



**Forging Cooperation over Competition: Opportunities for Practical  
Security Collaboration in the Asia-Pacific**



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## **Pacific Forum CSIS**

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## **Executive Summary**

**By Yan-Ying Huang and Daniel H. Katz**

Prioritizing mutual trust and win-win cooperation was the topic of the 9<sup>th</sup> Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) General Conference held in Beijing and the subject under consideration by attending CSIS Pacific Forum Young Leaders. The Asia-Pacific is a wide and dynamic region with many complicated issues, including Southeast and Northeast Asian territorial disputes, North Korean nuclear weapons and regional economic integration, to name a few.

In the first article, Young Leaders analyze a relatively new security institution, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which includes 18 defense ministers from regional countries. The ADMM-Plus demonstrates that key regional players are willing to engage in dialogue and coordinate with one another. The ADMM-Plus' objectives on five areas of practical cooperation – maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations and military medicine – are practical and functional in contrast to other regional security arrangements. The article first examines the case of HADR cooperation, in which the ADMM-Plus successfully executed several successful joint exercises. Considering the historical and territorial disputes within the Asia-Pacific, these exercises are substantial achievements. The second case focuses on the maritime security issue. Under the ADMM-Plus framework, Expert Working Groups (EWG) look at maritime security issues as well as information-sharing activities. However, there are still challenges, most notably countries' political will, different capacities, and domestic politics. There is room for improvement, and policy recommendations for an amended ADMM-Plus suggest the involvement of more regional players such as Taiwan and North Korea, greater transparency by the EWGs, and incorporating the plethora of other regional institutions into the ADMM-Plus process.

The second article examines HADR cooperation in ASEAN. Cooperation on disaster management is a mutually shared interest and a natural step for promoting greater sub-regional integration. In 2003, ASEAN established the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). In 2005, ASEAN signed the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Relief (ADMER). In addition to these institutions, HADR operations may require military support. Therefore, it is critical for the US and member states to also practice force exercises and continue with military training. The focus on non-traditional security has provided ASEAN member states the opportunity to cooperate and build trust. A critical evaluation of HADR efforts between the 2004 tsunami and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan reveals that ASEAN can be an effective platform for regional cooperation on disaster relief. Through HADR cooperation, ASEAN can gradually act as a bloc to interact with the US, China, India, or other larger powers. Successful HADR efforts also have significant potential to inspire people to support ASEAN as a whole. Therefore, the article recommends an annual meeting solely on HADR to improve the bloc's HADR framework.

The third article discusses the importance of regional economic integration and its potential to mitigate risks and conflicts. Two possible architectures for economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region currently under negotiation are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The TPP aims to be a high-standard agreement, while the RCEP aims to finalize an agreement by 2015, the same year as the creation of the proposed ASEAN Economic Community. The article examines the TPP and the RCEP, suggesting institutional balancing might be at work. Balancing could be inclusive or exclusive: the former refers to binding target states into an institution and the latter implies keeping the target states out. The inclusive mechanism involves small states as a bloc, influencing the larger power, while the exclusive mechanism would lead (in the case of RCEP) to constraining US power or (in the case of the TPP) to balancing Chinese power. The authors recommended that the two architectures not be perceived in this way however, and that the adoption of TPP or RCEP not be seen as competition. Instead, all parties should increase the transparency of trade talks, which would help negotiating states uphold their commitments.

The fourth article centers on one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific: the North Korean nuclear issue. The primary institution for addressing this issue, the Six-Party Talks (6PT), reached a deadlock. The situation might be improved by South Korea's 'trustpolitik strategy' and China's increased involvement. The authors present the strategic geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and examine China's intentions *vis-à-vis* North Korea. The article concludes that South Korea's 'trustpolitik' strategy, which employs carrots and sticks, could be accommodated by China and North Korea. If this strategy succeeds, the US should support South Korea's approach to harmonize US-ROK-China relations.

The fifth and final article explores science diplomacy as an alternative approach to building trust in the South China Sea. Although a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was adopted between China and ASEAN in an effort to address territorial disputes, the negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) have made little progress. Therefore, the authors explore avenues by which policy-makers can promote mutual trust in the South China Sea. The DOC indicated five categories for technical cooperation, such as environmental protection, scientific research, search and rescue operations, safe navigation and communication at sea, and combatting transnational crime. However, these categories did little to promote the COC. Nonetheless, technical cooperation remains the only viable option to build mutual trust among claimant parties to the South China Sea disputes. Science diplomacy and technical cooperation can strengthen state-to-state relations, and build trust among the DOC parties. The article strongly advocates for the establishment of a new Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) approach to fisheries in the South China Sea.

# **The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus): Opportunities for Practical Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific**

By Kirsten Asdal, Stephanie Kang, Daniel Katz, and Megan Strausser

On October 12, 2010, the defense ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met with eight additional dialogue partners in Hanoi to establish a more encompassing regional cooperation mechanism known as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, or ADMM-Plus.<sup>1</sup> The ADMM-Plus is consistent with the guiding principles of the ADMM established by the ten ASEAN member states, and aims to be “a platform for ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners to strengthen security and defense cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the region.”<sup>2</sup> Although a new initiative compared to other East Asian security cooperation mechanisms – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Six-Party Talks – the ADMM-Plus represents a concerted effort by the region's key players to stress the importance of openness and transparency on regional security issues through ongoing dialogue and coordination among defense policymakers.

In compliance with its stated objectives, the defense ministers of the ADMM-Plus agreed on five areas of practical cooperation: maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations, and military medicine (MM).<sup>3</sup> The outlined areas of cooperation show that the ADMM-Plus has potential to be more than a ‘talk shop’ and can produce functional security cooperation. This paper will focus on two areas of practical cooperation by examining the success the ADMM-Plus had in coordinating HADR efforts among ASEAN and its partners, and how cooperation in HADR can be applied to more challenging regional security issues in the maritime domain.<sup>4</sup> The effectiveness of the ADMM-Plus framework can be measured by its ability to meet its mandate and objectives and by tangible results, such as conducting joint exercises, increasing capabilities to jointly respond to emergencies, and influencing domestic policies.

Cooperation on the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of regional security issues arguably highlights the limitations of regional institutions to facilitate joint initiatives, but increased dialogue among security planners can produce mutual understanding of and transparency in domestic security policies. Establishing trust and confidence in one another is a basic step for regional actors to place common strategic interests above competing national interests. See Seng Tan states, “by

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<sup>1</sup> The ADMM-Plus consists of the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and their eight regional partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> “About the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus),” Jan. 19, 2013, <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html>

<sup>3</sup> “ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Concept Paper,” Nov. 13-15, 2007, [https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/4.%20Annex%20G\\_ADMM-Plus%20Concept%20Paper.pdf](https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/4.%20Annex%20G_ADMM-Plus%20Concept%20Paper.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> This paper will focus primarily on assessing the progress and challenges inherent in HADR and maritime security in the ADMM-Plus, but HADR and military medicine are included as they are often evaluated together.

adopting a low key approach and keeping their specific aims relatively mundane but doable, Asia's defense leaders presumably wish to avoid targeting bridges too far."<sup>5</sup>

While the ARF Defense Officials Dialogue (ARF-DOD) is tasked with defining the roles of regional arrangements and providing a strategic direction for the region, the ADMM-Plus finds relative success in setting agendas that focus on viable, functional security cooperation – as opposed to “grand promises that are easily uttered but difficult to achieve.”<sup>6</sup> Since its inception in 2010, the defense ministers of the 18 ADMM-Plus member states have met twice, established Expert Working Groups (EWG) on the areas of practical cooperation, and even conducted table-top exercises for military medicine (July 2011) and maritime security (September 2012).<sup>7</sup> Increased functional security cooperation among ASEAN and partner states is important for increasing mutual trust and confidence, and the ADMM-Plus provides an environment conducive to improving coordination on regional challenges.

### **HADR: A Case of Cooperation**

Despite only having been initiated in 2010, the ADMM-Plus has yielded tangible evidence that it has the ability to act in a capacity beyond that of being another regional ‘talk shop.’ In particular, ADMM-Plus has executed two successful HADR Military Medicine (HADR/MM) exercises. The inaugural table-top exercise took place with the sponsorship of Singapore and Indonesia in July 2011.<sup>8</sup> At this time, a practical exercise was agreed upon for 2013. This second exercise brought together over 3,000 personnel from member countries and is considered one of the biggest multilateral joint exercises of its kind in the region.<sup>9</sup>

The second HADR/MM exercise, held in Brunei in June of 2013, built upon the inaugural exercise, and included specific and practical concepts and objectives. The exercises simulated natural disaster scenarios, focused on military-to-military cooperation and enhanced interoperability between personnel from ADMM-Plus nations. The exercises also concentrated on search and rescue, military medicine, and logistics in an effort to execute a joint operation in a multinational environment. This approach was meant to achieve the following objectives:

- Enhance and increase military practical cooperation by bringing together the ADMM-Plus countries in a joint exercise.
- Build upon ASEAN experiences from the ASEAN Militaries' HADR Exercise and draw upon the successes of the five ADMM Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWG).

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<sup>5</sup> See Seng Tan, “A Farewell to Grandiosity? Practical Cooperation and the ADMM-Plus,” *PacNet* No. 65, Aug. 13, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> “ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Establishing an Experts' Working Group Concept Paper,” April 28, 2011, <https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/13.%20ANNEX%2014%20-%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20Establishing%20an%20EWG.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> “2<sup>nd</sup> ASEAN Militaries' HADR Exercise.” Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam,

<http://www.mindef.gov.bn/ADMM2013/index.php/admm-plus/157-2nd-asean-militaries-hadr-exercise>

<sup>9</sup> Vigay Sakhujia, “ADMM-Plus: HADR/Military Medicine Exercise” *South Asia Defence and Strategic Review*, July 22, 2013, <http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frnArticleDetails.aspx?DID=420>



- Enhance military-to-military interoperability, coordination and cooperation among participating countries in a HADR scenario incorporating military medicine.<sup>10</sup>

On a practical level, the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM exercise in Brunei saw the deployment of approximately 3,200 personnel, seven ships, and 15 helicopters as well as military, medical, engineering, and search and rescue teams. The assets from the 18 participating countries trained for scenarios relating to collapsed buildings, landslides, and flash floods. The multinational forces exercised the evacuation of casualties and displaced personnel, as well as the delivery of aid to affected communities.<sup>11</sup> Mukherjee argues “the fact that ships and forces from countries like Japan, China, Singapore, the US, Vietnam and India, among others were working together was no small feat, prompting Adm. Locklear, the Chief of the US Pacific Command, to call it a ‘substantial’ achievement.”<sup>12</sup> Considering the historical and territorial disputes between these countries, such as China and Japan, the fact that they were able to coordinate and execute a joint training operation successfully is indeed an achievement as well as an indicator that there is more than just potential for ADMM-Plus to reach its main objectives in a tangible manner.

Unfortunately, the disaster of Typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines in November 2013 demonstrated that ASEAN in general, and ADMM-Plus specifically, still do not have the capacity to respond in an emergency as an overarching entity. Although there has not been an ADMM-Plus-led initiative, ASEAN member countries have bilaterally contributed aid and deployed military personnel and assets.<sup>13</sup> It is important to note that Singapore and Brunei, as well as other participating countries, have donated HADR/MM response teams and resources to Philippines, without working under the umbrella of ADMM-Plus.

Although ADMM-Plus failed to act in response to *Typhoon Haiyan*, the HADR/MM exercises have succeeded not only in bringing together ADMM-Plus countries for exercises, but also in building capacity. The successful training exercises and commitment to continue exercising cooperation through ADMM-Plus in the future shows that HADR and MM have made practical and tangible advances in regional security cooperation. These efforts alone will not make ADMM-Plus the overarching security architecture many are hoping for, but it does indicate that there are practical and functional capabilities in this framework. As See Seng Tan points out, “[t]hey are taking small ‘actionable’ steps that do not make the news headlines but which build and enhance defense cooperation step by incremental step.”<sup>14</sup> The practical capacity and confidence-building among member countries through these exercises can be transferred over to other, more challenging areas, such as maritime security.

