

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2014

Edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen



DIIS

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DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies
Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
Ph.: +45 32 69 87 87
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
Web: www.diis.dk

Editors: Nanna Hvidt (nhv@diis.dk) and Hans Mouritzen (hmo@diis.dk)
Assistant: Jakob Dreyer
Linguistic Consultant: Jessica Lerche
Graphic Design: Carsten Schiøler
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Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook

Editors

Nanna Hvidt

Hans Mouritzen

Editorial e-mail: bmo@diis.dk

Assistant Editor

Jakob Dreyer

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Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook is about Danish foreign policy, including Denmark's role in a regional as well as a global context. This particular volume presents an official outline of Denmark's 2013 foreign policy by Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen, Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In a new venture, we have also included a corresponding presentation of Denmark's defence policy and its challenges by Lars Findsen, Permanent Secretary of State for Defence. After this follow four academic articles by scholars representing only themselves (for author titles and affiliations, see each article).

Cindy Vestergaard analyses the international rules for uranium extraction and export, the rationale for abolishing Greenland's zero tolerance policy in this regard, and the next step for the Danish Kingdom regarding its nuclear non-proliferation policy. Focusing on the Danish contributions in Mali and Syria, Tonny Brems Knudsen argues that Danish foreign policy activism remains possible in a changing world order, but only by careful navigation between Western great powers, rising powers, and regional organisations. Turning to a historical perspective on Danish foreign policy, Anders Wivel's thesis is that two challenges to the hegemony of the Munch and Hækkerup doctrines have been attempted, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, Peter Yding Brunbech investigates Danish aid policy 1945-70 and asks the perennial question: why did a small, northwest European country, with little colonial history south of the 60th parallel, become one of the most generous development aid donors in the world?

The articles are abstracted in English and Danish at the beginning of chapter one. After the articles follow a selection of official documents

characteristic of Danish foreign policy during 2013. This is supplemented by some of the most relevant polls on the attitudes of Danes to key foreign policy questions. Finally, a bibliography offers a limited selection of scholarly books, articles and chapters published in English in 2013 within the field covered by the yearbook.

The editors of Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook are director Nanna Hvidt and dr.scient.pol. Hans Mouritzen. Jakob Dreyer, third year student of political science, has served as the assistant editor.

The editors

DIIS, Copenhagen

May 2014

Chapter I

Articles

Abstracts in English and Danish

The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2013

Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen

Danish Foreign Policy and the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 were marked by the continuing economic and political diffusion of power on the global stage – a development that generates dynamism and new opportunities in the globalised world, but also challenges the position of Europe. The Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs describes the political and economic developments in the world – which have led to a far-reaching reorganisation of Danish diplomatic representations abroad – and analyses the most important Danish foreign policy priorities of 2013. The article emphasizes trends in the EU, in international security, and regarding the Arctic and the transatlantic dimensions, as well as developments in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and finally global development trends.

Dansk udenrigspolitik og Udenrigsministeriets aktiviteter var i 2013 præget af den fortsatte økonomiske og politiske magtspredning på globalt plan – en udvikling der skaber dynamik og nye muligheder i en globaliseret verden, men som også udfordrer Europas position. Udenrigsministeriets departementschef gør rede for den politiske og økonomiske udvikling i verden – som har ført til en omfattende omorganisering af den danske repræsentationsstruktur i udlandet – samt analyserer de vigtigste prioriteter i dansk udenrigspolitik i 2013. Artiklen betoner trends i EU, på det sikkerhedspolitiske område samt i den arktiske og transatlantiske dimension, så vel som udviklingen i Mellemøsten, Asien og Afrika samt, til sidst, globale udviklingstendenser.

Danish Defence Policy and Military Operations 2013

Lars Fimdsen

Danish defence forces continued their contributions during 2013 to Denmark's active defence and security policy by partaking in existing operations in, e.g., Afghanistan, Kosovo and off the coast of Somalia. In addition, new operations were launched and new partnerships emerged, as underscored by the Danish lead in the maritime transport operation to remove chemical agents from Syria and participation in the efforts to restore order in Mali. Danish defence forces also contributed to NATO's air policing mission over the Baltic States, to NATO's augmentation of Turkish air defence, and to capacity building in East Africa. These operations are testimony to the high international demand for Danish military contributions, and it underscores that allies and partners know that Denmark has both the ability and willingness to deploy to far corners of the globe to solve challenging tasks in a professional manner. 2013 also marked the beginning of a reshaping of the Danish defence. Based on the Defence Agreement 2013-2017 and against the backdrop of the drawdown in Afghanistan, Denmark initiated a process entailing an increased focus on the Arctic region and on cyber security.

I 2013 fortsatte Forsvaret sine bidrag til Danmarks aktive forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik ved at udsende styrker til operationerne i bl.a. Afghanistan, Kosovo og ud for Afrikas Horn. Desuden blev nye operationer iværksat og nye partnerskaber begyndte at tegne sig som illustreret ved den danske 'lead' på den maritime transportoperation, der fjerner kemiske kampstoffer fra Syrien, og deltagelse i operationerne for at genskabe orden i Mali. Forsvaret bidrog desuden til NATO's afvisningsberedskab over Baltikum, NATO's forstærkning af tyrkisk luftforsvar samt kapacitetsopbygning i Østafrika. Disse operationer vidner om, at dansk forsvar er internationalt efterspurgt, og at allierede og partnere ved, at Danmark har både evne og vilje til at udsende styrker, som professionelt løser svære opgaver rundt om på kloden. 2013 markerede også begyndelsen på en tilpasning af Forsvaret. Med udgangspunkt i forsvarsforliget for 2013-2017 og på baggrund af tilbagetrækningen fra Afghanistan iværksættes en proces, der bl.a. indebærer øget fokus på Arktis og cybersikkerhed.

Greenland's Uranium and the Kingdom of Denmark

Cindy Vestergaard

On 24 October 2013 the Greenland parliament, Inatsisartut, lifted what was considered a decades-long moratorium on mining radioactive elements. For a kingdom that has otherwise foregone the nuclear fuel cycle (except for medical purposes), the abolishment of the so-called 'zero tolerance' policy has the potential to catapult it into the world's top tier of natural uranium suppliers. Greenland's status within the Kingdom is regulated by a complicated legal system, giving Greenland authority over its natural resources, while Copenhagen is constitutionally responsible for the Kingdom's foreign, defence and security policies. This system is further complicated by Denmark's membership (and Greenland's non-membership) of the EU. Consequently, the process ahead for Greenland and Denmark in jointly developing a regulatory system to govern uranium will be complex and one requiring a steep learning curve. The article analyses the international and regional rules related to uranium extraction and export, Greenland's zero tolerance policy, the rationale for its abolishment, and the next step for the Kingdom and its nuclear non-proliferation policy.

24. oktober 2013 hævede Grønlands parlament, Inatsisartut, hvad der ansås for flere årtiers moratorium for udvinding af radioaktive stoffer. For et Kongerige, der hidtil har holdt sig fra kernebrændstofcyklussen (bortset fra til medicinske formål), har afskaffelsen af den såkaldte nultolerancepolitik potentialet til at gøre det til en af verdens største udbydere af naturligt uran. Grønlands status inden for Rigsfællesskabet reguleres af et kompliceret juridisk system, der giver Grønland ret til sine naturressourcer og København et konstitutionelt ansvar for udenrigs-, forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitikken. Systemet kompliceres yderligere af Danmarks medlemskab (og Grønlands ikke-medlemskab) i EU. Som en konsekvens heraf bliver det en vanskelig opgave for Grønland og Danmark at sammen udvikle et uranreguleringsystem; den vil kræve en 'stejl indlæringskurve'. Artiklen analyserer de internationale og regionale regler for uranudvinding og -eksport, Grønlands nultolerancepolitik, grunden til at ophæve den og næste skridt for Kongeriget og dets nukleare ikke-spretningspolitik.

Danish contributions in Syria and Mali: Active Internationalism in a Changing World Order

Tonny Brems Knudsen

Is Danish foreign policy activism in one form or another sustainable in a multipolar world order and, if so, how? The answer to this question is sought in the interplay between the evolving patterns of great power management and regional ownership on the one hand and Danish activism on the other. It is argued that current great power relations are characterised by soft and hard balancing as well as concerted action, the shifts between them being dependent on calculations of interests, status, and regional ownership. Under these circumstances Danish foreign policy activism remains possible, but only by means of careful navigation between Western great powers, rising powers, and regional organisations. It is furthermore argued that the Danish contributions to the disposal of Syria's chemical weapons and the stabilisation of Mali in 2013 and 2014 indicate a return to a policy resembling the active internationalism of the 1990s.

Kan Danmark opretholde en aktivistisk udenrigspolitik i en multipolær verdensorden og, i bekræftende fald, hvordan? Svaret på dette spørgsmål søges i samspillet mellem på den ene side stormagternes forhold og regionalt ejerskab og på den anden side dansk aktivisme. Artiklens argument er, at stormagternes aktuelle forhold er præget af såvel blød og hård balancering som koncert; skift mellem disse handlemønstre afhænger af stormagternes interesser samt hensyn til regionalt ejerskab og status. Under disse omstændigheder er dansk udenrigspolitisk aktivisme stadig mulig, men kun gennem omhyggelig navigering mellem vestlige og ikke-vestlige stormagter samt regionale organisationer. Artiklen argumenterer endvidere for, at Danmarks bidrag til fjernelsen af Syriens kemiske våben og stabiliseringen af Mali i 2013 og 2014 indikerer en tilbagevenden til 1990'ernes aktive internationalisme.

Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Origins of Denmark's Pragmatic Activism

Anders Wivel

The Danish 1864 defeat is typically regarded as the starting point for a reactive and pragmatic foreign policy, which was only replaced by foreign policy activism at the end of the Cold War. This article argues, by contrast, that pragmatism and activism may both be viewed as integral aspects of Danish foreign policy since the early twentieth century. The article defines foreign policy doctrine and how doctrines relate to grand strategy and foreign policy practice and it sets up a simple framework for identifying doctrines and their role in Danish foreign policy. From this starting point it identifies two Danish foreign policy doctrines – the Munch doctrine and the Hækkerup doctrine – and discusses how they have served as central principles for Denmark's role in Europe and the world. Two attempts at challenging the two dominant doctrines – the Danish 'footnote policy' in NATO in the 1980s and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's 'super Atlanticism' in the 2000s – are discussed, and reasons why both of these attempts at transforming Denmark's position were ultimately unsuccessful are explored.

Danmarks nederlag i 1864 ses typisk som startskuddet til en reaktiv og pragmatisk småstatspolitik, som først efter den Kolde Krigs afslutning blev transformeret til den udenrigspolitiske aktivisme, som vi kender i dag. I modsætning til denne konventionelle tolkning argumenter artiklen for, at både pragmatisme og aktivisme har været grundlæggende karakteristika i dansk udenrigspolitik siden starten af det tyvende århundrede. 'Udenrigspolitisk doktrin' defineres og relateres til 'grand strategy' og udenrigspolitisk praksis og det vises, hvordan doktriner og deres rolle i dansk udenrigspolitik kan identificeres. Det påvises, hvordan Munch- og Hækkerup-doktrinerne har præget udenrigspolitikken frem til i dag. To forsøg på revisionistisk udenrigspolitik – 1980ernes fodnotepolitik i NATO og Anders Fogh Rasmussens superatlantisme i nullerne – diskuteres, og det undersøges, hvorfor ingen af disse forsøg på at gøre op med de dominerende doktriner lykkedes.

Size, Targets and Purpose: An Analysis of Danish Aid Policy and the Emerging International Spending Targets 1945-70

Peter Yding Brunbech

Superficially the history of Danish foreign aid policy seems paradoxical: why would a small northwest European country with no significant colonial history below the 60th northern parallel choose to be one of the most generous development aid donors? This article analyses how Danish aid began as a small but multipurpose entity that was well integrated into overall Danish foreign policy. The article furthermore shows, how the years 1965-67 became formative and injected it with a new dynamic: a volume fetishism where meeting overall spending targets became one of its most important goals. This spending target-oriented approach was first and foremost a result of domestic demands and coincided with an international development, where relative aid spending began to decline, and where only a few rich countries outside Scandinavia placed any real importance on meeting international aid targets.

Dansk udviklingsbistands historie virker umiddelbart paradoksal: hvorfor skulle et lille nordvesteuropæisk land uden væsentlig kolonihistorie syd for den 60. nordlige breddegrad være stordonor af udviklingsbistand? Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan dansk udviklingsbistand begyndte som et politikfelt med en række forskellige politiske mål, som lå i naturlig forlængelse af Danmarks samlede udenrigspolitik. Artiklen vil derudover vise, hvordan det var perioden 1965-67, der blev den afgørende formative periode, blandt andet i kraft af en ny dynamik: en størrelsesfetichisme, hvor det at opnå bestemte udgiftsmål i sig selv blev et af de vigtigste formål. Denne udgiftsorienterede tilgang var først og fremmest resultatet af indenrigspolitiske krav og faldt sammen med en international udvikling, hvor de fleste landes bistandsoverførsler stagnerede, og hvor kun ganske få rige lande uden for Skandinavien tog de internationale bistandsmålsætninger alvorligt.

The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2013

Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen¹

In 2013, we may have witnessed a turning point in the recovery from the economic crisis of 2008. Economic growth seems to have picked up, and a renewed sense of optimism for the future has returned to Europe. At the same time, the reality of economic and political diffusion of power on the global stage became more evident over the course of the last year. The diffusion of power generates a different dynamism and new opportunities in the globalised world, but this process also challenges the position of Europe.

Last year, the Danish Foreign Service together with external partners analysed the political and economic developments in the world, which in turn led to the most far-reaching reorganisation of Danish diplomatic representations abroad in many years.

The below exposition of key issues in Danish and global foreign policy in 2013 will begin with the key findings of the discussion on global political and economic development trends. It will then go on to discuss new trends in the EU, regional developments and security policy issues before concluding with global development trends.

Danish Foreign Service in a Changing World

Changing Patterns of Power and Influence

In a world of rapid political and economic transformation and transition, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to continuously adapt itself. In September, a reflection group with a select circle of some of our most

important users and partners was established. The reflection group was asked to contribute to a discussion on global political and economic developments, focusing on how the present developments and future trends will affect Denmark and Danish foreign policy, and thus the way we organise the Danish Foreign Service.

The international system is moving towards increased multipolarity. There is no predominant superpower with both the ability and the willingness to act as international keeper of peace and enforcer of multilateral agreements. Instead, regional great powers with both increasing capabilities and commensurate political ambitions are emerging in all corners of the world. This global power transition is challenging the existing multilateral structures and the distribution of power that is formally codified in these institutions. New great powers are emerging and they are demanding a seat at the table; seats that will ultimately change the manner in which these multilateral institutions work and the agreements they will be able to negotiate.

As a relatively small state, Denmark has a clear interest in the development of strong multilateral institutions that can regulate international cooperation. We may not always be able to influence the making of the international agreements, but we still have a marked interest in maintaining an international order based on stable and predictable rules and conventions; a framework in which natural competition can take place within a sphere of mutual cooperation. Danish governments have given and will continue to give high priority to multilateral diplomacy, whether it be within the framework of the UN system or other global and regional fora.

The emergence of new regional great powers and the ensuing diffusion of power also represent a challenge for Denmark. The emerging powers do not necessarily share the core values that Denmark has been propagating over the past decades, nor do they necessarily share Denmark's interest in effective multilateral regulatory frameworks and efficient international institutions. The changing global political landscape underlines the continued relevance and indeed saliency of traditional foreign and security policy. Denmark's near abroad is relatively stable and prosperous, but further afield Denmark has to address a much broader range of security risks and threats that require new approaches and new policy instruments.

In economic terms, the diffusion of power in the international system is essentially a corollary of the sustained economic growth that has taken hold in especially Asia, but also in Latin America and to some extent in Africa. The emerging great powers have experienced strong economic

growth, which translates into increasingly affluent populations that typically covet Western consumer goods. And while the vast majority of Danish exports are directed towards our immediate European neighbours, Danish companies are increasingly demanding assistance in penetrating the new and emerging markets that are far from home. Danish economic diplomacy obviously needs to adapt to this new reality.

International development cooperation, where Denmark traditionally has played an important and highly visible role, is also undergoing a massive transformation these years. A number of our partners in Africa and Asia are now experiencing sustained economic growth, and the number of state and non-state entities working with poverty alleviation and development assistance has grown markedly over the past decades. Existing patterns of cooperation are evolving and changing, and Danish official development assistance is gradually being adjusted to this new reality.

Emerging Danish Responses

The global and regional dynamics that are currently transforming the international system are a challenge for Danish diplomacy. We need to understand the current trends as well as adapt and prioritise our diplomatic efforts accordingly. On 17 January 2014, the Danish Government consequently announced an ambitious and far-reaching reorganisation of the Danish network of diplomatic representations abroad. The mission of the Foreign Ministry is, and will continue to be, to promote and protect Danish interests, values and political priorities vis-à-vis the rest of the world. We need to be present in locations where it matters for Denmark, for Danish companies and for Danish citizens. The approach to representation, on the other hand, needs to be further developed and adapted to a rapidly changing world. It is the physical presence on the ground that generates value, but that physical presence need not follow a uniform pattern. Co-location agreements and “lighter” forms of diplomatic representation have to be further explored and developed.

The gist of the reform is a targeted shift of resources from Europe towards emerging markets further afield and a simultaneous strengthening of our presence in the major EU capitals. Denmark will be opening embassies in three emerging markets – in Nigeria (with an embassy in Abuja and a trade council in Lagos), in Colombia and the Philippines, respectively. We need to help more Danish companies gain access to the emerging markets, where the entry barriers are often radically different from the challenges they face in Europe. We will also open an embassy in Myanmar

with a view to supporting the positive democratisation and reform process of the country. The addition of new embassies represents an important strengthening of our global network of representations in the major regions of the world.

The EU is and will remain the single most important platform for the advancement of Danish interests, whether they be political, economic or idealistic. The European internal market remains the cornerstone of the Danish economy, just as the political cooperation is an inseparable part of Danish foreign policy. Hence, we will be strengthening both our EU representation in Brussels and our bilateral embassies in the three main EU capitals of Berlin, London and Paris.

With decreasing budgetary allocations over the coming years, the recent changes to our representation network have to be financed through parallel reductions in other parts of the world, notably Europe. We will be closing our embassies in Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland, redirecting consular services to other Nordic countries present in the said capitals and offering economic diplomacy from neighbouring countries. We will simultaneously be closing down our representation in Libya and shifting management of the development cooperation programme with Niger from Niamey to Ouagadougou. Affecting more than 25 countries, the present reform is the most far-reaching adjustment of the Danish network of diplomatic representations in many years.

Trends in the Global Economy

Fragile Recovery in the EU

The eurozone went into 2013 with negative growth in the first quarter. That was the sixth consecutive quarter of economic recession, but it also turned out to be the last. In the second quarter, the eurozone showed positive growth of 0.3 per cent and in the third quarter 0.1 per cent. The recovery primarily reflected improved financial stability in the eurozone since the summer of 2012 and increasingly successful fiscal consolidation and implementation of structural reforms in the Member States most at risk. This infused new confidence in the eurozone, but the recovery was modest and uneven and not sufficient to drive down unemployment, which increased to a level of 12.1 per cent in 2013 from 11.4 per cent in 2012.² Danish growth was also slightly negative in the first quarter of 2013, but rose in the second and third quarter to 0.5 and 0.4 per cent Q/Q, respectively.³

Shutdown and Growth in the US

The US economy also improved during 2013. The US had not been in recession in 2012, but economic growth had been sluggish. During the first three quarters of 2013, it rose to an annual rate of about 2 per cent. According to Eurostat, the level of unemployment fell from 8.1 per cent in 2012 to 7.4 per cent in the third quarter of 2013. On 1 October, due to the conflict in the American Congress about the federal budget, the debt ceiling and “ObamaCare”, the American federal government had to shut down all “non-essential” activities and furloughed about 800,000 federal employees. The shutdown lasted until mid-October, when agreement was reached to temporarily finance the government until mid-January 2014. As the economic effect of the shutdown was minor, the congressional fiscal disputes subsided, and since the economy continued to improve and the level of unemployment fell, the FED in December 2013 decided to begin scaling down on its bond-buying scheme (“tapering”) to the amount of USD 10 billion. Contrary to the situation in the spring, when financial and stock markets had reacted quite negatively to the rumour of tapering, the market reaction in December to the actual tapering was positive in most advanced economies. By the end of 2013, prospects seemed good for continued, though modest and uneven, recovery in the eurozone and relatively high growth in the US.

Japan, China and the Emerging Markets

In Japan, the impact of new monetary, fiscal and structural policies, “Abenomics”, produced strong export growth, rising consumer spending and a rebound in business investment, but also a 30 per cent depreciation of the yen against the euro. Japan grew at 1.7 per cent in 2013 and for this growth to be sustained, domestic consumption and investment will have to take the relay.

In several emerging economies of South America and Asia, the effects of the changed monetary policy of the FED were harsh. For several years since the Financial Crisis of 2008, the emerging economies had ridden high on cheap and abundant capital from the US and a government-induced Chinese investment boom that drove up prices of raw materials. The expectation in 2013 that this was about to change led to a flight of capital from many emerging economies, especially those whose current accounts were negative and relied on external finance. During 2013, the exchange rates of countries like India, South America, Turkey, Australia and Brazil depreciated by 15-20 per cent against the euro, and several emerg-

ing economies had to increase interest rates and introduce restrictions on capital movements.

China seemed immune to these developments, and growth, although slowing down during the year, averaged 7.7 per cent in 2013. At the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2013, it was again stressed that future economic growth should increasingly be based on domestic consumption rather than on exports and investments. Going forward, China's main challenge is to contain the building of risks in the financial sector without excessively slowing growth; a rather delicate balancing act. Likewise for many emerging economies, 2013 spelled a new situation, a new normal, where continued high growth would be more dependent on national structural reforms and sound macroeconomic and financial policies.

Free Trade Agenda

The demanding economic environment of 2013 meant a continued tendency towards protectionism. But 2013 also brought about a reinvigoration of the best defence against protectionism: the World Trade Organisation. After years of stalled negotiations in the Doha Development Round, the first multilateral trade agreement since 1994 was reached in December in Bali. The core of the agreement concerns facilitation of trade and will make it significantly faster and cheaper to trade goods across borders by cutting red tape. This will benefit all WTO members, especially developing countries. Importantly, the agreement renewed trust in the multilateral trading system. In 2014, WTO members are to agree on how to approach the remaining Doha topics. Among these is liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services, which EU Member States, not least Denmark, have emphasised the need to explore further.

2013 also saw progress on the bilateral trade agenda. The EU and the US initiated negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The geopolitical and economic perspectives of an ambitious free trade agreement across the Atlantic are difficult to overestimate. Strategically, it will deepen transatlantic ties and form part of the response to global power shifts. Economically, it will further integrate our economies and create much needed growth and jobs. The EU also initiated free trade negotiations with Japan and prepared for negotiations with China on an investment agreement. With Canada, political agreement was reached on a free trade agreement, which is expected to be finalised in 2014. Together, these developments will contribute to the EU leaving the crisis behind.

Trends in the EU

Strengthened Economic Governance

The financial and economic crisis continued to dominate the European agenda in 2013. However, the European Union showed determination to prevent any future crises and continued to seek solutions to the common challenges and to push for new growth and jobs in Europe. Strengthening of the *Economic and Monetary Union* (EMU) is an ongoing process on which discussions continued throughout the year. The core elements of the Stability and Growth Pact, preventive and corrective measures, were implemented as agreed to ensure that fiscal policy in the Member States was conducted in a sustainable manner. The social dimension of the EMU was strengthened in 2013 and employment and social indicators will be included in the European Semester from 2014. In 2013, a debate was initiated on how to underpin structural changes in the Member States through reforms/contractual arrangements. This debate is expected to be continued in the process leading up to the European Council in October 2014.

The work on establishing a “*Banking Union*”, the purpose of which is to break the negative link between weak public finances and weak financial institutions, progressed rapidly. In October 2013, the EU adopted the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for credit institutions, conferring specific supervision tasks on the European Central Bank. In December 2013, the Council came to an agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) aimed at the establishment of a single resolution board and a single resolution fund (SRF) for the resolution of credit institutions. The ambition is to reach an agreement with the European Parliament on the SRM before the European elections. An Intergovernmental Agreement on the functioning of the SRF is expected to be settled in March 2014. Provisions for a backstop arrangement are yet to be agreed on. The mechanisms will apply for all Member States in the eurozone and for non-eurozone members that enter into close cooperation on the “Banking Union”.

Growth Agenda

In February 2013, Member States agreed on a *Multiannual Financial Framework* (MFF) for 2014-2020. Agreement with the European Parliament was reached in autumn 2013. The MFF particularly focuses on creating growth and employment, and it includes new initiatives to help young Europeans find a job. Furthermore, the agreement met the three Danish main priorities: 1) a thrifty MFF mirroring the economic situation in Member States,

2) a modernised MFF including more funds for research, innovation etc., and 3) an annual Danish rebate of DKK 1 billion.

The implementation of the *Compact for Growth and Jobs* was evaluated several times at European Council meetings. Considerable progress has been made with regard to the modernisation of the Single Market, the Digital Single Market and the free trade agenda, but there is still much to be done, especially in the area of youth unemployment. The Youth Guarantee was adopted, recommending Member States to offer young people under 25 employment, internships or education in the event they are out of work for more than four months. Countries with youth unemployment over 25 per cent can apply for EU funds.

During the Danish EU Presidency in 2012, an agreement was reached on a *patent package*, which comprised two regulations and an international agreement. Danish ratification of the Unified Patent Court is considered to mean a loss of sovereignty and it has not been possible to attain the required 5/6 majority in the Danish Parliament. Therefore, the Danish Government is planning to hold a referendum on 25 May 2014.

EU Institutions

2014 will be a year characterised by major institutional changes. European elections will be held in May 2014. It will also be the year when all the top positions in the EU – President of the Commission, President of the European Council and the High Representative – will have to be filled. There is expected to be a package deal on the top positions, which to some extent will reflect the results of the European Parliament elections. This stems from the Lisbon Treaty granting more power to the European Parliament in electing the Commission President. Most of the political parties in the European Parliament have declared that they will present their own candidate for the position of President of the Commission in order to integrate the election of the Commission President in the campaign for the European elections.

Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership

Last year was an important year for EU enlargement. Firstly, Croatia became the 28th member of the EU family in July. Secondly, Serbia and Kosovo entered into a historic agreement on normalisation, which led to notable progress in the respective EU tracks of the two countries. Kosovo began negotiations with the EU on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in October 2013, while the EU in December 2013 initiated accession negotia-

tions with Serbia in January 2014. Finally, new momentum was created in the accession negotiations with Turkey with the opening of negotiations on a new chapter (22 – regional policy).

The EU's Eastern Partnership continued to be a dynamic framework for relations with the Eastern Neighbours. At the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013, Georgia and Moldova took a significant step in the European direction by formally concluding negotiations on association and free trade agreements (AA/DCFTA). Ukraine, however, decided shortly before the Summit to suspend negotiations with the EU on similar agreements. The EU made it clear that it remains open to signing the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine if genuine interest is demonstrated and conditions allow for it. In Ukraine, we witnessed major demonstrations towards the end of the year, expressing the desire of many Ukrainians to maintain Ukraine on a pro-European course. The public manifestations have continued into 2014 and the developments in Ukraine are expected to be a major theme for the EU's external relations in the coming year.

2013 also presented some challenges to EU-Russia relations, not least with regard to the Russian pressure towards some Eastern Partner Countries in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit. While expressing concerns about this kind of pressure on Eastern Partner Countries, the EU also continued efforts to strengthen cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest.

EU enlargement and the Eastern Partnership continue to be strong drivers of economic and political reforms. Implementation of European standards and increasing mutual market access help support stability, growth and prosperity in our neighbouring countries, also to the benefit of the EU and Denmark. Denmark has a strong platform for active engagement in our closest neighbourhood and a long tradition of actively supporting the young democracies in bringing them closer to Europe, both bilaterally and through the EU. We will continue to do so in 2014. Further progress in the normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo and the final signing of the AA/DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova will be important milestones in 2014 and proof of the EU's continued pull factor. Denmark and the EU will continue to cooperate with Russia in areas of mutual interest and are ready to engage in strategic dialogue on how to strengthen the partnership. A key element in the coming year is expected to be dialogue on further liberalisation of conditions for trade and investment between the EU and Russia.

The Arctic Dimension

One of the most significant trends in Arctic affairs in 2013 was the continued development of regulatory measures in regard to safety issues. At the Arctic Council's ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013, the Member States signed a new agreement on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response. A similar agreement on search and rescue activities was signed in 2011, which means that the Arctic Council has now adopted two legally binding agreements. While some may consider this a fairly modest achievement compared to other international institutions, the agreements are important steps towards the establishment of a working governance structure in a region where no such structure has previously existed. That the agreements were negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council serves to underline the role of the Council as the primary venue for cooperation in the region. Apart from its broader political significance, the agreement was also in itself very important to the Kingdom of Denmark, as maritime and environmental safety in the Arctic is a fundamental priority.

In 2013, China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea also became new permanent observers to the Arctic Council. The admittance of, in particular, the five Asian economic powers demonstrates the global nature of the dynamics at work in the Arctic region today. The particular interest of the Asian states is mainly connected to environmental research and potential economic opportunities. If the Arctic transit routes open up, the implications for global shipping, energy activities and trade would be considerable. Both old and new observers in the Arctic Council have now positioned themselves for possible future developments.

For Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the increased international focus on the Arctic comes at a time when the implementation of the Act on Self Governance in Greenland is still underway. In this regard, especially Greenland's assumption of responsibility for mineral resources has played an important role in this past year. The prospects of mineral production in Greenland, as well as Greenland's decision to end a long-standing moratorium on uranium production, have sparked off public debates in both Greenland and Denmark, ranging from the implications of imported labour and foreign investments to the strategic significance of rare earth elements.

In relation to the issue of uranium, a joint Danish-Greenlandic report on the consequences of a lifting of the moratorium was published in October 2013, serving as the point of departure for future work. Denmark

and Greenland will continue the dialogue in the coming year in order to find mutually acceptable solutions that support the wish for economic diversity and the development of the Greenlandic society, while ensuring that the collective foreign, defence and security interests of all parts of the Kingdom are taken into account.

Operating in the Arctic requires long-term investments and commitments – whether this entails financial investments in icebreaking technology or involvement in international fora. The events taking place at the moment could very well be decisive for the future outlook for the Arctic. For instance, by the end of 2014 the Kingdom of Denmark will be able to submit its fifth and final claim regarding the Faroese and Greenlandic continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, covering part of the Arctic Ocean. Like the four previous ones, the claim will be founded on international law, in particular the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Transatlantic Dimension

There is no doubt that the US is still the leading global power despite the political and economic developments. The US continued to be a natural and very close ally of Denmark, with cooperation in 2013 on a very broad range of important political and economic issues encompassing Afghanistan, Syria, the Arctic, the promotion of human rights, democracy, green growth and free trade. A free trade agreement across the Atlantic would provide a new and much needed boost to the economies on both sides of the Atlantic, and would – together with a similar free trade agreement between Canada and the EU – bring North America and Europe even closer together. A free trade agreement would be an important part of a so-called “transatlantic renaissance”, where intensified economic cooperation across the Atlantic would complement the traditional strong transatlantic cooperation within NATO.

Since 2012, there has been a gradual change of focus in US security policy towards rebalancing the upcoming powers in Asia. This tendency continued in 2013. This is a natural consequence of global developments and should not be interpreted as if the US is turning its back on its traditional allies and partners in Europe. It should rather be considered as a chance for Europe to prove that we are ready to do more to safeguard our own security, as well as an opportunity to find new areas of cooperation with our transatlantic partners.

Security Policy Issues

Fragile States and the Comprehensive Approach

Denmark increased its focus on fragile and conflict-affected states in 2013. In addition to support to Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan, new initiatives were started in Mali/the Sahel region and the occupied areas of Syria. A common denominator for the Danish efforts has been to work across the security and development divide. In September, in order to guide Denmark's increased engagement, the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, defence and development launched the policy, "Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World".

Internationally, Denmark has been working to strengthen global efforts for peace and security. Together with the US and the UK, Denmark initiated collaboration among other leading countries engaged in stabilisation, forming the "Senior Stabilisation Leaders Forum" with the aim of improving the learning culture for stabilisation and applying vital lessons learnt from Afghanistan, Somalia, etc. in future operations. In 2013, Denmark also spearheaded an initiative to strengthen the EU's comprehensive approach to ensure better integration of crisis management, peacebuilding and development. In addition, together with Timor Leste, Denmark last year co-chaired the "International Dialogue" cooperation between fragile states and donors, aimed at improving national ownership, inclusiveness, capacity building and development effectiveness.

Stabilising fragile states will remain a key priority for Denmark in 2014. *Politically*, Denmark will work to promote peace in the post-2015 development framework. *Multilaterally*, Denmark will engage closely with the UN and the EU in strengthening an integrated response to fragility and conflict. *Bilateral* stabilisation engagements combining development and security will continue with activities having a strong focus on conflict prevention and capacity building.

Syria

In Syria, the conflict continued to escalate in 2013. By the end of the year, the UN estimated that 9.3 million Syrians were in need of humanitarian assistance, including 4.3 million children. The continuous fighting and the refusal of the parties to allow humanitarian access to certain areas left 2.5 million people outside the reach of humanitarian organisations. Denmark has significantly stepped up its humanitarian support to Syria and

neighbouring countries in 2013, while at the same time also contributing to non-humanitarian support, focusing on a political solution, stabilisation efforts and human rights. In order to ensure the best possible coordination with the moderate Syrian opposition, Denmark appointed a Special Representative to the Syrian Opposition Coalition.

The level of violence in Syria reached unprecedented heights in 2013. The international community was dismayed when in August 2013 a chemical attack in Ghouta, on the outskirts of Damascus, killed scores of civilians, including children. As a consequence of international pressure, an agreement was reached on the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, and a joint mission was formed between the UN and the chemical watchdog, OPCW, to identify and destroy the chemical weapons. Denmark has assumed a leading role in the operation, contributing with maritime transport and escort plus a military cargo plane and a personal protection team on standby. For the transport of chemicals out of Syria, a task group was established under Danish leadership and preparations were made for the removal of the first batch of chemicals in January 2014. It is clear that the operation will be complex and require the flexibility of all involved.

As the year went by and the fighting continued, it has become clear that under the current circumstances neither party is able to impose a military victory. The Syrian opposition has become increasingly fragmented, with the opposition in exile struggling to maintain legitimacy among the opposition within Syria and several groups distancing themselves from the leadership of the Syrian Opposition Coalition. External actors' regional and international agendas have reinforced this fragmentation. At the same time, extremist groups, both local and foreign, have strengthened their foothold in Syria, giving rise to increased concerns. In light of such difficult preconditions, it was notable that the international community and the parties to the conflict were able to agree on a peace conference (Geneva II), to be held in January 2014 with the participation of Denmark. The road to a political solution will be long and difficult, but the Geneva II conference will hopefully be a small step in the right direction. Three years into the conflict, a solution is needed more and sooner than ever.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, transition has been a guiding principle behind Denmark's engagement in 2013. As Afghanistan took on an increasing share of the responsibility for its own future, the overall balance between the civilian and military components of Denmark's engagement began to shift gradually

towards the former. While Denmark's military engagement was reduced in scale and changed in scope, Afghanistan became the largest recipient of Danish bilateral assistance with more than DKK 500 million in annual support. This shift was designed to support the "three transitions" defining Afghanistan's overall development:

Firstly, the security transition reached a milestone on 18 June 2013, when Afghanistan assumed the lead security responsibility nationwide. Enabled by this achievement and tailored to the conditions on the ground and needs of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Denmark's military presence was reduced and took on a more supporting role, focused on training, advising and assisting the ANSF.

Secondly, the political transition continued apace as Afghanistan prepared for its Presidential election in April 2014. To advance conditions for a credible, legitimate and inclusive election process in 2014, much ground had to be covered in 2013 in terms of electoral reform, voting registration and improving security. Knowing that a peaceful and democratic transfer of power is crucial to Afghanistan's future, Denmark supported the UNDP's ELECT project (Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow) and civil society groups engaged in promoting democratic oversight. This also complemented our ongoing efforts to promote the empowerment of Afghan women and strengthen human rights in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, the economic transition in Afghanistan drew closer as the efforts to build a basis for sustainable development after 2014 intensified. With insufficient delivery of basic public goods and a large, illicit economy rooted in opium production, Afghanistan's economic outlook remained challenging. To promote sustainable development, Denmark has applied a long-term and multipronged approach by supporting agricultural development, alternative livelihoods and the provision of basic public goods. Denmark will continue these efforts and has pledged more than DKK 500 million in annual support from 2015 to 2017.

As Afghanistan enters 2014, it stands on the threshold of assuming full sovereignty. While Afghanistan stands up, the ISAF coalition will stand down. But Afghanistan will not stand alone. Much work was done in 2013 to pave the way for ensuring robust and comprehensive international support to Afghanistan after 2014. Denmark worked to ensure that both the EU and the UN maintain a strong engagement in Afghanistan after 2014. To this end, Denmark remained a strong advocate of international donor support beyond 2014 within the mutual commitments in the Tokyo Mu-

tual Accountability Framework. The foundation for a responsible transition was completed in 2013. This process will be concluded in 2014.

Hot Spots in Africa

The countries of Africa are developing at a different pace. We see the African Lions joining some of the fastest growing countries in the world, benefiting many Africans. However, Africa is also home to a number of fragile and conflict-affected countries.

The decline in piracy off the coast of *Somalia* was one of the most encouraging trends of the past year. The result is due to increased efficiency of international maritime efforts, commitment to Best Management Practices from the shipping lines and Somalia's own efforts to curb the scourge on land. The international community and Denmark remain committed to continue the counter-piracy efforts, with military and developmental means. And we are committed to rebuilding Somalia. In September 2013, a New Deal Compact for Somalia, where Denmark played a leading role, was endorsed, with priorities for building peace and stability that would enable elections to be held in 2016. Denmark has demonstrated its commitment to Somalia with a contribution of approx. USD 128 million (of which approx. USD 54 million is subject to parliamentary approval) from 2012-2016. Denmark also plans to support Somalia's armed forces through a trust fund and contributes to supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Denmark continued to play a key role in 2013 in the international efforts to stabilise the situation in *Mali*. This included a military contribution (a Hercules transport aircraft) to the French-led operation Serval in early 2013. In December 2013, the Danish Parliament also approved a contribution to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali. In addition, a Danish peace and stabilisation programme for the Sahel region was launched in 2013. The programme focuses on mediation and conflict resolution, democratic control of the security sector and on countering violent extremism and organised crime. On the political scene, the Danish support to civilian approaches to conflict resolution in northern Mali has contributed to an international recognition of the need for a broad and inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation.

As the year came to a close, an intense conflict broke out in *South Sudan* due to a split within the governing SPLM party. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been working hard to broker a

peace. Denmark fully supports IGAD's efforts. The situation is still alarming and the conflict will also be high on the agenda in 2014.

The broad Danish involvement in the international stabilisation efforts in Africa will continue in 2014, and Denmark will also continue to support Africa's own capacity to handle conflicts on the continent through the African Union and its regional entities.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Denmark continued in 2013 to actively support the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Within the field of conventional arms control, the UN negotiations on an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) were a key priority for Denmark throughout 2013. The UN process on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to regulate the trade of arms as well as combat arms trafficking and uncontrolled spread of weapons came to a successful conclusion in April, when the UN General Assembly adopted the treaty. Denmark worked actively for the treaty to include all types of conventional weapons, ammunition, parts and components, making robust demands regarding respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the trade of arms, and for it also to contain provisions on transparency and reporting obligations. In the margins of the conference, Denmark promoted the idea of a voluntary code of conduct for the transport of weapons. Denmark signed the treaty at a ceremony in New York on 3 June 2013. Following the conclusion of the treaty, the focus has shifted to implementation and Denmark has contributed DKK 9.25 million to building capacity in third countries.

