

## In this issue

### ■ On the Agenda

The PSC recently decided to lift **Egypt's** suspension from the AU. What does this mean for the AU's stance on unconstitutional changes of government?

### ■ Situation Analysis

As the political and security situation in **Libya** continues to worsen, the AU has put the country back on its agenda. The PSC will have to deal with several major issues as it increases its engagement in this country.

### ■ Addis Insights

A spotlight on post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa shows that the PSC has to closely monitor countries **coming out of conflict**.

**Ending all wars** in Africa by 2020 might be an ambitious deadline; but AU members should nevertheless be galvanised to work towards this goal.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has emphasised **the UN's commitment** to work with the AU on issues of peacekeeping; particularly in the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan.



# Peace & Security Council Report

“ Far-reaching implications of the PSC's decision on Egypt

Page 2

“ Libya back on the agenda of the PSC

Page 5

“ Silencing the guns to end all wars in Africa by 2020

Page 10



## On the Agenda

### Far-reaching implications of the PSC's decision on Egypt

In June 2014, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) took a decision with far-reaching consequences when it lifted Egypt's suspension of its participation in the African Union's activities.

Unlike similar Council decisions – including the one on Guinea-Bissau adopted the same day PSC/PR/BR.(CCCLXXII) – this decision invites critical questions on the credibility of the African Union (AU) and the future application of its norm on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). Contrary to the AU's rule banning perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government, this decision can be interpreted as conferring legitimacy on the election of a president who was responsible for the unconstitutional change of government in Egypt.

Since then this rule has been enforced on countries that have experienced unconstitutional change of government, including Guinea, Niger, Madagascar, Mali and Central African Republic.

It is not in dispute that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi played a central role in Egypt's unconstitutional change of government on 3 July 2013. In this regard, the final report PSC/AHG/4.(CDXVI) of the AU High-Level Panel on Egypt (the Panel) held that the election as president of 'Field Marshal el-Sisi, who was the Head of the Army

This decision invites critical questions on the credibility of the African Union and the future application of its norm on unconstitutional changes of government

#### Current PSC Chair

##### H.E. Rachid Benlounes

Ambassador of Algeria to Ethiopia

Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA

#### Current members of the PSC:

Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

The rule banning perpetrators from participating in elections held to restore constitutional order was first introduced when the Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance was adopted in 2007. However, this ban became legally binding only in 2010 when the AU Assembly adopted its 'Decision (Assembly/AHG/Dec.269.(XIV) Rev.1) on the prevention of unconstitutional changes of government and strengthening the capacity of the African Union to manage such situations' at its 14th ordinary session held from 31 January to 2 February 2010.

and Minister of Defence at the time of the unconstitutional change of government, poses a serious challenge to the AU as to how to address the resumption of Egypt's participation in AU activities'. The AU's concern was that lifting Egypt's suspension upon the election of the person responsible for the unconstitutional change could constitute direct disregard for a clear rule of the AU norm proscribing the legitimisation of unconstitutional changes through elections.

Now that the suspension has been lifted, the main issue is how it affects the AU

and its norm on UCG. Apart from being considered a breach of a legally binding rule, this decision could lead to charges of double standards being levelled against the AU. This is particularly due to the fact that this rule was applied in similar situations in other AU member states, including Guinea, Niger and Madagascar. In the case of Madagascar, the AU even warned that it would not recognise elections in which Andry Rajoelina, the leader of the group responsible for the overthrow of the Madagascan government in 2009, participated.

The AU also faces the prospect of setting a precedent that undermines the

of the Panel, particularly with respect to the 'continued engagement of the AU to effectively contribute to the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations of the Panel and submission of regular reports to the Council'.

A closer look at the dynamics surrounding the Council's decision offers important insights into the overall political and diplomatic environment that shaped this outcome.

The difficult atmosphere that the Egyptian authorities created not only affected the work of the Panel but also challenged the authority of the PSC. In this regard, one of

## Egypt had deployed a robust campaign lobbying the AU Commission members of the PSC and the Panel to ensure that its suspension was ended

legitimacy of this rule for application in future cases. In the event of the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government in another AU member state, there is now a serious risk that those responsible will cite Egypt's example to justify the legitimacy of their participation in elections held to restore constitutional order.

In an apparent move to mitigate these consequences, the PSC added certain caveats to its decision. First, the Council stated that it adopted its decision 'on the understanding that it does not constitute a precedent in terms of adherence to the relevant provisions of the 'Decision (Assembly/AHG/Dec.269.(XIV) Rev.1) on the prevention of unconstitutional changes of government and strengthening the capacity of the African Union to manage such situations' and 'article 24 (5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance'.

Second, notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, the Council decided to keep Egypt on its agenda. This was done by endorsing the recommendations

the recommendations of the Panel, on which the PSC acted, stated that 'in view of Egypt's ... rejection of the PSC decisions, it is critical that [the] Council informs Egypt of its obligations under the PSC Protocol and the AU Constitutive Act'.