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<sup>10</sup> “HADR & MM EX Background,” Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam, <http://www.mindef.gov.bn/ADMM2013/index.php/2012-10-05-01-50-52/2012-10-05-01-51-29/hadr-ahx-background>

<sup>11</sup> “Singapore and Other Militaries Conclude the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM Exercise,” *Asian Military Review*, June 2, 2013. <http://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/saf-and-other-militaries-conclude-the-admm-plus-hadmmm-exercise/>

<sup>12</sup> Anit Mukherjee, “ADMM-Plus: Talk Shop or Key to Asia-Pacific Security?” *The Diplomat*, Aug. 22, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/admm-plus-talk-shop-or-key-to-asia-pacific-security/>

<sup>13</sup> “With typhoon Haiyan, ASEAN suffers Katrina moment,” *Bangkok Post*, Nov. 23, 2013, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/381274/with-typhoon-haiyan-asean-suffers-katrina-moment>

<sup>14</sup> Tan, “A Farewell to Grandiosity? Practical Cooperation and the ADMM-Plus.”

## Maritime Security: A Need for Cooperation

The ADMM-Plus cooperation framework should focus next on addressing the host of maritime security concerns in the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and Singapore. In the South China Sea, maritime conflict prevention and resolution are important components of maritime security due to competing territorial claims. Piracy and armed robbery have been a problem particularly in Indonesia and near the Strait of Malacca. Maritime terrorism is less prevalent, but has cropped up occasionally in Southeast Asia.

Maritime safety is a critical component of maritime security. It involves safe transportation of dangerous cargo, fire protection, safety of navigation, standards for ship design, and coordination of radio-communications, among other things. The Strait of Malacca is one of the world's most economically vital waterways, with over 50,000 ships sailing through it every year, carrying about 40 percent of the world's trade.<sup>15</sup> The narrow sea lanes – the narrowest point measuring just 1.7 nmi wide<sup>16</sup> – increase the potential for collisions, groundings, and oil spills. These issues must be addressed using multinational cooperation, which the ADMM-Plus can facilitate.

The 2011 Concept Paper for the Maritime Security EWG, adopted by the ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus) at Yogyakarta, outlined objectives that aim to enhance maritime cooperation, identify risks in the maritime environment (especially nontraditional threats), and expand information sharing to eventually develop best practice approaches.<sup>17</sup> Between 2011 and 2013, the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security EWG met six times and conducted a Scenario-Based Maritime Security Table-Top Exercise (TTX) in September 2012 at the strategic–operational level.<sup>18</sup> The ADMM-Plus also established the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Community Information-Sharing Portal (AMSCIP) to foster greater information-sharing in the ADMM-Plus maritime security community and to promote awareness of maritime activities across the region.<sup>19</sup> Under the direction of the Maritime Security EWG in October 2013, force elements from 13 ADMM-Plus member nations completed the first maritime security field training exercise.<sup>20</sup> Joint training exercises facilitate real progress in

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<sup>15</sup> Bill Tarrant, ed., "Factbox: Malacca Strait is a Strategic Chokepoint," *Reuters*, March 4, 2010. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/idINIndia-46652220100304>,

<sup>16</sup> US Department of Energy, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," *US Energy Information Administration Analysis Brief*, Aug. 22, 2012.

<sup>17</sup> ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), "ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security Concept Paper," in "Consideration and Discussion on Papers of EWGs," April 29, 2011, <http://amscip.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/3-ADMM-Plus-Paper-Maritime-Security-EWG-endorsed.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> "ADMM Plus Experts Working Group on Maritime Security: Initial Planning Conference (IPC) on Table Top Exercise (TTX)," Maritime Institute of Malaysia, March 28, 2012, <http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/admm-plus-experts-working-group-on-maritime-security-initial-planning-conference-ipc-on-table-top-exercise-ttx/>. For a timeline of ADMM-Plus meetings, including EWG, see <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news/7-news.html#>

<sup>19</sup> See <http://amscip.org/>

<sup>20</sup> Australian Government Department of Defence, "Inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise," *Australian Department of Defence Media Release*, Sept. 30, 2013,

securing the region's maritime environment by creating a common understanding of maritime engagement through greater information-sharing and the development of baselines for communication at sea.<sup>21</sup>

While efforts to increase communication and mutual understanding of maritime security threats among the ADMM-Plus states have been effective, several key challenges to enhance maritime cooperation persist. First, the ADMM-Plus needs to create political will to achieve maximum participation in maritime security cooperation. Countries involved have been hesitant to advance real cooperation on traditional maritime security issues for fear of conflict over territorial disputes. Increased cooperation in information-sharing and developing baselines of communication are important and welcome, but they still avoid the biggest threats to maritime security in the region: territorial disputes. Countries should decide to set aside their disputes for joint maintenance of maritime security because the territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia may not be settled in the near future.<sup>22</sup> Defense ministers should push for more joint patrols and exercises, and politicians should support the inclusion of those that specifically address traditional security threats.

Second, exercises between different navies and coast guards will have to manage their different capacities. A country with a strong navy can lead a joint exercise and share its expertise with weaker navies, but reaching an equal competence and growing together can be difficult, especially with Southeast Asian participants whose maritime forces vary greatly in capacity and experience. However, within ADMM-Plus, defense ministers are the instigators of such cooperation, and they know their military capacities and practices better than politicians. Hence, this meeting is an effective place to plan the fundamentals of effective capacity-building exercises.

Despite being able to meet directly with one other, defense ministers from every country will still have to work within their own country's political framework to conduct any military exercises with neighboring countries. Defense ministers have different amounts of influence in their respective governments, which impacts the ease with which practical cooperation can be arranged. On the other hand, political leaders can put more pressure on their countries' defense ministers to move forward swiftly with cooperative efforts. This way both the political and military leadership is motivated to use ADMM-Plus to enhance maritime security.

Working together to combat threats like piracy and terrorism can keep up the momentum of the ADMM-Plus framework, develop deeper trust through military or law enforcement cooperation, and, most importantly, secure the maritime environment in Southeast Asia. Drawing from the relative success of HADR cooperation, the ADMM-Plus should continue to establish clear objectives to meet through its EWGs, conduct joint exercises and training, and enhance mutual understanding to address common security challenges over regional competition.

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<http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/09/30/inaugural-asean-defence-ministers-meeting-plus-maritime-security-field-training-exercise/>.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou, "Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation," *Ashgate*, 2009, ch. 1.

## **Policy Recommendations**

Though there is not an extensive institutional history, and only two summits, the ADMM-Plus can claim tangible achievements in several areas of practical cooperation, as evidenced by HADR cooperation and efforts to increase maritime security. Early hopes that the ADMM-Plus would be a panacea for Asian security cooperation were overly ambitious, but it is too early to declare failure. Compared with the 20-year institutional track record of the ARF, the ADMM-Plus has performed well.

The ADMM-Plus is an inclusive arrangement of 18 countries and seemingly includes all relevant actors in Indo-Pacific security. However, it is worth noting who does not have a seat at the table. Taiwan is absent, presumably because its inclusion would be unacceptable to China. North Korea, a potential spoiler in regional security, also is not present. There is no mechanism for Taiwanese or North Korean concerns to be raised in the current membership structure; thus their presence as observers would be a useful addition.

In addition to the now biennial gatherings, the EWGs meet regularly to discuss issues under their purview. Although several concept papers are publicly available on the ADMM-Plus website, substantive reports from EWG deliberations are absent. It is unclear whether this is due to the sensitivity of discussions among member countries or whether the EWG deliberations have not yet yielded concrete results. Greater transparency by the ADMM-Plus on the work of EWGs as well as benchmarking of outcomes outlined in the concept papers would bolster the strength of the ADMM-Plus.

There are a number of challenges that the ADMM-Plus face in a region characterized by a plethora of security institutions. The members of the ARF (that is, including the dialogue partners) and the ADMM-Plus are not the same. The ARF is even more inclusive than the ADMM-Plus since it includes smaller regional states as well as North Korea. Perhaps the ARF and the ADMM-Plus can become unified and complementary instead of being competitive and mutually exclusive.

In addition, the East Asia Summit (EAS) plans to increasingly address regional security issues. The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), organized annually in Singapore by the non-governmental International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), features dozens of regional and extra-regional defense ministers or their deputies in an official capacity. Even if there is integration between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus, the EAS and the SLD could also help shape a more unified regional consensus. Feeding the results of ADMM-Plus EWGs on HADR and maritime security specifically into these other processes would strengthen regional security.

What does the future hold for the ADMM-Plus, which next convenes in Malaysia in 2015? The ADMM-Plus countries need not address traditional sovereignty issues at first to be successful, but crisis and risk mitigation procedures should be part of the agenda. No countries in Asia desire confrontation, as it would imperil their economies. However, the possibility for miscalculation and subsequent escalation remains high and steps need to be taken to reduce this

risk. In the future, the ADMM-Plus could consider discussing creative solutions to previously intractable sovereignty disputes, particularly in the context of HADR and maritime security.

Coordination with bodies such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) on efforts such as adopting the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) would be especially helpful in the maritime domain. Although most cooperative regional security arrangements in Asia remain voluntary due to a collective aversion to binding obligations, there is great potential to strengthen the peace and security of Asia through institutions such as the ADMM-Plus, provided that member countries take active measures to build upon and operationalize the promise of these initiatives.

## **Cooperation in ASEAN: Disaster Response is Key to Cooperation in ASEAN**

By Jon Cheatwood, Yan-Ying Huang, Nathaniel Walton, Elliot Brennan

Displaced populations and communities ravaged by waste and destruction are found across the Asia-Pacific. They are often evidence of a region beset by natural disasters and severe environmental occurrences. Confronted with such disasters, communities face a long journey before normalcy can take hold again. Given the scope of these issues, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has highlighted the issue of disaster management as an issue of concern within its socio-cultural community framework. As the ASEAN community looks toward further integration, cooperation on disaster management is a mutually shared interest of all member states and a natural step for promoting greater integration. This paper examines current ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) frameworks, while highlighting nontraditional security cooperation as a path toward a more united, capable ASEAN. It will first examine ASEAN's potential capacity for HADR operations and disaster response. It will then review relevant improvements over the course of nine years between two large disasters which impacted the region: the catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that claimed over 283,000 lives and the 2013 *Typhoon Haiyan* that ravaged the Philippines.

ASEAN's involvement in HADR operations began with the establishment in 2003 of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), subsequently supported by the 2005 signing of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Relief (ADMER). Working within these frameworks, regional governments and NGOs have sought to improve preparedness and capability to provide effective, timely disaster relief. Similarly, ASEAN member state militaries have begun training for HADR scenarios.<sup>23</sup> At senior levels, this has involved frequent discussions of HADR operations at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). An outcome of these meetings has been two exercises known as HADR and Military Medicine (HADR and MM) exercises, the most recent hosted in Brunei in 2013. These initiatives, while in their infancy, have succeeded in bringing key military leaders to the table to discuss issues impacting the entire region.

US land forces in the Pacific remain uniquely postured to support HADR preparedness through routine partnership exercises. Marine Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC) has traditionally taken part in Balikatan, a HADR-focused training event held in conjunction with the Philippine armed forces. The US Army, Pacific (USARPAC) has also recognized the importance of HADR within the region, noting that, "simply put, disasters pose the most likely risks to the region's stability each year."<sup>24</sup> In addition to frequent partnership exercises held annually across the Pacific, USARPAC has begun Pacific Resilience, a disaster response exercise and exchange (DREE), in conjunction with the Lower Mekong Initiative, to promote capacity and develop best practices among partner nations.<sup>25</sup> These activities continue to hold the potential to both better

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<sup>23</sup> Stacey Chia, "Four-day multilateral humanitarian assistance exercise concludes," *Straits Times*, June 20, 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Col. James O. Robinson, Jr. and Lt. Col. John C. Lee, "Partnering in the Pacific," USARPAC Policy Brief, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Major G. Scott DeWitt and Justin Pummell, "Enhancing Resiliency to Transcend Disaster," *Asia Pacific Defense Forum*, Fall 2013.

prepare ASEAN nations for HADR scenarios, while also building trust within the alliance.