A cornerstone in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture is the conventional arms control regime. However, the current regime has de facto broken down and has not worked since the suspension of the existing Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2011. Denmark has on this basis throughout 2013 been actively involved in the process of modernising the regime and is engaged in close cooperation with Germany and Poland on the matter. The three countries share a common vision of a future system based on existing structures, but with focus on confidence-building measures and increased transparency and on capabilities of armed forces rather than their sheer quantity, resulting in a new system that can secure predictability and stability in a time with new threats, diverging threat perceptions and a significant development in military equipment. Denmark will continue to seek progress in this field together with Germany and Poland as well as other partners.

After years of deadlock in relation to Iran's nuclear programme, negotiations between the EU High Representative, together with France, Germany and the UK, as well as China, the Russian Federation and the US (EU3+3), led to the signing of the Joint Plan of Action on 24 November 2013. The plan marks the first time in nearly a decade that Iran has agreed to specific actions that halt the advance of its nuclear programme, roll back key aspects of the programme and include unprecedented access for international inspectors. If implemented faithfully, the plan should lead to a final agreement and the gradual lifting of sanctions. The EU already suspended certain sanctions in this regard at the Foreign Affairs Council in January 2014. Negotiations on a final agreement will commence early 2014.

NATO

NATO continued in 2013 to contribute to a more stable and peaceful development in the world. NATO is still actively engaged in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean Sea as well as in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia. Solidarity and the transatlantic bond are still at the core of NATO's activities. This was exemplified in 2013 in the continued contribution to strengthen the defence of Turkey with Patriot missiles from US, the Netherlands and Germany.

The preparation for a post-ISAF situation in Afghanistan, where NATO and allies will go from an "engaged" to a "prepared" situation continued in 2013. To that end, further deliberations were made on the Connected Forces Initiative and the Smart Defence Initiative among others in order to keep the operational edge, the interoperability with partners and to retain the complete range of capabilities as well as the ability to deploy and engage where needed. Also the partnership agenda has been at the heart of NATO business in 2013. This resulted in a wide variety of meetings with different partners on items other than operations, including Smart Defence, the Connected Forces Initiative and Missile Defence.

Other Threats

Countering *terrorism and violent extremism* remain key priorities for Denmark. The threat from terrorism and violent extremism appears to be ever-diversifying with new fronts still being opened. The Sahel region and Syria are increasingly replacing Afghanistan and Pakistan as the new jihadist battlefields, and we have to acknowledge that the core of the threat moves closer to Europe's borders. We are especially faced with the threat that foreign fighters, particularly European jihadist, might return to our own

countries and start plotting attacks here. Denmark's international efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism continued in 2013 with focus on providing assistance to partner countries in East Africa, including the Horn of Africa as well as in the Sahel region, where Denmark has formed a partnership with Burkina Faso to promote regional cooperation aimed at preventing violent extremism.

Denmark has played a significant role in the success of the international efforts to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, where in 2013 we saw a dramatic decrease in the number of *pirate attacks* as well as ships and hostages held by Somali pirates. Denmark participated in NATO's counter-piracy mission Operation Ocean Shield in the Indian Ocean with the naval vessels Iver Huitfeldt and Esbern Snare, the latter being supported by a Danish maritime patrol aircraft. Denmark also continued to address all legal piracy issues through its chairmanship of the international legal working group of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Denmark's contribution to the fight against piracy also took place on land with support to bolster the rule of law in Puntland, including helping to build prisons and assisting the EUCAP NESTOR mission, which aims at building up Somalia's own capacity to guard and protect its coasts.

Security in the *cyber* domain is an agenda which is receiving ever more attention from both private and public sectors alike. In 2013, the EU adopted a cyber-security strategy and Denmark participated actively in its implementation. In the OSCE, long-running discussions regarding confidence-building measures in the field of cyber security reached a conclusion in early 2014, and in the UN the issue has been debated intensely and this will most likely continue in the foreseeable future.

The Middle Eastern Dimension

Polarisation and Transition Beyond Black and White

Developments in the Middle East and North Africa in 2013 once again reminded us that most political dynamics are neither black nor white – and that we need to remember the long-term perspective when we try to make sense of them.

At first glance, developments in the MENA region seem bleak. A key word summarizing the many worrisome developments could be polarisation. In Syria, we see a deeply polarised population which is increasingly

divided along sectarian lines. The Syrian crisis has also increased regional polarisation as a main theatre for regional competition. With the regionalisation of the Syrian conflict, the battlefield has also increasingly moved into an already unstable Iraq and hence nurtured a vicious circle, as feelings of exclusion from the political processes among the Sunni minority in Iraq in turn had negative spill-over effects in Syria.

Unfortunately, polarisation is not only sectarian and regional. Deep ideological divides have also characterised some of the main developments in the past year. Perhaps Egypt is the best illustration of this sad development. The distrust in Egypt challenges the creation of the necessary broad consensus on the overall way forward and hence also the chances of an inclusive and successful democratic transition. Polarisation is also played out along tribal and ethnic lines across the region. This is very much the case in both Yemen and Libya, where the dynamics have weakened central government and led to a deteriorating security situation with dire implications for the transition processes in both countries.

Polarisation, of course, also has territorial aspects across the region, as illustrated by conflict between Israel and Palestine. Yet the *Middle East Peace Process* was given new impetus with the re-launch on 29 July 2013 of peace talks mediated by US Secretary of State John Kerry. The Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have remained at the negotiating table despite an extremely challenging political context and significant obstacles along the way. Before April 2014, John Kerry is expected to present the two parties with an “agreed framework” including all core issues to guide the continued negotiations towards a final peace deal. In the process, both Israel and Palestine must be prepared to make very difficult compromises in order to reach a final two-state solution, to which both parties have subscribed.

As the new impetus in the Middle East Peace Process illustrates, the worrying trends of polarisation should not distract our attention from the many positive dynamics also witnessed across the region last year. Iran and the provisional agreement on its nuclear programme is a good case in point. In the past year, we have seen new doors opening that hold important potential of both a national and regional scale. Yemen is another good case in point where the historical National Dialogue process has brought together the segments of the Yemeni population in substantial and complex dialogue. While we sometimes witness deeply worrying and violent processes of polarisation, we must not forget the courage and aspirations that in recent years have led to widespread and unprecedented popular demands for justice, dignity and freedom. Processes of demo-

cratic transition are always long, troublesome and far from linear. We also know this from our own history. Tunisia, the cradle of the Arab uprisings, is the current flagship of this trend. Though the Tunisian transition process is also marked by polarisation, we have seen an unprecedented will to compromise despite pervasive distrust and conflicting interests. The dignity and perseverance of the transition process in Tunisia will hopefully serve as a source of inspiration for other countries in the region and across the globe.

Denmark will continue its strong political engagement with a broad range of partners throughout the MENA region. We will continue our efforts to promote reform, democratisation and dialogue, continue our political and humanitarian engagement in Syria as well as in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and other countries, and we will continue to express our full support, also through the EU, to the ongoing efforts to mediate a peace deal between Israel and Palestine.

The Asian Dimension

Asia harbours historically rooted tensions between Japan and China, Korea and North Korea, and Pakistan and India. In 2013, the East Asian region continued to be affected by a number of unresolved territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea.

The main focus in 2013, however, was Asia as the main driver of global economic growth. According to the Asian Development Bank, Asia's share of world GDP could grow from 27 per cent in 2010 to 51 per cent in 2050 (Asian Development Bank "Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century", 2011) provided that the governments in the region prioritise political rights, invest in education, infrastructure and environmental solutions, fight corruption and continue to assist large parts of the populations out of poverty. Especially seven countries (Asia-7) account for a large share of Asia's growth: China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Potential growth markets such as Bangladesh and Pakistan also have good growth rates and expanding middle classes. Afghanistan, however, will remain a fragile state, which faces massive political, security and economic challenges. Such conflict areas with weak government control are a threat to development as it creates a breeding ground for terrorist threats across national borders.

The financial weight Asia has today results in political power and in-

fluence. This new role puts relevant international trade patterns under pressure and influences decision-making processes and agendas in multi-lateral fora, including the UN. It also creates political and value-based tensions within, for example, human rights and expectations in the Western world that Asian countries to a larger degree than hitherto will assume the obligations of global issues – including security issues.

Also in the years ahead, Denmark will seek to strengthen and focus its foreign policy engagement in the region and actively improve its market share. This will be achieved through a coordinated and focused Danish effort and through signing strategic partnerships with Asian countries. In addition, a wide range of high-level visits to the region were carried out in 2013 and will continue to take place in the years ahead.

The African Dimension

After decades of extreme poverty, conflicts and fragility, several projections indicate that Africa is on a positive path for the future. In the last decade or so, the continent has seen a growing and consuming middle class in many countries and there appears to be a real prospect of eliminating extreme poverty within the time span of a generation.

However, growth in Africa has not yet reached a “tipping point”. While potentials for long-term sustainable growth prevail, the continent faces several challenges that, if not managed, could undermine or even reverse the achievements to date. Continued environmental degradation, lack of infrastructure, fragility and conflicts should not be allowed to hinder sustainable and inclusive growth for the next generations of Africans. Significant reforms must be implemented in areas such as property rights, rule of law, merit-based bureaucracies and increased accountability of political leadership at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.

African leaders show increasingly strong leadership in this field.

Today, the African Union (AU) is seen as the central continental framework for Africa’s efforts to ensure African solutions to African challenges and opportunities, including development, peace and security as well as economic integration. In 2013, the AU celebrated 50 years of African unity under the slogan “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance”. With this theme, the AU embarked on an ambitious agenda to make Africa a global growth centre, stressing that Africa has the potential and rightful position to be a strong and unavoidable global player.

At the Global Green Growth Forum in October 2013 in Copenhagen, Denmark launched the Danish “Opportunity Africa” initiative as a supplement to its strong bilateral cooperation with a number of countries in Africa. The objective of the initiative is to further strengthen partnerships for green and inclusive growth in Africa in the fields of foreign policy, development cooperation, trade and investments. The opening in 2014 of a Danish embassy and a trade council in Nigeria is one example of Denmark’s willingness to further strengthen its commercial cooperation with Africa in order to ensure win-win partnerships for both Danish and African counterparts.

Global Development Trends

Human Rights-based Approach to Development

2013 was characterised by a concerted effort to roll out a number of key elements in Denmark’s new Strategy for Development Cooperation – “The Right to a Better Life”, which was unanimously endorsed by the Danish Parliament in May 2012. The strategy introduced a two-fold objective for Denmark’s development cooperation: to combat poverty and promote human rights. The human rights-based approach introduces a shift away from the traditional needs-based approach to development and builds on the vision of responsible governments in charge of their own development, in which active and engaged citizens participate in this process, demanding accountability and claiming their rights.

Human Rights

The promotion and protection of human rights remain priorities in all aspects of Danish foreign policy, including development assistance. In 2013, Denmark continued its focus on the fight against torture, the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights, women’s rights and the rights of LGBTI persons. As a concrete expression of the Danish support to the protection and promotion of the rights of LGBTI persons, Denmark contributed to the US-based “Global Equality Fund”. The fund actively supports civil society organisations and networks working for LGBTI rights.

Green Growth and Sustainability

International deliberations on the need to move towards more resource-efficient, low-carbon societies continued throughout 2013. As a follow-

up to the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, a UN working group on global sustainable development goals was established in 2013. In 2014, the group will provide recommendations for a new post-2015 structure to follow the Millennium Development Goals, which are due to expire in 2015. Consensus is emerging that new goals must address both the need to eradicate poverty and to promote sustainable development under one single framework.

The opening of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and an Energy Efficiency (EE) Hub in the UN City in Copenhagen strengthened Denmark's key role within climate and sustainable energy. The CTCN will promote climate-friendly technologies for use in developing countries. The EE Hub will advance global energy efficiency as part of the UN Secretary General's Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative. The CTCN and the EE Hub will help solve key global problems in areas where Danish competencies are in demand.

In an innovative public/private partnership, a number of Danish institutional investors and the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) with public funding established a fund of DKK 1.2 billion to support low-carbon growth and climate adaptation in developing countries. The partnership model has attracted substantial interest among key international finance institutions.

The Global Green Growth Forum (3GF) is now an international brand moving the global green growth agenda forward and facilitating scalable public-private partnerships. The third 3GF in October 2013 brought together decision-makers from governments, cities, think-tanks, international organisations and the business community around the theme "Improving resource efficiency in the value chain". The title of the 2014 forum will be "Changing production and consumption patterns – through transformative action".

Final Remarks

2013 may well have been a significant stepping-stone in many respects. The economic optimism was perhaps best illustrated by the WTO agreement in Bali at the close of the year. It proves that free trade still holds a relevant answer to many of our mutual interests and challenges. And it underscores the point that in spite of the economic crisis we as nations did not immediately revert to national protectionism. For a smaller country,

steps towards stronger international institutions and agreements must be welcomed and supported.

At least two further events from 2013 will impact on 2014: the breakthrough in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme and the decision by the international community to take charge of Syria's chemical weapons. The first holds perhaps some optimism for future developments in the Middle Eastern region and for international security. The second offers at least part of a foundation for finding time for negotiated solutions. Perhaps 2014 will shed greater light on these events, either as turning points or – in the worst case – just more footnotes in the history of these long conflicts.

As we move into 2014 we do so with an eye for the ongoing trends and with the continued aim of making a difference and creating value. Our ability to shape global developments in a changing world will depend on our success in identifying new developments, opportunities and risks. We will continue to analyse the changing patterns of power and influence, and we will continue to adopt new approaches and policy instruments in order to promote Danish interests and values. We do so with a reorganised Foreign Service, ready for the challenges and shifts in the global environment.

Notes

- 1 Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen is the Danish Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs
- 2 Eurostat: Unemployment rate by sex <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec450>
- 3 Eurostat: Gross domestic product Volumes: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teina011>
- 4 Danmarks Nationalbank: <http://nationalbanken.statistikbank.dk/statbank5a/select-table/omrade0.asp?SubjectCode=909&PLanguage=0&ShowNews=OFF>

Danish Defence Policy and Military Operations 2013

Lars Findsen¹

2013 became a year where new and challenging operations were launched and new partnerships emerged. For instance Danish armed forces took the lead in a maritime transport operation to remove chemical weapons from Syria and they participated in operations in Mali to restore order and alleviate the threat from militant islamists. Participation in these operations is testimony to the high international demand for Danish military contributions and it underscores that allies and partners know that Denmark has both the ability and willingness to deploy to far corners of the globe and solve challenging tasks in a professional manner.

2013 was also the year when the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan was initiated and it was the year when the first reforms envisioned in the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 were implemented.

While 2013 in many ways is synonymous with transition for Danish defence, the fundamental underpinnings of Danish defence and security policy remain constant: UN, NATO and the Nordic defence cooperation are the legal and operational pillars for Denmark's international engagement in defence and security matters. The ambition also remains unchanged and clear: Denmark can and shall maintain an active defence and security policy – and we will work closely with our allies and partners to do so.

Institutional Underpinnings for Danish Defence and Security Policy

NATO and the Transatlantic Bond

NATO is the main framework for Denmark's active defence and security policy and it is the world's strongest defense alliance. NATO not only pro-

vides security for its members, it is also the place where North America and Europe meet on a daily basis. It is *the* forum for transatlantic dialogue between nations who share the values and aspirations of freedom and democracy.

Against the backdrop of drawdown in Afghanistan, the Alliance finds itself confronted with a new challenge. It has to transition from being deployed to being prepared. In this process it is essential that NATO designs ways to uphold the ability to effectively cooperate on and off the battlefield.

Historically, NATO has managed to adapt well to such changing security environments. The NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 will offer a chance for Heads of State and Government to set a new course for the Alliance which will allow it to adapt to its current challenges.

The United Nations

The United Nations is the second fundamental pillar for Danish defence and security policy and Denmark is aiming to increase its contribution to UN efforts to promote peace and stability.

As a priority in 2013, Denmark has supported UN peacekeeping operations with personnel and been actively involved in strengthening UN's ability to execute integrated peacekeeping and stabilization efforts. Yet another element has been Danish financial support to alleviate concrete capability gaps such as helicopters in UN operations.

Peacekeeping missions remain the backbone of the United Nations work for international peace and security. Currently, around 117,000 UN personnel serve in 15 peacekeeping operations. The trend with increased focus on robust military operations and integration of military, police and civilian tools has continued in 2013. As a result peacekeeping, stabilization and long-term peacebuilding are now combined in an integrated framework, which increases the likelihood for durable peace and security.

Denmark actively participates in various UN peacekeeping and peace support operations with combat, staff and training officers. These Danish contributions and our support for new UN initiatives – often provided together with our Nordic partners – underline Denmark's active support to UN peacekeeping.

Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFKO)

The third pillar for Danish defence and security policy is the Nordic defence cooperation. The so-called NORDEFKO is the official forum for the

defence cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden established in 2009. However, Nordic defence cooperation has taken place since the 50's, starting with the training of troops for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In principle, cooperation within NORDEFECO might include all aspects of defence and security as long as it provides concrete added value or savings. The cooperation is complementary to other Danish institutional affiliations and efforts in the security arena and is characterised by flexibility and absence of formalities; countries choose areas of cooperation on a case-by-case basis. This means that cooperation in many cases is either bi- or trilateral. However, all cooperation areas within NORDEFECO are open to all Nordic nations in accordance with the fundamental principles of NORDEFECO: Inclusiveness, openness and transparency. As an example of the Nordic cooperation, 2013 saw the signing of a memorandum of understanding about tactical air transport cooperation (called NORTAT). The intention is to pool the Nordic countries' tactical air transport capacity in order to use the available flight hours more effectively. Each nation can decide to what extent their capacities will be a part of the pooling system. The agreement means that Denmark potentially will have a larger pool of aircrafts to carry out transport tasks in situations where the Danish capacity is insufficient. On the international stage NORTAT will enable the Nordic countries able to take on larger tasks for UN and provide more effective and substantial support in the transport field.

The Danish government and other NORDEFECO members intend to prioritize and strengthen the Nordic Cooperation both in regard to national defence issues but also in regard to international engagements in e.g. peace support operations and capacity building efforts in East Africa. With larger common Nordic contributions instead of minor national contributions all the Nordic countries will be better able to influence security matters and to make a difference in the areas where we choose to engage.

The European Union

Cooperation on defence as well as emergency management within the European Union is picking up speed.

In December 2013 defence was on the agenda of the European Council. The outcome of the European Council was a series of new initiatives concerning EU crisis management operations, the military capacities of EU countries and European defence industry. It is notable – and important – that the EU member states place defence on the agenda at a time

when the Union is still affected by the aftermath of the financial crisis. But it is exactly through better coordination that the European countries can achieve more security for less. This process is equivalent to the one Denmark fully supports in NATO. However, Denmark remains sidelined in many aspects of EU defence cooperation because of the Danish opt-out on defence cooperation within the EU. Yet, it remains the Danish ambition to contribute positively where we can and avoid hindering further cooperation between our European partners on issues where they decide to deepen the cooperation.

In the emergency management area Denmark participates fully in EU initiatives. In the past decade, EU disaster management has increased, often triggered by unforeseen events such as forest fires, earthquakes, tsunamis, major floods and acts of terrorism. The EU does not, however, act as a first responder but aims to support or complement the member states' actions when preparing for or responding to disasters.

In order to improve EU's ability to react more efficiently to disasters, Denmark has introduced a concept of predefined civil protection modules, which are compatible and complementary when several member states respond together. New civil protection legislation allows member states to share their modules and other capacities in a new voluntary pool in order to make these resources available for the EU's 24/7 Emergency Response Coordination Center to react to disasters wherever they may occur, both inside and outside the EU.

Operational Activities in 2013

Afghanistan

2013 was also a year of transition in Afghanistan. On 18 June 2013 the Afghans assumed the lead security responsibility across Afghanistan. This marked the culmination of years of joint efforts by ISAF and the Afghan security forces. The results – however fragile some of these might be – are impressive. In six years a capable fighting force has been built and trained in cooperation between some 50 nations. This has been done in a complex and dangerous environment, while still allocating considerable assets to security operations in order to keep the Afghan public safe and support the execution of national and local Afghan governance.

During this year of transition the Danish military engagement in Afghanistan has been characterised by the continued support to the build-

ing of Afghan security forces and a significant reduction in combat and support contributions. It is, however, important to note that the Danish soldiers continued to participate in security operations throughout 2013, even though the Afghan forces increasingly moved into the lead.

At the beginning of 2013 the Danish military contributions to ISAF numbered some 650 personnel. The *combat* forces comprised an infantry company and a tank platoon with organic combat support. The *training* contributions included a special operations troop in support of training and building a special police unit in Helmand, and two police training teams attached to the district police in Gereshk. The Danish *support* contributions at the beginning of 2013 included a mobile air control center in the northern Afghanistan, a C-130 transport aircraft and doctors and nurses at the field hospital in Camp Bastion.

The air assets were redeployed during the first half of 2013, and as the Afghan security forces moved into the lead across central Helmand, the Danish infantry company and police training teams ended operations during the summer. During this period the Danish military contributions were reduced by some 300 personnel. The Danish reduction of forces coincided with the traditional fighting season in Afghanistan. In this period Afghan security forces managed to fight off the insurgency and protect the vital population centers in Helmand, which underlines the readiness of the Afghans to take on difficult security tasks.

As Denmark's military presence in Helmand was reduced some of the personnel were reinvested to support operations at the strategic air bases in Kandahar and Kabul and in the late summer, the first instructors and mentors arrived at the British lead Afghan National Army Officer Academy in Kabul. Finally, a smaller contingent from the Danish Home Guard was deployed to support the American efforts to develop the agricultural sector in Helmand.

With the Afghans in the lead, the future security efforts will increasingly reflect the Afghan priorities. This is an important step towards a sovereign Afghan state which – with our continued support – can control its territory, fight terrorism and continue to improve the conditions for its sorely tested population.

Syria

On 19 December 2013 the Danish Parliament approved the deployment of one maritime escort vessel and up to two maritime transport vessels to the eastern Mediterranean, in order to lead a Combined Task Group to

remove the chemical agents from Syria. Furthermore, it was decided to make a close protection team and a C-130 transport aircraft available for the joint UN and OPCW mission.

The operation is a fine example of international cooperation to remove and destroy some of the world's most heinous weapons and hinder their use against the Syrian population as was the case on 21 August 2013.

The Danish led maritime Combined Task Group comprises Danish, Norwegian and British escort vessels, as well as transport vessels from Denmark and Norway and a Finnish team of chemical warfare experts. In addition to the Danish led Task Group, security for the transport vessels while inside Syrian territorial waters is provided by Russian and Chinese escort vessels.

The Danish lead role has created new international partnerships and has also provided Denmark with the opportunity to demonstrate the professionalism and flexibility of the Danish military.

The Danish, Norwegian and Finnish contributions to the Task Group provide the operation with a strong Nordic profile. It has clearly demonstrated the ability of the Nordic nations to agree on an operational framework in a politically challenging environment.

Mali

On 15 January 2013 the Danish Parliament decided to deploy a Danish C-130 transport aircraft in support of the French "Operation Serval" in Mali for three months. The Danish C-130 transport aircraft was deployed to Dakar in Senegal from where it conducted the missions, primarily to the central and northern Mali. Underway the mandate was extended for up to 90 days. In accordance with the French plans, the C-130 was redeployed from Mali on 15 May 2013. During the deployment the Danish C-130 flew a total of some 510 hours divided on 200 single missions (sorties) in support of the French operation. The aircraft has transported some 1,530 personnel and approximately 1,350,000 pounds of cargo.

The Danish contribution to Operation Serval has strengthened the ties to France as a strategic partner. In view of the fragile situation in Mali and the resulting risk to the stability of the Sahel region, Denmark continues to support the international efforts in Mali. On 19 December 2013 the Danish parliament decided to allow a Danish military contribution in support of United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA. Denmark will contribute staff officers and, from February 2014, a C-130 transport aircraft for up to five months.

Kosovo

Denmark continued to contribute to NATO's force in Kosovo (KFOR) in 2013. The Danish contribution comprised a platoon strength unit, guarding Camp Novo Selo in the vicinity of the town of Mitrovica, and staff members to KFOR's headquarters in Pristina. Kosovo still represents a challenge for the international community – not least in relation to establishing a lasting political solution and reliable security mechanisms. However, the next steps seem hampered by a political deadlock, which again clearly indicates, that the long term efforts in stabilization will involve risks and demand stamina for all involved.

Active Fence in Turkey

Turkish concerns in relation to the troubled situation along the borders to Syria resulted in a Turkish request for NATO assistance in December 2012. Along with other NATO member states, Denmark early in 2013 decided to contribute to a defensive effort within the framework of NATO's standing defense plan, Active Fence. Some ten Danish military communication experts assisted in establishing the critical strategic communication in support of Patriot missile units deployed by other nations to augment Turkish air defense in the Southeastern part of the country. In the spirit of NATO's *raison d'être*, NATO nations – including Denmark – quickly and decisively managed to assist an allied asking for help.

Counter piracy

Pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean reached its peak in 2011. In January of that year, 32 ships and 736 hostages were held by Somali pirates. More than 300 attacks and suspicious events were recorded and 25 ships were successfully pirated.

Today, 50 seafarers remain in pirates' hands, but no ships are held by Somali pirates.

Denmark has been at the front of the successful response to the piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2013, Denmark participated twice in NATO's counter-piracy mission Operation Ocean Shield. From October 2012 and until May 2013 with the naval vessel IVER HUITFELDT and again from October 2013 till December 2013 with the naval vessel ESBERN SNARE. Furthermore, Denmark deployed a maritime patrol aircraft to the mission from September until November 2013. In addition to the naval deployment, Denmark participates with staff officers in the Coalition Headquar-

ters in Bahrain, and leads CMF Task Force 151 from December till the end of February 2014.

In November 2013, the naval vessel *ESBERN SNARE* detained nine suspected pirates, who were successfully transferred to the Seychelles for prosecution.

Baltic Air Policing

Four Danish F-16 fighter aircrafts were stationed at Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania from 2 January 2013 to 1 May 2013 in order to conduct air policing and enforce the Baltic countries' sovereignty. This was done through regular patrol and training missions in the Baltic airspace. The missions could be either pre-planned exercises or live scramblings, for example, in response to foreign aircrafts operating over or near the Baltic countries' territories.

Capacity Building in East Africa

Denmark contributes to peace and stabilization in East Africa by supporting the development of the local security forces. The purpose is to improve local forces' ability to handle local stabilizations challenges. To this end, Denmark has in 2013 supported e.g. the training of the headquarters for Eastern African Standby Forces, the International Peace and Stabilization Training Centre in Nairobi, the Kenyan Navy and the African Union.

Shaping Danish Defence for the Future

The Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017

Danish defence is traditionally governed through politically broad-based five-year agreements. That ensures stability and the ability to conduct well-planned and thorough transformation of the defence forces when needed, and it guides major procurement decisions. On 30 November 2012 a new defence agreement was signed by a broad majority of the parties in the Danish parliament and since then the Danish defence and the Home Guard have been working persistently on the implementation of the new agreement.

The Defence Agreement 2013-2017 was the culmination of a long period with numerous efficiency studies, deep dives and a comprehensive political debate against a backdrop of already agreed budget cuts. The agreement stipulates a reduction of the annual defence budget by ap-

proximately 2.7 billion Danish kroner when fully implemented in 2017. The reduction will be achieved without reducing the overall operational capabilities of the Danish armed forces.

A number of areas will be reformed in the coming years. The army will be transformed to a new readiness posture to adapt to the post-ISAF period. Three autonomous battalion battle groups – of which one is permanently on high readiness – will be the backbone of the army. The army will still be able to maintain a continuous deployment with up to a battalion battle group as it retains the command structure for six battalions and the ability to produce soldiers to backfill the structure.

In addition, the agreement will lead to the transformation of logistics, acquisitions, human resource management and the armed forces will continuously seek to identify projects that may be carried out in bi- or multi-national perspectives. The agreement also emphasizes a new focus on the Arctic and the cyber domain.

Arctic

The world is increasingly turning its attention towards the Arctic because of the climate changes in the region and the economical and geopolitical ramifications of these changes. With increased attention comes increased human presence and hence a need for recalibration of Denmark's ability to provide emergency response and to maintaining sovereignty in the region, while adhering to the guiding principle of avoiding militarization of the Arctic.

The Danish Defence Agreement introduces several initiatives and acquisitions to that end. In December 2013 the contract for the construction of a third Arctic patrol vessel was signed and by selecting the Seahawk as its new maritime helicopter the Danish Defence improved its capability to operate in the Arctic considerably.

However, the significant changes in the Arctic calls for a more comprehensive and strategic approach. Therefore Denmark, in late 2013, initiated a thorough analysis of the future challenges in the Arctic. The analysis will determine possible future operational tasks for the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic, shed light on the possibilities for further cooperation with other Arctic nations and look into the potential of utilizing new technologies like satellites to enhance domain awareness. Likewise will opportunities for cooperation with the inhabitants of Greenland and Faroe Islands and the scientific community be addressed. Results are due by the end of 2014.

Cyber

The Danish society relies heavily on its IT infrastructure and consequently we need the ability to defend ourselves against cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and databases. In the coming years the Danish Defence will allocate additional resources to its presence in cyberspace.

In 2012 the Centre of Cyber Security was established under the Danish Defence Intelligence Service as the national IT security authority. It monitors relevant internet traffic, identifies cyber attacks and shares information concerning actual threats with a broad segment of customers to hinder or mitigate effects of cyber attacks. In 2013 the Centre has continued to develop and strengthen its ability to protect Denmark against cyber attacks.

In the Defence Agreement 2013-2017 it was furthermore decided to establish a military Computer Network Operations capacity that would give the Danish Defence the ability to operate both defensively and offensively in cyberspace. Work on this capacity progresses as planned.

Perspectives for the Future

Many of the operations initiated, initiatives taken and trends identified in 2013 will, of course, carry on into 2014 and beyond. When analyzing the current composition of the various Danish military contributions to NATO or the UN one will recognize a shift from large complex ground holding units, as previously seen e.g. in Afghanistan, to smaller and more functionally focused supporting contributions, tailored to deliver a specific effect for a specific period of time. This pattern is likely to continue and the implementation of the Defence Agreement ensures that Denmark can field the right forces for such engagements.

As a result of more focused contributions, the total number of Danish military personnel deployed in international operations has been gradually reduced throughout 2013. By the end of 2013 the total number of Danish military personnel serving in international operations numbered some 600 personnel which is relatively low compared to the preceding years. Yet, the wide variety of Danish military engagements in contemporary international operations reflects the utility and readiness of the Danish Armed Forces as well as the political will to contribute to the promotion of peace and stability in troubled regions. By actions Denmark has demonstrated that our military engagement to these ends nests firmly within the framework of the United Nations and/or NATO. Moreover, in most cases engagements efforts take place in close cooperation with our operational and strategic partners or with our Nordic neighbors.

Notes

- 1 Lars Findsen is Denmark's Permanent Secretary of State for Defence.

Greenland's Uranium and the Kingdom of Denmark

Cindy Vestergaard¹

Introduction

Greenland is a unique case among recent uranium suppliers to enter the market and countries that are currently exploring their uranium potential. Like the others, Greenland is economically developing and has little or no nuclear regulatory systems in place. Unlike the others, Greenland is an island within a state and part of the Danish Realm (*Rigsfællesskabet*). At the same time, while Greenland is the only case of a territory to leave the European Union, it still has informal links through Denmark's EU membership to the regulatory system of Euratom, and if it does extract its uranium for trade, it will be the newest Western (and Arctic) supplier in decades to enter the market. Greenland therefore offers a case study of a potential supplier with one of the most complex and mixed memberships within its overall legal system.

Much of the current debate on uranium in Greenland is around clarifying issues of competences and authorities between Greenland and Denmark. The two, along with the Faroe Islands, are linked within the 'Commonwealth of the Realm', or Rigsfællesskab, where the overseas islands enjoy autonomous authority in domestic affairs while Denmark remains constitutionally responsible for foreign, defence, security and monetary affairs. With the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Greenland 'took home' more authorities from Denmark, including full authority over its natural resources.² Greenland has since been embarking on developing its rich natural resources in its drive for modernisation and self-determination. And Greenland has lots to develop: it has iron, aluminium, zinc, diamonds, gold and incredible resources of rare earth elements (REE). It also has large reserves of uranium and thorium.

Until recently, Greenland had a decades-long practice of not allowing the exploration and extraction of uranium. On 24 October 2013 the Greenland parliament, Inatsisartut, lifted the so-called ‘zero tolerance policy’ on mining radioactive elements, thereby lifting an immediate hurdle to mining rare earths and other minerals that coexist with significant concentrations of uranium and thorium. The hurdle that remains, however, is a challenging one. On one hand Nuuk maintains that any area transferred to Greenland is under Greenland’s sole jurisdiction – even if it entails foreign and security policy implications. On the other, Denmark argues that while Greenland has authority over its natural resources, uranium is embedded within a variety of international treaty and safeguards obligations to which Copenhagen is ultimately responsible for, particularly when traded worldwide.

While legal interpretations of what constitutes ‘foreign, security and defence policy’ in the post-2009 Rigsfællesskab are ongoing, Greenlandic and Danish officials are working towards developing a cooperation agreement to frame uranium extraction and trade. Despite the differences in legal opinion, there is recognition that a cooperative structure will be needed as there is currently no administrative system for safeguards in Greenland while Denmark’s membership of the European Union and Euratom binds it to a regional system for export controls and nuclear safeguards that do not apply to Greenland. Complicating matters further, neither Greenland nor Denmark has any experience in the uranium trade. Thus, for a Kingdom which has otherwise foregone the nuclear fuel cycle (except for medical purposes), coupled with limited international guidance on uranium export controls, the task ahead for Greenland and Denmark in developing uranium governance will be complex, and one based on a steep learning curve.

This paper will go through the various international and regional treaty requirements related to the extraction and export of uranium and discuss the challenges that arise from the Rigsfællesskab’s mixed membership in the various regimes. It will then provide an overview of Danish–Greenlandic official activities in the lead-up to the lifting of zero tolerance and beyond and how Copenhagen and Nuuk are working towards understanding the political responsibilities that come with supplier status. The paper will end with a discussion of the policy challenges and opportunities that uranium extraction and export offers the Rigsfællesskab.

Limited International Guidance

There have been many lessons learned in seven decades of mining uranium. Most of the harshest are related to environmental hazards, particularly at so-called 'legacy mines', which were abandoned or closed without rehabilitation. And the legacy endures: many mines mothballed during the 1950s through to the 1990s are either still in need of remediation, or remediation efforts are still ongoing. As uranium exploration and development continues in over thirty countries and some legacy mines are being examined for their potential to be reopened, it is critical that potential new suppliers operate in accordance with established international standards to protect workers, the public and the environment, including site remediation. Given that uranium can be used for weapons manufacture as well as energy production, it is also critical for suppliers to be aware of their international non-proliferation requirements, specifically that all states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are obligated by international law not to provide nuclear material to a non-nuclear weapon state except under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. This system of safeguards however only provides limited international and regional requirements and guidance applicable to the governance of uranium ore concentrate (UOC).

IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards

Natural uranium is considered to be source material under the IAEA Statute and thus a type of nuclear material as defined in IAEA document INFCIRC/153, which defines the starting point for *full* safeguards (i.e. the application of the full set of accountancy and control provisions on nuclear material inventory). IAEA safeguards however "shall *not* apply to material in mining or ore processing activities".³ Paragraph 34(c) is commonly referred to in the safeguards community as 'the starting point of safeguards.' It states:

When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the State, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement.

Safeguards⁴ therefore start when nuclear material ‘leaves the plant or process stage’, and has historically been interpreted as the output of conversion plants (i.e. Uranium Hexafluoride or UF₆, which is the chemical form of uranium that is used during the uranium enrichment process). In 2003 the IAEA reinterpreted this definition with the introduction of ‘Policy Paper 18’ under which safeguards were applied to the production of purified uranyl nitrate or the first practical point earlier.⁵ In Canada, this meant moving the starting point of safeguards to when drums of yellowcake were added to production lines, which marked the first time that Agency safeguards had captured a refinery plant in Canada (i.e. Cameco’s Blind River refinery).⁶ The new starting point avoided the tens of thousands of drums stored at the site and therefore UOC remains a ‘pre-34c’ material and not subject to the *full* scope of IAEA accountancy and control provisions. UOC, however, is used to feed subsequent stages of the nuclear supply chain and therefore the IAEA requires information on exports and imports.

INFCIRC/153 states that “when *any* material containing uranium or thorium” which has not reached ‘34c-level’ is exported (Paragraph 34a) or imported (34b) “to a non-nuclear weapon State, the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, *unless* the material is exported for *specifically non-nuclear purposes*” (emphasis added). In other words, if a pre-34c material is traded for eventual use in a nuclear reactor its trade has to be recorded and reported (but is not subject to full material accountancy and control). If such material is not destined for use in the nuclear supply chain, then it is exempt from reporting.

Large supplier countries such as Australia and Canada report their exports and imports on a monthly basis. Unfortunately, when looked at as a whole, reporting under paragraph 34 is uneven across IAEA members, particularly since some states do not consider uranium-bearing ores or their concentrated by-products as potentially destined (or potentially divertible) for nuclear purposes. While the paragraphs are generally used for UOC exports and imports only, *any* material containing even trace quantities of uranium or thorium (i.e. phosphates, copper, coal, rare earth elements, etc.) should be reported if such material is exported for nuclear purposes. The technology for extracting uranium from phosphates, for example, is well known and mature, with some 20,000 tonnes of uranium recovered from phosphates to date.⁷ If a state recovered uranium from such secondary sources, it would not be obliged to report it until it reached 34c-level. Secondary sources, therefore, are a gap as they can provide a po-

tential proliferation pathway for states that may be seeking such sources specifically for their uranium content. Given this gap, it is incumbent on states such as the Rigsfællesskab, that may export uranium-bearing ores or UOC, to apply prudent controls and evaluate the risk that uranium will be extracted for nuclear purposes, and if so, to apply appropriate controls to such exports.

The Additional Protocol

The 1997 Model Additional Protocol (INFCRIC/540) is a voluntary agreement which grants the IAEA complementary inspection authority beyond that of comprehensive safeguards agreements. The AP further mitigates the gap within reporting of secondary sources as Article 2a.vi requires annual reporting on exports and imports of pre-34c material for *non-nuclear purposes* (although this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy).⁸ Article 2a.vi.a also requires states to report their uranium (UOC) and thorium holdings. These requirements formalise the need for AP states to apply prudent controls and evaluate the risk that uranium will be extracted for nuclear purposes. For those without comprehensive safeguards agreements (let alone the Additional Protocol) there are no legal obligations to track secondary uranium sources.

As states that have ratified the Additional Protocol, Australia and Canada provide information on their mines, mills, uranium production, capacity and purity, and routinely afford the IAEA complementary access to facilities and information on mining activities. Australia for example reports its holdings at each uranium mine and other locations where quantities of yellowcake and UOC are stored. On reporting for non-nuclear purposes Australia, for example, rarely reports under Article 2.a.vi.b as all of Australian UOC is exported for nuclear purposes (and therefore reported under Paragraph 34a of INFCIRC/153). There may have been one case where a shipment of UOC was exported for non-nuclear purposes (i.e. for glass tinting) when Australia then reported this under the Additional Protocol.⁹ As Denmark and Greenland are party to the Additional Protocol, they will also be required to report on, and provide access to, mining facilities and their products and trade.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

Natural uranium and its related technologies for conversion are included on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export trigger list with guidance

that states report UOC exports for nuclear purposes that exceed 500 kilograms. From a safeguards perspective, the NSG guidance states that suppliers should transfer natural uranium to a non-nuclear weapons state only when the receiving state has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards to all natural uranium for current and future peaceful activities.¹⁰ The NSG does not bar the export of UOC in small quantities, or even large quantities, if the supplier has reasonable assurance that the material will not be used for nuclear purposes. The NSG currently has forty-eight participating states, including Denmark. Although Danish implementation is done through EU regulation, the NSG's export controls do extend to Greenland.¹¹

Uranium Security

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) requires physical protection measures for nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while under international transport. Nuclear material is defined to include, "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-residue." Under Annex II, the Categorisation of Nuclear Material, Footnote (c) states that, "natural uranium should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice." It does not however provide further clarification on what is meant by 'prudent management practice'. The CPPNM also uses the 500 kilogram figure, and the provision that "transports exceeding 500 kilograms of uranium shall include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time of arrival and confirmation of receipt of shipment."¹²

In 2005 the CPPNM was amended and strengthened to also cover nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage and transport. The amendment did not change the provision regarding protection of natural uranium in accordance with prudent management practice or the specific requirements for international transport of natural uranium greater than 500 kg. The amendment is not currently in force because it has yet to be ratified by the required two-thirds of CPPNM parties. Denmark has approved the amendment but as of yet it still does not apply to Greenland.

