



Libya: deepening conflict


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The Foreign and Commonwealth Office advises against all travel to Libya, as the country splits among warring factions. The country now has two parliaments and its internationally-accepted government is based in a hotel in Tobruk.



Source: FCO travel advice, [Libya](#)

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1 Spreading conflict

After the general election in June, the violence in Libya quickly began to increase. The Muslim Brotherhood's Libyan political wing, the Justice and Construction Party, had been governing since the 2012 election with a majority in the General National Congress (GNC), the transitional parliament. Although nominally it only achieved about 10% of the 2012 vote, it managed to gain support from enough of the large number of independent members to form a government.¹

At the June 2014 election to the new Council of Deputies, the Islamists lost influence. Although all candidates were required to stand as independents in the new body, supporters of the Islamists got only about 25 to 30 seats in the 188-member assembly, while candidates close to the secular National Forces Alliance took about 60.²

The result suggested that political opinion in Libya is quite different from in neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamist parties have polled more strongly since the Arab uprisings of 2011.

¹ More than half of the seats of the GNC are reserved for independents, while the others go to people elected from party lists under a system of proportional representation. For more information about Libya's early constitutional arrangements and political developments since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, see the Commons Library Standard Notes [Libya's General Assembly election 2012](#), 18 July 2012 and [Political progress in Libya?](#), 10 June 2013

² 'Libya's civil war no closer to resolution', IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 20, Comment 31 – October 2014

The Justice and Construction Party, along with other parties that had done badly, continued to meet in Tripoli as the General National Congress, which appointed its own Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi.

1.1 Government splits

Following their defeat at the polls, the Islamist parties encouraged two armed militias, the Central Shield and the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room, to launch attacks on the capital, Tripoli, and the second city, Benghazi. After fierce battles costing hundreds of lives and causing much destruction, Islamist militias are now in control of those two cities plus Misrata, the third-biggest city. Derna, Sirte and Benghazi are in the control of Ansar al-Sharia, the al-Qaeda-linked group. Zintan and Tobruk are controlled by pro-government forces aligned with General Haftar (see below).

The House of Representatives appointed Abdullah al-Thinni as Prime Minister and the official government and the new parliament, the House of Representatives, fled to the eastern city of Tobruk, where they meet in an hotel. The United Nations and major powers accept the House of Representatives and al-Thinni as the legitimate leaders of the country.

One of the reasons for the Islamists' unwillingness to cede power is the lessons it has learned from the Egyptian experience. There the Muslim Brotherhood was swept from office and then subjected to a campaign of repression by the new military-led government, including designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, and prison and death sentences for hundreds of its supporters. Libyan Islamists feared that a similar fate awaited them, particularly if the former interim Prime Minister, Mohammed Jibril, who was associated with the Qaddafi government, returned to power.

In July 2014, most Western diplomatic staff were evacuated from the capital Tripoli. Libya Shield militiamen, mainly from Misrata, took control of the airport and the capital. Tripoli airport has been closed since then.

Supreme Court decision

In November, the Libyan Supreme Court backed the old parliament, the GNC, ruling that the House of Representatives was unconstitutional because the electoral process and the constitutional amendment that made early elections possible did not follow the proper procedures.

The fact that the Supreme Court has ruled the House of Representatives unconstitutional complicated Western and UN policy towards Libya, forcing international representatives to consider dealing with the GNC. The court's ruling was called into question, however, since the original complaint to the court was not about the legitimacy of the House of Representatives but, rather, where it should meet. The court's reasoning was not fully explained in the judgment.³ Critics pointed out that the court is based in Tripoli, which is under control of Islamist and Misrata militias. Members of the House of Representatives say that the judgement was reached after threats of violence to judges and their families.

Although the GNC accepted the judgment and said that it would re-start legislative activities, many of the Members of the GNC have left the country because of the security situation, leaving the GNC inquorate. The House of Representatives has rejected the Supreme Court's judgment, saying that it was made under duress.

³ ['The Supreme Court decision that's ripping Libya apart'](#), *Foreign Policy*, 6 November 2014

The legitimacy vacuum will leave the regionally-based militias in control of events and could hasten a split between the eastern half of the country, Cyrenaica, and the west, Tripolitania and Fezzan, to use the old administrative regions.