HADR cooperation within the community is also propelled, at least to some extent, by the rise of China's more assertive policies in the South China Sea in recent years and China's desire to assert its territorial claims. In the absence of a collective defense organization, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, military to military (mil-to-mil) training exercises create some capacity for ASEAN states to respond to military aggression within the community or toward its member states. However, this remains a highly political issue in a region that is witnessing significant militarization and modernization. Also, the role of the US 'rebalance' within Southeast Asia cannot be overlooked. US and member state exercises and training sessions have allowed an increased capacity and responsiveness of individual member states to HADR operations that may require military support.

In recent years, the priority among ASEAN member states of maintaining internal stability has resulted in recognition of the importance of focusing on nontraditional security concerns such as humanitarian and disaster assistance. There is growing recognition that inadequate responses to major humanitarian crises not only diminish economic growth and living standards, but also pose a threat to governments in power. The focus on nontraditional security has provided ASEAN member states the opportunity to work together in a way that promotes cooperation and builds trust. In time, this collaboration could lay the groundwork for more substantive collaboration on a military-to-military level between member states and other regional players.

The growing focus within ASEAN on nontraditional security issues has been of particular interest to China. The Chinese government sees this area as an opportunity to use its considerable resources to assume a greater leadership role in the region, and establish precedent for cooperation on traditional security issues.<sup>26</sup> In 2013, the annual meeting of ASEAN defense ministers launched its first HADR program and Military Medicine joint exercise. China widely touted its involvement as an example of a nation displaying regional leadership. This new emphasis on crisis response, while welcomed by some in the international community, has raised eyebrows as it presents China as a new actor in a HADR sector that has traditionally been led by Europe and the US.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has also promoted a framework for collaboration through its creation of inter-sessional meetings on disaster relief issues. This has allowed the creation of track-one discussions that have provided guidance on how ASEAN, China, and other regional players could work together in addressing humanitarian and disaster relief in the future.

### **HADR Improvements: 2004-2013**

The ASEAN HADR response frameworks were significantly underdeveloped in December 2004 when a 9.1 magnitude undersea earthquake hit off the coast of Indonesia. The earthquake, with an epicentre off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra, created a deadly tsunami that hit

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<sup>26</sup> Ian Storey, "China's Growing Security Role in Southeast Asia Raises Hopes and Fears," *World Politics Review*, July 5, 2013.

several countries and contributed to the deaths of over 283,000 people. Indonesia had the most casualties and missing among the affected countries. Although the international community, especially the United Nations (UN), helped victims soon after the tsunami, ASEAN's lack of capacity to coordinate relief and rescue operations was made evident by this disaster.

During the Asian Leadership Conference in March 2005, the former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong, acknowledged that the tsunami was truly unprecedented in recent memory and noted that ASEAN and the affected countries had been thoroughly unprepared. Ong called on disaster management to be integrated into mainstream development and investment efforts. The experience of the tsunami, as well as pressure from ASEAN member states, led to the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 59/279, which aimed to strengthen emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and preparedness.

One of the strongest recommendations was for the establishment of an early warning tsunami system for the region. There was a gap of several hours between when the earthquake struck and when the tsunami hit in most countries, and it was quickly seen that an early warning system could have saved tens of thousands of lives by alerting those in danger. At a 2005 UN conference in Kobe, Japan, the UN decided on the establishment of the Indian Ocean Early Warning System.<sup>27</sup>

Ong's 2005 speech demonstrated what ASEAN member countries had learned. Those countries were aware of the importance of cooperation. It was with this renewed clarity that ASEAN started several initiatives to facilitate cooperation and capacity building between ASEAN countries. Among these initiatives were legal and policy frameworks, risk surveillance and monitoring, early warning information, response arrangements for disasters, public education and awareness, regional agendas for disaster reduction, and the facilitating of the convergence of all stakeholders.

In 2005, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was signed. The Agreement provided a mechanism to coordinate intensified regional and international responses to disaster emergencies. Following this, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) was formed to facilitate early warning of natural disasters, such as tsunamis, in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. This was followed by the creation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) in 2008 to coordinate regional and international assistance to such disasters. These initiatives have been tested numerous times in recent years, most recently by Typhoon Haiyan.

In November 2013, a Category 5 super typhoon, Haiyan (Yolanda), devastated the Philippines. It was the strongest cyclone to hit the Philippines on record. Over 6,000 people perished. ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh quickly informed the Philippines that he was ready to facilitate ASEAN cooperation and coordination through the AHA Centre. At the 14<sup>th</sup> ASEAN summit, the secretary-general was entrusted to be the coordinator of AHA Centre. The coordinator can be activated any time at the request of the affected ASEAN member

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<sup>27</sup> United Nations, *Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction*, March 2005.



countries. Minh also stated that, “ASEAN stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the Philippines in these difficult times and we are ready to show the ASEAN spirit of a caring community to affected populations in the country.” Also, the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) was later sent to the Philippines to assist the local authorities in Tacloban.

Following the devastation of the 2004 tsunami, regional cooperation for HADR has improved significantly. The 2004 tsunami and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 demonstrate the important role that ASEAN can and should play as a platform for regional cooperation on disaster relief. However, progress has been slow. Further integration would allow more agility. ASEAN’s principle of non-interference within member states’ affairs can be an impediment to cooperation. Similarly, ASEAN must weather a rapidly changing regional environment. The rising influence of China and India in the region and the ‘rebalance’ of the US to the Asia-Pacific will have a significant impact on ASEAN, which will test individual member states’ resolve and willingness to act. If ASEAN continues to increase cooperation on HADR operations and act as a bloc, it can rival larger players and develop its own capability to respond. This responsiveness could be independent of the involvement of the US, China, or India – the involvement of which can be politically sensitive for some member states. If ASEAN cannot cooperate on this issue of mutual interest, then the bloc will find it increasingly difficult to cooperate on any issue and will likely, under the changing pressures in the region, be further divided.

Given the shared threats faced by ASEAN member states, cooperation on such issues is crucial to adequately responding, as well as sharing resources for preparedness. As such, the development of HADR operations offers one of the best areas for cooperation and greater integration.

## **Recommendations**

It is important that ASEAN builds on the progress of the last decade by continuing to encourage confidence within its HADR frameworks. As is true in all things concerning a bloc, this requires an emphasis on cooperation among member states. It also involves balancing the regional aspirations of larger powers such as China, India, and the United States.

However, aside from these geopolitical considerations, it is important for ASEAN leaders to recognize another element in regard to HADR. Successful HADR efforts have significant potential to inspire stronger support among citizens for their national governments as well as ASEAN as a whole. Obviously the first priority of any HADR initiative is to assist those in peril during times of need. However, this political element should provide further incentive to improve ASEAN’s HADR frameworks.

Policy changes could be made to build on past improvement of ASEAN’s HADR frameworks and ensure their future success. Foremost among these would be an annual meeting focusing solely on HADR issues for ASEAN member states. This meeting should be separate from the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting, where HADR served as a part of the latter meeting’s agenda. It should take place on a regular basis and involve senior officials whose portfolios include disaster response and emergency management. This would make it clear that

ASEAN has the highest level of seriousness and concern for HADR-related issues. It would also promote consistent collaboration to improve the bloc's HADR frameworks.

# **Transparency and Balancing in the Pacific: Lessons from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)**

By Young-June Chung, Michael Sullivan,  
Yu-Peng Teng, Graham Webster, and Lea Yu

Economic integration and trade are widely recognized as foundations of international security, with the potential to mitigate risks of broader interstate conflict. In the Asia-Pacific region, however, two separate free trade agreements (FTAs) are under negotiation – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and it is unclear whether they will converge or emerge as competitors. Most notably, the TPP’s 12 parties include the United States but not China, and the RCEP’s 16 parties include China but not the United States. How can these agreements best promote stability and avoid balkanizing the Asia-Pacific?

This paper examines the TPP and RCEP’s potential interactions, and what negotiators might learn from the TPP’s advanced state of deliberations. Specifically, it uses the framework of ‘institutional balancing’ to put the two agreements in a context of regional security architecture. It then examines political risks and benefits stemming from the TPP’s widely discussed ‘non-transparent’ mode of negotiation, using one specific area (pharmaceutical intellectual property) as a case study.

## **Background**

### *Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)*

The ‘Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership’ was originally a trade pact comprising Singapore, Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand, known as the ‘P4.’ In 2008, the United States entered the negotiations under the banner of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Australia, Peru and Vietnam joined shortly after, Malaysia in 2010, and Canada and Mexico in 2012. The TPP acquired additional importance and complexity with the addition of Japan in 2013, and the 12 parties now account for about 40 percent of the world’s GDP and 25 percent of global trade.<sup>28</sup>

The TPP’s progress is hard to gauge from the outside as negotiators have deliberated behind closed doors. Negotiators meet for two weeks every other month, a frequency that indicates “a certain momentum.”<sup>29</sup> But the parties missed a much-publicized target to conclude negotiations by the end of 2013, and some now look to US President Barack Obama’s planned visit to Asia in April 2014.<sup>30</sup> With the US government framing the TPP negotiations as an

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<sup>28</sup> V.S. Seshadri, “The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP),” Discussion Paper #182, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, July 2013, p.1.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.13.

<sup>30</sup> Scott Miller and Matthew P. Goodman, “TPP Trade Ministers Get Close, but No Deal in Singapore,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, Dec. 10, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-ministers-meeting>

important component of the Obama administration’s “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” the TPP’s center of gravity sits squarely in the Pacific, rather than in Asia.

### Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)


Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders launched the RCEP in November 2011, and negotiations gained further momentum in 2012. The RCEP aims to create an FTA among the ten ASEAN nations and the six countries with which ASEAN already has existing FTAs (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). Like the TPP, the RCEP would cover not only trade in goods and services but also other ‘cross-cutting’ issues such as investment, intellectual property, competition and dispute settlement.

Unlike the TPP, whose negotiators speak of a ‘high-standard’ or ‘gold standard’ agreement, the RCEP is more modest and explicitly focused on trade, with the ultimate aims of progressively eliminating all tariff and non-tariff barriers, and narrowing development gaps.<sup>31</sup> The target year for signing the final RCEP agreement is 2015, the same year as the proposed date for the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community. RCEP is truly an Asia-centered negotiation, including all major East Asian players and South Asia’s largest economy, India, while also incorporating Australia and New Zealand.

	# Countries	Pop (billion)	% of world total	GDP (USD trillion)	% of world total	GDP per capita (PPP USD)	Total Global Trade (import and export of goods and services)	Global FDI Inflow	Global FDI Outflow
TPP	12	.8	11%	28	38%	33,000	26%	30%	44%
RCEP	16	3.4	48%	21	30%	20,000	27%	24%	23%

Adapted from *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-income Trap*<sup>32</sup>

### The Major Players and Regional Architecture



The RCEP 16 includes the current negotiating parties for RCEP. The TPP 12 includes the existing TPP parties, with TPP 16 indicating a potential expansion. In late 2013, South Korea and Taiwan announced interest in joining TPP negotiations or acceding to a completed agreement.

Adapted from Choi Byung-il and Lee Kyounghee, “Future of Trading Architecture in Asia Pacific: TPP vs. RCEP,” Keri Brief 12(24), July 29, 2013, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> OECD, *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-income Trap* (OECD Publishing, 2013), p. 82.

<sup>32</sup> OECD, *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014*, p. 82.

