The role of the police in UNAMID

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMS	Assessment for Mission Service
APCs	armoured personnel carrier
AU	African Union
COE	contingent-owned equipment
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
CPV	community policing volunteer
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FPU	formed police unit
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	internally displaced person
IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Centre
IPO	individual police officer
ITS	Integrated Training Service
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
MHQ	Main Headquarters
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	non-governmental organisation

NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCC	police contributing country
PDT	pre-deployment training
PoC	protection of civilians
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SLA/M	Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TfP	Training for Peace
ToT	training of trainers
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VIP	very important person

Executive summary

The Darfur region in western Sudan has experienced decades of unrest and conflict because of a complex set of interacting dynamics at local, national and international levels. The current conflict began in 2003 when local perceptions of political and economic marginalisation by Khartoum spurred two main rebel groups to attack government forces. In response, the Sudanese armed forces and government-supported militias, among them *janjaweed* from nomadic Sudanese Arab tribes, launched counterinsurgency operations that included targeting Darfur's civilian population, who were perceived as supporting the rebellion. The conflict has resulted in one of the world's largest humanitarian crises; some 200 000 – 300 000 people have died as a result of the conflict, and 2.4 million have been forcibly displaced. There has been little progress in achieving a comprehensive peace process; the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) has stalled and remains largely unimplemented. From 2013 the security situation in Darfur has again deteriorated, with more frequent clashes between government and armed opposition groups, in addition to an intensification of inter-communal conflict, especially over natural resources. The renewed conflict has displaced more than 430 000 people since the beginning of 2014, fostering even greater humanitarian assistance and protection needs.

Established as a multidimensional mission in late 2007 to take over from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), UNAMID is the first – and so far the only – hybrid peace support operation, authorised and led jointly by the African Union (AU) and the UN. The revision of the mission's strategic priorities in 2014 in the wake of increasing violent conflict has sharpened UNAMID's focus on protecting civilians, delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensuring the safety of humanitarian personnel; mediating between the government of Sudan and non-signatory armed groups on the basis of the DDPD; and supporting mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes.

The mission has three components: military, police and civilian. The police component, UNAMID Police, plays a critical role in efforts to implement the mission mandate through its role in supporting physical protection of civilians (PoC); facilitating humanitarian assistance; and creating a protective environment through supporting the development of the government's police capacity and of community-oriented policing activities in camps for internally displaced people (IDP). Although UNAMID operates under a robust Chapter VII mandate,[1] it is not an executive policing mandate

with responsibility to uphold law and order in the host society, which would confer on its officers the power to arrest and detain individuals, investigate crimes and carry arms, as occurred in Kosovo and East Timor.[2]

The police component is composed of three core elements: formed police units (FPUs); individual police officers (IPOs); and the police core command/senior leadership group, which provides management and oversight. The FPUs ensure the safety of UN personnel by providing armed escorts for IPOs and civilian personnel. FPUs also support the physical protection of civilians through high-visibility targeted and interactive patrols in IDP camps in which they identify specific key actors such as community leaders with whom they can meet and speak. They also provide crowd management and respond to public order situations, including facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The work of IPOs focuses on monitoring, mentoring and building the capacity of local government police, and supporting community-oriented policing in Darfur through the building of capacity of community policing volunteers (CPVs) in IDP camps. Through these activities, UNAMID Police advisers attempt to act as a bridge between the local police and IDPs, including in areas where there is deep mistrust between the two.

UNAMID Police, and the Darfur mission more broadly, confront considerable challenges in implementing the core PoC mandate. The vast, underdeveloped region of Darfur lacks basic infrastructure and effective governance. Banditry, crime and the proliferation of small arms have further compromised security for the region's

> Unrealistic expectations for the police component to function as a development actor creates frustration among IDPs

inhabitants, as well as UNAMID and humanitarian personnel, who have been subject to attacks, abductions and carjacking. Further, UNAMID has encountered numerous sustained obstacles to its effective deployment and operations by the Sudanese government, to an extent that is greater than experienced by any other UN peacekeeping mission. Bureaucratic obstacles erected by the government prevent the timely deployment of personnel and delivery of materiel and spare parts. The authorities regularly deny or delay access of UNAMID patrols to areas where conflict has occurred, which negatively affects the mission's ability to investigate, verify and report alleged incidents.

With its daily patrols in the IDP camps and local communities, the police component is the most visible face of the mission and has the most interaction with Darfuris. Yet misperceptions persist among Darfuri civilians about the mission mandate, and specifically about what UNAMID Police is authorised and empowered to do. Unrealistic expectations that the police component should function as a development actor causes disappointment and frustration among IDPs and local communities.

Budgetary constraints, moreover, have limited outreach and training activities. Enhanced security requirements mean that armed escorts must accompany all UN personnel when travelling off the base. Consequently, FPUs have faced a prolonged period of strain from the high demand for their services in an environment with consistently elevated security risks and difficult operating conditions. Lack of resources for quick impact projects (QIPs), training for CPV programmes, and for sufficient numbers, and training of language assistants also negatively affects police activities.

In addition, UNAMID Police has experienced internal problems over the preparation and selection of personnel. UNAMID Police core command/senior leadership found that existing recruitment and selection procedures and guidelines were too generic and did not provide them with adequately skilled personnel, especially for police capacity development tasks. Another challenge for UNAMID Police is that most IPOs have not received mandatory pre-deployment training in their home states, which affects their preparedness and puts increased pressure on in-service training. Some personnel were also deployed with inadequate English skills, which are essential for this English-speaking mission. Additionally, some police contributing countries have provided deficient contingent-owned equipment, which severely affects the mobility and utility of affected FPUs.

Properly trained police officers are seen as a major factor in carrying out peacekeeping mandates. The police component's training is divided into training that focuses on UNAMID Police, and mandated training of government police officers and CPVs. Training of mission personnel is further divided into pre-deployment training and in-service training – induction and ongoing training. The high prevalence of sexual- and gender-based violence in Darfur means that gender issues constitute a critical element of UNAMID's PoC mandate. Yet UNAMID Police officers often have received little training on gender issues before deployment to the mission area, and the mission has also experienced hurdles in recruiting female police advisers, particularly from Arabic-speaking countries. Training of CPVs is limited and most attention is given to training of local police. The lack of qualified trainers, poor presentation skills and unclear training materials, and language issues – such as poor translations into Arabic or reliance on interpreters – hamper the efficiency of training.

Despite the above challenges, the UNAMID Police core command/senior leadership has made several notable achievements aimed at ensuring that police personnel deployed are appropriate to the mission's needs, are adequately trained and equipped, and have clear guidance that reflects revisions in their strategic priorities. Efforts to recruit female police continue and gender mainstreaming within the mission have both a community and in-mission focus. FPUs with non-functioning equipment have been warned to rectify the situation or face repatriation.

For IPOs, senior police management has focused on refining processes for personnel recruitment and extension of service. Instead of recruiting a very basic and generic skill set, as is currently the norm in UN peacekeeping operations, UNAMID Police has identified specific skill sets for individual functional areas. This has been instrumental in improving the quality of police advisers in such a highly specific mission. With extension of service, similar procedures were introduced, with an emphasis on providing practical justifications of why extensions should be granted. A central database system is under development to ease information sharing and enable more targeted deployment of staff.

Other achievements include a new draft of the standard operating procedure that not only better reflects UNAMID's revised strategic priorities, but is also substantially shorter, providing more concise guidance for field operations. UNAMID Police has also introduced scenario-based learning, a positive development that provides officers with more practical skills than previous approaches. Furthermore, although cooperation with the government police has been slow in developing, an important step was taken with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between UNAMID and the government police Directorate of International Cooperation in 2013.

The UNAMID Police is the most visible of the three components of the mission through its interactions with IDPs and local communities. UNAMID Police occupies a critical position in the

mission to protect civilians, combined with its activities to help build confidence of IDPs in government police, and to develop the capacity of government police. However, successive personnel reductions – despite escalating violence since 2013 – and lack of adequate funding in specific areas such as training and QIPs affect implementation of the police component's mandate.

UNAMID and its police component operate in a fluid, complex environment that has many challenges and tensions at strategic and operational levels. The hybrid nature of the mission constitutes a unique factor that influences the strategic environment of the mission. The UN and African Union (AU) have had both close, cooperative relations and competitive views and aspirations on Darfur. At the operational level, UNAMID Police confronts difficult conditions in terms of climate, logistics, security, and managing relations with government authorities and IDPs.

By early 2015 relations between UNAMID and the government were under intense strain, and UNAMID's performance has come under increasing criticism. At the same time, the Darfur conflict no longer commands a high level of attention internationally, in part because of the attention focused on recent peace operations operating in Somalia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Mali, as well as ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Ukraine. These have occurred in an international context of global financial crisis. The mission is thus experiencing budgetary and political pressures, which are reflected in successive streamlining efforts, despite increasing instability and conflict. This paradoxical situation, one of a mission deployed ostensibly with consent but in reality with significant constraints, helps to explain how UNAMID is distinct from other peace operations, whether those led by the AU or those undertaken solely by the United Nations.

In this shifting and often fraught environment, in the face of ongoing and increased levels of conflict, sustained obstruction by Sudanese authorities at political and operational levels, and despite progressively reduced personnel ceilings and resources to implement their mandate, UNAMID Police has made some important achievements. It is reasonable to conclude that UNAMID's presence in Darfur has helped to deter several atrocities against civilians, especially in IDP camps. It has helped to develop community-oriented policing mechanisms in IDP camps, and to build government police capacities and relationships with IDP communities. Through its armed escorts it has also facilitated delivery of humanitarian assistance, and enabled the civilian component to engage in essential activities involving mediation and conflict resolution, human rights, rule of law, and gender and child protection.

UNAMID Police leadership has been especially active in improving internal procedures, which has resulted in more effective management of a more relevantly skilled staff component. Through the strong leadership of the police commissioner, UNAMID Police has established several initiatives that are arguably unique to the mission. These include a recruitment system that is tailored to the mission's needs, a more rigorous performance management system and a central database management system. These are important innovations that have helped to improve the quality of police personnel deployed to the mission, improved the capacity to retain high-performing IPOs and facilitated faster, more effective decision-making by senior management.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This monograph examines the police component of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). It is one of three case studies in a comparative research project on the policing dimension in UN, African Union (AU) and hybrid peace operations. The project was organised under the auspices of the Training for Peace (TfP) Programme, which aims to help build African civilian and police capacities for peace operations through training, applied research and policy support.