Egypt had deployed a robust campaign lobbying the AU Commission (AUC), members of the PSC and the Panel to ensure that its suspension was ended. At a meeting of Arab ambassadors in Addis Ababa held before the PSC had taken a decision, a senior AUC official reportedly suggested that Egypt's suspension would be lifted. When the PSC adopted its monthly work programme for June, the date scheduled for it to consider the Panel's report and take a decision on Egypt was 25 June 2014. This date was brought forward to 17 June, allowing the AU enough time to invite Egypt to participate in the 23rd ordinary session of the AU Assembly held on 26–27 June 2014.

Within the PSC, members held positions that can be classified into three groups.

---

17 JUNE  
2014

THE DATE THE PSC TOOK  
ITS DECISION ON EGYPT

---



A SIGNIFICANT  
RECOMMENDATION IS THE  
PROPOSAL TO PRODUCE  
GUIDELINES TO ASSESS  
THE COMPATIBILITY OF  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
CHANGES THROUGH  
POPULAR UPRISINGS WITH  
THE AU'S NORM ON UCG.

---

The first was those states that advocated for the lifting of Egypt's suspension and which mainly comprised North African states. The second was those states concerned about the implications of reinstating Egypt in circumstances not fully in line with established AU rules. This group included some Southern African states and a few others from West and East Africa. The third was the majority of states, who had no firm position on the issue and were hence inclined to be guided by the Panel's recommendations.

While this might not have been decisive, the AU and its member states were also aware of major international actors' enthusiastic response to the outcome of the presidential election held in Egypt on 25–27 May 2014.

Noting that the presidential election marked an 'important step' towards 'democracy', the EU said in its official statement that it would like to work closely with the new authorities.

Similarly, after congratulating el-Sisi in a phone call, US President Barack Obama expressed 'his commitment to working together to advance the shared interests of both countries'. Egypt's new president received similar messages from Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States.

The PSC adopted its decision based on the recommendations of the final Report of the Panel. This report contained extensive and significant recommendations that are not fully reflected in the final decision of the PSC. One such recommendation was for '[the] Egyptian authorities to grant access

to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to undertake an assessment of the human rights situation and submit [a] report for the Council'.

Another very significant recommendation, with major implications for the AU norm on UCG, is the proposal for elaborating guidelines for assessing the compatibility of unconstitutional changes through popular uprisings with the AU's norm on UCG.

## Significantly, the lifting of the suspension did not result in Egypt's removal from the PSC's agenda

Taking into account recent events in North Africa, including in Egypt, and the challenges faced in applying the AU norm on UCG to popular uprisings, the Panel recommended the following as guidelines for making the compatibility assessment:

- the descent of the government into total authoritarianism to the point of its forfeiting its legitimacy;
- the absence or total ineffectiveness of constitutional processes for effecting a change in government (through normal procedures);
- the popularity of the uprisings in the sense of their attracting a significant portion of the population and involving people from all walks of life and ideological persuasions;
- the absence of the military's active involvement in removing the government; and
- the peacefulness of the popular protests.

Although the issue of popular uprisings will be elaborated further at a future

date by the Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, the Council's endorsement of the above elements as guidelines certainly fills the existing lacunae in the norm on UCG vis-à-vis changes of government in the context of popular uprisings.

Although much of the attention has been focussed on the Council's lifting Egypt's suspension, its decision reflects

an understandable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the AU to ratify the conditions in Egypt as manifesting the full restoration of constitutional order and being in full compliance with established AU norms.

This is in contrast with the decision PSC/PR/BR.(CCCLXXII) on Guinea-Bissau adopted on the same day in which it affirmed 'the completion of the transition process and the restoration of the constitutional order, and in conformity with the relevant AU instruments, particularly the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance'.

Significantly, the lifting of the suspension did not result in Egypt's removal from the PSC's agenda. It is likely that the Council will consider the situation in Egypt when the country holds the outstanding parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless, it is not clear from the PSC's decision if the Panel's mandate has been concluded or if it will continue to serve as the framework for following up and reporting on developments in Egypt.

# Situation analysis – Libya

## Libya back on the agenda of the PSC



As the worsening political and security situation in the country continues to raise regional and international concerns, the PSC increased its engagement in Libya by putting it back on its agenda.

Following a briefing it received on the deteriorating security situation in Libya at a session held on 23 May, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in a press statement PSC/PR/BR.(CDXXXVI) urged Libyan political forces to work for national reconciliation and the successful conclusion of the transition, including the holding of parliamentary elections. It also condemned all acts of violence and expressed its worry over the launch of 'Operation Dignity'. Most notably, the Council encouraged the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson to urgently appoint a special AU Envoy to Libya to 'undertake consultations' with relevant stakeholders, both national and international, and submit to it 'a comprehensive report on the situation, including concrete recommendations on how best the AU can further support the stabilization process in Libya and the early completion of the current transition'.