The three largest economies in the world, the United States, China, and Japan are significant players in both agreements. Although the existing TPP and RCEP memberships are substantially overlapping, the US-driven TPP currently does not include China, and the United States is not a party to RCEP. This presents the small and middle powers in both agreements with an opportunity to make their voices heard in ways that affect the major powers.

### *An Opportunity for Institutional Balancing?*

Under the ‘institutional realism’ framework proposed by political scientist Kai He, states engage in realist behavior not only through ‘hard’ or traditional military balancing, but also ‘soft’ balancing tactics. Among those ‘soft’ tools for Southeast Asian states is ‘institutional balancing’: which leverages existing Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, and related groups. Such institutional balancing comes in inclusive and exclusive types, where “the former refers to binding the target states into the institution [and] the latter means keeping the target states out.”<sup>33</sup>

In terms of RCEP and TPP, an ‘exclusive’ balancing scenario would see RCEP states employing institutional means to constrain US power and TPP states using the bloc to balance Chinese power, whereas an ‘inclusive’ mechanism would involve smaller states influencing the larger powers within their blocs, by leveraging the other competing agreement. The past few years of negotiation have indicated a weaker possibility for the former, and a much stronger possibility for the latter.

Many observers have posed an ‘exclusive’ containment scenario, arguing that the TPP is “a part of the US strategy to re-engage with the region and to contain China’s influences there” and that the RCEP is China’s defense against containment.<sup>34</sup> The containment argument, however, does not hold much water.<sup>35</sup> At a basic level, both FTAs have open ascension policies, meaning any nation willing to meet the requirements of the respective FTA is free to join. The ‘high-standard’ requirements for TPP admission will likely preclude China’s ascension in the near-term, but may also act as a carrot to motivate greater market liberalization in China (as did World Trade Organization membership in 2001). Some Chinese analysts predict China to join the TPP in the future.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, in the event that both agreements succeed, all participants in the RCEP and the broad TPP-16 stand to gain, none more so than the United States and China,

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<sup>33</sup> Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balancing of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14(3), August 2008, p. 493.

<sup>34</sup> Lukas Gajdos et al., “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and its impact on EU trade,” *Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Briefing*, February 2013, p. 13. Referencing Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, “Multilateralizing regionalism: what role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?” *The Pacific Review* 24(5), December 2011. David Pilling, “It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but China’ club,” *Financial Times*, May 22, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/08cf74f6-c216-11e2-8992-00144feab7de.html#axzz2U9X6IJK>

<sup>35</sup> Mireya Solis, “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP,” The Brookings Institute, May 24, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis>

<sup>36</sup> Li Jiabo, “China may have ‘missed the boat’ on TPP trade negotiations,” *China Daily*, Dec. 7, 2013, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-12/07/content\\_17159114.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-12/07/content_17159114.htm)

presenting a win-win scenario for all members with an estimated total annual income gain of \$1.2 trillion by 2025.<sup>37</sup>

There is also room for middle and small powers to employ soft inclusive balancing. During negotiations, smaller powers have the ability to affect the resulting agreement directly as negotiating parties and, once concluded, the rules can pressure those inside and outside each bloc. However, since there is some potential for eventual convergence of the blocs, member states may have limited inclusive institutional balancing power as smaller fish in an increasingly crowded pond. Moreover, if large powers succeed in setting the terms of each agreement, any institutional balancing leverage enjoyed by small and middle powers might be outweighed by concessions.

### **Style, Substance, and Strategy in Negotiation**

Public details concerning both the RCEP and TPP are limited. It is still very early in the RCEP negotiations, and the TPP talks have taken place under a high degree of confidentiality, save for a few leaks.

Despite the confidential nature of the negotiations, a witness to the November 2013 TPP meetings in Salt Lake City (hereafter SLC) leaked a draft text as well as a document accounting for each country's positions. While some have disputed the accuracy of the SLC document, the broad strokes of disagreements are clear enough to be illustrative. The document's release and the reaction to the leak show how transparency itself is becoming an area of contention. It also shows how negotiating parties, including small and middle powers, can leverage access to information under conditions of secrecy to bring outside pressure to bear on other parties.

#### *Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and Leaks*

Patent protections for pharmaceutical drugs have been a flashpoint in TPP negotiations, with the latest (publicly released) draft containing some of the most pro-originator intellectual property (IP) rules to date. The core dilemma is how IP norms can encourage innovation while allowing poor consumers access to affordable drugs. Countries that develop drugs wish to maintain strong patent rights, and countries that cannot afford treatment for their people argue that relaxed rights have humanitarian value. The United States has been advocating rules that would benefit global pharmaceutical firms.

From the SLC discussions as well as previous accounts, it is clear that the US position on pharmaceutical IPR has failed to gain traction over the past two years, and is now contributing to negotiation delays. Countries like Australia, Singapore, Chile, New Zealand, and Peru oppose

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<sup>37</sup> Makati Business Club, "TPP, the (Secret) Deal of the Century?" *MBC Research Report*, No. 111, August 2013, p. 7. Data used from Peterson Institute for International Economics and East-West Center. Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer and Fan Zhai. "The Trans Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment." *Policy Analysis in International Economics*, No. 98. Washington. (TPP-16 = \$572.5 billion, RCEP = \$664.8 billion for a total of \$1,237.3 billion)

language that goes beyond existing bilateral FTAs with the United States.<sup>38</sup> The US position not only stands to harm economies like Vietnam and Malaysia – which already suffer severe medicine shortages – but also healthcare systems in Australia and New Zealand if the TPP obstructs the purchase or use of cheaper generic drugs from the region.<sup>39</sup>

In response to the pushback – which was partly fueled by leaked documents – in November 2013, the US announced that it was willing to pursue a “differential approach” and to “tailor potential flexibilities based on countries’ existing laws.”<sup>40</sup> Although the move is ambiguous, it highlights how the strategic use of leaks can extract concessions. Meanwhile, TPP parties who are also in the RCEP bloc are able to use inclusive institutional balancing during TPP negotiations to affect the United States, which faces pressure from its own timeline and from the ramping up of RCEP negotiations.

The case of pharmaceutical IPR is one of many instances in which leaks have become accountability mechanisms. Activists have also seized upon leaks to argue that ‘strong’ IP protections would do significant harm to internet freedom and to investor-state dispute mechanisms; both of which could be perceived as infringing on national sovereignty.<sup>41</sup>

### *Transparency as a Rallying Cry for Opponents*

Leaks may be tactical, but they are even more effective in this case given a broader opposition to the TPP’s perceived lack of transparency. This concern poses a threat to the TPP’s viability, as members of the US Congress have called for greater access to the working draft text, and have the power to block a measure that is a *de facto* prerequisite to US ratification: trade promotion authority (TPA). Under normal rules, members of Congress can propose changes to a bill before it comes up for a vote. With TPA, Congress promises only an ‘up-or-down’ vote on a trade agreement, so long as trade officials follow certain rules.

While international negotiations require a degree of secrecy, the TPP’s lack of transparency has the potential to unravel the agreement once it arrives in countries such as the United States. And even before this, these conditions rendered the US Trade Representative (USTR) office a less credible negotiator, since it cannot fully execute its promises without Congressional approval.

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<sup>38</sup> Solís, p. 7. “TPP State of Play After Salt Lake City 19-24 November 2013 Round of Negotiations,” p. 2, <https://wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/tpp-salt-lake-extracts-.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> Oxfam International, “Putting Public Health at Risk: US proposals under the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) to exacerbate Vietnam’s access to medicines crisis,” Oxfam Media Briefing, March 4, 2013, <http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2013-03-04/us-trade-policy-putting-public-health-risk>.

<sup>40</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Stakeholder Input Sharpens, Focuses US Work on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Nov. 29, 2013, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2013/November/stakeholder-input-sharpens-focuses-us-work-on-pharmaceutical-IP-in-TPP>.

<sup>41</sup> Electronic Frontier Foundation, “TPP Leak Confirms the Worst: US Negotiators Still Trying to Trade Away Internet Freedoms,” Nov. 13, 2013, <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/tpp-leak-confirms-worst-us-negotiators-still-trying-trade-away-internet-freedoms>.

## **Lessons for TPP and RCEP Negotiators**

This paper assumes that greater trade volume, which is anticipated upon completion of the two FTAs, can help ensure regional security. To complete these agreements in the face of these transparency challenges, both TPP and RCEP negotiators should consider the merits of greater transparency for three reasons. First, greater transparency might prevent the discourse around RCEP and TPP from devolving into an oversimplified discussion of bipolar competition between China and the United States. Second, increased transparency and more substantial stakeholder engagement would produce agreements, perhaps less ambitious ones, that would be more likely to receive domestic support within developed and developing nations. Finally, if greater transparency allowed broader buy-in to a country's position, trade representatives might be better able to make good-faith commitments that other parties believe would be upheld and not amended domestically.

For larger economies, the lesson of TPP negotiations is that pushing hard for economic terms that satisfy one industry but arouse opposition from international and domestic interest groups can be very risky, especially in an era of widely published leaks. RCEP negotiators should consider how hard to push their positions in light of these risks.

For smaller economies, institutional balancing may be difficult. The evolution of the pharmaceutical IPR issue and the repercussions of leaks show that any actor in a confidential negotiation can bring political pressure to bear by leaking. For now, leaks are a potential tool for those with a weaker hand. However, if the strongest shift to a more open negotiation with less ambitious targets, this tool's value might be diminished.



## **Keeping Stability in the Peninsula: Old Problems, New Dynamics**

By Ippei Kamae, Virginia Marantidou, and Nanae Yamashiro

The Six-Party Talks (6PT) were established in 2003, creating a platform where the key regional players – the US, China, the two Koreas, Japan and Russia – could discuss possible solutions for the denuclearization of North Korea as well as ways to maintain regional stability. By providing a platform that facilitates communication among distrustful actors and engaging in preventive diplomacy, the 6PT have functioned as a crisis prevention mechanism, contributing to the maintenance of the fragile balance in the Peninsula.

After North Korea's second nuclear test in 2009 however, the talks reached a stalemate because the parties refused to go back to the negotiation table unless North Korea undertook significant steps toward dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. Consequently, the effectiveness and past success of the 6PT has been debated. Recent dynamics, however, have the potential to alter the negotiations' deadlock. These include the new administration in South Korea and its strategy of 'trustpolitik', as well as China's professed accordance with other parties in regards to harsher responses to North Korea's nuclear provocations.

This paper will discuss: (a) opportunities that may arise that will allow China to become more involved in North Korea's denuclearization in the wake of changes seemingly taking place in China's approach to North Korea; (b) the change in negotiation dynamics that South Korea's new administration's 'trustpolitik' might bring and, given all these dynamics; (c) provides recommendations for the US approach to the North Korean nuclear issue.

### **China's Stern Approach to North Korea**

Many agree on two points regarding Beijing's approach to Pyongyang. One is that China, as North Korea's last regional ally, is the only country that has leverage on it and can coerce it into making concessions regarding its nuclear program. The other point is that China is unwilling to do so because of security considerations.<sup>42</sup> North Korea holds a special place in China's geostrategic calculus since it serves as a strategic buffer between China and American troops in the ROK. In addition, regime collapse in the North will not only entail a humanitarian disaster in China's vicinity but also result in a unification whose conditions Beijing can neither control nor

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<sup>42</sup> Bajoria, J. & Xu, B. The China North Korea Relationship : Beijing's Leverage, *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 21, 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097#p5> (accessed, Jan. 25, 2014); Beardson, T. "China support for North Korea is rational" *The Financial Times*, April 23, 2013 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/954c33f6-ac0e-11e2-9e7f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2rgoB39D9> (accessed Jan. 19, 2014); Fisher, M. "Why China still supports North Korea, in six little words", *The Washington Post*, Feb. 12, 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/12/why-china-still-supports-north-korea-in-six-little-words/> (accessed Jan. 19, 2014); ICG, Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close. *Crisis Group Asia Report N°254*, 9 December 2013, p.14; Cossa, R. & Glosserman, B., 2012. The Illogic of China's North Korea Policy. *PacNet #32*, Pacific Forum CSIS

dictate; i.e., a future unified nuclear-armed Korea that is strongly allied with the US. Although, China values denuclearization, it values stability more.

