi. 21 April 2004.

³³ Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Nairobi. 21 April 2004.

Table 3: National legislation

Title	Reference (Chapter)	Reference (Act)	Comment
26 August 1963 Public Order Law	Unknown	Law No. 21	Concerns trade and ownership of firearms ³⁴

3 Weapons and ammunition management achievements

WAM remains at an understandably early stage of development in Somalia. However, the FGS should be congratulated on the speed at which it has begun to define an institutional framework for WAM oversight and implementation.

The following sections chart existing WAM achievements enacted by the FGS and its partner organizations. These achievements provide a baseline from which to examine Somalia's remaining WAM challenges, as well as a platform to explore its immediate and long-term WAM requirements.

3.1 National policy coordination

The FGS has recently taken important steps to define an institutional framework for WAM oversight and implementation. The government departments responsible for strategic WAM planning and operational WAM activities, respectively, are at a critical juncture. Recent modifications to the arms embargo under resolution 2093 (2013) have enabled the FGS to import weapons and ammunition. At the same time, international partner organizations are proceeding at a pace with the rehabilitation or construction of weapons and ammunition storage infrastructure. These factors indicate the need for deepening WAM coordination among FGS institutions and between the FGS and its partner organizations. Several recent developments point towards success in this regard.

3.1.1 The development of national WAM institutional structures

Figure 1 provides an organizational overview of WAM institutional structures within the FGS and indicates the specialized roles and responsibilities of various institutional bodies.

On 22 January 2014, the FGS established an Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee—a high-level body to coordinate and monitor implementation by the FGS of 1) its obligations under the partially lifted arms embargo, and 2) work under five key pillars, namely:

1. Arms control and stockpile management;
2. Import, export, and transit;
3. Tracking (tracing) and brokering;
4. Public awareness and education; and
5. Legislative measures.

³⁴ For the full text of Law No. 21 (1963), see http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Public_Order_Law_1963_full_copy.pdf.

The National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia, chairs the Steering Committee, which meets quarterly under the auspices of the National Security Council. The Steering Committee is made up of representatives of the FGS,³⁵ the United Nations,³⁶ AMISOM (military and police), the European Union, bilateral partners,³⁷ and non-governmental implementing partners.³⁸ The role of the Steering Committee is to “provide strategic guidance on the Federal Government’s management of arms and ammunition in accordance with the Constitution and international law.”³⁹ The Steering Committee is responsible for:

1. Identifying priorities of the FGS relating to arms control and stockpile management (Pillar 1);
2. Providing guidance on making progress on the other four pillars;
3. Ensuring compliance with Security Council resolutions 2093, 2111, and 2142;
4. Providing strategic guidance to the Somali Explosives Management Authority;
5. Overseeing the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group;
6. Recommending public awareness and educational activities to improve community safety and security;
7. Identifying future training requirements related to weapons and ammunition management; and
8. Mobilizing resources in support of weapons and ammunition management projects.

A parallel body, the Human Resources System Steering Committee (HRSSC), is intended to devise national strategy related to the emerging FGS defence and security forces. Clarity of structure in the FGS defence and security forces is a prerequisite to the development of effective WAM, notably in the field of weapons and ammunition accounting. This is because accounting requires that weapons be registered to identifiable units of the defence and security forces. In order to trace weapons to particular units, those units must be identifiable (see Section 4.2).

At the operational level, the Somalia Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) reports to the Ministry of National Security. The SEMA is designated the lead implementing agency for WAM activities in the FGS defence and security forces. In this capacity, the SEMA’s future roles will include the management and oversight of weapons and ammunition storage facilities; the development and oversight of a centralized weapons and ammunition registry; the drafting and promulgation of relevant WAM technical standards throughout the FGS defence and security force architecture; and holding ultimate responsibility for the safe, secure, and efficient management of weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

The SEMA receives operational guidance from its Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group (WAM TWG). The WAM TWG consists of a range of expert national departments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations, whose role is to guide the SEMA’s development of sustainable, international standards-based protocols, procedures, and practices in the field of WAM.

The FGS, together with the United Nations and other partners, created the WAM TWG in order to address key issues related to the control and management of arms and ammunition in Somalia. The Working Group is primarily concerned with arms control and stockpile management (Pillar 1), as well as aspects of public awareness and education (Pillar 4).

³⁵ The Ministries of National Security and of Defence, Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, Custodial Corps, and the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

³⁶ UNSOM and UNMAS.

³⁷ Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

³⁸ Mines Advisory Group, Danish Deming Group, Norwegian People’s Aid, and HALO Trust.

³⁹ Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee: Terms of Reference. UNSOM ROLSIG, 18 January 2014.

The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security and UNMAS co-chair the Working Group. The FGS is further represented on the Working Group by the Ministry of Defence, the Somali Armed Forces, the Somali Police Force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Custodial Corps, and the SEMA.

Additional members of the Working Group include UNSOM, SEMG, AMISOM, the European Union and bilateral partners, as well as non-governmental implementing partners.

In addition to its operational guidance to the SEMA, the role of WAM TWG is to assist the Federal Government of Somalia to mobilize and coordinate the resources that will enable it to more effectively control and manage weapons and ammunition. In particular, WAM TWG is responsible for:

1. Providing expert technical advice to the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee on all matters relating to arms control and stockpile management, including on compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 2093, 2111, and 2142;
2. Assisting the FGS to identify key priorities and developing a Work Plan on Arms Control and Stockpile Management;
3. Assisting the FGS to implement the deliverables of the Work Plan;
4. Assisting the FGS to mobilize and coordinate support and assistance from donors and partners;
5. Identifying future training requirements and coordinating the delivery of training;
6. Undertaking public awareness and educational activities to improve community safety and security; and
7. Involving FGS officials in all activities to grow and develop capacity so that the FGS can eventually assume total responsibility for weapons and ammunition management.

The WAM TWG meets monthly and submits a report of its work to the Ministry of National Security on a monthly basis. It has elaborated a Work Plan, which contains the following priorities for 2014:

1. Assist the FGS to meet its reporting obligations under Security Council resolutions 2093, 2111, and 2142.

This priority is in the process of being implemented, with the help of technical expertise provided by international partners. UNSOM has provided the Somali National Security Adviser with guidance on the structure of a biannual report to the Security Council, which was due 6 February 2014.

In addition, UNSOM has provided the National Security Adviser with a list of additional options the FGS could pursue in order to build confidence in the international community in Somalia's growing capacity to manage the arms and ammunition held by its Security Services. UNSOM will continue to support the FGS in pursuing one, several, or all of these options, depending on the Government's preference.

2. Assist the FGS to establish an arms registration system.

This priority is in the early stages of being implemented. UNMAS currently has one marking machine, which is being deployed to the main SNA armoury/depot. UNMAS will assist with training the SNA officers in marking and recording weapons before they are deployed to army units.

In order to achieve the longer term goal of establishing a national electronic registration system for all arms held by FGS Security Services (armed forces, intelligence, police, and corrections), UNMAS will work closely with RECSA, which runs a programme supporting States in its region to adequately mark and record weapons.


