



**A Legacy of Peace:
The US-Japan Partnership after 70 years**

**A conference report of the
Japan-US Friendship Commission Young Leaders Workshop
Edited by Julia Cunico and Brad Glosserman**

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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.



The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders program was established in 2004 and has four primary objectives: to foster education in the practical aspects and complexities of policy-making; to generate a greater exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals; to promote cross-cultural interaction and cooperation among younger professionals; and to enrich dialogues with generational perspectives for the benefit of all attendees.

The program provides opportunities for Young Leaders to attend high-level conferences, network with senior and emerging experts, and receive editorial guidance to publish their work within our network of security experts, policymakers, and opinion leaders. You leaders also develop skills writing policy briefs, creating and running table-top exercises, giving public presentations, networking, and in media relations. The program is further enriched by a strong alumni base with many Young Leaders continuing on to leadership positions in governments and the private sector across the world.



The Japan United States Friendship Commission (JUSFC)

The Japan United States Friendship Commission (JUSFC) was established as an independent agency by the US Congress in 1975 (P.L. 94-118). The Commission administers a US government trust fund that originated in connection with the return to the Japanese government of certain US facilities in Okinawa and for postwar American assistance to Japan. Income from the fund is available for the promotion of scholarly, cultural and public affairs activities between the two countries. JUSFC is also celebrating its 40th anniversary this year.

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Foreword

To mark the occasion of 70 years since the end of the Pacific War, a group of young professionals and scholars met in Honolulu to discuss the state of the US-Japan partnership. With generous support from the Japan-US Friendship Commission, the discussion veered from our usual focus on security and military alliance issues and instead examined the personal, cultural, educational, and professional ties between the United States and Japan. The group of 19 Japanese and American nationals (including a number of Japanese-Americans) looked ahead to future areas for collaboration in the realms of agriculture, educational training, technology, and innovation.

Our conversation emphasized looking forward instead of back and concluded that the war should not be the benchmark by which the health of the relationship is measured. This does not mean that either side should forget the past, but rather that the partnership between the US and Japan should be built upon consideration of our mutual strengths instead of dwelling on individual failures. For example, one recommendation is that the United States should emphasize Japanese language instruction in more schools, contributing to a learned population that can communicate effectively across borders. Another recommendation is to build exchanges that emphasize innovation and capitalize on Japanese and American enthusiasm for improving technology and problem-solving. Despite vocal support for the US-Japan partnership that exists in both countries, something is still missing.

The Pew Research Center recently released a new survey called, “Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years After the End of WWII.” (www.pewresearch.org). While the Pew survey had a much larger sample than ours, the enclosed documents show that we came to very similar conclusions: the alliance is strong and is based upon feelings of mutual respect. While both results indicate that the war is no longer the most important moment in the history of the alliance, both surveys emphasized the importance of the military alliance for Japanese national security as well as for regional stability and security. Also like the Pew results, we found that most Americans feel that Japan should take a more active role ensuring peace and security in the region, while Japanese respondents were divided. One aspect of the Pew poll that is getting attention is that Japanese views of Americans are based on negative stereotypes—that Americans are selfish, dishonest, and not innovative. In order to combat these competing visions of the relationship, we recommend more meetings such as ours.

The Pacific Forum CSIS established the Young Leaders Program in 2004 as a means to prepare the next generation of foreign policy specialists and to integrate them into the world of Asia-Pacific policymaking and analysis. We hope that by bringing Young Leaders to the table and encouraging them to interact with one another and with senior experts that they will have the opportunity to hone their views and to confidently contribute them to Asia-Pacific security policy discourse. One of the main obstacles that I face as head of the Young Leaders program is to assemble the right mixture of experience, personality, and citizenship, and to foster a well-balanced discussion between Young Leaders and with their more senior counterparts. Over the last six months, we

have tackled East Asian crisis simulations, US-Japan bilateral issues, and US-ROK-Japan trilateral issues. Though our surveys indicate that the US-Japan relationship is one of the most important in Asia today, time and again we struggle to get young Japanese to participate in our meetings. This is a symptom of a relationship in need of repair. If we can cultivate more respect by elevating the US-Japan relationship beyond the Pacific War and the historical memories associated with it, perhaps more conversations like this can air grievances, spark policy innovation, and bring more young Japanese to the table.

