



Women in Bangladesh turn the camera on the photographer. The data revolution could mean people becoming data producers themselves.
© SAFERWORLD/TOM MARTIN

MEASURING PEACE FROM 2015: AN INDICATOR FRAMEWORK AT WORK

Debates on the post-2015 development framework are now turning to monitoring and measurement. The United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) is expected to lead on the process for creating an indicator framework, while member states, UN agencies, civil society and academia will play key roles in shaping its final design.

More discussion is required to generate a common approach to overall principles, methods of measurement and data sources for the issues related to peace, governance and justice that have now been agreed for inclusion in Goal 16. This briefing paper lays out for discussion a model for a monitoring framework that will effectively measure these issues. It sets out consolidated and improved targets, and proposes sets of indicators that could be used together to measure progress towards those targets.

INSIDE



- Ensuring meaningful and measurable targets
- Options for assessing when a target has been met
- How and where Goal 16 issues are already being measured
- Key principles for designing a globally agreed indicator framework
- Models of possible peace-related indicators in action
- Areas for further development

AT A GLANCE

If member states do decide to do a ‘technical polish’ of the Open Working Group’s (OWG) targets, here is an example of how Goal 16 targets could be consolidated, together with a set of indicators to measure them.

Suggested consolidation of Goal 16 targets	Suggested global indicators
1. Reduce by x% the number of violent deaths and ensure people from all social groups feel safe	1.1 Homicides per 100,000
	1.2 Total number of deaths from armed conflict
	1.3 Percentage of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live
2. End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children	2.1 Percentage of young adults aged 18–24 years who have experienced sexual violence by age 18
3. People from all social groups have access to effective and independent justice systems and have confidence in the rule of law	3.1 Number of people who voice confidence in the judicial system
	3.2 World Justice Project combined score for effective criminal justice and access to civil justice
	3.3 Number of professional judges or magistrates per 100,000
4. Significantly reduce illicit and irresponsible global flows of finance, arms and conflict commodities as well as the violent impact of transnational organised crime	4.1 Total volume of outward and inward illicit financial flows
	4.2 Signature, ratification and reporting on implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty
	4.3 Drug-related crime per 100,000 population
5. Reduce corruption by x%, ensure that those involved are held accountable, and guarantee transparency and access to information	5.1 Percentage of people who have paid a bribe in the last 12 months
	5.2 Open Budget Index Score
	5.3 Percentage of people who believe that corruption is widespread throughout the government in their country
6. Ensure people from all social groups can participate in and influence decision-making at all levels	6.1 World Bank Voice and Accountability Score
	6.2 Percentage of population who believe that they can influence policy-making in their country
	6.3 Diversity in representation (by sex, region and social groups) in state institutions (legislature, government, military, and judiciary) compared to national distribution
7. Ensure that people from all social groups enjoy legal identity, and freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly	7.1 Percentage of children under five whose births have been registered with a civil authority
	7.2 Number of journalists and human rights defenders, imprisoned, missing or in exile
	7.3 Percentage of people who feel that they can express political views without fear

1. INTRODUCTION

The UN Open Working Group (OWG) on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has affirmed that the post-2015 development framework should include a Goal 16 to:

Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

The members of the OWG agreed twelve targets under this goal. Throughout the post-2015 debate, Saferworld has argued for a holistic range of targets that can prevent violence and promote lasting peace. Such targets would promote access to justice and security, political participation, fundamental freedoms, anti-corruption, and equality between social groups. Furthermore, transnational issues such as the illicit and irresponsible flow of arms, conflict commodities and finance should also be addressed. While many of these issues are already captured in the OWG's proposal, this brief includes a suggestion for how the targets could be further improved and consolidated below.

The remaining challenge for the international community is to complete the 'monitoring framework' with individual indicators and associated data sources that can monitor global progress towards meeting the new targets and goals.¹ Policymakers need to know where their attention should be focused, to strengthen the "basis for evidence-based decision-making".² Civil society groups, parliamentarians, the media, and other stakeholders need the framework to hold them to account. An effective target and indicator framework will be crucial if the goals are to have a positive impact.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have played a big role in improving data on global development priorities: the SDGs could do the same for a wider set of priorities.³ Building on trends over the last 15 years, this could mean that much more information is available to show progress on the issues that matter most to people, all around the world. Given that there are limited



Crowds in Tripoli protest against insecurity. Consensus has emerged around the need to promote peaceful societies in the new development framework. © UN PHOTO/IASON FOUNTEN

official data sources for some targets, monitoring this expansive agenda should mean that sources beyond member states and multilateral agencies are also used to track progress in real time.

National or regional indicators measuring priority issues particular to specific contexts will play a big role in monitoring the framework. These should be selected through consultation with a range of stakeholders, including for example local civil society groups or relevant regional and international organisations.⁴

Yet we cannot meet global goals and targets unless some global indicators are also created. Follow-up and review processes will depend on this data, and cross-country comparison will help the international community focus attention where it is most needed. This will underpin political commitment to meeting targets, and ensure accountability. For these reasons, the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) will be tasked with identifying a set of global indicators to

measure the world's progress towards global targets. Data for these common indicators will need primarily to be gathered at national level, and then aggregated at international level. As well as identifying key issues for consideration in the design of a global indicator framework, this briefing paper presents options for sets of indicators to monitor a holistic vision of peace.

NOTE: the numbers of each figure in this briefing correspond to the numbers of each indicator.

2. TARGETS FIT FOR MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Although nearly all the most crucial global issues for promoting peaceful societies are captured in Goal 16's 12 targets, the Secretary General, many member states and the co-facilitators of the final negotiations have suggested that there is room for improvement at a technical level. For example, language could be

improved to meet existing international standards and agreements, some of the targets could be made more quantifiable, and repetition and vagueness could be polished away. Although member states are understandably reluctant to risk their hard-won political consensus on the draft goals and targets, implementation and

monitoring would also be made more feasible if the number of targets under all goals was further reduced.

The table below presents an option for consolidating Goal 16 into seven improved targets:

Substantive Goal 16 targets proposed by OWG	Consolidation and improvement	Rationale
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	1. Reduce by x% the number of violent deaths and ensure people from all social groups feel safe	<i>Quantifies focus on violent deaths and adds crucial dimension of people's security; reiterates importance of all social groups (important given different types of violence experienced by different social groups).</i>
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children	2. End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children	<i>None.</i>
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all	3. People from all social groups have access to effective and independent justice systems and have confidence in the rule of law	<i>Underscores qualities of justice institutions using language from existing international agreements; focuses on key outcome, which is people's confidence in rule of law; reiterates importance of all equal access between social groups.</i>
16.4 By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime	4. Significantly reduce illicit and irresponsible global flows of finance, arms and conflict commodities as well as the violent impact of transnational organised crime	<i>Includes language on irresponsible flows, especially pertinent with regards to arms transfers; adds important issue of conflict commodities which is a key conflict driver.</i>
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms	5. Reduce corruption by x%, ensure that those involved are held accountable, and guarantee transparency and access to information	<i>Consolidates two related targets; quantifies corruption to make target more measurable.</i>
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels		
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	6. Ensure people from all social groups can participate in and influence decision-making at all levels	<i>Focuses on inequities of participation between social groups, a key driver of conflict; emphasises the key outcome for people – the ability to participate and influence decisions – rather than the process for achieving it.</i>
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance	<i>Move to Goal 17 and/or merge with 10.6</i>	<i>Avoids repeating targets included under Goal 10 (or could be moved to Goal 17 on global partnership).</i>
16.9 By 2030 provide legal identity for all including birth registration	7. Ensure that people from all social groups enjoy legal identity, and freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly	<i>Focuses on the outcome for people – the enjoyment of freedoms; reflects fact that rights must be ensured as well as simply protected; wording of rights reflects existing international law. Legal identity is included as a right.</i>
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements		
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing countries, for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime	<i>Merge with target 16.1</i>	<i>Avoids promoting heavy handed, combative approaches to security. Merging with target 16.1 allows focus on the actual outcome desired, i.e. people feel safe.</i>
16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development	<i>Move to declaration</i>	<i>Recognises the target as a cross-cutting issue crucial for whole framework – that should not be restricted to Goal 16.</i>

3. DEFINING SUCCESS: WHEN HAS A TARGET BEEN MET?

In order to serve as an effective and meaningful monitoring mechanism, the monitoring framework needs to show, at a minimum:

1. The **starting point** ('baseline')
2. **Progress** made towards meeting the target at national and global levels
3. **Whether the target has been met** at national and global levels

Many of the original MDG targets used quantified wording, for example calling for a "two-thirds reduction" in under-five mortality or a "halving of the proportion" of people who suffer from hunger. As currently worded, none of the targets in Goal 16 are quantified in these terms.