The key IAEA document for physical protection of nuclear material is IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, 'Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities' (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). This document provides guidance to states on how

to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material consistent with CPPNM and its 2005 amendment. INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 essentially reproduces Annex II of the CPPNM, including the statement that natural uranium should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice.¹³ Paragraph 4.12 also states that nuclear material required to be protected in accordance with prudent management practice should be secured against unauthorised removal and unauthorised access. This document also, however, does not elaborate further on implementation of prudent management practice.

In 2010 the IAEA convened a consultancy on 'Nuclear Security for the Uranium Industry' to elaborate prudent management practice. The consultancy was initially disbanded then re-convened in a new form in 2012 and then produced a draft tecdoc on "Prudent Management Practice for Nuclear Security in the Uranium Industry."¹⁴ This document will be presented to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) in June 2014 and proceed through the internal IAEA review process before publication, hopefully in 2015. Once approved, the tecdoc will not be legally binding but it will provide a useful tool for supplier states, such as Greenland and Denmark, in considering measures to apply when experiencing heightened security environments.

Euratom Safeguards

Whereas the IAEA Statute does not interpret the terms 'source material' or 'safeguards' as applying to ore or ore residue,¹⁵ Euratom's control begins as soon as ore is produced or material is imported into the territory of one of the member states. The Euratom Treaty states that the Commission shall satisfy itself that ores, source materials, or special fissile materials are not diverted from intended uses as declared.¹⁶ Euratom, therefore, requires operating records to be kept for ores and source materials,¹⁷ including during transport, and allowing inspectors access to places and data.¹⁸ In 1973, the agreement between Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), applied IAEA safeguards across Euratom member states (previously Euratom states had had bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA).

With the Additional Protocol in force across all Euratom states in 2004, the *Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards* stated that basic technical characteristics of ore extraction operations shall be declared and that accounting records of ore quantities extracted with average uranium and thorium content and stock of extracted ore at mines¹⁹ shall be kept for at least five

years with annual declarations on amounts of material dispatched from each mine or exported from the state.²⁰

The Euratom Treaty also established the European Supply Agency (ESA). The ESA was given the exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of ores and source materials generating from inside or outside of the Community.²¹ The ESA has a right of option on materials produced within the Community, meaning the ESA has to have the first offer of uranium before a member state can sell it to a third party. All transfers, exports and small quantities of ores and source materials also need to be reported to the ESA,²² with exemptions for quantities of not more than one tonne of uranium and thorium within a five tonnes/year limit.²³

Mixed Kingdom Membership

Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands all became party to INFCIRC/193, the safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear weapon states of Euratom, Euratom and the IAEA on 1 January 1973 when Denmark joined the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1985 Greenland withdrew from the EEC (and Euratom) and returned to the safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/176) that the Kingdom had with the IAEA previously. This Agreement is implemented in Denmark with Executive Order No. 315 of 27 June 1972 on control of the peaceful use of nuclear materials. Denmark has had an Additional Protocol with the IAEA in place since 1998, but until 2013 it did not apply to Greenland (it still does not apply to the Faroe Islands). Although Denmark and Greenland have different agreements with the IAEA, both are comprehensive safeguards and both have the Additional Protocol with the same reporting requirements on natural uranium as noted above. The main difference between Denmark's and Greenland's safeguards requirements is that provisions related to the European Supply Agency do not apply to Greenland. This difference allows the Rigsfællesskab to report Greenlandic uranium directly to the IAEA in Vienna, rather than through Euratom in Luxembourg.²⁴

Although Greenland is not a member of the EU, it does enjoy a special status within the EU as an 'overseas country and territory' (OCT). The 1985 Greenland Treaty treated Greenland as a special case and established a comprehensive partnership between the EEC and Greenland. The EEC, the Danish Government and the Greenland Government have

concluded fisheries protocols since 1987, essentially providing a fisheries agreement in which the EU keeps its fishing rights and Greenland its financial contribution, as they did before EEC withdrawal. Greenland is also given tariff-free access to the EU for fishery products. Outside of fisheries, EU financial assistance to Greenland from 2007 until 2013 amounted to 25 million per year.²⁵

In 2011 the European Commission noted a need for broadening and strengthening future relations between the EU and Greenland. The proposal suggests that the EU–Greenland partnership should include a framework for discussions on global issues where dialogue could be beneficial to both sides. Specifically, it states that the “increasing impact of climate change on human activity and the environment, maritime transport, natural resources, including raw materials, as well as research and innovation, calls for dialogue and enhanced cooperation”.²⁶ The proposal goes further, to include the mutual crossover in objectives of other EU strategies such as the 2020 Strategy, the Arctic Policy and the Communication on commodity markets and raw materials.²⁷ In modernising its relationship to its OCTs, the EU has noted its willingness to provide assistance to ‘upgrade’ local legislation in areas relevant to the EU *acquis* where gaps still exist, including standardising customs procedures and facilitating regional and international trade. While Greenland’s OCT status does not impact its uranium, it does allow for the provision of EU support to Greenland, including in the area of duties and customs. In short, the EU can be a useful training/financial/technical resource for both Greenland and Denmark.

The main complication with mixed membership lies in export controls, where Copenhagen gets its control lists and policies from Brussels and Greenland is not bound by them. Denmark’s export controls are, in practice, achieved through EU regulation 428/2009.²⁸ However, the EU regulation is in some ways tougher than the NSG controls, extending controls to smaller quantities (exempting four grammes or less “contained in a sensing component of instruments”) of yellowcake than the NSG.²⁹ While the NSG does apply to Greenland and EU dual-use exports do not, it is conceivable that Greenland may, in the future, be shipping its yellowcake for conversion in the EU (i.e. France) and thus will need to be aware of (and follow) Euratom’s rules along with the EU’s transport regulations (transhipment/transits through EU however are not subject).³⁰

Another complication arises when looking at Denmark’s ratifications of five other nuclear conventions that are not yet applicable to Greenland

and the Faroe Islands. Accordingly, nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation requirements are mixed across the Kingdom, providing disparities and confusion within the legal non-proliferation architecture for which Copenhagen is internationally responsible. The Rigsfællesskab's mixture of nuclear safety, security and safeguards commitments is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The Kingdom's Mix of Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Commitments

	Denmark	Greenland	Faroe Islands
EU membership	EU	Non-EU, but OCT status	Non-EU, non-OCT
IAEA Safeguards	INFCIRC/193 & INFCIRC 193.	INFIRC/176	INFCIRC/193
Additional Protocol	Add.8 (AP)	(AP March 2013)	(No AP)
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency	✓	–	–
Convention on Nuclear Safety	✓	–	–
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	✓	–	–
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	✓	–	–
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 2005 Amendment	✓	✓ (not amendment)	–


This mixed membership is further complicated by Greenland's status as a self-governing territory within a state in the post-2009 Rigsfællesskab. While the task is complex and layered, Greenland and Denmark have an opportunity to put together a common system to ensure non-proliferation reporting and international safeguards obligations are met. It will require a regulatory system of export controls and inventory management that meets their mixed – and collective – membership requirements.

Danish–Greenlandic Uranium Working Group

In February 2013 Greenland and Denmark established the Uranium Working Group (UWG) with representatives from Danish and Greenlandic ministries to look at the relevant foreign, security, fiscal and legal implications of mining and exporting radioactive minerals, including which international and national obligations apply to Greenland and which only apply to Denmark, and what steps, if any, should be taken for international obligations to apply throughout the entire kingdom.

In October 2013 the UWG issued a joint “Report on the extraction and export of uranium”, essentially providing a ‘mapping and scoping’ of what has become a relatively complicated and layered *Rigs* legal system.³¹ The 180-page report provides intermediate conclusions on how this system applies to Danish and Greenlandic authorities, with the disclaimer that far more discussion and investigation remains. The report initially identified areas related to the environment and nuclear safety as being under the competence of Naalakkersuisut (Greenland government), including the storage and transport of mining products and the handling of and responsibility for radioactive waste. It identified transport and emergency preparedness and response as a *rigsanliggende* (‘matter of the Rigsfællesskab’) and therefore a competency of Denmark, along with export controls. Radiation protection (health) and safeguards land in a space where Greenland does not have an administrative system for dealing with them, and because radiation protection and international non-proliferation commitments are within Copenhagen’s remit, the intermediate conclusion is for both to cooperate on future regulation and administration. Using the UWG’s first report as a starting point, the scope of negotiations ahead and potential overlap can be represented as below.

Figure 1. Areas of Competencies Established by the 2013 Uranium Report



It is important to note that although the report hands transport in terms of nuclear safety to Greenland it is Denmark that is responsible for transport on roads, sea and land: so there is an overlap on uranium transport that will need to be addressed. The report also stresses that safeguards are fundamental to foreign, defence and security policies as they are the means for the IAEA to ensure that international obligations under the NPT are met and that uranium trade does not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Safeguards, however, are located in the space between Denmark and Greenland as Denmark's ability to implement safeguards will be dependent on both Copenhagen and Nuuk establishing a jointly administered system for sharing information. Safeguards are thus dependent on a robust export control system, and while export controls were identified in the report as an area under Danish authority, the report underscored the need "for establishing a new and comprehensive export control set-up, which includes the provision of new legislation for Greenland and the building of necessary human skills and administrative systems and procedures for cooperation ...". It accepts that establishment of such a legal framework will be "a complex and complicated task" and that "there is no experience in Denmark in relation to the administration of these obligations is particularly true for export of uranium and there will be a need to conduct feasibility studies in order to clarify the content of the forthcoming legislation."³²

A follow-on status report will be issued by the UWG in the latter half of 2014, which will address the conclusions of the October 2013 report and provide an intermediate snapshot of progress by the UWG in identifying and building an administrative system across the kingdom to control uranium production and export. Thus, the 2014 report will not be a final report. The UWG has been provided a mandate of two years (2014 and 2015) to complete its task of framing a cooperation agreement between Denmark and Greenland, which will include mechanisms for information sharing and a jointly administered system for controlling extraction and trade.

A Territory within a State

The UWG report included in its annexes a legal opinion by Lett Law Firm, which had been requested by Naalakkersuisut almost a year prior, to look at the consequences of lifting the zero tolerance policy.³³ On the division of authorities, the Lett report concluded that the Kingdom's defence and security policy generally may not be affected when the use, export and sale of uranium is accompanied by a contract for peaceful uses.³⁴ In their view,

Naalakkersuisut is therefore able to conclude such agreements without the involvement of Denmark. It concluded however that if uranium were being used for weapons purposes, then international agreements would qualify it from the exemption rule of Paragraph 12 of the Self Government Act. It recommended therefore that the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut should set objectives and terms related to the use, export and sale of uranium and safeguards.³⁵

In January 2014 Greenland published another legal assessment by Danish lawyer Ole Spiermann who argued that under the Self Government Act, any area transferred to Greenland is under Greenland's sole jurisdiction – even if it entails foreign and security policy implications.³⁶ Denmark however argues that uranium not only triggers international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which Copenhagen is internationally responsible to, but also Danish non-proliferation, security and foreign policy which falls within Copenhagen's remit.³⁷ Despite the legal back and forth, both sides have accepted the need for developing a cooperation agreement related to uranium and have extended the work of the UWG to advise on the elements needed in such an agreement. How the cooperation agreement governs foreign policy, export controls and safeguards will depend on the political context and UWG momentum. Its implementation will also depend on the development of a specified common 'non-proliferation and uranium policy.'

A Common Non-Proliferation Policy

Non-proliferation policy has been characterised as “much more like a large construction project” that “may, to be sure, never follow the precise blueprints of its architects... But it is to be judged by whether it is in fact advancing toward the kind of result laid out as its long-term goal”.³⁸ Given the variety of international and regional obligations listed above, including the range of other treaties in existence that may impact the UOC trade, such as nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs), new supplier states are supplied with the skeleton of a non-proliferation policy and implementation. But it is up to states to flesh out the frame.

This section outlines various policies and approaches to uranium of a number of supplying countries and then examines Denmark and Greenland's historical approach with a view to what might come next for the Rigsfællesskab.

Supplier Policies

The policies that accompany uranium in various countries are dependent upon a range of domestic, regional and international regulations. Australia for example views its uranium exports as a means to increase global energy security, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and reduce the risks of misuse and diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes. It therefore requires bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, which attach specific 'conditions of supply' to the sale of Australian yellowcake. Other suppliers, such as China and Kazakhstan, however, are content with contracts, while Brazil only uses its own reserves domestically and currently does not sell its UOC for use in nuclear reactors abroad.³⁹ Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) are widely employed by countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States, and Euratom countries. These nuclear bilateral agreements usually require specific reporting requirements and prior consent (where the state buying uranium needs prior approval from the supplier state before reprocessing, enriching uranium beyond 20% or transferring to a third country). Canada has 27 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements in force covering a total of 44 countries (including Euratom), which are reciprocal and provide a policy framework for imports and exports. These NCAs are all slightly different, but the provisions on notifications, reporting, and requests for prior consent for retransfer, consultations and fallback safeguards provisions are found in all the NCAs.⁴⁰ The Euratom-Canadian Agreement of 1959, for example, provides that neither side can transfer source or special nuclear material to a third party without prior consent (Article IX).⁴¹ In certain cases additional reporting and/or verification measures are also in place.

In the case of Australia, Canberra requires export permits for any uranium-bearing ores and UOC – no matter whether for nuclear or non-nuclear purposes – so that it can ensure the end user. Risk assessments are then performed by safeguards agencies, foreign ministries and other ministries as necessary. In Australia, these risk assessments are based on four factors: quantity of nuclear material; extractability of nuclear material; purpose of the export; and the nature of safeguards that would apply should uranium be extracted. This process is similar to how Australia approaches exports of dual-use goods under the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Australia then reports exports for nuclear purposes to the IAEA on a monthly basis, but does not report exports for non-nuclear purposes because it has an export control system in place to satisfy itself that these exports are for “specifically non-nuclear purpose.”⁴²

Australia also tacks on additional requirements regarding which countries to sell to, along with the uses to which it may be put: it limits its exports to those countries that are party to the NPT, have the Additional Protocol and CPPNM in force and have a bilateral NCA with Canberra. Use of Australia's uranium thus becomes 'obligated' as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear supply chain, as does any nuclear material generated through its use. Australia's NCAs include provisions that IAEA safeguards will apply and prior consent from Canberra is required before Australian material is transferred to third parties, enriched beyond 20%, or reprocessed.⁴³

It should also be noted that some non-producing (but consuming) countries do tack on 'conditions of purchase' such as Japan where utility companies insist on uranium from Namibia because the purchase agreement is considered to be part of Japan's development assistance to Africa.⁴⁴ Euratom with a common supply policy requires a diversification of sources (i.e. requires more than one country source) and recommends long-term (ten year) contracts and keeping inventories.

Whether it is formalised in a legislative act or in regulations, expressed non-proliferation policies (and their implementation) shape the non-proliferation profile of a state internationally. Australia's policies for example were articulated publicly in 1977 and formalised in the 1987 Safeguards Act. The question for Greenland and Denmark then is: what kind of profile does the Rigsfællesskab already have? Should it be maintained? Altered? Strengthened? These questions are critically important for both Nuuk and Copenhagen as they move beyond the zero tolerance policy and towards a new policy on uranium production and trade.

A Policy that Never Was

The genesis of the zero tolerance policy is mostly one of speculation. Some give its starting point as around the time of Greenland's Home Rule in 1978–79, some say it was an indirect result of the 1985 legislative decision to not include nuclear energy as an indigenous power source for Denmark, and then there is a 2008 report on 'the social aspects of the use of uranium in Greenland' issued by the Siumut coalition government which states that the Joint Committee on Mineral Resources under the Ministry of Greenland and later the Ministry of Energy (Fællesrådet) adopted the principle not to grant permission for uranium exploration and exploitation in Greenland in 1988.⁴⁵ A similar statement was made by Greenland's Parliament in August 2013.⁴⁶ The Fællesrådet however had no decision-

making competency. It was an advisory committee consisting of five members from Greenland and five from Denmark with any final decisions on minerals made by the Greenland Home-Rule and the Danish Ministry of Greenland/Energy.

Minutes from meetings in 1988 from Fællesrådet also reflect that no decision for a ban on uranium mining was put forward to Danish or Greenlandic authorities.⁴⁷ Indeed, a meeting of the Joint Committee in 1989 suggests that no decision in principle was made since the Committee recommended three companies to collectively explore for radioactive elements in Sarfartoq (along with a range of other minerals) from March through to December that year. Fællesrådet's 1989 annual report covering the period 1 July 1988 to 30 June 1989 notes that environmental, archeological and technical issues were discussed in the minutes of the Committee's January 1989 decision; but there is no reference to a moratorium or zero tolerance policy on uranium mining.⁴⁸

The position of the Fællesråd on uranium mining was not further tested, as the companies did not proceed beyond exploration at the time. In fact, the Committee's common position was not tested until 2008 when advanced studies in Kvanefjeld required clarification on how uranium should be handled when considered a significant part of a deposit's mined product. The Fællesråd evaded clarifications at its May 2008 meeting, leaving the issue in limbo until the Inatsisartut's 'Law nr. 7 of 7 December 2009 on Mineral Resources and their activities', when Greenland achieved Self Government status and with it full authority over its natural resources. In 2010, Naalakkersuisut amended the standard licensing terms to allow Greenland Minerals and Energy (GME) an exemption to explore (but not exploit) beyond normal background radiation in Kvanefjeld. Three years later, the zero tolerance policy was then put to a vote in Naalakkersuisut with a vote 15–14 (with two abstentions) in favour of lifting a policy that never really was.

That said, while the 'zero tolerance policy' does not show up in the archives before the 2000s, historically Greenland has been opposed to mining uranium and the predominant common practice has been to exclude uranium and thorium from mining licenses. In comments to the 1965 Law on Mineral Resources in Greenland,⁴⁹ the first mining law specific to Greenland, certain commodities or groups of commodities including uranium and thorium, were considered inappropriate to exclude but that there may be concessions to take such decisions based on existing international agreements.⁵⁰ In other words, while exploration for radioactive

elements was not banned, there was space for considering uranium and thorium to be resources that were accompanied by a range of international conventions and therefore resources of a different sort.

With the introduction of Home Rule in 1979, a new Mineral Resources Act for Greenland came into force, which was replaced in turn with the 1991 Mineral Resources Act in Greenland. Both Acts embedded the principles of 'co-decision' (or common veto) powers in the raw materials sector. As before, licenses stated explicitly that, "an exploration [or mining] license covers all mineral raw materials with the exception of hydrocarbons and radioactive elements, unless otherwise detailed in the relevant permit."⁵¹ In the course of the 2000s the concept of 'zero tolerance' appeared and somehow became understood as a ban on exploring and mining 'beyond normal background' radiation. 'Background radiation' levels however were not identified. Although the first time the term 'zero tolerance' was used is yet to be identified, the concept appears to be a relatively new one and one which seems more intertwined with Greenland's 2009 Self Government than any other historical event.

Possible Policy Pathways

Denmark and Greenland have the opportunity to reconcile their non-nuclear self-image with their collective nuclear past and potential future as a uranium supplier state. In moving ahead, Greenland and Denmark need to ensure that domestic legislation is in line with their collective non-proliferation commitments such as that of the NPT, AP and NSG, but also to consider how they will employ Greenland's large uranium reserves to advance specific foreign policy objectives. Their cooperation will frame not only their relations for the years to come, but also prepare the regulatory foundation so when Greenland eventually does vote for independence; it will already have a well-functioning nuclear regulatory system in place.

Denmark and Greenland are in a unique position to move along the learning curve quicker and apply a higher set of standards for natural uranium than other new suppliers given their ties to the EU. Granted, Denmark's EU membership binds it to a common, regional policy and export control system that does not apply to Greenland; but it is hard to imagine that the provisions that apply to UOC in the EU would not be accepted by Naalakkersuisut as a standard for Greenland to follow, particularly since any Greenlandic yellowcake processed in Europe would be recorded as an import under that regulation. Greenland's non-EU membership means that the Euratom Supply Agency will not be involved in any Danish-Green-

landic decisions or bilateral agreements with third countries (unless it is a Euratom country). The ESA does however have a long experience with nuclear supply (and consumer) contracts, which may be of use to both Greenland and Denmark as they come to understand how they want their own nuclear cooperation agreements and contracts to be framed. Greenland's OCT status can also be leveraged to support non-proliferation safeguards, security and export controls training on the overseas island.

There is also a joint need for agreement on which countries the two are prepared to sell to. Greenland and Denmark might adopt conditions of supply similar to Australia and require NPT, AP and CPPNM memberships along with a number of prior consent provisions. They will also need to consider the best method for 'following their flags' through the nuclear supply chain to provide assurances that Greenlandic UOC is used for peaceful purposes. Nuuk and Copenhagen may also consider whether additional treaty memberships should be tacked on, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans all nuclear testing but will not enter into force until China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States (so-called 'Annex II' states) ratify it. Given their longstanding positions and the aversion to nuclear testing of both Greenland and Denmark, are they willing to sell to states that have not categorically renounced nuclear testing? There is also the Convention on Nuclear Safety – a treaty that does not yet apply to Greenland, but a treaty that commits parties operating nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks. Also, there is the question of what to do about the other four treaties that Greenland is not party to.

The list of supply conditions can be long or short and will depend on how Greenland and Denmark balance non-proliferation considerations with commercial ones. Indeed, "history has shown that ... a coincidence of [economic and non-proliferation] interests is crucial to the successful implementation of a state's foreign nuclear policy."⁵² Once they reach that balance the pathway will be paved more smoothly and things will likely move more quickly when politically aligned as was witnessed with Greenland's membership of the Additional Protocol on 22 March 2013,⁵³ which occurred within six months of Denmark and Greenland being reminded that Inatsisartitut had decided in favour of the Additional Protocol in May 2004.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The task ahead for Greenland and Denmark in building a 'Kingdom-appropriate' uranium export policy and regulatory control system is monumental. With no administrative system for safeguards currently in place in Greenland and with both Greenland and Denmark inexperienced in the uranium trade, there is a steep learning curve coupled with a complex post-2009 Rigsfællesskab. Given the small size and corresponding lack of resources available to both Denmark and Greenland, it is prudent for them to cooperate and to cooperate with other bodies that can provide them with building blocks for their regulatory frame. Pragmatically, neither side can meet their international non-proliferation requirements without the other: Greenland currently has no administrative system for safeguards in place and is not recognised as a 'state' by the IAEA. Denmark cannot provide IAEA reporting unless it has a system for information sharing and reporting with Greenland.

This paper has demonstrated that non-proliferation policy is too complex to be derived from a series of abstract principles. Whether pulled out of the ground as a by-product or not, the potential of uranium for electricity generation is matched by its potential to yield the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. It is therefore incumbent on states to apply prudent controls and evaluate the risk that uranium will be extracted for nuclear purposes. Policy is also inextricably linked with practice where the implementation of safeguards is dependent on an effective export control system which Nuuk and Copenhagen can base on existing legislation and on lessons already learned. It is in their common interest to form a new 'Kingdom standard' that may serve not only as a model for the Rigsfællesskab but also for other new potential suppliers.

Notes

- 1 Cindy Vestergaard is a Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). The author wishes to express her gratitude to Gry Thomassen, post-doc at DIIS, and her dedicated efforts and contribution to this article on the history of the zero tolerance policy in Greenland.
- 2 Greenland Government 2009: Preamble
- 3 INFCIRC/153, Paragraph 33, June 1972, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf>
- 4 Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a state is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes.
- 5 Policy Paper 18 noted that if production of uranyl nitrate was not associated with a practical or economically viable accountability point, then safeguards should be applied “at the first practicable point earlier (i.e. ‘upstream’) in the plant” (IAEA 2003).
- 6 Thereby also capturing the addition of safeguarded uranium scrap (recycled from conversion and fuel fabrication plants) to the process (see K.E. Owen, “Implementation of IAEA Policy Paper 18 in Canada”, Addressing Verification Challenges: Proceedings of an International Safeguards Symposium on Addressing Verification Challenges, organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, 16–20 October 2006).
- 7 World Nuclear Association, Uranium from Phosphates: <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Uranium-from-Phosphates/#.Uho1ZRtg9po>
- 8 INFCIRC/540, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards”, 1997, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>
- 9 Communication with Australian official, 19 February 2014.
- 10 The NSG Guidelines contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation Principle,” adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. See: Nuclear Suppliers Group: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/A_test/01-eng/index.php
- 11 Danish and Greenland Governments 2013: 32
- 12 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, CPPNM, Annex I.
- 13 CPPNM, Table I, Categorisation of Nuclear Material, Footnote (c)
- 14 The author participated in the consultancy from 2012 onwards.
- 15 IAEA Statute Art. XX (3)
- 16 Article 77, Euratom Treaty
- 17 Article 79, Euratom Treaty
- 18 Article 81, Euratom Treaty

- 19 *Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards*, Article 24
- 20 *Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards*, Article 25
- 21 Article 52, Euratom Treaty
- 22 Article 74, Euratom Treaty
- 23 *Commission Regulation (EURATOM) No 66/2006 of 16 January 2006 exempting the transfer of small quantities of ores, source materials and special fissile materials from the rules of the chapter on supply.*
- 24 Discussion with Euratom officials, January 2013. Luxembourg.
- 25 This amount was earmarked for the Greenland Education Programme, which involves the entire reform of Greenland's education and training sector, see: Vestergaard 2013: 4
- 26 European Commission 2011a: 8
- 27 European Commission 2011b
- 28 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009
- 29 Ibid
- 30 Article 74 of the *Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards*.
- 31 Danish and Greenland Governments 2013: 61
- 32 Ibid: 69–70
- 33 Lett Advokatfirma 2013
- 34 Ibid: 20
- 35 Ibid: 21
- 36 Spierman 2014
- 37 The Danish Ministry of Justice is expected to release its response to the Ole Spierman assessment in spring/summer 2014.
- 38 Nye 1978
- 39 Brazil, however, does ship its yellowcake abroad for processing, which returns to Brazil in the form of UF₆.
- 40 Written communication with Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission official, July 2013.
- 41 Cooperation agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC Treaty) and the government of Canada concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, 6/10/1959.
- 42 See Craig Everton, Stephan Bayer and Michael East, "Safeguarding Uranium Production and Export Conventional and Non-conventional Resources", paper delivered at the European Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA) and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) meeting in Aix-en-Provence, France in October 2011.

- 43 Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 2012: 35
- 44 Anthony, Ian and Lina Grip, "Africa and the Global Market in Natural Uranium: From Proliferation Risk to Non-proliferation Opportunity," *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 39, Stockholm, November 2013: 9.
- 45 A 2008 report of the Home Rule Administration on 'the social aspects of the exploration of the use of uranium in Greenland' stated that in 1988 the joint council (fællesrådet) adopted a principle not to grant permission for uranium exploration and exploitation in Greenland. See: Redegørelse om evaluering af ensprisreformens konsekvenser, May 2013: <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Departement%20for%20Boliger%20Natur%20og%20Miljoe/Klima%20og%20Energi/Ensprisevaluer ing%20DK.pdf>
- 46 Punkt nr. 106 om *Forslag til Inatsisartutbeslutning om at Inatsisartut med virkning fra EM13 tiltræder at "Nul-tolerancen" overfor brydning af uran og andre radioaktive stoffer ophører*, 8 August 2013.
- 47 Minutes of meeting in Fællesrådet, 28 January 1988. Rigsarkivet (RA) 0030 Statsministeriet, Grønlandsministeriet. 1957–1989 Journalsager, 1478 05 00 28 – 05 00 33, box 5975. Minutes from the 23 September 1988 meeting are currently in Energistyrelsen's (Ministry of Energy's) custody.
- 48 Beretning for perioden 1. juli 1988 til 30. juni 1989 fra Fællesrådet vedrørende mineral-ske råstoffer i Grønland, 30 August 1989. RA, 0030 Statsministeriet Grønlandsministeriet, 1957–1989 Journalsager 1478 05 05 box 5978.
- 49 The 1965 Act stated that the underground resources belonged to 'the state' and gave the Danish Minister for Greenland responsibility for authorising the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in Greenland with the eventual provision that Greenland's National Council (landsråd) be consulted and included in the distribution of mining revenues.
- 50 'Bemærkninger til Lov om mineralske råstoffer i Grønland', 1965. Tillæg A til Folketingstidende Fremsatte Lovforslag m.v. Folketingsåret 1964–65 spalte 433–444.
- 51 Råstofforvaltningen: Baggrundsnote vedrørende det tyske selskab Frölich & Klüpfel Untertagebau GmbH & Co. KG og dets aktiviteter i 1986 vedrørende niob i et område ved Sarfartoq syd for Søndre Strømfjord, 12 September 1986. RA, 0030 Statsministeriet Grønlandsministeriet 1957–1989 journalsager 1478 05 00 23-05 00 27 box 5974; Råstofforvaltningen: Ansøgninger fra Platinova A/S om to efterforskningsstilladelser vedrørende mineraler fra området i Østgrønland, 15 January 1992, RA, 0035 Energi-ministeriet 1989–1995 journalsager 9113 08-11 box 664.
- 52 Lellouche, Pierre, "Breaking the Rules without Quite Stopping the Bomb: European Views", *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Winter 1981: 49.
- 53 Additional Protocol Signings:
<http://www.iaea.org/About/dg/amano/photoalbum.html?id=Protocols>
- 54 Parliament of Greenland, 'Dagsordenens punkt 10' [Agenda item 10], http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/groenlands_landsting/landstingssamlinger/fm_2004/mdage_fortryk/17/fortryk?lang=da (in Danish).

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Danish Contributions in Syria and Mali: Active Internationalism in a Changing World Order

*Tonny Brems Knudsen*¹

In a speech given at Aarhus University on the 15th of March 2012, former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Villy Søvndal, stated that the time had come for a return to realism and patience in Danish foreign policy, especially in light of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He also said, “all imaginable and non-imaginable attempts to find political solutions by means of diplomacy must be exhausted before military solutions can be considered”.²

In spite of this more cautious and diplomatic outlook, the government (with broad parliamentary backing) decided to support France logistically in its military intervention in Mali in January 2013. It was a limited Danish engagement, and there was also a clear mandate from the UN Security Council providing for military measures to be taken by ECOWAS and states assisting the West African regional organisation, but the decision to join France in a narrow military coalition in the turbulent Sahel region was resolute and somewhat risky. The Danish engagement in Mali looked more like a continuation of the military activism in Libya in 2011, where Denmark joined France, Britain, the US and a few other states in combat in the UN-authorized, but soon divisive, humanitarian intervention,³ than a new cautious and pragmatic course.

Denmark also stepped forward as a determined supporter of military sanctions against the Syrian regime following its use of chemical weapons on civilian quarters in Damascus on 21st August 2013, even in the absence of a mandate from the UN Security Council. Though the military punishment was never implemented, the Danish support of it was somewhat surprising in light of the diplomatic and cautious approach signalled by the foreign minister back in 2012.

In Syria as well as Mali, the Danish follow-up was devoted to more dip-

lomatic, mediating and peacebuilding efforts based squarely on the UN – namely contributions to the removal of chemical weapons from Syria (OPCW–UN Joint Mission) and the peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) – but these contributions are quite remarkable as well.

Apparently, the Danish foreign policy and military activism associated (in various versions)⁴ with the 1990s and 2000s is continuing in spite of a changing world order in which Western leadership is being challenged by the rise of other powers including BRICS⁵ and regional actors,⁶ by the American debacle in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the economic crisis.⁷

This gives rise to the following question: is Danish foreign policy activism in one form or another sustainable in a changing world order and how? As a continued junior partnership with the USA, or by means of complex navigation between Western great powers, rising powers, and regional organisations? In other words: how can Danish activism operate in a more multipolar world order?

A study of the Danish engagements in the Syrian and Malian crises cannot give definitive answers to these broad questions, but combined with an analysis of the changing world order and with a view also to the management of other recent or current international crises like the ones in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic, it can give some indications on the prospects for Danish foreign policy activism.

Theoretically, the article is based on English School and Realist notions of great power management understood as a fundamental international institution consisting of a set of principles and practices that are shaped by the ongoing interaction of states, and which may change over time, or more rapidly following changes in the distribution of power or decisive international events. In turn, institutionalised principles and practices of great power management are likely to inform the interaction of great powers and other actors at any given moment.⁸

Methodologically, the article applies Weberian ideal types⁹ of great power management, 'regional ownership' and Danish foreign policy activism to the international and Danish engagements in the crises in Syria and Mali. More specifically, the interplay between patterns of great power management and regional ownership on the one hand, and Danish activism on the other, is examined and interpreted based on the following sub-questions and parameters: a) The crisis and the UN/legal basis for the actions taken, b) the (shifting) patterns of great power management and regional ownership, c) the Danish contributions and actions, d) implications for Danish foreign policy in a changing world order. Empirically, the

analyses of Syria and Mali focus on UN resolutions and meetings records, Danish foreign policy documents, and crisis analyses.

It is argued that the unfolding world order is characterised by shifting patterns of great power management, especially 'soft' (and occasionally 'hard') balancing and 'concerted' action, the shifts between them being dependent on calculations of interest, status, and regional ownership. Under these circumstances, American or Western leadership is still possible, but certainly not assured. Consequently, Denmark can no longer define its foreign policy as an automatic attachment to Washington. Instead, Danish foreign policy activism requires careful navigation between Western great powers, rising powers, and regional organizations. The logic of the evolving world order, and the recent Danish contributions in Libya, Syria, Mali and the Central African Republic, furthermore indicate a return to a policy of active internationalism resembling the 1990s.

The Changing World Order

The changes in the global distribution of power have become more and more evident over the last decade,¹⁰ although their magnitude and endurance are disputed by some observers.¹¹ But changes in capabilities, and perceptions of capabilities, are evident, and so are their ramifications for international leadership.

Militarily, the limits of the USA became strikingly evident in Afghanistan and Iraq where full control and sustained political results have been unachievable in spite of massive military superiority, initial victories, and prolonged efforts. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated how little the USA can do with its military superiority rather than the opposite. Conversely, the Russian intervention in South Ossetia and Georgia proper in 2008 showed that other powers could still obtain something with military power in their own vicinity. It also showed that the USA can do little to prevent or stop such military incursions, or change their political consequences.¹² Economically, the ongoing crisis has revealed the vulnerability of the American and European economies and underlined the continuing growth and relative strength of especially China. Politically and institutionally, the USA suffered a blow to its legitimacy as the natural leader of collective defence of international peace and security due to the 2003 attack on Iraq from which it has not fully recovered, in spite of the efforts of President Obama.¹³ Washington's cautious

approach to the intervention in Libya, relying on regional support by the Arab League and UN Security Council authorisation to gain international acceptance, may be seen as a case in point,¹⁴ and so may the many attacks on the allegedly unrestrained, illegal, or self-interested Western leadership during the Libya intervention and Syrian crisis by the BRICS and third world countries in UN debates.

The USA can still do more militarily and politically than any other great power, and economic recovery will come at some point. But it is not the world order, or the power political game, we knew until the middle of the last decade. But the development in the distribution of power is one thing, the dynamics and patterns of great power politics is quite another. Polarity – the number of great powers in the international system – does not tell us much about their interaction and the character of world order. Here the shared expectations and practices that evolve over time are much more important.

Great Power Management in a Changing World Order: Rivalry, Balancing or Concert?

Following the English School (and, increasingly, other mainstream IR theories like American Liberal Internationalism),¹⁵ great power management can be seen as a fundamental institution in international society. According to the English School, a state that wants to position itself as a great power must have (1) the military, economic and political resources to establish itself worldwide; (2) the will to act as a great power and assume the associated special rights and duties; and (3) the status as a great power which can only follow from the recognition of such a status by other great powers.¹⁶ In this perspective power management is basically about shared understandings, principles and practices and, not least, interdependence.

In recent years the club of great powers has been changing according to the just-mentioned criteria and logic. First, new (or temporarily weakened) great powers like China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa (BRICS) are progressing, although primarily in terms of growing economic and political strength.¹⁷ Second, these powers, and especially China and Russia, clearly have an ambition to act as global great powers. Third, the BRICS have taken a decisive step towards achieving the recognition of the West-

ern great powers (USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan) as global – or at least as more than regional – great powers.

But how should we understand the evolving relationship between old and new great powers? If we combine the English School (which already draws on elements of Classical Realism) with the realist tradition, we can point to three basic models, patterns or practices: rivalry, balancing and concert.¹⁸

Rivalry describes a relation characterised by military build-up, intense struggle for allies and resources worldwide, military confrontations between great powers in the territories of weaker states, and mutual insecurity and fear. This was generally the situation during the Cold War.

Balancing describes a less conflicting relationship among the great powers in which they nevertheless try to maintain the balance between them by means of military adjustments, alliances and containment (*hard balancing*),¹⁹ as well as softer approaches like political alliances and countermeasures, delegitimation via international organisations, and the development of economic cooperation which keeps some states out (*soft balancing*).²⁰ The BRICS and other non-Western powers currently favour soft balancing vis-à-vis Western great powers and the West as a bloc, and the Western powers can play that game as well, cf. their attempt to isolate Russia and China as irresponsible stakeholders in the UN Security Council due to the blocking of sanctions against the Syrian regime since the civil war and atrocities began in 2011.

Concert describes a situation where the great powers work together to maintain international order including the resolution of conflicts, interventions for the common good, recognition of new states, and the management of the international economy. To make that work they must exhibit mutual self-restraint and avoid taking home every possible gain to the detriment of other great powers. They must also agree on basic principles of international order amounting to a programme for peace.²¹ That was arguably the case in the decades following the 1815 Peace of Vienna and again in the 1990s, though this was helped along by the preponderance of the USA. The benefits from establishing a collaborative and trusting relationship with other great powers are immense. However, it also involves risks, if other great powers are, in reality, playing at balancing or rivalry.

There is no determinism in international politics, only more or less sustained practices, and thus more or less likely forms of action and interaction. Historically, some practices of great power management have

taken hold for long periods and to a degree that defined the international order as such, for example rivalry during the Cold War. Right now, all three patterns of great power management seem possible. One of them may become dominant in some years, but in the current situation great power management is characterised by shifting patterns, practices or games, especially shifts between soft balancing and occasionally concert.²² As argued below, the shifting great power cooperation and struggle over the recent (humanitarian) crises in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Syria, Mali, Congo and the Central African Republic can be understood and interpreted in this light. Sometimes the great powers go for (or end up in) balancing behaviour, sometimes they go for (or end up in) concerted action depending on the configuration of interests, recommendations by regional organisations and actors, the development of the crisis and crisis management, and other situational circumstances. The current great power twist over Ukraine and the unlawful Russian annexation of the Crimea is not likely to change this picture. Hard balancing (or even rivalry) is on the table, but in a part of the world which Russia has considered as its sphere of influence since the end of the Cold War.²³ However, if the game of hard balancing is played out time and again, it may become firmly institutionalised at the cost of soft balancing and concert.

Regional Ownership and Status in a Changing World Order

As indicated, great power management may depend on regional conditions.²⁴ Regional international societies have their own special history, cultural traits and norms, which may be built on top of or woven into the global international rules and institutions.²⁵ Regional organisations and great powers therefore have a special legitimacy and say in regional matters. Consequently, 'regional ownership' in the form of recommendations, support or leadership may play a significant role to great power management and collective defence of peace and security.²⁶ However, the regional actor's significance for international legitimacy will vary with the balance of power between regional and global actors. Under strong global rivalry between superpowers (the Cold War) or under hegemony (the US in the 1990s), we can expect regional organisations to play a smaller or less independent role than in a situation with (evolving) multipolarity (the present development) or a power vacuum. In these more complex and less

constraining conditions, great power balancing and interests are less likely to overrule recommendations and initiatives by regional powers and organisations.