### Crisis escalation potential

With various political forces and regions locked in rivalry for dominance and resources, the political landscape in Libya continues to be rocked by armed confrontations and deepening political divisions. The General National Congress (GNC), the legislative body mandated to lead the transition, has become deadlocked as disputes between Islamist members and their opponents worsen. The prospect of the parliamentary elections, meant to replace the GNC, delivering a more cohesive parliament is uncertain. While the elections were held as scheduled on 25 June 2014 in

what was hoped would mark a critical step in the country's transition, low voter turnout and fighting in the eastern city of Benghazi marred the vote.

In May 2014 forces loyal to former Libyan army General Khalifa Haftar, who accuses the government of appeasing terrorists, launched Operation al-Karamah (Operation Dignity) to cleanse Libya of 'terrorism and extremism' with attacks on radical armed groups in Benghazi. The operation involved both direct engagement with suspected radical militia groups and air strikes against their alleged bases. Instead of raising hopes for stability, Operation Dignity seems to have added further complications. It has exposed the inability of the interim government to control diverse armed formations, including the weak national army, and has raised fears of a military coup following the invasion of the national parliament in Tripoli. The interim government in Tripoli continues to condemn the operation, stating that Haftar has no mandate or legitimacy. While Haftar, who survived an assassination attempt earlier in June, claims to have the support of the army and the wider public, the operation has been criticised even by its supporters for the air strikes on the city.

With Haftar reportedly receiving support from Gulf countries opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, there are risks of further conflicts with serious regional consequences. Apart from its negative impact on the precarious


security situation in the Sahel and North Africa, the crisis in Libya risks drawing countries like Egypt and radical armed groups operating in the region into the fighting on either side.

### Key issues and internal dynamics

On 25 June 2014 Libya had its third legislative election since the removal of Muammar Gaddafi from power. The Libyan people went to the polls with some doubt as to whether the elections would bring about stability and help the transition to democracy. Compared to the 2,8 million voters who registered for Libya's first election in 2012, the current turnout of 1,5 million shows a significant decline, indicating a loss of interest and trust in the transitional process. In an attempt to ease factional tensions between various political formations, it was decided that all candidates would contest the parliamentary seats as individuals, with 30 of the 200 seats reserved for female candidates.

In a move interpreted by many as an attempt to appease the residents of Benghazi, the interim government decided in June that the new parliament would be based there. However, security will be a big concern for the parliamentarians as there has been no clear halt to the fighting in the city.

While there is a chance that the instability of the interim government might come to an end following the election of the new parliament, there is no indication that this would resolve



the fighting between Haftar's forces and Islamist militants.

Haftar is no new face to Libyan politics and public life. He was part of the 1969 coup that brought Gaddafi to power. Following Libya's defeat in a controversial war against Chad in 1977, which he led as Chief of Staff of the Libyan army, he defected to the United States (US) and launched an anti-Gaddafi movement. In 2011, he returned to Libya to join the fight against Gaddafi alongside some of the groups he is attacking at present. In February 2014 he accused the interim government of supporting terrorism and called on Libyans to rise up against the elected parliament. He claims that his group is no rebel as there is no state to rebel against.

One of the targets of Haftar's campaign is the Ansar al-Sharia ('Partisans of Islamic law'), a hard-line group the US state department has designated as a terrorist organisation. The group wants the strict implementation of Sharia law across Libya. It was created during the 2011 anti-Gaddafi uprising from the Abu Obayda bin al-Jarah Brigade, the Malik Brigade and the 17 February Brigade.

Libya's incoming parliament will inherit existing and emerging political and security challenges. On the political front, it has to create national consensus

The economy also continues to suffer from the ongoing violence and political instability. Reports suggest that Libya's oil production has decreased significantly in the past year. Oil production is further threatened since two of the three Libyan regions (Fezzan and Cyrenaica) have declared their autonomy. On 9 November 2013, leaders from Cyrenaica, the historically marginalised eastern part of Libya, announced the establishment of a regional oil firm and a central bank, defying calls from Tripoli not to do so. These moves further complicate the production and transportation of oil. A failure to stabilise the economy, and deliver services and jobs would intensify the anger and frustration of the public.

## Geo-political dynamics

### Pan-African and REC dynamics

At the regional level, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries bordering Libya also held a consultative meeting on 27–28 May 2014 in Algeria. The meeting, attended by the Secretary General of the Arab League, Dr Nabil El-Arabi, and the AUC Chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, discussed the security situation in Libya and its regional implications. The meeting called on all Libyan parties to stop violent acts and to resort to dialogue, and affirmed its support for the transition. It also urged

2.8  
MILLION

REGISTERED VOTERS  
IN 2012

1.5  
MILLION

REGISTERED VOTERS  
IN 2014

## Libya's incoming parliament will inherit existing and emerging political and security challenges

among the various political forces and address the question of regional autonomy and federalism. There is also the issue of the establishment of an effective national government that is free from infighting. In the security sphere, it faces the challenge of persuading the various militias and armed groups to surrender their arms and ensure that the fighting in eastern Libya is ended.

greater partnership between the Arab League and the AU in addressing the situation in Libya.