This monograph is the product of a team of researchers drawn from four TfP partner institutions: ACCORD (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes), ISS, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). In November 2014 the research team travelled to Darfur and visited the UNAMID main headquarters (MHQ) located in the 'supercamp' at El Fasher, Sector South HQ, Sector North HQ, and several team sites and IDP camps. Police Commissioner Hester Paneras granted the research team access to interview the police senior management team, IPOs and FPU personnel. The team also had the opportunity to meet with government of Sudan police representatives, IDP leaders and members of the civilian component of the mission, as well as UN Country Team representatives and UNAMID Police liaison officers in the capital Khartoum. Data was collected primarily through key informant interviews and discussion groups. All interviews were conducted on a confidential basis.

The overarching question that the TfP police project sought to address was how the police component in UN-led missions differs from that in AU-led missions. UNAMID is the first – and so far the only – hybrid peace operation authorised and led jointly by the UN and the AU. This hybrid nature is an important factor in understanding the strategic and political contexts of the mission. However, to build a comprehensive picture of the UNAMID police component, the team also focused on the 'nuts and bolts': key structural elements, processes and mechanisms of its day-to-day management and operations. This dual attention to the strategic political context and ground-level capabilities and activities is necessary to understand UNAMID's highly complex environment.

The monograph begins by providing the complex background to the conflict and the establishment of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and subsequent peace operations that UNAMID conducts in Darfur. The monograph then turns to focus on UNAMID's police component, UNAMID Police. It conducts a functional analysis, examining how the police component is constituted and managed through its three core elements – formed police units (FPUs), individual police officers (IPOs) and the core command/senior leadership. The main operational challenges that each element faces in

executing its mandated tasks, and how UNAMID Police relates and interacts with other components in the mission are discussed.

The monograph further considers the police component's main capacities and challenges in the implementation of the mission's primary protection of civilians (PoC) mandate, followed by an analysis of gender in the mission's work. This is followed by a training and training needs analysis. The monograph concludes with a discussion of the main findings in terms of the research question guiding the TfP police peacekeeping project and summarises some good practices that the team identified in UNAMID's police component, as well as making some recommendations about addressing existing gaps and opportunities for further improvement.

Chapter 2

Overview of Darfur conflict and peace operations

The region of Darfur in western Sudan has experienced decades of unrest and conflict because of a complex set of interacting dynamics at local, national and international levels. Relevant factors have included inter-communal violence and protracted tribal conflicts; tensions between African pastoralists and nomadic Arab herders; armed opposition groups and splinter groups; actions of government forces and government-supported militias against rebel groups; and at times the presence of Chadian militias operating from the region to launch attacks against their own country. The vast, underdeveloped region lacks basic infrastructure and effective governance, and banditry, crime and the proliferation of small arms have further compromised security for the region's inhabitants.

The current cycle of violence and intersecting conflicts began in early 2003 when local perceptions of political and economic marginalisation by the government spurred two main rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), to attack government forces. The Sudanese armed forces and a number of government-supported Sudanese Arab militias – collectively referred to as the *janjaweed* – conducted a counterinsurgency campaign that included retaliating against the civilian population of Darfur, who were perceived as supporting the rebellion.

According to UN estimates, since 2004 some 200 000 – 300 000 people have died as a result of the conflict, and 2.4 million have been forcibly displaced.[3] The brutality of the conflict has created one of the world's largest humanitarian crises, bringing it to the attention of the UN Security Council and the AU. This triggered a regional effort to mediate a peace agreement, backed with the deployment of a small AU-led peace support operation.

Peacekeeping in Darfur: from AMIS to UNAMID

Shortly after the outbreak of conflict in Darfur, the government of Sudan refused to agree to host a UN peacekeeping operation, but did consent to the AU's involvement. AMIS was established following the signing of the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004 between the government, JEM and SLM/A. The mission initially involved 300 military observers, accompanied by a small protection force, tasked with observing the ceasefire agreement between the government and the two rebel groups. After the ceasefire broke down and fighting resumed, the mission's

mandate changed to protecting of civilians and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and by April 2005 AMIS had a total authorised strength of 7 731 uniformed personnel.[4]

Although the local security and the humanitarian situation tended to improve in the areas with an AMIS troop presence, the mission continued to experience problems in implementing its PoC mandate because of several factors. These included the complicated language of the extended mandate,[5] which created confusion among AU commanders in terms of how they were to relate to government forces when encountering civilians under imminent threat; and how to interpret what was within their resources and capability given their forces were overstretched and under-resourced.[6] The collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the subsequent lack of a political settlement to the conflict, and lack of adequate personnel, resources and freedom of movement to implement its mandate posed further challenges to AMIS.[7]

Establishment of UNAMID

In light of AMIS's limitations, the UN sought to take over the peacekeeping mission and extend the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, which was established in 2005, to encompass southern Sudan; it would absorb AMIS's responsibilities in Darfur, including implementation of the DPA.[8] The government strongly opposed this plan. President Omar al-Bashir refused to consent to an international, UN-led peacekeeping force, which he likened to an imperialist plot or Western invasion of Sudan,[9] though he was not opposed to African or AU-led peace operations. The compromise solution to this deadlock arrived more than a year later: a jointly mandated peacekeeping operation would take over from AMIS. On the government's insistence, the mission would be 'predominantly African in character.'[10]

On 31 July 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 establishing UNAMID was passed with unanimous approval, including the provision pertaining to its 'predominantly African character'. UNAMID became the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN.[11] The mission had an authorised strength of 26 000 uniformed personnel, consisting of up to 19 555 military personnel and 3 772 police, and 19 FPUs comprising up to 140 personnel each.[12]

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorised UNAMID:

> 'to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to: (i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, (ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan'.[13]

Despite finally receiving the government's consent, and despite its robust mandate to protect civilians, UNAMID encountered significant challenges from the beginning. Problems related initially to lack of adequate personnel and failure of Western governments to provide essential materiel, in particular attack and transport helicopters.[14] Lack of full cooperation from the government resulted in myriad bureaucratic obstacles that impeded the timely customs clearances and thus importing and delivery of critical equipment and supplies, created delays in the issuance of visas for mission personnel, and delayed or denied UNAMID flight clearances.[15] Government authorities also frequently denied access to UNAMID patrols, ostensibly for security reasons, which led the mission to undertake a 'cautious' approach that emphasised negotiating with the authorities in carrying

out protection responsibilities.[16] The issuing of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for al-Bashir in 2008 – on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – created further obstacles to protection, after the government retaliated by expelling a number of international humanitarian NGOs.

As a jointly led mission, UNAMID was further affected by the relations between the AU and UN on issues pertaining to Darfur and Sudan, which ranged between 'meticulous collaboration and rivalry for leadership', and their differing conceptions of the situation and of the requirements for effective peacemaking.[17]

Perhaps most seriously, since its inception UNAMID has encountered an absence of the elements essential for a successful peacekeeping operation: a ceasefire, a political settlement or peace agreement, and real consent of the host government. Lack of progress in developing a comprehensive political solution to the conflict has meant the operational environment is one of ongoing hostilities, as well as one in which peacekeepers themselves are vulnerable to banditry and attacks by paramilitary groups.[18] The unsuccessful DPA of 2006 was followed by negotiations that led to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in 2011. Signed between the government and the umbrella Liberation and Justice Movement, the DDPD remains only partially implemented, with a lack of real power-sharing and popular support, and international support has faded. Moreover, it is not a comprehensive solution because key rebel groups have remained outside the agreement.[19]

UNAMID mission reviews

With a lowered intensity of armed conflict, by 2012 budgetary pressures linked to the global financial crisis had also begun to affect the mission.[20] Following a review by the secretary-general in consultation with the AU, the UN Security Council decided to reduce UNAMID's uniformed components and reconfigure them to focus on the areas in Darfur that presented the highest security threats. The Security Council authorised up to 16 200 military personnel and 2 310 police personnel, and 17 FPUs of up to 140 personnel each.[21] These recommendations were based on changes on the ground, including a lower overall level of direct confrontation between government and armed groups, and its concentration on specific areas; and the emergence of criminality as the main threat to civilians and humanitarian workers because of the lack of adequate governmental, judicial and policing capacity, as well as the political environment. Accordingly, the military component was reconfigured to focus on areas of armed conflict and provision of area security, whereas the police component focused on threats of criminality in areas where IDPs were highly concentrated, and on capacity building to support the return of internally displaced populations.[22]

However, UNAMID's operational environment shifted again in 2013 following a considerable deterioration of the security situation in Darfur, which prompted a special report by the UN secretary-general.[23] The mission review found a lack of progress in implementing the DDPD, continuation of significant humanitarian crisis, and an intensification of inter-communal conflict, especially over natural resources. Three main challenges were seen as hindering effective implementation of UNAMID's mandate: lack of government cooperation; major shortfalls in the capabilities of several military and police contingents; and the need for improved coordination within the mission, and between the mission and the UN Country Team in Sudan.[24]

The review recommended the revision of the mission's strategic priorities, to include: protecting civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensuring the safety of humanitarian

personnel; mediating between government and non-signatory armed groups on the basis of the DDPD; and supporting mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes.[25] The mission was directed to focus on improving its effectiveness in implementing these mandate priorities in 2014. An assessment to be completed in 2015 would determine future steps regarding the mission. The mission review further recommended a reduction of UNAMID IPOs from 2 310 to 1 583, and FPUs from 2 380 members to 1 820 (that is, reducing from 17 authorised FPUs to 13 composed of up to 140 members each).[26]

Recent developments: escalation of violence and displacement, and a mission under strain

More than 430 000 people have been displaced in Darfur since the beginning of 2014, of whom nearly 300 000 remain displaced in addition to the over 2 million long-term IDPs, which has created massive and growing humanitarian needs across the region.[27] The increasing violence in Darfur has been linked to the appearance in the region of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a counter-insurgency unit under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).[28] Former *janjaweed* commanders have been recruited to the RSF, and as a function of falling under the NISS, RSF members enjoy immunity under Sudanese law for all actions committed in the course of duty.[29]

By late 2014 relations between UNAMID and government were under intense strain. On 31 October Sudanese armed forces were alleged to have raped more than 200 women and girls in the village of Tabit, North Darfur. Government authorities prevented a UNAMID verification team from accessing the village for nine days; when the team finally received authorisation few villagers were on site and the investigation took place in an atmosphere of heavy Sudanese military and police presence and intimidation of witnesses.[30] The team subsequently reported it had found no evidence of the rapes. UNAMID was heavily criticised by villagers, media and international commentators for not properly investigating the alleged attack,[31] which led the mission to attempt a second investigation in Tabit. The government refused its permission. On the government's insistence, UNAMID closed its human rights office in Khartoum. In late November the government requested that UNAMID prepare its exit strategy and subsequently expelled the UN resident and humanitarian coordinator and the UNDP country director.[32]

An independent investigation by Human Rights Watch rejected the initial UNAMID report on Tabit and documented numerous rapes, despite also being denied access to the village.[33] The incident came on the heels of an earlier crisis for the mission when in 2012 a former employee accused it of manipulating reporting and covering up crimes by Sudanese and government-supported forces. An internal UN probe determined there was 'a tendency to under-report unless absolutely certain of the facts', but no deliberate cover-up.[34] Despite these controversies and tensions between the government and the mission, the head of UN peacekeeping, Hervé Ladsous, declared that the mission would not leave while the situation in Darfur was worsening, nor while there continued to be so much suffering.[35] Nevertheless, amid the escalating operations by government forces against armed opposition groups, inter-communal conflicts, rising banditry and crime, and continuing displacement, further UNAMID personnel reductions were indicated for 2015.[36]

Chapter 3

Role and operational challenges of UNAMID Police

UNAMID Police occupies a critical position in the mission through its role in protecting civilians combined with building trust in and the capacity of local police. Following the revised strategic priorities set out in the 2014 mission review, the role of the UNAMID Police focuses on the following areas: (1) supporting physical protection of civilians; (2) facilitating humanitarian assistance; and (3) creating a protective environment through government police capacity development and community-oriented policing activities.[37]

Although UNAMID operates under a robust Chapter VII mandate, it does not have executive policing functions such as the power of arrest, which only exist in the context of a peacekeeping mission when there is a non-functioning host state government.[38] In contrast to other missions that have been deployed following conflicts, UNAMID operates in an environment in which the host state and its police system are functioning, albeit with relatively weak government police presence in the region.