As an initial observation, the humanitarian interventions in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 indicate that regional ownership is becoming increasingly important in a (more) multipolar world order, whereas the international community's reactions to the atrocities in Syria in 2011–2014 indicate that the point about regional ownership should not be carried too far, given that the initial calls by the League of Arab States for UN sanctions against the Assad regime were not supported by Russia and China.

However, the interplay between new great power relations and regional ownership may to some extent explain the *shifting* patterns of humanitarian intervention and crisis management. In general, the West has encountered opposition to its R2P (Responsibility to Protect) agenda, especially following the generally discredited war against Iraq, not only from Russia and China, but also from democratic rising powers like India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa.²⁷ In some third world quarters values and principles like sovereignty, non-intervention, national self-determination and international equality are simply more important than the international promotion of human rights. In terms of the English School, their world order concept is more pluralist (there are many versions of 'the good life') than solidarist (common values may be enforced on the basis of international law and organisation).²⁸ Accordingly, the international divide over human rights is not simply a byproduct of the Bush era, and the recommitment of the USA to human rights under President Obama is not necessarily enough to give new momentum to the human rights agenda.

However, recent events indicate that the emerging multipolarity and the increasing self-confidence of regional actors not only involve new challenges, but also new possibilities. The humanitarian interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011 were both based on UN Security Council authorisations following recommendations by regional organisations and great power negotiations. Under some circumstances third world countries are willing to resort to interventionist measures in support of human rights and international humanitarian law – as stipulated most clearly in the Charter of the African Union.²⁹ Afterwards, Libya was soon presented by leaders of rising powers as yet another case demonstrating a Western lack of self-restraint and a propensity to abuse UN mandates. But both cases demonstrated that contemporary great power management can take not only balancing and conflicting but also cooperative directions, de-

pending on a number of situational factors including regional ownership and great power interests.

Furthermore, rising powers will look for great power status and a reputation as responsible stakeholders in the management of international order and justice. This goes particularly for India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) who do not enjoy an automatic element of great power status as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Therefore, these powers will sometimes go far, even as far as supporting or accepting humanitarian intervention or sanctions, in order to be seen as responsible stakeholders. Arguably, the prevention of large-scale atrocities is also a natural or possible priority of the new great powers, who generally subscribe to the collective maintenance of international peace, law and order.

Great power status and regional ownership also seem to matter to China judging from the case of Libya:

We support the Security Council's adoption of appropriate and necessary action to stabilize the situation in Libya as soon as possible, and to halt acts of violence against civilians. (...) China is always against the use of force in international relations. (...) China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution. Meanwhile, China attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and the African Union. In view of this, and considering the special circumstances surrounding the situation in Libya, China abstained from the voting on resolution 1973.³⁰

Similar references to the importance of regional ownership (by the Arab League) came from Russia and Brazil (and a number of third world countries) at the UN Security Council adoption of resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011. Furthermore, India stressed the importance of regional ownership before voting for the far-reaching sanctions against the Libyan regime in UN Security Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011.³¹ Regional ownership (by the African Union) was also important when the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1975 providing for humanitarian intervention – and effectively regime change – in Côte d'Ivoire on 30 March 2011.³² It seems that under the right circumstances – including the absence of strong great power interests – regional ownership may tip the balance in the UN Security Council in favour of R2P action, humanitarian intervention and great power compromise.

There are many indications that the USA is stepping back from the omnipotent and sometimes dictatorial leadership³³ we have known since the end of the Cold War, and without any clear successor or substitute. But the result is not necessarily a fragmented or anarchical world order. Rather, we might expect a negotiated world order and negotiated crisis management as well as balancing behaviour. Interests and values will differ, but there will also be overlaps and dynamics pulling towards more concerted action. It is in this light that the different and fluctuating approaches to the crises in Mali and Syria must be analysed and understood.

Danish Activism in a Changing World Order

As has often been pointed out, Danish foreign policy activism has generally followed the leadership of the USA.³⁴ But Danish activism has come in different versions due to the changing international environment and shifts in government. In the 1990s Denmark supported international crisis management, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. These activities were normally carried out under US leadership, but in most cases they were also in accordance with international law and based on UN Security Council authorisation. Danish activism also included proactive or risky policies which were relatively independent of, or ahead of, Washington. For instance the work for the independence of the Baltic states at an early point (1989–1991), the deployment (1993) and use in combat of tanks in the Tuzla area during the Bosnian war, and contributions to the peace missions in Macedonia (1993) and Albania (1997) at critical moments.³⁵ This was a policy of so-called ‘active internationalism’.³⁶

In terms of theory, this was basically in accordance with a ‘Grotian’ or ‘solidarist’ vision of an international society in which the goals of international peace, security, order and justice are pursued on the basis of international institutions like the United Nations and on the basis of advanced principles of international and humanitarian law as well as law enforcement, cf. the collective security system of the UN and international courts like the ICJ and the ICC.³⁷ These goals, principles and institutions were quite evident in the Danish activism of the 1990s, although it can be argued that collective security (understood as maintenance of international peace and security on the basis of UN Security Council authorisations) was sacrificed in favour of humanitarian intervention on the side of the

Albanians of Kosovo in 1999, and that mediation has played a relatively small role in Danish foreign policy in the 1990s.

After the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 Denmark followed the US into the 'war on terror' based on narrow western security concerns, coalitions of the willing, and even preventive war in blatant disrespect of the principles of the UN Charter in the case of the 2003 attack on Iraq. Arguably, Denmark was "losing sight of internationalism" in that period.³⁸ The activism led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen's liberal-conservative government was either strategic (as long as the USA defined the mission, Denmark would follow as the loyal and rewarded junior partner)³⁹ or 'ideological' (as long as the western values of freedom and democracy were at stake, Denmark would do its part – and fight).⁴⁰

Consequently, it would be wrong to consider Danish foreign policy activism since the end of the Cold War as an ongoing and increasing militarisation designed to obtain the maximum goodwill in Washington. And it would be even more wrong to regard it as a doctrine that was introduced by the governments of Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the beginning of the millennium. Activism, understood as the desire to make a difference in international politics by using a variety of means from diplomacy to the use of force, has been a constant ambition in Danish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. But the main goals of that activism (or rather the balance between them) – to support an orderly and just international society and to support the USA – have changed over time. In the 1990s there was sufficient focus on global (and European) international society to warrant the term "active internationalism".⁴¹ In the 2000s there was a sufficient focus on loyal support of the USA and western values of liberalism to warrant terms like active value policy or active Americanism.

The important question today is not only whether Danish activism is still possible, but more importantly what purposes an active foreign policy may serve in a world order where (1) the USA is no longer a hegemon, but 'only' the strongest among a number of great powers, (2) the principles and institutions of international society are being negotiated and renegotiated among the great powers as well as regional powers and institutions, and (3) the non-Western world becomes more and more important economically and politically. How can Denmark navigate between the great powers and regional stakeholders? How can Denmark promote general principles of peace, order and justice and take care of its own interests at the same time? Syria and Mali may give us some indications.

The Syrian Massacres: Danish Manoeuvres under Great Power Balancing

In the case of Syria, collective great power management turned sour from the start. The main reasons for this were the Russian pursuit of national interests and Western attempts to go for ideal solutions (in terms of both humanitarian values and interests) including a Syrian regime change instead of compromise.

In spite of the Syrian regime's brutal crackdown on civilian demonstrations at the outset of the popular revolt in 2011 and excesses in the following civil war including destruction of cities like Homs, Hama, Aleppo and suburbs of Damascus (and other crimes against humanity that went far beyond the ones committed by Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya in 2011), Russia and China vetoed three draft resolutions (4 October 2011, 4 February 2012, 19 July 2012)⁴² sponsored by Western and Arab States in the UN Security Council, even though they provided for sanctions only and not the use of force. According to recurrent statements by Russia, measures proposed by the West and its allies have been designed to promote a regime change in Syria which would benefit the interests of the USA (taking an ally away from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah) at the cost of Russia.⁴³

The League of Arab States provided regional ownership for sanctions and threats of force as in the case of Libya, at least in the first part of the atrocious civil war, though perhaps less coherently this time.⁴⁴ The League suspended Syria and introduced sanctions in November 2011. In a remarkable UN General Assembly resolution of 16 February 2012 the League obtained the support of the UN General Assembly for its 2 November 2011 Action Plan, which demanded that the Syrian government should stop all violence, protect its people, withdraw all forces from cities and towns, and accept the facilitation by the League of a peaceful transition to a democratic system.⁴⁵ The resolution also provided for the appointment of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as special envoy of the UN and the League to try to break the great power deadlock and quarrels in the Security Council.

The League was also firmly behind the "Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States" (Kofi Annan's peace proposal) and the associated Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) authorised by the Security Council on 14 and 21 April 2012.⁴⁶ The mission and the mediation by Annan was terminated in August 2012

after new clashes between the great powers in the UN Security Council and continued intense fighting in Syria. Arguably, the demand by the USA that President Assad had to go, put an end to Kofi Annan's six point plan – and then effectively to his options as mediator. In any case, when explaining his decision to resign, Annan referred to “finger-pointing” in the UN Security Council.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the League of Arab States has been able to set the agenda inside and outside the UN at several points during the Syrian crisis, and this has also led to various peace initiatives and pressure on, especially, the Syrian regime. UN sanctions and intervention have been prevented by determined Russian (and Chinese) opposition in the Security Council, but the regional ownership of the League has made a difference, also to the BRICS and especially India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) who have not systematically rejected sanctions against the Syrian regime.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the West played the ‘irresponsible stakeholder’ card against Russia and China time and again, culminating in the unusually undiplomatic words of the American UN ambassador, Susan Rice, when commenting on the Russian and Chinese veto (the second one) of draft resolution S/2012/77 (sponsored by the Western powers, eleven Arab states, and others) on 4 February 2012:

The United States is disgusted that a couple of members of this Council continue to prevent us from fulfilling our sole purpose here, which is to address an ever-deepening crisis in Syria and a growing threat to regional peace and security. For months, this Council has been held hostage by a couple of members. Those members stand behind empty arguments and individual interests, while delaying and seeking to strip bare any text that would pressure Al-Assad to change his actions. That intransigence is even more shameful when we consider that at least one of those members continues to deliver weapons to Al-Assad.⁴⁹

Susan Rice was more diplomatic when Russia and China vetoed the third draft resolution (S/2012/538) sponsored by the Western powers on 19 July 2012, but the Western references to Russia and China as irresponsible stakeholders continued in policies of sharp ‘soft’ balancing. British UN ambassador Sir Mark Lyall Grand stated that “by exercising their veto today Russia and China have failed in their responsibilities as permanent members of the Security Council to help resolve the crisis in Syria (...) They have chosen to put their national interests ahead of the lives of millions

of Syrians”. Similarly, the French ambassador said that the “third veto on Syria means for Russia and China, there will be no consequence for the Syrian regime’s disregard of its commitments. The crimes will go unpunished; their perpetrators will continue to proceed with their disgusting plans; the people’s legitimate aspirations can be disregarded; and the victims are insignificant in number”.⁵⁰

Meanwhile India voted in favour of the vetoed draft resolution S/2012/538 and thus the possible introduction of UN sanctions against the Syrian regime, while South Africa abstained. Both India and South Africa supported draft resolution S/2012/77 on 4 February 2012 (the second veto), while the three IBSA powers, all rotating members of the Security Council in 2011, abstained together on draft resolution S/2011/612 on 4 October 2011 (the first veto). The coalition of the BRICS has generally not been united on Syria. This indicates that regional ownership, concerns for great power status and possibly a slightly more positive attitude towards the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ have affected the position of the IBSA powers.⁵¹

But Russia stuck to her national interests in Syria including a navy base, a close Middle East ally (great powers do not lose allies willingly), arms contracts, and possibly simply a desire to prevent American gains in Syria and the Middle East. According to its own account, Moscow was simply preventing yet another illegitimate regime change (Libya being the standard reference) designed to promote Western interests.

Consequently, great power management took the shape of soft and arguably hard (given military supplies and other support to the warring parties by Russia, the USA and other powers) balancing. Concerted action was almost non-existent, and Arab regional ownership and Western delegitimation of the Russian and Chinese policies failed to make a decisive impression on these two powers – although it did make an impression, by all indications, on India, Brazil, and South Africa, who did not vote against these sanctions as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.⁵²

Hawkish Denmark: The Friends of Syria and the Threat of Force without the UN

In this confrontational great power climate, the Danish government positioned itself on the side of the pro-interventionist part of the international community, led by the USA, France and Great Britain. With the cautious and restrained foreign policy of President Obama – even in the light of the 2011 intervention in Libya, which he presented almost as an exception⁵³ – it was, from the outset, political intervention and economic sanc-

tions rather than military measures that were on the Western agenda for the crisis in Syria. Denmark joined the 'Friends of Syria' which was apparently created to put the same kind of pressure on the Assad regime from the outside (sanctions against the regime, recognition of the opposition) and from within (organising and supporting the opposition) as had effectively contributed to the undermining of Gaddafi in Libya.⁵⁴ Continuing pressure and isolation of the Syrian regime was also on the agenda when Danish foreign minister Villy Søvndal received his American counterpart Hillary Clinton in Copenhagen on 31 May 2012 just after the shocking massacre in the Houla region for which the UN held the Assad regime responsible.⁵⁵

Denmark was also an outspoken supporter of military punishment of the Syrian government following its use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013.⁵⁶ Moreover, Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt made it clear that Denmark would support a military punishment of Syria, at least morally and politically (without ruling out the possibility of some kind of military participation), in spite of the absence of a UN Security Council authorisation.⁵⁷ This was a hawkish move indeed, given that a military punishment would send the USA and its supporters into direct military confrontation with Russian interests. But it was also a move that was closely attached to American leadership, and one that was out of tune with the declared lessons from Iraq, namely to stick to the rules of the UN Charter.

To be fair, foreign minister Villy Søvndal had actually kept the door open for the use of force without UN Security Council authorisation also before the showdown over Syria's use of chemical weapons. In a reflection on the Danish participation in the attack on Iraq 10 years after it took place, Søvndal stated that Denmark would only use force on the basis of UN Security Council authorisation except in cases of "acute humanitarian necessity". He also said that the use of force should from now on be a part of a comprehensive and sustained approach instead of 'symptom treatment'.⁵⁸ A limited punishment of the Syrian regime (that was what President Obama had put on the table) could hardly be anything but symptom treatment, but the situation was arguably one of acute humanitarian necessity, since non-action could be interpreted by the Syrian regime as an opportunity to continue the use of chemical weapons. In any case, the centre left government was willing to stand by the USA in a situation of serious great power tension and without UN Security Council authorisation. To some, this indicated that Denmark continued to operate in the

'old' international order defined by American leadership and definition of the mission. But, as in the case of Libya, there were strong humanitarian grounds for a resort to force (in contrast to the 2003 attack on Iraq). Consequently, the Danish support of a military punishment of the Syrian regime could be seen as 'active internationalism' rather than 'active Americanism', even though the UN Security Council would have been bypassed if the threat of force had been carried out. As in the case of the unauthorised humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, one internationalist ideal (collective UN authorisation) was sacrificed in favour of another (attempted prevention of crimes against humanity), and the choice followed the leadership of the USA (but also France) once again. The Danish support of a military punishment of the Syrian regime is therefore not an ideal testimony of active internationalism in a new world order.

The threat of force was not implemented due to the mid-September Russian–American compromise on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. But foreign minister Villy Søvndal moved fast to put the Danish decision to support a punishment of the Syrian regime without UN Security Council authorisation into principles.⁵⁹ His proposal was that 'R2P' action and humanitarian intervention shall be considered legitimate even in the absence of UN Security Council authorisation, provided that one or more great powers are blocking the council. The criteria to be attached to this use of the 'Responsibility to Protect' would be (1) that all political options in the Security Council have been exhausted, (2) that military actions are taken in a strictly proportional manner, and (3) that the intervening parties have no national interests at stake.

Denmark continues, in other words, to be unwilling to leave decisions on the Responsibility to Protect and humanitarian intervention entirely in the hands of the (non-western) great powers. This is sympathetic and, arguably, sometimes necessary, especially when the principle is applied in situations like the one following the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities in August 2013, where the threat or use of force really did seem to be necessary to induce the Syrian government to show a minimum of restraint. A determined Russian and Chinese decision never to authorise the use of force to stop genocide and crimes against humanity would also make an absolute insistence on UN authorisation morally untenable. However, such a decision in favour of a return to an absolute principle of non-intervention by Russia or China seems unlikely; firstly, because the institutionalisation of the R2P and humanitarian intervention has reached a point where it has become an intrinsic part of responsible great power

management and thus mutual great power recognition and, secondly, because intervention for a combination of humanitarian, orderly or strategic goals may sometimes be directly in the interest of China and Russia.

However, the question is whether it is not only sympathetic, but also wise, for Western governments to start a discussion of non-authorized humanitarian intervention in the current context of evolving multipolarity, value differences and a fair degree of harmful mutual distrust. It would seem to be a wiser course to take seriously the call by rising powers for stronger measures of R2P accountability and then put some more specific and advanced measures on the table. This would mean taking the constructive Brazilian proposal “Responsibility while Protecting”⁶⁰ further towards operative principles and procedures in an attempt to rally Brazil even more affirmatively behind the R2P framework. It would also mean challenging China to move from novel and interesting, but still defensive and sceptical, ideas concerning “responsible protection”⁶¹ and into serious consideration of measures that would involve stronger checks and balances against the risk of (Western) abuse of the R2P framework, but also a stronger commitment to humanitarian protection by all great powers and thus China as well. The Danish government can hardly promote such an agenda and such results alone, but it could contribute, and this would be active internationalism indeed.

Active Internationalism under momentary Great Power Concert: Transporting Chemical Weapons out of Syria

Suddenly, a great power compromise between Russia and the USA came about at the brink of an American–French military punishment of the Assad regime.⁶² Following remarks by US foreign minister John Kerry during a visit to London on 9th September 2013 that a destruction of Syria’s stock of chemical weapons would be the only way to avoid military action, Russia quickly declared that it would support such a solution.⁶³ Just five days later, on 14 September, the two great powers had managed to agree on a framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons as well as a commitment to bring the warring parties of Syria to the negotiation table in a second round of the Geneva peace process.⁶⁴ The agreement was adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 September (S/RES/2118) with all 15 votes in favour, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was put in charge of the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons in a joint mission with the UN.⁶⁵

From one day to another great power management shifted from soft

and almost hard balancing to concerted action, at least momentarily, this time as a consequence of great power manoeuvres rather than regional ownership as in the case of Libya. This was yet another example of the flexible operation of great power management under evolving multipolarity. Shifts between balancing and concert are possible, both from case to case (cf. the different patterns in the management of Libya, Syria and Mali), and within a specific case (cf. the fluctuations between balancing and concert in the cases of Libya and Syria). The reasons can be changing calculations of national interest, concerns for great power status, regional ownership, and even coincidence cf. John Kerry's apparently quite casual remarks that punishment of Syria was inevitable unless Syria destroyed its chemical weapons voluntarily.

On 31 October 2013 the OPCW announced that it had secured all Syrian stocks of chemical weapons. But somebody had to take care of the transport of the weapons out of Syria to sites of destruction. The Danish government quickly stepped forward and announced that Denmark was willing to act on the call by the UN Security Council and do the job.⁶⁶ Following the parliament's adoption of the contribution proposed by the Danish government on 19 December 2013, Denmark became the leader of the joint Danish–Norwegian maritime transport operation. The Danish contribution also included transport ships, a military vessel for maritime protection (including maritime special forces), air transport, and facilitation of the establishment of a protection team for the security of the leader of the OPCW–UN mission in Syria, the Dutch UN diplomat Sigrid Kaag.⁶⁷ With up to 275 persons involved this is a quite significant contribution for Denmark.

In terms of foreign policy doctrines, this was a swift and seemingly unproblematic shift to genuine active internationalism – including UN Security Council authorisation, humanitarian activism, and 'R2P' action – at a moment of concerted action among the opposed great powers.⁶⁸ In an unfriendly reading, the Danish shift from the threat of force without UN authorisation to authorised humanitarian interference could be seen as an indeterminate course, or simply as an ongoing support of American initiatives. But it can also be seen as a flexible and pragmatic approach in which humanitarian goals are pursued undogmatically under shifting great power games, and in cooperation with non-western powers (Russia brokered the deal and China takes part in the mission as well) as soon as the circumstances permit it.

Intervention against Anarchy and Violence in Mali: Denmark and the French Connection

From early 2012 and onwards – in the middle of the great power struggle over Syria – Mali was threatened by a complete state collapse stemming from the combination of a secessionist Tuareg rebellion, Islamic terrorist infiltration, and political turmoil in the capital. On 9 January 2013 the situation became highly critical after the fall of the key town of Konna, and France moved fast to come to the assistance of the hard-pressed Malian government.⁶⁹ Thereby France also overtook the African support force AFISMA, which was authorised by the UN Security Council on 20 December 2012 to take all necessary measures to restore order in the country and protect the population.⁷⁰ The mandate was given to the West African organisation ECOWAS, but the resolution invited other states to support ECOWAS (who welcomed the intervention and cooperation by France), and the transitional Mali government had also invited France to come to its assistance. There was, in other words, local, regional and international support for the military intervention by France and ECOWAS.

In the case of Mali, great power management was characterised by concert supported by regional ownership. Maybe because this was an intervention for regime stability rather than regime change. To the BRICS this was a perfect demonstration of collective management of peace and security in respect of state sovereignty and thus a perfect illustration of what was wrong with the Western approach to Syria. To France it was another opportunity to demonstrate great power responsibility for the sake of order, security and humanitarianism, and in their own preferred backyard. To everybody, and not least Mali, the neighbouring countries and ECOWAS this was simply necessary to prevent the spread of anarchy and terrorism in the Sahel region.

For Denmark it was another opportunity to demonstrate an active internationalist responsibility, as in the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya, but now in a situation without great power tension. France, the new senior partner, welcomed the Danish contribution, a C-130J-30 Hercules cargo plane, which the Danish parliament put at the disposal of the French-led intervention on 15 January 2013.⁷¹

The new French connection was founded in the humanitarian intervention in Libya in which Denmark delivered a relatively strong contribu-

tion with four F16 fighters and support personnel as one of the very first countries to come to the assistance of France and President Sarkozy, who went ahead of the rest of the coalition to bomb the forces of Muammar Gaddafi at the brink of the fall of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. This was in line with the French self-image as a European great power championing the standards of humanity.⁷² To France the preservation of great power status (and national interests) and the defence of human rights and international humanitarian law often go hand in hand. This is not a bad partner for an ambitious Denmark, and the Danish–French military cooperation went well in Libya.⁷³

Denmark also decided to follow France into the UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which was authorised by the UN Security Council (on 25 April 2013) to take over from AFISMA.⁷⁴ Once again the Danish contribution was a C-130J-30 Hercules cargo plane as well as approximately 60 personnel including crew, technicians, support personnel and liaison officers as well as 10 staff officers.⁷⁵ This participation in a genuine UN mission supports a thesis of a Danish return to active internationalism, but under new international conditions in which the USA generally steps back, while France steps forward as much as possible, especially in Africa and The Middle East, and where concerted action among the great powers, as well as regional ownership, is sometimes possible – thereby leading to a demand and room for contributions by smaller states. In the case of Mali, Danish active internationalism is furthermore underlined by the Danish stabilisation initiative for Mali which was launched at the UN General Assembly in September 2013.

Conclusions: Back to the Active Internationalism of the 1990s

The prospects for future R2P action, humanitarian intervention, peace operations, and stabilising missions is that such occasional interventionist measures will be based on UN Security Council authorisation and thus great power compromises as well as regional partnerships. This is a logical consequence of the rise of great powers and regional actors who are generally sceptical towards Western interventionism, but open to collective measures for the ‘common good’ under the right conditions. This requirement of negotiation, compromise and multiple partnerships would seem to match the soft-power abilities of countries like Denmark.

At the same time, the retreat of the USA to a 'liberalism of restraint' rather than a 'liberalism of imposition'⁷⁶ could give European great powers and smaller states an independent and at times leading role in the orchestration and implementation of humanitarian and peace operations, as indicated by the humanitarian interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011.⁷⁷

The French-led and UN-authorized intervention in Mali in 2013 confirms this pattern and so do the UN-authorized military operations in Congo in 2013 and the Central African Republic in 2014. Even Syria, where the room for manoeuvre has been closed down by the soft and hard balancing of the great powers, shows that small states like Denmark can still play a role, this time in the disposal of chemical weapons.

But the international context has changed. It is no longer a matter of simply convincing the USA. It is about building up consensus with rising powers and regional organisations in the Third World. This is what happened before the resort to force in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011, and Mali and Congo in 2013, with the African Union, the League of Arab States, and ECOWAS in key roles as legitimisers and sponsors of UN Security Council authorisation. As argued by Bellamy and Williams,⁷⁸ regional organisations can play a 'gatekeeping' role by providing conditions under which the UN Security Council can possibly agree to resort to force. In the evolving world order, regional ownership is presumably a necessary, but (as indicated by the unchecked atrocities in Syria in 2011–14 in spite of Arab–European–American attempts to build up the pressure at the UN) hardly sufficient condition of Russian and Chinese acceptance.

There is, in other words, still room for Danish activism, and also for military activism, in the new world order that is materialising. The challenge is how to navigate the new circumstances of great power management and regional ownership. In the case of Syria, Denmark supported the Western great powers and their resort to sanctions and threats of force against the Assad regime following its use of chemical weapons in Damascus in August 2013. When great power balancing gave way to (brief) concerted action regarding the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons Denmark followed suit with contributions to the transport of these weapons to sites of destruction. In the case of Mali, the great powers, the African Union and ECOWAS agreed that anarchy, terrorism and radical Islamism should not be allowed to take hold. This was an opportunity for Denmark to demonstrate international responsibility in a concert situation, but in a new constellation which has also been evident in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire,

Congo, and the Central African Republic: France plays a leading role supported and legitimised by regional organisations (the Arab League, the AU or ECOWAS) and UN Security Council authorisation, and Denmark can then enter as a potentially important supportive actor, as in the cases of Libya, Mali and most recently also the Central African Republic, at the direct call of the UN.

In the war against Iraq in 2003 it was plain to see that Denmark chose to support the USA at the cost of the UN and international law.⁷⁹ The Danish policy was activist and risky, but hardly internationalist or independent. Does the arguably lost paradigm of active internationalism capture the essence of Danish foreign policy today?

In the case of Syria, there was no UN Security Council mandate for the cancelled punishment (which Denmark supported) of the Assad regime, and the Danish contribution to the removal of Syria's chemical weapons was in line with American policies. However, there were strong humanitarian grounds for interventionist measures against Syria, and there was also strong and broad UN backing for the removal of chemical weapons – a task which only a few countries volunteered to solve. The Danish policies towards Syria therefore fall inside the Grotian–solidarist paradigm of active internationalism, but in ways that have kept Copenhagen closely attached to Washington. Arguably, this has been the normal picture since the end of the Cold War.

In the case of Mali, there was an indirect but valid UN Security Council authorisation, regional backing, and an invitation from the Malian government behind the French-led intervention to stop the spreading anarchy in the country. This was clearly in line with the Danish active internationalism that was founded in the 1990s. The same goes for the Danish support of the (in terms of media attention) low profile UN stabilisation mission in the country, which indicates a commitment to the long-term work for peace and to the UN as such.

The case of Mali is also difficult to fit into a claim that Danish foreign policy activism is reducible to the interests of the USA. The interests of the USA were not at all strong enough to induce Washington itself to play a leading or even substantial role. At the very least, Denmark is now willing to joint military operations and missions with other senior partners than the USA and the UK, namely France who took the lead in the case of Mali in 2013 and (in terms of mobilising and initiation) the humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011. France seems to be a likely senior partner for coming Danish contributions to UN peace operations and humanitarian

interventions and joint UN ventures with likeminded states (like Canada and the Nordic countries) do not seem implausible either.

What is perhaps still questionable is whether Denmark has taken the full consequence of the changing world order. Unilateral Western initiatives are becoming less likely and less workable. So the prospects for Danish foreign policy activism, not least of a military kind, lie in participation in humanitarian and peace-supporting operations that have the backing or acceptance of all the great powers as well as relevant regional actors, and which will often be operated or supported by the UN. This should not only be reflected in a Danish ability to adapt and jump from support of Western powers in balancing great power games (Syria most of the time) to support of common initiatives (the removal of Syria's chemical weapons and the stabilisation of Mali), but also in an ability to search for negotiated and concerted action from the early phases of crisis to the later phases of reconstruction.

A return to the UN-informed 'active internationalism' of the 1990s seems to be underway, but under more complex and fluctuating great power politics, and with the USA in a less dominating role.

Notes

- 1 Tonny Brems Knudsen, PhD, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University. The author is grateful to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Rasmus Brun Pedersen and the editors for helpful comments and assistance with documents and materials. The article was presented at the ISA 55th Annual Convention, Toronto, 26–29 March 2014 on the panel “Solidarism in Question: Constraints and Prospects for a Solidarist Global International Society”.
- 2 Søvndal, 2012: 5 (translated by the author).
- 3 Jakobsen and Møller, 2012; Knudsen, 2012.
- 4 Holm, 1997, 2002; Knudsen, 2004; Pedersen, 2012; Branner, 2013.
- 5 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. On these rising powers and their loose coalition see Skak, 2013.
- 6 Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Valbjørn, 2012; Knudsen, 2013a.
- 7 Drezner, 2007; Zakaria, 2008; Ikenberry, 2009; Roberts, 2010.
- 8 Bull, 1977: 71–74, 200–229; Knudsen, 2012; Knudsen, 2013b.
- 9 Navari, 2009.
- 10 Drezner, 2007; Zakaria, 2008; Ikenberry, 2009; Roberts, 2010; Rachman, 2011.
- 11 Beckley, 2011.
- 12 Mouritzen and Wivel, 2012; Götz, 2013. The Russian annexation of Ukraine in March 2014 is yet another example of this logic.
- 13 Dunne, 2003; Knudsen, 2004, 2013c.
- 14 Jensen and Knudsen, 2011.
- 15 Ikenberry, 2009.
- 16 Bull, 1977: 200–205; Knudsen, 2012 and 2013b.
- 17 Christensen et al. 2010.
- 18 Knudsen, 2012.
- 19 Bull, 1977: 200–225.
- 20 Paul, 2005; Pape, 2005; Knudsen, 2012.
- 21 Bull, 1977: 225–227, 297–301.
- 22 A fourth scenario is a power vacuum in which the great powers seek to order or control international affairs in their own region in something reminiscent of spheres of influence, while they are unable to maintain a substantial global order by means of concert or balancing. See Wæver, 2010.
- 23 Götz, 2013.

- 24 Bull, 1977: 219–225, 305–311.
- 25 Buzan, 2004: 205–227; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009); Knudsen, 2012; Valbjørn, 2012.
- 26 Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Knudsen, 2012; Citirikaya, 2014.
- 27 Ayoob, 2004; Weiss, 2004; Knudsen, 2004; Bellamy and Williams, 2006; Thakur and Weiss, 2009; Dennison and Dworkin, 2010; Knudsen, 2013.
- 28 Bull, 1966, 1977; Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2000; Thakur and Weiss, 2009; Knudsen, 2013.
- 29 Ayoob, 2004.
- 30 China's UN ambassador on 17 March 2011 when explaining the Chinese decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which authorised the humanitarian intervention in Libya (S/PV.6498).
- 31 See Knudsen 2012.
- 32 Bellamy and Williams, 2011.
- 33 Knudsen, 2004.
- 34 Holm, 2002; Mouritzen, 2007; Jakobsen and Møller, 2012.
- 35 Mouritzen, 2006: 134–137.
- 36 Holm, 1997, 2002; Knudsen, 2004.
- 37 Lauterpacht, 1946; Bull, 1966, 1977; Jackson, 2000; Ikenberry, 2009.
- 38 Knudsen, 2004.
- 39 Rynning, 2003; Jakobsen and Møller, 2012.
- 40 Petersen, 2009.
- 41 Holm, 1997.
- 42 S/2011/612; S/2012/77; S/2012/538.
- 43 In a striking comment to the Russian support of the compromise (regarding humanitarian access) in UN Security Council Resolution 2139 as late as 22 February 2014, the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, said that “The Security Council decided relatively recently to consider the humanitarian situation in Syria, and only after it became clear that attempts to use the deterioration of the humanitarian situation to effect regime change were unsuccessful”. Russia thus defends its (veto) policies with reference to alleged attempts by the West to abuse the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and humanitarian intervention to its own advantage. See UN Security Council Meeting Recording S/PV.7116, p. 7, and UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2139, 22 February 2014. On the Russian interests and outlook see also Buckley 2012.
- 44 On regional ownership in Libya and Syria see Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Knudsen and Jensen, 2011; Knudsen, 2012, 2013; Citirikaya, 2014.
- 45 See UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012.
- 46 See S/RES/2042 (14 April 2012) and S/RES/2043 (21 April 2012) and the associated meeting recordings S/PV.6751 and S/PV.6756.

- 47 Burleigh, 2012.
- 48 Cf. the votes and statements by the IBSA powers and other third world countries during the UN Security Council negotiations of the three draft resolutions (S/2011/612; S/2012/77; S/2012/538) vetoed by Russia and China. For a detailed analysis of the regional ownership in Syria, see Citirikkaya, 2014.
- 49 UN Security Council Meeting Recording S/PV.6711, 4 February 2012, p. 5.
- 50 UN Security Council Meeting Recording S/PV.6810, 19 July 2012, pp. 2 and 4.
- 51 Citirikkaya, 2014.
- 52 Knudsen, 2012, 2013; Citirikkaya, 2014.
- 53 Jensen and Knudsen, 2011.
- 54 Knudsen and Jensen, 2011.
- 55 Vibeke Sperling, 2012, 'Syrien præger Clinton-besøg i København' (Syria dominates Clinton visit to Copenhagen), *Politiken*, 31 May 2012.
- 56 By all indications the Syrian regime was responsible for the use of chemical weapons. See the report of the UN investigation mission, A/67/997-S/2013/553, 16 September 2013, which presented evidence for this conclusion without drawing it.
- 57 Kaare Sørensen, 2013, "Thorning: Danmark har 'pligt' til at støtte et angreb" (Thorning: Denmark has a duty to support an attack), *Jyllandsposten*, 3 September 2013.
- 58 Søvndal, 2013b.
- 59 Jakob Nielsen, 2013, "Søvndal foreslår ret til angreb uden FN" (Søvndal proposes right of intervention without the UN), *Politiken*, 29 September 2013.
- 60 Spektor, 2012.
- 61 Zongze, 2012.
- 62 Great Britain was out after the remarkable defeat of Prime Minister David Cameron in parliament, and US President Barack Obama had not secured a majority in Congress at the time of the Russian-American compromise. The military punishment was therefore not certain, but likely, to come, and the swift Russian move gave President Obama a way out of the unilateral military action that he much desired to avoid, given his policy of restraint in Syria, the Middle East and elsewhere.
- 63 Henry Chu, 2013, "US, Russia agree on a disposal plan for Syria's chemical weapons", *Los Angeles Times*, 14 September 2013.
- 64 Framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, CNN, 14 September 2013.
- 65 UN Security Council Resolution 2118, 27 September 2013 (S/RES/2118).
- 66 Kenneth Lund, 2013, "Danmark skal hjælpe FN med at yde beskyttelse i Syrien: Udenrigspolitisk Nævn har sagt ja til at hjælpe FN i Syrien" (Denmark will help the UN with protection in Syria), *Politiken*, 8 November 2013. See also the account given by acting foreign minister Rasmus Helveg Petersen, 2013b (Beslutningsforslag B 29, 6 December 2013), when presenting the proposal on the Danish contribution to the mission in Syria to the Danish parliament on 6 December 2013.
- 67 Helveg Petersen, 2013b (Beslutningsforslag B 29, 6 December 2013).

- 68 Russia, China, and the USA participate in the mission as well. See Ole Damkjær, 2014, “FN-chef tilfreds med samarbejdet om fjernelse af Syriens kemiske våben” (UN leader satisfied with cooperation on the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons), *Berlingske*, 25 January 2014. As for non-violent interventionist collective measures under the R2P framework (what may be called Pillar 3A) see Ban Ki-Moon, 2009. Arguably, the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons can be seen as a case of humanitarian intervention since the Syrian government was threatened to accept dictatorial and coercive interference in its internal affairs on humanitarian grounds.
- 69 Mills, Lang and Lunn, 2013.
- 70 UN Security Council Resolution 2085, S/RES/2085, 20 December 2012.
- 71 Søvnald, 2013a, Beslutningsforslag B 49, 15 January 2013.
- 72 Knudsen, 1997, 2013a.
- 73 Jakobsen and Møller, 2012.
- 74 See UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (S/RES2100), 25 April 2013.
- 75 Helveg Petersen, 2013a (Beslutningsforslag B 28, 4 December 2013). See also Jakob Stig Jørgensen, 2013, “Danmark sender soldater og fly til Mali” (Denmark sends soldiers and a plane to Mali), *Politiken*, 9 December 2013.
- 76 Sørensen, 2011.
- 77 Bellamy and Williams 2011; Knudsen 2013a.
- 78 Bellamy and Williams 2011: 839.
- 79 Knudsen 2004.

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Still Living in the Shadow of 1864?

Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Origins of Denmark's Pragmatic Activism

*Anders Wivel*¹

It is a common assertion that the Danish defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1864, which reduced the Danish territory by one third, “until recently haunted both foreign policy makers and the Danish public”.² In the conventional interpretation 1864 is regarded as the starting point for a small state reactive pragmatism, which was not replaced by foreign policy activism until the end of the Cold War. This article takes issue with this interpretation by making three counterarguments about Danish foreign policy activism. First, I argue that activism is not new, but has been an integral aspect of Danish foreign policy thinking and practice since the early twentieth century.³ Second, I argue that in order to understand the most important characteristics of foreign policy activism today, we need to understand how activism developed during the twentieth century in interplay with external constraints and Danish state identity. Finally, I show how attempts at revisionist foreign policy thinking and practice failed because they did not take into account these internal and external conditions for Danish foreign policy.

My method for reinterpreting activism is to view Danish foreign policy practice in the light of Danish foreign policy thinking, i.e. the doctrines providing the principles for conducting foreign policy. Doctrines are typically associated with the great powers. However, even though small states have traditionally suffered from a more restricted action space and, therefore, have had less scope for formulating doctrines on how to conduct their foreign policies, the external behaviour of small states as well as great powers is influenced by certain ideas and beliefs on how and why to interact with states and other actors internationally. Denmark is no exception,

and Danish foreign policy makers have continuously made claims and voiced ideas about Denmark's ideal role and behaviour in international relations, although without codifying these claims into coherent doctrines.

The article proceeds in five steps. First, I define what I understand by doctrine and how doctrines relate to grand strategy and foreign policy practice. Second, I set up a simple framework for identifying doctrines and their role in Danish foreign policy. Third, I identify two Danish foreign policy doctrines – the Munch doctrine and the Hækkerup doctrine – and discuss how these two doctrines have served as central bodies of principles on Denmark's role in Europe and the world. Fourth, I discuss two attempts at challenging the two dominant doctrines – the Danish 'footnote policy' towards NATO in the 1980s and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's 'super Atlanticism' in the 2000s – and explore why these attempts at transforming Denmark's position turned out to be ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, I sum up the discussions and conclude the analysis.

What is a Foreign Policy Doctrine?