After North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013, however, Beijing seemed to have toughened its approach toward North Korea. It acted in concert with Washington, drafting the 2094 Security Council Resolution that provides for harsh sanctions against North Korea. Unlike before, Beijing seems not only to be following the letter of the law but also its spirit by implementing selected sanctions.

On May 8, 2013, the Bank of China shut down a North Korean Foreign Trade Bank (NK FTB) account with ties to North Korean nuclear and missile programs.<sup>43</sup> Chinese customs procedures were also tightened, ostensibly in an effort to disrupt the transfer of dual-use items that would help North Korea's nuclear program.<sup>44</sup> In the same line, PRC officials openly expressed their displeasure with North Korea's provocative behavior and hardened their tactics toward it. For example, Chinese officials, in meeting with their North Korean counterparts, go through the foreign ministry channel rather than through the ruling communist parties. Since traditionally the interparty relationship has had more importance than the interstate one, this has a political significance indicating that China has lowered the diplomatic approach toward North Korea. China is also giving permission to North Korean refugees confined at the ROK embassy in Beijing to leave for asylum in South Korea.

There is no love lost between China and its ally.<sup>45</sup> As aforementioned, the Bank of China (BOC) recently shut down a NK FTB account that had ties with their nuclearization program, giving no reason for the closure.<sup>46</sup> Although the BOC is one of China's equitized banks, where the government only holds roughly 67.5 percent of its holdings, this move stressed relations between North Korea and China.<sup>47</sup> It is unsure if the PRC government pressured BOC into closing this account. Further ramifications for the people of North Korea came when smaller banks followed BOC's example and close more North Korean accounts.<sup>48</sup> These smaller banks refusal to continue facilitating North Korean accounts has the potential to fundamentally unsettle North Korean businesses.<sup>49</sup> According to financial analyst, Andray Abrahamian, this could represent a shift "into a new, even more risk-averse atmosphere, which will make things very difficult for North Korean traders."<sup>50</sup> As China is a key financial partner with North Korea, this shift could mark either policy changes from the centralized government or financial changes as banks less willing to trade in what could be considered a high-risk environment.

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<sup>43</sup> Snyder & Byun, 2013. China- Korea Relations: How does China solve a problem like North Korea? *Comparative Connections*, Pacific Forum, CSIS, Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 5

<sup>44</sup> Weitz, R., "China and North Korea: New Thinking, Old Policies." *The Diplomat*, Oct 30, 2013 <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/20783/> (accessed Jan. 20, 2014)

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1-32

<sup>46</sup> Abrahamian, A., "China Closes Pyongyang Bank Account", *The Diplomat*, May 27, 2013 <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/china-closes-pyongyang-bank-account/> (accessed Jan. 23, 2014)

<sup>47</sup> Martin M. F., 2012. China's Banking System: Issues for Congress. *Congressional Research Service*, p.3

<sup>48</sup> Abrahamian, A., "China Closes Pyongyang Bank Account", *The Diplomat*, May 27, 2013 <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/china-closes-pyongyang-bank-account/> (accessed Jan. 23, 2014)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, the point of this paper is not to argue that China's shift in strategy is genuine, but to examine its intentions and what opportunities are being erected. China's stern rhetoric and tactics reveal that it has realized that: (a) Pyongyang's brinkmanship deteriorates its security environment as its provocations strengthen US-ROK-Japan strategic relations, causing anxiety in Beijing;<sup>51</sup> (b) Pyongyang disrespected not only Beijing's security considerations but also Beijing itself since Beijing repeatedly warned North Korea not to proceed with the third nuclear test. The fact that North Korea ignored China harms China's image and credibility. Given other Chinese concerns in the East and South China Seas, Pyongyang might be losing its strategic value. The stricter measures, at least in terms of symbolism, as well as the instigation of a more open debate amongst Chinese experts, netizens, and policy makers in China over North Korea's strategic importance are important signs.<sup>52</sup>

Despite a tougher stance, China's dissatisfaction with North Korea has not been translated into drastic measures against the DPRK. For instance, Beijing did not increase pressure by disrupting oil supplies, highlighting China's prioritization of stability on the peninsula. To China, US methods for denuclearization equate to regime collapse and unfavorable regional security arrangements, indicating the potential loss of a strategically important buffer zone.

Incorporating the above Chinese strategic priorities into a realistic policy may lead to the resumption of the 6PT and North Korea's denuclearization. How? South Korea's 'trustpolitik' may have the answer.

### **President Park's "Trustpolitik"**

President Park Geun-Hye's 'trustpolitik' toward North Korea constitutes a departure from previous administrations' policies. The Roh and Kim administrations' 'Sunshine policy' provided unconditional assistance to Pyongyang. This complicated negotiations not only because they approached North Korea unilaterally, but it is believed that Roh and Kim gave North Korea space to develop their nuclear capabilities, only encouraging them to become more demanding. Lee's administration on the other hand, with its hawkish approach, not only cut inter-Korean channels of communications, but also alienated important regional players such as China.

Park's 'trustpolitik' seems to be different because it balances both approaches. On one hand, she is willing to cooperate with the North, providing economic assistance and aid on the condition that verifiable steps taken by the DPRK toward denuclearization occur. At the same time, it seeks to deepen and strengthen its deterrence posture, including its defense alliance with the US, against the North's acts of aggression. 'trustpolitik' seeks to enhance cooperation and communication with the North from a position of strength, demonstrating, if necessary, consequences in response to North Korea's actions.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> *BBC News*, March 19, 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21840215> (accessed Dec. 17, 2013).

<sup>52</sup> Ren, X. "China Debates DPRK Policy", *Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet*, #55R, July 22, 2013, pp.1-3.

<sup>53</sup> Park Geun-Hye, 2011. "A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang", *World Politics Review*, September/October Issue; Ministry of Unification, 2013. Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,

Although ‘trustpolitik’'s main audience is North Korea, it can bring about a rapprochement with China over the question of denuclearization. China’s approach toward North Korea is not expected to radically change, but accommodating Chinese concerns might make Beijing more cooperative.

Park’s administration promises an incremental process of denuclearization. It starts with humanitarian assistance, continues with inter-Korean economic, social, and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and leads to a third stage in which mutual trust allows for denuclearization and unification.<sup>54</sup> The first two steps accommodate Chinese fears of an imminent regime collapse that isolation could cause. At the same time, they suit longtime Chinese aspirations for economic reforms in the North. Humanitarian assistance will go through official international humanitarian programs and NGOs in an effort to reach the common people in the North rather than flow through its military, while economic cooperation has a shared-benefit character that also targets ordinary people.<sup>55</sup> These steps have the potential of bringing reforms through a bottom-up process if economic relations both within North Korea and between North Korea and the world transform. Although reforms might lead to regime collapse, in Park’s articulation of ‘trustpolitik’, there is no such intent. In addition, the verifiable steps are carefully designed to be realistic, which does not ask for full denuclearization from the beginning. These two facts accommodate the Chinese and the North Koreans.

If Pyongyang continues its brinkmanship, Park’s ‘trustpolitik’ will have strong reactions. The Park administration has provided credible evidence of these intentions by signing the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, which would allow the US to provide support to South Korean forces against localized provocations carried out by the North.<sup>56</sup> Such an outcome would be bad for China, putting it in an unfavorable security environment. North Korea, by deliberately refusing to take a good deal by the South and ignoring Beijing in its decision-making will only spark further doubts over its geostrategic value. This gives Beijing incentives to push Pyongyang toward concessions, both in an effort to alter the hostile environment and to show to North Korea who has the upper hand in this relationship.

Seoul has thrown down the gauntlet to Pyongyang, offering an exit from its dead-end policies. Through proposals such as the Eurasian Initiative which “envisions connecting the Eurasian continent’s divided logistics network (...) to make the continent a viable single entity” and statements such as “unification is certainly a matter for the Korean people to decide, but it should be achieved with the support of the neighboring countries, ensuring that it benefits all

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Republic of Korea; Cheon, S. 2013. Trust – The Underlying Philosophy of the Park Geun-Hye Administration, CSIS

<sup>54</sup> Klinger, B., The US Should Support New South Korean President’s Approach to North Korea, *The Heritage Foundation*, April 11, 2013; <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/the-us-should-support-new-south-korean-presidents-approach-to-north-korea> (accessed Jan. 25, 2014); Przystup, J., 2013. “Triangulation and Trustpolitik,” *PacNet*, #43 Pacific Forum, CSIS

<sup>55</sup> “Singapore and Other Militaries Conclude the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM Exercise,” *Asian Military Review*, June 2, 2013. <http://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/saf-and-other-militaries-conclude-the-admm-plus-hadrm-exercise/>

<sup>56</sup> Teo, S. 2013. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: Will Park’s *Trustpolitik* Work? *RSIS*, Commentary No. 051/2013

parties in the region”<sup>57</sup> Park indicates that the main obstacle is the lack of trust.<sup>58</sup> Having China ‘trust’ Park’s ‘trustpolitik’ is a way to have it deeper engaged in the denuclearization process.

### **US Perspectives and Policy Recommendations:**

Meanwhile, the US has been asked to take the initiative to put an end to North Korea’s nuclear development. The US has used a variety of negotiation patterns and approaches, ranging from soft-line with engagement, financial inducements, security assurances, and dialogue, to hard-line with sanctions, isolation, and strong deterrence.<sup>59</sup> However, nothing seems to have worked. The Obama administration has resolved to embrace ‘strategic patience’ which, however, perpetuates the status quo.

On the other hand, the US Congress pressures the administration to adopt a firmer stance against North Korea.<sup>60</sup> North Korea, however, is still able to acquire resources from China. Given these obstacles, the US should support President Park’s trustpolitik for the following reasons:

- ‘trustpolitik’ has the potential to harmonize the US, ROK and China’s different approaches. Trilateral US-ROK-China dialogue on common challenges posed by North Korea provides a great opportunity to mitigate strategic misunderstandings.<sup>61</sup> Through such initiatives, the US and ROK could lower Chinese anxieties and negotiate assurances on regional security arrangements. Alleviating China’s fears over the aftermath of a breakdown in the North could ease doubts about exercising tougher leverage on North Korea. Assurances could include:
  - a) After unification, promises not to deploy US bases near the Chinese border;
  - b) Discussions of possible reductions of US forces in a post-unified Korea;
  - c) Creating the principles of a nuclear-free Peninsula by concluding a peace treaty;
  - d) Identifying a possible role for Beijing in future security arrangements; and
  - e) Convincing China that a liberal unified neighboring Korea serves Chinese economic interests and can lead to regional prosperity.
- ‘Trustpolitik’ does not offer unconditional economic rewards to North Korea while it calls for strengthening the US-ROK alliance in the face of DPRK’s provocations. This is in concert with the Obama administration’s stance, creating a common front and the impression of an aligned approach towards the North.

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<sup>57</sup> Park Geun-Hye, “Reinventing the Inter-Korean Relationship”, *Project Syndicate*, Jan. 7, 2014 <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/geun-hye-park-lays-out-her-government-s-plan-for-building-trust-between-north-and-south-korea> (accessed Jan. 21, 2014)

<sup>58</sup> *ibid*

<sup>59</sup> Revere, E.J.R., 2013. Facing the Facts: Towards a New US North Korea Policy, CNAPS Working Paper, *The Brookings Institution*, pp.1-24

<sup>60</sup> Snyder, A.S., 2013. US Policy Toward North Korea, *Council on Foreign Relations* <http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962> (accessed Jan. 31, 2014)

<sup>61</sup> *ibid*

In a parallel way, the US should strengthen the sanctions regime. North Korea's lucrative illegal activities, such as the smuggling of nuclear materials or counterfeit currency and goods, provides financial support for the regime and thus complicates negotiations on economic assistance. Cutting off this bloodline has the potential to:

- a) Give a one-way option to the North to survive by engaging in legal economic activities including ones that South Korea offers;
- b) Alienate the regime from the elites that enjoy the benefits of these activities;
- c) Strengthen support from the part of the international community that are indifferent to North Korea's denuclearization but care about international law through delinking North Korea's illegal activities from nuclearization. China will want to maintain its image as a responsible actor and be cautious about activities that are connected to Chinese networks.