Nonetheless, some are – as with the MDGs – 'zero' or '100 percent' targets: they call for either elimination (eg to "end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children") or total fulfilment (eg for "all people" to have a legal identity by 2030). Other targets call for an unspecified amount of progress ("significantly reduce", "ensure" and "broaden and strengthen").

With the right indicator, it is relatively easy to know when quantified, zero and '100 percent' targets have been met, and it is also easy to monitor progress over time towards meeting them from the baseline. The challenge is what to do with the rest of the targets in Goal 16: if they are not quantified, it will be impossible to know if they have been met. Here is our analysis of the options:

Option one: quantify targets where possible.

For example, target 16.1 on violent deaths could be quantified. However, countries should be allowed to set their own pace of progress in accordance with their own national conditions; arbitrary benchmarks imposed from the global level down are not always helpful. As such, the target should for the time being read 'x' for the quantity unless member states are able to come to consensus on a suitable quantity that would represent achievement, which they may be reluctant to do in the near term.

Example

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere → Reduce by x% the number of violent deaths per 100,000

Later on, the quantity for 'x' could be established at international level based on the aggregated outcomes of inclusive consultations at national levels between ministries, experts, civil society groups and citizens to agree on the quantity for 'x'.

Option two: quantify the indicators. Not all targets or the issues they cover can be worded quantifiably. In such cases, to know when the target has been met at national and global level, benchmarks can be set at the indicator level. Again, this can be done through an inclusive process of national consultation. Under this option, certain targets would be considered met within a country when the agreed benchmarks at indicator level have been reached. The global target could be considered reached when countries containing a certain proportion

of the world's people have reached their targets.

This option is sensitive to different contexts and is also compatible with the 'reduce by x%' wording used for the quantified targets given above. Indicators specific to particular countries or regions could also be integrated into this option. And if member states are unable to change or quantify the wording of any of the targets as suggested above, then this option could still be used for the existing targets in Goal 16.

This option can be demonstrated using target 16.1, as it is currently worded, for a fictional country in the year 2020. As with the MDGs, colour coding could be used to ascertain whether a country has achieved the target (green), is on track to meeting it (orange) or unlikely to meet it (red).

One risk under this approach is that governments could set themselves low benchmarks, lowering the global level of ambition. This is why an inclusive process of national consultation will be required to keep the level of ambition high, and it may be helpful for indicative minimum levels of ambition to be established internationally in advance of national consultations. A related challenge is that countries with a higher level of ambition

Table 1: Example country in 2020 with benchmarked indicators

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere			
Global indicators	Baseline 2015	National target 2030	Progress in 2020
Violent homicides per 100,000	12	8	8
Total conflict deaths	236	0	0
% of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	42	75	48
National indicators			
Number of people per 100,000 displaced by conflict	12	0	2.3
% of people who have been violently threatened or assaulted	8	4	6.5

Table 2: Example country in 2020 with composite score

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere						
Global indicators	Baseline 2015	Progress 2020	Scoring	Score 2020	Composite score 2020	2030 target composite score
Violent deaths per 100,000	12	8	0 = 0 50 = 100	16	22.7	20 (Baseline score = 35.2)
Total conflict deaths	236	0	0 = 0 1000 = 100	0		
% of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	42	48	0 = 100 100 = 0	52		

may appear to be falling behind others who set lower benchmarks despite making greater progress. As such, levels of ambition should be clearly communicated, with inter-state comparison and peer review incentivising those with limited ambitions to aim higher.

A further risk is that the indicators may end up acting as targets, with efforts focused on meeting the national benchmark rather than on pursuing the overall spirit of the target itself, though this is a risk regardless of what type of indicator framework is adopted.

Option 3: combine some quantified targets with other targets quantified at indicator level. Another option worth considering is a combined approach, where levels of ambition are set by a mix of quantified global targets and national benchmarks.

Option 4: Aggregate indicators to give a combined 'score' for each target. A score is given for each indicator used to measure a target, on a common scale, and these scores are aggregated into a single composite score for each target. This option can be demonstrated using target 16.1 in a fictional country with indicators equally weighted as follows.

A single composite score would be easy to communicate and can be further aggregated across targets or even goals. This makes it an attractive option, especially if a wide number of indicators are used. However, the weighting of different indicators will be hugely influential on the score, making it a sensitive, subjective and potentially contested issue at both global and national levels. Finally, the nuance of

three-sided indicator sets risks being lost, undermining their use for policy making (though the underlying data would of course still be available).

Recommendation: In order for the indicator framework to meet the three requirements outlined above (showing starting point, progress, and whether targets are met), the international community will need to go further than simply placing groups of indicators under individual targets. Saferworld would recommend option 3 (a combined approach) for further discussion and testing as a model for use by all member states. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the technical and political challenges, UN agencies and other third parties could also consider exploring option 4 independently.



Somali soldiers walking at dusk near Mogadishu. The new indicator framework needs to measure a holistic vision of peace that goes beyond the mere absence of violence. © UN PHOTO/STUART PRICE

4. HOW IS GOAL 16 ALREADY BEING MEASURED?

Some opponents of a peace goal have suggested that it would be impossible to measure, but this is not the case. In 2013, Saferworld identified over 160 multi-country datasets that could be used to measure the peace agenda.⁵ UN agencies and other organisations have come to similar conclusions.⁶

Just because the international community has not chosen to measure something well in the past does not mean it cannot. By combining ambition, innovation and existing datasets, it is feasible to measure Goal 16.

Some issues, such as the number of violent deaths, are in fact relatively easy to measure compared with issues that are considered uncontroversial such as the number of people living in poverty. Measurement methods and data on other aspects of peace, such as participation in decision-making, may be more challenging. However, even on these, data and methodologies exist, and gaps in data are more related to a lack of ambition than of feasibility. Just because the international community has not chosen to measure something well in the past does not mean it cannot. By combining ambition, innovation and existing datasets, it is feasible to measure Goal 16.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

The quality and quantity of data from these and other initiatives vary enormously. Capacity gaps affect both the quality and timeliness of data – especially at national level. Some datasets cover a large number of countries, while others remain country-specific or are still being tested. The comparability of data between different contexts and across time is a major hurdle. Some of these initiatives generate primary data while others merely collate and merge data into composites. There are also

Existing measures of peace-related issues around the world

At national level individual countries are experimenting with a wide variety of innovative approaches:

- Mexico's Social Cohesion and Crime Prevention Survey produces specialised information on trust among citizens and security actors.
- In 2009, Indonesia set up a National Democracy Index to track political participation and government effectiveness.
- Under the New Deal, conflict-affected states from across the world are piloting 34 common indicators to measure progress on five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

At regional level there is a wealth of innovation and experience to build on:

- Under the Strategy for the Harmonisation of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA) led by the African Union (AU), Cabo Verde and eight other African countries are now collecting statistics on governance, peace and security with encouraging results.
- Nearly half of Africa's countries have confirmed their interest in following their lead.
- The European Union (EU) has also developed various initiatives, for example harmonising crime and justice data and launching a European Crime and Safety Survey.
- Afrobarometer, Asianbarometer, and Latinobarometer survey people's views and experiences of insecurity, political empowerment and other related issues at regional level.

At international level:

- The 'Praia City Group' of national statistics offices has been formed to develop common approaches to governance, peace and security statistics.
- Multilateral institutions such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Health Organization collect data on violence and insecurity.
- Large-scale household surveys supported by multilateral agencies and donors include optional modules on peace-related issues.
- Seventy countries have participated in the International Crime Victimization Survey.
- A range of research institutions such as the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Human Security Report Project, Transparency International, and the World Justice Project collect a wealth of data relevant for peace, governance and justice.
- The international polling company Gallup collects people's experiences and perceptions of security in 140 countries every year.
- Initiatives like Ushahidi are collecting data on peace from the public using mobile phone and crowd-sourcing technology, providing a further example of how Africa is leading the way.
- Global Financial Integrity has developed methods for measuring illicit financial flows.


differences on the perceived legitimacy of different data collectors, for example between national statistics offices and civil society groups. Data on peace issues – such as the incidence of violence or people's participation in politics – are perceived by some governments as sensitive, and thus expanding coverage will require confidence-building. However, while further support to fill capacity gaps is needed, the data and the lessons learnt through these initiatives provide every confidence that a strong data foundation for Goal 16 is entirely feasible.