3. Construct armouries and ammunition storage facilities for FGS Security Institutions.

This priority is in the early stages of being implemented. The WAM TWG has agreed to a draft list of armouries and ammunition depots to be constructed for the Somali armed forces, police, and corrections, which include a total of 18 armouries and 12 ammunition depots. Construction work has begun (see section 3.5 below).

4. Host a workshop for the FGS to sensitize it to its obligations and responsibilities in the area of arms and ammunition control.

This priority has been implemented. On 21–22 January 2014, the FGS—in cooperation with UNSOM, UNMAS, UNIDIR, and UNDP—held a Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop in Mogadishu. The goal of the workshop was to facilitate better understanding among relevant officials of the FGS of 1) their obligations and responsibilities in the area of arms and ammunition control, and 2) partners and resources that are available to the FGS to assist it in this area. The workshop contributed to building the capacity of the FGS in the area of WAM and highlighted key priorities and recommendations for moving forward.

Figure 1. WAM institutional structure within the FGS (operational and strategic levels)



As noted in subsequent sections of this report, there is a clear requirement for coordinated decision-making among FGS WAM bodies—notably the SEMA/WAM TWG, the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee (AAMSC), and the HRSSC. This can be explained with a process description of WAM implementation: 1) FGS force structures (units of the defence and security forces) need to be clarified in order to 2) define the authorized units granted custody of weapons and ammunition, and 3) harmonized FGS-wide protocols and procedures need to be established for the management of weapons and ammunition in order to develop an effective national accounting system.

3.2 Rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure

A great deal of progress has been made in the rehabilitation or construction of physical infrastructure. International partners have been particularly active in the rehabilitation or construction of police armouries, although much work remains to be done, with a further 18 arms and ammunition storage facilities having been earmarked for attention in the near future.

3.2.1 Armouries (SALW only)

As of November 2013, international partners have rehabilitated or constructed total of 66 armouries, ranging from relatively small police storage facilities to larger purpose-built constructions for the Somali Police Force.⁴⁰ These armouries are designed to store small arms and light weapons (SALW) and small-calibre ammunition. They are not built to accommodate explosive light weapons ammunition. Some of the armouries are currently empty (see Section 8).

3.2.2 Weapons and ammunition storage facilities

The FGS is nearing the completion of a purpose-built weapons and ammunition storage facility in Halane. The site is intended to serve as the main processing point for imported FGS weapons and ammunition, wherein the materiel will be marked, recorded in the national registry, and held pending distribution to the defence and security forces. The site already contains FGS weapons and ammunition (see Section 7).

3.3 Weapons and ammunition management systems

As the following sections note, although international partners have provided guidance to the FGS in the development of WAM systems, it is unclear whether these systems are currently operational in local storage facilities, such as police armouries. Furthermore, any such systems have yet to be integrated into a national weapons and ammunition accounting system, which is not yet in operation.

3.3.1 Weapons marking

There is currently no marking at the point of import. UNMAS has one marking machine, and together with RECSA will support the FGS to develop a national marking standard, which will be in line with the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS 05.30).

⁴⁰ Information provided by UNMAS. Presentation to the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group, November 2013; and correspondence with Country Director, MAG, 28 January 2014.

3.3.2 Weapons registration

Weapons registration has so far been restricted to the armoury level. SNA authorities intend to implement registries of all weapons within its storage facilities. Issuing will reportedly be by a “weapon card” system, whereby users submit a card when issued with a weapon and retrieve the card when returning the weapon to the armoury. International partners, in particular UNMAS and MAG, have provided training to storekeepers at newly constructed armouries in the correct registration and use of weapons cards. However, the responsibility to ensure the correct use of weapons cards falls to national staff. There does not appear to be a quality management system in place within the FGS to ensure correct implementation across the national armouries and this is an obvious area for action.

3.4 Ongoing WAM-enhancement activities (February 2014)

As of February 2014, the following PSSM activities were ongoing and scheduled for completion in 2014:

3.4.1 Refurbishment of two police armouries in Baidoa

The FGS, with support from UNMAS, has completed the construction of two armouries in Baidoa and completed its training of weapons and ammunition storekeepers/managers at the sites.

3.4.2 Construction/refurbishment of two police armouries in Belet Weyn

The FGS, with support from UNMAS, has completed the construction of two armouries in Belet Weyn and continues to train weapons and ammunition storekeepers/managers at the sites.

3.5 Envisaged WAM-enhancement activities (April 2014–March 2017)

The SEMA, and notably the WAM TWG, has outlined a range of proposed WAM activities scheduled for the April 2014–March 2017 period. Alongside the existing schedule of rehabilitation or reconstruction of (primarily SALW) armouries, increasing attention is being given to the need to rehabilitate or construct dedicated ammunition and explosive storage sites. This is necessary because 1) the FGS has begun to import quantities of explosive light weapons ammunition for which SALW storage infrastructure is inadequate, and 2) because of potential future imports of larger calibre explosive ordnance, should the Security Council lift the arms embargo on Somalia.

3.5.1 Rehabilitation or reconstruction of armouries across Somalia (WAM TWG)

The WAM TWG has identified 16 storage facilities that are scheduled for rehabilitation or reconstruction across Somalia in 2014.⁴¹ International partners will work closely with FGS in this process.

3.5.2 SPF and NISA armoury construction

The FGS, together with international partners (in particular UNMAS and MAG), plans to construct 14 armouries for the SPF and four armouries for the NISA in the South Central region.

⁴¹ Information provided at the WAM TWG meeting of 26 November 2013.

3.5.3 National Armoury Network

The FGS with UNMAS proposes the progressive construction (April 2014–March 2017) of police and military armouries in Mogadishu, along major supply routes, and situated in regional hubs. This project aims to develop an expanding network of armouries, which will facilitate the regular cataloguing of weapons and ammunition in the country, in conformity with paragraph 39(b) and (c) of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). This is an incremental approach, which is designed to work in concert with efforts to clarify the structure of the SPF and SNA, progressively, at increasingly further distances from Mogadishu.

3.5.4 National storage facility—site clearance and refurbishment

Under the framework of the WAM TWG, UNMAS has commenced explosive remnants of war clearance of former ammunition and explosives storage sites, including in Dayniile (around 30 km north of Mogadishu).⁴² It should be noted that the Dayniile site is heavily damaged, with 21 of the original 24 depots having collapsed.

However, the site is reportedly sufficiently distant from major populations to reduce the impact of a possible unplanned explosion at a munitions site (UEMS) event. This site is not physically protected (against attack) and suffers from the encroachment of civilian populations. Successful rehabilitation of the site would require the following activities:

1. FGS defence and security force presence (battalion strength) would need to provide effective protection against attack, looting or act of sabotage;
2. A full outside quantity–distance assessment would have to be made, reflecting UEMS implications to nearby populations and infrastructure;
3. Any civilian encroachment would have to be reversed by law (exclusion zone) and the site protected against any future incursions; and
4. Existing depots would need to be cleared of explosive remnants of war, and be repaired or rebuilt according to international standards.