'Trustpolitik' might be able to create a new momentum in the 6PT. As the 6PT offer a tested ground for negotiations, their resumption could help South Korea to further clarify 'trustpolitik' to other involved parties. Similarly, as 'trustpolitik' can function as a policy to balance and align different opinions over denuclearization, the US should support South Korea to take the lead within the negotiations.

## **South China Sea: From Technical Cooperation to Mutual Trust?**

By Wendy Leutert, Jennifer McArdle, and Sachi Gerbin

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was signed in 2002 between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the primary aim of avoiding violent conflict in disputed waters. Advocates argue that the DoC has served important functions: promoting multilateral discussions about the disputed territories, building mutual trust among claimants, and stabilizing conflict by setting shared expectations for state behavior. Yet negotiations on a legally binding Code of Conduct have been mired in stalemate for the past decade. A Code of Conduct would establish legally binding rules to enforce the principles outlined in the DoC, but claimants diverge sharply in their views about its specific content and scope. Amid soaring tensions over territorial boundaries in the East China Sea and ongoing confrontations in the South China Sea, progress toward a legally binding Code of Conduct appears more unlikely than ever. Given the hardening of sovereignty claims in the Asia-Pacific, what initiatives can policy-makers take to promote mutual trust in the South China Sea?

The DoC established five areas for potential technical cooperation: marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, search and rescue operations, safe navigation and communication at sea, and combatting transnational crime. Critics rightly note that even successful technical cooperation among claimant states does not directly advance negotiations on a legally binding Code of Conduct, and that such efforts have been sporadic, often contentious, and constrained in both scope and impact. However, technical cooperation – more broadly, science diplomacy – has been used throughout history as a mechanism to build mutual trust and improve relations between states. Given the current political atmosphere, substantive multilateral negotiations over a peaceful settlement to disputed sovereignty claims in the South China Sea are extremely unlikely. Technical cooperation remains the only viable option at present upon which to build mutual trust among claimant countries.

This article will proceed in two parts. First, it will explain how science diplomacy and technical cooperation can strengthen state-to-state relations. Science diplomacy has been used in the past as an instrument of soft power and a mechanism to bolster mutual trust in diplomatic relations. However, there are also limits to its ability to influence state behavior. Second, it will critically assess the progress of science and technical cooperation in building trust among parties to the DoC. While some technical cooperation has occurred, new initiatives are urgently needed to complement and reinvigorate stalled multilateral efforts under the DoC framework. The article concludes by proposing a new ecosystem-based management approach to fisheries in the South China Sea, to enhance future technical cooperation and build mutual trust among claimant countries.

### *The Soft Power of Science Diplomacy*

‘Science diplomacy’, the use of science as a foreign policy tool to build deeper state-to-state relations or simply alleviate a given area of tension, is employed by states across the world.

While the US has historically taken the lead in promoting science diplomacy, it has also been used as an effective soft power instrument and means to build mutual trust by many other countries such as the UK, South Korea, Israel, Canada, Brazil, as well as many nongovernmental organizations. In late November 2013, the World Science Forum convened participants from over 100 countries in Rio de Janeiro to discuss the increasingly interdependent nature of science and foreign policy. History is replete with examples demonstrating the transformative potential of science in establishing deeper diplomatic relations despite strained ties between states. Indeed, science played an integral role in the Sino-US rapprochement of 1972 and the easing of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. More recently, science diplomacy has been used as a tool to build networks of trust between American, British, and North Korean scientists. Since 2011, British and US scientists have actively engaged their DPRK counterparts to install six seismometer stations outside Mt. Paektu in North Korea. This initiative represents the first engagement of its kind between US and DPRK scientists at a time when no formal diplomatic relationship existed between the US and North Korea.<sup>62</sup>

To further examine the draws of utilizing soft power, Joseph Nye's seminal work, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," will be explained and analyzed. Nye outlines the mechanisms by which a state can wield soft power – coopting rather than coercing others into like-minded opinions. Nye asserts, "seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive."<sup>63</sup> Science, with its transformative societal potential, is immensely seductive to governments throughout the world. Science is essential for economic development, military security, health, and innovation. Moreover, the basic nature of science lends itself to being an effective foreign policy instrument. The fundamental principles of science – rationality, transparency, and universality – are the same the world over, allowing people to communicate in a common language. As Micah Lowenthal writes, "scientific discussions have the advantage of being fact-based, potentially more objective than typical diplomatic discussions, and in many cases less susceptible to the vicissitudes of standard diplomatic relations."<sup>64</sup> Discussing the scientific implications of international or diplomatic issues provides an alternative bilateral or multilateral means of communication: it allows officials to step beyond the policy gridlock straining diplomatic relations and find a concrete alternative mechanism to work together.

But despite science diplomacy's potential as a tool to build mutual trust amid strained diplomatic ties, critics note that its actual impact on foreign policy may be limited. First, and most importantly, the transnational community of scientists it creates may have little direct influence on policymaking. The institutional mechanisms through which dialogue and the mutual trust built through scientific and technical collaboration shapes – or even reaches – conversation among foreign policy decision-makers is often unclear. In addition, the ability of science diplomacy to affect public opinion may be equally limited. Disputes over sovereignty claims in

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<sup>62</sup> Meagan Phelan, "New Partners Keep Watch Over North Korean Volcano," *AAAS News* (Sept. 5, 2013).  
Retrievable at: <http://www.aaas.org/news/new-partners-keep-watch-over-north-korean-volcano>. For an other example of how science diplomacy has been used to bolster relations on the Korean Peninsula, see: Stephanie Kang, "Science Diplomacy in North Korea," *ISN ETH Zurich* (Nov. 14, 2013).

<sup>63</sup> Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) p. x.

<sup>64</sup> Micah Lowenthal, "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," USIP Special Report (2011).



the South China Sea have fanned nationalist sentiment among the publics of claimant states, circumscribing their governments' ability to negotiate and reach compromise over contested territories. While science diplomacy may foster dialogue among governments, its elite-based nature and the relatively small scale of collaborative projects make it less likely to shape popular nationalist sentiment. Finally, the initiation of science diplomacy must first overcome skepticism, or even suspicion, about its effectiveness and motives. Critics suggest that scientific and technical cooperation in the South China Sea may be mere diplomatic window dressing, and that the parties involved lack both the sustained commitment and sincerity of purpose needed to move beyond *ad-hoc* collaboration and toward real mutual trust.

Keeping these limitations in mind, what future scientific initiatives can build mutual trust among claimant states in the South China Sea? And, more importantly, what programmatic framework for scientific cooperation provides the best chance of actually influencing the ongoing DoC policy dialogue? Science diplomacy at its core is a results-oriented foreign policy tool – how can concrete scientific results help to achieve broader foreign policy goals?

### *Assessing Recent Scientific and Technical Cooperation under the DoC*

In 2011, nearly a decade after the signing of the DoC, ASEAN and China adopted concrete guidelines for its implementation. In 2012, the following science-related activities were held to advance the goal of technical cooperation under the DoC framework: a Workshop on Marine Hazard Prevention and Mitigation in the South China Sea, a Workshop on Marine Ecosystems and Biodiversity, and a Symposium on Marine Ecological Environment and Monitoring Techniques.<sup>65</sup> Committees were formed on four of the five areas of collaboration outlined in the DoC. No committee on the safety of navigation and communication at sea was established, likely due to political sensitivities surrounding delineation of maritime borders. Although China has offered to fund actual cooperative projects in the areas of agreed potential collaboration, none have been carried out.<sup>66</sup>

### *Fishing for Peace? The Need for a New EBM Initiative in the South China Sea*

Littoral states to the South China Sea have put forward competing claims to its marine resources, resulting in hotly contested fishing zones. This was demonstrated most recently in January 2014, when China provoked international concern by announcing that foreign vessels must first seek Chinese permission to fish in waters under the jurisdiction of Hainan, China's southernmost province.<sup>67</sup> This action underscored the importance of fisheries management for building the mutual trust essential to long-term regional cooperation, and for minimizing the risk of conflict among claimant states in the near term.

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<sup>65</sup> ASEAN-CHINA Dialogue Relations. Dec. 19, 2012. Retrieval at: <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-china-dialogue-relations>

<sup>66</sup> Carlyle Thayer. ASEAN and China Consultations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: Prospects and Obstacles. Paper presented to The International Conference on Security and Cooperation in the South China Sea Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Oct. 18, 2013. Retrieval at: <http://www.iacspsea.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Thayer-Russian-Academy-of-Sciences-SCS-Paper.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> "The South China Sea: Hai-handed", *The Economist*, Jan. 18-24, 2014. Retrieval at: <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21594355-china-creates-adiz-fish-hai-handed>

The economic and cultural importance of fishery resources have previously provided a rationale for increased civilian patrols in the South China Sea and a rallying point for nationalist sentiment. Declining fish stocks and government encouragement have driven fishing vessels farther into disputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), where they frequently clash with the law enforcement vessels of other claimants. The degradation of fishing stocks – and the multiplication of maritime conflicts – can be directly linked to overfishing and the region’s lack of a sustainable fishery management system.<sup>68</sup> Scientific dialogues and early stage scientific interactions among conservation scientists, climate specialists, marine biologists, oceanographers, and other scientific stakeholders have the potential to maintain and generate long-term increases in fish stock in the South China Sea, building mutual trust and minimizing the fishing vessel clashes that could possibly lead to diplomatic or even military conflict.<sup>69</sup>

Previous bilateral efforts have been made to establish Joint Fishery Committees (JFC) and Joint Fishing Zones (JFZ) in the South China Sea. For example, China established a JFC with Vietnam in 2004 under the Gulf of Tonkin Agreement.<sup>70</sup> The Sino-Vietnamese JFC was an important step because it established maritime fishing boundaries between the two claimant states and a joint cooperative fisheries management program, complete with fishing regulations and a dispute settlement mechanism. The major role of the JFC is to determine the quota of fishing vessels allowed in the joint resource management area each year. As David Rosenberg explains, “the JFC [between China and Vietnam] employs a ‘quantity control approach’ that quantifies the total allowable catch (TAC) of several target species, the status of each resource, the extent of traditional fishing activities, modern fishing methods and management, and then derives the allowable number of vessels.”<sup>71</sup> But existing agreements are primarily bilateral and the JFZs are limited to managing fisheries in narrowly defined geographical areas. A more comprehensive, multilateral ecosystem-based management (EBM) approach is urgently needed to manage fisheries and maritime resource extraction in the South China Sea.

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<sup>68</sup> International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report Number 233, April 23, 2012. Retrieval at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.pdf>

<sup>69</sup> While it is difficult to isolate science diplomacy’s role in ameliorating conflict, it has played an integral role in building trust among different parties in conflict zones. Multiple early stage scientific interactions have helped build trust and create long lasting development results. For example, the Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) program is a competitive research grants program, financed by the US Agency for International Development, which supports cooperation between Arab and Israeli scientists. Various MERC scientific collaborative grants have raised the quality of life for children with cerebral palsy, designed an approach for diagnosing Epidermolysis bullosa (EB) a prevalent inherited skin disease in the Middle East, and facilitated agricultural resistance breeding. For more information see: <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/middle-east-regional-cooperation-program>.