On 9 November, there was a bombing in Shahat, eastern Libya, near to where the UN Special Representative and members of the UN mission to Libya were visiting, then on 12 November, there were two bomb attacks, one in Tobruk and one in al-Bayda, a town between Tobruk and Benghazi, killing several people.

1.2 General Haftar's campaign

An enigmatic general, former Chief of Staff of Qaddafi's armed forces, emerged as the leader of a military campaign against Islamist militias in 2014. Having fallen out with Qaddafi in the 1980s, General Haftar fled to the US, from where he tried to organise several attempts to bring Qaddafi down, possibly with the help of the CIA. In February 2014, he appeared on television calling on Libyans to rise up against the General National Congress. Nothing came of that immediately, but he continued to work at building alliances with militias and in May 2014 launched attacks on Islamist militias in Benghazi and, with the help of the Zintan militia, from the west of the country, on the GNC parliament in Tripoli.

The May attacks were indecisive, but General Haftar, probably with the assistance of the Egyptian military, has continued his campaign, launching air strikes on Islamist positions in August and October, probably from Egypt.⁴

The United Arab Emirates are also reportedly supporting the secularists, while it is reported that Qatar and Turkey have sent assistance to some of the Islamist militias, opening another worrying prospect of proxy battles between Gulf States and others being carried out in Libya. Sir Richard Dalton, former British Ambassador to Libya, said that outside interference was making compromise more unlikely:

This intervention by foreign countries - despite signing up to agreements saying they would not intervene - is unhelpful because it's encouraging each side to believe there is a military solution to the problem.⁵

General Haftar denies that he has any personal political ambitions but many commentators say that the general is likely to remain an influential figure.

1.3 Conflict spreading

New conflicts were also breaking out in the south of the country in October 2014, as Tuareg tribesman fought with the larger Tebu tribe near the town of Owbari, close to one of Libya's biggest oil facilities. The groups were described as proxies for the larger forces in Libya's civil war, as the official army accused Libya Dawn, the Islamist-backed militia group, of provoking the fighting.⁶

There are also reports that ISIS, whose centre is in Syria, is forging links with *jihadi* groups in North Africa and the Sahel; a French tourist was murdered in Algeria in September by a group claiming allegiance to ISIS. However, such groups have existed in North Africa for

⁴ ['Profile: Libyan ex-General Khalifa Haftar'](#), *BBC News Online*, 16 October 2014

⁵ 'The broken state of Libya; Three years after the fall of Gaddafi, his country has descended into a lawless theatre for the competing influence of Britain's friends in the Gulf', *Sunday Telegraph*, 9 November 2014

⁶ ['Libya's south drawn into civil war chaos'](#), *Financial Times*, 5 November 2014

some time, exploiting smuggling and other crime networks across the region's insecure borders. So far, they have failed to make any spectacular breakthrough.

However, reports suggest that powerful Libyan militias connected to mainstream Islamist parties are showing signs of interest in ISIS, which could give the group access to much greater influence.⁷ ISIS is also connected to North Africa by the large number of North Africans (particularly from Tunisia but also from Libya) that have gone to Iraq and Syria to fight.⁸

The conflict in Libya has already worsened unrest in neighbouring countries, as huge amounts of unsecured arms found their way across barely-controlled borders to fuel violence in countries such as Mali. Instability is causing a feedback effect, where unrest in the Sahel further inflames the situation in Libya. Added to this is the increasing problem of the West African cocaine supply route, which often passes through North Africa on its way to Europe. It is thought that *jihadi* groups have considerable income from that trade and have moved from providing protection to the trade to controlling it.⁹

The worsening situation in Libya led Algeria to close its border with Libya in November 2014.¹⁰

2 Oil and money

The Islamist groups may control the three main cities in Libya and about half of the population, but the House of Representatives are still in control of much of the oil. Libya has perhaps the biggest oil reserves of any country in Africa and it is largely concentrated in the south east and south west, in the desert. Production has fallen and risen repeatedly as labour and political disputes have plagued the oil fields, but the fact that the House of Representatives in Tobruk is recognised internationally has been invaluable, allowing it to arrange overseas oil sales and to get access to the proceeds of oil sales held abroad, amounting to around \$110 billion.¹¹

This economic advantage may mean that the official government's forces are likely to be strengthened; a big counter-attack at some stage is likely, which would lead to a surge in casualties and displacement.