Foreign policy is made at the intersection between ideational and material factors and between domestic and international politics. At these points of intersection, we find human decision makers responsible for making the day-to-day decisions on concrete challenges, codifying general trends and ambitions on foreign policy in white papers and reports, and outlining the visions for the country's position and influence in the world and acceptable and desirable ways to realise these visions in what is often referred to as 'foreign policy doctrines', i.e. "a system of normative and empirical beliefs about the international system and the role of one's own country in that system, as declared in public by the official decision-makers of that country".⁴

A foreign policy doctrine is a set of fundamental principles guiding foreign policy. These principles are relatively stable but never fixed as they reflect developments in domestic and international society and the lessons drawn by policymakers and the general public from these developments. A foreign policy doctrine provides a general guidance on ends and means and signals to domestic and foreign audiences who 'we' are, and where we see our place in the world. For instance, the nineteenth century Monroe Doctrine stated that the United States viewed further colonisation efforts by the Europeans in North and South America as acts of aggression and that the United States would refrain from interference in European affairs

on the European continent as well as in the existing colonies. Introduced in 1823 by President James Monroe it guided US policy for a century and served as a precursor to the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. Another example is the Truman Doctrine introduced in 1947. In a speech promising US support for Turkey and Greece in the face of what the United States perceived as a growing Soviet threat, President Harry S. Truman generalised the argument by promising support for 'free peoples' threatened by 'totalitarian regimes' thereby laying the foundations for US containment policy and the Cold War stalemate that would last for more than four decades. Although, the United States is probably the country with the longest list of foreign policy doctrines (some of them with more profound policy implications than others), other countries have been guided by foreign policy doctrines as well. In 1968, Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the central committee of the communist party in the Soviet Union, made a speech to the Polish United Workers' Party in which he stated that development towards capitalism in one socialist country was not only a problem for that particular country but for all socialist countries. Thereby, he was defining the limited action space of policymakers in the Cold War Eastern Bloc and summing up the principles that had guided Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (earlier in 1968) and Hungary (in 1956) and which were to guide Soviet policy towards its Eastern Bloc allies until they were gradually undermined by Soviet restraint towards the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s and finally abandoned in the face of the Central and Eastern European revolutions of 1989. More recently, British foreign policy was guided by the 'doctrine of the international community', more often referred to as the Blair doctrine, because it was first introduced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech in Chicago in 1999 identifying principles for intervention in a foreign country when the threat was not directed at other states, but at the domestic population of that country itself. The doctrine defined the guiding principles for British interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as a combination of British national interests and the willingness and ability to conduct an intervention and the ability to find evidence that it was justified in terms of human suffering.

Foreign policy doctrines are most often associated with great powers. This is not a coincidence as great powers typically have a bigger action space than small states and therefore greater leeway to discuss and define what to do with this action space. However, doctrines may play a central role in structuring the domestic action space for small state foreign policy

thinking and to carve out a position for the small state internationally. For instance during the Cold War, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland all had foreign policy doctrines based on neutrality. No matter how restricted the action space is, it is rarely confined to a single option. Even when the enemy is standing at your border threatening to invade, there is always the decision on whether to fight or surrender. This decision is based on a set of principles, a foreign policy doctrine, sometimes operationalised in a grand strategy, which may be further specified in a security strategy and which, ultimately, leads to the foreign policy profiles of the state vis-à-vis particular conflicts, challenges or threats and the multiple day-to-day decisions on foreign policy. Thus, in order to understand foreign policy doctrine, we may situate it as the most basic set of principles for foreign policy making.

Foreign policy doctrines, as here understood, are fundamental codifications of beliefs, sets of general principles, but they are rarely action plans for unambiguous implementation. As they tend to combine the analysis of external challenges with collective lessons of the past and the ideas and norms of foreign policy elites, and sometimes with the addition of the pet issues of a particular foreign policy maker, they are at best signposts for foreign policy. ‘Containment’ or ‘liberal interventionism’ may be handy catchphrases summing up the content of foreign policy doctrines, but there are numerous ways to understand what are meant by these concepts, let alone implementing them in a world of endless complexity and limited information. This does not mean that they are without value for guiding or understanding the foreign policy of a particular country.⁵ Like the ideologies guiding political movements and parties, they help structure our thinking about particular challenges and occurrences in the world. They point to certain threats and values as more important than others and give us a rough guide to which means are legitimate for meeting threats and promoting values. However, just as two liberals may agree on the value of individual liberty, but disagree on what it means in practice and to what extent it may be compromised in the pursuit of other ends, foreign policy doctrines provide us only with the fundamentals.

Adding complexity and typically bound by a more specific historical context, we find grand strategy: “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself [...] A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state’s security and it must devise political, economic, military and other remedies for those threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies”.⁶ Thus, a grand strategy includes a compre-

hensive analysis of the state's action space and an identification of the primary goals and most effective diplomatic, military and economic means to reach these political goals. The grand strategy and the general political course that follows from it have important implications for the state's approach to more specific challenges. The optimal grand strategy of a state depends both on its own capabilities and ambitions and on its external environment.

Moving one step down the ladder of complexity we find security strategies. In contrast to doctrines or grand strategies, national security strategies are typically formal documents and their preparation may be regulated both in regard to how often they must be published and to who will take part in their preparation, e.g. a national security council.⁷ A national security strategy outlines the strategic vision of one particular government, communicates this vision to domestic and international audiences and legitimises requests for resources to implement the strategy, although the specifics of implementation are often to be found in supporting documents unpacking the implications for defence procurements, troop deployments as well as diplomatic and economic means for obtaining the overall goals. The means and goals of national security strategies are put into practice in the general foreign policy profiles of the state vis-à-vis concrete conflicts, challenges and threats, i.e. the outward appearances of their foreign policies,⁸ and the day-to-day decisions at multiple levels of the political and administrative system of the state.

To be sure, this is a simplified depiction of how foreign policy doctrines underpin foreign policy making. Moreover, levels tend to interact. Day-to-day decisions may eventually modify or change foreign policy profiles. National security strategies and their supporting documents are rarely fully implemented, and they often emphasise some aspects of grand strategies while ignoring or downplaying others; indeed one may argue that this is one of the main purposes of the exercise as they aim to specify aims and means and to prioritise resources. Doctrines provide the fundamental set of beliefs for the other levels, but these beliefs are themselves gradually modified and updated – and at some point even abandoned – as conditions for foreign policy making change and the results of policies based on the principles are fed back into the system. However, the aim here is to identify the doctrines underpinning Danish foreign policy and to use them to cast light on the origins and content of Danish foreign policy activism.

Identifying Danish Doctrines

In Denmark the political elite has no tradition of speaking in doctrines. Particular perspectives on Danish foreign policy and Denmark's role in the world are usually associated with influential foreign policy makers – typically prime, foreign or defence ministers – but they are rarely codified into a doctrine by these politicians or observers. This is not a problem in itself. A doctrine is not necessarily, or even best, understood as the content of a particular document or to be associated with the thought of any particular, prominent decision makers. Rather, following Mouritzen and in accordance with Brodin's definition above, a doctrine "is a whole set of premises and conclusions, a set which is to a large extent *construed* by the researcher from a multitude of statements in different contexts".⁹

Using this point of departure and surveying Danish foreign policy debate since the end of the Cold War, 'activism' seems to be an obvious 'candidate doctrine'. As noted above, Danish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is routinely characterised as 'activist' by foreign policy decision makers and analysts, although there seems to be little agreement on the exact nature of activism.¹⁰ Activism has proved difficult to define and operationalise, and analysts disagree on the origins, effects and significance of Danish foreign policy activism.¹¹ Moreover, activism is sometimes defined on the basis of the aims or means of the policy, but at other times using the development of goals and strategies in a comparative perspective.¹² In sum, activism seems to cover everything from participating in military interventions with or without UN approval to supporting good governance in the developing world to actively promoting a 'progressive' agenda in European and global negotiations on energy and climate. Or to put it even more bluntly, activism means doing a lot of stuff internationally and sometimes, but not always, proactively taking an initiative in international diplomacy, but in itself this tells us little about the principles that guide policy makers on how, when and where action is appropriate.¹³

This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, converting ideas and observations into doctrines facilitates debate on foreign policy by the elite and the electorate. A doctrine summarises what seems to be a mess of different statements and actions into a few sentences thereby providing an 'executive summary' of a particular foreign policy. This allows more people to understand the content and consequences of the policy and to take a stand on it. Thus, doctrines help to popularise and democratise foreign policy debate. Second, doctrines help us to provide signposts through history.

Therefore, the lack of doctrines has consequences for our understanding of foreign policy history and how present foreign policies are embedded in past experience and practice. For instance, although foreign policy makers and analysts have discussed Danish foreign policy in terms of 'activism' for more than two decades, activism has never found a consensus definition and is rarely put into historical context, and as a consequence its historical uniqueness and distinctiveness from the past are exaggerated;¹⁴ e.g. the activist Danish foreign policy in the UN and in regard to the developing world conceived by Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup in the early 1960s – strongly documented but never formulated as a doctrine – is typically forgotten in these discussions.¹⁵

How do we identify Danish foreign policy doctrines if politicians and analysts are generally reluctant to speak in 'the language of doctrines'? Even if doctrines are not made explicit in Danish political debate and foreign policy discourse, Danish foreign policy like any country's foreign policy is guided by a particular set of ideas embedded in the historical development of the state and its external environment and constrained by a set of external conditions such as the power and interests of states nearby and the lack of an "overarching authority to prevent others from using violence or the threat of violence, to dominate or even destroy them".¹⁶ In a security environment based on this anarchic structure of the international system, the foreign policy choices of small states like Denmark are typically affected most decisively by their proximate environment, because it is the powers nearby that most often threaten their security interests.¹⁷ Thus, in the history of Denmark, it has been Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union, which have posed the greatest threats to Danish security and survival. These external conditions help us identify one set of influences on foreign policy doctrines, but as noted by Gvalia et al. "[a]lthough a state's external environment is certainly important for understanding its foreign policy, variations in an external threat environment are filtered through elite ideas".¹⁸

Ideas about how to respond to external challenges and how to position the state in its salient environment and the international system more generally, are closely related to the identity of the state in general, i.e. the values serving as a legitimate base for lawmaking and political activism.¹⁹ Domestic and international events in the nineteenth century have been decisive for formulating principles for Denmark's present role and policy in Europe and the world. The size of the Danish territory was reduced by one third as a consequence of Denmark's unsuccessful foreign policy,²⁰

and the defeat in 1864 in particular had a decisive influence on how the Danish people and political elite would understand Denmark's future action space. Consecutive military losses had reduced Denmark from Baltic Sea imperial power in the thirteenth century and leading power of Scandinavia until the fifteenth century, to a gradually smaller and less powerful state from the sixteenth until the nineteenth century, culminating in the defeat in 1864 when Denmark lost the three duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria and effectively became a small state. The defeat resulted in "a complete overhaul of Danish policy", which was from then onwards based on the premise that Denmark was a small state and needed to act accordingly.²¹ However, the effect was not only on policy but also on the principles and beliefs guiding this policy: one important lesson of 1864 being that a small state would rarely benefit from military conflict and therefore should aim for diplomatic solutions to international conflict, and a second lesson of 1864 being that the Danish state needed to prove its worth as a security provider to the Danish people, a task that it had failed in 1864.²² Together these two lessons embodied a third and a fourth lesson. By recklessly engaging the country in a war that could not be won, the political elite had endangered the security of the population as well as the future survival of the state. Accordingly, confidence in the elite could only be re-established through a pragmatic foreign policy taking into account the interests of the population at large.²³

Domestically, the gradual establishment of parliamentary democracy allowed for a growing debate on the normative and empirical basis of Danish foreign policy with the conservative government and military establishment arguing in favour of a return to Denmark's past role as a regional power by rebuilding military capabilities in order to be prepared for the continuation of European great power politics, the so-called 'defence cause', and the liberal and social democratic challengers arguing that this was of little use for what had, since 1864, effectively been a small state, the so-called 'peace cause'.²⁴ In the decades following the final institutionalisation of parliamentary rule in 1901, the influence of the 'peace cause' grew slowly until it finally became the dominant perspective in Danish foreign policy. One reason for the victory of the 'peace cause' over the 'defence cause' was its closer fit with a Danish state identity dominated by a so-called 'libertarian ideology of solidarity',²⁵ which had developed in the last part of the nineteenth century. Fusing classical liberal values (e.g. civil liberty, free trade) with strong notions of egalitarianism this view of society

originated in the peasant movement and its organisational structures and was reinforced by a protestant 'Grundtvigian' conception of enlightenment and universal brotherhood influencing Danish society at the time,²⁶ and the parallel cultural romanticism of the post-Napoleonic Scandinavian movement with the works of Danish poet Adam Oehlenschläger playing an important role.²⁷

For illustrative purposes it makes sense to think of the international and domestic conditions for foreign policy making in terms of supply and demand. Externally, the anarchic structure of the international system in combination with systemic and regional power balances creates incentive structures and provides information for policymakers about the demands for different types of policies and actions. Internally, state identity helps us to understand how the state chooses between conflicting regional and systemic incentives or why some states choose to endure the costs of foreign policy decisions that do not conform to the rationality of balance of power incentives. Foreign policy doctrines operate at the meeting point between demand and supply by providing a 'production guide' for foreign policy: which demands are we able and willing to meet and what kind of foreign policy are we producing in order to do so?

The Dominating Doctrines: Munch, Hækkerup and the Principles of Danish Foreign Policy

In order for the foreign policy 'production guide' to be robust and effective it must respect the demand as well as the supply side of foreign policy making, i.e. in the Danish case doctrines must start from a liberal egalitarian interpretation of how to maximise the security and interests of a small state. Two doctrines have fulfilled these criteria over the past 150 years. The first doctrine, here termed the 'Munch doctrine', may be seen as a direct consequence of the 1864 defeat and its domestic and international consequences for Denmark. The second doctrine, here termed the 'Hækkerup doctrine', reflects the changing domestic and international context after the Second World War. At the same time as reflecting the changing conditions for policymaking, each doctrine also affected policymaking by beating paths that have been followed since.

The Munch Doctrine: from the 1864 Defeat to the Second World War

Danish politician and historian P. Munch, a social liberal, became one of the most influential thinkers and policymakers in early twentieth century Denmark. A member of the group of intellectuals who created the ideological foundation for a social liberal party in Denmark in 1905, he represented this party in parliament from 1909-45, and served as the leader of the party from 1927. He was Minister of Defence 1913-20 and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1929-1940 and although initially a pacifist proponent of the 'peace cause', his view of international relations and Denmark's role grew more complex and pragmatic.²⁸ Munch's thinking on international relations became influential in its time, because of his position as an prominent politician and leading intellectual, taking into account the external action space as well as Danish state identity, and at the same time the practices and principles of his time have influenced Danish foreign policy thinking ever since.

The Munch doctrine may be summarised in three fundamental assumptions about international relations and three recommendations for Danish foreign policy that follow from these assumptions.²⁹ First, in international relations there is a fundamental distinction between great powers and small states. Great powers define the rules of the game and the boundaries for when and how small states can pursue their interests.³⁰ By being powerful and pursuing their interests, they may even define what is in the interest of small states. For this reason the ability of the small state to pursue its interests – and even being in a position with a sufficient action space to define what these interests may be beyond the ultimate goal of survival – is dependent upon the small state's relations with great powers in its salient environment.³¹ Second, the role of the policymaker is to reduce risk and maximise influence rather than to seek to promote grand ideological, philosophical or religious schemes.³² For this reason the context of foreign policy making is pivotal. The foreign policy maker needs to rationally evaluate options and to resist the temptation to act when no action is needed and to forgo the pursuit of grand ideals, when this will only serve to undermine the national interest and to endanger the people of the state he is representing.³³ Denmark's national interest followed largely from Denmark's geopolitical location (in a Europe of great power interests with Germany and the United Kingdom as the most important powers for Denmark's interests), its population size (making it a small state) and its trade interests (free trade). Third, although transformation to a

more peaceful international order is impossible in the short term, a more peaceful order is achievable in the long term. A small state may contribute to this development by providing a necessary counterweight to the great powers' way of thinking and accepting that improvements will only take place little by little and only in a way acceptable to the great powers.³⁴

Three recommendations for Danish foreign policy followed from this view of international relations. First, Denmark was a small state and needed to concentrate its attention on the great powers in its salient environment, in Munch's time the United Kingdom and Germany so dependency on great powers with the ability to project power on Danish territory was a given. However, Denmark should continuously work to reduce the consequences of dependency by identifying and taking advantage of the weaknesses of great powers and actively working to reduce the effectiveness of great powers' means to blackmail small states like Denmark into pursuing courses of action which are not in their interest. From this first principle followed a second: that Denmark should always avoid dependency on a single great power as this would create too strong a dependency and leave Denmark without action space to pursue its own interests. Moreover, it was thought that Denmark should work with other small states with shared interests to limit the influence of the great powers. Also, Denmark needed to work actively in international affairs to pursue and support initiatives that could solidify or increase the action space of small states such as the legalisation and institutionalisation of international relations and initiatives supporting the equality of all states.³⁵ Thus, whereas Danish foreign policy is fundamentally restrained by and conditioned upon its relative weakness in material power resources, Denmark may contribute to a more peaceful and morally superior international order and its own national security by using its ideational power: promoting ideas which are both morally right and beneficial to Danish security.

Viewing Danish foreign policy through the Munch doctrine allows us to understand the changing Danish foreign policy in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1870s and 1880s were characterised by "a fear of national extinction and a lack of confidence in the willingness of the great powers of Europe to help maintain the territorial integrity of Denmark".³⁶ The unification of Germany in 1871 under Prussian leadership set the geopolitical conditions for Danish foreign policy and despite some Danish deliberations over the opportunity for different degrees of alignment with either France or Great Britain in the late nineteenth century,³⁷ the main debates focused on the extent to which Denmark should try to appease

or deter Germany in order to minimise the chance of war and thereby to maximise the chance of security and survival.³⁸

Under these circumstances the Munch doctrine became a compass for Danish foreign policy. By viewing Denmark as a small state, which could neither deter nor balance Germany, Denmark came to pursue a non-provocative, German-oriented policy focusing on survival throughout most of the period.³⁹ From the defeat in 1864 and until the First World War Denmark pursued what the small state literature terms a 'hiding strategy' aiming to stay out of trouble by staying out of sight.⁴⁰ However, hiding was a consequence of pursuing the policies of necessity, not a moral choice, and from the end of the First World War until the 1930s Danish foreign policy became activist on two points embedded in the Munch strategy. First, Denmark started to pursue more offensively a foreign economic policy based on trade interests.⁴¹ Although the weakening of Germany and Russia in the wake of the First World War renewed Danish interest in the Baltic Sea area, Great Britain remained the most important trading partner during this period with between a half and two thirds of Danish exports being imported by Great Britain. Second, Denmark joined the League of Nations in 1920 and participated actively in the organisation in the interwar years. Denmark was active in League of Nations negotiations on disarmament, in particular after Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States started to participate in this work in the late 1920s. Danish Foreign Minister Munch was elected president of the committee responsible for the League of Nations disarmament conference in April 1931. In September 1931 Denmark successfully proposed an 'armament moratorium' and in 1932 the conference was established with Denmark co-sponsoring a number of ambitious propositions, albeit with little success.⁴²

The more offensive and activist Danish foreign policy did not represent a fundamentally revised perception of Denmark's position in the world or the conditions upon which this position rested. Rather, the more activist policies in international trade and diplomacy reflected a revised analysis of the means available to small states as the post-war international environment allowed for small states to actively pursue their national interest with less risk to their security and survival than had been the case in the past.⁴³ In this environment, 'League of Nations internationalism' promoting Danish interests by promoting norms of peaceful co-existence became an integral part of Danish foreign policy.⁴⁴ Even though the Danish action space was restricted as a consequence of the power and interests of Germany, Danish participation in the day-to-day activities of the League

was characterised by high degree of activism. This was consistent with the Munch doctrine's principle of working with likeminded small states in order to blunt the traditional instruments of the great powers, in this case by making "the legal and normative stipulations on which the League was based more visible and pronounced and endow[ing] them with a higher degree of authority, thereby creating an effective instrument for the pursuance of the interests of small states".⁴⁵ Thus, an attempt to strengthen the legalisation of world politics through active participation in the League of Nations was in accordance with the Munch doctrine's policy advice to pursue Danish interests diplomatically in order to increase the action space of small states and limit the influence of the great powers. Likewise, pursuing trade interests after the First World War, including a continued close trade relationship with Great Britain, was in accordance with avoiding dependence on one great power and taking advantage of the weakness of the great powers whenever possible. This policy did not prevent a German occupation of Denmark in 1940 and also the importance of activism should not be exaggerated as Denmark continued to adapt its policies in order not to provoke Germany throughout the period. However, it should be noted that during the first years of occupation, Denmark continued its pragmatic activist pursuit of the national interest as Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius attempted to limit the consequences of German demands, for example by holding off a system change in 1940–41 and by avoiding the participation of national socialist members of the government in 1941–42, until the suspension of the government in 1943. In that sense Danish policy during the German occupation may be viewed as the logical conclusion of the Munch doctrine: pragmatically accepting the conditions of power and geopolitics, while continuously seeking to exploit the action space available to further the interests and security of the Danish state and people.

In sum, despite having suffered a devastating defeat to Prussia in 1864, which helped lay the foundation for a united Germany and, subsequently, spending the 1864–1945 period 'in Germany's shadow',⁴⁶ Denmark still managed to gradually develop an activist approach to international affairs after coming out of hiding in the second decade of the century. To be sure, this activism was distinctively 'small state' in its acceptance of the great powers and their agendas as defining the Danish action space and highly pragmatic in its quest to find the room for Danish security and influence. However, grounded in Danish state identity and combined with the liberal egalitarian ideology for which Denmark found an outlet in the League of

Nations, pragmatic activism was successfully developed on the basis of the Munch doctrine providing the principles for seeking influence.

The Hækkerup Doctrine: The Cold War – and After?

Per Hækkerup, a social democrat and Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 1962–66, served in several key positions in Danish government in the 1960s and 1970s. From the 1930s he played an active role in defining the international attitudes of the Social Democratic Youth of Denmark. He served as president of the organisation 1946–1952 and as secretary general of the International Union of Socialist Youth 1946–1954. Hækkerup started his political career as Munch's was drawing to an end, and his formative years were in the 1940s and 1950s, when his international work in the early Cold War period influenced him towards an anti-Communist and pro-US understanding of Cold War politics, which would later leave him as one of the most prominent Danish social democratic defendants of US Cold War policy, even with regard to the Vietnam War.

Hækkerup's foreign policy doctrine (and more generally his understanding of politics) was characterised by the same combination of pragmatic realism and liberal egalitarian values that had characterised Munch's thinking.⁴⁷ However, an increased Danish action space following from the combination of a frozen security environment and a steep increase in the institutionalisation of international relations allowed for a greater role for ideational aspects in Denmark's pragmatic activism. On one hand, Hækkerup found that all political thinking and planning should start from setting the goals one would aim for, on the other hand, if these goals were ever to be obtained, a balanced and level-headed understanding of reality would be the next step. In international relations this means analysing the most important actors and the dominant trends in world politics. When this is done, one can proceed with identifying the most effective means to achieving one's goals based on the political realities. Doing this, it is of utmost importance to realise that world politics is power politics, and that the conditions for small state foreign policy are therefore very different from those of the great powers.

Based on this view of international relations, the primary goal of Danish foreign policy is to adapt to the agendas of the great powers in order to pursue the short and long-term interests of the country and its citizens. Small states, more than great powers, need to follow the rules of the game and signal their respect of the great powers. Official declarations of foreign policy should be reserved for issues of national interest and a few

selected questions of general and principled concern for world politics. This does not mean that world politics is exclusively a game of *realpolitik*. In contrast, it makes little sense to set up a dichotomy between realism and idealism. Realism is a precondition for idealism, because only by taking into account the political realities do we have a chance of pursuing our ideals. At the same time realism without idealism leaves foreign policy a meaningless pursuit of power for its own sake. The national interest is the interest of the people at large and accordingly legitimate foreign policy needs to be based on a broad elite and popular consensus. As summed up by Hækkerup in his book on Danish foreign policy: "Denmark's opportunities for making an impact on international relations are modest, but this does not exempt us from moral responsibility. At every given opportunity we must attempt to tip the scale in favour of our wishes and ideals".⁴⁸

Considering that the Munch era ended with the German occupation of Denmark (although it is unclear if any other doctrine would have allowed Denmark to avoid this) and widespread critique of the political elite of the time, the Hækkerup doctrine presents us with a rather modest adjustment of Danish foreign policy thinking. Although the starting point is ideals rather than geopolitical realities, Hækkerup makes sure to remind us that ideals are of little value if they do not take account of the realities of power politics. The main contribution of the doctrine is to emphasise some of the aspects of Danish state identity which were suppressed in the Munch doctrine, in combination with a reflection of the increasing globalisation of foreign and security policy of the period and Denmark's increased action space following from the institutionalisation of world politics and the US governance of its sphere of interest during the Cold War. This allowed for a variety of expressions of liberal ideology and policy including welfare state policies. The globalisation of the foreign and security policy is reflected in the increased focus on global politics and the reduced emphasis on Denmark's geopolitical location. The increased action space and emphasis on the liberal egalitarian foundation of Danish state identity go hand in hand as an increasingly institutionalised international environment allowed Denmark to emphasise the principles and goals for foreign policy making embodied in Danish state identity.

In practical politics, the combination of these factors resulted in an increased role for Danish peace policy, which had already been a prominent, although limited, aspect of Danish interwar policy and a new focus on development policy as the anti-colonial policies of the new superpowers and the institutionalisation of global relations in the UN created room for

small state action on this issue. These issues were embedded in the pursuit of three long-term priorities viewed as essential for promoting Danish foreign policy interests⁴⁹ and which connected the Cold War policies of the Hækkerup doctrine not only to the preceding interwar period, but also to the post-Cold War activism of today.

In accordance with Hækkerup's realist embedded idealism, the first priority was to promote international rules and norms of behaviour. Like other small states with limited military capabilities, Denmark had an obvious interest in an international legal system constraining the actions of all states rather than a system where power decides alone. Following up from Denmark's active engagement in the regulation of disarmament in the interwar period, Denmark now made active participation in the United Nations a key priority. As argued by Hækkerup: "It is a major aim of the Danish Government and the Danish people to do everything within their power to strengthen the United Nations. Small countries have a vital stake in supporting the development of the United Nations so that it becomes an effective instrument of the international rule of law".⁵⁰ This policy of international rules and norms was continued during the Cold War and emphasised even more vigorously afterwards as Denmark's engagement in the first Gulf War and the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were legitimised as fundamentally norm-enhancing manoeuvres, underpinning the security of small states and the freedom of peoples. The second priority was cooperation and integration. Denmark supported détente and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and became a member of the UN, NATO and the EC. As the Cold War ended Denmark saw the promotion of cooperation and peaceful relations in the Baltic Sea area as one of its most important foreign policy priorities. A few years later the eastern enlargement of the EU became the overriding goal in Danish foreign policy and this continued to be the case until the enlargement was finally decided by the EU member states at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Later in the 2000s climate policy became an increasingly prominent issue in Danish foreign policy. Based on Danish international environmentalist action of the 1970s and continuing as a key priority of Danish foreign policy, even in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, Denmark hosted the United Nations Climate Conference (COP15) in 2009 and contributed actively in European and global climate negotiations.⁵¹ The third priority was the military defence of Denmark. This was the biggest change from the interwar years, as Denmark changed its strategy after the Second World War where the country, after a brief period of relying on the United

Nations and flirting with the option of a Scandinavian Defence Union, became a NATO member in 1949. Reliance on NATO continued after the Cold War, but with Denmark playing a significantly more active role than before, in particular in the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe and increasingly outside Europe in various institutional fora and coalitions of the willing.

During the Cold War the promotion of these three long-term priorities was embedded in a functional compartmentalisation between four so-called 'cornerstones' identified by Prime Minister Krag⁵² and popularised by Foreign Minister Hækkerup (1965), each denoting a central area of foreign policy and a corresponding international organisation, which Denmark could use as a platform for promoting its foreign policy interests:⁵³ security policy/NATO, economic cooperation/EU, identity politics/Nordic Council, and value promotion/UN.⁵⁴ In line with Hækkerup's realist embedded idealism, Denmark's policy was pragmatic and adaptive on issues viewed as closely tied to national security, most importantly in relation to the two superpowers, but activist on many issues related to the legalisation of world politics. With the notable exception of Greenland, the superpowers showed little interest in the Nordic region, leaving Denmark with an incentive not to provoke the Soviet Union (because of its geographical proximity), but also with little incentive to invest much in NATO beyond a basic membership fee.⁵⁵ Thus, NATO membership was a pragmatic way of pursuing Danish security interests, with the Danish defence budget viewed more as a membership fee to pay for protection than as a direct contribution to international peace and security.⁵⁶ This allowed Denmark to pursue an activist policy on international détente and development and thereby to promote the liberal egalitarian values associated with Danish society, in particular from the 1960s (which coincided with Hækkerup's term as Foreign Minister and his main writings on the principles of foreign policy; cf. DIIS 2005: 675–677). A peace policy based on liberal egalitarianism allowed for the dual purpose of locating Denmark firmly within the US-based security order, and thereby defending Denmark as a liberal democracy, and of serving as a base for cooperation with the other Nordic welfare states on détente and development, thereby offensively working to influence the order of the future.

As the Cold War ended the external conditions for Danish foreign policy were transformed and compartmentalisation became obsolete. For the first time in the history of Denmark as an independent country, Danish territory was not threatened by a conventional attack in the short to medium

term. The ensuing Danish foreign policy activism was internationalised in the sense that policy options are viewed in a European and increasingly global context;⁵⁷ value-based in the sense that it promoted a set of values deemed important by Danish foreign policy makers; most importantly activism was seen as a necessary instrument for providing the conditions for peace and to counter anti-liberalism.⁵⁸ It was militarised in the sense that military means are viewed as legitimate policy instruments when pursuing ideationally defined international objectives.⁵⁹

However, this reflected an increased action space and a change in demand from the great powers, rather than a change in principles. The Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the struggle over former Yugoslavia created new demands for active conflict management, and small states were expected to contribute to their solution even if their immediate security interests were not under threat. The repercussions of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasised the global aspect of small state security.⁶⁰ In this context Denmark continued its pragmatic activism by playing into the agendas of the great powers and positioning itself as an impeccable ally, delivering exactly “the kind of output that NATO kept calling for: deployable expeditionary forces that were sustainable in terms of national logistics and reinforcement and that could be put in harm’s way in the combat zones where NATO now needed to be engaged”.⁶¹ To Denmark, the new US-dominated world order resulted in a stronger pressure from the great powers, in particular, the United States, to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of international order and at the same time better opportunities for pursuing Danish liberal egalitarian ideas within this order as they often coincided with the liberal agenda of the superpower.

Moreover, even though there was now an even bigger action space for promoting the fundamental values embodied in Danish state identity during the Cold War, the change was, as it had been after the Second World War, surprisingly modest. As noted by Branner, since the 1960s Denmark had promoted a number of policy initiatives, even inside NATO, challenging the United States on détente and bridge-building and the old great powers on colonialism.⁶² These initiatives were characterised by a) being on the fringes of the great powers’ agenda, i.e. implicitly accepting that they were setting the agenda and that Denmark needed to accept that the starting point for any initiative continued to be that Denmark was a small state in an anarchic world of great powers, and b) promoting the common good of international society, i.e. avoiding being the delivery boy of any

great power in particular and thereby preserving important elements of neutrality despite alliance membership. Danish post-Cold War activism did not refrain from this formula, as it was making common security and the spread of democracy along with environmental sustainability and human rights the central tenets of Danish foreign policy.

However, in 2001 this lack of a reorientation of Danish foreign policy doctrine resulted in a bold attempt to point out the continuity from Munch to the post-Cold War period and to change the basic principles by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This was the second attempt at transforming Danish foreign policy doctrine in a few decades as the so-called footnote policy may be seen as (a very different) attempt twenty years earlier. The next section discusses these two attempts at changing the fundamental principles of Danish foreign policy and why they failed.

The Doctrines That Never Were: Footnoting and Super Atlanticism

The Munch and Hækkerup doctrines have proved remarkably stable as they have continuously provided a guiding set of principles for Danish foreign policy since the early twentieth century. This does not mean that Danish foreign policy history is without attempts at replacing these doctrines with alternatives. This section briefly explores two attempts at introducing new doctrines: the Danish 'footnote policy' towards NATO in the 1980s and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's 'super Atlanticism' in the 2000s. Both attempts were revolutionary in the sense that they signalled an explicit break with past practices, both received widespread public support and both attempts ultimately failed as foreign policy doctrines.

From 1982 to 1988 a majority of the Danish parliament forced the Danish minority government to footnote a series of NATO communiqués. The footnotes expressed the Danish dissatisfaction with superpower relations in general and the nuclear policy of NATO in particular and were marketed as an explicit response to hardened US rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and the intensification of the Cold War.⁶³ NATO's 1979 dual-track decision responding to a Soviet arms build-up, at the same time offering mutual limitations on intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles and threatening to deploy more medium range nuclear weapons in case of disagreement, had been controversial in Denmark and caused some parliamentary debate on whether Denmark should contribute to-

wards the costs of deploying new missiles. Denmark tried, without success, to convince NATO member states to postpone the decision. However, it was only after the change of government in 1982 that a new majority in security policy passed 23 resolutions requiring the Danish government to pursue reservations and objections to a number of NATO initiatives and policies, including NATO's nuclear strategy and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The resolutions included a notable sharpening of Danish anti-Cold War rhetoric, for example by demanding unconditional exclusion of nuclear weapons in crises and war as well as in peacetime, thereby challenging NATO's flexible response policy, and working for an agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO about no first use of nuclear weapons, thereby challenging nuclear deterrence.⁶⁴ The footnote policy ended in 1988 when the government called an election on the opposition's wish to tighten the rules governing visits by allied warships and argued that this would challenge Danish NATO membership as it would require allies to state explicitly whether they were carrying any nuclear weapons. The government won the election and the Social Liberals subsequently changed sides thereby bringing an end to the footnote policy. Soon after the election, the government presented an agenda for foreign policy with no room for footnoting NATO policy.⁶⁵

Whereas the early attempt to convince fellow NATO members to postpone the decision on missile deployment may well be seen as in accordance with the dominant doctrines so far as it would buy Denmark time and maybe modify the final agreement among member states, the footnoting made little sense in the context of the Munch and Hækkerup doctrines' pragmatic activism. The footnote policy seemed at the same time to undermine the policies that would protect Denmark from the Soviet Union and to provoke Denmark's most important ally, the United States.⁶⁶ At the same time it attacked NATO policy head-on rather than taking an active role in influencing the agenda of NATO. Paradoxically, then, the policy seemed to undermine both defensive and offensive elements of the Danish doctrines at the same time.

In the 2000s super Atlanticism represented another candidate doctrine.⁶⁷ Super Atlanticism denoted a foreign and security policy combining a close political and military partnership with the United States, as underlined by the Danish contribution to the Iraq war with Denmark's active diplomatic effort to "reinvigorate Atlantic relations, both in NATO and the EU-US framework" and Danish policy to promote democracy in the Middle East.⁶⁸ In contrast to the Atlanticist position that had charac-

terised Danish foreign policy during the Cold War and afterwards, this meant taking sides in a struggle over the future world order.⁶⁹ As summed up by Mouritzen, “Denmark [seemed] to specialise in anticipating palatable US policy initiatives and subsequently enter as close cooperation partner in the further development and implementation”.⁷⁰

Although, super Atlanticism might be seen as a continuation of Hækkerup’s realist embedded idealism, or even as a parallel to the more adaptive polities of the Munch era, its principles were formulated as an idealist antithesis to the two dominating doctrines in particular, and to pragmatic power politics in general. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen saw the military action by the coalition of the willing in Iraq as a natural modern implementation of Wilsonianism: “When people are granted the real freedom of choice”, he noted in a speech shortly after the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, “they choose democracy over every other form of government”.⁷¹ This idealism was explicitly contrasted to the previous foreign policy of Denmark, which was seen as pragmatic and opportunistic in the Second World War, when the Danish government decided not to fight against German occupation, and in the Cold War, when Denmark was in some ways a restrained member of NATO. It was also contrasted with the present ‘forces of darkness’, who “try to block the road towards democracy, with all means. Because they fear freedom, enlightenment and democracy”.⁷² However, this bold move was short-lived. When Rasmussen was made Secretary-General of NATO in 2009 and succeeded by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Danish foreign policy started to normalise moving gradually towards the position it had occupied prior to 2001.

The footnote policy and super Atlanticism may both be seen as logical next steps in the evolution of Danish foreign policy doctrines from Munch’s national interest-based small state realism; Denmark had gradually moved towards Hækkerup’s realist-embedded idealism. In very different ways both the footnote policy and super Atlanticism represented bold moves towards a purely idealist small state policy. However, they both failed to make a lasting impact. In their attempt to revise the doctrinal foundations for Danish foreign policy they failed to acknowledge the external conditions as well as Danish state identity. This contrasts with Munch and Hækkerup. No doubt the development of the Danish welfare state from the 1930s and the different ideological points of departures for Munch and Hækkerup played a role in their respective perceptions of what the state should and could do, but the main difference between the Munch doctrine and the Hækkerup doctrine lies in the differences be-

tween the international conditions that the two doctrines responded to. Both doctrines represented a meeting between a liberal egalitarian Danish state identity and a set of international conditions mainly reflecting the interests of the great powers, and for both doctrines this meeting was informed by the lessons of 1864. In contrast, the pragmatic lessons of 1864 were forgotten in the footnote policy and super Atlanticism and, just as important, despite their idealism, they were paradoxically at the mercy of changing power politics. As the security environment began to change in the late 1980s, the footnote policy seemed increasingly archaic. It is difficult basing your policy on anti-Cold War rhetoric, when the Cold War is coming to an end. Likewise, super Atlanticism was stuck in the neo-conservative ideology characteristic of the first Bush government, but as this ideology gave way to a more traditional realist position in US foreign policy, super Atlanticism seemed to offer a policy with a rapidly diminishing value to the Atlantic superpower.

Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? 150 Years of Pragmatic Activism

Unpacking the doctrinal principles of Danish foreign policy enables us to understand the origins and content of Danish foreign policy activism. The principles for foreign policy making formulated in response to the Danish defeat in 1864 have proved remarkably consistent over the past century. A liberal egalitarian starting point for policymaking has directed Danish foreign policy makers to focus on issues such as the legalisation of world politics, détente and international development. However, the pragmatism induced by the defeat and the realisation that Denmark was a small state, embedded liberal egalitarianism in doctrines using Denmark's position as a small state in an anarchic world of great powers as a starting point. The result was a continuous pragmatic activism.

This does not mean that Danish foreign activism has not developed over the years. Taking our point of departure in the analysis above, two long-term trends can be detected. First, Danish activism has increased. This is often seen as a post-Cold War phenomenon, but it is not. From the hiding strategy of the last part of the nineteenth century, Danish foreign policy gradually developed a more activist approach as the action space was expanded from the First World War and onwards. Moreover, this development happened in tandem with the development of the welfare state

from the 1930s, developing the liberal egalitarian state identity into a modern welfare state and thereby underpinning activism on a wide range of policy issues, including foreign policy.⁷³ Second, Danish activism is increasingly militarised. Again, this is a long-term development beginning with the Danish contribution to UN peacekeeping during the Cold War and gradually developed since 1989 to the point that military forces were reformed to underpin the Danish ability to contribute military around the world. However, Danish policymakers viewed military and diplomatic activism as basically two sides of the same coin, because they both served as means to the same end: a stable, rule-governed international environment protecting Danish security interests.

In sum, the Munch and Hækkerup doctrines created principled points of departure for a durable pragmatic foreign policy activism. Denmark is still living in the shadow of 1864 as these doctrines were based on the lessons learned from the Danish defeat and the realisation that Denmark was now a small state. However, if 1864 is synonymous with reactive pragmatism or even hiding, Denmark left a life in the shadows more than a century ago.