Challenges in UNAMID's operational environment

Perhaps one of the most significant challenges to UNAMID's operational effectiveness derives from political factors: namely the strength of the government and the extent to which it not only asserts its sovereignty vis-à-vis the mission, but actively creates obstructions to UNAMID's deployment and operations, especially in imposing restrictions on freedom of movement for UNAMID uniformed and civilian personnel. Peacekeeping missions in principle operate with consent of the host government.[39] In practice, many operations take place in a post-conflict environment where the host government is weak or largely absent and there is a breakdown of law and order, and where the mission has played a prominent, even dominant, role in the immediate post-conflict phase. In the Darfur region, the Sudanese government has subjected UNAMID to numerous obstacles, constraints and delays, impeding the mission's deployment and ability to implement its mandate, to an extent that has been greater than experienced by any other complex UN operation.[40]

In Sudan, there is a strong national government, albeit one confronted by insurgency in an environment of overlapping and shifting conflicts. To implement its mandate, UNAMID Police must foster mutual understanding with the government and local police. The government's military and national security services may deny access to UNAMID personnel, particularly to zones where government forces have launched attacks against rebel forces, operations that often result in the

forced displacement of civilians. Denying or delaying access to UNAMID Police and the other components affects the ability of the mission to fulfil its mandate. As one interviewee described, the nature of UNAMID's relations with the government and the degree of control the government exercises makes it a very specific mission.

As well as being one of the largest peacekeeping missions, UNAMID has operated under some of the most challenging conditions for a peacekeeping mission as a result of its vast territory, extreme climate and underdeveloped infrastructure. The Darfur region covers 493 180 square km, similar in size to the country of Spain, and has a population estimated at between 6 and 7.5 million. The region poses significant logistical challenges: harsh climatic conditions; poor infrastructure and communications networks; economic underdevelopment; and long and difficult supply lines from Port Sudan, where much equipment is shipped to and from where it must be transported overland 2097 kilometres to the mission HQ in El Fasher.

UNAMID operates within a context of complex and shifting conflict dynamics. Conflict has afflicted the Darfur region since the mid-1980s. With the onset of the current conflict in 2003, casualties peaked in 2004, then declined amid continuing low-level conflict among the shifting kaleidoscope of armed opposition groups, government forces and government-backed militias. The DDPD has continued to falter because it has not been a comprehensive process and only certain rebel and militia groups have participated in it. The security situation has deteriorated since 2013, featuring conflict between communities over access to natural resources in addition to the renewal of hostilities between government forces and armed rebel groups.

> UNAMID's peacekeepers must carry out a challenging mandate in an environment that poses significant security risks

Moreover, UNAMID's peacekeepers must carry out a challenging mandate in an environment that poses significant security risks in the form of attacks, abductions and car-jackings. Attacks on armed FPUs have occurred, as well as frequent criminal activity targeting UNAMID Police. Between 2008 and 2015, 212 UNAMID personnel were killed in attacks, of whom 43 were police officers.[41]

Most of Sudan's 2.4 million IDPs are located in Darfur. Of those, about 1.9 million live in camps throughout the region. Some older IDP camps in Darfur have been incorporated into pre-existing towns or have themselves become towns. By mid-2013, 82 IDP camps had been identified in Darfur.[42] Camps can contain as few as several hundred IDPs, while the largest IDP camps – such as Zam, Gereida and Kalma – have populations of over 100 000 IDPs. However, little or no data exists on IDPs who have settled in Sudan's towns and cities.[43] IDPs have at times of conflict sought refuge near UNAMID bases and team-sites. The protection and humanitarian needs of IDPs are huge and growing, and although PoC is UNAMID's core mandate, major challenges exist to achieving this because of slow progress implementing the DDPD, growing conflict and insecurity, restrictions on access and budgetary issues.

Moreover, after the ICC issued its international arrest warrant for al-Bashir, in March 2009 the government expelled 13 international NGOs and shut down three Sudanese relief NGOs,[44] which halved humanitarian capacity in Darfur. Expulsions of humanitarian relief organisations have continued, including Merlin (UK), the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED, France), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2014.[45] In early 2015, Médecins sans Frontières announced that it would be terminating activities in Sudan because the authorities

were systematically denying it access to civilians in conflict zones.[46] The dwindling presence of humanitarian NGOs in Darfur has created challenges for wider UN efforts, particularly those of the UN Country Team, which is based in Khartoum and often lacks implementing partners on the ground in Darfur. Moreover, reductions in police personnel mean that fewer FPUs can provide support for humanitarian assistance.

Constraints specific to each component are discussed in more depth in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 4

FPUs, IPOs, core command/senior police leadership, and coordination

This chapter addresses the roles, capacities and challenges of the three main components comprising UNAMID Police. It begins with FPUs, then examines IPOS/police advisers, followed by the core command/senior police leadership team based at UNAMID MHQ. For each group it provides a summary of the roles and capacities as described in interviews, followed by a brief discussion of challenges encountered by that specific element. The chapter then examines cooperation and coordination of the police component with other components within the mission, focusing specifically on key elements in the civilian component.

Roles and capacities of FPUs

An FPU is a team of at least 140 police personnel who function as a cohesive body, are rapidly deployable and self-sufficient; these qualities combined with their special weapons and equipment provide FPUs with robust policing capabilities. At the time of research, UNAMID had a total of 13 FPUs deployed, each composed of 140 personnel, of whom 90 – 100 typically were employed on operational duties. The FPUs ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and facilities. They provide armed escorts to UNAMID individual police officers (IPOs), as well as other UN civilian and humanitarian personnel, including VIPs and visiting delegations; guard humanitarian aid; conduct regular confidence-building patrols in IDP camps, and night patrols as well as daily patrols in villages, towns and markets; and escort IDPs during firewood, water and grass collection, and farming communities during the harvest season, when workers are especially vulnerable to robberies and rapes. These patrols and escorts are police operations that entail a higher risk and require a formed response. FPUs perform crowd management and control, such as during the distribution of humanitarian aid. They may also perform some static protection duties for the base of operations.

The FPUs deployed to UNAMID are not responsible for security in the IDP camps; these are widely dispersed and their size and scope would make it practically impossible for FPUs to secure them. FPUs do not have the power of arrest and suspected criminals are handed over to the local police. When it comes to the PoC mandate, the primary role of the FPUs is to maintain a high-visibility presence through targeted patrols and to buttress the work done by other UN personnel by providing security escorts. It is primarily IPOs that engage directly with the local police and the IDP population, including through community policing training programmes. However, unarmed IPOs and civilian personnel could not perform their tasks in Darfur under the current circumstances

without armed escorts. An additional contribution of FPUs to PoC is through night patrols, which also depend on the permission of the government authorities. UNAMID camps are under a 12-hour curfew. However, permission for night patrols and visits to sensitive areas is often denied.

In providing armed escorts, FPUs share their responsibilities with UNAMID's military component. FPU patrols are not heavily armed; they can cover maximum 40 km in a patrol and must return on the same day. The military component is equipped with heavy weapons with a calibre of more than 10 mm and conducts long-distance patrols and escorts of more than 40 km. Discussing differences between FPU and military escorts, IPOs expressed a preference for FPU escorts. This was mainly attributed to the difference between military and police culture. FPUs, which are composed of armed police officers, were seen as having a better understanding of the need of IPOs to interact with community members. They were seen as having a less rigid approach than a military escort. On the other hand, the civilian component did not see much difference between the approaches of the two. Similar concerns about understanding the mission's civilian component's priorities and time schedules were raised with respect to both FPUs and the military.

Given that UNAMID has been in Darfur for a number of years, many police contributing countries (PCCs) have been sending their FPUs to the same area for some time. Certain FPUs provide direct humanitarian support to the communities through donations from their respective governments, distributing food items and blankets to deprived communities. Units that engage in such practices see it not only as a humanitarian activity that addresses some of the suffering they see on a daily basis, but also as a confidence- and trust-building measure. However, a commander of an FPU from a PCC that did not engage in such activities saw such actions as unsustainable and contributing to unreasonable expectations from the local community.

Operational challenges of FPUs

Though their mandate is clear, FPUs face an array of operational challenges. These are related to harsh environmental conditions and government restrictions. In the dry season temperatures in Darfur can reach 50 degrees Celsius, and the rainy season brings heavy mud, creating conditions that obstruct movement into certain areas. Sand and dust also accelerate wear on material. Supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment was noted as a particular problem because no local market exists for it. The equipment may need to be flown into Darfur, which involves complex bureaucracy and multiple clearance procedures from government authorities, creating bottlenecks in the supply of parts and equipment on the ground.

UNAMID has encountered serious problems associated with shortages of contingent-owned equipment (COE) or COE of substandard quality, which results in equipment breakdowns. In some cases this has involved non-functioning armoured personnel carriers (APCs), which in effect renders an FPU non-operational. Cooperation with other police contingents and mission components is hindered by language barriers, because many FPU personnel do not speak English. Lack of necessary equipment, including APCs, has been a major factor in the reduction of UNAMID's FPUs under the mission review plan. Although a number of problems with COE have been attributed to PCCs themselves, that government cooperation is often not forthcoming complicates the situation further.