Julia Cunico
Director, Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program

Key Findings and Recommendations

by Petra G. Kubalkova

The Pacific Forum CSIS, in partnership with the Japan-United States Friendship Commission (JUSFC), held a workshop in Honolulu, Hawaii, on February 27, 2015. It brought together 19 Young Leaders from the US and Japan from private, public, and government sectors with one common interest: US-Japan relations. The participants engaged in a one-day workshop discussing the US-Japan alliance and marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War. The workshop identified the views of both nations and how we should commemorate and celebrate war legacies to further strengthen the US-Japan alliance. This meeting highlighted survey data that will serve Pacific Forum CSIS and the JUSFC in the creation of longitudinal study of the US-Japan alliance. Participants were asked the same survey questions before and after the meeting and these questions were modeled after a similar survey conducted in 2009. Both the 2009 and 2015 surveys are attached in Appendices A and B.

In the first session, participants examined the roles Japan and the US should play in the region and whether they believed the alliance was sufficiently strong. This discussion began with a survey that Pacific Forum CSIS conducted prior to the meeting that assessed participants' attitudes toward the alliance, ways to make the alliance prosper, and the roles Japan and the US should play. The data revealed that 72 percent of US respondents believed that the US-Japan alliance is strong and 85 percent of Japanese concurred. We further assessed the level of assigned strength the participants expressed. 36 percent of US respondents believed that the US-Japan alliance is excellent, and 36 percent believed it to be good. In contrast, 71 percent of Japanese found the alliance good and 14 percent found it excellent. Overall, the alliance was perceived by both parties as sufficiently strong. In addition, we asked Americans and Japanese how they perceived the level of respect shown between the US and Japan. Notably, we found that 85 percent of Japanese and similarly 85 percent of US respondents thought the level of respect was equal. Therefore, we concluded that there is strong mutual respect. The polled data also assessed differences in how American and Japanese participants view the military alliance. Both agreed that the US-Japan alliance is vital to Japan's security, with 64 percent of Americans and 71 percent of Japanese strongly concurring. When considering the role of the US-Japan partnership, survey respondents indicated that 91 percent of Americans perceived the US-Japanese alliance as essential to regional stability and security; only 28 percent of Japanese held the same view. Japanese respondents were also more inclined to suggest deepening diplomatic relations with 42 percent support, whereas their US counterparts were more inclined to suggest strengthening of the military alliance with 45 percent support. When asked what the relationship between Japan and the US should be, 71 percent of Japanese felt strongly about strengthening it and only 14 percent suggested keeping it at the same level. On the contrary, 54 percent of their American counterparts wanted a stronger relationship and 45 percent wanted to keep it at the same level.

The first session of the meeting discussed the data at length and the group concluded that the relationship is sufficiently strong. Nevertheless, throughout the

workshop, Japanese participants felt misunderstood by their US counterparts, notably, they felt Americans did not understand the cultural roots and values Japanese possess. Collectively, the Japanese position aimed to foster deeper cultural ties to not only assimilate bilaterally, but also to work toward embracing the cultural dichotomy and ingrained mutual understanding. They suggested that greater economic integration through improved business development practices and a stronger future business alliance might be hampered by the lack of structural, historical, and normative knowledge of Japan. The survey supported this sentiment. US participants said that they feel Japanese are too passive in their approach for a broader integration of not only business but political alignment. One US participant noted that, “we might see this shift happen under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s call for a greater participation.” Notably, the tendency among participants was to steer away from focusing on earlier military actions and the need for Japan to apologize for past actions against the United States. The Japanese participants’ sought to refocus attention on balancing cultural differences and to work toward more collaborative people-to-people exchanges that would enhance the US-Japan alliance. This is to combat not only a sense of misunderstanding, but also to refocus US attention from US-China relations to the US-Japan alliance.

In the second half of the conference, participants were divided into three groups of 6-7 participants with equal representation from the US and Japan. They met separately for two hours to propose a plan of action to deepen the US-Japan alliance. Each group proposed five recommendations to strengthen the alliance.