Libyan Central Bank assets are also being fought over by the two sides, in an unresolved conflict that may powerfully affect developments.

3 UN involvement

The United Nations set up UNSMIL, the Support Mission in Libya, in 2011 with Security Council Resolution 2009 (September 2011). The mission's mandate was extended and broadened in a series of further resolutions.¹² The mission aims to:

- give technical assistance to assist with the transition to democracy

⁷ 'Fears grow of Isis expansion into north Africa as jihadis forge alliances in Libya', *Financial Times*, 27 October 2014

⁸ 'Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps', *BBC News Online*, 12 November 2014

⁹ 'Terrorists, traffickers forge unholy alliance', *Magharebia*, 12 September 2014

¹⁰ 'Algeria Locks Down South-Eastern Border', *Magharebia*, 11 November 2014

¹¹ 'Libya's civil war no closer to resolution', *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Strategic Comments, Volume 20, Comment 31 – October 2014

¹² United Nations Support Mission in Libya, [UNSMIL Background](#)

- promote the rule of law and respect for human rights
- control unsecured arms and other military equipment in Libya
- build governance capacity.¹³

3.1 UN-sponsored peace talks

UN sponsored peace talks officially opened in Ghadames, Libya on 29 September. The Islamists had already indicated that they had no intention of participating in them, however. The Secretary General has appointed a Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino León, a Spanish diplomat who has spent much time working with the Arab world, particularly with the EU.

After the Supreme Court judgment, Bernardino León met with the President of the GNC on 11 November for discussions on a way out of the crisis. The UN omitted the title of 'GNC President' in its comments on the meeting.¹⁴

The Special Representative had further meetings with interested parties in the following days.

Both the UN mission and the UK's special representative are trying to organise some sort of compromise that might involve a power-sharing arrangement and persuading Islamist MPs to return to the House of Representatives, in return for security guarantees.¹⁵

3.2 Joint statement

On 7 November, the governments of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Malta and Spain issued a joint statement, in which they called for a political solution:

- We are deeply concerned by the situation of political polarisation in Libya.
- We are studying carefully the decision of the Supreme Court, its context and consequences.
- We note that the challenges facing Libya require political solutions. We remain committed to helping Libyans at this difficult time.
- We fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and urge all parties to cooperate with him to ensure immediate and inclusive consultations among the stakeholders to agree on the way forward.
- We urge all parties to cease all military operations and to refrain from taking any steps which increase the polarisation and divisions in the country.¹⁶

4 Migrants and people trafficking

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, there were already over 50,000 internally displaced persons in Libya at the beginning of 2014.¹⁷ There are also many

¹³ United Nations Support Mission in Libya, [UNSMIL mandate](#)

¹⁴ 'Leon in Tripoli, Meets Libyan Actors to Explore Ideas on Way Forward to Reach Political Consensus', UNSMIL press notice, 11 November 2014

¹⁵ 'Libya's civil war no closer to resolution', International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments Volume 20, Comment 31 – October 2014

¹⁶ [Joint statement on Libya](#), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 7 November 2014

¹⁷ UNHCR, [Libya](#)

refugees and asylum seekers from other countries such as Eritrea and Somalia, and a concentration of Palestinian and Syrian asylum-seekers in Benghazi. The plight of these foreigners in Libya is particularly acute.¹⁸ Meanwhile, some of the many foreign workers in Libya, from countries such as Nigeria, are fleeing Libya to seek refuge in countries of the Sahel, to the south. According to the International Organisation for Migration, Niger and Chad had already received about 75,000 refugees from Libya in April 2014,¹⁹ seeking safety in those impoverished and unstable countries from the violence in Libya. Since that time, the violence has got worse.