Arguably, in light of these points, the merits of rehabilitating this site should be carefully weighed against constructing an entirely new facility elsewhere, with thought given to ranking these factors when comparing alternative site options.

3.5.5 Marking and registration

UNMAS intends to train FGS defence and security forces in the marking and registration of 1) weapons held at refurbished armouries (commenced in some locations) and at 2) the central registration site for newly imported weapons in Halane.

4 Weapons management—current status and ways forward

Although the FGS has made important gains in clarifying the institutional structures necessary to implement WAM (see Section 3.1.1), meeting operational WAM requirements will require concerted effort in the coming months. Priority areas for attention include the adaption or enhancement of physical infrastructure to ensure the safe storage of weapons; the development of a national weapons registry, local registries, and a process for documenting weapon and ammunition movements; and the pressing need to clarify FGS defence and security force structures—which is a prerequisite for effective weapons registration and accounting.

⁴² UNMAS reports that approximately 1,200 items of unexploded ordnance have been cleared from the site, although this does not include unexploded ordnance that remain in the damaged storage facilities. Presentation at Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop, Mogadishu, 22 January 2014.

As the following sections note, given ongoing fluidity in the structure of FGS defence and security forces, any such activities will necessarily be incremental. However, existing international standards provide guidance on arms management, notably International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05.20, 'Stockpile Management: Weapons'⁴³ and International Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 03.10, 'Inventory Management'.⁴⁴

4.1 Physical infrastructure

The FGS, working with partner organizations and donor States, has made considerable gains in the rehabilitation or construction of weapons storage infrastructure. The following sections address the rehabilitation or construction of armouries, which are designed to accommodate small arms (firearms) and small-calibre ammunition only. For ammunition storage infrastructure, see Section 5.

4.1.1 General requirements

The structure of armouries built or rehabilitated to house small arms and small-calibre ammunition needs to be robust enough to minimize the risks of forced entry through walls, ceilings/roofs, floor, windows, and doors (ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1). Armouries should also be constructed to allow for the separated, secured storage of weapons and ammunition, on the assumption that anyone forcibly entering the facility would thereby find it more difficult to seize weapons and ammunition at the same time. Recently constructed FGS armouries generally accord with these principles, although there are variations in the degree to which they comply with the specifications of ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.

4.1.2 Measures to prevent the storage of explosive ammunition

Storage facilities that have been constructed to house small arms (firearms) and small-calibre ammunition are not designed to store explosive ammunition (see Sections 6 and 8). Because they are not configured to contain blast effects, the storage, and unintentional detonation, of explosive ammunition could result in wide-area impacts. To guard against such an eventuality, armouries should be clearly signed to indicate that only small-calibre ammunition (Hazard Division 1.4s) can be stored within. Appropriate picture signage might also be used to indicate common types of explosive ammunition, such as mortar bombs and rockets, that are prohibited in the armoury.

4.1.3 Construction in conformity with international standards

Most of the rehabilitated or newly constructed weapons storage facilities in Somalia are a vast improvement on previous weapons storage infrastructure and substantially enhance the physical security of weapons and ammunition. It should be noted, however, that the FGS and partners engaged in the rehabilitation or construction, where feasible, should follow international standards on the construction of weapons storage facilities. ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9 provides clear specifications.⁴⁵

⁴³ See <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0520-en.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Although it concerns the management of ammunition, rather than SALW, IATG 03.10 addresses a range of issues, some of which are applicable to SALW accounting. See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG03.10.pdf>.

⁴⁵ See <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0520-en.pdf>.

4.1.3.1 Wall construction

A number of recently constructed armouries do not conform to ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1.1 specifications for wall construction: a) solid reinforced concrete of 250 mm minimum thickness; b) walls of solid bonded brickwork or masonry of 325 mm minimum thickness; or c) cavity walls of dense concrete block, brick or stone, not less than 275 mm excluding the cavity. The FGS and international partners should aspire, where feasible, to follow the specifications of ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1.1. Clause 9.9.1.1 also provides additional guidance on reinforcements to existing walls that do not conform to the specifications listed above.

4.1.3.2 Roof/ceiling construction

ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1.2 specifies that the roofs/ceilings of newly constructed armouries must be constructed of reinforced concrete (150 mm), or vaulted brickwork or masonry (300 mm). While internal wire reinforcement (4.5 mm thickness, 50 mm by 20 mm mesh size) is suggested, it is important to stress that this applies only to existing roofs/ceilings that fail to meet the required specifications. Wire reinforcement is not a minimum standard for newly constructed armouries. Cost constraints are a key issue in this regard and it is cheaper to roof an armoury with sheet steel and mesh the roof/ceiling than it is, for example, to construct a 150 mm reinforced concrete roof. The FGS and international partners, however, should aspire where feasible to follow the specifications of ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1.2.

4.1.3.3 Floor construction

All recently constructed armouries visited, or viewed in photographs, appear to conform to ISACS 05.20, clause 9.9.1.3, having solid reinforced floors of 150 mm thickness or more, tied to the walls.

4.1.3.4 Standardized layout

The police headquarters armoury in Mogadishu, constructed by MAG, exemplifies a well-configured armoury. It features separate storage rooms (separated by locked doors) for weapons and ammunition. This is an important consideration from a security perspective, because it means that a party forcibly entering the facility would not easily be able to seize weapons and ammunition at the same time.

The FGS and partner organizations should consider adopting a standard armoury configuration, which will 1) standardize construction specifications (according to ISACS 05.20) and 2) allow for the development of country-wide standard operating procedures (SOPs) for weapons and ammunition storage configurations within armouries.

4.2 Accounting systems

The FGS has yet to develop and implement an accounting system capable of tracing⁴⁶ weapons and ammunition throughout the national stockpile. The following sections outline the basic requirements of a national weapons and ammunition accounting system and, subsequently, concrete proposals for consideration by the FGS and partner organizations in the development of such a system in Somalia.

⁴⁶ Conflict Armament Research defines tracing as “the tracking of a weapon, quantity of ammunition or related materiel, from any one point along a chain of custody to another, by consulting, inter alia: marks applied to the item, its identifying characteristics and transfer/custody records.” This definition differs to that in the International Tracing Instrument, which concerns tracing in the context of illicit weapons only.

4.2.1 General requirements

The purpose of a national weapons and ammunition accounting system is to record the chain of custody of a particular weapon, or item of ammunition, as it is transferred to different units within the defence and security forces.

This accounting system should record, for each transaction, unique information that identifies the weapon or quantity of ammunition, together with information that specifies the custodian (storage facility or unit of the defence and security forces) at any one time.

It should comprise a paper trail (see Section 4.2.5), extending from the point of import (when the weapon enters Somalia) to its end use (the final unit of the defence and security to which the weapon/ammunition is issued). The paper trail should encompass the entire lifecycle of the weapon/ammunition, such that national authorities have continuous records, which enable them to identify which facility/unit is in possession of the weapon/ammunition at all times. Consequently, if a unit is found not to be in possession of the weapon/ammunition (i.e. it has been lost, stolen or retransferred without authorization) appropriate punitive measures can be taken to prevent diversion occurring again.