Acting on the 23 May 2014 request of the PSC, the AUC Chairperson on 11 June 2014 appointed Dileita Mohamed Dileita, a former Prime Minister of Djibouti and who is currently serving on AU High-Level Panel on Egypt, as the AU's Special Envoy for Libya. In its press statement,

the AUC stated that the Special Envoy, supported on the ground by the AU Liaison Office in Tripoli, would engage with 'the Libyan authorities and other stakeholders in support of the efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country, promoting national reconciliation and facilitating the early completion of the current transition'.

### UN dynamics

In a statement dated 24 June 2014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) urged stakeholders in Libya to ensure that national elections are held peacefully. The UNSC 'emphasized that these elections are an important step in Libya's transition towards stable democratic governance and an opportunity for the Libyan people to select a transitional government that meets their legitimate aspirations'. On 12 June UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also stressed the importance of the peaceful and timely holding of elections on 25 June.

On 14 March 2014, the UNSC extended the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for another 12 months. The UNSMIL was mandated by UNSC Resolution 2040 of 12 March 2012 to manage the process of democratic transition; promote the rule of law; monitor and protect human rights; restore public security, including through the provision of appropriate strategic and technical advice to the Libyan national security forces or their demobilisation and reintegration; and counter the illicit proliferation of all arms and related material.

### Wider international community

There is a belief among secular political and armed groups that Turkey supports radical groups in Libya. In June Haftar's spokesperson Mohamed el-Hejazi announced that all Turkish and Qatari citizens should leave Libya within 48 hours. Haftar accused Turkey and Qatar of supporting terrorism through their connection to the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, it is believed that

Haftar receives support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

On 21 June 2014, the EU expressed its concern over the situation in Libya and urged all stakeholders to commit to constructive political engagement based on nationally agreed principles. It called for the transition to a state based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and committed to the welfare of its citizens. While condemning the widespread acts of violence, the EU called on all sides to address their differences through peaceful political means.

## A failure to stabilise the economy, and deliver services and jobs would intensify the anger of the public

Relations with the US have been mixed. The assassination of the US ambassador, J Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans in an attack on a US mission in Benghazi in September has marred Tripoli-Washington relations. While the US' deployment of security forces to seize the suspects in the attack has angered officials in Tripoli, Libya seems keen to work with the US in its efforts to achieve stability.

### Major issues for the PSC

A general issue for the AU is how to deepen its engagement in Libya, not only by closely monitoring the situation but also by adopting appropriate responses as the situation evolves.

One of the major issues for the PSC is how to leverage the appointment of the AU Special Envoy to support the Libyan government in dealing with the political and security challenges facing the country. Another issue is containing the regional implications of the continuing conflict and the risk of the involvement of radical armed groups operating in the region. Related to this is the need for enhancing cooperation and interaction between Libya and neighbouring

countries, particularly in terms of the control of the trade in arms, organised crime and terrorist groups.

### Options

The PSC, through the AU Special Envoy to Libya and in collaboration with the Arab League and UNSMIL, could support the government in Libya in developing and implementing national dialogue and reconciliation.

The PSC could encourage the government to develop a comprehensive strategy to end all acts of violence,

including the speedy establishment of the fact-finding and reconciliation commission the government had vowed to establish.

Another option for the PSC is to request the AU Special Envoy and its Liaison Office to collaborate with the UNSMIL in helping the government to develop a plan for implementing a comprehensive security sector reform.

To mobilise coordinated international support and contain the regional ramifications of the crisis, the PSC could also consider working with the Arab League to establish an international contact group on Libya.

### Documentation

#### AU Documents

- Press Release (11 June 2014) The African Union Appoints Mr Dileita Mohamed Dileita as Special Envoy for Libya
- PSC/PR/BR.(CDXXXVI) (23 May 3014) Press Release on the Situation in Libya

#### UN Documents

- Resolution 2014S/RES/2144 (14 March, 2014) Extension of the mandate of UNSMIL until 13 March 2015 and the mandate of the Panel assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 13 April 2015



# Addis Insights

Spotlight on post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa

Recent events show that the PSC has to closely monitor and remain engaged in countries coming out of conflict.

Despite the many efforts to stop conflicts on the continent, in the past few years a number of countries emerging from conflict soon afterwards were again plunged into renewed violence. These include Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and most recently South Sudan. This disturbing trend raises questions about the effectiveness of the tools and mechanisms of the African Peace and Security Architecture and

of the PSC, expressed the view that the recent trend of countries relapsing into conflict can in many ways be attributed to the inadequate attention given to PCRD work and the lack of progress made in the implementation of the AU's PCRD policy.