5. WAY FORWARD: DESIGN OF THE INDICATOR FRAMEWORK

1. Balance multiple indicators to create a reliable measure of progress.

When measuring progress towards more peaceful societies, no single indicator can in every context tell a full, fair story about progress. Wherever possible, each of the peace-related targets in Goal 16 will need to be monitored using three-sided indicator sets that measure:

- **Capacity** – is governmental and social capacity being developed to enhance peace and prevent violent conflict?
- The **‘Objective’ Situation**⁷ – do statistical measures of actual societal situations show that improvements are being achieved?
- **Public Perceptions** – does the public feel that an improvement is occurring?



None of these will by itself present a full, reliable picture – but when combined and triangulated, each indicator type can validate the other and highlight the interconnections between the multiple facets of peace, governance and justice even within an individual target focused on a single issue. Three-sided indicator sets can provide a valuable picture whereas single indicators risk creating perverse incentives and misleading results.⁸ Due to capacity limitations, the number of indicators must be limited, but in the case of Goal 16 it is crucially important that monitoring is not reduced to a limited set of ‘catch-all’ proxies: this would be misleading, and could do considerable harm.

2. Use criteria. There is broad consensus on the criteria that should be used for selecting indicators. First of all, global indicators are only desirable if they are limited to upholding progress on a short list of priorities that are genuinely universal. Second, each global indicator must be relevant for and representative of the target in question (a key issue to be kept in mind when considering proxies). Third, the timeliness of the data produced is a crucial consideration if the indicator is to be useful for effective policy-making; data should ideally be produced annually. Fourth, the feasibility of collecting the data should be factored in, especially

ensuring that a large enough sample size is available to allow for disaggregation.

3. Draw on existing indicator sets – but consider new ones as well. Although indicators for which data exist should be prioritised, proposals for new sets of indicators should not be overlooked.⁹ Some indicators may be especially effective in measuring progress on a certain issue but, currently, only be in use in a few contexts. If they add significant value, creating or expanding certain indicators should be an option to consider.

4. Disaggregate data as far as possible. Disaggregation of data could make it possible to spot differences in access to resources, services and benefits between, for example, racial, ethnic, religious, class, gender, age, income, and geographic groups. Disaggregation according to refugee/internally displaced person (IDP) status can also provide important insights. Disaggregation is difficult, but it should be a priority. Capturing inequalities is central to achieving fairness and ensuring no-one is left behind. However, there is also a conflict prevention dimension: a considerable body of evidence suggests that horizontal inequalities between social groups are a significant driver of conflict.¹⁰ As disaggregation may carry political sensitivities/risks for vulnerable groups, confidential and impartial data gathering mechanisms are required.¹¹ Disaggregation will require that statistically significant sample sizes are produced. If data availability restricts the level of disaggregation possible then, from a peace perspective, sex, age, and geographic region should be prioritised. The most important identity group in a given context should also be added, whether religious, ethnic or racial. In some cases, however, individual indicators may merit tailored disaggregations.

5. Vary the data sources. Using a variety of data sources, each with their own strengths and weaknesses, will help strengthen the reliability of the overall picture being developed.¹² Administrative data, surveys of individuals/households (tracking both people’s experiences

USING THREE-SIDED INDICATOR SETS TO MEASURE PEOPLE’S SECURITY

To measure progress in the thematic area of ‘people’s access to security’, increases in police capacity (such as the number of officers per violent crime) are a step in the right direction. Capacity indicators help show the level of effort that is being made to work towards improved security. But the effects of this capacity on security levels will only be clear from ‘objective’ situation indicators, such as the number of reported violent crimes. However, this kind of ‘objective’ data is of variable reliability. For example, national statistics on reported violent

crimes can be manipulated, politicised, or ‘improved’ through heavy-handed, counter-productive approaches. Most of all, they are dependent on people actually reporting crimes, which is itself indicative of faith in the security services. Therefore, a perceptions-based indicator showing people’s confidence in the security services can validate trends in the indicators on capacity development and the reported rate of violent crime – illustrating whether the ultimate intended outcome of security provision is actually being attained.

(including of victimisation) and their perceptions), and surveys of experts already offer a strong combination. In the era of the data revolution,¹³ new data sources can be merged together to measure different aspects of peace and their interconnections.¹⁴

One of the biggest questions for the new indicator framework is how to use emerging bottom-up forms of information gathering, such as mobile phone crowd-sourcing technologies or participatory approaches. These could serve as useful shadow-monitoring systems even if left outside of the formal indicator framework – but it would be a missed opportunity by the UNSC not to find ways to integrate and use such data.

6. Support the independence and autonomy of National Statistics Offices (NSOs).


Data for global indicators will primarily be produced at national level. This means building monitoring systems that are broadly owned at country level, and reliable for governments, people, and the international community. The impressive strides by NSOs to measure peace, governance and justice must be learnt from, built on, and widened extensively. Yet building the capacity of national systems is only worthwhile if the system achieves independence, impartiality, and sensitivity in handling confidential data on specific groups.¹⁵ Use of established international best practice on the principles and legal frameworks that guarantee this should become the global norm to help ensure this.¹⁶

7. Involve multiple stakeholders in gathering data. As the UNSC Friends of the Chair Group has asserted, “the necessary data revolution is a joint responsibility of Governments, international and regional organisations, the private sector and civil society”.¹⁷ While NSOs will play a central monitoring role, the potential of the data revolution lies in the wealth of official and non-official actors that are driving it. Their potential should be harnessed. Given the political dimensions of conflict in many contexts, it is crucial to ensure that multiple stakeholders take part in

monitoring and validating the story of progress that data can provide. Civil society organisations (CSOs), private companies and multilateral bodies also have significant amounts of data and experience that will be vital for the formal indicator framework.

8. Beware of perverse incentives. When selecting the type of indicator to be used in measuring peace, governance or justice, we should remain focused on outcomes for people, not the outputs of states. For example, measuring the

conviction rate of criminals might tell us something about the administrative delivery of justice – but it could also mask serious injustices being committed that can drive conflict. Some indicators that may be progressive in one context could have unintended, harmful impacts in another; these must be avoided. Even if combinations of indicators are used to validate each other, the risks of pursuing progress on every indicator in a variety of different contexts need to be carefully weighed.



An African Union soldier on the roof of Mogadishu University. Gathering data on peace-related indicators will require an investment in capacities across the world, especially in low-income countries affected by conflict.
© UN PHOTO/STUART PRICE

STRETCHED CAPACITY?

Measuring the 169 substantive targets proposed by the OWG will “pose a significant challenge for even the most advanced statistical systems. Statistical systems in many developing countries will have great difficulty to comply with the expected new requirements.”¹⁸ This means that member states *could*:

- Accept that the number of targets they have agreed presents a serious obstacle for meaningful monitoring and should be reduced through a technically led process to consolidate targets and address repetition. An option for cutting the number of targets in Goal 16 from 12 to 7 has been set out in Section 2.
- Commit to finance a significant scale-up in data capacities, with

more support for NSOs and data-sharing across borders.

- Recognise the potential of ‘harmonisation’. For example, through the SHaSA process African NSOs have already started harmonising 53 indicators on peace and governance. Many of these indicators could be used for Goal 16.
- Agree to use data from third parties. It is widely accepted that meeting the new goals will require deeper partnerships involving diverse stakeholders – for example leveraging the potential of the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The indicator framework is no different.

6. INDICATOR SHORTLIST

This section models sets of indicators that could be used together to measure peace targets in the post-2015 framework.

We have followed the common criteria outlined above in nominating these indicators. For each indicator we have:

- Assessed what type of indicator it is
- Explained its relevance to the target in question
- Presented an overview of known global data availability, coverage, timeliness and source type
- Noted key pros and cons
- Assessed how feasible it would be to use the indicator on a universal basis

Where possible, under each target we have sought to demonstrate the indicators in action using data available for an illustrative time period in relation to three example countries. This illustrates not only that measurement is possible, but also how indicators can track change over time and validate trends illustrated by other related indicators. In selecting our example countries we have sought to strike a balance between developed, middle-income and developing countries. The selection of example countries has also been influenced by data availability.

The data presented for these countries is **purely illustrative**. Gaps, inconsistencies and errors may exist in the data and we are not inferring that the data we use demonstrates relationships between indicators.

In addition to our preferred indicators, we have included information on others that we believe also merit attention. While some of these indicators would be feasible, they may be less relevant than those we have nominated. In other cases they are equally (or more) relevant, but currently less feasible and so would require further development.