National accounting systems not only dissuade members of the defence and security forces from diverting (stealing or selling) government weapons, they also enable national authorities to inventory weapons in the national stockpile accurately. This information:

1. enables national authorities to quantify weapons and ammunition in the national stockpile, which:
2. enables national authorities to identify surplus, obsolete, or unserviceable weapons, which:
3. enables national authorities to forecast weapon and ammunition requirements accurately, which:
4. increases operational efficiency and reduces government expenditure.

An effective national weapons and ammunition accounting system, requires four elements: 1) the weapons/ammunition must be marked and identifiable, 2) they must be recorded in a national registry, 3) they must be recorded in the “local registries” of the storage facilities/units of the defence and security forces where they are held, and 4) any movement of weapons between storage facilities/units must be documented.

4.2.2 Marking

Weapons and ammunition need to be uniquely identifiable. If they are not marked appropriately at the time of import, as identified under the requirements of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI),⁴⁷ these marks must be applied before they are recorded in a national registry (see Section 4.2.3). At present, the FGS has yet to agree on an appropriate marking format, while international partners (UNMAS, in particular) are advising the FGS on national marking standard in line with the ITI and the ISACS (ITI article 8.b and ISACS 05.30, clause 5.3).

⁴⁷ *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.*

With weapons imported by the FGS that bear normal factory markings (including a serial number), the FGS should apply a simple import mark—the country of import and the year of import. If imported weapons do not bear serial numbers, the FGS should mark one at the time of import, in addition to the markings mentioned above. Further, Somalia is a signatory of the Nairobi Protocol⁴⁸ and a member of RECSA, which has agreed to a regional marking format.⁴⁹ The marking standard set by ITI and the ISACS, with additional information from the RECSA format, would follow the mode presented in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. The marking format as applied to Somalia (based on ITI and ISACS, with additional RECSA marking)

☆ SO 14 SNA 56-1 67856342

Explanation of marks:

☆	-	Regional mark adopted by Nairobi Protocol/RECSA
SO	-	ISO country code for Somalia
14	-	Year of Import
SNA	-	Somali National Army
56-1 67856342	-	Serial number (and prefix)

Note: Nothing in the RECSA agreement precludes national governments adding additional information to their national marking formats.

4.2.3 National registries

All weapons need to be recorded in the national registry at the moment at which they come under government control (either through import or in-country acquisition). For adequately marked weapons, this should occur when the weapons are unpacked. If they are inadequately marked, registration should occur at the time of marking. The national registry must record all information necessary to identify the weapon or item of ammunition and associated (and regularly updated) information on its past and current custodians. ISACS 05.20, clause 11.1.1 provides the following specifications for the national registry:

In order to achieve a holistic and effective programme of weapons stockpile management, national authorities (with the assistance, in the case of production weapons, of manufacturers) should determine

- a) the number of weapons being held within the national stockpile;
- b) detailed information on the weapons, in accordance with Clause 11.1.3 (see Section 4.2.4 below);
- c) the physical location of weapons stockpiles;
- d) the condition of weapon stockpiles; and

⁴⁸ *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*. Nairobi. 21 April 2004.

⁴⁹ In 2005, the region's States agreed upon a common weapons marking format that consists of a star to denote state-owned weapons in the RECSA region, an International Standards Organization (ISO) country code, and a unique serial number (RECSA, 2005, p. 15). States are also free to introduce codes that specify the particular branch of service or particular unit of the defence and security forces.

- e) the designation of the weapons (operation, operation replacement, training, etc.).

The above information should be entered into a national database, which should be collated and controlled by an established national authority. This will allow national authorities to maintain an overview of

- f) individual weapon locations;
- g) future weapon procurement and supply requirements;
- h) weapon movements; and requirements for weapon disposal.

This forms the basis for an effective weapon stockpile management system, preferably within one centralized database that can collect and collate all weapon inventory information.

4.2.4 Local registries

Every weapon and ammunition storage facility (major or minor) or unit of the defence and security forces (major or minor) must have its own weapons and ammunition registry/local weapons account. The local weapons account holds updated records of any weapons or ammunition in the current custody of the storage facility/unit, in addition to records of any weapons that have formerly been in the custody of the storage facility/unit—i.e. items that have subsequently been transferred to other storage facilities/units. ISACS 05.20, clause 11.1.3 provides the following specifications for the local weapons account:

An account shall be maintained at each weapon storage facility that records the following information for each weapon in storage:

- a) make;
- b) model;
- c) calibre;
- d) serial number;
- e) country of manufacture or most recent import;
- f) current holding unit and location;
- g) date entered into account;
- h) date transferred to another storage location;
- i) record of modifications and/or repairs; and
- j) overall quantity of weapons, disaggregated by type.

4.2.5 Movement of weapons and ammunition

The movement of any weapon or item of ammunition needs to be documented, such that there is a permanent record of the consignee and the consignor—often called “a paper trail”. The most effective method of permanently recording these transactions is the “issue and receipt voucher” system. In this system, whenever a weapon is transferred from one storage facility/unit to another, the consignor issues an “issue voucher”. Upon receipt of the consignment, the consignee issues a “receipt voucher”. Each of the vouchers is issued in triplicate, allowing for a copy to remain 1) with the consignor, 2) with the consignee, and 3) with the national registry. This system provides a continuous, cross-verifiable record of all weapon and ammunition movements within the national stockpile (see Annex A for a sample issue and receipt voucher).

4.2.6 Appropriate accounting systems

While electronic accounting systems enable rapid access to weapon records and save time, they are not appropriate in situations that experience interrupted telecommunications (notably Internet) networks. Pen and paper systems, while clearly consuming more time to maintain, are equally accurate and appropriate to the task of national accounting. In either case, a “double entry” system is the preferred choice. This system records the issuing of weapons/ammunition and the receipt of weapons/ammunition as separate transaction lines. The system enables easy verification of weapons issued against weapons received.

4.2.7 Harmonizing a national accounting system

Given the fluid structure of smaller FGS defence and security force units, an integrated national accounting system will require incremental implementation, beginning with larger storage facilities and “working downwards”—the Halane storage facility being the obvious starting point (see the proposed National Armouries Network, discussed in Section 3.5.3).

The SEMA, in conjunction with partner organizations and relevant FGS ministries, needs to devise in parallel:

1. a national registry (see ISACS 05.30,⁵⁰ clause 6.2 and IATG 03.10⁵¹);
2. a uniform format for storage/unit registries (see ISACS 05.20,⁵² clause 11.1.3); and
3. an appropriate and uniformly implemented issue/receipt voucher system to record weapon/ammunition transactions among storage facilities/units of the defence and security forces (see Figure 3 below and Annex A).

Discussions in the WAM TWG indicate that SNA officials have very clear ideas as to the required functioning of the issue/receipt voucher system.


