

East Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION NO. 4

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OCTOBER 2014

The global architecture of multilateral diplomacy is in transition and a comprehensive understanding of the new dynamics, players, and capacities is needed. The Mapping Multilateralism in Transition series features short briefing papers on established but evolving regional organizations and select cross-regional organizations. The papers aim to: (1) identify the key role and features of the organizations; (2) assess their current dynamics; and (3) analyze their significance for the overall regional and global geopolitical context.

This paper examines the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a principal East African regional organization composed of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

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The views expressed in this publication represent those of the author and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI owes a debt of thanks to its donors who make publications like this one possible.

Introduction: The IGAD Region

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), composed of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda with its secretariat headquartered in Djibouti, covers northeast Africa, a region continuing to experience major changes, arguably more than any other part of the continent. This is the only region of Africa where colonially drawn borders have been redrawn.¹ In contrast to other regions of Africa, this is also where the prospect of further redrawing of borders—with Somaliland seeking international recognition as a separate state—remains a real possibility.

The region is also known for being very prone to violent conflicts and various forms of transnational security threats. It is thus common to come across experts on the region describing it as “the most dangerous corner of Africa,” “one of the most unstable and conflict-ridden parts of the world,” or as a region that distinguishes itself from other parts of Africa “by the prevalence and longevity of its multiple conflicts.”²

The IGAD region is also host to states with authoritarian and autocratic systems of government and that lack popular legitimacy, cultures of democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Many of these states also pursue contentious national and regional policies that fuel mistrust and rivalry within and among the member states. In some of these states, such as Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea, state institutions are either too weak or totally lacking. The regional security environment further accentuates weak governance systems and authoritarian tendencies.

This region is also characterized by other structural weaknesses. These include differences in governance and national development policies, major imbalances among the economies of the region, and the similarity of the countries’ major export items. Socioeconomic deprivation affects the vast majority of the peoples of the region. This region also suffers from massive environmental degradation, frequent drought, and chronic food and water shortages affecting a significant portion of its territories and populations.

It is these various political, security, and socioeconomic characteristics that continue to receive the most attention in the literature on the region. These

1 The secession of Eritrea in 1993 led to the redrawing of the map of Ethiopia. More recently in 2011, Sudan lost part of its resource-rich territory as South Sudan became independent.

2 “Dangers and Dilemmas in the Horn of Africa,” *Africa Confidential*, September 11, 2009, pp. 1–3, quoted in Peter Woodward, *Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Politics, Piracy and the Threat of Terror* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), p. 1; Alex de Waal, “The Horn of Africa: A Fragile Region?” proceedings of 3rd subregional consultation on peace and security challenges in the Horn of Africa, Inter Africa Group, November 23–24, 2009; and Sally Healy, “IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn,” in *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, edited by James J. Hentz (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 217.

features are also the basis for conclusions that conditions for achieving strong and dynamic regional frameworks for economic and political integration are lacking.

However, another dimension of the region that is not often given enough attention pertains to developments in the economic sphere that increasingly reinforce the need and demand for greater integration of the countries of the region. The IGAD region holds strong potential for substantially improving the process of regional economic

and sociopolitical integration. This is attributable to the presence of economic and geographical conditions that tend to catalyze and enhance greater interdependence and cooperation among member states of IGAD. Three of the countries of the region, Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, are landlocked countries, with Ethiopia being “the most populous landlocked country in the world.”³ The imperative of access to the sea for these countries is a major impetus for enhancing regional integration.

Additionally, IGAD also has emerged as host of

Table 1. Basic data of IGAD countries

Country	Population in millions	GDP	GDP growth
Djibouti	0.90	\$1.46 billion	5.0%
Ethiopia	94.10	\$46.87 billion	10.4%
Eritrea	6.33	\$3.44 billion	1.3%
Kenya	44.35	\$44.10 billion	4.7%
South Sudan	11.30	\$13.80 billion	24.4%
Sudan	37.96	\$66.55 billion	-6.0%
Somalia	10.50	\$917.0 million	-1.5%
Uganda	37.58	\$21.48 billion	5.8%

Source: World Bank, “Countries,” 2013, available at www.worldbank.org/en/country.

Table 2. Intraregional trade in USD millions (2001–10)

Year	Intraregional exports (\$ millions)	Share from global exports (%)	Intraregional imports (\$ millions)
2001	827.8	17.9	691.1
2002	809.6	15.2	687.9
2003	970.0	15.0	869.6
2004	981.8	12.0	820.9
2005	1094.3	10.5	1137.1
2006	1162.5	9.7	1180.6
2007	1319.2	8.0	1261.6
2008	1640.4	7.7	1801.2
2009	1435.2	9.4	1575.8
2010	1822.6	9.7	2001.3

Source: Compiled from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, as cited in Edris Hussein Seid, “Regional Integration and Trade in Africa,” 2013.

3 Sally Healy, “Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa,” A Chatham House Report, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 2011, p. 31.

countries registering huge economic successes in Africa. Perhaps the most notable example in this regard is Ethiopia, whose GDP has been growing in the past decade at nearly 10 percent annually. As a country at the heart of the IGAD region and “as the most capable and at times formidable state, as an emerging regional economic and political power” with its huge population and hydroelectric power reserve, Ethiopia will remain critical both for the sustainability and for the economic and political integration project of IGAD.⁴ The region also is attracting increasing levels of investments in various sectors including hospitality and tourism, infrastructural development, manufacturing, telecommunication, retail, and mining sectors.