We have also given some hypothetical examples of the progress that the indicator sets could show, using existing data for past years.

TARGET 1: REDUCE BY X% THE NUMBER OF VIOLENT DEATHS AND ENSURE PEOPLE FROM ALL SOCIAL GROUPS FEEL SAFE

Consolidates OWG targets:

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing countries, for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime

1.1 Homicides per 100,000

As a widely used 'objective' indicator that draws on administrative records from law enforcement and public health authorities, this indicator can be used as one source for the 'x%' in Target One. Intentional homicide is usually defined as the unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person, though specific definitions can vary between contexts. It generally does not include homicides judged to be a "legal intervention" (i.e. at the hands of security services), conflict deaths, and may not include deaths in some crisis situations. UNODC currently produces annual data for 219 countries and territories annually. However, its data largely rely on reporting by authorities and gaps exist at this level. For example, in 2012, 70 countries did not collect any homicide data.¹⁹ This means that existing data in some cases rely on estimates created using WHO household survey data. As such, this indicator will require further development despite its evident feasibility. See Fig 1.1.

1.2 Total number of deaths from armed conflict

This 'objective' indicator can also be used to measure the 'x%' of target one. While it could be combined with indicator 1.1 to aggregate deaths per 100,000, there is also a case for keeping it separate in order to allow for differentiation

between types of violence within and between countries.²⁰ There are few existing official data sources on conflict deaths, but a number of organisations currently collate global data on conflict deaths using different definitions and methodologies. For example, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) draws on media reports, other secondary sources and experts to count battle-related deaths in conflicts where more than 25 people are killed (it also collates data on "one-sided violence" and "non-state violence" which could feasibly be included). However, reliance on events data reporting currently used for collecting data on armed conflict risks missing deaths that go unreported. Furthermore, deaths from some forms of conflict-related violence – such as riots – may be omitted due to definitional boundaries. Significant efforts will need to be made to harmonise definitions and sources, make them more comprehensive, and improve methods of data collection. Nonetheless, in general, this is a feasible indicator for universal use. See Fig 1.2.

1.3 Percentage of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live

This perception indicator is a direct measure of people's sense of security. It may not always be comparable between contexts: for example, people living in highly insecure areas may become habituated to violence and underestimate threats while those living in safer environments may inflate risks on the basis of media reporting or rumour. Furthermore, mainstream global perception surveys do not always have data from the most fragile contexts and/or are affected by political restrictions on what they can ask. This indicator is being used by some NSOs, but is also collected on a global basis through Gallup's annual World Poll, which covers

95% of the world’s population. Alternatively, the indicator could be packaged into other household or victimisation surveys in the future and could be used universally with little difficulty. See Fig 1.3.

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:


1.a Number of people per 100,000 displaced due to violence

This indicator would add a further measurement of a country’s level of peacefulness. UNHCR collects data on numbers of refugees while the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) collects data on global levels of internal displacement from national governments, international organisations and the media. While global data have been published annually since 2008 by IDMC for 161 countries, country-specific data are currently restricted to displacement from natural disasters – and therefore are not displayed graphically here. Given that the administrative records on displacement due to violence are held by a number of governments, UN agencies and NGOs, getting timely and accurate data for this target would require harmonisation and partnerships rather than significant capacity building. This makes the indicator relatively feasible for universal use.

1.b Percentage of the adult population subjected to physical, psychological or sexual violence within the last 12 months


Through focusing on violence aside from death, this ‘objective’ indicator is relevant to the target as a broader measure of personal security and social peacefulness. Data for this indicator can be gathered through victimisation surveys. For example, the International Crime Victimization Survey has been conducted in 80 countries. Nonetheless, to date, these studies have not been consistent in

Fig 1.1 Homicides per 100,000, 2003–11 [Source: UNODC]




COMMENT: Using data available from UNODC over a seven-year period, this chart demonstrates falling homicide rates in three different contexts. Sri Lanka’s homicide rate nearly halved, Turkey’s dropped by around 40%, while the USA’s rate has seen a more modest reduction of around 16%.

Fig 1.2 Total battle-related deaths, 1989–2013 [Source: UCDP]



COMMENT: Drawing on UCDP data (from the ‘best-estimate’ data set), this chart demonstrates large changes in conflict deaths across a 24-year period. It demonstrates how trends in conflict deaths can differ greatly from homicide deaths, as is clearly the case in Sri Lanka.

Fig 1.3 Percentage of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live, 2006–14 [Source: Gallup World Poll]



COMMENT: Despite having a lower homicide rate than the United States or Sri Lanka, less people in Turkey feel safe walking alone at night according to this data. Nonetheless, the percentage feeling safe has increased over the years – at roughly the same time as homicide rates fell shortly before.



coverage and are only conducted every five years. Another household survey with questions on gender-based violence is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Modules on violence within DHS surveys need to be requested by host governments, so significant capacity would need to be invested to produce annual, global datasets. Definitional differences between countries would also need to be addressed. The universal use of this indicator is therefore feasible but challenging.

1.c Number of police and judicial personnel per homicide

Through measuring the number of personnel, this indicator can help illustrate

the state's capacity to prevent, investigate and adjudicate cases of homicide. Nonetheless, the indicator does not measure the quality of this capacity. Furthermore, increases in capacity – especially as measured in personnel – may not always correlate with reductions in homicide or wider peacefulness in society. Indeed, increasing the number of personnel may be driven by the state's response to an increase in violence. As such, this indicator would need to be used carefully and be validated alongside other indicators. Nonetheless, the indicator is relatively feasible given that UNODC already collects relevant annual data on police and judicial personnel as well as homicide rates for a number of countries.

Table 3: Option for demonstrating when targets are met

Hypothetical case of United States of America (USA) in 2011 for a 15-year framework initiated in 2006. The USA has decided to aim for a 15% reduction in homicide and is on track five years in. However, it is off track in seeking a 50% reduction in conflict deaths and a 10% increase in people feeling safe.			
Global indicators	Baseline in 2006	National target 2021	Progress in 2011
Violent homicides per 100,000	5.8	15% reduction (4.93)	4.7
Total conflict deaths	191	50% reduction (95)	190
% of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	73	Additional 10% (83)	74
Hypothetical case of Turkey in 2011 for a 15-year framework initiated in 2006. Turkey has decided to aim for a 20% reduction in homicide and has already met this benchmark within five years. It appears to be on track to increase the number of people who feel safe walking home at night by 20%. However, Turkey is off track in seeking to reduce conflict deaths by 50%.			
Global indicators	Baseline in 2006	National target 2021	Progress in 2011
Violent homicides per 100,000	4.6	20% reduction (3.68)	2.6
Total conflict deaths	210	50% reduction (105)	599
% of people who report that they feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	48	Additional 20% (68)	60

TARGET 2: END ABUSE, EXPLOITATION, TRAFFICKING AND ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND TORTURE AGAINST CHILDREN

Original OWG target:

16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children

Note: the first five indicators related to Target One on violence, above, could also serve as useful indicators for this target if disaggregated by age.

2.1 Percentage of young adults aged 18–24 years who have experienced sexual violence by age 18

This 'objective' indicator captures a specific type of violence against children, being reported by adults retrospectively. Sexual violence affects children across the world and measuring its prevalence would indicate progress against the wider objective of the target as a whole. Data on violence against children is only currently being collected every five years or so in a handful of DHS and UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). However, with sufficient investment, data for this indicator could be collected through these existing tools and methodologies more frequently and/or through individual surveys. This makes it a feasible but challenging indicator.



TARGET 3: PEOPLE FROM ALL SOCIAL GROUPS HAVE ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:

2.a Percentage of children aged 1–14 years who experienced any physical punishment by caregivers in the past month

This 'objective' indicator focuses on a more specific type of violence against children – and the most common one. As such, it arguably presents the best picture of the exposure of children to violence. Relevant data has been collected in a small number of low- and middle-income countries since 2005 through DHS and MICS surveys. While standardised and validated approaches to gathering data for this indicator exist, it would still require harmonisation of national household surveys and use in a far greater number of countries on an annual basis. Moreover, given that it directly measures young children's exposure to violence, collection of data for this indicator must be sensitive and would be challenging in some contexts where honest responses are hard to attain. As such it is a feasible but challenging indicator for universal use.

Internally displaced persons' camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Combined with other indicators, data on numbers of people displaced by violence may potentially prove useful for 'objective' measures of peace.