Notes

- 1 I would like to thank Hans Mouritzen and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft.
- 2 Branner, 2013: 140. For another recent analysis exploring the importance of 1864 for Danish foreign policy, see Mouritzen (2014).
- 3 See also Branner (2013) and Wivel (2013a) who emphasise strong aspects of continuity in Danish foreign policy.
- 4 Brodin, 1972: 104
- 5 As one major study on American foreign policy doctrines from Monroe to Reagan argued, the doctrines under scrutiny tended to be imprecise, ambiguous, and mystifying, but still providing better guidance than if they had not been there at all (Crabb 1982).
- 6 Posen, 1984: 13; cf. Biddle, 2005: 1; Luttwak, 1987: 239–41
- 7 cf. Breitenbauch, 2008
- 8 Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012
- 9 Mouritzen 1981: 26
- 10 See e.g. Danish Government, 1990; 1993; Elbjørn & Wivel 2006; Ellemann-Jensen, 2004; Holm, 1997, 2002, 2004; Knudsen, 2004; Pedersen 2012a, 2012b; Petersen, 2006; Rynning, 2003; Wivel, 2005.
- 11 cf. Henriksen & Ringsmose 2011; Pedersen, 2012a; Wivel, 2005
- 12 Pedersen, 2012b: 113 16
- 13 This is not the place to elaborate on my own understanding of foreign policy activism. For a discussion of this, see Wivel (2013c).
- 14 Branner, 2013; Wivel 2013a
- 15 Kjeldgaard, 2012; cf. next section
- 16 Grieco, 1990: 38
- 17 Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012: 36–38
- 18 Gvalia et al., 2013: 109–110
- 19 For a more comprehensive discussion of how a starting point in the identification of external conditions may be combined with an analysis of state identity when analysing foreign policy and an attempt to ground this combination in so-called neoclassical realism, see Wivel (2013a).
- 20 Bjørn & Due-Nielsen 2003: 259
- 21 Branner, 2013: 140
- 22 Knudsen, 2006: 128

- 23 Olesen & Wivel, 2013; Knudsen, 2006
- 24 Breitenbauch & Wivel, 2004; Gram-Skjoldager, 2012
- 25 Østergaard, 2000: 161
- 26 Breitenbauch and Wivel, 2004
- 27 Parker, 2002: 358
- 28 Gram-Skjoldager 2012; Pedersen 1970
- 29 As conveyed in the quote from Mouritzen above, the doctrine is the researcher's rational reconstruction of the principles. Thus, the term 'the Munch doctrine' does not refer to a specific document where the doctrine can be found, nor does it denote that Munch was the only policymaker of importance for the principles of foreign policy conveyed by the doctrine. Other influential politicians, e.g. Erik Scavenius, Carl Th. Zahle or Thorvald Stauning were important for laying out the principles and practice of foreign policy embodied in the doctrine.
- 30 Pedersen, 1970: 404–5
- 31 Lidegaard, 2003
- 32 Pedersen, 1970
- 33 Pedersen, 1970: 417
- 34 Gram-Skjoldager 2012, 67–72. For Munch's public statements on foreign policy and Denmark's role, opportunities and challenges in international relations, see the examples and quotes in Pedersen (1970) and Gram-Skjoldager (2012). Pedersen tends to emphasise the pragmatic and realist aspects of Munch's foreign policy outlook, whereas Gram-Skjoldager documents how Munch's thinking on foreign policy was influenced by the Danish peace movement.
- 35 Pedersen, 1970: 56
- 36 Holbraad, 1990: 45
- 37 Bjørn & Due-Nielsen, 2003: 466–70
- 38 Olesen, 2013: 256–260
- 39 Lidegaard, 2003; Olesen, 2013: 256–60
- 40 cf. Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010
- 41 Lidegaard, 2003: 190–92
- 42 Lidegaard, 2003: 266–67
- 43 Pedersen, 1970: 406
- 44 Gram-Skjoldager, 2012
- 45 Branner, 2000: 212
- 46 Olesen, 2013: 256

- 47 Hækkerup, 1965. Like in the case of the Munch doctrine and in accordance with the general understanding of doctrines in this article, the Hækkerup doctrine is not synonymous with the man and his writing but a result of the rational reconstruction of the ideas at his time, some of them conceived before Hækkerup's term as foreign minister and some of them only becoming visible after.
- 48 Hækkerup, 1965: 16; author's translation. The original text reads, "Danmarks muligheder for at påvirke den internationale udvikling er ikke store, men det fritager os ikke for et moralsk ansvar. Hvor lejlighed gives, må vi lægge vort lod i vægtskålen til fordel for en udvikling i overensstemmelse med vore ønsker og idealer".
- 49 Heurlin, 2001
- 50 Hækkerup, 1964: 176
- 51 Wivel, 2013b
- 52 Olesen & Villaume, 2005: 15
- 53 The discussion of compartmentalisation and Danish peace activism is based on Wivel (2013a).
- 54 Due-Nielsen & Petersen, 1995: 38; Hækkerup, 1965
- 55 Holbraad, 1991: 119-20
- 56 cf. Ringsmose, 2009
- 57 Holm, 2004
- 58 Wivel, 2013a
- 59 Rasmussen, 2005
- 60 Wivel, Bailes & Archer 2014: 4
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Size, Targets and Purpose: An Analysis of Danish Aid Policy and the Emerging International Spending Targets 1945-70

*Peter Yding Brumbech*¹

Introduction

Danish Development Aid Policy and History

When examining the history of Danish development aid policy, the most surprising facet is the almost constant preoccupation with size and volume. Why has a small northwest European country with no significant colonial history below the 60th northern parallel chosen to be one of the most generous development aid donors? And why has Denmark taken international aid targets more seriously than virtually all other economically developed nations outside Scandinavia and a few other 'like-minded' countries?

The popular answer would perhaps be that Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries take their international responsibility more seriously than other nations. This idea can be found, at least indirectly, in many official statements on the purpose of Danish aid, and it can also be identified in other foreign policy areas; for example, climate change. However, the last decade of historical research on Danish development aid has revealed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the reality is more complex. Like any other country, Danish development aid policy has not been without altruistic motivations, but it has also served Danish political and economic interests.²

Having said this, the Danish economic and political interests behind aid can only serve as a partial explanation for why Denmark, along with a handful of other countries, has developed more substantial aid programmes than a range of other, larger, states with a more direct political

interest in the developing countries. Explanations for the high aid contributions by Denmark and what have been termed ‘The like-minded countries’ have varied. A number of papers in the research project “Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty”, which ran from 1983–1990, used the ‘humane internationalism’ of the Scandinavian countries, along with Canada and Holland, to explain their high aid contribution. Pratt defined ‘humane internationalism’ as “an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialised world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty”, whilst Olav Stokke identifies a connection between humane internationalism and the nations’ domestic social welfare policies, arguing that it “represents an extension internationally of the predominant socio-political values at home, as reflected in the five countries’ national social welfare policy, broadly defined.”³ In *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949–1989*, David H. Lumsdaine drew a similar connection, which was investigated further in a study by Noel and Therien in 1995. This study revealed a link between aid levels and various countries’ “welfare socialist attributes”.⁴


Previous research thus shows, that Danish development aid policy has served as a more or less integrated part of overall Danish foreign policy that has been motivated by both altruism and (sometimes enlightened) self-interest. Furthermore, the development of the Danish welfare state created a climate in which the state’s active role in the socially motivated redistribution of income was broadly recognised. This climate made the philosophy behind development aid more readily acceptable to Danish politicians and the Danish public.

By tracing the history of the first two decades of Danish development aid history, this article will argue that, although the above-mentioned factors played an important role in the early development of Danish development aid policy, another important driving force behind the (almost obsessive) Danish focus on international targets for aid giving was an attempt to meet a domestic demand for not very clearly defined ‘action’. ‘Action’ that could assure the Danish public that, while Denmark was only a small player on the international stage, it was at least a moral superpower.

This article will present a dynamic in Danish aid policy that does not contest the idea of a multifaceted rationale behind development aid policy; in fact, it presents a dynamic that was developed to bind a range of these purposes. This dynamic then continued as a force in its own right, and became one of the most important driving factors behind Danish

development aid policy. It also played a key role in laying the groundwork for the development that has made Denmark one of the largest per capita development aid donors since the 1970s; a development I have chosen to call *volume fetishism*.

Figure 1: The development in Danish aid spending 1962–1992 measured as a percentage of GNI⁵



Aid Targets and Volume Fetishism

In the early 1960s, attention shifted away from the identification of specific operational instruments for the pursuit of specific operational ends, to a search for general norms, or ‘rules of the game’, governing what was falsely assumed to be a homogeneous and common activity called ‘aid giving’. This falsely perceived activity was assumed to be self-evidently desirable, and no longer in need of justification by reference to objectives.⁶

This quotation from John White captures an essential development in how aid giving was perceived in the 1960s. Spurred on by the debates in international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the donation of economic aid was transformed into a special foreign policy area with its own inner logic and specific purpose. In some ways, this transformation was primarily rhetorical, but the formulation of aid spending targets and international aid programmes under the UN and the World Bank

also lent some reality to the notion, since they presented a yardstick with which to measure countries' commitment to the newly developed policy field of aid giving.

The reasons for the rhetorical transformation were fairly clear. The new network of international organisations and the demand from developing countries for aid to assist their economic development created a stage for an aid debate and a need to measure whether or not wealthy countries lived up to expectations. However, the term 'development' was – and remains today – a very elusive phenomenon to measure. As well as this, potential development aid was only ever a minor factor among many others that influenced development. It is therefore not surprising that the effort, rather than the result, became the primary standard by which to measure the wealthy countries' commitment to supporting development in developing countries. This was intensified (and, in some ways, initiated) by the United States, who formulated a policy around 1960 that demanded increased allied burden sharing in the field of aid giving. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the OECD was created with two main purposes: burden-sharing and coordination amongst western developed countries. DAC's comparative statistics on economic transfers were an important cornerstone in the development and consolidation of aid giving as an end in itself, rather than simply a means to an end.

As this article will demonstrate, the Danish development aid programme throughout the 1950s and 1960s was a multipurpose entity that served both long and short-term political and economic interests as well as an altruistic drive. It was also a policy that served both direct and more indirect goals, and it was well integrated in general Danish foreign policy at many levels. However, in the middle of the 1960s, the international debate on aid targets and aid spending developed into almost an obsession in Danish aid policy, to the extent where there was little or no foreign policy rationale behind the large increases in overall Danish aid spending. Various Danish governments adopted a new, target-oriented policy, that was not designed to pursue either foreign policy or commercial goals, and developmental goals seemed to claim only a secondary role in relation to the desire to increase aid spending. This 'volume fetishism' – where aid volume became a substitute for the (altruistic, political or commercial) purposes development aid was supposed to serve – became a driving force behind Danish aid policy in the decades to come, and it helps to account for the relatively high aid contributions Denmark has upheld until the present day.

1949–1960: The UN Era of Danish Development Assistance Policy

The Point Four Program Kicks off Danish Aid

US president Harry S. Truman's inaugural speech in January 1949 is often considered the starting point for modern development aid policy. In his speech, Truman launched the idea of a "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."⁷ The main idea was that economic growth would have a stabilising effect on developing countries and make them less likely to succumb to communism.

Truman's so-called 'Point Four Program' was very modest in its scope and was only designed to deliver 'technical assistance' to developing countries, who would have to raise the funds to finance development elsewhere. However, an integral part of the programme was to establish a UN programme to channel some of the US aid for technical assistance. This led to the establishment of the UN's Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1950, which called upon all member states to consider how they could contribute to the programme. This meant that, for the first time, Denmark was faced with the question of whether or not it should become a development aid donor.

It was clear that development aid was a completely new policy field for the Danish political system, since the Danish Foreign Ministry initially thought it might receive aid for Greenland and thus become a recipient country under the programme. However, when it transpired that this would not be possible, Denmark donated a small amount to the programme; the precise amount was agreed upon by using Sweden as a guide and adjusting for population size.⁸

The contribution to EPTA was the start of an era in which Denmark regarded aid for economic development as the sole responsibility of the United Nations and its affiliated organisations (among which Denmark also counted the World Bank). In the years from 1950 to 1960, Denmark acted on the principle that all Danish development aid should be channelled through international organisations. The official reason for this was that developing countries preferred this method of aid to bilateral aid, which enabled donor countries to influence recipients. In many ways, this was a naïve rationale; nevertheless, it continued to act as guiding principle until 1960.

The Three Reasons behind Danish Aid through the UN

While the notion that developing countries only wished to receive aid from the UN might be naïve, the UN-only focus of Danish aid policy had three underlying reasons that throw light on the Danish perspective of the time. The first reason for the Danish UN focus in development aid in the 1950s was that it was simple, and it allowed Denmark to have a development aid policy that was easy to understand and manage. In contrast to Norway and Sweden, which, at various times in the 1950s, both experienced surges in public interest and also initiated small bilateral aid projects, the Danish public (and their political representatives) were, in general, uninterested in aid; they were content when told that Denmark 'did its bit' for the starving masses of the world through the relevant UN programmes. A few NGOs, such as *Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke* (literal translation: Cooperation Between People), attempted to lobby for Danish bilateral aid, but without much determination or success until 1960.⁹

The second reason for the exclusive UN focus in Danish development aid policy was the positive role that the UN played in Denmark's general foreign policy. The UN system performed a significant role in Danish post-World War II foreign policy thinking, and, in the years immediately after 1945, it was even hoped that the UN could be the cornerstone of Danish security policy. With the rising tensions between East and West in the late 1940s, this hope quickly faded and, when it joined NATO in 1949, Denmark opted for the Western alliance system as its primary security guarantee. However, to a certain extent, the UN was able to retain its status in Danish foreign policy as the only truly global international organisation that, in the course of time, could effect a climate of peaceful international cooperation. Historian Kristine Midtgaard has identified that Danish foreign policy had a two-level approach in the 1950s, in which NATO delivered short-term security and the UN delivered long-term security.¹⁰ In this context, the UN focus on development aid policy was a way for Denmark to support the UN and Denmark's long-term security strategy. It was also a means by which to lend political purpose to an organisation that Denmark considered important but could no longer use in the way it originally intended (as a source of short-term security).

The third reason for the UN orientation in Danish aid policy was economic, though not in the strict direct sense normally associated with aid giving. From the outset, the Danish Foreign Ministry viewed Danish aid contributions as a way to establish valuable connections between Danish firms and emerging markets in developing countries. This was the primary

motivation for paying Danish contributions to the UN in Danish currency, since this would encourage the UN programme to spend its funds on Danish experts and facilitate financially rewarding contacts with the new countries.

Apart from this direct economic benefit, Danish civil servants and a number of policymakers also hoped that an increased global transfer of capital from richer to poorer countries would offer a broad economic advantage for Denmark. This relates to the chronic Danish dollar shortage in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As well as schemes designed to save dollars, various Danish governments attempted to increase Danish exports to the Western hemisphere and find replacements for imports from the dollar area. Consequently, Denmark was interested in both an increased flow of dollars from the US to the global economy and in the economic development of the developing countries, so they could act as an alternative source of raw materials. These considerations were the primary motivation for the Danish interest in the idea of a Special UN Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), which Denmark supported in the mid 1950s. Such a fund, which was envisioned to hold several billion dollars, would stimulate the outflow of dollars, since the US was thought to be the main contributor. In the mid 1950s Denmark was prepared to allocate a substantial amount to the fund. However, in the end, the US decided not to participate. A plan by other European countries to establish SUNFED without the US was rejected by Denmark, as the economic benefit derived from US participation was Denmark's main reason to support the fund. Thus the Danish policy regarding SUNFED underlined both the UN focus in Danish aid policy and the focus on economic self-interest.¹¹

The Fledgling Bilateral Programme

The almost exclusively Danish focus on multilateral aid in the 1950s meant that early Danish development aid policy differed substantially from the other Scandinavian countries' early approach to aid. While both Norway and Sweden donated to the various UN aid programmes in the 1950s, the public aid debate in both countries focused on high-profile bilateral aid initiatives. In Sweden, several aid drives were held during the 1950s to fund early bilateral aid projects,¹² while Norway's Aid to India project in 1952 attracted most of the attention in Norway.¹³ Both the Swedish projects and the Norwegian project had a domestic and a foreign policy purpose, which, among other things, was to demonstrate that the donating countries were willing to try to solve international tensions with

peaceful and humanitarian policies. In Norway, Andreas Buraas from the Swedish Social Democratic Party's committee rather cynically formulated some of the domestic benefits of bilateral aid in an internal memo. A fundraising campaign for a bilateral aid project would:

Provide an idealistic course to the many Norwegian 'intellectuals', who feel that Norway's perceived dependence on capitalistic America has given them intellectual respiratory troubles and whose only occupation thus far has been to occasionally criticise our foreign policy.¹⁴

While this was by no means the only (or even the most important) reason to start a bilateral aid project, it seems certain that, in both Norway and in Sweden, bilateral aid had an important symbolic role vis-à-vis the general public.

Denmark did not embark on a high-profile bilateral aid initiative in the 1950s. The reason for this lies in the above-mentioned multilateral focus in Danish aid and in the fact that Denmark succeeded in obtaining some of these domestic benefits vis-à-vis the public through its UN contributions.

When Norway began discussing its first bilateral aid project in 1952, the debate was also observed in Denmark. Various groups, including the NGO *Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke* and the Social Liberal Party (*Det Radikale Venstre*), were inspired by the Norwegian debate and believed that Denmark should also make a recognisable effort to increase development in the poorer countries of the world. In 1952, during one of the few parliamentary debates in the 1950s that touched on aid, the leading Social Liberal politician Jørgen Jørgensen mentioned the new Norwegian aid project, and he called for Denmark to embark on a 'daring initiative'. He claimed that a Danish bilateral aid project could become "a uniting task for the Danish people".¹⁵ Despite calls for a bilateral aid initiative, it was instead decided that Denmark should quadruple its contribution to the UN Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance and, at the same time, reserve half the funds for use in Denmark.¹⁶

This setup – which was, in part, reserved for use in Denmark – was a way for the Danish government to show its people that Denmark was 'doing something', while, at the same time, honouring the principle of only granting multilateral aid. Therefore, throughout the 1950s, a number of courses for civil servants and experts from the developing countries were held in Denmark for the earmarked Danish contribution. While never re-


sembling a true bilateral aid project, these Danish courses signalled that Denmark took its responsibilities seriously and that it did not simply transfer contributions to an anonymous bank account in the UN. However, in the United Nations Denmark's particular manner of allocating its funds gave rise to many administrative challenges. In fact, this Danish method was only accepted because of the way in which US contributions were calculated – they were pegged to other countries' contributions – meaning that Denmark's contribution in Danish kroner was matched by the US contribution in US dollars.¹⁷

It could be argued that Danish aid for economic development in the 1950s was modest, but that political interest in aid was even smaller. At its peak in 1959, Denmark contributed some seven million kroner to the UN's Development Assistance programmes, which equated to approximately 1 million US dollars, or 0.01% of Danish national income. A little less than half had to be used in Denmark, but the entire contribution was paid in Danish kroner and could not be converted into other currencies by the UN unless the Danish government gave its permission (which it seldom did). The contributions were more or less equal to the Norwegian contribution and amounted to approximately a third of the Swedish contribution. However, in contrast to the other Scandinavian countries, development assistance had not captured the imagination of the public nor of the politicians before 1960. Thus Danish development aid policy in the 1950s played only a minor role in Denmark's overall UN policy and, at the same time, was an area in which Denmark hoped to reap future economic benefits. For symbolic reasons a part of the contribution was tied to use in Denmark itself, which meant the Danish government could show its (dis)interested people that Denmark was playing an active part in solving the problems of the poor countries in the world.¹⁸

1960–1967: The Bilateral Programme and the Allied Burden-Sharing Regime

The New Beginning 1960–62

As stated above, Danish contributions to development assistance hovered around 0.01% of Danish national income in 1959. This was, however, neither a domestic nor a foreign policy problem, as there were no comparative international statistics on aid and, even if there had been, there was no international tradition of comparing the overall development aid dona-

Figure 2: Danish aid from 1959/60 to 1970/71 in million Danish kroner.¹⁹

tions of various countries. Despite its very low development aid contribution, Denmark was in a position to present itself as the top per capita contributor to the United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance, which it did on various occasions.²⁰ In 1960 neither the Danish public nor Danish politicians could envisage that, in only a few years, Denmark would be internationally reprimanded for its low aid contributions. This was quite simply because official definitions of aid, the comparative statistical framework and the idea of burden sharing, were not yet in place. Let us now examine the international picture. On the international stage, there was a surge of interest in development aid policy around 1960. It was once again a presidential inauguration in the United States that played a key role; John F. Kennedy had made development aid and allied burden-sharing one of the focal points of both his presidential campaign and his new presidency. The new administration's policies were inspired by the need to gain developing countries' support during the Cold War in the second half of the 1950s, and economic assistance played an increasingly important part in this.²¹ While much of the US aid was earmarked for military build-up in allied countries, it became increasingly important for the US and the Soviet Union to offer aid to civilian sectors when competing for allies in the developing world. Furthermore, aid theory around 1960 began to focus more explicitly on the connection between development

aid, economic development and the development of liberal democratic institutions. A seminal work in this movement was W. W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth*, with the telling subtitle *A Non-Communist Manifesto*. This work described how aid, when applied at a strategic point in a country's development, could act as a catalyst for economic development, which, in turn, would drive the recipient country towards a liberal capitalist system. Rostow was one of Kennedy's chief advisors and had a profound impact on American aid policy at the beginning of the 1960s. However, the new US focus on aid for economic development came at a time when the United States' share of the overall Western economy was declining. Thus, from the outset, the Kennedy Administration had its eyes fixed on allied burden-sharing; the US's western European allies were expected to contribute their share.

The years around 1960 saw an explosion in international aid initiatives and debates. In 1959, the World Bank formed its 'soft loan arm' the International Development Association (IDA), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was established under the newly reorganised OECD and, in the US, high profile initiatives were launched, such as The Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps.²² In the UN, the United States was instrumental in passing the resolution that named the 1960s 'UN Decade of Development'.

It was during this time – the heyday of international development assistance – that Denmark passed its first comprehensive development aid legislation in 1962, which established a full-fledged Danish development aid programme with bilateral project aid, multilateral contributions through various agencies, and bilateral and multilateral development loans. It is clear that the domestic debates preceding this legislation were significant, and some writers on the topic even present them as the main reason for the new expansive Danish aid policy.²³ However, it is difficult not to view the Danish aid policy that was formulated at the beginning of the 1960s as an integrated part of an international development in which development aid was the 'flavour of the month'. Like Denmark, both Norway and Sweden passed new aid legislation and established aid administrations in 1962. West Germany and Italy had done the same only the year before, and Holland followed suit in 1963. Most of the western European countries that did not have strong ties with former colonies developed or redeveloped their aid policies and administrations in these years. Countries with strong ties to former and existing colonies, such as France, Great Britain, Belgium and Portugal, had less need to reorganise their aid policies, as

they had already been using aid and other economic transfers as an integral part of their colonial or post-colonial policies in previous decades.

In Denmark, the NGO *Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke* was an early proponent of bilateral aid and in 1960 its call for a bilateral aid programme was increasingly supported by other groups; for example, the Social Democratic party's youth movement and the umbrella organisation for various youth organisations, *Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd*. The Social Democratic Prime Minister, Viggo Kampmann, was also enthusiastic about the idea and argued that the Social Democratic party should be the front runners in the call for a new and more active aid policy.²⁴ Kampmann underlined the domestic benefits of a development aid policy in a newspaper interview in June 1960:

In the West, we talk about cars and television sets while people in the East are dying in the streets. I find that frightening. Besides it will be morally healthy for the Danish people to help and that is why our aid must be of a size that is fit to rouse the individual out of his disinterest.²⁵

As is already apparent from this early interview, the needs of the recipient countries were not the only factors in determining the amount of aid to donate; the effect that aid contributions would have on the Danish public also played a significant role.

In many ways, the development of Denmark's new development aid policy (1960–62) was a rerun of the first bilateral Norwegian initiative in 1952–53: the Social Democratic Party latched on to a popular idea and spearheaded the call for a new start. In 1962 a large public fundraising initiative was held in Denmark in connection with the launch of the new aid programme. The primary purpose was not to raise money, but to gather public support for Denmark's new and more active aid policy. Half a dozen aid project proposals were selected for the fundraising campaign, all of which had good PR value and identified the parts of Danish 'civilisation' the public would find worthy of exporting to underdeveloped areas of the world. Among the project ideas was the establishment of public libraries in West Africa, a dairy project in India, an elementary school in Morocco, a training centre for women in 'Africa' and an adult education initiative in India, which was inspired by the Danish 'Højskoler' (Folk High Schools). Subsequently, a few civil servants complained internally that this fundraising campaign had left them with a handful of relatively amateur projects that required completion due to their high-profile role in the campaign of

1962.²⁶ Of course, these civil servants did not understand (or chose not to understand) that these aid projects were as much a gesture for the benefit of the Danish public as they were genuine attempts to bring 'development' to the developing countries.

The New Aid Policy and Danish Foreign Policy

In the early 1960s the first bilateral aid projects of the new Danish aid administration had important political functions besides creating 'development'. Some projects – such as those planned in connection with the 1962 fundraising drive – were directed towards a domestic audience and were designed to present Denmark as a humane internationalist. Other projects were diplomatic bargaining tools in negotiations with developing countries. As a result of the large international focus on development and aid giving, economic aid became an integrated part of the diplomatic toolbox vis-à-vis the developing countries. At state visits and other official arrangements, the gift of an aid project became more or less expected, and a country's willingness to provide aid became a measure of its interest in diplomatic and economic relations. Denmark also discovered as much when it tried to present aid projects as gifts to newly independent countries. While only a few years earlier a purely symbolic gift would have been sufficient, Kenya in 1963 told Denmark that its planned gift of 1.5 million Danish kroner (DKK) to establish a school for women in Karen Blixen's old house in Kenya was inappropriately low. The project budget was quickly raised to 2.5 million DKK to avoid "loss of prestige in Kenya".²⁷ In a similar case in 1962, Denmark approached India with a suggestion of granting the country a 15 million DKK development loan, only to be met with the question of why the offered amount was not larger.²⁸

Many projects fulfilled both the domestic and foreign policy functions simultaneously. However, other projects, such as the first Nordic project, which was launched in Tanzania in the early 1960s, had a different purpose. In this particular case, the primary motivation appears to have been the desire to simply do something 'Nordic', irrespective of the political or economic implications.²⁹ And when then Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag was confronted in parliament with the view that a joint Nordic project would present an unnecessary complication, he came back with the somewhat lame defence that "sometimes you have to do something more complicated in the hope that you might do something that is more right".³⁰

The interests of Danish business and industry were primarily served through the development loan programme (see below). However, to a cer-

tain extent, the bilateral project policy was also geared towards serving Danish exports. When, for instance, Danish bilateral project aid in the 1960s consisted of many small projects worldwide (as opposed to fewer, more focused projects), this was because the broad approach was deemed to be in the interest of Danish exports, since it would create wide-ranging contacts between developing countries and Danish experts and businesses.³¹

Other parts of the development programme played other important roles in other political spheres. Issuing soft loans under the development loan programme was a method to meet developing countries' demand for finance and not simply 'technical assistance' (to use the terminology of the times). On more than one occasion, Denmark was also persuaded by the United States to partake in larger loan packages to strategic allies or non-aligned countries, such as Turkey or India. However, more importantly, the development loans, which were tied to purchases in Denmark, were seen as a way for Danish businesses and products to establish a foothold in new markets in the developing countries. The Danish government recognised the trading advantages that previous colonial powers enjoyed with former colonies, and they viewed development loans as their way of competing in this promising global market.³²

Finally, Danish development aid policy in the 1960s was also seen as a general contribution towards strengthening the independence of developing countries and thereby releasing international tension between East and West in the Cold War. It was the Social Democratic Foreign Minister, Per Hækkerup, who underlined this reason for Danish development aid policy.³³

By 1965 Danish development aid had increased almost tenfold since the late 1950s and amounted to approximately 100 million Danish kroner (see figure 2).³⁴ Even though 60% was still given as multilateral development assistance through various international organisations, the remaining 40% was given as bilateral project aid and bilateral development loans, and the bilateral component was to grow much more rapidly in the coming years; so much so that the percentages were reversed by 1968. All the assistance was provided with the purpose of assisting with 'development' in poor countries or groups of poor countries (though the term 'development' was often undefined). However, all the items on the Danish aid budget had a number of other goals and purposes in other policy areas, be it to lay the ground for future Danish exports, strengthen a particular international organisation or make Denmark stand out positively in a specific setting. Thus, during 1960–1965 Denmark evolved a modern mul-

tipurpose development aid programme that suited its needs as a small, wealthy, Western ally in the Cold War and its desire to signal a non-aggressive policy towards the newly independent countries of the world. The overall volume of the multifaceted and multipurpose phenomenon that was Danish aid was less important. But this was about to change in the second half of the 1960s, at which point a new overall goal for Danish policy was introduced: to spend money.

The DAC, the UN, Denmark and the Early Spending Goals

The new and more active Danish development aid policy that was formulated in 1960–62 and implemented after 1962 coincided with the first internationally formulated aid spending targets. Yet, up till 1965, the spending targets did not play a significant role in the formulation of Danish policy. However, after 1965 Danish development assistance policy began to take the spending targets seriously.

The 1960s' international aid spending targets were developed simultaneously by the United Nations' General Assembly and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In both of these forums the US was instrumental in formulating the goals, and the DAC targets in particular were designed to support the US burden-sharing policy. In a 1960 UN resolution (GA res. 1522[XV]), the United Nations "expressed the hope" that the international flow of aid and capital would soon reach 1% of the "economically advanced countries' " national income. This was, however, neither a target for individual countries nor an aid target, since the resolution also referred to normal capital market transfers. In 1961, DAC (named DAG at the time) passed its resolution on *The Common Aid Effort*, which recommended that the members "should make it their common objective to secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to the less developed countries and to improve their effectiveness".³⁵ The US had hoped that the resolution would include the 1% target, but it was unable to convince the other members. A couple of years later, the UN General Assembly made its recommended target an individual target for wealthy nations and, in 1964, the first United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) passed a resolution confirming a recommended 1% capital transfer target for each of the wealthy countries individually. A year later in 1965, DAC confirmed the 1% target for overall aid and capital transfers.³⁶

So, in 1964–65, the world only had a non-binding recommendation that wealthy countries should strive to ensure a capital transfer vis-à-vis the

developing countries that amounted to at least 1% of “national income”. This did not even emerge as an aid target until the 1970s, at which point the Pearson report and the proclamation of a second UN development decade specified that, of the 1%, 0.7% (now of GDP) should preferably be aid.³⁷ However, Denmark had already formulated its own aid goals several years previously, while the US and most other major western powers had lost much of their interest in both aid targets and development aid itself.

Although the US pressured its allies to commit to increasing their capital transfers to developing countries around 1960, it did not direct this pressure at Denmark. The primary focus was, rather, on West Germany and, to a lesser extent, on Italy; two major western European economies without strong ties to former colonies, which meant that their economic relations with developing countries were limited. The US did not even officially invite Denmark to join the DAC; instead, Denmark had to enquire unofficially about the possibility of membership in 1961, but decided against membership when the US made it clear, that it expected a radical increase in Danish development aid in return for membership. Two years later, however, the Danish Foreign Ministry observed, that Norway had been accepted as a member, without being pressured to increase its aid budget. After making sure that membership would not entail a pressure to increase the Danish aid programme too rapidly, Denmark once again proclaimed its interest in joining DAC and was accepted as a member in 1963.³⁸ The development shows that Denmark did not plan a rapid increase of its aid programme in the beginning of the 1960s and that the US was ready to accept Danish membership, knowing that no radical increase was planned.

The Means Become the Purpose: 1965–67

In the beginning of 1965, Denmark had a small but expanding development aid programme that played a role in many foreign and domestic policy areas. Danish funding to the programme was increasing at a relatively steady rate, which reflected that this was an expanding policy area. This increase, however, was not as quick as some in the aid administration (or those political groups who supported aid) wished. Despite this, there was still a general feeling that Denmark was doing more or less what was expected of it. This changed radically during 1965–67, when domestic pressure for aid spending suddenly exploded and spending targets became an important goal of Danish development aid policy.

As shown above, the international targets formulated in the beginning

of the 1960s in the UN and in the DAC were non-binding recommendations. Before 1965, these targets were not taken any more seriously than other non-binding targets produced by international organisations. However, in 1965 the DAC began publicising annual comparative statistics on the economic transfers of the member countries. It was the first of these statistics that produced a radical shift in the way Denmark viewed its development aid policy.

In the first comparative DAC report from 1965 Denmark, along with Norway and (to a lesser degree) Sweden, were at or near the bottom of most of the statistics on aid, capital transfers, and investments (among other things). The report did not heavily criticise the Scandinavian countries directly, although critical passages could be identified. One such example is in the field of bilateral development assistance, in which the report stated, “Disbursements by Denmark and Norway were again disappointing as to their level”.³⁹ In his confidential and non-publicised review, the DAC chairman was a little more direct and claimed that the Danish effort was “distressingly low compared to Denmark’s high standards of living”. This was, however, not a major foreign policy problem for Denmark, as development aid was no longer the talk of the town between the Western economies (as it had been just a few years before). The DAC countries’ average disbursement had, in fact, been declining since the establishment of DAC, and US disbursements were stagnating and would soon begin to fall markedly (see figure 4). In such an international environment, Denmark did not have to fear a strong and persistent pressure from its DAC colleagues. Nonetheless, the report indirectly became very important for the Danish aid debate, as the Danish Board for International Development Cooperation used it to paint a very negative portrait of Danish aid spending.

The Board for International Development Cooperation (Styrelsen for International Udviklings Samarbejde) was established in 1962 to oversee the aid administration and advise on Danish development aid policy. Along with the leading civil servants in the Danish aid administration, many board members believed that Danish aid was not being increased as quickly as promised in 1960–62. The board published its first report in 1965 and, while it was not able to criticise policy directly, it nonetheless skilfully succeeded in doing so indirectly. The report openly stated that Denmark was among the very lowest ranking in international aid statistics and that, if Denmark wished to reach 1% of GDP in aid giving by 1970, it needed to increase its aid by 50% each year. The report failed to mention that there was no international 1% aid target, that the 1% target for

economic transfers was not measured in GDP (this was first decided some years later), that the 1% target had no fixed end date, and that it had never been declared official Danish policy to reach a 1% aid target. The board further pressurised the government by publicly citing the DAC chairman's critique that Danish disbursements were "distressingly low".⁴⁰

Both Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag and Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup rejected the notion that it was Danish policy that the 1% goal should be reached before any set year. Hækkerup further added that the Danish public's willingness to bear the extra cost was the real bottleneck for increasing funding, and Krag declared that quality and not quantity was the most important measurement for Danish aid.⁴¹ The statements by Krag and Hækkerup were very poorly received by aid-interested circles as well as by the political youth movement that was developing as one of the chief pressure groups for increased aid spending. When the Social Democratic government in 1965 tried to reduce the Danish contribution to UN development programmes as a way of accommodating expenditure in other areas of the aid programme, the decision created strong opposition. The Danish delegation to the UN strongly protested against the cutbacks and succeeded in convincing the government to retract the decision.⁴²


The debates on the 1% target continued however, and at the end of 1965 the pro-aid NGO DUF (Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd/Danish Youth Council), led a campaign where numerous youth organisations (political and non-political alike) sent letters of protest to the government, as a reaction to Prime Minister Krag's statement that the attainment of the 1% goal for Danish aid had no fixed deadline year. Only a few weeks later the government felt compelled to approve an extraordinary 15 million Danish kroner increase in annual aid funding, and to proclaim a debate in parliament on the future of Danish aid.⁴³

The pressure on the government came from an emerging Danish aid lobby, which began to manifest itself around 1965-66. Here could be found a number of youth organisations (amongst them DUF and most of the political parties' youth organisations), the Board for International Development Cooperation, various high-level officials in the new aid administration and the two political parties the Social Liberals (Det Radikale Venstre) and the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti). The Social Liberals had been proponents of aid since the beginning of the 1950s, whereas the Socialist People's Party were new both to the political scene and to the campaign for development aid. Having been established at the end of the 1950s as a democratic offspring of the Danish Commu-

nist Party, the Socialist People's Party had originally inherited communist scepticism towards development aid as a tool for the capitalist West to use to extend its influence in the developing countries. As the Socialist People's Party developed a more independent political platform in the 1960s and as the US dominance of the development agenda declined, the party warmed to the idea of development aid, which seemed to fit with its call for international solidarity and the wish for development in independent, non-aligned developing countries. Both the Social Liberals and the Socialist People's Party were relatively smaller than the Social Democrats, the Liberal party and the Conservative Party, but they played an important role in Danish politics in the 1960s, since they took turns to supply the Social Democratic party with a ruling majority in Parliament.

Having said this, the emerging aid lobby was not deeply rooted in the Danish public. While many Danes felt that Denmark should do its bit for the poor countries of the world, they did not possess a broader understanding of the economic and political complexities of development aid policy. Neither did the politicians. Of the few debates in parliament that touched upon the question, most were brief and often showed that even the proponents of aid lacked an understanding of the issues. As to public support, various opinion polls did reveal support for an active Danish development aid policy amongst the Danish public and, in many cases, they even revealed a majority for Denmark meeting the 1% target. It remains doubtful, however, how deeply rooted this support was, as the general public could not be expected to comprehensively understand how much 1% of national income actually equated to. As well as this, opinion poll numbers tended to fluctuate and, amidst the pressure from the aid lobby in 1965-67, an opinion poll from spring 1966 revealed that 43% of the population was against Denmark meeting the 1% target while only 33% supported it.⁴⁴

As for the political parties, only the Social Liberals and the Socialist Peoples Party were in favour of a fixed date for when the 1% target should be reached. The other political parties, however, showed great ingenuity in proclaiming support for the 1% target while at the same time avoiding any concrete promises. When the Social Democratic Minister for Finance was asked in 1966 whether or not Denmark had "a moral obligation to reach the 1% target", he skilfully answered that Denmark indeed had "a moral obligation to try to reach the 1% target". Per Federspiel from the Liberal Party stated that his party supported the UN recommendation that the rich countries should give 1% in development aid but added that

Figure 3: Danish Public Support for the 1% Target According to Opinion Polls⁴⁵

his party “did not view this as something that could be translated into concrete numbers”. In 1968 the Danish Conservative Party issued a statement that an amount of aid surpassing 1% of Danish national income might be needed, and that the most important factor when deciding the amount of Danish aid must be the needs of the developing countries and Denmark’s “ability to meet these needs in a responsible way.”⁴⁶

The debates in 1965–67 thus quickly produced a debating climate in which practically every politician had to at least pretend to be in favour of the 1% aid target. And this happened even though Denmark was not the target of any international pressure to increase its aid. At the same time the pressure on more than one occasion also produced an increase in aid funding, though the increase was sometimes more cosmetic than real. In the autumn of 1966 for instance, the Foreign Ministry’s proposal for increases in development aid funding was once again deemed too generous by the government, who asked the ministry to suggest a more modest increase. This would mean, however, that Denmark would not be able to keep up with Norway and Sweden’s increased contributions to the UNDP. The contributions from the two other Scandinavian countries to the UN programmes were an important benchmark for Danish contributions to UNDP, and falling too far behind in UNDP funding was deemed politically unacceptable by the Foreign Ministry. The Danish government thus created a new form of contribution and gave a portion of its contributions in the form of non-interest bearing drawing rights, which the UNDP could apply for when the funds were required. Therefore, Denmark was able to

pledge an increase in its UN aid contribution from 45 million kroner to 58 million kroner while actually paying two million kroner less than the year before. This sort of arrangement was, of course, only a way of saving money in the short term, and it did not help Denmark's placement in the DAC statistics, since these measured donated, and not promised, contributions.⁴⁷

The pressure on the government culminated in 1966, when the social democratic government's annual budget proposal to Parliament stated that, if the planned increases in spending were realised, Denmark would be able to reach 0.5% of GDP in development assistance spending by 1970. Once again, the consternation from the aid-friendly circles was strong and, once again, the government was under pressure to live up to the 1% target. When the government claimed that administrative difficulties made it impossible to reach 1% quickly, this was rejected by the former head of the aid administration, Mogens Boserup. The former Danish Minister for Finance and now Head of the OECD, Thorkild Kristensen, also threw his voice into the debate and said that Danes "ought to be ashamed of ourselves". In January 1967 the continuing critique forced the government to agree to present a plan to parliament on how the 1% target could be reached as soon as possible.⁴⁸

The Social Democratic government presented its plan on how Denmark should reach the 1% target in the spring of 1967, thus for the first time making the 1% target official government policy. The plan proposed that the target should be met in the fiscal year 1972/73. By paying careful attention to every detail in the plan, the social democratic government actually managed to reduce the hitherto planned increase in development aid spending. This was done by defining the goal as a percentage of net national income, rather than GDP, as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had done when it calculated that Denmark would only reach 0.5% in 1970. Furthermore, the government also included private investments in its figures and, finally, the plan was designed in such a way that the first three years only saw a modest increase in aid, which should then be increased sharply in the last three years of the six-year planning period. Thus the planned increase in the first three years was actually 27 million kroner less than what had previously been planned. It goes without saying that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not draw attention to these facts when the plan was presented to Parliament.⁴⁹

The plan met with broad political support, although some voiced disappointment that the target could not be reached sooner. In fact, the

political debate in 1967 saw statements from both ends of the political spectrum that the target eventually should be higher than 1%.⁵⁰ With the new plan, Danish development aid policy had found a simple way of measuring its own success and the political debates on aid now focused on how the target was to be reached, as opposed to what aid was hoped to achieve (other than a very general notion that Danish development aid in itself would help the poor and create a more peaceful and harmonious world).