The region has other notable characteristics influencing the politics of regional integration (or lack of it) in IGAD. The IGAD region covers the part of northeastern Africa bounded by the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in the east and the western end of the Nile basin in the west. This geographic location gives the IGAD region its other notable historical, political, and strategic features. The region enjoys huge historical and geostrategic significance not only for Africa but also for the world. While it is a region where “the first humans are believed to have evolved over millennia before spreading across the world,” the Ethiopian highlands were vital to the emergence of the ancient Egyptian civilization (as a major source of the waters of the Nile River) and Axum, one of the oldest kingdoms marking the beginning of the process of the formation of the Ethiopian state.⁵ As a region bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (key international maritime commercial routes connecting Asia to the Western world and close to major oil lines) as well as countries in the Middle East, the IGAD region is in a considerably significant strategic location.

The Geopolitics of the IGAD Region

Although recent oil and natural gas discoveries and further potentials are changing its image, the IGAD region is not known for major natural resource

endowments that made other parts of Africa a center of attraction for major powers. This notwithstanding, the region has been and remains of considerable strategic importance. While there are a number of factors accounting for this, including availability of vast agricultural land and water resources, the major factor is that the region borders the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, which are two crucial international waterways. These major sea routes serve as very significant and convenient paths for international maritime trade and communications between Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. These are also the main routes for transportation of oil from the major oil-producing countries of the Middle East to countries in Europe and North America.

One of the consequences of its geography was that the IGAD region became a theater where the United States and the USSR staged one of the most destructive rivalries on the continent during the Cold War. In their quest for domination in controlling both waterways, the two superpowers established client relationships, with Ethiopia “supported by the USSR, while neighbouring Sudan and Somalia were in turn backed by the USA.”⁶ The resultant division among the countries deepened their mistrust of each other and aggravated their rivalry, sometimes resulting in war.

The region also has emerged to be a major front in the war on terror that became a defining feature of the international system after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. At least two factors account for this. The first is that the region was seen as having served as a basis for terrorists including Osama bin Laden, who was in Sudan before moving to Afghanistan. It also witnessed a large number of terrorist attacks including a major one on the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, a few years before 9/11. Second, in the post-9/11 world in which failed or weak states are considered as safe havens for terrorists, the fact that Somalia, as an epitome of a failed state, is in IGAD made the region one of the centers of attention in the fight against terrorism. The region’s proximity to the Middle East, particularly Yemen, where al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

4 Ibid., p. 5.

5 Woodward, *Crisis in the Horn of Africa*, p. 17.

6 Ibid., p. 168.

established its base, added the value of the region as a staging ground for undertaking counterterrorism operations across the sea. The United States established the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the US Africa Command with its base at an old French site, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti.

With Africa attracting increasing interest from emerging Asian powers as well as others, the waterways of the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the IGAD region are gaining greater significance. Countries of the region have become destinations of increasing investment particularly from Asian countries, mainly China and India, as well as Middle Eastern states. Following the breakthrough of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in developing Sudan's oil reserves, China holds a major stake in the oil sector of Sudan and South Sudan. China also has been increasingly engaged in infrastructural development including, most notably, in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya, among others.

Apart from the region's proximity to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, the Nile River is another major geographic feature that significantly shapes the geopolitics of IGAD. In a recent work, a long-time analyst of the region noted the "Nile has long been both the most discussed and most contentious water source in the region."⁷ Although Egypt is not part of IGAD, it has always been involved in the politics of the region as part of its strategy of maintaining its hegemony over the waters of the Nile. The tension between Egypt, the main consumer of the waters of the Nile, and Ethiopia, the main contributor to the waters of the Nile, has in recent years entered a new chapter. Following Ethiopia's move to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, whose construction was about 40 percent completed in 2014, Egypt has been expressing opposition leading to rising tension between the two sides often with significant consequences on the relations among the countries of IGAD.

The IGAD region is fraught with political antagonism and historical rivalry among its member states that hugely affects the geopolitics of

IGAD. Historically, the rivalry between Ethiopia and Sudan as well as the one between Ethiopia and Somalia largely shaped both the interrelations of the countries of IGAD and their international relations. During the past decade, the rupture of the ideological and economic disagreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea into full-scale war from 1998 to 2000 remains one of the defining elements of the geopolitics of IGAD. The resultant tension between the two countries not only spilled over into the existing conflicts in the region (primarily the Somali conflict), but it also has become a major stumbling block for IGAD's regional integration mandate. Following IGAD's support for Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in late 2006 to remove the threat from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was in control of south central Somalia, Eritrea declared its exclusion from IGAD and has since remained outside of the organization.⁸

While the conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and now South Sudan continue to be the major preoccupation for the region, the contention over the waters of the Nile and the standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea have tended to regionalize these conflicts and to make their resolution more complicated. Although Ethiopia has been playing the role of regional peacemaker in recent years (for example, in the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan and currently in the South Sudan mediation efforts), its role remains constrained by the constant concern of containing perceived destabilizing tendencies of the regime of Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki in Asmara.