Admittedly, since the adoption of the PCRD policy in 2006, the AU has undertaken some notable activities within its framework. The AU Commission (AUC) has developed operational guidelines for the adoption of the policy at regional and

The eruption of conflict in the eastern DRC and Mali in 2012, and in the CAR and South Sudan in 2013, shows that the efforts undertaken to support peace-building have been either inadequate or unsuccessful

puts the spotlight on the work of the African Union (AU) on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD).

It was in this context that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) recently held an open session on 'Enhancing AU efforts in implementing post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa'. While the PSC, according to its protocol, has to 'promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence', in 2006 the AU adopted a PCRD Policy Framework to enable it to deliver on its responsibilities in this area.

During the 14 June session of the PSC, many participants, including members

national levels; the establishment and creation of a database of African experts on PCRD; and the development of an AU Standing Multi-dimensional Committee on PCRD. The AUC has also launched specific in-country peace-building works – so-called 'quick impact' or peace-strengthening projects – to support countries such as the CAR, Comoros, Liberia and Sierra Leone within the context of the PCRD Policy Framework.

The AU undertook multidisciplinary missions to the CAR (2006), Liberia and Sierra Leone (2009), the DRC and Burundi (2010), and Sudan (2011), in order to assess and ascertain the post-conflict demands of these countries. In addition, the AU has also developed and adopted a Framework on Security

AU MULTIDISCIPLINARY MISSIONS

2006

TO THE CAR

2009

TO SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA

2010

TO THE DRC AND BURUNDI

2011

TO SUDAN



Sector Reform (SSR). However, while a ministerial committee on PCRDR has been established (in 2003, prior to the AU PCRDR Policy and focusing on Sudan), it has been inactive for many years.

While these activities remain relevant, many of them are institutional and related to policy development. The eruption of conflict in the eastern DRC and Mali in 2012, and in the CAR and South Sudan in 2013, shows that the efforts undertaken to support peace-building have been either inadequate or unsuccessful. Given the limited experience that the AU has in this area, the amount of resources and expertise PCRDR demands, and the high-level political and diplomatic engagement it requires to be successful, the AU's lack of success or inadequate engagement does not come as a total surprise. It has become clear that the AU needs to do more work, within the available means and capacity, in various areas.

In this context, a number of issues need to be addressed. Several participants highlighted the importance of establishing close cooperation and working relationships with those regional and international actors with the institutional, technical and resource capacity relevant to PCRDR. In this context, one major issue is how to leverage the work of entities such as the African Development Bank and the UN Peace-building Commission that undertake projects in this area. The other and related issue concerns the creation of synergy and coherence among the various entities of the AU with the relevant mandate for and expertise in PCRDR. Although PCRDR is a crosscutting policy framework, it is currently housed within the AU Peace and Security Department and its links with relevant departments such as Political Affairs, Social Affairs and Economic Affairs remain weak.

Perhaps the most serious challenge for the AU's PCRDR policy is capacity and resource limitations. One example of this lack of capacity is the fact that the AU PCRDR Unit employs only one expert. More broadly, as the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, observed in his opening speech, the capacity deficits '[range] from planning and conceptualization of projects and programmes, to the

One example of this lack of capacity is the fact that the AU PCRDR Unit employs only one expert

execution, monitoring and evaluation at national and regional levels'. One plan for addressing this capacity constraint is the establishment of an AU Centre for PCRDR. Additionally, a lot may also be gained if the AU develops mechanisms for tapping into the existing technical and institutional capacities of some of its member states, regional organisations and civil society organisations.

The issue of resources has been recognised at the highest of levels. Perhaps one of the most promising initiatives to emerge within the AU's PCRDR framework is the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI), which was adopted at the 19th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in July 2012. While the ASI was initiated as a flagship programme to support identified pilot countries, the ministerial declaration launching it also stipulated that the ASI 'shall institute a coordinated and expanded platform aimed at mobilizing resources to PCRDR activities in Africa'. It is commendable that a number of AU member states have in the past year made financial contributions to support AU peace efforts.

From the perspective of the work of the PSC, one of the questions raised in the concept note for the open session was

how much the PSC had done to advance PCRDR. In this regard, one major concern is how the PSC can best implement its mandate with respect to PCRDR in general and prevent countries' relapse into conflict in particular. At one level, this is about following up and implementing decisions that the PSC adopts, such as those adopted at its 230th (PSC/PR/2.CCXXX) and 352nd (PSC/PR/COMM/CCCLII) meetings.

On the other hand, this is in part a question of the need for the PSC to pay as much attention to countries emerging from conflict as to those still in conflict. In the current dispensation, the PSC's work is dominated by a 'firefighting' approach and as such does very little in the post-conflict phase.