© UN PHOTO/MARIE FRECHON



Modifies OWG target:

16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all

3.1 Percentage of people who voice confidence in the judicial system

This perception indicator gathers people's views on the judicial system – and is potentially a proxy of their confidence in the rule of law more widely. When used alongside other measures of justice, perception indicators can provide a validation of whether people believe that the justice system is fair and effective. Data are currently collected on this indicator through polling of individuals. For example, Gallup's World Poll, which has extensive coverage from 2006, currently asks people about their confidence in the judicial system and courts. This indicator is restricted to perceptions of the formal judicial system but could feasibly be expanded to include views of the informal justice sector too. It could also be broadened through a focus on the rule of law. See Fig 3.1 on next page.


3.2 World Justice Project combined score for effective criminal justice and access to civil justice

This 'objective' indicator could provide a broader picture of justice in a country because it draws on a wide range of sources. The World Justice Project (WJP) collects global data on the rule of law under nine key areas, including measures of criminal justice effectiveness and access to civil justice. A score (where 0 = worst and 1 = best) is based on seven sub-factors for the former and nine sub-factors for the latter. Data are drawn from public polling and expert surveys of legal professionals. Data have been produced in waves since 2009; the number of countries covered has increased to 99. While the wide number of factors measured adds strength to this indicator, this also makes it complex and reliant on subjective weighting. Nonetheless, the approach used by the WJP could inform the global indicator framework's

focus on justice and should be seriously considered given the complexity of this target. Furthermore, the WJP has started collecting data on three sub-factors of informal justice: data gaps exist alongside challenges for cross-country comparison, but this promising and relatively unique approach may merit consideration as it develops in the future. See Fig 3.2.

Fig 3.2 Combined core for effective criminal justice and access to civil justice, 2010–14

[Source: WJP] Score, where 0 = worst, 2 = best




COMMENT: While there is only limited coverage of the three case countries, combining the scores of the two indicators illustrates downward trends from 2010–2014. The decline in the score for the Philippines is notable and stands in contrast to popular perceptions of the judicial system improving in the same period (see 3.1 above).

3.3 Number of professional judges or magistrates per 100,000

This capacity indicator measures differences in the ratio of judicial sector personnel to citizens. As such, while it may not measure outcomes for people and would need to be used alongside other indicators, it is potentially useful in assessing changes in the formal judicial system's capacity to provide access. Data on this indicator is currently collected on an annual basis through the UNODC's Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). Coverage is currently limited, especially amongst developing countries, and only 64% of reporting countries have consistently provided data for more than six of the ten years currently covered. Definitional discrepancies are another challenge. Addressing these issues would




Fig 3.1 Percentage of people who voice confidence in the judicial system, 2006–14 [Source: Gallup World Poll]



COMMENT: While the Philippines has less judges and magistrates per 100,000 than either Mongolia or Chile (see 3.3 below), people appear to have much greater confidence in its judicial system. Despite having nearly eight times as many judicial personnel as the Philippines, confidence in Mongolia is significantly lower. While Chile has increased its number of judicial personnel and lowered numbers of people in pre-trial detention, confidence in the judicial system rose from 2006–2009 but then fell. *NB: For 2009 in Mongolia and 2014 in Chile, data from the previous year was used.*

Fig 3.3 Number of judges or magistrates per 100,000, 2003–12


[Source: UNODC]



COMMENT: While data is missing for some years, this chart demonstrates changes in judicial human capacity across a nine-year period and significant differences between countries. Chile more than doubled its number of judicial personnel per 100,000 during this period – at the same time as declining numbers of people were held in pre-trial detention – though this could be due to changes in definition and/or methodology.

Fig 3.a Untried/pre-trial detention rate per 100,000 of population, 2003–12

[Source: UNODC]



COMMENT: With some missing data, this chart nonetheless demonstrates clear reductions in pre-trial detention over time in Chile, consistency in the Philippines and significant fluctuations in Mongolia over a nine-year period.

not be insurmountable if the indicator was to be used on a universal basis. Nonetheless, a significant problem is that it does not measure the capacity of informal justice or dispute mechanisms, which may be widely used in some contexts. See Fig 3.3.

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:

3.a Total untried/pre-trial persons held per 100,000

This ‘objective’ indicator demonstrates how effectively a formal judicial system is administering justice and the extent to which it minimises the time spent on remand by those awaiting trial. Because it might demonstrate speedy but unjust administration of justice, it could only be used alongside other indicators and likely requires further testing. UNODC collects national administrative data on this indicator, as do some regional bodies. Methodological and definitional discrepancies exist between countries and the data do not include how long people have been held in detention, a variable that would improve the indicator’s quality. Data are already available for 118 countries between 2003–12, though only a minority of states reported every year. Though relatively feasible, universal use of this indicator would require harmonisation of approaches and significantly higher reporting rates. See Fig 3.a.

3.b Percentage of people who have experienced a dispute and report that they had access to an adequate dispute resolution mechanism

This ‘objective’ indicator directly captures the target’s intended outcome. Importantly, it is worded in a way that could cover both formal and informal justice mechanisms. When used alongside capacity and perception indicators it would greatly contribute to a rounded picture of progress. No known global data sources are currently available for this indicator. Nonetheless, it could be integrated into existing or new surveys. This makes it a feasible but challenging proposal for future development.

Table 4: Example of use of composite scores

<p>This example draws on existing data for a composite score for target three in a hypothetical framework initiated in 2006 and ending in 2021. Due to data availability, this example uses the indicator on untried or pre-trial detention rates instead of the combined WJP scores (themselves composites). A maximum score of 100 is available for each indicator. All three are then aggregated into a composite score.</p>		<p>The case of Chile between 2006 and 2011 shows its score increasing across all three indicators, with a decrease in untried or pre-trial detention rates, increases in the number of judicial personnel and increases in public confidence. As such it is on track to meet its hypothetical 2021 target composite of 40. The Philippines is also well on track to meet its hypothetical composite target of 45 by 2021. Despite scoring significantly lower</p>		<p>than Chile on number of judicial personnel, it gets a larger overall score based on high confidence in the judicial system.</p> <p>While a very simple method has been used to calculate scores, the two country examples demonstrate how the relative weighting of indicators would need to be carefully constructed and tested.</p>			
Global indicators	Baseline 2006	Indicator score 2006	Composite score 2006	Progress 2011	Indicator score 2011	Composite score 2011	2021 target composite
Untried/pre-trial detention rate per 100,000	71.5	64.3 0 = 100 200 = 0	33.0	61.2	69.4	37.6	40
Number of judges or magistrates per 100,000	9.5	15.8 60 = 100 0 = 0		10.5	17.5		
Percentage of people who voice confidence in the judicial system	19	19 100 = 100 0 = 0		26	26		
Philippines							
Global indicators	Baseline 2006	Indicator score 2006	Composite score 2006	Progress 2011	Indicator score 2011	Composite score 2011	2021 target composite
Untried/pre-trial detention rate per 100,000	66.3	66.9 0 = 100 200 = 0	41.7	64.5	67.8	44.3	45
Number of judges or magistrates per 100,000	1.9	3.2 60 = 100 0 = 0		1.8	3		
Percentage of people who voice confidence in the judicial system	55	55 100 = 100 0 = 0		59	59		

TARGET 4: SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE ILLICIT AND IRRESPONSIBLE GLOBAL FLOWS OF FINANCE, ARMS AND CONFLICT COMMODITIES AS WELL AS THE VIOLENT IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME

Modifies OWG target:

16.4 By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime

4.1 Total volume of outward and inward illicit financial flows

This ‘objective’ indicator measures illicit financial flows (IFFs), which are a central aspect of this target. Data on illicit outflows from developing countries are currently collected by Global Financial Integrity (GFI). GFI identifies gaps in trade and balance of payments data from several sources, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, UN trade data, the United States Department of Commerce and European trade statistics. GFI accepts possible flaws in the data it draws on and believes that its estimate of outflows is conservative. Furthermore, data is not currently produced for 33 developed countries and several developing countries. To show a fuller picture of global flows, data on estimated inflows of IFFs would also need to be created. Nonetheless, the data produced by GFI – or at the very least the approach it uses – could be feasibly integrated into the indicator framework on a universal basis. IFFs could also be assessed as a percentage

of GDP and/or split between trade mispricing (the majority of IFFs) and other types of illicit flows. This indicator could also be triangulated with indicators on corruption under target five. Finally, the existence of this data means that the wording of the target itself could be quantified. See Fig 4.1.