History, Membership, Mission, and Institutional Makeup

Many of the features of the region discussed previously have shaped and continue to shape IGAD. The major factors that led to the establishment of IGAD in its previous incarnation as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986 were the catastrophic droughts of the 1970s and 1980s that

⁷ Ibid., p. 177.

⁸ Government of Eritrea, "Eritrea Suspends Its Membership to IGAD," Press Statement, April 21, 2007.

were, in part, induced by the major environmental degradation that the region experienced. Similarly, against the background of the ideological differences and military antagonism that characterized the relationship of the countries of the region, the initiative for the establishment of IGADD came from external actors, with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) playing the key part. The founding members were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. While Djibouti played a role as host of the founding meeting of IGADD, no individual country took leadership for the establishment of the regional body.

IGADD was established with a narrow mandate of addressing issues of drought, desertification, and food security. Following the changes in government in Ethiopia and the independence of Eritrea in the 1990s, the membership of IGADD not only expanded to seven, but also a momentum for revamping the role of the regional body was created. The launch by IGADD of a peace process for resolving the Sudanese civil war in September 1993 gave rise to a recognition that IGADD could be transformed into a forum mandated to address wider regional issues beyond drought and desertification. This culminated in a decision made at the IGADD extraordinary summit held on April 18, 1995, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for revitalizing the authority and expanding the mandate of IGADD.

At a summit held in Nairobi, Kenya, on March 21, 1996, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted an agreement revitalizing IGADD and renaming it the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The mandate of IGAD was expanded to cover not only peace and security, which was the immediate motivation for revitalization, but also regional economic cooperation and integration. Its mission and vision was to become the premier regional organization for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and integration by assisting and complementing the efforts of member states to achieve through increased cooperation (a) food security and environmental protection, (b) promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and humanitarian affairs, and (c) economic cooperation.


Following the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011, IGAD's membership once again increased, to eight. While at the founding of

IGADD the number of landlocked countries was one (Uganda), following the independence of Eritrea and then South Sudan, this number increased to three, as Ethiopia and South Sudan became landlocked. This expansion of number of landlocked countries has changed the dynamics of the relationship of the countries of the region and IGAD's agenda of regional integration, since Ethiopia, as the most populous and economically expanding country, seeks more choices for access to ports in the region.

As reflected in figure 1, the institutional makeup of IGAD consists of four major elements. The first body, which is the highest policymaking body, is the IGAD Heads of State and Government, or the IGAD Summit. Meeting at least once per year, the IGAD Summit is the body on which IGAD depends for all of its most significant political and economic policy decisions. The second body is the Council of Ministers, which is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs and one other focal minister designated by each member state. This body is responsible for formulating policy and approving the work program and annual budget of the secretariat during its biannual sessions. The Council of Ministers undertakes all these responsibilities under the authority of the Heads of State and Government.

The third body is the Committee of Ambassadors, which is composed of IGAD member states' ambassadors accredited to the IGAD headquarters in Djibouti. It is a body in which the interests of member states are represented for shaping the workings of the executive body of IGAD, its secretariat. Indeed, the Committee of Ambassadors is the only standing policymaking body that oversees policy-relevant initiatives that the IGAD secretariat undertakes and ensures implementation by the secretariat of the decisions of IGAD's main policy bodies. The final standing body of IGAD is the secretariat, which is responsible for assisting member states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitating the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizing resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the council, and reinforcing national infrastructures necessary for their implementation. Headed by an executive secretary, the secretariat is organized into three substantive divisions: Peace

Figure 1. Organization of IGAD



and Security, Economic Cooperation and Social Development, and Agriculture and Environment.

As the following sections will reveal, much of IGAD's most visible work has been in the areas of peace and security. This is also the area where IGAD has achieved its most advanced institutional development and registered the most success. This is not surprising given that conflicts remain the most dominant issues affecting many of the countries of the region and also because the demand to address the scourge of conflicts remains IGAD's. It is on this account that peace and security takes much of the focus in the remaining parts of this analysis.

Major Areas of Engagement

PEACE AND SECURITY

It has already been noted that the IGAD region is primarily known for the short supply of peace and security within and among its member states. Broadly speaking, one can identify four conflict clusters in the region. These are conflicts taking the form of (a) interstate conflicts prominently exemplified by the unresolved standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea, (b) intrastate conflicts with major regional dimensions (involving armed insurgency and terrorism), (c) the protracted violence and insecurities affecting Somalia and its neighboring countries arising from years of state collapse and intra-Somalia and regional violent rivalry, and (d) transboundary intercommunal resource conflicts aggravated by food insecurity and environmental degradation.⁹

The security challenges of the countries of the region are deeply interconnected. There are no major conflicts in these countries that are ordinarily confined to national borders. Instead, such conflicts often both spill over into neighboring countries and tend to draw countries in the region into the fray, particularly if they are not settled in a short period of time. The conflict that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013 serves as the latest illustration of this phenomenon.

The notion of a regional security complex is

commonly used in analyzing the security situation of the IGAD region. The underlying causes of conflicts and insecurity in the region are diverse. These range from external and historical factors (such as the legacies of colonial rule and the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies, and continuing superpower interference in the region including the war on terror) to structural factors such as socioeconomic deprivation and inequalities, lack of democratic governance and rule of law, and the non-inclusive organization and control of state power heavily reliant on force. According to the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS), “[v]irtually all major conflicts in the region ... emanate from factors associated with gaps in democratic governance, poverty and low levels of development, a political culture of (in)tolerance and lack of respect for the rule of law.”¹⁰ Other factors it identified are the colonial and Cold War legacies including lack of trust and rivalry among countries of the region, low penetration of state institutions in peripheral areas, and communal struggle over access to resources such as land and water.