The core command/senior leadership of UNAMID Police has made efforts to significantly improve the quality and readiness of FPUs deployed. The quality of FPUs in UN peacekeeping operations

has in the past been problematic, as established in a 2008 UN Police Division review that found the majority of FPUs deployed on UN peacekeeping missions had significant, serious or unrecoverable operational deficiencies. This spurred efforts to improve preparation and training to raise FPUs to minimum standards.[47] By late November 2014, 11 of the 13 FPUs deployed to UNAMID had serviceability rates of over 90%, with an average rate of 91%.[48] Nevertheless, some concerns remain about the capacities of certain FPUs deployed to UNAMID. FPU policy requires that commanders have English language skills. Despite this requirement, some countries send personnel who are not proficient in English. The lack of standardised training of FPUs appears to be a further problem. Although FPUs are required to undergo four weeks of mandatory training before deployment, not all PCCs follow this guideline – for example, only providing two weeks of training.

Psychological stress is also a challenge, a consequence of frequent attacks and car-jackings against UNAMID personnel, even against armed convoys; in addition to few recreational opportunities within the mission at many team sites and the fact that some PCCs do not grant their personnel leave. FPU respondents considered the recent downsizing (or 'rightsizing') to have had a negative impact on their

> FPU policy requires that commanders have English language skills. Despite this, some countries send personnel who are not proficient

work, with the same responsibilities remaining but with fewer personnel to accomplish the tasks. Morale among FPU personnel is further affected by significant differences in compensation between IPOs, who each receive from the UN a substantial daily mission subsistence allowance but are expected to organise their own accommodation and food, and members of FPUs, whose sending state receives a monthly per capita reimbursement per FPU officer, but who receive accommodation and food through their unit.[49] Further, according to interviews with members of one UNAMID FPU, all members of the FPU receive the same compensation from their sending state, regardless of role, rank at home or experience.

Roles and capacities of IPOs

The work of IPOs in UNAMID focuses on monitoring and mentoring government police, and building the capacity of local police and community policing volunteers (CPVs) in IDP camps. Through these activities UNAMID police advisers attempt to act as a bridge between the local police and IDPs, including in areas where deep mistrust exists between the two. These activities fall mainly under the categories of PoC and 'addressing root causes of conflict', two of the mission's three revised strategic priorities.

IPOs monitor crimes that are reported to local police, and follow the police response, advising and guiding them according to international standards where necessary. IPOs inspect detention cells and advise local police on international standards of detention. They also participate in verification patrols if incidents, such as alleged attacks on civilians, are reported. At team sites where FPUs are not present, IPOs conduct joint patrols with the UNAMID military and civilian components, including human rights monitors. IPOs also conduct community policing patrols in IDP camps to monitor sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including patrols with CPVs. These monitoring and mentoring activities contribute to the PoC.

IPOs engage in building government police capacity and conduct training programmes on a range of topics, including community-oriented policing, crime scene management, SGBV, treatment and

detention of suspects, and IT skills. UNAMID Police component has taken several important steps in this respect, including the negotiation of an MOU between UNAMID and the government police on police development, and the agreement of the government police to provide their training curriculum to UNAMID to identify areas for cooperation and development.

Deep mistrust between police and local populations means that certain IDP camps in Darfur, such as Kalma camp, refuse access to government police, who are therefore unable to enter the camps to apprehend criminals and make arrests. UNAMID's IPOs help to build capacity of CPVs; that is, individual IDPs residing in camps who are selected by the IDP community itself and are provided with a basic understanding of community policing, crime detection, conflict resolution skills, and handling of SGBV cases. CPVs are meant to help bridge the gap between government police and IDP communities. CPVs go on patrols with UNAMID police officers and attend monthly meetings. They function as a community resource when UNAMID police officers are not present; for example, if a crime occurs during the night in the camp. However, criminal incidents in camps should be reported to the government police.

Capacity building of government police and CPVs aims to address some of the root causes of crime and conflict, such as impunity, and seeks to foster greater community engagement in crime prevention and detection. By encouraging the establishment of community safety committees, IPOs bring together local government police and CPVs from IDP camps to instruct them in identifying and addressing crime in the camps. In areas where there are no established camps, IPOs visit IDPs in settled communities. They also visit villages on migration routes where conflicts tend to occur between nomads and farmers.

Through QIPs, IPOs facilitate the building of police infrastructure, such as police stations within IDPs camps where feasible, and further capacity development through projects such as establishment of a forensics lab in Nyala, the second-largest city in Sudan. The lack of a forensics lab has created challenges in getting quality evidence in cases of serious crimes such as murder and rape. Lack of scientific evidence can impede or prevent an effective prosecution. Also, government police personnel are regularly rotated through the country but are not provided with accommodation. As a result, some police stations in rural areas are not occupied because of the lack of residential accommodation for police officers. UNAMID Police has helped to address this gap through QIPs to provide accommodation.

Operational challenges of IPOs

One of the main challenges to IPOs is the authorities' denial of access to certain areas in Darfur. This affects the operational activities of IPOs in terms of the effective protection of civilians and the quality of information used for reporting, as well as the ability to verify alleged incidents.

As mentioned above, UNAMID has had problems linked to substandard COE and inadequate training of some FPUs, which indirectly affect the work of IPOs because of their reliance on armed escorts. Communications are essential for the work of IPOs and another technical challenge that affects them in some sectors is limited internet and communications systems. Other challenges relate to personnel and have stemmed from difficulties in recruiting police advisers with appropriate skill sets, such as good reporting skills, which involve the ability to understand and analyse conflict trends. Furthermore, not all PCCs carry out adequate pre-deployment training before sending their police personnel to a mission assignment.

UNAMID Police advisers must often rely on language assistants to communicate with CPVs, IDPs and government police officers. However, IPOs at some team sites lack language assistants. Where language assistants are present to assist police advisers and used to bridge the language gap, they are drawn from the local civilian population and often lack an understanding of policing concepts and terminology. Specialised training for language assistants in the mission is lacking, despite the critical role they play in communicating the mission mandate and facilitating interaction with local civilians and police officers. Furthermore, certain language assistants may not provide impartial interpretations.

Another challenge confronting IPOs involved in capacity building, specifically those who train government police, and train IDPs to become CPVs, is the lack of funding for mandated training courses. The research team heard that this also meant that training facilities were inadequate (e.g. faulty IT equipment) and that no budget is even available to provide refreshments to IDPs and CPVs who attend courses. As explained by UNAMID individual police officers to the research team, IDPs are already deprived and lack the means to sustain themselves, and cannot be expected to sit in a classroom for 3-5 hours without receiving some sort of nourishment. As a result, IPOs have resorted to collecting money from UNAMID personnel on team sites to buy refreshments out of their own pocket. At the same time, because of security risks from attacks and ambushes, UNAMID has required all personnel to move within or to the periphery of the main camp, and accommodation in the supercamp is expensive for many IPOs (who are responsible for paying for their own food and accommodation). This has resulted in lower voluntary contributions among IPOs to purchase refreshments and find other ways to sustain IDPs, given lack of dedicated budgetary funding for these activities.

> Specialised training for language assistants is lacking, despite the critical role they play in communicating the mission mandate

The UN Country Team generally classifies policing under security, which it understands as being the responsibility of the government to provide, and hence does not generally provide financial support. Nevertheless, the UN Country Team told the research team that discussions were underway for a UNDP-funded programme that would focus on community policing and psycho-social projects for women.

A further challenge to IPOs is the often unrealistically high expectations of IDPs about what the mission should be doing. By virtue of the number of police officers on the ground and their daily interactions with civilian populations, the police component is the most visible element of UNAMID in IDP camps and local communities. UNAMID Police officials noted that IDPs tended to have a one-dimensional view of the mission's PoC mandate, seeing it in terms of physical protection from harm, but not its other UN-endorsed dimensions of facilitating inclusive political processes or a protective environment, such as through institutional development of government police. The various constraints on UNAMID Police described above – a strong host government that controls access, deterioration of local security conditions, and a vast territory with huge humanitarian needs – has created challenges in meeting the needs of physical protection. As one IDP commented, how can UNAMID protect the IDPs when it cannot even protect itself from attack?

Discussion with IDP leaders also indicated that IDPs thought UNAMID Police should function as a development actor, bringing livelihood training and opportunities for work. Even those IDPs who had

more interaction with IPOs had misconceptions about the police's role. Some CPVs, for example, appeared to think the community policing training they received should qualify them to be paid a salary, or might lead to a paid position in the government police. Several individual UNAMID police officers acknowledged the scant opportunities for IDPs to generate income, and some thought the mission should make a greater effort to compensate them in some way for work performed as CPVs.

Challenges in the implementation of community policing also derive from the differences in how different PCCs and cultures of IPOs approach community policing and the lack of common approach to community policing, which negatively affects implementation and effectiveness. It was mentioned by several IPOs that every IPO tries to implement his own country's approach.

Core command and senior police leadership

UNAMID Police has its MHQ at the supercamp in El Fasher. The police commissioner is the overall commander of UNAMID Police and reports to the UNAMID joint special representative through the deputy joint special representative. The police commissioner, along with the deputy police commissioner, police chief of operations and police chief of staff, comprise the core command. This is the most senior organ in the chain of command and provides overall strategic guidance for the mission's police component. The core command is assisted by the police senior leadership team.[50]

In addition to operational challenges to achieving UNAMID Police's mandate, outlined in the following sections, challenges the core command/senior leadership face include slow responses by the government to UNAMID Police requests and initiatives, insufficient ability of PCCs to provide police advisers with the required skill sets, and insufficient financial support for implementing capacity building of the government police and CPVs. UNAMID Police has also not received from UN Police Division all of the tools it needs to manage the component effectively. This has particularly been the case with directives for the selection and extension process. At the strategic level, there may also be political tug-of-war on some issues between the UN and the AU, which hold joint responsibility for the mission.

To address some of the above challenges, the core command/senior leadership team has focused much attention on internal management processes. A fundamental element in this regard is the new draft of the standard operating procedures (SOP), developed to replace the original 156-page SOP from 2011. The draft 2014 SOP has been updated to reflect UNAMID's revised strategic priorities, flowing from the 2014 mission review and condensed into a more concise 15-page document. It provides the organisational and procedural framework for the implementation of the concept of operations, also updated in draft in 2014.[51]

UNAMID senior management has focused attention on recruiting. Past deployments did not involve an effective selection process for IPOs, or efficient coordination with the UN Police Division. The result was that UNAMID received police advisers who had met the UN HQ's Selection Assistance and Assessment Team's very basic and generic requirements (e.g. proficiency in the mission language, driving skills, and for executive missions, proficiency in firearms), but without the skills required for the specific operational needs of UNAMID. Moreover, the process did not ensure considerations of PCC geographic balance in provision of IPOs.[52]

The police component has accordingly overhauled its recruitment processes. This began with the development of a concise portfolio of five basic skills that are required of all candidates: computer

literacy, report writing, multicultural sensitivity, ability to adapt to diverse cultural situations and cross-cultural communication. Beyond these basic skills, personnel those who fill positions in each of the different main functional areas of UNAMID Police – reform and restructuring, operations, training, human resources, and physical resources – must have specific operational skill sets; and likewise in specialised functional areas, including IT, public information, evaluation, planning, internal investigations, forensics and crime scene investigation, and command and control.[53]

The police management also refined the mechanism for establishing geographic balance in the provision of personnel to UNAMID. PCCs are grouped into one of three geographic categories: African countries, as required by Sudan to be the predominant contributors to UNAMID (further sub-divided into regions); Arabic-speaking countries (which acquired even greater significance following the most recent review of the mission, which recommended reducing the numbers of language assistants provided to the police component); and other countries. Each country is then assigned a national weighting based on an assessment of its history of contribution to the mission over the past five years and the training of its candidates.