4.2 Signature, ratification and reporting on implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty

This capacity indicator relates to reducing illicit and irresponsible arms flows. The UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which was agreed by the UN General Assembly in 2013 and entered into force in December 2014, obliges States Parties to take actions to reduce irresponsible arms transfers, including those which may enter the illicit market. 130 states have signed the ATT and 64 have so far ratified it. The indicator would monitor whether a state has signed, ratified and reported on its implementation of the treaty. Future reporting could provide a source of useful data for this target. See Table 5 on next page.

4.3 Drug-related crime per 100,000 population

The production, sale and transfer of illicit drugs makes up a considerable proportion of activities related to transnational

organised crime and so this ‘objective’ indicator would show a key dimension of the violence associated with it. UNODC collects data on a range of drug-related crimes through its surveys of member states and their administrative data. Given that drug-related crimes have to be reported to authorities before member states can report on them to UNODC, considerable gaps may exist in this data – and it could be affected by heavy-handed approaches to drugs. Victimization surveys may prove useful alternative sources of data for this indicator. It would be feasible to use this indicator.

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:

4.a Combined value of trafficking of arms, natural resources and drugs as a proportion of GDP


Relative to its GDP, this ‘objective’ indicator would help assess whether flows of illicit goods from, to, or through a country are increasing or decreasing. UNODC already collects and analyses data on drug trafficking trends, including seizures, price and purity of illicit drugs. However, the quality of this data is often reliant on member state reporting. Second, changes in data on the value of seizures of illicit goods may reflect changes in the capacity of either law enforcement agencies or traffickers themselves. Finally, data on illicit flows of arms and natural resources are less developed than is the case with drugs. Nonetheless, a concerted effort to address some of these challenges, using the lessons learned from measuring illicit drug flows, could make this indicator feasible in the future.

4.b Business perceptions of the cost of organised crime

This perception indicator is based on a survey of businesses, asking whether they believe organised crime imposes costs on business in their country. While this is a restricted perspective, its specific focus may be more revealing than generalised assessments. A weakness is that the indicator does not focus on transnational

Fig 4.1 Total volume of outward illicit financial flows, US\$ million nominal, 2003–12

[Source: GFI]



COMMENT: This graph highlights the huge volume of IFFs estimated by GFI. Nigeria and Indonesia follow similar trends while IFFs from Russia increase markedly before declining again in 2012.

TARGET 5: REDUCE CORRUPTION BY X%, ENSURE THAT THOSE INVOLVED ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE, AND GUARANTEE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Table 5: Signature, ratification of and reporting on implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty [Source: UN Treaty Collection]


	Signed?	Ratified?	Reporting?
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	N/A
Russian Federation	No	No	N/A
Indonesia	No	No	N/A

organised crime. Data are currently collected for this indicator through the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (WEF-GCR). 14,000 executives across 144 countries were polled on this question for its latest 2014–15 report. Data have been collected since 2005. As such, this indicator would be feasible for universal use with some expansion of coverage. In order to gather people’s views on the presence of organised crime in their country or community, the indicator could also be relatively feasibly integrated into polling of the general public or into crime victimisation surveys. See Fig 4.b.

Fig 4.b Business perceptions of the cost of organised crime (“To what extent does organised crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses in your country?”), 2011–14

[Source: WEF-GCR]

Score, where 1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all



4.c Recovered stolen assets as a percentage of illicit financial flows

This indicator would measure how well a country is doing in recovering the proceeds of corruption and other illicit

assets held overseas. As a percentage of illicit financial outflows in a given year – excluding trade mispricing – the indicator would demonstrate successes in proportion to the challenge. Nonetheless, it would need to be recognised that these flows include more than the proceeds from corruption; even when large assets are recovered they will only represent a small proportion of illicit outflows. Some countries currently maintain their own asset recovery databases. As part of the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR), the World Bank and UNODC currently host the Asset Recovery Watch (ARW), which compiles, systematises and publishes information about completed and active asset recovery efforts around the world. Focused only on the proceeds of corruption, the ARW mainly draws its data from media sources and thus should not be considered comprehensive. With sufficient political will and openness, this indicator could be further developed on a universal basis.



Money stacked high by currency traders in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Tackling illicit flows of money across borders will require that its movement is effectively monitored. © SAFERWORLD/THOMAS WHEELER

Consolidates OWG targets:

16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

5.1 Percentage of people who have paid a bribe in the last 12 months


This indicator could present a relatively ‘objective’ picture on the prevalence of bribery in a country and could provide data for the ‘x%’ in the target. However, while it would measure how often people confront corruption in their everyday lives, it would not measure the scale of corruption in financial terms or necessarily capture corruption in specific areas, for example at political levels. Data on this indicator have been collected in Gallup polls in the past and variations are found in the World Values Survey. Transparency International collects data on experiences of paying bribes during engagement across eight public services within its Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) poll, which covered 107 countries in 2013. It would be feasible to use this indicator universally with a number of existing sources to draw on, though coverage would need to be widened. See Fig 5.1 on next page.

5.2 Open Budget Index Score

Focusing on an important aspect of governance, this capacity indicator would help measure transparency and access to information in a country. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) currently scores countries using its Open Budget Survey Tracker. Information is gathered through a standard questionnaire completed by researchers drawing on official documents and interviews. Produced every two years since 2006, the last survey included 100 countries. As well as requiring improvements in coverage and time-liness, this indicator could be challenged on the basis of subjectivity. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the feasibility, in principle, of measuring transparency of and access to information about government budgets. See Fig 5.2 on next page.




Fig 5.1 Percentage of people who report paying a bribe in the last 12 months, selected years 2004–13 [Source: Transparency International GCB]




COMMENT: This graph shows stark differences in the number of people who report paying a bribe to access a service between the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Yemen. It also shows significant fluctuations – though this may be influenced by slight differences in polling questions between years. It should also be noted that while it has low aggregate levels, the UK sees an increase in reported bribe-paying, from 1% in 2011 to 5% in 2013 – a five-fold increase.

Fig 5.3 Percentage of people who believe corruption is widespread in their country, 2006–14 [Source: Gallup World Poll]




COMMENT: This chart illustrates fluctuations over time in perceptions of corruption, especially within the United Kingdom. Despite having low levels of people reporting paying a bribe, significantly more people in the United Kingdom have come to believe corruption is widespread since 2006.

Fig 5.b Control of Corruption Score, 2003–11 [Source: World Bank WGI]
Score 0–100 with 100 being the best possible score and 0 the worst



COMMENT: Differences between the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Yemen and Pakistan on the other, are shown to be relatively larger in this index than in indicators 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 above.

Fig 5.2 Open Budget Index Score, 2006–12
[Source: IPB] Score (100 = best, 0 = worst)



COMMENT: While there are clear gaps in the data within a relatively brief timeframe, this chart still demonstrates differences between countries in levels of transparency in budgets and differences between years within countries. The differences are mirrored in other indicators.

5.3 Percentage of people who believe that corruption is widespread throughout the government in their country

This perception indicator captures people’s views of corruption within their own countries. It only focuses on government corruption – potentially overlooking the private sector. As with some other perception indicators, rumours of corruption, the level of media coverage or secrecy on the issue, and other perception-shaping factors in a country would impact on this indicator in a way that may not reflect actual levels of corruption. Nonetheless, it could serve as a useful complement to other ‘objective’ or capacity-focused indicators. Furthermore, it should be noted that comprehensive hard evidence of corruption is extremely challenging to collect. Data on this issue are currently gathered through Gallup’s World Poll and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, demonstrating the high feasibility of this indicator. See Fig 5.3.

TARGET 6: ENSURE PEOPLE FROM ALL SOCIAL GROUPS CAN PARTICIPATE IN AND INFLUENCE DECISION- MAKING AT ALL LEVELS

Modifies OWG target:

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

6.1 World Bank Voice and Accountability Score

As with 5.b, this indicator is a subset of the World Bank's WGI which establishes an aggregate score drawn from numerous sources. It could be used as an 'objective' indicator as it seeks to capture perceptions of citizen participation in governance as well as wider political freedoms. Countries are ranked from -2.5 (worse) to +2.5 (best). As noted, the number of data sources used in each year for different countries varies and the indicator as a whole suffers from the same challenges as other composite indicators. It does, nonetheless, merit consideration as a universal indicator with relatively wide coverage and frequency of production, produced by a multilateral institution. See Fig 6.1 on next page.



Sudanese people take part in 'Citizen Hearings' in Blue Nile State, part of a process of popular consultations where residents can express whether the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has met their expectations. Indicators on people's experiences and perceptions of peace need to be included in the new development framework.