Given that peace and security are generally in short supply in the region, it was no surprise that peace and security came to take center stage in IGAD's integration agenda. The success that IGAD(D) registered in the peace processes on Sudan and Somalia and the opportunity it presented for member states to push for a regional effort for addressing conflicts prevalent in the region were the major factors for the prominence that peace and security received in IGAD.¹¹ Indeed, as noted previously, one of the major factors behind the transformation of IGADD into IGAD with an expanded mandate was the need for addressing conflicts within a regional cooperative framework. It was at the extraordinary summit held in Addis Ababa in April 1995 that the decision to invest the regional body with a peace and security mandate was adopted.

The 1996 IGAD Agreement gave significant space to peace and security. Two of the principles of the agreement are “the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue”

9 For details, see Kidane Mengisteab, “Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts,” discussion paper prepared for the Nordic Africa Institute, 2011.

10 IGAD, Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, January 19, 2010.

11 See generally, Healy, “IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn,” p. 217.

and “maintenance of regional peace and security.”¹² One of the objectives of the regional body was “to promote peace and security in the region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue.”¹³ Conflict resolution was given a prime place with a dedicated article and agreement among member states to (a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation, peace and security; (b) establish an effective collective mechanism for consultation and co-operation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and (c) deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations.”¹⁴

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

IGAD is one of the eight regional bodies recognized by the African Union (AU) as building blocks for continental integration, including in the areas of peace and security. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU as a comprehensive mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution offers a useful lens for assessing the peace and security mechanisms envisaged within the IGAD Agreement.

APSA is the policy and institutional framework that the AU established as “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.”¹⁵ The APSA as elaborated in the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) consists of mechanisms that are designed for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.¹⁶ The institutional mechanisms constituting the APSA principally include the PSC, the continental early warning system, a panel of the wise, and the African Standby Force.¹⁷ While the PSC serves as the principal decision-making body

on matters of peace and security, the other components provide early warning and analysis; implement peacemaking and mediation; and undertake peace support operations and intervention.

If the IGAD framework is analyzed using the APSA lens, then it becomes clear that IGAD has not fully implemented the provisions of its agreement stipulating the creation of mechanisms “for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts.” IGAD does not have a body comparable to the AU PSC that is principally designed for taking decisions on peace and security matters in the region. There is no indication that IGAD will have any similar structure. In practice, this responsibility is undertaken by the principal policy body of IGAD, namely the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government (with the support of the Council of Ministers).

In terms of early warning and response, similar to the AU, IGAD has developed an early warning system known as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN was established in 2002 by a protocol signed and later on ratified by the IGAD member states. According to the protocol establishing CEWARN, the mandate of IGAD includes providing “credible, evidence-based early warning information and analysis in a fashion that would inform timely action to prevent or mitigate violent conflict.”¹⁸

In terms of institutional development in the areas of peace and security, the establishment and operationalization of CEWARN has been one of IGAD’s most significant achievements. Launched on June 30, 2003, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa, CEWARN operates in cooperation with regional early warning units, or CEWARUs, based in each IGAD member state.

Since it became operational in 2003, CEWARN was limited in its work both in terms of subject matter and geographic scope. In terms of subject

12 *Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, Art. 6., March 21, 1996.

13 *Ibid.*, Art. 7 (g).

14 *Ibid.*, Art. 18.

15 African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, para. 17, July 9, 2002.

16 For details, see Solomon A. Dersso, “The African Peace and Security Architecture,” in *Handbook of Africa’s International Relations*, edited by Tim Murithi (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 51.

17 *Ibid.*

18 See *Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States*, available at <http://cewarn.org/attachments/article/58/The%20CEWARN%20Protocol.pdf>.

matter, CEWARN's work focused on pastoralist and related conflicts. Geographically, CEWARN's work was confined to parts of the IGAD region identified into various Karamoja clusters, the borderlands between Uganda, Kenya, Sudan (now South Sudan), and Ethiopia. This was a clear manifestation that at the initial stages of the development of CEWARN, IGAD states were willing and ready to cooperate only with respect to issues that were non-intrusive and politically less sensitive.

This is now changing with CEWARN's new strategy for 2012 through 2019 that IGAD member states adopted on September 4, 2012 in Kampala, Uganda. This strategy provided for the expansion of CEWARN's monitoring and analysis of the types, causes, and drivers of violent conflicts, as well as its geographic focus. This expansion means that, in addition to its traditional area of work, CEWARN now engages in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of early warning information in areas that are covered by the continental early warning system, including political governance and socioeconomic, climatic, and environmental issues.