Recent events show that the PSC has to closely monitor and remain robustly engaged with countries coming out of conflict. To this end, the PSC needs to periodically consider and assess the situation in these countries as well as undertake visits to these countries. This should build on the AU practice of undertaking assessment missions, which should be supplemented with a follow-up mechanism capable of addressing the areas of intervention these assessment missions identify in their reports. As part of its increased focus on PCRDR, the PSC needs to activate its envisaged sub-committee on PCRDR (meant to be established in its decision at its 230th meeting) and dedicate a session to it on a quarterly or biannual basis during which it receives reports from the Commission and reviews the state of countries emerging from conflict (as part of the implementation of its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM/CCCLII).



# Addis Insights

## Silencing the guns to end all wars in Africa by 2020

Although it is unlikely that the AU will achieve its ambitious deadline to end all wars by 2020, it is worth mobilising AU members towards this goal.

The 50th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) served as an opportunity to set various targets meant to move the agenda of the AU substantially forward. This was contained in the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. One of the most ambitious targets was the pledge of the Heads of State and Government of the AU Assembly ‘not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans’ and ‘to end all wars in Africa by 2020’.

In the light of the violent conflicts that continue to affect various parts of the continent, as reflected in the crises in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, there is no illusion that this ambition will be fully realised in the remaining six years. The value of this target is in mobilising AU member states to make progress towards achieving the end of ‘all wars in Africa’. However, even this progress will stand a chance of success only with a proper diagnosis of the sources, dynamics and manifestations of armed conflicts in Africa and a road map with clear and time-bound benchmarks.

In an effort to mobilise action on the agenda of ending ‘all wars in Africa by 2020’, the AU Peace and Security Council at its 430th meeting held an open session with the theme ‘Silencing the guns: pre-requisites for realizing a conflict-free Africa by the year 2020’. The PSC in its press statement PSC/PR/BR (CDXXX) acknowledged and stressed the need for coordinated efforts at regional, continental and international level.

At the meeting the PSC also underscored the importance of the responsibility of individual member states in protecting their citizens by addressing the root causes of conflicts. In this regard, it called for deepening the culture of democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, popular participation and inclusivity, and addressing the problem of youth unemployment. It stressed that member states should double their efforts to bring about economic development and ensure that the proceeds from natural resources are utilised to meet the basic needs of all Africans.

To realise a conflict-free Africa, the PSC stressed the need to effectively address both current and emerging threats to peace and security on the continent. For this to happen the PSC needs to enhance its strategic partnership with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It added that Africa’s partnership with the international community was equally important to address current and emerging threats. Moreover, greater engagement and collaboration with civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as greater synergy within the AU Commission (AUC) and among AU member states, was called for to address the peace and security concerns of the continent in realising a conflict-free Africa.

Participants in the debate and the PSC called for various actions. With regard to conflict prevention, the participants and the Council called for the further strengthening of all the existing preventive mechanisms, including the Panel of the



22  
THOUSAND

AMISOM TROOPS  
IN SOMALIA

6

THOUSAND  
MISCA TROOPS IN CAR

Wise and the Continental Early Warning System, and for the full operationalisation of the African Standby Force and its Rapid Deployment Capability. In order to address the root causes of conflicts, the participants and the Council called for a common understanding and definition of and response to these root causes and to build a consensus on the solution. However, while these are important steps, the Council failed to stipulate who should undertake these exercises and the timeline for such actions.

The PSC also called on member states to sign, ratify and domesticate existing AU legal frameworks and normative instruments on democracy, accountability and good governance and for universal signature and ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty.

was held with the intention of exploring concrete options towards silencing guns in Africa with the objective of laying a foundation for the subsequent elaboration of road map towards a conflict-free Africa. The Chairperson of the AUC in her opening remarks noted that 'unless we silence the guns and bury the machetes, the AU vision of building an integrated, prosperous and conflict-free Africa remains an abstract goal'.

As a recent article observed, 'the greatest threat to the AU's aspiration of eradicating war is that policy objectives and targets are unlikely to be reached without an adequate understanding of the current situation (that is, the baseline), its underlying dynamics and likely future trends. Without that,

## To realise a conflict-free Africa, the PSC stressed the need to effectively address both current and emerging threats to peace and security on the continent

One of the important requests in the press statement was for the AUC to undertake a comprehensive study on the flow of illicit weapons into and within Africa and submit the outcome of the study to the PSC. However, no timeframe was set within which this study had to be submitted. On the same issue, participants and the Council called for the naming and shaming of suppliers, financiers, facilitators, transit points and recipients of illicit weapons to stem their proliferation.

The PSC also asked the AUC to prepare a road map to underpin the actions necessary for the attainment of the goal of a conflict-free Africa by 2020.