In the process of identifying qualified personnel, UNAMID receives nominated IPOs from UN Police Division and verifies that they have received Assessment for Mission Service (AMS) clearance, as well as disciplinary clearance. Nominated candidates are then screened to identify those who meet the mission's operational needs. A selection committee, a new development in the UNAMID selection process, then puts together a shortlist of IPOs based on a review of candidates' P-11 forms (CV/résumé information provided on a standardised UN form) against the skills set inventory, geographical and gender considerations. Telephone/video interviews are conducted with shortlisted candidates to verify the existence and level of required skill sets. A list of UNAMID's approved qualified candidates is then sent to UN Police Division, which liaises with PCCs, and sends UNAMID the confirmed list of the IPOs that they will receive.[54] Based on the assessment of qualifications of candidates, UNAMID Police now only accepts 30% of candidates from some PCCs, whereas from others they may take 80%. The mission will not accept candidates from PCCs that refuse to use the AMS. UNAMID is the only mission to apply this significantly revised selection procedure, which has been credited with improving the quality of police advisers deploying to the mission.

The procedures governing extension of service have also been refined. Generally police officers are deployed for one year. UNAMID Police senior leadership may give an extension based on operational needs, and to maintain national representation. Normally an extension is for six months with two terms (amounting to one year). Exceptional

> The core command/senior leadership team recognised that building relations and networks with the government police in Khartoum was of the utmost importance to implementing their mandated tasks

three- and four-term (two years total) extensions occur in cases of critical need (scarce skills and/or outstanding performance). A panel of five principal officers reviews all proposed extensions. The police commissioner initiated the removal of her authority to overrule the panel, which has ultimate decision-making authority on extensions. In the event that the police commissioner disagrees with a decision the panel has made, she must present an argument before the panel to reconsider the decision. A performance management tool has also been developed in which sector commanders must justify with practical examples why an individual should be granted an extension. Also new is the requirement that new team members at the MHQ should compete for extensions of their

positions, proving their added value, and asking sector commanders to justify why certain individuals were recommended and not others.

Another innovation in internal management under development is a central database management system that will make information available online to senior managers in real time. Each unit in the police component has its own standalone system; each system operates a different programme and they cannot speak to one another. Information loss occurs as officers end their deployment, taking their portable computer memory sticks – and thus mission information – with them. It is hoped that the new data management system will enable proper, transparent record management, and better ensure institutional memory and continuity. Given the size of the mission, recording personnel rotations manually, as is currently done, is a time- and resource-consuming task. Similarly, incident reporting is submitted manually. With a central database management system, the recording of personnel rotations would be done live, and incident reporting would be done online. Senior managers could immediately access information on who is available, where and with what specific skills.

The research team heard that the core command/senior leadership team recognised that building relations and networks with the government police in Khartoum was of the utmost importance to implementing their mandated tasks. The signing of the MOU with the government police's Directorate of International Cooperation in August 2013 has helped in this respect.[55] The agreement addresses the areas of institutional framework and procedures, capacity building, community-oriented policing, and project implementation and evaluation. Building further cooperation will entail greater interaction and coordination at the strategic level between UNAMID Police and the government police, and the UNAMID Police core command/senior leadership clearly sees progress in this regard.

However, this has been a slow process; signing of the MOU took three and a half years. The first strategic workshop was held three months after the signing of the MOU, but it took a further year to organise the next workshop. Confidence building through regular interaction between UNAMID Police, the government police and Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also helped overcome delays in issuing visas for component personnel. The building of trust and professional relations between UNAMID Police and government counterparts has also facilitated cooperation, which is better served by greater continuity of those UNAMID Police personnel holding key liaison and management positions rather than short rotations and their replacement by new personnel.

The police commissioner has also contacted PCCs directly, conveying the component's requirements and the new procedures involved in recruiting according to requisite skillsets. UNAMID Police not only conducts outreach at the political level, but also the operational level, which has proved particularly effective because operational heads tend to understand the needs of performance management in their own domestic police systems, and thus UNAMID Police's efforts to improve the quality and performance of its personnel through the new recruitment process.

Coordination and cooperation between UNAMID Police and other components

UNAMID is a multi-dimensional mission and various mechanisms exist for coordination among the different components – police, military and civilian. For example, every week at Sector South the heads of the three components meet to determine the patrol priorities and activities for that week.

However, because the civilian component is not present at all team sites, where this is the case the police component represents the civilian one, having the most daily interaction with IDPs and receiving feedback on their needs and local developments from them.

Since the 2014 review, the need for coordination within the mission has become much more strongly emphasized. This has resulted in greater frequency of coordination meetings, focused mainly on the operational level. Nevertheless, obstacles to cooperation and coordination within UNAMID have been identified. Interviews with members of the mission's civilian component suggested that some police personnel lack adequate knowledge of the mandate of the civilian component (e.g. human rights, civil affairs, rule of law). Although the induction training for police personnel should convey this information, it does not appear to have been completely effective. The consequence of this is reflected in the misunderstandings that interviewees said often ensue between the police and civilian component personnel over their respective work schedules. Officers in the civilian component indicated that the police often wanted civilian personnel to conform to police schedules when patrolling the IDP camps, instead of following their own schedules, thereby impeding the effectiveness of their work.

Similarly, at some of the team sites where the military had responsibility for patrols because of the absence of FPUs, the team heard that military workplans often conflicted with those of the police, which affected the overall performance of the team sites. Also the rotation of the military component takes a month during which successive contingents return home and are replaced by incoming ones, and this handover period affects the team site operations because IPOs and civilian personnel cannot go to the IDP camps without armed escort, which is provided by the military when no FPUs are present.

A mutual lack of understanding of mandates and work methods between components was similarly mentioned by police interviewees as occurring in patrols involving the military and IPOs; in particular, the military component often fails to understand the time that is required by police advisers to speak to IDP and community members and develop a rapport to build trust. Although the research team did not interview any members of the military component, the responses of members of the police and civilian components suggested greater efforts are needed to inform all mission personnel of the respective roles, requirements and methods of each component.

Police cooperation with the civilian component: human rights, rule of law and civil affairs

The UNAMID human rights and rule of law units and civil affairs section work in collaboration with the police component on its core mandates of capacity building and training of government police, and interface with communities in IDP camps. These civilian elements generally rely on the police component to provide security in carrying out their mandated activities. The units inform UNAMID Police about all of their activities so that the police component can provide safety guidance based on information obtained from the government police.

The most common challenge in this work is that without UNAMID Police, human rights, rule of law and civil affairs officers cannot conduct their tasks effectively. According to interviewees from the civilian component, UNAMID Police officers tend not to be highly knowledgeable about human rights issues, nor are they well informed about the UNAMID human rights mandate. UNAMID Police and human rights and rule of law officers often have conflicting priorities over which areas to visit.

At the community level, people reportedly tend not to interact well with civilian personnel when police officers are present, and yet civilian personnel cannot go out into the field without police protection.

Government restrictions also affect the activities of the civilian component. One core mandate of UNAMID human rights officers is to access detention facilities, but they have not been able to do so since 2011 because of government restrictions; and they are not allowed to monitor court proceedings without official government clearance.

In its efforts to mitigate inter-communal violence, the Civil Affairs section relies on the police for information gathering, and the UNAMID Police was recognised by civil affairs interviewees as the key element in the mission's early warning system, relying on them for critical information especially where civil affairs officers are not present. The Civil Affairs section supports the police in the extension of state authority by providing training and building the capacity of state institutions in public administration and governance issues, as well as managing conflict and building confidence between warring tribes through conflict resolution workshops and reconciliation activities. Civil affairs officers always work with police interacting directly with IDPs and local communities for implementation of QIPs, awareness raising, mediation and negotiation outreach.

However some interviewees from the civilian component suggested that certain UNAMID Police need to make a greater effort to understand the core mandates of civilian component and the areas in which its cooperation is required. In view of the security situation across Darfur, civilian personnel can only implement their work with armed escorts provided by police or military contingents. This challenge cuts across all components of the mission. The downsizing of the police and military components has directly affected the work of the civilian component because fewer escorts are available, and since military observers and IPOs also require armed escorts, the demand for this service is huge. Due to the security situation many mediation activities are also conducted by air, and civil affairs personnel may only have an hour or two on the ground to negotiate before having to return to the base by helicopter or aeroplane. These short periods on the ground are not as conducive to building community trust and collecting information as a longer-term presence.

Chapter 5

Protection of civilians

As described in previous chapters, UNAMID's core mandate is PoC. Since the 2014 mission review and revised strategic priorities in response to increasing insecurity, UNAMID Police's role in implementing this mandate focuses on physically protecting civilians; facilitating humanitarian assistance; and creating a protective environment through building government police capacity and community-oriented policing in IDP camps.

Generally, UNAMID's police component has capacities in place to facilitate the protection of civilians. These capacities include the FPUs, IPOs and the police gender cell, working in collaboration with military and civilian components and the government police. Although the FPUs are not directly involved in the physical protection of the civilian population beyond conducting high-visibility patrols, they act as enablers that create the possibility for PoC work to be carried out by the police advisers, as well as the work of the civilian component in the delivery of humanitarian aid, mediation, conflict management, reconciliation, human rights protection and rule of law.

In 2010 the United Nations developed an operational concept of protection of civilians based on three mutually reinforcing tiers. Tier 1 concerns protection through political process; Tier 2 involves providing protection from physical violence; and Tier 3 is establishing a protective environment (such as through facilitation of legal protection, humanitarian assistance, and support to national institutions).[56] To protect civilians, UNAMID Police has four pillars that complement the efforts of the three UN tiers for PoC. The four pillars include: institutional framework and procedures to marginalise differences on ground between the operations of UNAMID and government police; capacity building; community policing; and programme implementation and evaluation.