IGAD does not have a body or mechanism that is dedicated to mediation and peacemaking roles. However, it has been engaged in peacemaking and mediation efforts throughout its existence. This is perhaps the one area that IGAD is considered to have made its most notable achievements,¹⁹ although initiatives in this area have been dependent on the political and diplomatic role of individual member states and the support or push of external partners. Kenya played a lead role in the Sudanese peace talks that produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and in hosting the Somali National Reconciliation Conference of 2002–2004 that established the Transitional Federal Government, predecessor to the current Somali government. Ethiopia's role was key in the Sudan-South Sudan negotiations on

outstanding postsecession issues, and the country has been spearheading the IGAD mediation process for South Sudan since conflict broke out in December 2013. The lack of an institutional framework and the ad hoc nature that characterizes IGAD's work in this area continue to undermine the building of institutional memory and development of institutionalized capacity and expertise by the regional body. As the IPSS itself admitted, IGAD's efforts "have been reactive [and] lack continuity and institutional memory due to the ad hoc approach [...] pursued so far."²⁰

One of the ambitions of the IPSS was indeed to rectify many of the institutional weaknesses of the peace and security agenda of IGAD.²¹ Accordingly, it envisaged the development of the IGAD peace and security agenda "in alignment with that of APSA including early warning and Panel of the Wise."²² To this end, IPSS provided for a new conflict prevention, management, and resolution protocol to be adopted by member states. Specifically with respect to mediation and peacemaking, it stipulated that IGAD will establish and operationalize both "an IGAD Mediation Support Unit" and "a mediation support framework including a roster of mediators and a Panel of the Wise."²³ While many of these plans remain unfulfilled, a mediation support unit has been established as part of the Peace and Security Division of the IGAD Secretariat.

With respect to peace support operations including peace enforcement, IGAD lacks both the institutional framework and established experience. Institutionally, IGAD's engagement in this area is within the framework of the wider East African component of the African Standby Force known as the East African Standby Force (EASF).²⁴ However, recognizing the need for IGAD to play a supplementary role in this area, the IPSS, for example, provided for the development and implementation of "IGAD best practices on peace support operations, covering peacekeeping, peace

19 See Healy, "IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn," pp. 217, 221–225.

20 IGAD, Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, January 19, 2010, para. 9.

21 The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (2010–2014) was initialed in December 2010 in Nairobi, Kenya but has not been adopted by the main policymaking body, namely the IGAD Heads of State and Government. For further discussion of the strategy, see Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, "IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy: A Panacea for Long-term Stability in the Horn of Africa Region?" *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, edited by Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011), pp. 347–376.

22 IGAD, Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, January 19, 2010, para. 23.

23 Ibid., para. 15 (a), (d).

24 The EASF is meant to cover countries in the East African region that consist of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

enforcement and post-conflict reconstruction and development bearing in mind the available framework of the East African Standby Force (EASF).²⁵ In terms of IGAD's role in peace support operations, the IPSS affirmed that this role would be undertaken within the EASF "under a collaborative instrument (such as a MoU) and framework developed between the two organizations."²⁶

The civil war that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013 laid bare IGAD's lack of both experience and of an established framework for undertaking peace support operations. Although IGAD proposed the deployment of a deterrence and protection force to reinforce the monitoring and verification mechanism established within the framework of the January 23, 2014, cessation of hostilities agreement between the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in the Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition), it was not able to facilitate the deployment of this force on its own. This demonstrated that the existence of some form of peacekeeping framework within IGAD could help in facilitating the speedy deployment of peacekeepers whenever the need arises, and, in the process, it could facilitate the operationalization of the EASF within IGAD.

Despite IGAD's lack of experience in peace support operations, several of its member states are major contributors of peacekeepers to both the UN and AU peacekeeping missions. While Ethiopia is the largest troop-contributing country in Africa to UN peacekeeping missions, Kenya and Uganda play major parts in both AU and UN current peace support operations. This is yet again further testimony to the huge capacity and potential within individual member states, which have not been translated into institutionalized regional capacity.

POLITICAL GOVERNANCE: TOO SENSITIVE TO ADDRESS?

The peace and security agenda of IGAD and indeed its broader ambition of regional economic integra-

tion cannot succeed unless political governance is also addressed within the regional framework. It is usually argued that some measure of democratization is a precondition for sustainable regional cooperation, and the two processes reinforce each other, even if some regional cooperation could be, and was, attained among non-democratic states.²⁷ As one study pointed out "[g]overnance structures in the Horn (IGAD region) have regularly been authoritarian, heavily militarized and have contributed to high levels of political marginalization and economic inequalities. In particular, with the partial exception of Kenya, none of the region's ruling regimes have permitted the growth of genuinely independent judicial, security or media institutions, nor have they facilitated genuine space in which civil society groups can flourish."²⁸ The political landscape of a significant number of IGAD countries remains dominated by the repression of the media, opposition political groups, and dissenting voices; the politicization of state agencies; and the resort of governments to the use of police and military force as an instrument of settling political disagreements.²⁹ Political and socioeconomic inequalities along ethnic and regional lines are commonplace and constitute major sources of instability and contestation of state legitimacy.

It is generally recognized that these governance deficiencies constitute the structural basis for conflict and instability in the region. Clearly, political governance is key in terms of both creating conditions for conflicts and addressing political and security challenges facing the countries of the region.

This was acknowledged, perhaps half-heartedly, in the 1996 agreement that established IGAD, which provides as one of its principles the "recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights."³⁰ This offers a direct legal basis for IGAD to assert a

25 IGAD, Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, January 19, 2010, para. 14 (d).

26 Ibid, para. 20.

27 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "The Perils of Regionalism: Regional Integration as a Source of Instability in the Horn of Africa?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, No. 1 (2009): 1, 5.