After 1967: the 1% Target and Danish Volume Fetishism

The New Aid Front-Runners

After the formulation of the 1967 plan for Danish development aid, Danish aid increased markedly, particularly from 1968/69 onwards. In the early years, much of the increase was in the Danish development loans that were tied to procurement in Denmark, but the other parts of the aid programme also followed suit. When a new centre-right coalition government came to power in 1968, it inherited the years in the Social Democratic spending plan, with the steepest increases in aid funding. However, the Social Liberal Prime Minister for the new government, Hilmar Baunsgaard, proclaimed in his opening speech to parliament that the new government would fulfil the 1% plan and a Social Liberal minister was placed in charge of International Development Cooperation.⁵¹ During the almost four years (1968–71) the centre-right coalition government was in power, there were numerous clashes between the Social Liberal minister responsible for aid, and the conservative ministers for defence and finance, on whether or not it was acceptable that the government cut back on defence and other government spending without also curtailing the steep rise in aid spending. On more than one occasion the Social Liberal party succeeded in saving the aid budgets from substantial cutbacks.⁵²

Yet the 1% target proved elusive and, at the beginning of the 1970s, it was redefined in accordance with the new UN target of 0.7% of GDP in 'pure' aid which was an increase of some 20–25% on the previous target. The foreign minister of Denmark's new centre-right government (1968–71) stated that Denmark would strive to meet the more modest national goal first, but here the Social Democratic party showed that it was more aid-friendly when in opposition, and the former Social Democratic foreign minister Per Hækkerup stated that his party favoured that the new


aid target should be met as quickly as possible.⁵³ The economic crisis in the 1970s meant that the new 0.7% target was only reached in 1978. By this time, spending targets were so well integrated in Danish policy that the Social Democratic government immediately set a new, purely national, target for Danish aid and proclaimed that Denmark should now strive to reach 1% of GDP in 'pure' aid.⁵⁴

With the 1967 plan for how Denmark should reach the 1% target, Denmark embarked upon a new course in its development aid policy, where aid measured as a percentage of national income (and later GDP) became the most important measurement of the policy's relevance and success. The various parts of the Danish development aid programme continued to have important foreign policy functions for Denmark. Development loans were still used to try to gain access to new markets and, at the same time, they supplied goods to the developing countries. Contributions to the various UN programmes were still a part of overall Danish UN policy and, at the same time, strengthened the UN's role as an important actor in international development cooperation. Bilateral projects were launched to create development in some of the poorest countries in the world and, at the same time, played a role in showing the Danish public some concrete results of Danish aid. However, despite these various economic, political and altruistic goals, overall Danish aid spending in itself became the single most important measure of the policy's success. Denmark developed a volume fetishism, where the easily defined volume of aid became a substitute for the goals that aid and aid policy hoped to achieve.

The reasons for the development of volume fetishism were primarily domestic. As we discussed previously, modest pressure from the US and various international forums such as the DAC and the UN was not able to provoke a dramatic increase in Danish aid (other than in aid that was deemed to be in Denmark's own political interest). However, pressure from youth organisations, other NGOs and aid-friendly political parties in 1965–67 had a much more profound impact on Danish aid spending. The fact that aid from the developed world was already beginning to decline relatively by the mid 1960s (when measured as a percentage of GDP) further underlines the idea that the pressure on Denmark to increase its aid spending was internal rather than external.

As figure 4 shows, the years around 1970 were when Denmark – along with Norway and Sweden – surpassed both the US and the DAC average in aid giving and began to establish their position as frontrunners in aid giving; a position they have more or less retained to the present day. In fact, it

Figure 4: Aid Spending (% of GNI) of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States compared to the DAC Average



was also in the late 1960s when the Scandinavian countries began to try to apply their own pressure on other Western countries to increase their aid giving though, perhaps unsurprisingly, often with limited effect. In 1968 and 1969 Denmark was a vocal supporter in the DAC for increased aid efforts and for the DAC to adopt more ambitious targets for the members' aid disbursements.⁵⁵ Denmark became a strong supporter of the DAC's reviews and tried to prevent any proposals that would weaken the review institution in the DAC. Furthermore, Denmark often argued that the comparative aid statistics should focus on official development assistance and not on private flows and commercial capital transfers. The argument was not that these capital flows could not produce development, but rather that the government could not control them; thus, in Denmark's view, it was unfair to include them in comparative statistics. This argument further underlined the fact that Denmark saw aid giving as a system which required fair, clearly defined rules that were easy to understand, but not necessarily rules that sprang from the wish to further economic development.⁵⁶

Onwards and Upwards: the 1970s and Beyond

In 1971 the Danish Parliament passed new Danish aid legislation that brought the Danish aid programme up to speed with Denmark's new

role as potential aid frontrunner. The new legislation tried to oil the Danish spending machine by creating the concept of a rolling five-year plan for Danish aid expenditure, which should enable the administration to conduct long-term planning. The possibility for planning ahead was, of course, an important instrument when planning and organising Danish aid projects professionally, but it was also a way to overcome bottlenecks in the flow of funds, especially when it came to bilateral aid, which often required several years of planning and negotiations before the first funds could be used. Although it was approved by Parliament, the rolling five-year plan was non-binding. Nevertheless, the existence of the plan made it more difficult for Parliament to cut back on the planned increases in aid spending, as it was now necessary to point out which areas should receive less than previously planned. In this way, the rolling five-year plan created a situation where a mere reduction in the growth rate of funding looked like an absolute reduction in aid expenditure.

Another consequence of the new 1971 legislation was a compartmentalisation of the Danish aid programme that helped to secure domestic political backing for an increased aid effort. From 1971 to the end of the 1980s, the Danish aid programme strove to maintain a balance whereby 50% of aid should be given through multilateral organisations and 50% should be given as bilateral aid. The bilateral aid was further divided into two, where half should be granted as soft development loans tied to purchases in Denmark and the other half should be granted in the form of bilateral Danish project aid. The 50/50 split between bilateral and multilateral aid was a guideline that was never strictly upheld and, throughout the 70s and 80s, the bilateral component was always somewhat larger than the multilateral component. The principle of compartmentalisation did, however, ensure that most of the interests of aid-interested groups in Denmark were considered when the aid allocations increased. Danish industry was naturally in favour of the tied development loans, while aid professionals and the aid-interested parts of the Danish public tended to favour bilateral project aid, which was better suited to targeting the poorest people in developing countries, and which was also better at delivering an identifiable Danish aid effort. At the same time, those who favoured a strong Danish UN profile and a strong focus on international cooperation were pleased by the clout that the large UN contributions gave Denmark (along with the other Scandinavian countries) in the UN.⁵⁷

Danish aid continued to grow until the beginning of the 1990s, at which point it reached the new national goal of 1% of GDP. Among the

reasons for the increased growth throughout the economic crisis of the 80s was a strengthening of the aid-friendly forces in Parliament, if not necessarily numerically then at least tactically. In the first half of the 1970s, two new centre parties entered Parliament: The Christian People's Party and the Centrum-Democrats. Both were aid-friendly right leaning centre parties that supplemented the left leaning centre party, the Social Liberal Party, to the effect that it became very difficult to create a governing majority without one or more of the aid-friendly centre parties. Furthermore, the Social Democratic party was in opposition from 1982-1993 and, just as they had done between 1968-71, the Social Democrats proved to be more active in their call for increased aid when in opposition. In the mid 1980s, the Social Democrats - in an alliance with the Social Liberal Party - forced the centre-right government (led by Conservative Poul Schlüter) to adopt a new plan on how to reach the 1% target. The plan was instrumental in breaking the lull in the Danish aid percentage in the years after 1978 - during which time it hovered just above 0.7% - and in laying the groundwork for reaching the 1% target in 1992.

Conclusions

It would be wrong to conclude that target-oriented policies and volume fetishism meant that Danish development aid policy was not motivated by a desire to assist people in developing countries. As I have hopefully demonstrated in this article, Danish development aid policy was a multifaceted and multi-purposed entity that incorporated many areas into overall Danish foreign policy. However, what this article does argue is that, besides a vague notion of 'development' or even perhaps just 'help', Danish development aid policy had no overriding purpose before 1965-67. Before 1960-62, development aid policy was hardly even viewed as one specific policy area with its own specific rationale. Instead, it was a corner of Danish UN and export policy. The international focus on development and aid in the years around 1960 created the notion of 'aid' and 'development' as two simple interlinked concepts, whereby the first would more or less automatically produce the second. Therefore, in 1962, a Danish aid administration was created to administer this new form of foreign policy that wealthy states were expected to pursue. However, from 1962-65, no overall purpose existed for the policy apart from creating unspecified 'development' and living up to the international expectation that wealthy coun-

tries had such a policy. This changed drastically in 1965–67, when Danish policy finally found its own purpose, which was to live up to spending targets measured by national income.

This new purpose for Danish development aid policy was created by transforming what was actually a tool into a purpose in and of itself. Yet the paradox is, that this happened at the same time that practically all countries outside of Scandinavia began to pay less and less attention to aid and spending targets. The average aid disbursements of the DAC members fell from just over 0.5% of GNI in 1960 to just over 0.3% in 1970, and this aid level was upheld until the end of the Cold War, at which point aid began to drop even further. Also, by the mid 1960s the initial US pressure for burden-sharing abated as the US shifted its attention elsewhere.

In Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries, however, aid levels soared from the end of the 1960s onwards. When examining Denmark, as this article has done, it is difficult to identify a political rationale behind the exclusive focus on spending targets that practically no other countries took seriously at the time. It is also hard to find a comprehensive altruistic motivation behind the target policy. Denmark was more preoccupied with reaching its own targets than ensuring a rise in international aid. Danish spending targets and growth plans created a huge pressure on the Danish aid administration, not simply as a result of the numerous new programmes that had to be established, but also because the administration was not expanded at the same rate as the overall aid budgets. Several sectors of the Danish aid programme in the 1970s and 1980s experienced difficulties using all the funds that continued to be made available, which, of course, also influenced quality.⁵⁸ Finally, Denmark was not as forthcoming to the demands of developing countries when it came to other development cooperation areas that would cost more than aid. The debate in the 1970s about a New International Economic Order (NIEO) found Denmark amongst the countries which had a fundamentally positive attitude towards discussing the proposed reforms, but which was less enthusiastic to actually committing itself when discussion threatened to become (costly) policy proposals.⁵⁹ Indeed, had some of the reform wishes of the NIEO agenda materialised, the costs for Denmark would have been far more than the cost of aid.

Thus while various parts of Danish development aid policy continued to play a role in pursuing political, economic or altruistic goals, the developed volume fetishism and target-oriented policy did not seem to have any clear-cut rationale. Instead, the hunt for aid targets was a way to satisfy a

domestic demand for action. In 1965–67 development aid as a percentage of national income/GDP became a widely accepted index of the nation's moral health. This was present to such an extent that even the mainstream bourgeois parties considered it necessary to at least pay lip service to the 1% goal until the end of the 1990s, at which point later Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen rejected the unconditional 1% target in favour of the more modest UN 0.7% goal.

The reasons why Denmark embraced the aid targets and developed volume fetishism are complex. The parallel developments in the other Scandinavian countries suggest that aid giving became part of a perceived Scandinavian identity. Yet the 1% target was a more important yardstick for Danish policy than the aid level of the other Scandinavian countries, suggesting that Scandinavian competition in aid giving is only part of the explanation. Another factor might have been, that the lack of any colonial ties in the developing countries made the Danish public more ready to view development aid as a field devoid of Danish self-interest. This notion was further strengthened by the rhetoric in the aid debate in 1960–62 and by the general lack of public interest in aid, which favoured the development of simple, easily comprehensible explanations, such as 'aid is good; therefore, more aid is better'.⁶⁰ Finally, the connection between the domestic welfare state institutions and high aid levels, which has been documented by researchers, also created a situation whereby the insistence that international economic transfers would more or less automatically help alleviate world poverty was more readily believed, as it seemed only a mirror image of what was being established at home with the welfare state institutions that were developed in Denmark from the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s. As an area where the results of the policy were much harder to identify than when it came to domestic welfare state spending, targets such as the 1% target, became a simple way to measure success that was easy to understand for both politicians and the public. The aid debates in 1965–67 established Danish aid measured as a percentage of national income as a way to measure Denmark's moral health and commitment to what has been termed 'Humane Internationalism'. And once this link was established it proved a very efficient engine for raising Danish aid contributions up until the 1990s.

Notes

- 1 Peter Yding Brunbech, PhD, is head of Nationalt Videncenter for Historie- og Kultur- arvsformidling at *University College Lillebælt*. This article reformulates and expands on the research carried out for my PhD dissertation (Brunbech, 2007).
- 2 The last decade has seen a surge in historical research in both the Danish and European History of aid; for example (primarily in the field of Danish aid history): Friis Bach et al., 2008; Borring Olesen & Pedersen, 2010; Borring Olesen & Brunbech, 2013; Brunbech, 2007; Brunbech, 2011; Pharo & Fraser (eds.), 2008; Borring Olesen et al. (eds.), 2013.
- 3 Cranford, 1990 and Stokke, 1989.
- 4 Lumsdaine, 1993 and Alain & Thérien, 1995.
- 5 Data extracted on 3 Jan 2014 11:02 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat. GNI, GDP and National Income will be used throughout the article. Today aid statistics most often use GNI, while historically GDP was preferred. However, some early aid targets used the less precise concept of National Income.
- 6 White, John 1974: 215.
- 7 The American Presidency Project: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13282> (retrieved 20 January 2014).
- 8 Brunbech, 2007: 121–27.
- 9 Brunbech, 2007. For Swedish aid, see also Nilsson, 2004, for Norwegian aid see also Pharo, 1986. For more on Mellempøkkeligt Samvirke se Juul, 2002.
- 10 Midtgaard, 2005.
- 11 Brunbech, 2006.
- 12 Nilsson, 2004.
- 13 Pharo, 1986.
- 14 Pharo, 1986, Vol. 1: 36.
- 15 Folketingets Forhandling 1951/52: 3993–3995.
- 16 Brunbech, 2007: 150–59.
- 17 Brunbech, 2005.
- 18 For more on Danish aid policy in the 1950s, see also Brunbech, 2008.
- 19 Numbers based on the annual reports from the Board of International Development Cooperation. For further information see Brunbech, 2007: 239.
- 20 For example in “Denmark and the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance”, Danish National Committee on Technical Assistance, Copenhagen, 1956: 6.
- 21 Rostow, 1985.

- 22 Packenham, 1973, Brunbech, 2007: 77–82.
- 23 Juul, 2002 and Kelm-Hansen, 2000.
- 24 Kelm-Hansen, 2000: 44–45.
- 25 Danish daily newspaper *Information*, 25th June 1960.
- 26 Brunbech, 2007: 260–65; Juul, 2002: 472ff; Letter from Jens Christensen to the Danish UN ambassador, 9 February 1962 in Archives of the Foreign Ministry 104.P.2.a.
- 27 Minutes and background papers from meetings in “Styrelsen for teknisk samarbejde med udviklingslandene” (the Danish Development Aid Board) 6th November and 4th December 1964.
- 28 Archives of the Foreign Ministry 104.O.8; See also Brunbech, 2007: 355–356.
- 29 Danida 1974: 4; Brunbech, 2007: 372–79.
- 30 Folketingets Forhandlinger, 1961/62: 366–367.
- 31 Brunbech, 2007: 337–361.
- 32 Brunbech, 2007: 351–362.
- 33 Hækkerup, 1965: 151–69; Brunbech, 2007: 293–98.
- 34 Figures for the fiscal year 1965/66 based on reports from the Danish aid administration. See also Brunbech, 2007: 239.
- 35 Führer, 1994: 8–10.
- 36 Rubin, 1966: 66.
- 37 As to the changing aid goals, see also Clemens & Moss, 2007.
- 38 Brunbech, 2007: 324–26 and Danish National Archives, the archive of the Foreign Ministry 1945–1972 groups 95.g.8 and 95.c.3.
- 39 OECD, 1965: 33.
- 40 Udenrigsministeriet, 1965.
- 41 Article by Krag in the Danish daily *Aktuelt* 10 November 1965; On Per Hækkerup’s statements see minutes of meeting in the Danish Council for International Development Cooperation in Archives of the Foreign Ministry 104Dan3-1 vol. 3.
- 42 Letters on the subject from October 1965 in Archives of the Foreign Ministry 104.F.1.a.3 vol. 4. See also Brunbech, 2007: 274–79.
- 43 Jørgensen, 1977: 170; Kelm-Hansen, 2000: 84–86; Folketingets Forhandlinger, 1965/66: 2021.
- 44 Jørgensen, 1977: 242.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 citater fra afh si. 286f..
- 47 Brunbech, 2007: 280–93.

- 48 Folketingets Forhandlinger 1966/67 2. samling: 828-41. Quotations from Jørgensen, 1977: 238-40.
- 49 Brunbech, 2007: 280-93.
- 50 Examples in Kelm-Hansen, 2000: 99-100.
- 51 Brunbech, 2007: 287.
- 52 Brunbech, 2007: 381-83.
- 53 Minutes of meeting in "Udenrigspolitisk Nævn" (parliament's foreign policy committee) 13 September 1968. Archives of the Foreign Ministry group 3.E.92.
- 54 Brunbech & Borring Olesen, 2013: 95-96.
- 55 Brunbech, 2007: 322-37.
- 56 Minutes of the DAC's High-level Meeting in November 1969 in Archives of the Foreign Ministry group 104.S.6.
- 57 For more on this, see Brunbech, 2011 and Brunbech & Borring Olesen 2013.
- 58 For examples on this in the case of aid to Bangladesh, see Brunbech, 2011.
- 59 Holm, 1992.
- 60 This byproduct of the 1960-62 fundraising campaign has also been suggested by Jørgensen, 1978.

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Chapter 2

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The Danish Model and Health Care

Speech by the Minister for Trade and Investment, Pia Olsen Dyhr, Mailman School of Public Health. Columbia University, New York, 4 February 2013

Dear Guests, Faculty Members, Students,

First of all, let me thank Columbia University for the invitation to speak here today. It is a privilege to be invited to one of the world's most distinguished universities.

And I look forward to talk to you about a fundamental and very pertinent issue for Americans and Danes alike.

By the way, I should start out by mentioning that I had the pleasure of serving as Minister for Health for a three month period last year while my good colleague was on maternity leave. All that for saying that today's topic is not completely new to me.

As a keen observer of your debate on Medicare for the past couple of years, I am aware of the sensitivity of this issue here in the US. I know that Medicare and free universal health coverage remains hotly debated.

I also know that you won't be surprised when I say that I have complete sympathy with the position taken by President Obama.

Where I come from, it would be hard to find someone who does not sympathise with President Obama's position. Actually, in many ways I guess the Danish health care system is the nightmare of any anti-government free market believer: a tax-funded, state-run universal health care system.

The Government-sponsored health care system with universal coverage is an engrained part of Scandinavian welfare societies. Very few people in my country would question the desirability of such a system.

Before I explain the reasoning behind this, I would like to provide you with a few basic facts about Denmark. Firstly, as some of you may know, Denmark has the highest level of taxation anywhere in the world with 48.1 percent of GDP .

For many Americans this might sound quite extreme. Denmark might seem like a horrible place to make a living, but most Danes don't see it that way. A large majority of them recognise that they get essential services in return for the high taxes that they pay. This is confirmed by successive opinion polls year after year.

Of course Denmark's universal health care means a higher overall tax bill and that healthy people are paying for the treatment of sick people through their taxes. But because the system is simpler and less profit-oriented, it ends up being cheaper for everybody.

When asked if they prefer a health care system based more on private insurance schemes or differentiated health coverage depending on what the individual citizen can pay, a large majority of Danes say "no thanks".

They want the state to ensure universal health coverage for all Danes regardless of the size of their wallets and they accept to pay the taxes which go along with having such a system.

In Denmark, hospitals are generally owned and run by the government and regional authorities. Medical care right from family doctors to hospitalisation is free.

Danes are free to pick their own family doctors, as long as they choose one within their own geographical area, and they have a choice of hospitals and in certain cases can opt for treatment abroad.

The government covers around 85 percent of the total medical costs and, during a single year, nine out of ten Danes are in contact one way or the other with the health care system.

As you probably are well aware, the Danish health service is facing the same challenges as health services are facing in many other western countries:

The population is ageing and the number of patients suffering from chronic diseases is rising. Also, we have an increasing challenge with health inequalities. Together, this puts pressure on the resources that we allocate to health care.

During the past ten years, the healthcare sector – in both Europe and the

US – has grown significantly. So have the costs. At a time of growing economic and demographic pressure we need to address this challenge in order to maintain sustainable health systems and high quality care for patients.

Unfortunately this trend entails that the ratio between the number of elderly people receiving state subsidies and the number of people who are active on the labour market is changing in a costly way.

It impacts public finances in a negative way, when you have many more elderly people needing health care services not to mention state pensions, while at the same time having to pay for that through a shrinking tax base. That is a difficult mix, indeed.

In 2010, Denmark spent 11.1 percent of its GDP on health care. It is a bit more than most European countries, but significantly less than the US.

In comparison, the US currently spends 17.6 percent of its GDP on health care. In other terms, Denmark spends about 4.465 dollars yearly per citizen on health care – in the US it is around 8.233 dollars.

So, to sum up, we are in the same boat and have the same task ahead of us: we must supply health services in a smarter way in order to meet the challenges of the future.

We will have to improve our health care system within existing or even with less economic means, while at the same time meeting growing demands and expectations.

This is not simple, and we are still on the lookout for the silver bullet – if you have the solution here today – please let me know. Meanwhile let's look at some of the steps we have already made in order to meet the future challenges.

For my government, it is obvious that the continuing ability of the Danish state to offer universal health care to all its citizens requires that the system is run efficiently and that medical costs are fairly passable. What we aim for is to provide improved health care at a lower cost.

So far we have managed to achieve meaningful progress and tangible results in the last couple of years. For example, we have increased the productivity at the Danish hospitals. From 2010 to 2011 the productivity has gone up by 5.3 percent and costs have been reduced by 1.7 percent.

The productivity increase is closely related to several positive measures. Last year 29 percent of all surgery was performed ambulatory without hospitalisation.

In 2008, it was 25 percent. And the people who do get hospitalised, stay for a shorter time period. In fact, we have gone from 4.5 days in 2008 to 3.8 days in 2011.

Speaking of numbers and statistics, we mustn't forget that we are dealing with real people. Sending patients home earlier and being more productive is not just about saving money.

It is indeed also about increasing life quality of the patients. Life quality is spending time with your loved ones and living your life close to normal – performing everyday tasks – instead of lying in the hospital.

But as in the US, the Danish health care system is struggling with readmissions. In 2011, the readmission rate was 9.4 percent. That is down from 10.6 percent in 2008, but still too high. Again, a bit of progress has been accomplished, but more definitely needs to be done here.

Thankfully, however, life is not all about economics and health care is not all about costs. Another key challenge for us is what we call equality in health care. Even though we have a universal health care system free of charge, we have not attained equality in health care. The problem is that our system to some extent is set up around the idea of the ideal patient.

A patient who knows his rights and how to enforce them. A patient, who has a basic understanding of symptoms and a solid grasp of how our health care system works and how to get access to the system.

We take it for granted that as long as health care is freely available to everyone, everybody will make use of it and by logical necessity, the system will cover the needs of each and every individual. This is not what actually happens in real life.

Unfortunately, equal access is not a given thing. More visits to emergency departments, more hospitalisation, bigger risks of readmissions and lower participation in cancer screenings is the reality for many Danish citizens with limited social and economic resources. Danes with better education and more resources live up to ten years longer than their less fortunate fellow citizens.

This is an essential challenge to address for the Danish Government. How can we help or equip these people in order for them to become capable of navigating the health care system successfully?

I am talking about people with little or no formal education. People with precious little feel for how the health system works, for the way doctors and nurses operate and what medical expressions mean. People who often lack a network to support them or guide them through to the right entry point in the system.

As you will agree, good medical treatment depends on a decent cooperation between the health providers, for example the medical staff and the patient.

In Denmark, we have to ask ourselves if our health system is able to acknowledge when a patient does not possess the strength or the mental resources to participate in such a cooperation.

Some need extra help to make sure that they are treated in time, and not just when their condition is very serious. We need to identify the cracks in our system, which these people too often fall through.

The cracks might exist between general practitioners and the medical specialists, between the specialists and the hospitals or between the hospitals and other institutions outside the health system. We are exploring, where and how these cracks emerge, and I am confident that we will find at least some of the answers in the near future.

Another major initiative is our process of redesigning the hospital system. Actually, we are in the midst of a complete overhaul of Danish hospitals. In the next 15 years, Denmark will invest 7 billion US Dollars in 16 new main hospitals, going from more than 40 hospitals scattered around the country.

This is the largest capital investment in Denmark since church construction in medieval times.

By centralising departments, we obtain more synergy, more quality and more scale. In addition, we will be able to optimise our resources not just in relation to medical care, but also with regard to administration and logistics.

This provides several benefits to the patients. By concentrating our efforts, we increase specialisation to provide the best possible service from the most skilled medical staff.

This will allow us to reduce waiting times for high demand surgeries and treatments. In certain geographical areas in Denmark, we know that the time to treatment can mean the difference between life and death.

We will also minimise the need for transferring patients between different hospitals, making the process through the health system smoother and more coherent. Furthermore, the new and larger hospitals will utilise the latest advances in technology and care.

New buildings will be designed according to strict environmental and sustainability standards. The new buildings will also be designed to facilitate the newest approaches in relation to management of patient flows.

Another recent initiative that has already shown positive results is the newly established so-called “diagnostic centres”. Present at the centre are various specialists to carry out the medical checks of patients with symptoms of serious illness.

This ensures a faster diagnosis and comfort during the process, and leads to better and faster treatment. The government has set a clear goal that patients with symptoms of serious illness are diagnosed within 30 days. I think that the collection of diagnostic skills can help us reach the goal.

While the patient is our main focal point here, I would also like to highlight the health care industry in Denmark and Danish companies within the health care industry. They offer solutions to many of our most challenging health problems.

In fact, I see it as a win-win situation for all, and the Danish Government is determined to promote a business-friendly environment for this industry in the years to come.

One way of doing this is through Public-Private Partnership, and hereby inviting private actors to contribute to innovations in the public sector. This approach is one of the reasons that Denmark has already come a long way in empowering patients through self-monitoring and self-treatment by the use of telemedicine and other technologies. The potential is enormous.

For this reason – in August last year – the Danish Government, municipalities and regions published a national action plan dissemination of telemedicine.

One of my favourite examples of a Public-Private Partnership is between a small private company Medisat and a larger university hospital.

Together they developed the so called “COLD-suitcase” [COLD: chronic obstructive lung disease] – a suitcase containing tele-medical equipment – video, sound and measuring device – connecting a patient at home with doctors at the hospital.

The COLD-suitcase is installed at the patient’s home no more than a day after hospital discharge. Patient and doctor see each other and talk to each other in real time through display and built-in microphone.

Study shows that the new treatment concept is at least as good and much cheaper. There is a significantly lower readmission rate. Normally 20–25 percent of the patients are readmitted within four weeks of discharge.

Among patients who received a COLD-suitcase at home it was less than 10 percent. The number of readmission days was reduced by more than two-thirds (66 percent). And the patient satisfaction among participants is more than 90 percent.

The ambition of the Danish government is also to strengthen the Danish life science cluster. Therefore, we have formed a special “growth team”

consisting of our most prominent experts within this area, to come up with recommendations and policy options on what the Danish Government can do to enhance the economic growth potential of the Danish health industry. I am very optimistic that we can move forward quickly here.

One of the core competences of the Danish Life Science cluster is optimisation and efficiency. Whether we look at the pharmaceutical industry – for example Novo Nordisk or Lundbeck – the medical equipment and technology industry comprising companies such as Coloplast and Radiometer, or companies focusing on health IT, the main driver for them is to improve their products without incurring huge costs.

Many recent innovations by Danish companies have been fostered by this ambition to deliver higher quality at a lower cost. This approach is also one of the reasons for the success of Danish life science companies on the American market today. The cooperation taking place across the Atlantic between our two countries represents a fantastic opportunity for Danish companies as they seek the new input and inspiration. Like their competitors, they want to be on the cutting edge technologically and researchwise.

For its part, Denmark provides opportunities for those foreign companies, research institutions and investors, who would like to try their hand on the Danish market.

What we offer is one of the largest bio-pharma clusters in Europe, including state of the art facilities, and access to a highly skilled workforce. Denmark has the third largest pipeline of drugs in development in Europe in absolute numbers.

Big US pharma companies such as Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer and Abbott, use Denmark for clinical research because they recognise the benefits to be gained there.

Last year we launched the Danish National Biobank, which provides access to more than 15 million biological samples, and the biobank links all these samples in a huge cradle-to-grave register.

Nevertheless, despite these innovative measures and our ongoing reforms, the Danish health care system and private companies need to come up with more solutions on how to give better and more effective care.

An important part of this is to make sure that the strongest expertise and competencies in Danish corporations and research institutions reach international markets, including of course the biggest of them all – the American market.

I began my speech today with a few words on the relationship between a free universal health care system and high levels of taxation. I said that a large majority of Danes, according to the opinion polls, accept high taxes in return for free health care and free education.

The fact that high taxes and state-sponsored health care do not equal unhappy citizens was just recently confirmed by the British magazine *The Economist*.

Two months ago, *The Economist* published a survey called the “Where to be born” index. It ranked 80 countries around the world according to number of key economic, social and political parameters.

The Economist had conducted the same survey in 1988, when Denmark was placed 24th. In 2012, we came in fifth behind Switzerland, Australia, Norway and Sweden.

I mention this not as a vindication of state-sponsored universal health care free of charge, but as a way of telling you that a tax rebellion because of free health care is not on the cards in Denmark.

I hope my speech has provided a few insights into the Danish approach in dealing with health challenges. I have tried to give a snapshot of where we are and where we would like to be.

It is my belief that through increased international cooperation and by making use of the vast knowledge and experience of private companies, we will be able to confront the health challenges ahead.

The hilarious American comedian Groucho Marx once said that politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.

As a politician and as a government minister, I acknowledge that Marx has a point sometimes, but for me the issue of health is too important for politicians to get wrong. We must get it right!

In Denmark as in the United States and elsewhere, politicians dealing with health care must deliberate carefully, consult with experts and act to the benefit of the largest number of people. To accomplish this, an informative debate is needed.

I would be intrigued to hear how you think the US and Denmark can work together in providing better health care for an ever-wider circle of people at a lower cost. I look forward to your questions and comments.

Thank you.

Global Inequality

The Minister for Development Christian Friis Bach's Speech at "Leadership Meeting on Addressing Inequalities" during the Inequality Conference in Copenhagen, 19 February 2013

Your Royal Highness, Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Inequality, like poverty, has many faces. A woman being raped, a child dying from starvation, and a worker trapped in a burning factory are all stark images of people experiencing violations of their human rights. Human rights such as the right to physical security, to be free from hunger and to decent work, are universal. Inequality is an unacceptable denial of these rights.

I am therefore truly pleased to see so many colleagues and friends here today to discuss inequalities and the challenge they constitute to the global development agenda beyond 2015. I am also honoured that her Royal Highness Crown Princess Mary, herself a member of the High-Level Task Force for ICPD, is here to observe this important event. Thank you for your strong and inspiring statement yesterday.

The need to address inequalities is not new. On the contrary, people experiencing inequalities have looked for ways to express their discontent – from the French Revolution to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and more recently during the Arab Spring. Often, human rights failures are the structural causes of inequality that leads to such discontent.

Fighting inequalities matters not only to the bottom billion, but to all of us. Because equitable societies with accountable and transparent po-

litical systems promote the formation of human and social capital, social cohesion and stability; it spurs investments, innovation and economic growth. It brings with it a more stable global economy, and a more secure world.

Having spoken enough already yesterday, I will briefly address three key issues.

First, that we need to go to zero and – by doing so – build on the fundamental human rights and the core principle of universality. Some have argued that the current Millennium Development Goals contradict the core human rights by only halving the share of people without access to food. Even if we were to reach all the MDGs by 2015, close to one billion people would still suffer from poverty and hunger. That is simply not good enough.

By going to zero we can create the necessary link to the core human rights.

- The right to food being operationalised by universal access to food security.
- The right to education turning into universal access to quality education.
- The right to water turned into a goal for universal access to clean water.
- The right to basic health services turning into a goal for universal access to health services including reproductive health.
- And the human rights principles of anti-discrimination must be turned into a strong goal for equality – with a special emphasis on gender equality and sexual and reproductive rights. And this principle must be there as a separate goal and a strong cross-cutting principle.

Secondly, we must also adopt a human rights-based approach to development and the core principles that underpin the international human rights framework; namely participation, accountability and transparency. Wherever I go, whoever I meet – from the Nobel Peace Prize winners Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, to Tawakkol Karman in Yemen, the human rights activist who I both met last year – I am reminded that a new development framework, most importantly, should contribute to building an enabling environment at the country level, where people themselves are empowered. When citizens and civil society organisations stand up for their rights and demand change, real development occurs.

Finally, a new development framework should address the situation of fragile states and recognise that peace, security and development are interconnected. The complex situation in fragile states represents perhaps the greatest challenge in getting to zero. No low-income, fragile state has reached a single MDG.

There will be no development without peace, no peace without development.

Without doubt, a new development framework therefore has to take a comprehensive and integrated approach to fragile states. In practice, this could be done by building on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states including the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals – with their comprehensive approach to security, justice, social improvements, legitimate politics and economic progress.

These could be strong messages from this dialogue. There are other core issues to tackle – jobs, energy, biodiversity – in what I hope will become one set of sustainable development goals. There is a long way to go. But I feel and sense optimism and engagement. We can agree on a new set of goals. And more importantly – they can unite the world in a strong effort to eradicate extreme poverty, promote sustainable development and ensure all people the right to a better life.

Thank you.

The Minister for Development Christian Friis Bach's speech at the 22nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva from 25 February to 22 March 2013, 27 February 2013

Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Human Rights Council,
Madame High Commissioner,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to lend my voice of support for the statement by Ireland on behalf of the European Union. As an EU Member State, Denmark fully endorses the points raised in that statement.

Turning to my national statement on behalf of Denmark, I would like to convey one key message: human rights norms are goals in their own right and they are powerful tools for progress. It would be a big mistake not to use them as the basis for our dialogue and for the development of the societies we live in. Countries may choose different ways to protect and promote human rights. There should, however, not be any doubt about their universality – human rights cannot and should not be interpreted in different ways in different cultures. All humans are equal and have equal rights.

The decade-long discussion about which human rights – economic or political – are most important, is fortunately behind us now and we share

a new understanding of the interrelation between these rights. Freedom of expression is a valuable tool, if you can read and write, but it is difficult to learn, if you go to school hungry or you do not go to school at all. This captures in a nutshell the close relationship between political and economic rights. You cannot separate them.

Mr. President,

I recognise that human rights norms hold the promise of changing the role of citizens from passive recipients of services to active participants that hold a set of rights. This is why I have decided to embark on a human rights-based approach for all Danish development assistance. I believe this will be a major contribution from our side to the translation of human rights norms into what they are supposed to be: a better, safer, freer, healthier and more productive everyday life for ordinary people.

The Human Rights Council has an essential role to play here. It is particularly important for Denmark that the council delivers real progress on the ground including timely responses and adequate responses to human rights situations. In addition, it must be the frame for real progress in the normative area. I would like to underline the need for a continued fight for the rights of women. It is shocking that it is still necessary to argue women's right to decide over their own bodies. Furthermore, it is crucial to continuously fight for the rights of LGBT people.

Finally, the fight against torture is a strong and longstanding Danish priority. At this session of the Human Rights Council we would like to place the spotlight on the victims of torture by sponsoring a resolution on rehabilitation of torture victims. And we hope for strong support from all Member States in this regard.

Important strides have been taken in the right direction. One remarkable achievement is particularly worth noticing: the UPR mechanism seems to have the potential for creating real changes on the ground. It is a unique construction – that all countries participate and are examined on the same terms. It is also extremely useful that governments can manage the process themselves. It seems to be a formula that works. It can therefore not be emphasised enough how important the loyal and earnest participation of all countries is. A country that decides to stand outside this mechanism not only puts itself into disrepute, it also carries a responsibility for potentially derailing a process which holds the promise of serving as a power of real improvement of human rights globally.

Mr. President,

The Human Rights Council has shown its will in establishing the Commission of Enquiry on Syria. Unfortunately, the work of the Commission is still highly relevant and Denmark supports the extension of its mandate. The situation in Syria is appalling and it is a disgrace that such horrific atrocities can take place in the 21st century. As the recent report of the Commission of Enquiry shows, war crimes have been committed by both sides in this conflict, while the Syrian regime is also guilty of crimes against humanity. We believe that the UN Security Council should step up to its responsibility and refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.

Beside Syria, I would like to mention a number of other countries. The Government of Bahrain has continued a course of imprisonments of those who demand democracy despite consistent international pressure to refrain from this course of action. In January 13 prisoners of conscience – among these the Danish-Bahraini citizen Mr Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja – had their sentences, including life sentences, upheld in court. Denmark will continue to follow the deteriorating human rights situation in Bahrain very closely – and we call on the international community to continue to apply pressure on the Bahraini Government. Bahrain must respect fundamental human rights, including the freedom of speech and assembly.

The situation in Mali is another point of utmost concern. We must not lose sight of Mali's inherent fragility and the need to protect the civilian population. We must continue to stress the importance of compliance with international humanitarian law and for all parties to respect human rights, including Malian authorities. The capacity to monitor the global implementation of the Human Rights norms is the responsibility of all of us.

At the opposite end, I warmly welcome the positive developments in Myanmar over the last two years. I have taken note of the Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Mr. Tomas Quintana, that reforms in Myanmar are continuing rapidly. At the same time, Denmark agrees with the SR that significant human rights shortcomings remain unaddressed, and we are deeply concerned over the human rights situation in Kachin and Rakhine states. Finally, we strongly encourage the Government of Myanmar to swiftly pave the way for the establishment of an OHCHR Office in the country to provide the required assistance and expertise on how to address some of the remaining human rights challenges.

Impunity for large-scale violations of human rights may risk setting a damaging precedent in terms of how states deal with internal dissent and conflict. Accountability is both important for victims and their communities, and for upholding respect for international humanitarian and human rights law. In this context we hope to see a process leading to accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

The strengthening of the OHCHR is an essential element, and I am pleased to announce that Denmark has doubled its financial support to the OHCHR. However, we continue to be concerned about the ongoing budget cuts and urge this session to show restraint in mandating the OHCHR with new and costly tasks.

Let me conclude by reiterating my profound conviction that human rights norms should be at the heart of our actions to promote progress and development.

Opening Speech by Minister for European Affairs Nicolai Wammen at the Conference “20 Years that Changed Europe”, Copenhagen, 14 May 2013

Fellow Ministers [Lajcak, Grubjesic and Poposki, and Commissioner Füle], Distinguished Experts, Ladies and Gentlemen.