People-traffickers reportedly charge about £1,250 for a journey across the Mediterranean although the criminal networks may not be too concerned whether the migrants actually arrive on the other side. In September, some 500 migrants were deliberately drowned by the people traffickers, when a larger boat rammed the craft on which they were heading for Italy.²⁰

The main involvement on the part of the EU has been the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). This was aimed at helping to secure Libya's notoriously porous borders, which were causing big problems with the flow of illicit arms from the south, as well as the trafficking of migrants.

The mission was launched in May 2013 and started to work with the Libyan Border Guard and Coast Guard services. In July 2013, however, all its European personnel moved to Tunisia because the levels of violence in the country were making the operation unsafe.

The matter is particularly sensitive at present because of the number of boat migrants, many from other African countries, whose point of departure heading for Europe is often Libya. There has been a surge of migrants this year, leading to the deaths of 3,000 people in the sea so far this year, compared with only 700 in 2013.

4.1 Mare Nostrum

The Italian government set up the Mare Nostrum search and rescue operation in 2013 after shocking numbers of migrants drowned trying to reach Italian shores. The operation was relatively successful but highly costly. It was reported that the Italian government intended to end the operation in October 2014, although there was some suggestion of division in Rome about the matter, with the Italian Navy saying that it had not yet received an official order to end the mission.²¹

In a controversial Parliamentary Answer in October 2014, the British government said that it would not support any future search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, because they encouraged more migration:

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Anelay of St Johns) (Con): We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. We believe that they create an unintended "pull factor", encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths. The Government believes the most effective way to

¹⁸ ['UNHCR fears for the safety of thousands of refugees in embattled Libya'](#), UNHCR press notice, 5 August 2014

¹⁹ ['Niger, Chad receive 75,000 refugees from Libya'](#), *Afrol News*, 27 April 2014

²⁰ ['Italy's decision to end Mare Nostrum will put the lives of thousands of migrants and refugees at risk'](#), *Independent*, 24 October 2014

²¹ ['Italian navy says it will continue refugee rescue mission despite plan to scrap it'](#), *Guardian*, 28 October 2014

prevent refugees and migrants attempting this dangerous crossing is to focus our attention on countries of origin and transit, as well as taking steps to fight the people smugglers who wilfully put lives at risk by packing migrants into unseaworthy boats.²²

James Brokenshire, Security and Immigration Minister, answered an Urgent Question on the decision:

Since Italy launched its Mare Nostrum operation in October 2013, there has been an unprecedented increase in illegal immigration across the Mediterranean and a fourfold increase in the deaths of those making that perilous journey. The operation has been drawn closer and closer to the Libyan shore, as traffickers have taken advantage of the situation by placing more vulnerable people in unseaworthy boats on the basis that they will be rescued and taken to Italy. However, many are not rescued, which is why we believe that the operation is having the unintended consequence of placing more lives at risk, and why EU member states have unanimously agreed that the operation should be promptly phased out.²³

The Mare Nostrum operation will be replaced by an EU operation managed by the EU's Frontex border agency. The new operation, codenamed Triton, will operate closer to the Italian coast than did the Italian operation. It will also be considerably smaller and will largely rely on private ships rather than warships. Despite the statement by Baroness Anelay, the UK has contributed a debriefing expert to support Triton and James Brokenshire suggested that, in emergencies, help would be given:

I find it inconceivable—the head of Frontex has said the same—that support would not be provided if a boat were in peril. Obviously, a rescue would be undertaken in those circumstances.²⁴

Some have called the effectiveness of the new arrangements into question, while Mark Lazarowicz, who asked the Urgent Question, said that the UK government's policy was "shameful".²⁵

5 UK policy towards Libya

The British government set out an overview of its position on the conflict in October 2014:

We are gravely concerned by the fighting between rival militias in Benghazi since May 2014. The UN estimate that 15,000 people have been displaced from their homes around Benghazi, and there have been reports that over 200 people have been killed since mid-October. The fighting in Benghazi also undermines the United Nations-led peace talks and diminishes the prospects of a stable and prosperous Libya. At a meeting in Paris on 30 October 2014, the UK Special Envoy for Libya, Jonathan Powell, alongside his international counterparts, from the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Spain, Turkey and the United States, reaffirmed that there is no military solution to the current situation in Libya. They called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and a return to dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations. We are also concerned by reports that groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia (Benghazi), who have publicly rejected dialogue