28 Paul D. Williams, "Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace," Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, October 2011, p. 19.

29 Mention can be made of the dire state of the authoritarian rule in Eritrea that is forcing the youth to flee the country in huge numbers (see International Crisis Group, "Eritrea: Ending the Exodus?" Africa Briefing No. 100, Nairobi/Brussels, August 8, 2014), the harassment and detention of members of the Eritrean opposition, the state of independent media and civil society organizations in Sudan, the effects of Ethiopia's terrorism law in stifling political opposition, dissent, and freedom of the press, and the suppression of freedom of association, assembly, and expression in Uganda.

30 IGAD Agreement.

mandate on matters of political governance. It should, however, be noted that unlike the other aspects of the IGAD mandate, this mandate was given the least space in the establishing agreement. No reference was made to this principle in the article outlining the objectives of IGAD.³¹ Similarly, this principle, or even the spirit of it, is also conspicuously and inexplicably absent from the article listing the areas of cooperation among member states, despite being most elaborate and detailed.³² This is one of the indications that human security concerns were given only secondary and marginal attention in the IGAD normative framework.

The poor record of democratization in the countries of IGAD together with a history of mutual destabilization among them continues to sustain mistrust. Although countries in IGAD perform better than countries in the Central Africa region, IGAD is host to two (Eritrea and Somalia) of the five worst-performing countries in Africa, according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.³³ In the 2013 Ibrahim Index, none of the countries of IGAD is ranked in the top ten best-performing countries for governance. With the exception of Uganda and Kenya, all other IGAD states scored below the African average in their governance record.³⁴ This poor record coupled with the scant attention given to governance and human rights in the IGAD Agreement have undermined cooperation for promoting good governance and nurturing democracy within the framework of IGAD. Accordingly, as a result of this, IGAD made very little progress in undertaking activities in the areas of democratic governance, human rights, and rule of law. The body is indeed lagging behind other regional groupings, most notably the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in terms of developing effective normative and institutional infrastructure in this area. Accordingly, unlike these other regions, no mechanism or practice has emerged in the region to sanction or even investigate major democratic and human rights deficits in member countries.

There have been positive developments; IGAD has implemented some institutional developments in the area of governance. The first was the IGAD Civil Society Forum that came into existence in 2003. The other was the IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union, which was established under a protocol that came into force on November 28, 2007.

Perhaps most importantly, IGAD was in the process of developing instruments relevant to democratic governance in the countries of the region. These include a protocol on democracy, governance, and elections, the IGAD Election Code of Conduct, and the IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers. All of these documents were endorsed by the IGAD Committee of Ambassadors in a meeting held on June 3–6, 2014, in Bishoftu, Ethiopia. The Committee of Ambassadors recommended the presentation of these documents to the next session of the IGAD Council of Ministers for further endorsement.

These are very encouraging developments that over the long term may allow IGAD as a body to develop practices that would incrementally enable it to scrutinize the state of political governance in the region. In the short term, despite these commendable developments, IGAD would remain unable to exercise any meaningful mandate with respect to ensuring that democratic rule, human and peoples' rights, and constitutionalism are respected in member states. Most IGAD member states lack the will and readiness to allow IGAD to develop mechanisms that puts limitation on the scope of their authority in national political governance.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

The objectives of IGAD as outlined in the IGAD Agreement include the following on economic cooperation and integration: (a) promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macroeconomic policies and programs in the social, technological, and scientific fields; (b) harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of

31 Ibid., Art. 6.

32 Ibid., Art. 13.

33 See the "2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," available at www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/.

34 Ibid.

goods, services, and people within the region; (c) create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment; and (d) develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications, and energy in the region.³⁵

A number of factors including cross-border communal interconnectivity, the nature of the distribution of key resources such as water and energy sources within the IGAD region, and the dependence of three of IGAD member states on coastline states of IGAD for access to the sea have increasingly spurred the need and demand for regional economic cooperation. Sally Healy, for example, pointed out that “there is recognized potential for enhancing regional economic interdependence through the development of transport corridors to sea ports, the management of shared water resources and improved energy security.”³⁶

It is the IGAD Economic Cooperation and Social Development Division that is tasked to discharge IGAD’s mandate in this area. In 2008, a meeting aimed at formulating an economic integration plan for the region was held. It followed a decision of the 12th Ordinary Summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government that directed the secretariat to undertake an inventory of what had been achieved in terms of regional integration and make recommendations on the way forward, as well as develop and implement regional integration programs.³⁷ A Minimum Integration Plan for the region was adopted that encompasses transport, industry, information and communications technology (ICT), peace and security, agriculture, livestock and food security, environment and natural resources sectors, as well as cross-cutting sectors such as gender and health.