In the spring of 1989 I visited the divided city of Berlin as a high school student. It made a huge impression on me to experience the checkpoints. And to see how families and friends were kept away from each other by force. Even my own group of students was held back for several hours by the border police.

Less than a year later – together with the rest of the world – I watched in awe as the Berlin Wall came down and the people of Central and Eastern Europe embraced their newly-won freedom. Looking back, it was indeed another era compared with today’s Europe where citizens travel, work and trade freely across our continent.

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to the Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters, and welcome to our conference on EU enlargement and the Copenhagen criteria. I am pleased to see the strong turnout for our discussion today. It bears witness to the fact that the enlargement process remains immensely important to Europe 20 years after the Copenhagen criteria were adopted just a few kilometres from here. I also want to thank the Danish Institute for International Studies – in short DIIS – for organising today’s event. It is an impressive line-up of speakers, and I am certain

that we will be able to identify some key outstanding challenges as well as provide some fresh perspectives on the road ahead for enlargement.

First of all, a quick word on the Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters, which has kindly provided the premises for our conference today. In line with the aspirations of the Enlightenment, prevailing in much of Europe at the time, the Academy was established in 1742 by permission of Denmark's King Christian the Sixth. It moved into this beautiful building in 1899, and some of Denmark's most famous scientists and writers have been among its members. Perhaps the most famous of them all, the nuclear scientist and Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr, was actually the Academy's President for 23 years.

But let me now turn to another Nobel Prize winner, the European Union, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year. The Nobel Committee said in a statement that it regarded the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights as the EU's most important achievement. Within the first thirty years of its existence European cooperation managed to bring about peace and reconciliation between old adversaries in Europe and helped consolidate democracy and human rights in Southern Europe. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European cooperation has made great strides towards meeting the same goals in Central and Eastern Europe. The key driver in this context has been the EU's enlargement process.

Today's political map of Europe looks radically different from the one that existed in 1952, when the ancestor of the European Union – the European Coal and Steel Community – was established. It is immensely encouraging that countries, which have suffered under totalitarian repression for decades, have decided to stake their future on a close and demanding European cooperation based on democracy and human rights. The EU has turned age-old military enemies in Europe into political and economic partners, thereby making another war in Europe almost unthinkable.

However, the Balkan wars in the 90's were a brutal and horrendous reminder that peace in Europe must never be taken for granted. Today the situation in the region has changed entirely. All of the countries in the Balkans have a European perspective and all are engaged in comprehensive reform efforts. Old conflicts are being overcome. The most recent success is the historic agreement on normalisation between Serbia and Kosovo. More than anything else it is the perspective of one day joining the EU that continues to drive reforms and contributes to reconciliation in the region.

Let me also add that many non-European countries regard the Euro-

pean Union as a beacon of democracy and human rights. During the Arab Spring, Egyptian and Libyan activists have looked towards Europe and European values for inspiration on how to reform their own societies.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at a time, when the European project is experiencing turbulent times – when the debt crisis, high unemployment and poor economic growth are causing some to ask, if the EU has a future at all – I would like to state the following: if the European Union did not exist already, European countries would invent it as quickly as possible. They would do so, because the current crisis has made it abundantly clear that there is a need for European solutions to underpin the crisis management undertaken at the national level. They would do so, because they would realise that no single European state has the size, the economy or the defence budget to make a real difference on the big global issues like, trade liberalisation, conflict prevention and climate change. It is only by acting together that European states are able to effect global change.

As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Copenhagen criteria, we should not only acknowledge how the criteria have fulfilled the hopes and aspirations vested in them at the time of their adoption. It is equally important that we look ahead and assess how to ensure that the Copenhagen criteria continue to provide an appropriate basis for the EU's enlargement policy.

Today the Copenhagen criteria are enriched by measures deriving from lessons learned from the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The criteria remain the same, but there is a strengthened focus on their implementation. Candidate countries are evaluated not on stated intentions, but on tangible facts on the ground with regard to how they actually implement fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of law, good governance, economic reforms and the fight against corruption and organised crime.

From time to time we hear voices talk of enlargement fatigue, pointing either to the risk of weakening the EU or the inadequate preparation of candidate countries. We also hear some people refer to the current economic crisis in Europe in order to make the point that enlargement must await better times. However, it is important to recognise that enlargement has obvious benefits not only for the inhabitants of the new Member States, but also for the old Member States. It affects us all, when our neighbours are burdened by corruption, organised crime, drugs, illegal immigration or human trafficking. And we all benefit from true and sustainable reforms to promote rule of law and functioning market economies. We stand to gain, when our neighbours prosper.

So my message to all the sceptics, who see the enlargement process as causing or aggravating Europe's current economic difficulties – this is not the case! On the contrary! Enlargement is very much a part of the solution to Europe's economic crisis, because democracy, rule of law and economic reforms in candidate countries will only help to increase stability, thereby promoting trade and business opportunities across Europe. That is for existing EU Member States and candidate countries alike. Enlargement – when it is the result of hard work to meet the Copenhagen Criteria – is a win-win situation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the viability and continued impact of the Copenhagen Criteria serve as a reminder to all of us. The EU is a community built on common values with democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities and a well-functioning market economy at its core. These basic values are the glue that holds us together in times of prosperity as well as in times of adversity. And it is the consolidation of these values on the whole of the European continent that remains the ultimate goal of enlargement.

So there is every reason to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Copenhagen Criteria. They have stood the test of time, and they have served their purpose well. I am confident that they will continue to do so in the years to come. I wish you all a successful conference.

Thank you.

Defence Minister Nick Hækkerup's Speech at Danish Institute for International Studies and Center for War Studies' Conference, "Cooperative Security and NATO's New Partnership Policy", 10 June 2013

Good morning everyone, and thank you – Trine and Sten – for the kind words of introduction. I would like to praise DIIS and CWS for their initiative to organise this important – and quite timely – conference. The list of speakers is quite impressive. So thank you for that.

I have very much been looking forward to this event. In a globalised world partnerships are more important than ever. NATO's partnerships are a great success – and quite often an overlooked success. Partnerships do not often make headlines in the media, but partners make a real difference in operations and for many, many people. However, we should be fully aware that partnerships have much more potential. In that respect this conference – and your discussions – here today are most important. Together we can take partnerships to the next level. Today, I have three key messages. Firstly, we live in a globalised world. Therefore local or regional security challenges can soon spread and become a global issue. NATO's partnerships can contribute to prevent conflicts. And partnerships strengthen NATO's ability to act if need be.

Geography is no longer a limiting factor to NATO partnerships. In principle, I see no barriers to NATO's partnership: why should I? Partnerships must be built on a shared understanding of respect of human

rights, and international law. Any country subscribing to these values is a potential partner – for Denmark and for NATO. What matters are partners' contribution to global security – and thereby our own security. We see this in Afghanistan. Here NATO – far from Europe – does a great job to ensure our common security. It is done in extremely close cooperation with more than twenty non-NATO partners. I also foresee further NATO focus on engagement with partners from the Middle East and North African region. In light of the dramatic events of the Arab Spring and NATO's engagement in Libya, it is relevant that the dialogue and cooperation between NATO and partners in the Arab world is strengthened.

My second point is, that the security challenges today are complex. And also this calls for wider cooperation. No country or organisation can “go it alone”. We must take a fresh look at what our partners have to offer in terms of military and civilian instruments. Effective partnerships allow the Alliance to be more effective and credible. Let me give you some examples. In Libya, Sweden contributed to the air campaign; more than some members of NATO! Finland is a strong contributor to NATO's Response Force (NRF). Australia provided 100 million Australian dollars to the Danish-led 3C initiative. In Afghanistan, Australia is also a strong contributor to good governance and capability building. Finland, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia provide boots on the ground in a number and quality which calls for respect. I spoke last week to my Georgian colleague. They provide 1,600 soldiers to ISAF! So partners provide solid contributions in NATO-led operations – and – sadly, also have significant sacrifices. Allies and partners meet in different forums such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO).

Thirdly, I sense a growing demand for NATO to act not only as a defence alliance and crisis manager, but also as an organisation of cooperative security. NATO is not only the key platform for transatlantic political dialogue and cooperation in responding to threats and broader security challenges. NATO is also an important forum for dialogue and cooperation with our partners. I share the NATO Secretary General's ambition to further develop NATO partnerships. As Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said: “NATO must adopt a global perspective”. To me, this does not mean that NATO should be a global policeman. But a global perspective means that we are aware of global challenges that affect our security. And that we are prepared to cooperate with partners across the globe to protect our populations and ensure our peace and stability. And we should look for new flexible formats for our partnerships. It is vital that we move beyond old-fashioned thinking.

What is required of NATO's partnerships to remain relevant after Afghanistan? How can the Alliance best manage its interaction with partners? Should we offer special consultations with like-minded partners who share and support our values? To me, the answer is flexible platforms for dialogue and cooperation. The existing regional partnerships such as the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and the MD (Med Dialogue) should remain. But NATO should also build on these achievements and provide a flexible platform for dialogue – on a global scale and on global issues. We saw a first step in this direction at the NATO Summit in Chicago last year. Here NATO hosted the ever first meeting with strategic partners such as Australia, Japan, Jordan, Qatar, Finland, Sweden and United Arab Emirates. And we should continue to develop NATO's partnerships. This may also require further reforms of NATO. Denmark will remain an active supporter of these reforms.

In a partnership all participants contribute. It means that we must consider how to meet our partners' desires and wishes. Non-NATO partners deploy troops, invest money, host exercises, and provide training. What can NATO offer? NATO gives partners a voice on NATO-led missions in which they participate. NATO has opened Alliance training and education activities to partners.

The NATO-Russia Council is a forum for both practical cooperation (for example on transit through Russian territory to and from Afghanistan) and political dialogue – on piracy and counter-terrorism. NATO also has important partnerships with other international organisations including the European Union. NATO and the EU should play mutually supportive and coordinated roles in that process. The sensitivities are well-known. But the relationship is in fact better than its reputation: EU-NATO cooperation has taken place on the ground in some of the world's hotspots. For instance, at the African Union headquarters, EU and NATO personnel coordinated airlift support of AU peacekeepers. In Afghanistan, the European Commission funds non-military activities (such as judges, aid workers and administrators). Also in Afghanistan, EU's police force and ISAF are cooperating. The Berlin Plus arrangements – which give EU “assured access to NATO planning” – works. We see that in Bosnia.

Even though NATO and EU collaboration is not relevant everywhere, it is key in many of the world's regions -- not least in Europe's neighbourhood. NATO and EU have different strengths and can play different roles with regard to disaster relief, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation. Politically, the relationship has taken on a

meaning beyond the purely operational. The economic crisis makes duplication unacceptable; few can afford to pay twice for the same service. So there is no way around improving the links between the two organisations.

Also other international organisations are important for NATO. Military action can secure space for civilian action, but military forces alone cannot restore good governance and progress in fragile or failed states. Civilian functions are normally performed by a large number of agents, – development agencies and international actors such as UN, EU, OSCE, the World Bank, NGOs as well as civilian contractors. Moreover, experience shows that stabilisation, reconstruction and development often do not occur in a linear sequence. Another challenge relates to NATO's role in security sector reforms and training of local security forces. Such efforts are often a key element in restoring long term security and governance. In this area NATO has clear comparative advantages through many years of experience from training activities and support to defence reforms in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans. However, NATO's capabilities in the area of security sector reforms and governance should be further developed: As I see it, NATO should see to further develop its interaction with NGO's.

Strong and effective institutions are the best tools we have to tackle the world's most pressing challenges. The current situation of financial crisis and major shifts in global power threatens to weaken the international institutions. It's important that we take a closer look at how we best support institutions such as NATO, UN and OSCE. And that's why Denmark supports the continued attempt to reform these institutions. We need to ensure that they continue to handle the security challenges we face now and in the future. Denmark will remain an active and trust-worthy security partner. We will maintain our ability to provide both civilian and military capabilities to international missions in support of human rights, democracy and solidarity.

Let me go one step back in history to sum up on my points: NATO was founded in 1949 by twelve nations in order to stabilise a Western Europe that was in ruin by two world wars.

For the next forty years, we stood united in purpose against the enemy behind the iron curtain.

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NATO helped to rebuild Central and Eastern European countries while integrating them into the community of democratic states. NATO has played an integral role in the creation of a Europe that is more united, peaceful and democratic than at any time

in its history. But it is my firm belief that we must continue our efforts to develop NATO's role as a global hub for security partnerships.

It is in this context that NATO's partnerships continue to develop. And we should be fully aware that our partners' motivation for working closely together with NATO differs. Partners are individuals. It is in that respect this conference is important. I am sure your discussions will be an inspiration for further development of NATO's partnerships.

I wish you good discussions. Thank you for your attention.

Green Growth Programme

The Minister for Trade and European Affairs Pia Olsen Dyhr on the first day of the Green Vitus Programme, 28 August 2013

Welcome to the first Vitus Green workshop. It is very encouraging to stand here in front of 12 green enterprises with ambitions to expand on new markets.

I have only been Minister for Trade and European Affairs for about three weeks, and have just begun to learn about your sectors.

However, after reading your profiles I could see right away that you hold unique qualities. Together we must make this visible to the rest of the world and create jobs in Denmark.

The Government is determined to promote green transition in Denmark and abroad. By promoting green Danish solutions abroad we create new jobs here in Denmark. To help you succeed on the export markets and create value in our society, we have developed Vitus Green. A programme that supports your efforts to expand globally.

The Government is keen on contributing to green transition globally. It is a moral obligation: that we leave the globe in a safe condition for our children and the generations to come. Denmark has for many years been a front runner in this area. As a society we stand together to protect our environment.

With our bold and ambitious environmental regulations, we reduce the use of toxic substances in nature and in our household products.

But it is also a matter of economy. Not only does our progress in this field ensure a healthy environment.

It also creates jobs.

The global challenges within sustainable transition are enormous. With increasing global resource scarcity, international investments in green growth are rising. We need to be better at converting our unique competences and solutions into export and employment.

Many of you work within the water sector. Within this sector alone we expect global investments to increase by an annual rate of 6.2 percent in the coming five years. Water is a scarce resource under increasing pressure due to intensive urbanisation. It cannot be substituted by other commodities.

These investments create opportunities that match the competences in companies like yours. In this specific area, Denmark has an upper hand compared to many of our competitors. For example, Denmark is among the best in reducing water waste.

Fast growing urbanisation means that investments within water networks are increasing at a rate of 10 percent per year. With us today we have companies like Salling Plast and Scandinavian No-Dig Centre specialised in this specific area.

Global water resources are running out and water recycling is part of the answer.

Many of you have chosen the US as export market for your participation in the Vitus Green programme. It is a booming market for water technology, with investments of approximately 300 billion USD in the future.

Not only water companies are represented here today. Cleanfield, Resen Energy and PowerSense are specialised within the environment and energy sectors. This is also an important and growing market where Denmark has had a leading position, which we have to uphold in order to retain jobs in Denmark.

However, I do recognise that as a small company it is not easy to gain a share in these markets.

For a small Danish company it can be difficult to find the right entry point into a new market, to establish the right connections and to find a reliable partner. Just to mention some of the challenges you are facing.

That is why we have created Vitus Green. In the programme you have an experienced export advisor available to assist and support you on the new markets.

Your export advisors are here with you today. They have come from all parts of the world to support you in the Vitus Green programme. I acknowledge the great job you do to help Danish companies abroad. Your

efforts reflect on the Danish society: 700,000 Danish jobs are export dependent.

The Government hopes that initiatives like Vitus Green help you expand internationally.

Green transition is in everyone's interest. Morally and economically. For future generations. And for employment today and tomorrow.

In 2010, green production in Denmark had a turnover of 250 billion DKK.

Green export amounted to 80 billion DKK, equalling 10 percent of the total Danish export.

These numbers have a tremendous importance to the Danish society. In 2010 more than 100,000 Danes were working within green production.

Each and every one of these jobs has a value. Not only to the society, but also to the person holding the job. Not alone does it ensure him an income, more economic opportunities – it also gives a sense of security.

Your contribution to growth and job creation in Denmark is indispensable. Therefore, we must work together to exploit the export potential of small and medium-sized companies.

The government has initiated several initiatives for small and medium-sized enterprises. Vitus Green is one of them.

We also work closely with the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Climate, Energy and Buildings on promoting Danish green solutions abroad. And to make our advice to companies even better.

Nevertheless, I realise that financing is one of the biggest obstacles to companies like yours. That is why the Government has ensured more funding to the Export Credit Agency. We have moreover established a joint advisory team between the Export Credit Agency and the Trade Council. This advisory team is established to guide you on export and financing for investments.

I wish you great success with the Vitus Green programme, and I will be looking forward to hearing about your experiences and not least the results.

You are supported by dedicated and professional advisors who will work their best to help you.

I am confident that, with your competences and know-how, we can contribute to solving some of the global environmental challenges.

Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal's Address at Columbia University: "Reforming Europe Out of the Crisis to get Jobs and Growth – Nordic and Danish Perspectives and Solutions", 23 September 2013

Ladies and Gentlemen, Honored Guests, Academic Staff and Students. First and foremost thank you for inviting me to speak here today at the School of Global Economic Governance. It is an honour and a pleasure.

With such a broad academic field I could speak about many things. But I think in this moment in time, it is interesting for you to hear about the state of play in the European economy and how we have responded to the crisis in a way that has made Europe emerge both sounder and stronger. Also, I will use this opportunity to tell you about how Denmark is approaching the jobs and growth agenda and how this has served us very well during the last years of economic difficulties.

But first, let me pause a short moment on the global developments which have changed the political and economic framework. A lot has happened since the fall of the Berlin Wall. New powers have moved into the fray. New challenges have emerged. Global competition has become more fierce and the Western world is no longer the innovative force by definition. On top of all this, climate change has proven to be a major challenge that we need to take very seriously.

Despite setbacks and troubles, the world today is a better place than it was 50 years ago. Democracy and freedom have progressed, and human

rights are spreading. In many countries people have seen economic growth and improved social conditions. Millions of people have escaped poverty and international trade flows reach wider than ever before. These are all necessary components of global progress as security, political stability, economic progress and development go hand in hand.

In this changed global setting, the transatlantic relationship has proven its worth and demonstrated its tenacity. Individually and together, Europe and the US have played key roles in promoting such developments, inspired by our own democracies, our common values and not least the progress we have made in our home countries. In this new, multipolar world, Europe and the US together make up an inescapable balancing force in both political and economic developments.

In this setting of almost constant progress, I think it is fair to say that we were all unprepared for the hardship that hit us as a result of the financial crisis. In Europe, we had come to take our welfare models and relative wealth for granted. Suddenly, this had to change.

As the crisis evolved, it was clear that deep reforms were needed not only in the form of surveillance mechanisms and stronger economic co-ordination but also in the structure of our individual economies. In many countries, the normal way of life was threatened. People all over Europe have experienced hardship and tough times. And across Europe, our solidarity is put to a test. Politicians in every country had to demonstrate strong leadership and make necessary but unpopular policy choices. Only this way could we prevent the crisis from spreading and pave the way for a return to sound public finances. And thereby achieve our main goal – to create more growth and jobs.

I know that Europe has often been criticised for doing too little too late. But I actually believe that what we have done has been rather impressive! The nature of European decision making is not lean and swift. The European Union is made up of 28 countries. And this means 28 parliaments and 28 peoples who had to make tough policy choices while unemployment skyrocketed and the value of ordinary people's savings evaporated.

And yet we did manage to make important and significant reforms: we have introduced new financial regulation and are currently working on developing a banking union inside the EU. We are expanding and refining the internal market to help businesses grow and create new jobs across Europe. We have strengthened our economic surveillance mechanism and tightened and expanded our economic cooperation. And we are carefully

prioritising our resources so that we do not strangle growth and employment in our efforts to consolidate our economies.

Last month, we saw the first signs of the Eurozone emerging from the crisis. This is wonderful news, but it is not yet time to rest on our laurels. We must stay focused on implementing the reforms we have agreed on, and on maintaining economic discipline. We still have a long way to go to restore acceptable employment levels and regain our competitiveness.

This is where the Danish experience is very relevant. Just like the other Nordic countries, we have had our welfare model for many decades. And it has clearly demonstrated that low taxes and unregulated markets is not the only way to economic growth. Some of you may have read *The Economist's* recent feature article on this.

In short, the Danish welfare model is a system where high taxes provide the funding for relatively high unemployment benefits, free education from kindergarten to graduate school, a generous child and family policy, comprehensive care for disabled or socially marginalised citizens, and free, universal and equal access for all Danes to our health care system. The idea is that everyone contributes according to ability and benefits according to need. We have a very high level of tax income relative to GDP and one of the largest income distributions. Put in a different way, it is difficult to become very rich but even harder to become very poor.

Still, Denmark consistently ranks among the most competitive nations in the world. Our workforce is well-educated and Danes switch jobs and start new businesses at rates far above those in other welfare states. This is often attributed to the success of our Flexicurity system that combines flexible rules for hiring and firing with financial security in case of unemployment, all of which takes place within a framework of an active labour market policy.

Despite the relative success of the Nordic and Danish model, we know that we have to keep reforming in order to stay competitive and maintain our welfare system. My government has done just that, but we have tried to do it in a way that maintains Denmark as a socially inclusive and egalitarian society. The main aim of the reforms has been to secure our prosperity and welfare model on a high level. It has not been and is not easy – but it has to be done.

Just like we have shown that economic and social policies can successfully go hand-in-hand, Denmark has also proved that economic and environmental policies can complement each other. Since 1980, our economy has undergone a green transition and we have become a global leader in

the development of new sustainable technologies and solutions. Meanwhile, our economy has grown by almost 80 percent while our energy consumption has remained constant and our CO₂ emissions have been reduced. So don't let anyone fool you: being green doesn't have to mean giving up economic growth! We continue to pursue the green agenda and are aiming at being completely independent from fossil fuels by 2050. Our green policies are thereby helping both our economy and the climate and environment. It is also good for our health – about half of all the Copenhageners bike to work or other activities daily.

As a small open economy, we are strong believers in free trade and level playing fields for our businesses across the world. So for many years, we have been pushing for an EU-US free trade agreement. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has huge potential. This is why we should strive for a quick and ambitious outcome of the ongoing negotiations.

The figures speak for themselves. Together we have more than 50 percent of the global GDP. Two thirds of top research and development companies are located in our countries. And we trade for more than 650 billion US dollars each year. But calculations show that our exports to each other could increase by two figure percentages if an agreement is reached.

This alone is reason enough to be ambitious. But another reason is that an agreement will further align our standards and regulation and ensure more mutual recognition. Given the size of the transatlantic market, this will inspire others and pretty much dictate global standards. In this world with new rising economic powers, this is in our strong interest! None of us could do that alone. We both need each other!

A strong transatlantic relationship is crucial for us to improve, develop and safeguard our economies and societies. The crisis has demonstrated to all Europeans the value of standing by each other and the importance of being big. These are considerations that should also guide us in the trade negotiations between the US and Europe.

Standing together, we have much greater impact globally. This is true economically and politically. The world needs our leadership to ensure that we continue the progress I mentioned in the start of my speech so the world develops in a peaceful, sustainable and socially acceptable way. It can be done, let's make it happen.

Thank you.

Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt's Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Global Green Growth Forum (3GF) in Copenhagen, 21 October 2013

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to the third Global Green Growth Forum in Copenhagen. I am delighted to see so many prominent representatives from governments, business and organisations here today.

I am particularly pleased to welcome my 3GF partner countries: Republic of Korea, Kenya, Qatar, China, and Mexico. Together we spearhead a global partnership of countries.

We all face different domestic challenges with regard to development, economic growth, environment and climate change. Still, we share this common ambition: to ensure sustainable, green and inclusive growth. And find real and tangible solutions to meet this goal. The 3GF is an increasingly important platform in getting this done.

One example is the “Alliance for Sustainable Energy Trade Initiatives” – the SETI Alliance. The Alliance was launched in 2012 as a direct result of 3GF.

The aim was to promote free trade for goods and services associated with sustainable energy. The project succeeded and products are now available to more people – to the benefit of all.

This year, we hope that 3GF will launch the development of a new food waste protocol, in order to measure global food waste. If we can agree to

measure food waste, we may significantly reduce the waste itself. The idea behind this cooperation was first presented at an informal breakfast session at last year's 3GF.

In other words: With 3GF we have created a platform that delivers. No actor can solve the challenges alone. Governments, investors, companies, civil society and researchers cannot do the job by themselves. We need to collaborate to succeed.

The first regional 3GF meeting took place in Colombia in June. The meeting illustrated the enormous potential of this collaboration. Latin America and the Caribbean is a region with vast renewable, zero-carbon energy resources from geothermal, wind, solar and marine sources. This provides an opportunity for the region to transform its power sector. And for Governments and the private sector to gradually steer away from a fossil-fuel dependant era.

We have taken important steps. Still, much needs to be done. The enormity of the task requires us to change our mindset.

As Albert Einstein once said: "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used, when we created them."

We need to think differently. And we need to act differently.

Part of the answer is a gradual transition to a green economy. With an efficient use of resources and with less negative impact on sustainability.

This is why resource efficiency throughout the value chain is at the core of this year's 3GF. Resource efficiency is also at the heart of Danish policy – to ensure sufficient resources for our production and for the next generation. This is the background for the Danish Government's newly launched resource strategy that will ensure a high degree of recirculation of materials. Transforming waste into new materials, compost and bioenergy.

Tomorrow, we will be joined by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is preparing for the Climate Summit next year, where high impact action that can catalyse the transformation of the global economy will be central.

The Secretary-General comes to challenge us to step up our work when it comes to public-private partnerships and bringing concrete, ambitious deliverables in the form of solutions, commitments and timetables to the Summit. I am sure we will rise to the challenge!

As always, I look forward to stimulating debates here at 3GF. And perhaps most of all; I look forward to the real and concrete results that I am sure will follow from our discussions here at this year's 3GF.

Thank you.

Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt's address at a3 meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, 4 November 2013

Thank you all for coming today. I am pleased to have this opportunity to once again meet with you. I will give you an overview of current affairs seen from my perspective and I look forward to exchanging views with you afterwards.

Some of the key foreign policy developments that we are currently focused on include of course European affairs, the Arctic as well as the crisis in Syria. I will also address other issues including the Danish development assistance and the Danish work within the area of preventive security.

First, however, a few words on national developments in Denmark.

The Danish society is built on the core principle of equal opportunity for all.

Since my Government took office about two years ago, we have worked to ensure that this fundamental principle of solidarity remains intact even as we take measures to exit the financial crisis.

For that reason, we have pursued a balanced policy.

Our budget proposal for 2014, which is currently being negotiated, reflects our determination to ensure that the economy gets back on track while making social improvements.

We are ensuring that public finances are kept on a sound footing. And at the same time, we are supporting growth and employment.

My government firmly believes that education is a fundamental prerequisite for growth, welfare and our competitiveness. That is why we have put reforms of our education system at the top of our agenda.

In fact, we are spending more on education and training than any previous Danish government.

Recently we have secured a broad political majority behind a very ambitious reform of our primary and lower secondary schools.

The aim is to challenge all children to reach their full potential. This means more lessons for our children – especially in Danish and Math – and more varied and inspiring school days. Also, English will be introduced around the age of seven.

Vocational Education and Training has been a cornerstone in the Danish education system for decades.

Alternating between school-based education and workplace experience plays a crucial role in supporting young people's readiness for the labour market. We know that from experience.

Recently, my government has launched a major reform to enhance the quality of our vocational education and training system to reduce dropout rates, which are currently too high.

A key priority for us is to avoid a situation where people become dependent on public welfare for years. For that reason, we have changed cash benefit rules to provide the necessary incentives for people to take up education or employment.

And we have implemented a tax reform that reduces income tax.

As part of the significant Growth Plan DK, where we are strengthening our companies' competitiveness and Danish jobs, we have also implemented reductions in the corporate tax rate and other corporate duties.

This comes on top of our efforts to reduce administrative burdens and ensure an optimal business climate in Denmark. As late as last week, the World Bank ranked Denmark number one in Europe in its ease of doing business index.

And let me add that a historically ambitious energy agreement will support the Danish companies who are already leading in this field.

The agreement will ensure that – by 2020 – more than 35 per cent of our energy comes from renewable energy sources and close to 50 per cent of our electricity consumption is generated by wind power. At the same time, the agreement will ensure a stable framework for the business community as a whole, and the energy sector in particular.

Education, business environment, public welfare and green energy – in all of these areas, the Government has taken important decisions. And today, Denmark stands stronger compared to two years ago. The economic mood is changing from uncertainty to cautious optimism.

We expect a modest growth this year – and a more substantial growth next year. We have seen increasing confidence among consumers and businesses and positive developments in the labour market.

Our economic policy still supports growth and employment within the framework of sound fiscal policy. The level of public investments is high. At the same time it is a basic premise that our fiscal planning complies with the EU recommendation to reduce public deficits. Denmark is back on track.

Let me now turn to foreign policy issues. If I had to use two words to characterise Danish foreign policy it would be “committed” and “active”. To me, this means that we are ready to make difficult decisions when that is required of us. And that we commit ourselves through development aid and humanitarian assistance.

First, a few words on the EU. Although things look a bit brighter in 2013, the European debt crisis is not over. We still have hard work ahead of us to restore stability and growth and we are still faced with considerable challenges such as alarmingly high youth unemployment in Europe as a whole.

But we are progressing and are beginning to see the effect of our efforts to mitigate the crisis. Over the past year and a half, we have progressed from acute crisis handling to a focus on improving our economies short term and long term.

An important part of our work right now is the strengthening of European banks to avoid future crises. Recently, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Single Supervisory Mechanism that will improve financial stability in Europe.

And we have set ourselves a tight deadline to reach agreement between the Member States on a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in December.

Denmark fully supports the work on establishing a banking union as part of the ongoing work to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union. It is important to underpin financial stability in the euro area and the EU as a whole.

We have not yet decided on possible Danish participation. We will take this decision later on, when all elements of the banking union are clear. The steps Europe has taken to strengthen banks, improve budgetary balances and keep macro-economic imbalances in check are all necessary to ensure a stable foundation for sound economies and growth.

At the same time, we are working towards increasing growth. Our top priorities are to improve the Single Market, move towards a more digital economy, enhance energy efficiency, and improve free trade just to mention a few. This work should be accelerated to ensure that we make full

use of the growth levers at our disposal. Also, the fight against youth unemployment remains a key objective of the EU as well as my government. I look very much forward to the youth employment summit in Paris next week where I will share experiences from Denmark.

I believe in a strong European Union capable of addressing the challenges ahead of us – not least in the economic area. And I firmly believe that being an active, skillful and trustworthy partner in the European Union is what serves Denmark's interests best. Consequently, it is my ambition that Denmark should remain as close to the core of the EU as possible.

That is also why this government would like to do away with our opt-out in the area of defence and to change our opt-out regarding Justice and Home Affairs to an opt-in.

As you know, abolishing the defence opt-out and changing the opt-out on Justice and Home Affairs will require a referendum. We will only take steps to have a referendum when the time is ripe. For the time being, I find that the European project is surrounded by too much uncertainty to take that step.

Moving to another key foreign policy priority, the Arctic.

The developments in the Arctic and the increased global interest for the region bring challenges as well as opportunities.

Our goal is to maintain the Arctic as a region characterised by peace and cooperation. Our means to do so is to continue our cooperative approach and follow existing international regulation.

Having said that, we know that the increasing global interest in the Arctic demands more of us than status quo.

We need to ensure that the development and growth take place in a sustainable and social manner. Growth and development need to respect the vulnerable Arctic climate.

On that basis, the Danish Government will initiate a thorough analysis of how we can best address the future challenges in the Arctic. This is a very important priority for this Government. And within the Realm of Denmark we are cooperating very closely on the dossier.

In terms of the broader international agenda, I want to briefly touch upon two areas of interest: Syria and – a bit closer to home – the European Partnership.

The conflict in Syria poses grave political, humanitarian and security challenges.

The chemical attack on 21 August was absolutely unacceptable and we gave our political support for efforts to pressure the regime to comply.

The subsequent adoption of the UN-OPCW mission was a positive de-

velopment that we must now build on. Denmark has decided to contribute financially to the work of the OPCW in Syria, and we stand ready to consider additional contributions.

Denmark continues to support the moderate Syrian opposition. We have recently appointed a special envoy to the Syrian opposition, and we have increased our support for stabilisation efforts, notably in the police and justice sectors in opposition-controlled areas.

We will continue to urge the Coalition to engage in the Geneva II process and to ensure a broad-based opposition delegation in the talks.

We also give substantial humanitarian support. So far, we have contributed more than 80 million dollars to the humanitarian efforts and we keep pressing for humanitarian access.

It is through our support for the opposition and our humanitarian support that we believe we can make a difference.

Looking ahead let me now briefly turn to the Eastern Partnership. I will attend the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius later this month. The single most important issue will be whether the EU will be able to sign an association and free trade agreement with the Ukraine at the summit.

On the EU side we have, since December last year, made it clear that the signature will depend on Ukraine's reform efforts. Despite some progress, there are still outstanding issues. We will make an assessment of the progress later this month.

I sincerely hope it will be possible to sign the agreement in Vilnius. The association agreement will benefit both the Ukraine and the EU. So will the agreements with Georgia and Moldova, which we expect to initiate in Vilnius.

I believe that closer cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours is to the benefit of the entire region. This is not a game, where one party's gain is another party's loss. Closer cooperation will benefit the entire region – including Russia – not only the Eastern partners and the EU.

My government remains committed to maintaining the high level and quality of Danish development cooperation.

With the 2014 Finance Bill, we will ensure that the Danish development aid will correspond 0.83 percent of our expected GNI in 2014.

That puts Denmark in the club of just five countries that allocate more than 0.70 of their GNI to official development assistance; the others being Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the UK.

We do that because we believe it is necessary and makes a difference for those who need it. And because it gives us influence.

One of our top development priorities is education. As a champion of the UN Secretary General's Global Education First Initiative, I take pride in promoting quality education for all. Education lifts people out of poverty, it creates more equality between men and women and it creates growth and prosperity. Denmark is a very good example of that. Next year, we celebrate the 200th anniversary of Danish children's right and duty to receive free education.

Free education has formed Danish society and has played an important role in creating equality and individual freedom.

Allow me to also briefly address the Danish growth market strategies. As we all know, the global economic framework is changing these years.

Most economists agree that more than 90 per cent of global growth will take place outside Europe in the coming five years, particularly in big growth economies such as China and India.

Denmark is taking this development very seriously. We are strengthening our efforts in the growth markets and we are exploiting new commercial opportunities.

In 2012, we launched our overall growth market strategy as well as specific action plans for the BRIC countries. In 2013, we presented individual action plans for a number of other growth markets. For instance Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam. Our growth market strategy identifies ambitious targets such as increased Danish exports to these countries by 50 per cent from 2011 to 2016. To fulfil this target, Danish companies need a stronger presence in the emerging markets. And we need to raise awareness about Danish knowhow and commercial strongholds in these countries.

This is a strong priority for me and my Government.

Personally, I have visited countries such as China and South Africa – and you will see an increased number of visits by my ministers – most of them accompanied by Danish companies.

And it works. Since last year, Danish companies are improving their performance in the growth markets – even beyond the level of the targets in the strategies. The work continues, but we are on the right track.

However, one thing needs to be made clear: A number of traditional markets and partners will continue to play a dominating role in Danish foreign trade. And our efforts on the growth market will not be at the expense of these traditional markets and partners.

In 2014, we will present new export and investment strategies focusing on three mature and big markets, the US, Germany and Japan. Apart from

outlining the opportunities for Danish companies, we will roll out concrete initiatives that will help increase our commercial presence in these three countries.

It is important to also stress the potential that I see in some of the upcoming markets, notably in Africa.

In that regard I want to mention a new Danish initiative “Opportunity Africa”, which comprises foreign policy, development cooperation and trade and investments, in support of inclusive and green growth in Africa. The initiative was launched in connection with this year’s 3GF in Copenhagen.

Finally, let me add a few words on Denmark’s firm commitment to international stabilisation and crisis management.

Dealing with fragile states and creating stability in conflict areas is a key priority in Danish foreign policy.

We need to be better at combining our political, development and security assistance in an integrated approach – and engaging at an early stage, before full-scale conflict erupts. We could call this preventive security policy.

Denmark supports the development of comprehensive and integrated approaches internationally – whether in the EU, NATO or the UN.

And we have launched an integrated stabilisation policy this September. Our ambition is to strengthen the integration of Denmark’s diplomatic efforts, development initiatives, civilian efforts and military instruments as we work to stabilise fragile and states affected by conflict.

I know that you will also be meeting the Foreign Ministry’s Permanent Secretary later today and I am sure he will take you through some of the Danish foreign policy priorities in greater detail.

I am ready to answer any question you may have, but before I conclude, I want to stress the value that my Government attaches to international cooperation.

This meeting today is an example of such cooperation and I am very pleased with the relationship that my Government enjoys with all of you. I want to thank you all for your valuable commitment to Denmark. Your work here is greatly appreciated.

I thank you for your attention and I look forward to your questions and comments.

Chapter 3

Opinion Polls

The Danish EU Opt-outs · 217

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Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq · 225


Global Warming · 226

The Danish EU Opt-outs

From 2000–2013 the research institutes Greens Analyseinstitut and Gallup have been polling a representative sample of the Danish population concerning their attitudes towards the Danish EU opt-outs.


Question 1:

How would you vote in a referendum on Danish participation in the Single European Currency?




Question 2:

How would you vote in a referendum on Danish participation in the Common Defence?




Question 3:

How would you vote in a referendum on Danish participation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs?



Question 4:


How would you vote in a referendum on Danish participation in the Union Citizenship?



Note: Polls on the Union Citizenship for 2002 and 2004 could not be found. Therefore, the numbers for 2002 and 2004 are an average of 2001–2003 and 2003–2005.

Question 5:

How would you vote in a referendum on all four opt-outs together so that yes would mean that all four opt-outs would be abolished and no would mean that all four opt-outs would be maintained?




European Union Membership

In June 2013 Eurobarometer polled a representative sample of the Danish Population (1,010 people aged 15 or older) as part of a larger opinion poll asking a representative sample of the EU27 population (27,624 people aged 15 or older) concerning their attitudes towards membership in the European Union.


Question 1:

Generally speaking do you believe that (YOUR COUNTRY'S) membership in the EU is...?



Question 2:

All things considered is it your opinion that (YOUR COUNTRY) has been advantaged or disadvantaged from its EU membership?




Development Aid

Epinion publishes an annual report for Danida on the Danish people's knowledge and opinion concerning Denmark's development aid. In their report for the year 2013 a representative sample of the Danish population (2,864 people aged 18 or older) were asked the following questions.


Question 1:

Do you support or oppose Denmark giving development aid?



Question 2:

Do you believe that the government spends too much, an appropriate amount or too little money on development aid?




Intervention in Syria

In the period 27–29 August 2013 Voxmeter polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1,000 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitude towards Western and Danish intervention in the conflict in Syria. The poll was conducted for Ritzau's Bureau.


Question 1:

A suspected chemical attack killed hundreds of civilians in Syria last week. Many things now suggest that the US is going to bypass the UN system and lead a military intervention in the Syrian civil war. Do you support a US-led coalition intervening in the Syrian civil war?



Question 2:

Do you support Danish participation in such an intervention in the Syrian civil war, if we are being asked?




Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq

In July 2013 Megafon polled a representative sample of the Danish Population (1,074 respondents). The poll was conducted for TV2.

Question 1:

Which one of the following statements relating to the risk of terrorist attacks in Denmark do you agree most with?




Global Warming

In December 2012 and 2013 Survey Sample International polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1,020 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards global warming. The survey was conducted on behalf of the think-tank Concito.


Question 1:

The average temperature on Earth is increasing




Question 2:

To what extent do you believe they are man-made?



Question 3:

To what extent do you think humanity is able to limit climate change?



Chapter 4

Selected Documents

The following bibliography is a limited selection of scholarly books, articles and chapters published in English in 2013 dealing with Danish foreign and transnational policy.

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