²² [HL Deb 15 October 2014 c41WA](#)

²³ [HC Deb 30 October 2014, c397](#)

²⁴ [HC Deb 30 October 2014, c399](#)

²⁵ [HC Deb 30 October 2014, c398](#)

and the democratic process, are involved in the fighting. This underlines the threat posed by extremists to Libya and the wider region.²⁶

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has advised against all travel to Libya and strongly urges all British nationals to leave the country by commercial means. The British Embassy in Tripoli is temporarily closed and no consular services are available.

A former Chief of Staff in Tony Blair's Downing Street office, Jonathan Powell was appointed by David Cameron in April 2014, although the appointment was not announced until later.²⁷

In 2013 the British government also set up a number of capacity-building projects in Libya, including:

- projects to strengthen democracy and help devising a new constitution, through the Arab Political Participation Fund²⁸
- projects to support the Libyan Ministries of Defence and Interior as they seek to reform and improve the armed forces and police, funded through the Conflict Pool
- Conflict Pool funding is also being provided to international organisations to deal with unexploded weapons and disarmament²⁹
- Through the Arab Economic Partnership, two experts from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, respectively, are resident in Libya to help with macroeconomic and financial management issues.³⁰

The effectiveness of these programmes in the current climate of violence must be questionable, however.

5.1 Bassingbourne Camp training project

As part of its capacity building effort, the UK agreed in 2013 to train 'up to' 2,000 Libyan troops, to help the country progress towards stability. Over 300 arrived at an army base in Cambridgeshire in June 2014, but three of the cadets were charged with sexual assault in October. The Defence Secretary gave details in a statement to the House of Commons:

The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon): On 11 June this year, my predecessor informed the House, Official Report, column 49WS, that the UK had started training the first tranche of Libyan recruits at Bassingbourne Camp, as part of an international commitment with other G8 nations to train a general purpose force.

The UK has been providing a challenging training programme to Libyan troops since late June. The majority of recruits have responded positively to the training despite the ongoing political uncertainty in Libya but there have been disciplinary issues.

²⁶ [Libya: Written question – 213507](#), 11 November 2014

²⁷ ['David Cameron appoints former Blair aide as special envoy to Libya'](#), *Financial Times*, 22 May 2014

²⁸ [Arab Partnership](#), Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Department for international Development, 25 March 2013

²⁹ 'The Conflict Pool funds conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping activities that meet the UK Government's conflict prevention priorities as set out in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. It brings together the work of the three departments traditionally involved in conflict prevention work, FCO, DFID and MoD', [Conflict Pool](#), FCO, 17 May 2013

³⁰ [Supporting democracy in Libya](#), Foreign and Commonwealth Office/British Embassy Tripoli, 22 March 2013

Training was initially expected to last until the end of November but we have agreed with the Libyan Government to bring forward the training completion date. The recruits will be returning to Libya in the coming days.

The UK remains committed to supporting the Libyan Government as they work to establish stability and security across the country. The immediate priority must be agreement to a political settlement and the Prime Minister's special envoy to Libya, Jonathan Powell, is playing an active role in support of that process.

As part of our ongoing support for the Libyan Government, we will review how best to train Libyan security forces—including whether training further tranches of recruits in the UK is the best way forward.

6 Commentary

The conflict in Libya is out of control, with soaring levels of violence and no prospect of a resolution in sight. Human Rights Watch called recently on the UN Security Council to end impunity for what it alleged were war crimes and crimes against humanity; HRW said that these should be referred to the International Criminal Court.³¹

After helping to bring down the Qaddafi government, Western leaders presented the military operation under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 as a success. As the situation in Libya has gradually deteriorated, however, some might argue that the West is now failing to take enough responsibility for events. Lord West of Spithead, former First Sea Lord, called recently for the world not to forget Libya, saying that it could become a 'failed state':

The world seems to have forgotten Libya.