In terms of overall PoC programme implementation and the wider PoC environment in which the police component operates, the Humanitarian Affairs Section coordinates all PoC mandates within the mission. UNAMID has an operational PoC strategy that was approved in 2013 with 11 structures. At the time of our research, four of the 11 structures were functional. These four structures include: (1) the Protection Management Group, composed of mission managers; (2) the Joint Protection Group, which brings together the different components of the mission inclusive of all chiefs of substantive sections; (3) the Early Warning Group; and (4) the Field Protection Team, which conducts patrols at all UNAMID team sites and channels reports on the findings of the day to MHQ

to analyse and prepare a response in the event of potential threats to the civilian population. These different groups are also represented at the sector level of UNAMID operations.

UNAMID Police have protected civilians through their presence in the field and through patrols. For example, South Sector headquarter civilian component personnel reported that when IDPs and local civilians encounter a threat of attack they often coalesce around UNAMID team sites while UNAMID deploys a robust posture. During harvest time, UNAMID Police, and military contingents if available, deploy around farms to deter molestation of civilians, and also try to assist with escorting civilians collecting water and firewood.

UNAMID Police have been particularly beneficial in regard to Kalma camp, a large IDP camp in South Darfur where there is no government police presence. Serious potential has existed for government to come into conflict with Kalma camp with repeated threats of security raids by Sudanese authorities, but the efforts of the police in bridging the gap between local government police and IDP leaders, including increased confidence-building measures and engagement of IDP leaders and government authorities at all levels, has helped in preventing a crisis. They have also taken preventive measures to help mitigate the effects of potential security raids on Kalma by government authorities, such as demanding coordination with camp leaders and respect for human rights and humanitarian law. Further, UNAMID Police has supported due process by monitoring the handling of criminals and crimes reported to them, and by ensuring government police adhere to international standards.

Furthermore, UNAMID Police established 24-hour radio and phone coverage for all team sites in case field protection teams were not available. This process is well coordinated, and intelligence is transmitted to sector headquarters and MHQ if any threat to the civilian population is imminent. UNAMID Police thus play a crucial role in early warning.

Despite these capacities and coordinated structures to facilitate PoC, constraints and challenges pose obstacles to implementation of the mandate. A major challenge is posed by the uncertainty and deterioration of the security situation in Darfur since 2013. Security has been eroded by the increasing number of armed actors (RSF, government-supported militias, *janjaweed,* rebel groups and communities in conflict); the continued proliferation of weapons; and banditry and crime, which result in frequent attacks on UN personnel and property, including robberies, car-jackings and kidnapping. The deteriorating security situation has led to the imposition of safety measures that include the requirement that armed escorts accompany all visits to IDP camps by police and civilians – FPUs where they exist or the military.

As mentioned above, given the downsizing of the mission manpower for frequent patrols is insufficient and the capacity to carry out operations has been reduced. Although some felt that the downsizing had helped the police component become more efficient, various police and civilian personnel interviewed reported feeling over-burdened with work – despite the downsizing, the mandate of the mission remains the same and the number of tasks individuals are expected to carry out has grown.

Another major constraint on the implementation of the PoC mandate that affects all components is the denial of access by the government to areas that UNAMID personnel seek to visit outside of the UNAMID base and team sites. Such access restrictions have been a significant factor in curtailing

the ability of the mission to investigate and verify alleged attacks on civilians, and have given rise to accusations that the mission is failing in its reporting duties.[57]

UNAMID is also challenged by misinformation often provided by coverage of events in the region from radio station Radio Dabanga, currently broadcasting from the Netherlands and whose reports have a wide international reach. In interviews, several personnel from UNAMID's police, humanitarian and civilian components commented that Radio Dabanga often broadcasts incorrect information that causes tensions between UNAMID and the government.

In addition to the above factors influencing all components, several challenges specific to UNAMID Police create obstacles to implementing PoC. FPUs on their own cannot conduct long-range patrols and are limited to medium-range patrols. They are also challenged by not having the resources to implement the protection mandate to its fullest. As a result of the downsizing, the work of the civilian component on PoC is affected because insufficient FPUs are available to provide escorts. Most importantly, the protection provided by the police to the civilian population is restricted to IDPs located in camps. Thus, the three-tier PoC mandate is not fully implemented because the vast majority of civilians in Darfur are not extended protection.

Moreover, there is a lack of understanding among Darfuri IDPs about the UN concept of protection of civilians, and what it entails for the UNAMID Police. According to interviewed civilian component personnel, average Darfurian IDPs believe that they are being protected only when given physical protection by UNAMID Police or military who intervene on their behalf in the face of a threat of imminent violence. The three-tier notion of protection, involving also political means to establish peace through consultations, mediation and negotiation is not perceived by IDPs as protection; nor is the creation of a supportive environment such as through strengthening of rule of law, and ensuring respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

Furthermore, Darfuri IDPs lack understanding of the operating principles and constraints of international peacekeeping operations. UN-led peacekeeping missions traditionally operate on the basis of a 'holy trinity' of principles including impartiality, consent of the host state, and minimum use of force. While UNAMID is a hybrid operation under the joint leadership of the UN and the AU, the UN principles appear to have strongly influenced its operational parameters. And although interpretations of the core principles have shifted in the context of intrastate conflict and protection of civilians, they continue to impose important limits on peacekeeping action by UNAMID. In the case of UNAMID, these principles are observed in the context of a strong host government of a sovereign country for which consent has been a consistently sensitive issue. Contrary to popular belief in Darfur, UNAMID cannot compel the government of Sudan to do as it wants. UNAMID cannot, for example, prevent Sudanese authorities from conducting security raids in IDP camps. These misperceptions about UNAMID's protection of civilians mandate, operational parameters and resources have resulted in unrealistic expectations about what the mission can deliver.

Given the large number of IDP camps in Darfur, UNAMID Police is not able to be present in every one of them. Where UNAMID Police do conduct patrols and CPV training, it is the most visible component of UNAMID and must often deal with the high and unrealistic expectations of IDPs about services they can provide (such as livelihood training, jobs and other development activities), which is not reflected in the mandate of UNAMID Police.

Another barrier to success in achieving the PoC mandate is that although the mission has a budget for QIPs, there is no funding to implement relief activities as part of PoC. UNAMID is challenged in implementing the PoC mandate in areas where government police are not present, mostly because of security concerns.

In this regard, UNAMID needs to find ways to identify the most important issues that need attention. It also needs to improve information analysis on PoC within the mission. Interviewees indicated that more armed police were needed to provide escorts for police advisers. UNAMID also needs to step up its efforts in providing welfare services to IDPs through the UN Country Team or QIPs. This would make the work of the police more flexible in terms of its relations with the civilian population and in building the continued trust of the people on the mission.

Other constraints include the limited presence of the UN Country Team in Darfur, and lack of understanding of their respective roles and the effective integration of their programmes. UNAMID Police involvement in the activities of the country team in the IDP camps in Darfur is also limited

Rapid UNAMID Police rotation affects continuity and trust with the local people and government police, especially when personnel have built good relations with the locals. This challenge is common to police components in peacekeeping missions. The UNAMID police commissioner and police leadership group have sought to mitigate the effects of this in part by identifying effective UNAMID Police officers and seeking to extend their deployment to the mission.

Finally, challenges also exist to creating a protective environment through building government police capacity. A number of the UNAMID Police personnel that the research team interviewed acknowledge that government police officers are generally well-trained and professional but face limitations because of the ongoing conflict dynamics in the region and proliferation of Sudanese security forces and ad hoc government-supported forces, and lack adequate equipment and vehicles to carry out their duties.

Government police officers operate in an environment in which military actors take the lead as a result of their counter-insurgency role, and paramilitary forces may interfere with investigations by removing suspects accused of serious crimes such as murder before they come to trial. Impunity continues for crimes committed by individuals in uniform. As with UNAMID itself, armed groups that are looking to acquire weapons and vehicles may target government police officers in Darfur. IDPs identify the government police as representatives of the Sudanese state rather than as professional law-enforcement agents, and hence IDPs and local communities often do not trust them. It is within this challenging environment that UNAMID Police seeks to protect civilians, build local police capacities, redress grievances and rebuild trust between IDPs and local police.

Chapter 6

Gender analysis

The prevalence of SGBV in Darfur means that gender issues constitute a critical element of UNAMID's PoC mandate. Starting with the wider mission context, the Gender Advisory Unit's mandate focuses on mainstreaming gender in all operations of the mission and providing training and capacity building as and when required. Generally, gender mainstreaming within the mission has shifted from a community-based focus to an in-mission focus. When exactly this shift occurred is not clear. The mission formerly implemented QIPs for the empowerment of women in Darfur. It was noted, for example, that the UNAMID Gender Advisory Unit used to work towards mainstreaming gender within the Sudanese government by promoting political participation of women in politics and also training of government police officers on gender and SGBV issues.

The UNAMID Gender Advisory Unit mainstreams gender in all of the mission's operations including policies, planning, procedures and reporting. It engages in capacity building of senior mission leadership, gender focal points and mission staff. The Gender Advisory Unit also provides technical assistance and policy advice to the components in the mission. In this capacity, it trains UNAMID Police officers on how to mainstream gender within the operations of the government police.

Gender representation in UNAMID Police

In terms of the composition of the police component, UNAMID has recognised the need for female police personnel. Given the extent of SGBV cases in Darfur and cultural beliefs that make victims reluctant to report these to the police, the police component aims to maintain a ratio of at least 20% female police advisers among its personnel, though this fluctuates. At the time of field research in November 2014, UNAMID Police included over 300 female police officers out of 1 583 personnel. In Sector South, 21.3% of police advisers were female. The emphasis on recruiting female police advisers is because IPOs or police advisers have the main interactive role within the police component with female IDPs, many of which are likely to have experienced SGBV. Furthermore, there are relatively few female government police. The mission has, however, experienced difficulty acquiring female police advisers from Arabic-speaking countries, which tend to have fewer female police officers in operational roles. Failure of many female police to meet the driving requirements for deployment on mission has also been a problem.

Very few female police are included in UNAMID's FPUs. One FPU commander viewed the presence of even a few women as a constraint, because they would require special facilities and arrangements; for example, not being able to send female police on night patrols.

Recognising that there were few women in decision-making positions in the mission, UNAMID Police established a network for female police to help mainstream gender issues in the work of the police component. The network also looks at the needs of women police within UNAMID and offers a support structure for them. It also aims to facilitate the reporting of SGBV. The network is to be replicated in the government police.

Gender dimension of UNAMID Police strategies

The UNAMID Police Gender Cell coordinates all gender-related activities of the UNAMID geographic sectors; collates information and sends it to the Police Gender Unit at MHQ. The Police Gender Cell coordinates gender-related work, such as training and sexual violence cases, with the civilian Gender Advisory Unit. The recruitment of women as child protection volunteers at the team sites has raised gender awareness at the community level. UNAMID Police also advocates that the government police should have gender desks at the various team sites.