<sup>70</sup> Other bilateral fisheries agreements in the region include Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) on fisheries cooperation between Vietnam and the Phillipines, and between Vietnam and Indonesia.

<sup>71</sup> David Rosenberg, “Managing the Resources of the China Seas”, *The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, June 30, 2005. Retrieval at <http://www.japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1789>

An ecosystem-based management approach is essential for the sustainability of fisheries and building mutual trust in the region.<sup>72</sup> Scientific evaluations and collaborations on fisheries must move from a mono-species approach at the national level to a multi-species, ecosystem approach at the multilateral level. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility both advocate such an EBM approach to fisheries management. EBM seeks to manage “human uses at a scale that encompasses its impact on marine and coastal ecosystem functions, rather than scales defined by jurisdictional boundaries.”<sup>73</sup> In the South China Sea, an ecosystem-based approach will enable a comprehensive understanding of functioning marine ecosystems by providing information on the environmental factors affecting the natural viability of the stocks of exploited species, predator-prey relationships, ocean structures and patterns, breeding grounds, and the environmental impact of fisheries.<sup>74</sup>

While an ecosystem-based approach is the optimal way to ensure the sustainability of fisheries in the South China Sea, the UNEP program remains highly abstract, in both theory and practice. The Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) has begun to implement an EBM approach in the Coral Triangle region in the seas near the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Malaysia.<sup>75</sup> However, it has not yet expanded to the South China Sea. Furthermore, two additional challenges remain: the physical management of fisheries and enforcement of fishing regulations in the South China Sea is weak, and there is a lack of funding for concrete EBM approaches. Most importantly, the scientific capacity gaps between various East Asian and Southeast Asian states remain vast, limiting the ability of some governments’ policies to align with scientific best practices. An effective EBM approach would seek to build regional marine scientific capacity, a regional scientific network for effective EBM science and best practices, and mutual trust among participants.

Given the direct connection between sustainable fisheries management and promoting durable peace in the Asia-Pacific region, a new initiative is needed to complement stalemated efforts for scientific and technical cooperation under the DoC framework. Specifically, the following steps should be taken to build an ecosystem-based approach for sustainable marine resource extraction among claimant states:

1. A scientific advisory committee should be established under the auspices of the DoC. Simply creating a new EBM initiative between claimant states will not generate mutual trust; it is essential that it be linked to policy discussions under the DoC. This advisory committee should be composed of scientific and policy experts

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<sup>72</sup> From a scientific perspective, the argument is that by improving the overall environment of the sea, the populations of life essential to fisheries will improve as well, thus creating a more sustainable solution to fishing stock depletion.

<sup>73</sup> Tundi Agardy, John Davis, Kristin Sherwood, Ole Vestergaard, “Taking Steps toward Marine and Coastal Ecosystem-Based Management,” United Nations Environment Program, 2011. Retrieval at: <http://www.unep.org/ecosystemmanagement/Publications/Publication/tabid/439/language/en-US/Default.aspx?BookID=6200>

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid* and Manuel Barange, “Ecosystem science and the sustainable management of marine resources: from Rio to Johannesburg,” *Frontiers in Ecological Environments*, 1.4 (2003) 190-196. Retrieval at: [http://tiee.esa.org/vol/v2/issues/frontier\\_sets/marine/pdf/Frontiers-Barange.pdf](http://tiee.esa.org/vol/v2/issues/frontier_sets/marine/pdf/Frontiers-Barange.pdf)

<sup>75</sup> For more information on CTI see: <http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/about-us>

from each of the claimant states and experts from select nongovernmental and international organizations, such as the Global Environment Facility, Conservation International, or the Asian Development Bank.

2. The advisory committee will be tasked with ensuring the EBM programs' scientific findings are shared regularly with policy officials in each claimant state – through ministries of science or foreign policy – to build shared understandings of the status of the marine environment and principles for its future management. This will also ensure governments – particularly those with greater gaps in scientific capacity – are aware there is a developing scientific community they can utilize for scientific and policy advice.<sup>76</sup>
3. It is essential to convene a regional meeting of scientists at the track 1.5 level with the aim of developing scientific capacity, generating trust, and building a regional network of key scientific and policy stakeholders. This meeting would provide a venue for scientists to discuss EBM and propose new areas of scientific research in EBM in the South China Sea. Ideally the meeting would provide a venue for scientists to identify scientists from other claimant states with mutual research interests, providing the personal basis for them to consider near to long-term scientific engagement.
4. Additionally, funding from multiple independent sources should be provided for early stage scientific interactions between claimant state scientists on scientific and policy issues identified at the meeting.<sup>77</sup> Examples of early-stage interactions on EBM to be supported under this scheme include student and faculty fellowships or more substantial awards for technical workshops, laboratory work, or virtual joint research. The scientific findings from these interactions will inform the policy dialogue under the DoC.

These suggestions build on current EBM efforts by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Programs such as Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), funded by the UNDP, that attempted to implement an EBM approach to fisheries. However, territorial conflicts among claimant states largely caused the initiative to fail. But this failure was not necessarily a function of an EBM approach to fisheries, but rather a result of the methods used to implement the program. PEMSEA expands the definition of an EBM approach beyond a strict scientific and technical approach to an approach that attempts to tackle all the challenges to South China Sea

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<sup>76</sup> The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP) is spearheading an EBM based science diplomacy initiative in the South China Sea. AAAS has a proven track record of developing concrete mechanisms and frameworks that help translate scientific findings and dialogues into broader policy dialogues. For more information on the AAAS South China Sea EBM program, see: <http://www.aaas.org/program/center-science-technology-and-security-policy> or contact [CSTSPInfo@aaas.org](mailto:CSTSPInfo@aaas.org)

<sup>77</sup> Funding could be solicited from organizations and foundations with a focus on development and science, such as the Asian Development Bank, the McArthur Foundation, or the Rockefeller Foundation. Likewise, the DoC could facilitate donations from each of the claimant state governments to support these early stage interactions. Given advisors from each of the claimant states will be on the advisory committee, an external scientific nongovernmental organization would be best placed to facilitate and manage the grants. This would ensure objectivity in the selection and scientific process.

sustainability: governance, management, monitoring, and economic assessment issues.<sup>78</sup> While at first glance this may seem to be a positive implementation method, it is essential to incorporate all requisite stakeholders – government, NGOs, and industry – to attempt to congruently address the myriad of challenges preventing South China Sea sustainability.<sup>79</sup> However, when the environment and stakeholder relationships are characterized by a lack of trust, issues such as governance, management, and monitoring tend to get mired in policy discussions, which can cause the overall program to fail. In contrast, this study’s proposed EBM approach is far narrower and seeks to strictly use science as a tool to begin building trust, setting aside these controversial policy issues to focus first on confidence-building measures. The goal is to use science as a mechanism to implement an EBM approach while also building trust, which can later be used to advance policy dialogue.

### *The Future Potential of Science Diplomacy in the South China Sea*

A new EBM scientific initiative in the South China Sea has the potential to promote sustainable marine resource extraction – and more importantly, lasting regional peace – in two specific ways. First, it would build mutual trust by developing a transnational network of scientists and related national ministries and thereby enabling their regular communication, interaction, and potential long-term collaboration. Second, greater sustainability of fishing stocks and better regional fisheries management will slow the decline of marine resources, thus decreasing the likelihood of fishing vessels crossing into disputed territories and causing clashes that can lead to diplomatic or even military conflict. Given the lack of progress in scientific and technical cooperation over the past decade under the DoC framework, a new EBM scientific initiative will provide a vital alternate mechanism to promote the multilateral cooperation and mutual trust so urgently needed in the South China Sea.

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<sup>78</sup> Chua Thia-Eng, “Regional Cooperation in Ecosystem-based Management in the Seas of East Asia: The Partnership Approach,” United Nations, PEMSEA. Retrievable at: [http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative\\_process/documents/7\\_Chua2.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/documents/7_Chua2.pdf)

<sup>79</sup> While it seems PEMSEA did include some scientists (for example, to develop the technical aspects of the State of the Coasts (SOC) reporting system), Chua Thia-Eng does not include them as a separate stakeholder group. Including scientists from academia that are separate from NGOs, government, and industry should help preserve some of the scientific integrity of the technical process. Not all academic institutions in South China Sea littoral states are autonomous from stakeholder groups mentioned above; academic selection should be based on institution reputation, peer-reviewed publication, and autonomy.

# **APPENDIX A**

## **About the Authors**

**Ens. Kristen ASDAL (USA)** is a native of Chester, New Jersey, where she grew up with her four sisters. She graduated from the United States Naval Academy in May 2013 with a BS in Chinese. While at USNA, she shot on the international pistol team and completed several intensive language study programs in China. She is currently living in Taipei executing a Fulbright Scholarship to study maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. Next year she will complete a degree in contemporary Chinese studies at Oxford University, and the following year report to her first ship, DDG 112 USS MICHAEL MURPHY in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

**Mr. Elliot BRENNAN (AUS)** Elliot Brennan is a Contributing Analyst with Wikistrat (USA) and a Research Fellow with the Institute for Security and Development (Sweden). His research focuses on conflict management and resource security in the Asia-Pacific/ Southeast Asia region, with a current focus on Myanmar and Vietnam. He holds a Masters in European and International Studies from Monash University, Australia. He holds a Diploma in International Crisis Management from the Swedish National Defence College. He has also undertaken studies at Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden), Centre for Disaster and Emergency Management (Spain), Institut d'Études Politiques (France), London School of Journalism (UK), and Université de Lyon III (France). Prior to starting at ISDP, Elliot worked as a consultant and journalist across five continents specializing in emerging economies.

**Capt. Jon CHEATWOOD (USA)** currently serves as the Deputy S-3, Chief of Operations for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division where he is responsible for the daily management of garrison operations and executing command and control responsibilities upon deployment across PACOM. Jon was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 2006 and graduated from the US Military Academy with a BS in American politics. He has deployed to Iraq and most recently Afghanistan where he commanded Delta Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 35<sup>th</sup> Infantry. Following completion of his tour in Hawaii, Jon will attend the Fletcher School, Tufts University to pursue a MA in law and diplomacy, followed by subsequent assignment as a member of the rotating military faculty at West Point.

**Mr. Young-june CHUNG (KOR)** is a PhD candidate at China Foreign Affairs University and part-time researcher at the Center for US-China Relations at Tsinghua University. He received his BA and MA in political science and international studies from Yonsei University. He has interned with the Institute of East and West Studies at Yonsei, US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea in Washington, DC and was a military police for the Republic of Korea Presidential Security Service.

**Dr. C. Sachi GERBIN (USA)** is the 2013-2014 US resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received a BS in biology from Harvey Mudd College, and a PhD in biological chemistry from UCLA, specializing in cell and cancer biology. Sachi has taught science to a broad audience, as a high school biology teacher in Japan through the JET Program,

and as a writer for Nature Publishing Group's education website. She was a Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy fellow at the National Academies. Sachi's current research project focuses on strengthening the US-Japan alliance by examining biosecurity and biopreparedness in these two countries.

**Mr. Yan-ying HUANG (TWN)** is a PhD candidate from Institute of East-Asian Studies, National Chengchi University. His research interests are cross-strait relations, Chinese politics and security issues in East Asia. He received his BA in political science from National Chung-Chung University in 2004 and a MA in cross-strait relations and China studies from National Taiwan University in 2007. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan from 2007 to 2008 at the Research and Planning committee. He also worked in a policy think tank, Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies (in Taipei), as an assistant director from 2008 to 2012.

**Mr. Ippei KAMAE (JPN)** is a PhD candidate at Boston University, an intelligence analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a researcher/assistant to former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (US-China Relations Project). Previously, he was a project researcher for the Constitutional Revision in Japan Project at the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University and was an intern in the office of Mr. Shinzo Abe. Ippei's areas of specialization include: Asia-Pacific, international relations, Japanese diplomacy and nuclear proliferation in East Asia. His dissertation is titled "Hedging on Taboo? Understanding Japan's Nuclear Logic and Behavior: 1945-2010." He received his LLB and LLM in political science from Keio University.