© UN PHOTO/TIM MCKULKA

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:

5.a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Score

Unlike 5.3, this perception indicator is based on assessments of countries collected by various institutions as well as surveys of experts. Nonetheless, it presents some of the same challenges as indicator 5.3. While it can be argued that drawing on multiple sources increases the reliability of the indicator (a minimum of three data sources are used), the indicator faces some of the common challenges associated with composite indices (e.g. weighting between data sources, impact of omission of some data sources). The indicator already has a wide coverage, including 175 countries in 2014, and could be adopted fairly easily as a universal indicator for this target.

5.b World Bank Control of Corruption Score

A subset of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), this composite index score has been collected for 215 economies since 1996. It provides a potentially rich source of information: 32 data sources are currently used to form the WGI scores, drawing from surveys of households and firms, commercial information providers, NGOs, and public sector organisations. The number of data sources used in each year for different countries varies and the indicator as a whole suffers from the same challenges as other composite indicators. While these problems are not insurmountable, the same data sources would need to be used in all contexts to allow for comparison between countries and over time. Its established use by a multilateral institution, however, makes it a feasible option. See Fig 5.b.

6.2 Percentage of population who believe that they can influence policy-making in their country

This perception indicator would reflect people's views on the essence of the target and is potentially the optimal way to measure influence. It is also worded in a way that would be more universal than indicator 6.a below, which would be restricted to countries that hold elections. While there are currently no known global data sources for this indicator, it would be feasible to add it into existing global polls or national surveys. The indicator might require that survey questions outline or define the different types of policy-making processes to which the question applies.

6.3 Diversity in representation (by sex, region and social groups) in state institutions (legislature, government, military, and judiciary) compared to national distribution

This capacity indicator would measure how well institutions of governance reflect the make-up of the national population and hence, potentially, infer levels of representativeness and participation in decision-making by different social groups. There are currently no existing global data sets for this indicator, though it has been proposed as a common indicator for the New Deal process in conflict-affected states, and variations of it may exist in other countries. It would be challenging but still feasible to make this a universal indicator using administrative and census data.

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:


6.a Percentage of people who have confidence in the honesty of elections

This perception indicator reveals how honest people believe elections are in their country, providing important complementary data to information on whether elections are held and levels of participation in them. However, with around 120 electoral democracies in existence around the world, the




Fig 6.1 Voice and Accountability Score, 2003–13 [Source: World Bank WGI]

Score, where 2.5 = best; -2.5 = worst




COMMENT: The large variation between Canada, Tunisia and Vietnam from 2003–10 is visible in the WGI scores. Notable are the changes in Tunisia after 2010.

Fig 6.a Percentage of people who voice confidence in the honesty of elections, 2006–14 [Source: Gallup World Poll]



COMMENT: While having vastly different scores in the WGI Voice and Accountability rankings, people in Vietnam and Canada have similar views of the honesty of elections in their countries. Notable again is the absence of data for Tunisia pre-2010 as well as a steep decline in initial optimism about the honesty of elections, demonstrating a different trend to the WGI score. NB. In 2014, data for Canada were drawn from the previous year and in 2013 data for Vietnam were taken from the previous year.

Fig 6.c Percentage of people who have voiced opinion to a public official in last month, 2006–14 [Source: Gallup World Poll]



COMMENT: This indicator demonstrates relatively small numbers of people who directly engage with public officials in all three countries. Nonetheless, drops in Tunisia and Vietnam between individual years are notable, as is Canada’s significant increase since 2006. The absence of data for Tunisia before 2010 illustrates some of the difficulties of getting relevant data from politically restrictive contexts. NB. In 2009 and 2011 data from the previous years was used for Canada and Vietnam. In 2014 data from the previous year was used for Vietnam and Tunisia.

universality of this indicator is questionable. Global data is already collected through the Gallup World Poll and could be gathered nationally, as it already is in 20 African countries participating in the SHaSA process. This means that it is a feasible indicator. See Fig 6.a.

6.b Percentage of people who report participating in a political process in the past year

This ‘objective’ indicator would measure people’s participation in political decisions and would be applicable in most countries despite differences between political systems. However, while applicable to different levels of decision-making, a clearer definition of what a political process is may be required. Another limitation is that while people may be able to participate in political processes, they may choose not to – so the indicator could reflect apathy rather than ability to participate. This indicator would not measure influence, and there are no known global data sources for this indicator, although the World Values Survey does already poll people on their participation in some forms of political action (such as demonstrations and protests). Data could feasibly be gathered through surveys. It would, however, be difficult to gather meaningful responses to this question in countries where opportunities for political participation are already low.

6.c Percentage of people who have voiced opinion to a public official in last month

While this ‘objective’ indicator is less comprehensive than indicator 6.b, it would be a partial reflection of people’s ability to engage with officials and, as such, potentially be relevant to the target. Nonetheless, the indicator faces some of the same problems as 6.b For example, it may reflect political apathy and does not capture influence on decision-making. Its strength is that data for this indicator is already gathered in the Gallup World Poll, meaning that it could be feasibly used as a universal indicator with little difficulty. See Fig 6.c.


TARGET 7: ENSURE THAT PEOPLE FROM ALL SOCIAL GROUPS ENJOY LEGAL IDENTITY, AND FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Consolidates OWG targets:
16.9 By 2030 provide legal identity for all including birth registration
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements

7.1 Percentage of children under five whose births have been registered with a civil authority

This ‘objective’ indicator captures a key aspect of the target on legal identity. It is based on the assumption that people with legal identity will enjoy more equal access to social goods than those who do not – and thus is a proxy indicator rather than measuring an outcome per se. Data are already collected on this indicator through censuses, administrative civil registration systems and household surveys, including the DHS and MICS surveys. Systematic reporting of births by administrative systems in many countries remains a challenge, meaning that household surveys will continue to be relied on in many low-income countries. This would be a very feasible indicator, though significant effort would be required to improve the timeliness of these common surveys. See Fig 7.1.

Fig 7.1 Percentage of children under five whose births have been registered with a civil authority [Source: UNICEF]



COMMENT: This table shows significant variation between Tanzania, on the one hand, and Egypt and Poland on the other.

7.2 Number of journalists and human rights defenders imprisoned, missing or in exile per 1,000,000 population

This ‘objective’ indicator would be a relatively relevant measure of freedom of the press in a country and, more broadly, freedom of expression and action. It is suggested that this be measured ‘per million population’ in order to distinguish between countries with different-sized populations. While administrative data could be drawn for this indicator, more comprehensive and intensive methods may be required to ensure cases of imprisonment or disappearance are captured. Indeed, the sensitivity of these issues for authorities in some countries might mean that third parties are better placed to gather data on this issue. Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists currently collect data on journalist deaths and imprisonments for a select number of countries. Other NGOs and UN agencies, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHCR) or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), produce some similar data. As well as NGO sources, OCHCR annual reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances could be used for information on human rights defenders. While politically challenging, this indicator is technically feasible for universal use.

7.3 Percentage of people who can express political views without fear

The Gallup World Poll collected data on this indicator across many countries in the past, demonstrating its feasibility. Alternatively, in order to focus more on behaviours, a variant of this indicator would measure the percentage of people who feel free to join any political organisation they want (Afrobarometer currently collects data on this indicator). Nonetheless, political restrictions could obstruct efforts to gather data for either indicator in some contexts: if people already fear expressing political views, some may be less likely to respond honestly to polling or other forms of

survey. It would be crucial that those conducting surveys are perceived to be independent.

OTHER INDICATORS FOR CONSIDERATION AND/OR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT:

7.a Combined scores for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and association

This ‘objective’ indicator would draw from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, which annually rates the level of government respect for a variety of internationally recognised human rights. Primarily drawing on data from Amnesty International and US State Department Reports, scores for 15 human rights are made by CIRI, ranging from 0 (no respect for a right) to 2 (full respect for a right). Scoring based on a limited set of sources creates risks of subjective bias and/or overlooked data. Furthermore, the current sources used would likely meet strong opposition from some member states. Nonetheless, and despite some significant data gaps, CIRI has provided annual information for about 202 countries from 1981 to 2011, demonstrating the universal feasibility of this indicator. See Fig 7.a on next page.