All three groups came up with similar propositions. Group 1 recommended agricultural exchanges, which would encourage greater participation from the younger generations in agro-business, build connections between program participants and institutions, and allow for the sharing of innovative ideas and the growth of bilateral business networks. Their second recommendation was for innovation fairs that would recognize world leaders in development and design. This would allow for transfusion of innovative ideas and new technology through joint engagement from both nations. The third recommendation was for establishing a US-Okinawa community-building project to improve tense relations and create a more conducive environment for diplomatic dialogues. Fourth, they suggested holding concurrent festivals that would build awareness of Japanese and American culture and bridge cultural differences. Group 1’s core concept was tackling the cultural divide.

Group 2 recommended student exchanges that also aimed at bridging the cultural divide. Second, they proposed a ‘Nobel Peace Prize’ for Asia to recognize and reward contributions to regional peace and security. Their third recommendation was for a ‘birthright program’ for Japan that would operate on a similar platform as the Jewish heritage model where Japanese-Americans would travel to Japan to learn about their heritage free of charge. This would help to strengthen US-Japan relations. Their final recommendation was for an enhanced social medial presence, and the establishment of ‘kick-starter funds’ to support business networks and media production that would make a positive impact on future US and Japanese generations.

Group 3 proposed increased US-Japan economic integration through the creation of executive exchange programs that would explore potential bilateral joint ventures, agricultural exchanges (similar to Group 1's proposal), and a US-Japan fund that would promote entrepreneurship and start-ups. Second, they proposed a US-Japan partnership strategy, an official document that outlines priorities for non-military US-Japan regional engagement and identifies areas where the respective countries can take action. Their third recommendation was to create educational colloquia for history professors from major universities in all countries that participated in the Pacific War. The colloquia would provide a platform for exchange of educational material, and afford audiences the opportunity to discuss historical issues from divergent perspectives. This would give rise to a more widely shared understanding of the past. Their final recommendation was for a commemorative event or initiative that would highlight the "70 Years of Collaboration" between the US and Japan and emphasize the cultural ties between the two nations in education, economics, and diplomacy.

The group exercise led to a plenary discussion that answered the conference's final question: how can the US-Japan alliance be strengthened? The general sentiment was to move forward rather than focus on the past in commemorating war legacies. The participants acknowledged the importance of remembering the legacy of the war, but were more interested in finding new ways that the US and Japan can come together and cooperate beyond the military realm. A generational shift has caused the need for a 're-apology' to evaporate. The desire for the US to accept the notion of *kami-no-michi* (commonly Shinto) was prevalent. In Shinto belief, the dead should be forgiven for their deeds and left to rest in peace. Participants concluded that they hope for a 'peace memorialization,' that would shift focus from the emphasis on war to an emphasis on shared cooperation, development, and accomplishment.

Remarks for “Session 2: Evaluating the 70th Anniversary” by John K. Warden

How should we think about the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II? First, we should think of it as a *celebration* of all that the US-Japan alliance has achieved after the horrors of the Pacific war. In the intervening years, we have gone from Japanese militarism to prolonged peace, from a shattered Japanese economy to one that has been among the most vibrant in the world. Second, we should use the 70th anniversary to highlight the *evolution* in the US-Japan relationship. In the 1950s, Japan was occupied by the United States and had no military capability of its own. But the relationship continues to transform, and today Japan is a critical, independent partner – economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

It is important to note, however, that the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II comes with both opportunity and risk. In the worst-case scenario, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo will use the anniversary to relitigate facts about the war, which will incite nationalism in China and South Korea, harm Japan’s regional standing, and limit the potential for US-Japan partnership. Rather than looking backward, the United States and Japan should use the anniversary as an opportunity to be *even more forward-looking* and imagine the potential of their partnership. To define that future, the two countries must answer *three* questions.

First, what role does Japan want to play in the region and the world? The United States has been asking Japan to take on a greater role, and there is some indication that Japan, under Prime Minister Abe, is moving in that direction. Abe has shown a greater willingness to engage outside Northeast Asia and has proposed a revision of Japan’s constitution that would allow for collective self-defense. But to what extent does Abe represent Japan? Will the Japanese people support greater international engagement over the long-term? Or is Abe an aberration? Japan’s economy remains somewhat stagnant and its demographic problems will only worsen, which may limit the Japanese people’s willingness to take on a greater international role. At the same time, a shrinking percentage of Japanese citizens lived through the horrors of World War II, which may increase support for Japan’s return to a more ‘normal’ status in the international community. Only time will tell which trend prevails.