**Ms. Stephanie Nayong KANG (USA)** is a resident Kelly fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. She was previously a program associate for the International Strategic and Reconciliation Foundation, a non-profit organization aimed at promoting humanitarian aid and science diplomacy with North Korea. She received her MA in international studies from the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University, and her BA with honors in political science from the University of California, Irvine. Stephanie's current research interests are in US-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation toward North Korean issues, Northeast Asian regionalization, and East Asian regional security cooperation.

**Mr. Daniel KATZ (USA)** is a PhD Candidate in strategic studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. His research focus is defense diplomacy. He holds a BA from Yale University in international studies and classics (Latin) and a double MSc degree in international affairs (Merit) from the London School of Economics and Peking University. He has previously worked at the Center for a New American Security, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, and the US Department of State.

**Ms. Wendy LEUTERT (USA)** is a third-year PhD student in the government department at Cornell University, currently based in Beijing from 2013-2014 as a visiting scholar at Peking University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Her research examines the effect of state ownership on Chinese companies' investment behavior in the mining and construction industries in Africa. She is also co-organizer of "Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: Domestic Evolution, International Influence", a year-long research study with Chinese junior faculty

funded by a Lehman Grant from Cornell. Previously, she became the first American to earn a Master's degree in international relations (Mandarin program) from Tsinghua University. She also worked as a researcher for International Crisis Group in Beijing, and as a student research assistant for the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy. She is a current Lee fellow for World Affairs and a Chinese Scholarship Council fellow.

**Ms. Virginia MARANTIDOU (GRC)** is a non-resident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and a Chinese Government Scholarship recipient, currently studying Mandarin at Hunan Normal University. She holds an MSc in Asian politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and a BA in international and European studies from Panteion University of Athens. She also spent one year at Science Po Bordeaux, specializing in political sciences and international relations. Her research interests revolve around defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, with China as her main focus. These include, among others, China's naval power and strategy. Most recently she worked as an editor at the International Relations and Security Network, ISN, Zurich, while previously she cooperated with various international relations institutes in Greece. She has also worked as a freelancer business consultant for European firms engaged in the Chinese market.

**Ms. Jennifer MCARDLE (USA)** is a program associate at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. Jennifer was previously a visiting fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a visiting fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Prior to moving to India, Jennifer served as a contractor at the US National Defense University. Jennifer's published work has featured in the Asia Times, Real Clear World, The Diplomat, the ORF Occasional Papers, and ORF CyFy. Jennifer has an MPhil from the University of Cambridge in politics and a BA from the University of New Hampshire in political science and justice studies. Jennifer was selected as one of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and the Diplomatic Courier's 2012 Top 99 under 33 in Foreign Policy.

**Ms. Megan STRAUSSER (USA)** is a graduate student at Hawaii Pacific University earning a Master of Arts in diplomacy and military studies. She graduated with an international studies BA from Arcadia University with a concentration in globalization, development and human rights. She also holds certificates in restorative justice and national security. In pursuit of these degrees, Megan has studied abroad in the Republic of Ireland and Tanzania as well as field study trips to Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Serbia. Her field studies focused on conflict resolution and governance, and culminated in generating policy recommendations. Currently she holds an executive position as secretary of HPU's Association of Diplomacy and Military Studies. Research interests include state building, governance, and national security.

**Maj. Michael SULLIVAN (USA)** is an active duty officer in the US Air Force, currently stationed in Beijing as an Olmsted Scholar. He is a graduate student at Tsinghua University enrolled in the Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy program, focusing on security relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Previously, as a fellow at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, he worked on numerous contracts involving NASA's International Space Station at the Johnson Space Center in Clear Lake, Texas. Michael is an aircraft commander and instructor pilot with nearly



1,000 combat hours spanning three deployments to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He is a graduate of the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program, holds a MS in mechanical engineering from Rice University, and a BS in engineering mechanics from the United States Air Force Academy.

**Mr. Yu-peng TENG (PRC)** obtained his BS from Shandong University. After graduation, he worked as a translator and interpreter from 2003 to 2006. Since 2006, he has been teaching English in a private educational institute. Yu-peng had been continuing his postgraduate studies at Renmin University from 2004 to 2006. He joined Marine Research Center in 2011.

**Mr. Nate WALTON (USA)** is a principal at Sachem Strategies, a consulting firm headquartered in Boston and Washington, DC. Nate's career in public policy began at Bates College, where he served as state chairman of the Maine College Republicans, which received national recognition for excellence in youth political activism during his tenure. Upon graduation, Nate accepted a position at Harvard, where he managed a US Defense Department grant that designed innovative technology systems for measuring US military inventions. His work has included advising the Romney/Ryan presidential campaign on defense policy issues, especially defense spending, military readiness, and national security. He was also a top-tier fundraiser for the campaign, achieving the highest fundraiser level, Stripes (\$500,000+), as well as serving as a national chair of the ticket's youth coalition. Today, Nate's work primarily focuses on providing counsel to defense and technology companies on federal/state government relations.

**Mr. Graham WEBSTER (USA)** is a Beijing- and New Haven-based fellow at the Yale Law School China Center, where he researches US-China relations and manages high-level track-two bilateral dialogues. He is also an adjunct instructor of East Asian politics at the New York University Center for Global Affairs. His research focuses on the technology, the Internet, and politics in China and among countries—including cybersecurity, the online public sphere, and e-government. He has worked at the Center for American Progress and consulted for the Natural Resources Defense Council China Program, the National Bureau of Asian Research, and the Clinton Global Initiative. His writing has appeared in The Boston Globe, Fortune, Al Jazeera English, Talking Points Memo, CNET, China-US Focus, and elsewhere. He holds a Master's in East Asian studies from Harvard University and a Bachelor's in journalism and international studies from Northwestern University.

**Ms. Nanae YAMASHIRO (JPN)** is a resident Vasey fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and is currently enrolled in a PhD program at the University of Tsukuba, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences. She completed her BA (international relations, 2009) and MA (international political economy, 2011) at the University of Tsukuba. She specializes in international relations and has a strong interest in the US Marines relocation issue in the Asia-Pacific region. Her former research was sponsored by the Okinawan prefectural government, as well as the US Consulate General in Naha, Okinawa. Born and raised in Okinawa, Nanae has both a personal and professional interest in the interactions between the Marine Corps and the targeted places for the current realignment of the US Marines.

**Ms. Lea YU (USA)** is an analyst for Century Bridge Capital, a US private equity real estate fund that invests in residential properties across China's middle-class markets. She formerly worked as an editor and reporter for Caixin Media, where she managed a blog that covered social media in China, among other topics. In 2012, she did on-the-ground reporting for Washington Post journalist Neil Irwin for his book *The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire*. She is currently an organizer for the speaker series Young China Watchers, and is director of membership for the Yale Club of Beijing. Lea graduated from Yale in 2010 with distinction in the history major, and was the 2010 recipient of Yale's Percival Wood Clement Prize for the best senior essay in American history.

## APPENDIX B

### PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS

#### 9th CSCAP General Conference

#### *Prioritizing Mutual Trust and Win-Win Cooperation*

Jianguo Garden Hotel, ♦ Beijing, People's Republic of China

December 2-4, 2013

### YOUNG LEADERS AGENDA

#### Monday, December 2

18:00            **Pre-Dinner YL only Briefing**

19:00            **Welcoming dinner**

#### Tuesday, December 3

08:30            **Registration**

09:00            **Opening remarks**

Amb. MA Zhengang, Chair CSCAP China

Amb. Leela K Ponappa, CSCAP Co-chair

09:15            **Session 1: Building New Type of Major Country Relations for the  
Benefit of the Asia-Pacific Region**

Chair: Professor Jim Rolfe

Acting Director and Director of Program, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand

Speakers: Mr. HE Xiangdong

Counselor, Department of North American & Oceanian Affairs, MFA, PRC

Mr. Michael Schiffer

Senior Adviser and Counselor, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Professor Jusuf Wanandi

Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Indonesia

Mr. John Quinn

Assistant Secretary, Strategic and Intelligence Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

10:45            Tea Break

11:15            **Session 2: Fulfilling the Promise of Regional Security Architecture**

Chair: Ms. Clara Dyah Vidyarini Joewono  
Vice Chair, Board of Director of CSIS Foundation, CSIS Indonesia

Speakers: Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi  
Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institutes of International Studies, Japan

Commodore Uday Bhaskar (Retd.)  
Visiting Fellow, National Maritime Foundation, India

Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan  
Chairman, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia

Dr. Victor Sumsky  
Director, ASEAN Centre in MGIMO University, Russia

13:00 **Luncheon Speech**

H. E. Mr. LIU Zhenmin  
Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC

Chair: Professor Jusuf Wanandi  
Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Indonesia (TBC)

14:30 **Session 3: Overcoming Current Obstacles for Peace and Stability in NE Asia**

Chair: Major General(Ret.) Qian Lihua  
Vice Chair, CSCAP China

Speakers: Mr. Ralph A. Cossa  
President, Pacific Forum CSIS, USA

Professor Takagi Seiichiro  
Senior Associate Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan

Professor Jaewoo Choo  
Professor, Department of Chinese Language, Kyung Hee University

Professor Georgy Toloraya  
Head of Regional projects department, Russkiy mir Foundation, Russia

Ambassdor Sukhbaatar Tsedenjav  
Ambassador of Mongolia to China

16:00 Tea Break

16:30 **Keynote Address**

H.E. Mr. YANG Jiechi  
State Councilor, State Council of the People's Republic of China

Chair: Amb. MA Zhengang  
Chair, CSCAP China

17:00 **Session 4: Building a Secure and Open Cyberspace through Cooperation**

Chair: Mr. Ron Huisken  
Associate Professor, the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

Speakers: Professor YANG Jian  
Vice President, Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, China

Mr. B.J. Srinath  
Senior Scientist, Department of Electronics & Information Technology, India

Dr. Amirudin Abdul Wahab  
Chief Executive Officer, CyberSecurity, Malaysia

Ms. Elaine Korzak, Cybersecurity Fellow, CISAC, Stanford University, USA Mr.

Kwa Chong Guan  
Senior Fellow, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

18:30 **Dinner Speech**

Lieutenant General REN Haiquan  
Vice President, Chinese Academy of Military Science

Chair: Professor Anthony Milner  
Co-chair, AusCSCAP and Professor, Australian National University

**Wednesday, December 4**

09:00 **Session 5: Water Security: Dealing with Common Challenges**

Chair: HRH. Sirivudh Norodom  
Founder and Chairman, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace

Speakers: Professor ZHOU Shichun  
Department of Environmental Protection, Hydrochina Corporation, China

Dr. Somkiati Ariyapruchya  
Dean, Inst. of Diplomacy & International Studies, Rangsit University, Thailand

Dr. NGUYEN Nam Duong  
Deputy Director General, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies  
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Mr. Mark Brindal  
Adelaide University, the Australian representative on CSCAP SG on Water Security  
and former Minister for Water Resources in the South Australian Government

Dr. Arvind Gupta  
Director-General, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India

10:30 Tea Break

10:45 **Session 6: Enhancing a Peaceful and Cooperative Maritime Environment in the Region**

Chair: Amb. Barry Desker  
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Speakers: Dr. Rizal Sukma  
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia

Mr. Gi Hoon Hong  
Professor of Marine Science and Policy, Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology

Prof. Paul Sinclair  
Regional Security Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand

12:15 **Closing Session**  
CSCAP Co-chair : Prof. Nguyen Thai Yen Huong

Chair, CSCAP China: Amb. MA Zhengang

13:00 **Young Leaders Lunch Guest Speaker**

14:30 **Young Leaders Wrap Up Session**  
Group discussions for conference project

18:00 **Young Leaders Dinner**