The agreed accounting system would need to be formalized in FGS-wide SOPs and implemented for progressively smaller units of the FGS defence and security forces, once the command structure, location, and physical storage sites for those units has been clarified.

⁵⁰ See <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0530-en.pdf>.

⁵¹ See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG03.10.pdf>.

⁵² See <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0520-en.pdf>.

Figure 3. Integrated accounting—the national registry and storage/unit registries



4.3 Preconditions

There are a number of essential preconditions to safe, secure and effective WAM. These relate primarily to the structure and functioning of the defence and security forces. As the following sections note, the FGS will have to clarify the structure of its defence and security forces if proposed national accounting systems are to function. The SPF will also have to devise a means of maintaining control over ostensibly personal—rather than government-owned—weapons. From a WAM perspective, these should be considered priority areas for FGS attention.

4.3.1 Force structure

An effective national weapons and ammunition accounting system depends on being able to attribute weapons and ammunition to custodians throughout the chain of supply. Stated simply, this means that individuals and individual units of the defence and security forces need to be “identifiable” in order to register their weapons and ammunition. While FGS security forces remain relatively fluid, a national accounting system will be extremely difficult to implement. The proposed National Armouries Network (see Section 3.5.3) recognizes this problem and proposes an incremental roll-out of a national registry, as and when units of the defence and security forces are identified and their structure clarified. The FGS, and notably the HRSSC, needs to take all required steps to define the organizational structure of FGS defence and security forces to the lowest possible levels. Accurate payroll accounts are the obvious means of doing this effectively.

4.3.2 Personal versus government-owned weapons

Despite the construction of a number of armouries to house SPF weapons, some of these armouries remain empty. One reason for this may be the fact that weapon ownership is often a precondition for recruitment into the SPF. As a consequence, many serving police personnel are reluctant to leave their personal defence weapons in a police armoury when off duty. It is difficult to suggest optimal solutions to this problem until the security situation in Somalia has stabilized to the point at which civilians are willing to disarm.

However, one short-term solution to ensure that SPF armouries are used (and accounting/security approaches maintained and further developed) is to gradually diminish reliance on personal weapons, in favour of government-owned arms. Even if serving police personnel—for the time being at least—are unwilling to relinquish their personal weapons, a daily exchange system might be considered.

In this system, the personal weapon and the government weapon would be registered in the armoury. When personnel arrive on duty, the personal weapon is placed in the armoury and exchanged for 1) a weapon card pertaining to that weapon and 2) a government weapon. On leaving duty, the process is reversed: the government weapon is exchanged for 1) a weapon card pertaining to that weapon and 2) the personal weapon.

Although this approach provides no solution to civilian arms reduction in Somalia, it does provide some benefit in extending registration beyond government weapons.

4.4 International standards and support

A range of international standards on weapons management are available online. The following sections provide a brief introduction to two of these resources, which provide national weapons management authorities with technical standards and tools for effective weapons management.

4.4.1 International Small Arms Control Standards

The United Nations, together with partners worldwide, have developed the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) in order to provide clear, comprehensive and practical guidance to practitioners and policymakers on fundamental aspects of small arms and light weapons control. These standards fit within the framework created by existing global agreements on small arms and light weapons control (the Programme of Action, the International Tracing Instrument, and the Firearms Protocol) and are built upon best practices developed at the regional and subregional levels.

As voluntary standards, the ISACS can be used by international partners, as well as the FGS to strengthen their existing weapons management policies, programmes and practices, in particular for such areas as stockpile management, and marking and record-keeping of weapons. The full list of guidance is available online on the ISACS website.⁵³

4.4.2 International Small Arms Control Standards Assessment Tool

In order to support the practical application of the ISACS, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has developed a software tool—known as the ISACS Assessment Tool—designed to facilitate use of the standards. In particular, the tool provides States with a means of conducting self-assessments of their small arms and light weapons controls based on the ISACS.

The Assessment Tool allows the user to navigate the standards quickly; to sort the provisions by priority levels set by the standards; and to generate electronic assessment questionnaires on operational issues covered by the standards.

The ISACS Assessment Tool can be used by international partners and the FGS to monitor and evaluate existing weapons management policies, programmes and practices, in particular for such areas as stockpile management, and marking and record-keeping of weapons. The software is available for free download from the ISACS website.⁵⁴

5 Ammunition management—current status and ways forward

Unsurprisingly, years of war have left the FGS, and notably the SNA, with little ammunition-related technical expertise. This problem is compounded by the relative scarcity of appropriate ammunition storage facilities. Many such facilities have been destroyed. Others, as this section notes, are unsuitable for the storage of explosive ammunition and pose severe risks in the event of unintentional detonation. Ammunition is a hazardous commodity and planning the location, design and management of ammunition facilities should be premised on the assumption that an unplanned explosion at a munitions site (UEMS) may occur. The task of effective ammunition management is therefore to minimize the risks to populations and vital physical infrastructure if—through negligence, accident or sabotage—such an explosion occurs.

An explosion produces various physical effects and the aim of explosives storage is to reduce these effects through a combination of factors, including: imposing the correct quantity or separation distances (QD) for explosives, ensuring that Compatibility Group (CG) mixing rules are adhered to, and ensuring that the design of the storage facility minimizes explosive blast effects.⁵⁵

The following sections provide an introduction to basic ammunition management practices for consideration by the FGS, including safeguarding (separating populations and infrastructure from explosive danger areas) and licensing (limiting the volume of explosives in a given store). They introduce international standards and resources, which provide guidance and support on ammunition management, respectively. These include the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), which address the full range of ammunition management principles and the United Nations SaferGuard IATG implementation support system. The section concludes with initial observations of three weapons and ammunition storage sites visited on 23 January 2014.

5.1 General requirements

Planning is critical to ensuring that FGS's national stockpile, wherever located, is subject to adequate management procedures, ranging from accounting through to appropriate storage locations, surveillance, security, and the destruction of surplus or dangerous ordnance.

⁵³ See <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org>.

⁵⁴ See www.smallarmsstandards.org

⁵⁵ IATG 05.20 "Types of buildings for explosive facilities", clause 4.

Not only is this necessary for explosive safety requirements, but it is also the only cost-effective method of efficient stockpile management. Ammunition is an expensive commodity with long production lead times. This means that it must be procured in advance in order for it to be available on demand. Ammunition inventory management systems should not only be capable of accounting for ammunition in great detail to support explosive safety and to detect diversion (loss or theft), but should also be designed to ensure that the best “value for money” is obtained from the ammunition.⁵⁶

Ammunition is clearly a necessary part of national defence and deterrence capabilities. Effective planning must cover all aspects of ammunition—from the defence policy that determines requirements, through procurement, storage, and deployment, to safe disposal. When effective, ammunition management provides clear savings in efficiency and, with these, operational benefits to a State’s defence and security forces.