7.b World Press Freedom Index Score

This ‘objective’ indicator speaks directly to a specific aspect of the ‘freedom of expression’ component of the target. Compiled by Reporters Without Borders, the index reflects the degree of freedom that journalists, news media and ‘Internet’ citizens enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. Drawing from experts surveys and reviews of administrative data, a range of criteria are assessed to form a composite score (0 = best, 100 = worse). The index has been compiled since 2002 in 180 countries, demonstrating comprehensive coverage. Despite suffering from the same challenges as other composite indicators and drawing on subjective expert data, the existence of this indicator demonstrates that it is feasible to measure press freedom in a way



Fig 7.a Combined CIRI Score: freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and association [Source: CIRI]

Combined score, where 0 = worst and 4 = best



COMMENT: Taking a long view over 30 years, this graph demonstrates significant changes in CIRI scores in all three countries. While only reaching the maximum possible score of 4 twice, Poland’s score increases significantly since 1981 while Tanzania and Egypt exhibit fluctuations.

that takes into account issues such as media pluralism and independence, respect for the safety and freedom of journalists, and the legislative, institutional and infrastructural environment in which the media operate. See Fig 7.b below.

7.c Existence of legislation for freedom of expression, media, association and peaceful assembly


While it does not measure their enjoyment, this capacity indicator would assess

whether laws exist to ensure freedoms of expression, media, association and peaceful assembly. A range of potential data sources exist. For example, UNESCO currently assess the media environment through expert surveys currently covering 11 countries. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) releases annual reports on freedom of expression, though they are not country-focused. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of human rights has involved 192

countries to date, though only a limited number are reviewed annually. With coverage of 160 countries and territories in 2015, Amnesty International’s annual reports contain information on legislation related to human rights. While feasible, it will be challenging to draw these and other sources together to produce quantified data that is comparable across time and between countries.

7.b World Press Freedom Index Scores, 2002–15 where data available

[Source: Reporters Without Borders] Score, where 0 = best; 100 = worst



COMMENT: This chart shows significant differences between Egypt, on the one hand, and Poland and Tanzania on the other. Annual changes in the indicator score are visible, notably for Egypt where Press Freedom has reportedly worsened between 2002 and 2007. Significant change is also visible in Poland – between 2004 and 2007, its score more than doubles.

CONCLUSION

The transformative potential of the SDGs critically depends upon the setting of time-bound, measurable targets for the world to meet. Investing in the capacity to measure them effectively could prove crucial to ending extreme poverty and promoting sustainable development.

To measure the new Goal 16 on peaceful societies, the international community has a range of existing initiatives to build on. This paper identifies 19 promising indicators that could be used to measure for the core aspects of Goal 16 on a global basis. Of these, 12 have existing data that is relatively comprehensive in coverage, five have existing data but require an expansion of coverage, and two are new indicators which are highly feasible but for which no data currently

exist. We have also identified a further 18 global indicators which have sufficient potential to be considered. Of these, comprehensive data exists for seven, six require wider coverage, and five are entirely new. Together these indicators show that effectively measuring peace on a global level from 2015 is feasible with sufficient ambition and innovation.

The OWG reached a hard won consensus on an ambitious global agenda; success will require yet more ambition – at national level, and in the forging of new transnational partnerships. Part of this must be a readiness to provide finance and political support for building the global capacities for effective monitoring. Third parties will be crucial actors in the data revolution for sustainable

development. Putting the monitoring of targets aside, the availability of global data on issues such as access to justice, levels of corruption or feelings of safety would be an immense international public good in its own right.

Not every country would be able to monitor all 19 of our proposed indicators from day one, even with the assistance of third parties. As capacities grow, it may be necessary to prioritise some indicators as others are slowly being brought online. Nonetheless, it is important that all countries are working towards a common list of global indicators to track progress against the OWG's "integrated, indivisible set of global priorities for sustainable development."²¹



The UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)'s Community Violence Reduction section brings local residents together in a programme to build flood defenses. With sufficient innovation, ambition and international cooperation, an effective global indicator framework is within our grasp.
© UN PHOTO/LOGAN ABASSI



Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives.

We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in 20 countries and territories across Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe, and advocacy platforms based in London, Brussels, Washington and Vienna. Our priority is people – we believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict.

Acknowledgements: Significant inputs into earlier drafts of this paper came from Transparency International and the Institute for Economics and Peace, for which we are very grateful. Feedback from a large number of experts and practitioners to an earlier Saferworld discussion paper was also invaluable for the development of this paper. Finally, Gallup kindly provided data that allowed us to demonstrate many indicators in action.



PUBLICATIONS

All our publications are available to download from our website. We can provide hard copies of specific publications on request.

Saferworld also produces regular policy briefs and submissions, all of which are available on our website.

Read more at:

www.saferworld.org.uk

- *From the Sustainable Development Goals to the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Building a Consensus for Peace*
- *Gender, violence and peace*
- *Conflict and the post-2015 development agenda: Perspectives from South Africa*

NOTES

- 1 UN Economic and Social Council (2015) *Report of the Friends of the Chair Group on broader measures of progress* – E/CN.3/2015/2, p 11.
- 2 *Ibid*, p 4.
- 3 Cassidy, M (2014) *Assessing Gaps in Indicator Availability and Coverage* New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
- 4 While specific approaches and data may not be comparable, global mechanisms should still exist for sharing knowledge and experience of using such indicators between different contexts. Data on country- or region-specific indicators could also still be collated into a single open and accessible database at the international level.
- 5 Saferworld (2013) *A Vision of Goals, Targets and Indicators: Addressing conflict and violence from 2015*, London: Saferworld.
- 6 For example, see UN Task Team (2014) *Statistics and indicators for the post-2015 development agenda*, Institute for Economics and Peace (2014) *Measuring Goal 16: Identifying priority indicators based on key statistical and normative criteria*, Sydney: IEP and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) *Accounting for Security and Justice in the Post-2015 Development Agenda* (unpublished).
- 7 The inverted commas here indicate that the definition of some indicators as 'subjective' and others as 'objective' is problematic. All quantitative measures have an element of subjectivity, and the potential for bias and imperfect recording of phenomena. See for example UN Development Programme (2007) *Governance indicators: A Users' Guide* New York: UNDP-BDP, pp 5–6.
- 8 Scheye, D and Chigas, E (2009) 'Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators', Online pp 7, 13, 16–17, 19; UN (2010) *Monitoring Peace Consolidation – United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* New York: United Nations, p 40. On the importance of public confidence and perceptions surveys see also World Bank (2011) *World Development Report 2011*, Washington DC: World Bank and Overseas Development Institute (2015) *Asking people what they think: Using perceptions data to monitor the post-2015 development framework* London: ODI. See also UN Development Programme (2007) 'Golden Rule 1: Use a range of indicators' in *Governance indicators: A Users' Guide* UNDP BDP, p 12.
- 9 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2015), p 7.
- 10 Saferworld and UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2013) *Addressing Horizontal Inequalities as Drivers of Conflict in the Post-2015 Framework* London: Saferworld.
- 11 See also Scheye & Chigas (2009), pp 7, 12, 15, 18; and Center on International Cooperation (2011) *Development in the Shadow of Violence: A Knowledge Agenda for Policy* New York: CIC, p 31.
- 12 Scheye E, Chigas D, 'Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators' (2009), p 22.
- 13 The UN Secretary-General's Independent Advisory Group (IAEG) on the Data Revolution noted that in May 2013 90 per cent of all the data in the world at that point had been generated in the previous two years. See *Science Daily*, 'Big data, for better or worse: 90% of world's data generated over last two years' *Science Daily* (2013).
- 14 Independent Advisory on the Data Revolution (2014) *A World that Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development* New York: United Nations.
- 15 This is an area where further work is required. For example, only 12 African countries are considered to have autonomous NSOs as in the other 42 countries they fall under the mandate of government ministries.
- 16 This includes the UN's Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics as well as regional codes of practice in Africa, Europe and Latin America. See Eurostat (2013) 'How Statistics are Made' in *Guide to Statistics in European Development Co-operation*, Eurostat, p 56. In order to ensure that established best practices are used by all stakeholders, the UN Secretary-General's IAEG on the Data Revolution has rightly called for a "global consensus on data." See UN Economic and Social Council (2015), p 12.
- 17 UN Economic and Social Council (2015), p 4.
- 18 UN Economic and Social Council (2015), p 10.
- 19 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) *Global Study on Homicide: Trends, context, data* UNODC: Vienna.
- 20 The Geneva Declaration has proposed a methodology for aggregating violent deaths. See Geneva Declaration (2015) 'Every Body Counts: Measuring Violent Deaths' *Research Note* No. 49.
- 21 UN (2013) *Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals – Introduction*, Online at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal>.