One of the main challenges to mainstreaming gender in the work of UNAMID Police is the lack of a comprehensive police presence in Darfur, whether UNAMID Police or government police. Within Sector North alone, there are 14 team sites, some of which do not have any government or UNAMID Police representation. Sexual violence against women and children often goes unreported. Some of the areas in which team sites are located are also controlled by 'movements' police' – police belonging to armed groups that signed the DDPD. According to interviewees, members of the 'movements' police' tend to lack an understanding of gender issues, and UNAMID Police should train them on gender along with the government police. The CPVs are playing a major role in preventing abuse against women and children at the different team sites; however, their work is limited by lack of remuneration, and the lack of full access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The police gender advisers at the team site receive training twice a year on how to train community leaders. The number of training session is not sufficient and this is mostly because of the lack of funding. Moreover, it emerged from interviews with members of the civilian component and MHQ that police advisers need specialised training on report writing for more effective reporting from the deep field.

Above all, it was reported that UNAMID Police officers tend to have little knowledge on gender issues before they are deployed. Thus, it takes them time to learn to work effectively on gender issues in the context of Darfur.

The UNAMID Police Gender Cell has made a number of achievements. Many cases of abuse are now reported to authorities, in contrast to previous years. Low levels of community trust in police have improved as a result of the UNAMID Police's confidence-building efforts. It has built the capacity of three government police centres to handle SGBV issues; and coordination between UNAMID Police and the government police on gender issues has increased. UNAMID Police workshops have raised awareness among communities to include women in all spheres of decision-making and also encouraged communities to put in place education and awareness-raising measures to help change perceptions about gender. UNAMID Police is working closely with government to include women in policing and also promoting understanding among the government police of the benefits of recruiting women as prison officers, because only two female police officers were identified as working in the entire Sudanese prison system.

Gender mainstreaming – government police

Significant challenges exist for mainstreaming gender within the government police. The government police do not give high priority to hiring women and police officers are predominantly male. Due to cultural beliefs in Sudan, families do not consider policing to be a suitable occupation for women. Females who join the government police also refuse rotations to work in rural areas, preferring to stay in Khartoum or the major cities. Consequently, there is a lack of female police experts to handle SGBV. The government police's failure to respect the confidentiality of IDP victims of SGBV often exposes women to threats and retaliation by perpetrators. The very low numbers of female government police, cultural barriers and procedural issues mean that victims of SGBV, especially in rural areas, remain reluctant to report assaults to government police officers, except in cases that are linked to other matters such as theft. Female representation in UNAMID-mandated training programmes for government police is correspondingly low.

Sector North police became aware of frequent cases of SGBV in the area and developed a vigorous awareness-raising programme, including workshops in IDP camps. Sector South also had plans to help establish a gender desk at the Nyala government police HQ. Similarly, UNAMID Police has supported the development of women and children's protection centres, focusing primarily on infrastructure development by means of QIP funding.

UNAMID Police advisers cooperate with female government police officers to help them understand gender perspectives in their activities. They also support female government police in development programmes and livelihood programmes.

Chapter 7

Training and training needs analysis

Among the many factors that determine the success or failure of peace operations are the quality and effectiveness of individual personnel. Effective training equips police personnel with the necessary skills and knowledge to perform their functions.[58] The UN has three prescribed training programmes for police officers before and after deployment. These are: pre-deployment training (PDT); mandatory induction or mission-specific training, which is delivered to personnel on arrival at the mission; and on-going or in-mission/in-service training, which is a form of learning activity for personnel in the mission subsequent to the induction training. Collectively, these three training programmes complement one another. Some of the issues that were raised during interviews with the UNAMID Police component and government police are discussed below.

Pre-deployment training

The objectives of UN PDT for police officers are generally to prepare participants for duties in a peacekeeping operation so that they can fulfil policing aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates in accordance with Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/Department of Field Support principles and guidelines, perform their policing functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner, and demonstrate the core values and competencies of the UN.[59] PDT is important because it provides useful information on the mission context and expected roles and conduct before deployment, which helps personnel to adapt quickly to the mission environment.

Experience has shown that UN police officers who have been provided PDT adjust much better to the mission conditions, work culture and the peacekeeping tasks. They make an impact with their professional skills much sooner than those who have not had the benefit of PDT.[60] According to the UN PDT Standards for police officers, regional or national peacekeeping training institutes deliver police PDT over a minimum period of two weeks. PCCs are mandated to provide their police officers with the UN PDT Standards consisting of the Core Pre-deployment Training Material and the Specialized Training Material for police officers developed by the DPKO.

However, the research team learnt during its field research that only 30% of IPOs received PDT before deployment to UNAMID, and 70 % of them did not receive the mandatory training in their home country. This presents a challenge for the police component because individual police officers come to the mission without the necessary skill sets or knowledge of the mission environment and their expected roles. This challenge also has implications for the content of the induction training

of the mission to be more generic than specific. In addition to this, most of the content of the PDT provided for the IPOs was outdated and needed to be more mission specific.

Furthermore, PDT was reportedly delivered to some IPOs as if personnel would be deployed to executive missions. This focus on executive missions is at odds with current peacekeeping practice. There are broadly two types of peacekeeping mandates. Peacekeeping missions that have an executive mandate are authorised to undertake executive (legislative, executive, and judicial) functions as the UN undertakes the role of a transitional government. In executive missions, police peacekeepers themselves provide law and order in the country, have powers of arrest, and are armed. To date, only the peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Timor Leste have had executive mandates. These types of missions are considered unlikely to be seen again in the foreseeable future. The other type of mission has a non-executive mandate, in which the peacekeeping operation does not assume authority for the executive functions of government but provides support to national authorities. Most contemporary peace operations, including UNAMID, have non-executive mandates, and PDT should reflect this as whether a peacekeeping mission's mandate is executive or non-executive will directly affect the roles and functions that deployed police will be expected to fulfil.

Induction and in-service training

Induction and on-going or in-service training provide an opportunity for police officers to train personnel on the same curriculum, which reduces differences in competency levels. These training programmes are imperative because they fill gaps in knowledge, skills and general competencies where PCCs deploy their personnel without providing the required PDT.

The UNAMID Police training department consists of an in-service training section, which is responsible for induction and in-service training for IPO and FPU personnel. The research team noted that the duration of induction training was short and generally more like an information-sharing forum than practical training on specific and required skill sets. The UNAMID Police leadership has reviewed the police induction framework and training methodology and decided that induction training will be based on scenario-based learning for more interactive and skills-based learning. The training curriculum and methods have been revised and updated to accommodate scenario-based learning, which provides personnel with the practical skills they need. However, most of the trainers do not have expertise in scenario-based learning and this gap needs to be addressed.

The in-service training unit of the UNAMID Police training department has mainly focused on induction training and seems to be ignoring in-service training. Between June and November 2014, the unit provided induction training to 286 police officers, including 28 female officers. It was not possible to get specific figures, but it was noted that many IPOs participated in different in-mission training sessions that the Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) organised.

The operational- and tactical-level managers, including team site commanders, are appointed based on their skill sets and experience in their home countries. The mission did not used to provide them with training that would make them competent for their specific position on deployment. Recently, the UNAMID police commissioner ordered the unit to start developing a curriculum for team site commanders, for which they have also requested international support, particularly from TfP. It is believed that this training will fill the gaps in managerial skill sets at the operational and tactical levels of UNAMID Police.

Some IPOs are responsible for mandated training to build the capacity of local police officers to carry out their roles professionally. In interviews with IPOs in UNAMID, the research team identified a gap in this regard; specifically there appeared to be a lack of skill sets among some IPOs in delivering adult trainings. Some of the IPOs requested periodic orientation programmes on new modules, training materials and methodologies to bring themselves up to date. In addition, most trainers at MHQ lacked the experience and skills to develop curricula and training materials, especially for mandated training. Specialised training of trainers is needed to address this capacity gap.

Building capacities of the government police and community policing initiatives

To accomplish the mission mandate, UNAMID Police has mandated activities that are related to building the capacity of the government police, as well as promoting community-oriented policing among IDPs and local communities. The UNAMID Police Revised Concept of Operations (CONOPs) includes 'monitoring and advising Sudanese Police and Community Policing Volunteers in responding to criminal and security incidents' as a part of its mandate for physical PoC.[61] The revised CONOPs also includes 'creat[ing] protective environments through capacity building of GOS [Government of Sudan] Police in the areas of: prevention, detection and investigation of crime; protection of persons and property; the maintenance of public order and safety'.[62]

It is clear from the points above that training for capacity-building activities is of central importance. Between 2008 and 2013, before the revision of the mission's strategic priorities and when it had a wider capacity-building role, UNAMID Police delivered different types of training to government police officers, IDPs and members of armed groups in Darfur. During this period, 32 748 people – including 5 645 women – benefited from the training packages, which included:

• Human rights

• SGBV

• Child protection

• Community policing

• Public order management

• Crime investigation

• Crime scene management

• A field commanders' course

• VIP protection

• Police management

• Computer skills

Challenges included the short duration of the training programme for government police officers and its impact on the value and acceptance of the certificate given. Until then, UNAMID training certificates had enhanced promotions. But the government police leadership considered the courses too short compared to government training courses and indicated that the UNAMID certificate would only be recognised if the duration of courses was extended from two to five days to two weeks or

more. However, UNAMID Police interviewees noted that extension of the duration of UNAMID's training courses for government police could only be done if there was sufficient funding. The government police also requested that the mission upgrade its courses from basic to advanced level. In this respect, UNAMID Police must ensure that design of curricula and development of training materials and courses are done in consultation and coordination with the government police, the beneficiary.

Beginning in 2013, greater collaboration and coordination has occurred between UNAMID Police and the government police. The two parties signed an MOU in August 2013 to collaborate on an institutional framework and procedures, capacity building, community policing, and project implementation and evaluations. A strategic workshop was held in November 2013 in Khartoum that opened new opportunities for both, and allowed the government police to recognise the importance of UNAMID Police to Sudan. Since these events, UNAMID Police has had regular interactions with the government police in Khartoum and has proposed a forensics pilot project in Nyala, Sector South.

Training materials

During field research, the research team observed certain gaps related to training as a means of capacity building. IPOs responsible for mandated training at sector levels noted that the training materials from MHQ were sometimes vague and unclear, and that the trainers themselves lacked presentation and facilitation skills to deliver the modules. The translation of some of the in-service training materials from English to Arabic by different nationals also presents a problem for the language assistants. For example, although Arabic is spoken in Egypt, Sudan and Jordan, each of these countries has certain words that are unique.

These gaps need to be addressed through harmonising the training materials to enhance their delivery and interpretation, and providing training of trainers (ToT) for IPOs to more consistently and effectively train their target audiences. Similarly, some training officers themselves requested periodic orientation programmes on new modules and training materials and ToT to enable them to update their knowledge and refresh their memories.