A basic checklist for effective ammunition management includes the following:

1. Storage sites are located in areas that minimize the impact of a UEMS event;
2. Storage facilities are constructed to be secure (from loss, theft, illegal entry or sabotage);
3. Storage facilities are constructed to minimize inside and outside blast effects from a UEMS event;
4. Clear rules and procedures safely limit the quantity of ammunition stored in facilities;
5. Staff are trained to monitor constantly for ammunition degradation and instability (surveillance);
6. The locations and custody of all ammunition is known (accounting and inventory management); and
7. The appropriate procedures, protocols, management systems, and staff are maintained constantly.⁵⁷

All of these elements can be conceived as a single, integrated ammunition management system. If any one part of the system fails, the risks to security and safety increase, as do the costs of ammunition storage and the negative impacts on the operational effectiveness of the defence and security forces.

5.1.1 Climate and weather effects on ammunition and explosives

The frequency of UEMS incidents has risen dramatically over the last three decades. The first 10 years of UEMS records (1987–1996) saw an average of seven incidents per year. That average rose to over 20 per year during the next 10 years (1997–2006) and then increased to 29 incidents during each of the past six years (2007–2012).⁵⁸ Many of the UEMS incidents can be attributed to poor stockpile management procedures that do not meet international standards. However, many of the causes are a direct consequence of the degradation of old ammunition stocks due to poor storage conditions and deterioration of ammunition after shelf-life expiry. A large proportion of the UEMS occur in countries that have extreme diurnal (daytime high and night-time low) temperature cycles. Somalia is one such case.

⁵⁶ See IATG 03.10, Introduction.

⁵⁷ Paragraphs a) to g) condense primary considerations presented in IATG 01.30 “Policy development and advice”, which are specified in greater detail in further IATGs (notably 02.10, 05.10, 05.20, and 05.30). Readers are encouraged to read the IATGs progressively for a full presentation of the general principles of ammunition management.

⁵⁸ See Small Arms Survey, Unplanned Explosions at Munition Sites: www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html.

A general observation is that ammunition has a shelf life of around 20 years under correct storage conditions.⁵⁹ Once passed its shelf life ammunition can become either unreliable or unstable. The effects of weather, large temperature changes, and high humidity can rapidly degrade the performance of explosives. In some cases, the weather may make the explosives unserviceable and dangerous to use within a relatively short space of time—this is especially true when ammunition is stored in less than ideal conditions or field storage conditions. The effects of high temperatures on explosives can be divided into the physical⁶⁰ and chemical⁶¹ effects (in some cases, these combine to produce an overall effect). The storage conditions that are most likely to lead to ammunition degradation occur when explosives are exposed to considerable temperature fluctuations from day to night, together with high humidity levels.⁶²

5.1.2 Special effects—propellants

Chemical deterioration has a profound effect on the shelf life of many explosives, but especially on propellants. As a guide for prolonged periods of storage, the rate of chemical deterioration is approximately doubled for every 10°C rise in temperature above 30°C. As noted in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Explosive Regulations (2013, Section 13), the effect of high temperatures over protracted periods is to halve the shelf life of gun propellants for every 10°C rise in temperature above 30°C. Thus a propellant with a shelf life of 20 years would be reduced as follows:

- 40°C—shelf life is reduced to 10 years
- 50°C—shelf life is reduced to 5 years
- 60°C—shelf life is reduced to 2.5 years
- 70°C—shelf life is reduced to 1.25 years
- 80°C—shelf life is reduced to 0.58 years

The FGS's National Adaption Programme of Action on Climate Change indicates that Somalia is vulnerable to increasing high temperatures, and relative humidity is high in central and southern coastline (including Mogadishu), ranging from 70 to 80 percent on average.⁶³ It is important that every effort is to be made to reduce the effects of high temperatures and moisture on explosives held by units and in bulk storage locations. It is therefore vital to negate the risk of UEMS that a rigorous surveillance programme of ammunition is undertaken to ensure ammunition safety and stability during storage. The chemical, electrical and mechanical properties of ammunition change and degrade with time, leading to a finite serviceable life for each item. The accurate assessment of ammunition life is of paramount importance in terms of both safety, cost effectiveness and preventing a UEMS event in Somalia.

5.2 Explosive safeguarding

Safeguarding is the separation, by distance, of populations and vital infrastructure from the explosive effect of a UEMS event.⁶⁴ The most important part of safeguarding is the capacity of ammunition management authorities (FGS, the SEMA, and AAMSC) to exercise control over the land surrounding ammunition and explosive stores.

⁵⁹ The range presented refers to propellant shelf life, as provided in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Explosive Regulations (2013, Section 13.2.1), which state a range of between 15 and 25 years. Twenty years is a median value commonly accepted by ammunition technical officers.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Section 12.2.1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Section 12.3.1.


⁶² *Ibid.*, Section 11.1.

⁶³ Sections 2.3, 3.13, and 3.2.1, National Adaption Programme of Action on Climate Change, Ministry of National Resources, Federal Republic of Somalia, April 2013. See <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/som01.pdf>.

⁶⁴ IATG 02.40 "Safeguarding of explosive facilities", clause 4.1. See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG02.40.pdf>.

The sites occupied by populations and vital infrastructure can be described as exposed sites (ES). A quantity–distance (QD) is the minimum permissible distance between a potential explosive site (PES) and an exposed site (ES) based on the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of explosives in a given Hazard Division (HD). In simple terms, if the NEQ increases then the QD increases. Thus, if more explosive material is contained within the ammunition store (the PES), the blast radius (QD) around the site increases. The home (ES) in Figure 4 is outside of the QD radius. If the quantity of explosives (NEQ) increases, then the home will fall within the QD radius (dotted line) and its inhabitants will be at risk from a potential UEMS event.

Figure 4. Quantity–distance radius around an ammunition store (illustrative)



As IATG 02.40 (p. iv) notes, “without a system of safeguarding the land outside the facility boundary the civilian population may build dwellings or commercial installations thereby negating the effective separation distance”. This leaves four options:

1. the explosive quantity permitted for storage must be reduced within the facility;
2. the increased risk to the civilian population must be formally accepted, even if it is above the tolerable risk level;
3. the civilian population must be moved from the area; or
4. the ammunition storage area must be relocated.

These are very real considerations for the FGS, notably given discussions over the potential rehabilitation of damaged storage sites, including at Dayniile, as well as various ammunition storage sites in Mogadishu. As stated in IATG 02.20 (p. v), national authorities “have a legal responsibility to ensure that during any operation involving storage and/or handling of ammunition and explosives that the risks associated with those operations are both tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)⁶⁵ should an explosive event occur”.

The FGS and its international partners are encouraged to consult the quantity–distance map of the United Nations SaferGuard IATG implementation support toolkit.⁶⁶ The map allows an operator to visualize and create a quantity–distance map for any location in the world, with specific quantities of ammunition.

⁶⁵ For a concise explanation of the ALARP principle, see <http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm>.

⁶⁶ See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/map/>.