Regarding economic integration, the work that IGAD has thus far undertaken remains limited. In terms of infrastructural development, increased cooperation and investment on key regional infrastructure projects was an important part of the IGAD Minimum Integration Plan. One of the

contributions of IGAD in this area has been the identification of the infrastructural development priority areas. Areas identified for regional integration through infrastructure include transport, energy, and telecommunication. With respect to infrastructural development in the transport sector, mostly road and rail, IGAD also coordinated the identification of regional priority projects. The projects that are currently under implementation include the Isiolo-Moyale road, the Djibouti-Addis Ababa road and rail link construction, and the Kampala-Nimule and Juba road projects. Significant progress has been made in the construction of the Isiolo-Moyale and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa projects. For example, as of May 2014, 37 percent of the construction of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, supported by Chinese funding, had been completed. Projects identified for development and currently under preparation include the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSSET), the Berbera-Addis Ababa Corridor, and the Kampala-Juba-Addis Ababa-Djibouti Corridor.

In terms of implementation of the projects, IGAD has limited success in securing funding for large capital investment projects, such as roads and railways. As a result, IGAD’s role has been limited to providing regional support through lobbying and facilitation of the efforts of member states in the regional priority projects.³⁸ In 2012, IGAD convened an infrastructure investment conference that sought to popularize the infrastructure projects and mobilize resources supporting their implementation.

With respect to ICT, IGAD has been implementing a Regional ICT Support Programme (RICTSP). The program aims at facilitating projects that reduce both the cost of ICT and the cost of doing business, by providing new opportunities for economic activities. IGAD member states have been participating in RICTSP, which ultimately contributes to the Eastern and Southern Africa regional integration agenda by reducing

35 *IGAD Agreement*, Art. 7.

36 Sally Healy, “Hostage to Conflict,” p. 23.

37 IGAD, “IGAD Member States and Development Partners Discuss Minimum Integration Plan for the Region,” November 4, 2008, available at http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=163:igad-member-states-and-development-partners-discuss-minimum-integration-plan-for-the-region&catid=44:economic-cooperation&Itemid=127.

38 For example, the construction of the Isiolo-Moyale road was started based on collaborative efforts between Kenya and Ethiopia with the support of the African Development Bank.

costs of trade and investment, thereby stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty.³⁹ Another initiative of IGAD in this area is the development of marketing information systems for tradable crops and livestock by developing user friendly websites and networking points in member states. Given major policy divergence among IGAD countries in the telecom sector, the work in this area would inevitably be limited to addressing issues affecting the development of the sector within the existing policies of individual countries.

Energy is another subsector of infrastructural development in the IGAD region. Major developments in this area include the exploration and development of oil and natural gas in countries such as Sudan and South Sudan, and most recently Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The production of oil in Sudan has been one of the factors that spurred increased economic cooperation with Ethiopia. The new discoveries in Uganda and Kenya are sure to catalyze cooperation in areas such as pipeline construction and building of refineries. In addition to this, Ethiopia has been developing its water resources particularly for purposes of generating hydroelectric power. While Ethiopia is currently producing 2,000 MW of electricity, the country's Growth and Transformation Plan has the target of increasing generating capacity to 10,000 MW by 2015.⁴⁰ The country is currently building major dams of which the most notable is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is expected to produce nearly 6,000 MW upon its completion. These projects are driven as much by the aim of exporting surplus to neighboring countries as by the need to meet the increasing energy demand of the country. Following the completion of the construction of a transmission line, Ethiopia is currently exporting electricity to Djibouti. Electricity exports to Sudan already started in 2010. The construction of a transmission line for exporting electricity to Kenya, financed in part by the African Development Bank, is currently being finalized.

After its completion, the dam will have huge geostrategic importance, potentially making Ethiopia the powerhouse of hydroelectric power in the IGAD region and beyond. As it will transform the power production capacity of the country, the export of electricity to countries in the region and beyond will increase exponentially. While the construction of the dam continues unabated and reached 40 percent completion by October 2014, it has become a major source of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt.⁴¹ Egypt argues that the dam will affect its water supply and considers it to be a threat to the longstanding balance of power over the Nile that has been in its favor.

As the foregoing makes clear, rather than being projects initiated by IGAD, many of the current energy-related infrastructural developments are driven by national development initiatives of member countries. As a result, there is a perception that IGAD is playing catch-up in this area. But for the economic interdependence that such nationally driven development initiatives create to be sustainable and prevent friction among countries, there is a need for anchoring them in a regional institutional framework.⁴²

Compared to other regional bodies in Africa, IGAD also made the least progress in facilitating the establishment of a free trade area in the region. Since IGAD countries are also member states of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), IGAD has been promoting COMESA's program on trade, including a free trade area (FTA), World Trade Organization negotiations, and the EU Economic Partnership Agreement.⁴³ In this context, while IGAD planned to establish a FTA in 2012 covering the member states, the plan did not materialize. Other areas of activities undertaken in the region include the development of various policy frameworks including a protocol on free movement of people, projects for transport standardization such as axle load limits, and policies on migration and cross-border issues, including communicable diseases.

39 "IGAD Roadmap for Preparation and Launching of the IGAD Minimum Integration Plan Part I: Economic Cooperation in Transport and Information Communication Technology," pp. 28–29.

40 See Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, "Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11 to 2014/15," Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Addis Ababa, September 2010.

41 See Solomon A. Dersso, "Heat over the Nile," ISS Today, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 18, 2013, available at www.issafrica.org/iss-today/heat-over-the-nile.