Second, if Japan does want to play a greater role in the world, what role should the US-Japan partnership play? Traditionally, the US-Japan relationship has focused primarily on the military alliance, where cooperation with the United States gives Japan political cover. But are there opportunities beyond the military realm? To what extent should the United States and Japan work together to promote common values? Can the alliance function as a framework for engaging third parties? The United States has placed particular emphasis on the trilateral US-Japan-ROK relationship, but deeply ingrained animosity between South Korea and Japan has severely limited progress. In Southeast Asia and Oceania, however, the United States and Japan may find a more receptive audience. In order to promote and encourage Japan, the United States should look for particular issues or initiatives where Japan can take the lead.

Third, if the United States and Japan need to bind closer, how should they do so? At present, the two allies are 1) revising the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and 2) negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Once implemented, these measures should go a long way toward solidifying the partnership, while at the same time posturing the alliance to deal with 21st century challenges. But are these steps sufficient? If not, what else do Japan and the United States need to do? The military relationship between the two countries is arguably as strong as ever, but work remains in binding the United States and Japan culturally, economically, and diplomatically. Where should the focus be? Increasing people-to-people exchanges? Further economic integration? New areas of cooperation?

In the 70 years since the end of the Pacific war, the US-Japan alliance has been one of the most successful in history. The upcoming anniversary of the end of the war gives the two countries a chance to celebrate, but also to focus on the potential for further evolutions that would allow the alliance to continue contributing to each country's security for decades to come.

Remarks for “Session 2: Evaluating the 70th Anniversary” Where should we focus our efforts? by Mari Skudlarick

As we commemorate the 70th anniversary of the US-Japan alliance, we should identify our countries’ strengths to recognize how we can continue to build on our partnership. The US-Japan alliance is most often heralded for its military component but its most important aspect may be the way it fosters education, cultural understanding, soft power, ethnic ties, community relationships, and cross-cultural dialogues.

The first step to strengthen the US-Japan alliance is to bolster education. Science, technology, innovation, and learning one another’s language and culture are important ways to grow the alliance. Both countries should press young people to understand the importance of learning English and Japanese, beginning in early schooling when young minds more easily master this skill. The business sector can continue to encourage and incorporate language initiatives, which would facilitate understanding and improve negotiation and conflict resolution strategies. With improved relationships in business and education, we create a learned work force that can strengthen ties between our two countries.

We must also pay close attention to cultural understanding, particularly on social issues such as gender equality. The US should encourage Japan to move towards women’s equality in the workforce and the home, but be sensitive to traditional gender roles. Although Japan still has a long way to go, the Abe administration has taken strides through its *Womenomics* initiative, signaling attempts at reform.

Another point on building a solid partnership is ‘soft power,’ non-military forms of attraction between states. In the case of the US and Japan, tradition, culture, food, and the arts flow between Americans and Japanese. The exchange of American pop culture and Japanese *anime* are eagerly absorbed, and each country’s food is highly popular with the other. As the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2014 Poll on the US image of Japan shows, Japan is highly viewed for its great tradition and culture. Perhaps the most important component of “soft power” in this case is the alignment of American and Japanese values, where both cultures emphasize tradition and respect.

The last way to strengthening US-Japan ties is through exchanges between individuals and communities. The *JET Programme* is one example of students living and learning in Japan, experiencing a real-life exchange. In Hawaii, there is a large population with ancestral roots in Japan and Okinawa: *nisei*, *sansei*, and *yonsei* generations. Their presence in business, politics, education and government serves as a bridge across the Pacific with their familial understanding. Furthermore, communities in Hawaii and other states have established US-Japan Sister Cities, which help to foster community/city level ties. Hawaii’s sister cities include Fukuyama, Hiroshima, Ishigaki, Miyakojima, Nago, and Naha.

As we mark this important occasion in the US-Japan partnership, we can reflect on its success and foster events that can play a role. The 2014 US-Japan Council's Annual Conference held in Honolulu is a perfect example of promoting understanding between the countries. Whether through education, 'soft power,' individual or community ties – as well as through organizations that exist specifically to foster international collaboration such as Pacific Forum CSIS and the Japan-US Friendship Commission – we must adopt a forward-looking attitude for the US-Japan alliance to grow stronger.