Around the same time a high-level retreat on the theme 'Silencing the guns in Africa: building a road map to a conflict-free continent' was held on 28–29 April 2014 in Durban, South Africa. The retreat

sensible planning, monitoring and evaluation become impossible.' Since only six years are left before 2020, these tasks need to be undertaken promptly and a road map with clear and time-bound benchmarks needs to be adopted. One option could be to focus on selected intervention areas, building on those identified in the PSC press statement, such as control of the illicit flow of and trade in weapons. Related issues worth considering in developing the road map include identifying priority areas for action and the roles and responsibilities of various actors, including the PSC, AUC, Regional Economic Communities and individual member states, as well as non-state actors.

Although no timeline has been assigned for following up on this agenda item, it is one of the pending issues.

---

28-29  
APRIL 2014

A HIGH-LEVEL RETREAT  
THEMED 'SILENCING  
THE GUNS IN AFRICA:  
BUILDING A ROAD  
MAP TO A CONFLICT-FREE  
CONTINENT' IS HELD  
IN DURBAN

---



## Addis Insights

### Strengthening AU PSC and UNSC ties

This year has seen notable advances with respect to strengthening cooperation between the Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council.

As African leaders gathered in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea for the 23rd summit of the African Union (AU) on 26 June 2014, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon emphasised the UN's commitment to working with the AU on issues of peacekeeping, notably in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia and South Sudan.

This statement follows the annual consultative meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) in New York on 6 June this year. This was the eighth such meeting between the two bodies since 2007, with the venues alternating between Addis Ababa and New York.

There had been notable progress in the level and process of preparation for the New York meeting.

Following the practice developed by the two councils in recent years, the agenda for the annual consultative meeting was negotiated in advance. This was in accordance with the communiqué from their 7th joint consultative meeting

The advance exchange between the two on the agenda items and the PSC's preparatory meetings are valuable improvements on previous meetings in setting the stage both for the smooth conduct of the meeting (by avoiding misunderstandings) and for a more substantive dialogue between the members of the two councils.

Items up for discussion included current crises and peacekeeping operations (the CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], South Sudan, Mali, Somalia and the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur [UNAMID]), terrorism in Africa and strengthening cooperation between the two bodies.

This 8th consultative meeting took place against the background of rising conflicts and instability, in particular terrorist attacks in East and West Africa. While the atrocities and humanitarian tragedies in the CAR and South Sudan continue to attract high-level attention both in Africa and at the UN level, Boko Haram's abduction of schoolgirls in northern Nigeria and the global campaign it

This 8th consultative meeting took place against the background of rising conflicts and instability, in particular terrorist attacks in East and West Africa

held on 8 October 2013. As host of the consultative meeting, the UNSC was responsible for drafting the agenda.

The two sides exchanged inputs on the draft agenda based on a draft sent to the PSC in a letter dated 19 May 2014.

triggered brought terrorism in Africa into the international spotlight.

There were a number of issues of particular concern to members of the PSC among the various agenda items of the consultative meeting.

With respect to the situation in the CAR, PSC members are keen on UN/international support for the AU Mission in the CAR (MISCA) and a well-coordinated and jointly planned transition of this mission into the envisaged UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). This is meant to avoid the problems encountered during the transition of the African-led International Support

the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)', although it made no reference to the role of the Force Intervention Brigade of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in this regard.

Another issue of particular interest was the implementation of the Framework Agreement signed by countries of the region in February 2013.

## The communiqué doesn't detail the burden that needs to be shared to maintain peace and security

Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MUNISMA).

In the joint communiqué that they issued at the end of their meeting, the two sides expressed concern over the continuing security and humanitarian challenges in the CAR and 'made an urgent appeal to the international community and donors to mobilize substantial resources for the MISCA to enable it to better fulfil its mission and prepare the ground for the smooth transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA on 15 September 2014'. Additionally, they stressed the need for the coordination of efforts between the UN, the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 'in ensuring a successful transition, drawing lessons from previous experiences'.

The nine-page joint communiqué also addressed each of the other agenda items. On the situation in the DRC, the two sides expressed concern over the fragile security and humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC. Echoing the concerns of some of the DRC's neighbours, the communiqué expressed the concern of members of the two councils 'over the destabilizing activities of armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for

In this regard, the communiqué urged 'the government of the DRC to take further steps to implement their commitment under the PSC Framework, including the establishment of a professional, accountable and sustainable national army, including a Rapid Reaction Force, in accordance with its commitment to deepen SSR [security sector reform] and the finalisation of the development of a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) plan'.

On the issue of terrorism, the two sides emphasised the importance of cooperation between states. More specifically, the joint communiqué paid particular attention to three issues in the fight against terrorism: intelligence information-sharing and sanctions; dialogue and understanding among 'civilizations'; and a long-term approach in dealing with the socio-economic and governance ills that create the conditions for terrorism. With respect to Boko Haram, the communiqué welcomed the recent decision of the UN's committee to include the terror group on the al-Qaeda Sanctions List.