42 Healy, "Hostage to Conflict," p. 36.

43 African Union, *Status of Integration in Africa*, 2nd ed. (Addis Ababa, 2009), p. 76.

A number of factors limit the potential of IGAD for achieving regional economic integration. One such challenge is the existence of several regional economic bodies where IGAD members have overlapping membership. This overlapping membership leads not only to duplication of efforts but also increases the burden and cost of participation. The political will to pursue integration appears to be lacking. Similarly, the economic imbalance among the countries of IGAD poses challenges toward effective integration. Another challenge is the similarity of the countries' imports and exports.

FOOD SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

One of the major objectives of IGAD, which was indeed the mainstay of its predecessor IGADD, is the fight against drought and environmental degradation in the region, which caused major disasters in the region on a number of occasions. Within this framework, IGAD is charged with the responsibility of supporting national agricultural policies and promoting cooperation among the member states for mutual benefit, while ensuring that these policies are based on rational use of natural resources and also encompass sound environmental management for sustainable development.

IGAD's Agriculture and Environment Division is the entity tasked to discharge IGAD's mandate in this area. The division is organized around four subject areas: (a) agriculture, livestock, and food security, (b) natural resources and energy, (c) environmental protection, and (d) dryland agricultural research and technology.

As part of this mandate, IGAD has launched a number of initiatives. One such initiative was the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). The aim of this center was subregional and national capacity for climate information, prediction products and services, early warning, and related applications for environmental management and climate risk management for sustainable development in the IGAD subregion. The protocol establishing ICPAC as a specialized institution of IGAD was signed on April 13, 2007, during the meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Nairobi, Kenya. The ICPAC is engaged, among others, in the provision of early warning, assess-

ment of climatic risks in the region, and capacity building trainings for experts of member states on climate prediction and assessment.

IGAD also developed a framework on livestock and has been implementing various projects in this area, such as the Livestock Marketing Information System (LMIS) project funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. In addition, information and data management systems have been established through the creation of a website prototype for the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative project.

Following one of the worst droughts in the region that particularly affected Somalia in 2010 and 2011, the region adopted the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and a number of related initiatives aimed at operationalizing the drought resilience agenda in the region's arid and semi-arid lands. One of the initiatives involved the establishment of the Dryland Agricultural Research and Technology Programme with the aim of enhancing food security in the dryer parts of the region through cooperation, integration, and exchange of technologies and information concerning promotion of production in the arid and semi-arid lands.

The preservation and sustainable use of the natural and physical environment is a key component of IGAD's mandate. Given the high level of environmental degradation that the region has experienced for many decades, it brought the protection of the physical environment and the sustainable use of resources into sharp focus in IGAD. Following the Forum on Environmental Protection held in Nairobi in 1990 and the Regional Strategy to Combat Desertification, IGAD established the Environment Assessment for Sustainable Environment Management as one of its programs. This aimed at supporting national efforts and providing monitoring and analysis of the processes of environmental changes and their impact on ecosystems and development in the region.

Conclusion

While it is clear that IGAD has not achieved the same level of progress in its three areas of engagement, its role has received increasing recognition

both from member states and external actors. It is one of the eight regional economic communities recognized by the AU as the building blocks for continental integration. Forming part of the APSA and establishing itself over the years as the platform for regional action in dealing with peace and security challenges of its member countries, IGAD's role in peace and security is well established and continues to receive continental and international support including from the AU and the UN.

As in other parts of Africa and the world, there is increasing interest for regional socioeconomic integration as a vehicle for increasing regional economic development. This is indeed one of the areas where IGAD has as yet to utilize the opportunity for further growth. Similarly, there is huge opportunity for IGAD to expand its role in peace and security. In this regard, IGAD needs to build on its major institutional development in this field, the establishment of CEWARN, and develop a more comprehensive peace and security mechanism able to operate with some level of autonomy from member states. Moreover, with only forty-four permanent staff, the room for expanding the institutional capacity of the IGAD Secretariat remains huge and such enhanced capacity is key for the secretariat to serve as a driving force for moving forward the agenda of the organization.

As economic interdependence among IGAD countries deepens, the need for an independent dispute resolution mechanism in regard to trade

and economic cooperation is sure to increase. Providing such a mechanism could be one area where IGAD could play a role in the future. In the light of the great need for sourcing finance for various regional integration projects, there is potential for IGAD to play a role in the mobilization of finances. It is interesting to note in this regard that a proposal for the establishment of an IGAD development bank has recently been floated.⁴⁴

As highlighted in this report, various structural and political challenges affecting IGAD remain. They include: historical rivalry and continuing antagonism as well as lack of trust among IGAD countries; the proneness of the region to intrastate as well as interstate tensions and conflicts, as the recent outbreak of civil war in South Sudan illustrated; the dependence of IGAD on individual member countries for driving key aspects of its agenda and the resultant lack of institutional autonomy; the limited institutional capacity of IGAD; huge divergence in the nature of the systems of governance and in the size and level of development of the economies of IGAD countries; membership of IGAD countries in multiple economic groupings; the absence of a clear regional hegemon, with Ethiopia and Kenya vying for leadership; and the poor democratic record of member states and the contested legitimacy of many states and their governments. IGAD's role in regional economic integration and peace and security in the region will remain weak until these major challenges facing it are addressed.

⁴⁴ See Zerihun Getachew, "Ethiopia: IGAD Forwards Regional Development Bank Establishment," *allAfrica.com*, July 26, 2014, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201407280257.html>.

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