ISIL, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Ebola and a number of other crises have grabbed our attention. And yet the coalition air attacks on ISIL seem to have a striking similarity to those raids that superficially seemed so successful three years ago. So what next?

There are a number of lessons to learn from the events in Libya, which apply to other countries in the region. The world cannot afford to ignore the fate of Libya and it hangs in the balance.³²

The extreme fragility of North and West Africa at present and the general turmoil in the Middle East mean that the situation is particularly alarming, especially given the appeal of ISIS. Brahim Fassi Fihri, of the independent Amadeus Institute of Morocco, warned that ISIS is likely to have its eyes on the region:

In my opinion, the Sahel and Sahara area has now become a natural extension for the Islamic State, or ISIS. It's a dismembered region where terrorist groups reproduce at an alarming pace, taking advantage of the deteriorating security situation in some failed countries, and the poor capabilities of others...

If we look at the situation in Mali and Libya, we'll find the same elements and conditions that led to the appearance and domination of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, I think that as part of its overall strategy, ISIS is considering the Sahel to be the natural extension of its activities and ambitions.³³

³¹ 'UN Security Council: Address Libya Crimes', Human Rights Watch press release, 11 November 2014

³² Admiral Lord West, 'How we are failing Libya', *Al-Jazeera*, 23 October 2014

³³ 'Maghreb On 'Brink of a Volcano'', *Magharebia*, 7 November 2014

The Islamists in Libya appear to be less popular than their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt; the Libyan people have shown a general preference for more pragmatic politicians, and the Islamists seem to be unwilling to accept that choice. Borzou Daraghi criticised the impartial tone of the Joint Statement of 7 November, saying that the international community should do more to support the Tobruk authorities, which were trying to reflect the will of the people:

Governments of the UK, US, France, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement earlier calling for both sides in Libya's war to cease hostilities. They urged the country's various political and regional leaders to come to the negotiating table. They singled out for criticism the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia, which has increasingly embraced the ideology and methodology of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or Isis, as well as the forces under the command of the controversial retired general Khalifa Haftar.

In reality one side in Libya's conflict, those loyal to the elected House of Representatives sheltering in the eastern city of Tubruq, has sought to reflect the broad will of the Libyan people as mandated in three national elections. Though they are highly flawed, politically inexperienced and guilty of grievous mistakes, they have the right intentions. They aim to reinvigorate the army and police, reintegrate those people who supported former ruler Muammar Gaddafi back into public life and put Libya back on the economic trajectory of the former regime's final years.³⁴

Some commentators have been calling for a more robust response from Western countries. European countries have perhaps hoped that the UN mission would be sufficient to help Libya find its way back to stability, but the mandate of the UNSMIL is unlikely to be broadened to allow for an effective military presence, because Russia, which criticised what it saw as the over-interpretation of UN Security Council resolution 1973,³⁵ is most unlikely to vote for such a move.

Libya expert Dirk Vandewalle argues that what is needed is a European peacekeeping force:

Only the presence of an international peacekeeping force can make a difference today. The U.N. support mission was never meant to be such a force; it was designed to help build institutions of governance. And the United Nations Security Council cannot expand its mandate. Russia, which accused the West of wrongfully extending the U.N. support mission's ambit beyond the protection of civilians during the 2011 conflict, would veto any resolution calling for the mission's transformation into an intervention force. The United States government, for its part, has no appetite for sending more American boots on the ground, particularly as it pulls troops out of Afghanistan and struggles to forestall the advances of Sunni Islamists in Iraq.

The responsibility for creating a peacekeeping force for Libya falls squarely on European states. Considering their longstanding economic and political interests in North Africa and their concerns over immigration, it is they, after all, that have the most to lose from Libya's collapse. Libya is part of the European Union's soft underbelly.³⁶

However, there is not likely to be much appetite for such a mission among European electorates or governments.

³⁴ Bourzou Daraghi, 'Libya's unfolding tragedy highlights the perils of impartiality', *Financial Times*, 28 October 2014

³⁵ For more on this see [Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya](#) - Commons Library Standard Note, 6 April 2011

³⁶ Dirk Vandewalle, 'Saving Libya, Again', *New York Times*, 11 November 2014