---

6 JUNE  
2014

ANNUAL CONSULTATIVE  
MEETING BETWEEN THE AU  
PSC AND THE UNSC TAKES  
PLACE IN NEW YORK

---

With respect to strengthening cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC, the communiqué shows some notable advances since previous years. The UNSC's primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security seems to be accepted without any ambiguity, while recognition is given to the role of the AUPSC within the framework of the Protocol Establishing the AUPSC and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This notwithstanding, the communiqué seems to shy away from spelling out the corresponding burden that needs to be fairly shared for the maintenance of peace and security.

Most notable in this regard is the shift from the emphasis of earlier years on the need for predictable, sustainable funding of AU peace operations, including by

President, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, said 'we had a deeper understanding of the African continent'. He added that the 'African Union and the United Nations work very closely together' and 'there is room for more close cooperation between our two councils'.

The PSC Chairperson, Uganda's Ambassador Mull Sbuja Katende, commended the meeting as having been 'very constructive' and added, 'We believe that we, working together with the Security Council, would be able to make more achievement.'

On efforts in the region, Ambassador Katende said that 'we already said that as Africa, there is a lot we put in place to resolve the conflict on the continent' and, emphasising the need for partnership in

The joint press conference was a good addition, but the meeting didn't address implementation of previous communiqués

the UN, to the current communiqués emphasis on greater provision of financing by AU member states and individual donor countries while reiterating that regional organisations have the responsibility to secure their own human, financial, logistical and other resources, including through member contributions and support from partners.

It is not clear if this provision manifests the end of years of the AU's consistent requests for predictable and sustainable funding, including through UN-assessed contributions for peacekeeping.

Apart from adopting the joint communiqué, the conclusion of the 8th consultative meeting included for the first time joint press briefing by the President of the UNSC and the Chairperson of the PSC. The UNSC

maintaining peace and security in Africa, he added, 'We require further support from the international community.'

While this joint press conference is a good addition, suggestive of the strengthening of the relationship between the two sides, as with previous meetings this year's consultative meeting failed to address the issue of follow-up and implementation of previous communiqués. This is an issue worth considering in the next consultative meeting of the two councils.

The 9th consultative meeting of the members of the UNSC and AUPSC is scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa in 2015 at a time to be determined through consultations between the Chairperson of the AUPSC and the President of the UNSC.

## 2015

THE 9TH CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNSC AND AUPSC IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN ADDIS ABABA

## Notable dates for July 2014

### 3 July

- Consideration and adoption of the provisional programme of work of the PSC for July 2014
- Finalisation of the draft declaration on the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the PSC

### 9 July

- Report on the activities of African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Darfur
- Post-mortem on 8th annual consultative meeting between the AU PSC and UNSC, and 7th annual consultative meeting between AU PSC and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EU PSC)

### 22 July

- Report by Department of Social Affairs on the socio-economic and security challenges of drug trafficking and related organised crimes in West and Central Africa

### 24 July

- Meeting of the PSC Committee on counter terrorism
- Adoption of the rules of procedure of the PSC Committee of Experts

### 28 July

- The Chairperson's Report on the Activities of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel is due for consideration by the PSC
- AU Strategy for the Sahel

### 29 July

- Review of the working methods of the PSC

### 30 July

- PSC chairs for March, April, May, June and July to report back to the Permanent Representatives Committee of the AU on the activities of the PSC during their respective months



## About the ISS

The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation which aims to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance.

## Contributors to this issue

Solomon A Dersso, ISS Addis Ababa

Hallelujah Lulie, ISS Addis Ababa

Lydia Atmosso, ISS Addis Ababa

Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Consultant to the PSC Report

## Contact

### Solomon A. Dersso

PSC Report Project Leader

ISS Addis Ababa

Email : [sayeledersso@issafrica.org](mailto:sayeledersso@issafrica.org)

## Acknowledgements



The publication of the PSC Report is made possible through the support of the Humanity United Foundation and the Hanns Seidel Stiftung. The ISS is also grateful for the support of the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.

## ISS Pretoria

Block C, Brooklyn Court  
361 Veale Street  
New Muckleneuk  
Pretoria, South Africa  
Tel: +27 12 346 9500  
Fax: +27 12 460 0998  
[pretoria@issafrica.org](mailto:pretoria@issafrica.org)

## ISS Addis Ababa

5th Floor, Get House  
Building, Africa Avenue  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251 11 515 6320  
Fax: +251 11 515 6449  
[addisababa@issafrica.org](mailto:addisababa@issafrica.org)

## ISS Dakar

4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum  
Route de Ouakam  
Dakar, Senegal  
Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42  
Fax: +221 33 860 3343  
[dakar@issafrica.org](mailto:dakar@issafrica.org)

## ISS Nairobi

Braeside Gardens,  
off Muthangari Road  
Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel: +254 20 266 7208  
Fax: +254 20 266 7198  
[nairobi@issafrica.org](mailto:nairobi@issafrica.org)