Trainers

As noted above, some of the training officers, especially those in the sectors and at team sites, lack the facilitation and presentation skills to deliver modules. As a result, some simply read out the materials to those they are training, and this diminishes the effective delivery of modules/training materials. To address this challenge, PCCs should be requested to deploy professional trainers to the mission based on UNAMID skill sets. The mission should also provide continuing professional development opportunities for training officers to improve their own skills by pursuing courses in the peacekeeping training centres.

Curriculum development

Some of the trainers at MHQ also indicated that they lacked the expertise to develop training curricula, especially those requested by the government police. This has been compounded by the absence of an e-library where trainers might easily access the materials and information necessary for curriculum development. It was suggested by one trainer that an e-library should be created with

access to information for all training officers in the sectors and at team sites and MHQ, to enable them to update their knowledge continually. Additionally, the mission could also coordinate with the UN Integrated Training Service (ITS) in New York or training and research institutions such as ISS, KAIPTC, ACCORD and NUPI to provide training packages (curricula) for delivery of courses at the government police's request.

Despite these difficulties, the training unit has developed the following training modules for the government training authority:

• Human rights, SGBV and child protection

• Criminal investigation

• Crime scene management

• Community policing

• Detention and treatment of suspects

• Basic computer skills

• First aid

The government police has accepted all of these training modules and requested that UNAMID incorporate certain aspects of national law into the modules. Additionally, UNAMID Police has developed a three-month English language course for beginners, intended for government police officers, IDPs and CPVs.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and recommendations

UNAMID's hybrid nature invites cooperation as well as rivalry at times at the strategic political leadership level. It must contend with a difficult operating environment in terms of relations with the government; logistical challenges resulting from the huge geographical expanse, difficult terrain, climate and underdeveloped infrastructure; and financial challenges from donor fatigue. Although UNAMID has a robust Chapter VII mandate to deliver its core task of protecting civilians, it has experienced difficulties achieving this because of constant obstructions by the government, continuing conflict between government and government-supported forces and various armed groups in Darfur, and the failure to reach a comprehensive peace settlement. Indeed, after almost eight years of UNAMID's deployment, finding a win-win solution to the Darfur conflict remains a distant prospect.

Although the security situation has worsened since 2013, UNAMID Police has been subject to successive personnel reductions. The government has restricted its access, which has negatively affected the mission's capacities to implement its PoC mandate through interactive patrols in which IPOs talk to IDPs, supporting community-oriented policing, and investigating allegations of attacks on civilian populations.

The police component is the most visible face of the mission and has the most interaction with IDPs and local communities, given the forced withdrawal of many humanitarian NGOs from the region, reductions in civilian mission staff and restricted access. Misperceptions persist among Darfuri civilians about the mission's mandate and what specifically the police component is authorised to do. They have unrealistic expectations that UNAMID can impose its will on the government, and that UNAMID Police should function as a development actor, which results in disappointment and frustration.

Despite the many challenges, UNAMID Police has made some important achievements. These include the development of the police component's recruitment, performance management and central database management systems. These should improve the quality of personnel put forward by PCCs and deployed to the mission, and the means of assessing their performance, as well as facilitating faster and more effective decision-making by senior leadership. UNAMID Police has also established a broad training needs analysis to enhance the curriculum development process; and the CONOPs has also been included as part of the modules taught at induction training.

Further good practice is the harmonisation of training modules used during induction and at the IMTC to avoid duplicating courses. Additionally, the UNAMID Police training unit uses knowledge-based and scenario-based learning techniques for more interactive and skills-based learning during induction training.

UNAMID Police provide timely early-warning information to the mission. Regular visits, meetings and communication with the government police have been instrumental in building trust and improving formal and informal relations between UNAMID Police and its Sudanese counterparts. This applies both to high-level management and operational levels. Government bureaucratic processes can sometimes be cumbersome or become blocked; developing contacts and trust with counterparts in government ministries and the police helps to facilitate and expedite these processes. UNAMID Police has also helped to build the capacity of the government in SGBV investigations, VIP protection, gender and child protection, human rights and criminal investigation. These have been demand-driven, capacity-building activities and are more likely to enjoy local ownership.

Given its important role in civilian protection, combined with its role in building trust in and the capacity of government police, the police component occupies a critical position in the mission. In a shifting and often fraught operational environment, in the face of ongoing and increased levels of conflict, sustained obstruction by Sudanese authorities at political and operational levels, and despite progressively reduced personnel ceilings and resources to implement their mandate, it is clear that UNAMID Police has made some important achievements. It is also reasonable to conclude that UNAMID's presence in Darfur has helped to deter several atrocities against civilians, especially in IDP camps. It has helped to develop community-oriented policing mechanisms in IDP camps, and to build government police capacities and relationships with IDP communities. Through its armed escorts it has also facilitated delivery of humanitarian assistance, and enabled the civilian component to engage in essential activities involving mediation and conflict resolution, human rights, rule of law, and gender and child protection.

The UNAMID Police leadership has been especially active in improving internal procedures, which has resulted in more effective management of staff, who themselves have more relevant skills. Through the strong leadership of the police commissioner, UNAMID Police has established several initiatives that are arguably unique to the mission and should be of interest to other peacekeeping and peace support missions. These include a recruitment system that is tailored to mission needs, a more rigorous performance management system, and a central database management system. These innovations have helped to improve the quality of police personnel deployed to the mission; improved the capacity to retain high-performing IPOs; and facilitated faster, more effective decision-making by senior management.

Recommendations for UNAMID Police

- Conduct more training of IPOs in report writing, to better document the impact of police activities, which tend to go unreported or are not effectively captured in reports.

- Increase gender training for government police officers and UNAMID Police personnel.

- Promote local ownership of training programmes, and systematically involve facilitators and trainers from the government police in curriculum development and facilitation of all UNAMID-mandated training.

- Seek to ensure that training for government police officers responds to their stated needs. For example, it appears that the government police have received training in human rights and gender issues, but they have expressed a need for training in computer skills.

- Train language assistants in basic police terminology and concepts.

- Seek to maintain the morale of UNAMID Police personnel, especially those who regularly work in insecure environments and/or those not given leave by their sending countries.

- Find ways to clearly communicate the mandate of UNAMID Police to IDPs to better manage their expectations. UNAMID Police often confronts IDP demands for relief and humanitarian and development assistance, which do not fall under the police mandate, and this affects efforts to build trust and confidence.

- In coordination with the UN Country Team, explore possibilities for funding livelihood training and other means of vocational support for IDPs, and to provide compensation and other incentives for CPVs in IDP camps.

- Improve cooperation and coordination with the UNAMID civilian component, in particular concerning rule of law.

- The police, military and civilian components in UNAMID should improve their awareness of the respective roles and requirements of each component during joint patrols. For example, police and civilian components may require longer to interact with local communities and IDPs.

- Transfers of government police throughout Sudan and the rotation of UNAMID personnel at the senior and middle levels affects cooperation for both UNAMID Police and the Sudanese police. It is necessary for UNAMID Police to build institutional memory to continue cooperation.

- Adequate funding for UNAMID Police QIPs and to support CPV training in IDP camps is needed. This is a relatively low-cost way to support confidence building with government police and local communities.

- QIPs should be determined through consultations with IDPs and the government police, and based on their real needs, rather than what mission personnel believe is needed.

- The police commissioner should continue to engage with and encourage PCCs to select and deploy to UNAMID officers who possess the skill sets that are specifically relevant to the mission (in planning, project management, mediation, etc.).

- PCCs should be strongly urged to provide PDT for their personnel.

- UN Police Division/DPKO should consider innovations by UNAMID Police in recruitment and extension processes with a view to using them for other missions.

Notes

1   Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter contains provisions relating to 'Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression'. The Security Council has come to invoke it 'when authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.' http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml

2   Renata Dwan (ed.), *Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations,* SIPRI Research Report No. 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-4.

3   OCHA, *Humanitarian Bulletin Sudan,* Issue 3, 12-18 January 2015.

4   African Union, Briefing Note on the Renewal of the Mandate of the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(XLII), 20 October 2005.

5   According to the mandate, AMIS would 'Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS'. African Union, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm. (VII), 20 October 2004, para 6.

6   Paul D. Williams, The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis, *African Security,* Vol. 2, Nos 2-3 (2009), 103.

7   Williams (2009), 103-5.

8   United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006).

9   Oliver Burkeman and Xan Rice, Sudan rejects UN peacekeeping plan, *The Guardian,* 1 September 2006.

10 Henry Anyidoho, Experiences of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Sudan (UNAMID), in Linnéa Gelot and Cedric de Coning (eds), *Supporting African Peace Operations* (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2012); Seth Appiah-Mensah, The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas, *African Security Review,* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006).

11 By the end of 2014, UNAMID was the second-largest mission with a strength of 20,060 personnel. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was the largest mission with 25,172 personnel strength. See Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.

12 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007), 31 July 2007, para. 2.

13 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007), 31 July 2007, para 15(a).

14 Michael Gaouette cited in Colum Lynch, A mission that was set up to fail, *Foreign Policy,* 8 April 2014.

15 Colum Lynch, A mission that was set up to fail; also UNAMID, 1_ Annex List of Challenges & Restrictions Imposed by GoS, www.scribd.com/doc/217111994/1-Annex-List-of-Challenges-Restrictions-Imposed-by-GoS.

16 Linnéa Gelot, *Security and Governance: Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur* (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2012), 127.

17 Alex de Waal, 'Sudan: Darfur' in *Responding to Conflict in Africa,* Jane Boulden (ed.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 284.

18 Christian Walter, 'Hybrid Peacekeeping: Is UNAMID a New Model for Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations?' in Holger P. Hestermayer et al (eds), *Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity,* Vol. II (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1339.

19 International Crisis Group, Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process, Africa Report No. 211, 27 January 2014.

20 'July 2012 Monthly Forecast: Sudan/Darfur', *Security Council Report,* 29 June 2012, www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-07/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_8191997.php.

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22 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2012/231, 17 April 2012, paras 72-76.

23 Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2014/138, 25 February 2014 (henceforth Special Report 2014). See also UN Security Council Resolution 2148 (2014), 3 April 2014.

24 Special Report 2014, paras 25-38.

25 Special Report 2014, para. 40.

26 UN Security Council Resolution 2173 (2014), 27 August 2014, para. 4.

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About this monograph

This monograph examines the role of the police component in the multidimensional AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It begins by setting out the complex context of the Darfur crisis and responses by regional and international actors. It then considers the mandated roles and specific functions of the main elements of UNAMID Police – formed police units, individual police officers and core command/senior leadership – as well as discussing the various challenges encountered in attempting to implement the mission's protection of civilians mandate. The report focuses particularly on training: mandated training of Sudanese government police and community policing volunteers in IDP camps; and training of UNAMID personnel. It ends by identifying good practices within the police component and making recommendations for UNAMID Police.

About the ISS

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