5.3 Licensing

One of the most efficient means of reducing risk, and thereby contributing towards protecting the public from the effects of a UEMS event, is through the use of separation distances.⁶⁷ These ensure that people and facilities are always at a tolerably safe distance from the explosives during storage and handling. Such distances should be appropriate, recorded and promulgated in the form of an Explosives Limit License (ELL) for each individual explosive storehouse (ESH) or facility.⁶⁸

All facilities used for ammunition and explosives storage in Somalia should hold an ELL that is suitable for the intended purpose. Many States use rules based upon the explosives, their quantity, and the distance from the explosive to where people and, in some cases, critical facilities/equipment are at risk.

A separation distance is the minimum permissible distance between a PES and an ES where the risks due to an explosive event have been determined as tolerable by the appropriate national authority.

The protection of explosives at an ES from the effects of an explosion at a PES can be achieved by a combination of:

1. the provision of adequate separation distances between all explosive storage facilities; and
2. ensuring the buildings used for explosive storage are buildings designed to protect the contents from the effects of an explosion.

Adequate separation distance also ensures that in the event of a blast in close succession at a PES and an ES, the time between the two events would prevent the two blasts from coalescing into a single blast wave.⁶⁹

The United Nations SaferGuard IATG implementation support toolkit⁷⁰ allows the easy creation of an ELL for an ammunition or explosive facility. However, it should be recognized that most States require a legal licensing authority to issue ELLs—notably qualified ammunition technical officers. The first step in explosive licensing is, therefore, the creation of a competent legal licensing authority.

The FGS has no existing expertise required for the production of ELLs and would benefit from formal ammunition management training on how to produce basic ELLs. In this regard, there is a general requirement in IATG Risk Reduction Process Level 2 that can assist the FGS in meeting international ammunition management standards (the IATGs are structured into three risk reduction process levels, dependent on the complexity of tasks).⁷¹

⁶⁷ IATG 02.20 “Quantity and separation distances”, clause 5.

⁶⁸ IATG 02.30 “Licensing of explosive facilities”, Introduction.

⁶⁹ For example, blast waves from two independent 10,000kg explosions would not be as far-reaching as the coalesced blast waves from two storage sites, each containing 10,000kg, which would represent an explosion event of 20,000kg. See IATG 05.20 “Types of buildings for explosive facilities”, clause 5.

⁷⁰ See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/explosives-limit-license>.

⁷¹ For further information on risk reduction process levels see IATG 01.10, clause 6.5.

5.4 International standards and support

A range of international standards and implementation support resources on ammunition management are available online. The following sections provide a brief introduction to these resources, which provide national ammunition management authorities with technical standards for safe and secure ammunition management, in addition to support tools, such as the United Nations SaferGuard Interactive Implementation Support Toolkit.

5.4.1 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines

The IATGs are designed to assist States to establish national standards and national SOPs by establishing a frame of reference that can be used, or adapted for use, as a national standard. Previous to the introduction of the IATGs there were no internationally recognized ammunition standards and States had to develop their own ammunition guidelines. Furthermore, few States had the technical expertise to design and implement their own ammunition technical publications, so ammunition stockpile management was often neglected. These United Nations publications have been recognized, approved and validated, and are now freely available to national authorities around the world.⁷²

5.4.2 IATGs implementation support—United Nations SaferGuard Interactive Implementation Support Toolkit

This is a web-based application that is designed to support implementation of the IATGs. The resources enable practitioners to implement “best practice” and thereby enhance the safe, secure and efficient management of ammunition. The SaferGuard Interactive Implementation Toolkit is also intended to be used to “communicate, visually, safety and security requirements to policymakers and other stakeholders”. Access to relevant IATG training courses on stockpile management safety is also available on the website.⁷³

6 FGS storage facilities—National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)

The armoury buildings for NISA in Mogadishu are not purpose-built for the storage of either weapons or ammunition, although they contain both.

The general condition and management of the facilities should be improved as there is little evidence that NISA storekeepers follow formal stockpile management principals or procedures. NISA should look to establish written protocols or SOPs for weapons, ammunition and explosives stockpile management. NISA personnel would greatly benefit from the basic ammunition and weapon storehouse management training. In addition, there is a clear requirement for the construction of a new facility to house NISA weapons and small arms ammunition (limited to the storage of Hazard Division 1.4S ammunition).

Of the 27 specific ISACS clauses reviewed during the visit, the NISA stockpile facilities adhered to the standards in 11 cases, was unverifiable in seven cases, and failed to adhere to the standards in six cases. Three voluntary standards were not applicable.

Of the 34 specific clauses of IATG reviewed during the visit, NISA stockpile facilities fully or partially complied with 10 standards, could not comply in five cases due to lack of technical expertise, and failed to comply in 16 cases. Compliance was unverifiable in three cases.

⁷² See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG>.

⁷³ See <http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard>.

The separation of weapons and ammunition is a guiding principle in PSSM, because it diminishes the risk of both weapons and ammunition being seized in the case of unauthorized entry. Additional physical security measures should be implemented for weapons and ammunition that can be classified as “attractive to criminal and terrorist organizations” (ACTO). Storage management practices can be improved by installing weapon storage racks and securing weapons with additional chains.

Only ammunition of HD 1.4 should be stored at these facilities due to the explosive safety distances appropriate for other Hazard Divisions.

The FGS, with support from international partners, has trained a small number of NISA officers as weapons storekeepers. NISA has no qualified armourers, storekeepers or specialist ammunition-trained personnel. The FGS should seek international partner assistance in basic armoury and ammunition storekeeper training.

7 FGS storage facilities—Somali National Army (SNA)

The SNA storage facility is a purpose-built installation for the storage of weapons and ammunition. The storage facility is a warehouse-type structure, suitable for the storage of large quantities of weapons and small arms ammunition (Hazard Division 1.4S only), which presents no significant explosive hazard.

This site is not suited for the storage of other ammunition types, including Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3, which present more serious explosive hazards. When storing ammunition in large open areas, all ammunition stocks in the location are aggregated into one PES and licensed accordingly. Because all stocks are stored in the same building it is impossible to store the ammunition items by their Compatibility Groups, through which a higher degree of safety might be achieved by storing every ammunition type separately.

Ideally, for security purposes, weapons and ammunition should be stored separately. This is to prevent illegal entrants from having easy access to both weapons and the ammunition, which would assist them in repelling security forces. All weapons and ammunition that can be classified ACTO should be subject to additional security measures in order to make it difficult for illegal entrants to obtain both weapons and ammunition. These items should be stored in secure cabinets or wire mesh cages to make immediate access difficult and to delay acquisition for as long as possible.

Only weapons and small-calibre ammunition (Hazard Division 1.4S) should be stored in this facility. Ammunition containing HE should be stored in either small explosives store houses (ESH) or, possibly, hardened ISO containers (in a separate location to be determined). The storage of HE ammunition at this site would place all other stocks in the building at risk should the building be attacked by indirect or high trajectory fire.

Of the 27 specific clauses of ISACS reviewed during the visit, this stockpile facility was found to be adherent or equivalent to adherent with ISACS standards in 18 cases, unverifiable in two cases, and not adherent in four cases. Three voluntary standards were not applicable.