How to Remember the Pacific War

by Denny Roy

The 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War later this year is an opportunity to review what we learned from the war and why lingering bitterness continues to perturb regional politics. It is an occasion for a complex combination of mourning the victims, celebrating the 70 years of peace with Japan that followed the war, and searching for ways to reduce current tensions. A few points might guide our thinking about this commemoration.

The historical importance of the war can hardly be overstated

It re-set Asia. The Japanese invasion of China probably saved the Chinese Communist Party from annihilation. Imagine postwar China under Kuomintang instead of Communist rule, a giant Taiwan. Imagine also a united Korea and the absence of the North Korea problem. The war caused Japan to change from a traditional great power (with a strong and unshackled military) to a ‘civilian’ or economic great power. The European powers lost their colonies in Southeast Asia. The war made deep US involvement in Asia a permanent and bipartisan US policy, to the extent that the United States now describes itself as a ‘resident power’ in Asia. The war also produced grievances that remain unrequited: Okinawan complaints about hosting a disproportionate number of US military bases, foreign plaintiffs stonewalled in their attempts to sue the Japanese government for compensation, the controversy of the atomic bombings, and the ‘history issue.’

Commemoration is necessary

Important though the war was to the world we live in, general knowledge among both Americans and Japanese about World War II is both thin and unbalanced. The typical American believes several self-serving myths about the war: (1) that the United States won the war and D-Day was the climactic battle; actually, while the US did most of the work in the Pacific, in Europe it was the Soviets who ground down the Nazi armies; (2) that it was a war of good v. evil, even though America’s main allies on the ‘good’ side were imperialist Britain and brutal dictatorships in Russia and China; (3) that the US entered the war to defeat fascist tyranny, despite the fact that Americans opposed sending troops to fight the Nazis and entered the war in Europe only because Hitler declared war on the US; and (4) that the Pearl Harbor attack was a bolt from the blue, overlooking the US policy of protecting European colonies in Southeast Asia by cutting off supplies of oil to Japan. Knowledge is similarly weak among Japanese. Many Japanese school teachers have avoided the subject because it’s uncomfortable. Most of what the typical Japanese knows emphasizes Japan’s victimhood: the US oil embargo, the atomic bombings and the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (which many Japanese see as a case of victor’s justice). Japanese tourists who visit the *USS Arizona* Memorial at Pearl Harbor are often shocked to see Japan pictured in the role of aggressor, something many had never considered. Memory of the war is slipping away, and with it are going the valuable lessons it can teach us and future generations.

We should have humility when we defend our view of history as right and contending views as wrong

It is almost inevitable that memories and histories of major world events get distorted. This happens in all communities. Part of it is unintentional. Any story-teller emphasizes certain parts of a story over other parts and offers interpretations that not everyone would agree with. People are naturally inclined to deliver what their own group wants to hear, whether the group is distinguished by ethnicity, nationality, religion, country, gender, age, or what have you. It's human nature. Some distortions, however, are intentional. Governments, for example, are prone to trotting out historical examples and 'lessons' carefully crafted to support the ruling party's immediate agenda. Another example is commercial cinema, which routinely dramatizes 'true' stories but unapologetically embellishes or re-routes these stories to make them more saleable. Koreans and Chinese might keep in mind that if they were born as Japanese, they might have a different view of the war, and vice-versa. Perhaps the discussion should be about each side acknowledging that its side's version has flaws and the opposing side makes some good points that they should incorporate into their view.

An unusually bitter war produced an unusually strong alliance between Tokyo and Washington

This demands an explanation. First, the US has been a relatively magnanimous hegemon. Americans were able to accept Japan as a rehabilitated country relatively quickly because of American faith in liberal institutions. In this case the United States' often-alleged historicism was an advantage. But most importantly, the alliance is built on shared self-interest. The Cold War quickly made Soviet/Chinese communism the main threat perceived by both the US and Japanese governments. Furthermore, the Japanese government wanted to concentrate on economic growth and needed help getting its business re-established in the region. Washington needed a vehicle for double containment: forestalling a 'war of national revenge' by Japan, while at the same time ensuring a Japanese contribution to US Cold War strategy. The alliance well suited both sides. Remembering this helps us understand that the alliance needs constant care and feeding. It will not survive either country's determination that national self-interest is better served by going in a different direction.

The Pacific War reminds us, lest we forget, that war is even worse than we think

The war between Japan and the United States exposed serious miscalculations on both sides. The US government underestimated Japan's military prowess. Consequently, its forces were poorly prepared for Japanese attacks on US bases in Hawaii and the Philippines. Japan's decision to attack was premised on the hope that Washington would react to the sharp military reversal by suing for peace and acceding to Japanese supremacy in the Western and South Pacific. Instead, Congress voted 470-1 to embark on what became a total war against Japan. Going into the war, Japan had a modest empire (Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan) and sought a bigger one, but the actual result was the Japanese government lost everything. Other unanticipated consequences stem from the tendency of governments to go at least a little crazy during wartime. Before the war, the United States officially proscribed itself against unrestricted submarine warfare,

aerial bombing of civilian areas of cities, and shooting enemy soldiers trying to surrender. US forces discarded all these principles in the Pacific War. At home, the US government also set aside the Constitution when it interned US citizens. As for the Japanese government, in addition to the atrocities committed abroad, officials prepared the nation for mass suicide by instructing all able-bodied citizens to meet the invading American armies with sharpened bamboo sticks.

It is a serious and extremely difficult problem that some groups in Japan deny atrocities by the wartime government when the outside world accepts these atrocities as historical fact

This atrocity denial is simply wrong, and its effects are destructive. Admitting to official atrocities in the past should not prevent the building of Japanese national pride today. No one of working age or younger in Japan today is personally responsible for Pacific War crimes. They are part of the new, postwar Japan, characterized by economic and technological prowess and admirable international citizenship. These accomplishments are not canceled out by events from the middle of the last century. As many commentators have pointed out, atrocity-denial is not in Japan's self-interest because it restricts Japan's opportunities for cooperation with its neighbors and generally damages the otherwise favorable Japan 'brand' internationally. Japan and South Korea are both democracies that fear Chinese domination, yet the animosity between the two societies restricts what should be natural strategic partnering.

Outside critics often exaggerate the danger of atrocity-denial in Japan. Justice for victims such as the surviving 'comfort women' is certainly at stake. The claim, however, that an unrepentant Japan is prone to return to military aggression against its neighbors is spurious. Japan has had a democratic government based on liberal values for nearly seven decades. A new political culture has replaced that of the wartime era. Peoples are not innately warlike. This trait is environmental, not genetic. Despite harboring atrocity-deniers, Japan is certainly no more likely to start a war of aggression than any other country of comparable size and economic capacity in the international community, and probably less so because of lingering anti-militarism stemming from Japan's disastrous experience in the Pacific War. If we recognize that the stakes are lower, the discussion can be less hysterical. Critics of Japan should also acknowledge the Japanese complaint that as a loser of the war, Japan is unfairly singled out for negative attention. Personnel wearing the uniforms of the victorious Allied Powers also committed acts that broke their own rules of conduct, but these are lesser known or discussed. This is not to argue moral equivalency between the Rape of Nanjing and the murder of Japanese POWs and suspected Chinese collaborators by Chinese soldiers, or between the Bataan Death March and the routine refusal of US troops to accept Japanese surrenders. Rather, it is to point out that the distance between the two arguing sides may not be as great as they imagine.

Revisiting the Pacific War threatens to worsen the strains in Japan-China relations and Japan-ROK relations as some groups have an interest in exploiting discussions of history to serve narrow political ends. For the rest of us, however, the commemoration is an opportunity to work for reconciliation and a future of shared prosperity and security.