Of the 34 specific clauses of IATG reviewed during the visit, this stockpile facility was to be found compliant or equivalent to compliant in 17 cases, non-compliant in 15 cases due to a lack of technical expertise, and unable to verify compliance in two cases.

The SNA should establish written protocols or SOPs for firearms, ammunition and explosives stockpile management in the Halane facility. All weapons and ammunition held in the armoury/magazine are accounted for in a manual accounting system. The SNA should ideally hold a separate copy of the information in another location, in the event that the store file/accounting book is lost, damaged or destroyed. The practice of using white corrective fluid to correct inaccurate entries in the accounting ledgers should cease forthwith to ensure transparency in all bookkeeping. Any mistakes should be struck through and a new line started underneath.

Due to the current security situation in Somalia, the location of the SNA storage facility is based on operational necessity. While no “safeguarding or licensing” process had been conducted prior to construction of this facility, appropriate physical security and stockpile management practices in line with the IATG may mitigate the risks ammunitions pose to the population and buildings.

The arms embargo currently limits the SNA to acquiring SALW ammunition of less than 100 mm in calibre. For this reason, stored quantities of HE ammunition are relatively small at present. However, lifting of the arms embargo could result in greater quantities of ordnance and of HE ammunition being stored at the facility—with obvious implications for the quantity–distance effects.

The 23 January 2014 site visits highlighted that implementing several IATG Level 1 activities would rapidly improve the physical security and stockpile management at this facility. In response, the FGS have requested international partners to assist with these activities.

Discussions during the 23 January 2014 site visits suggest that the SNA is considering building a second weapons and ammunition storage facility at a nearby location. This building would be twice the size of the current storage facility. As noted above, the existing facility’s explosive safety distances already encroach on buildings that are vulnerable, inhabited by civilians, and are nearby a public traffic route with civilian access. Assessing the second building’s effect on the safety of those living and working in the area is critical prior to construction. All parties engaged in this decision should refer to IATG 05.10 “Planning and siting of explosive facilities”. Furthermore, a Siting Board should be assembled, comprising all relevant agencies (civilian and military) to discuss the proposed facility.

The FGS, together with international partners, have trained a small number of SNA weapons storekeepers and store managers. The SNA has limited qualified armourers, storekeepers or specialist ammunition-trained personnel. The FGS should seek assistance for basic armoury and ammunition storekeeper training at this site.

8 FGS storage facilities—Central police armouries

The FGS, together with international partners, recently constructed a police armoury and has plans to construct another 14 armouries for the SPF and four for the NISA. This is an excellent facility, which has storage space for weapons and a small “ready use” ammunition store. The SPF must only store small arms ammunition (Hazard Division 1.4S) in this facility.

Unfortunately the armoury was empty during the 23 January 2014 site visit. No weapons or ammunition were observed during the visit. The site visit team was, therefore, unable to evaluate SPF weapon and ammunition practices and procedures at the facility. The FGS, together with its international partners, continues to train weapons storekeepers at this site.

9 Priorities

In conclusion, based on the initial finding from the weapons and ammunition workshop and the one-day site visits, this report has identified key priorities for FGS and its international partners to assist them with ongoing and future WAM work. The following priorities are not ordered in respect of urgency.

9.1 Priority 1—clarification of FGS force structures

Clarification of FGS force structures is an absolute necessity from a WAM perspective.

9.1.1 What?

FGS force structures need to be clarified to the lowest possible level. In practice this will be an incremental process, which starts at the brigade/headquarters level and works downwards through the defence and security force hierarchy.

9.1.2 How?

To the extent possible, the HRSSC needs to compile and centralize a payroll for every serving member of the defence and security forces. The payroll needs to include the unit concerned, its commander, its physical location or areas of deployment, and the individual service numbers (unique) of the forces serving within it.

9.1.3 Why?

A national weapons and ammunition registry and accounting system cannot operate unless the units of the defence and security forces using those weapons and ammunition are identifiable. Such a registry and accounting system is necessary to prevent the continued diversion of FGS weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, resolution 2142 (2014) stipulates that the FGS regularly report on the structure of the security forces, for which force structure clarification is a requirement.

9.2 Priority 2—arms and ammunition registration and accounting systems

A national registration system and appropriate accounting systems are a precondition for effective WAM.

9.2.1 What?

The system must include 1) a centralized national registry of weapons and ammunition, 2) local registries for every unit of the defence and security forces, and 3) an accounting system that documents the movement of weapons and ammunition between stores/units using the issue and receipt voucher system.

9.2.2 How?

The AAMSC, working in conjunction with SEMA and partner organizations, needs to agree upon the structure of a national registration and accounting system, in line with IATG 03.10 and 03.20 and ISACS 05.20 and 05.30.

9.2.3 Why?

The FGS will not be able to maximize the safe, efficient and cost-effective use of the national weapons and ammunition stockpile unless appropriate registration and accounting systems are in place. Such a registry and accounting system is necessary to prevent the continued diversion of FGS weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, resolution 2142 (2014) stipulates that the FGS regularly report on the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use, and storage of weapons by the security forces and on training needs in this regard.

9.3 Priority 3—ammunition storage infrastructure and stockpile management

Purpose-built infrastructure and effective stockpile management is required for the safe storage of ammunition and explosives.

9.3.1 What?

The AAMSC, working in conjunction with SEMA and partner organizations, needs to identify safe, long-term storage solutions for current and future stocks of HE ammunition.

9.3.2 How?

The AAMSC should convene a “Siting Board” to determine options for the location and construction of HE ammunition and explosives stores. This board should adopt a risk-management approach, adopt a safeguarding methodology, respect explosive quantity–distances in its planning, and adhere to IATG 05.10 standards.

9.3.3 Why?

The current storage solutions, and locations of stores, are unsafe for the storage of HE ammunition and explosives and exceed quantity–distances with respect to populations and physical infrastructure. A UEMS event at one of these facilities would severely undermine Somalia’s security, development, and recovery from armed conflict. Furthermore, resolution 2142 (2014) stipulates that the FGS regularly report on the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance, and distribution of military equipment by the security forces.

Abbreviations

AAMSC	Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee
ACTO	attractive to criminal and terrorist organizations
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
DDG	Danish Demining Group
ELL	Explosive Limits Licence
ESH	explosive storehouse
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
HD	Hazard Division
HE	high explosive
HRSSC	Human Resources System Steering Committee
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IFFA	immediate firefighting appliances
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MIA	Mogadishu International Airport (and AMISOM secured perimeter)
NEQ	net explosive quantity
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency
PES	potential explosive site
PSSM	physical security and stockpile management
QD	quantity–distance
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
SAA	small arms ammunition
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEMA	Somalia Explosives Management Authority
SEMG	Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
SNA	Somali National Army
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPF	Somali Police Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UEMS	unplanned explosion at a munitions site
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WAM	weapons and ammunition management
WAM TWG	Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group