APPENDIX A

2015 Pre Conference Findings

American Breakdown

1. Will my country be better in 10 yrs?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 Agree Strongly	5	45.450	
2 Agree Somewhat	4	36.400	
3 Disagree Somewhat	2	18.180	
		100.000	
2. Who should be Asia Leader?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 Other	5	45.450	
2 China	1	9.100	
3 The US	1	9.100	
4 Japan-China	1	9.100	
5 The +3	3	27.270	
		100.000	
3. Most Imp. Economic Partner (5-10 yrs)?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 China	8	72.730	
2 Europe-Japan	1	9.100	
3 Other	2	18.180	
		100.000	
4. Most Imp. Security Partner (5-10 yrs)?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 US	1	9.100	
2 Japan	4	36.400	
3 Europe	3	27.270	
4 Other	3	27.270	
		100.000	
What role should Japan play in the world?			
5. Solve Environmental problems			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	4	36.364	
No	7	63.636	
		100.000	
6. Develop & stabilize asian economy			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	8	72.727	
No	3	27.273	
		100.000	
7. Develop & stabilize global economy			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	3	27.273	
No	8	72.727	
		100.000	
8. Help solve problems of diminishing natural resources			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	0	.000	
No	0	.000	
		100.000	
9. Solve Intl. Disputes			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	3	27.273	
No	8	72.727	
		100.000	
10. Solve Food Shortages			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	

Japanese Breakdown

1. Will my country be better in 10 yrs?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 Agree Strongly	0	.000	
2 Agree Somewhat	6	85.714	
4 Disagree Somewhat	1	14.286	
		100.000	
2. Who should be Asia Leader?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 Other	1	14.286	
2 China	0	.000	
3 The US	0	.000	
4 Japan-China	2	28.571	
5 The +3	4	57.143	
		100.000	
3. Most Imp. Economic Partner (5-10 yrs)?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 China	1	14.286	
2 Europe-Japan	1	14.286	
3 Other	5	71.429	
		100.000	
4. Most Imp. Security Partner (5-10 yrs)?			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
1 US	5	71.429	
2 Japan	0	.000	
3 Europe	1	14.286	
4 Other	1	14.286	
		100.000	
What role should Japan play in the world?			
5. Solve Environmental problems			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	4	57.143	
No	3	42.857	
		100.000	
6. Develop & stabilize asian economy			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	5	71.429	
No	2	28.571	
		100.000	
7. Develop & stabilize global economy			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	0	.000	
No	0	.000	
		.000	
8. Help solve problems of diminishing natural resources			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	1	14.286	
No	6	85.714	
		100.000	
9. Solve Intl. Disputes			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Yes	1	14.286	
No	6	85.714	
		100.000	
10. Solve Food Shortages			
	Frequency	Valid Percent	

Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

11. Develop new technologies

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	7	63.636
No	4	36.364
		100.000

11. Develop new technologies

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	5	71.429
No	2	28.571
		100.000

12. Arbitrate interest and opinion in Asia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	27.273
No	8	72.727
		100.000

12. Arbitrate interest and opinion in Asia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	2	28.571
No	5	71.429
		100.000

13. Arbitrate opinion in international society

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

13. Arbitrate opinion in international society

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

14. Serve as bridge East and West

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	6	54.545
No	5	45.455
		100.000

14. Serve as bridge East and West

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	42.857
No	4	57.143
		100.000

What are the top three threats to Asia's regional security?

What are the top three threats to Asia's regional security?

15. China

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	5	45.455

15. China

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	4	57.143

16. N. Korea

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	5	45.455

16. N. Korea

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	5	71.429

17. Environmental degradation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

17. Environmental degradation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	3	42.857

18. WMD Proliferation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	4	36.364

18. WMD Proliferation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

19. Taiwan Independence

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

19. Taiwan Independence

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

20. Pandemics

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	1	9.091

20. Pandemics

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

21. Resource Shortages

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	3	27.273

21. Resource Shortages

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

22. Russia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	2	18.182

22. Russia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	1	14.286

23. The U.S.

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

23. The U.S.

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	1	14.286

24. Poverty

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

25. Criminal Groups (transnational)

Frequency	Valid Percent
2	18.182

26. Nationalism

Frequency	Valid Percent
5	45.455

27. Econ. Crisis

Frequency	Valid Percent
6	54.545

28. Which country is more imp. to JP?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
US	8	72.727
China	0	.000
Equal	3	27.273
		100.000

29. Which country is more imp. to US?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Japan	4	36.364
China	4	36.364
Equal	3	27.273
		100.000

30. Has US influence in over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	7	63.636
2 Decreased	3	27.273
3 The Same	1	9.091
		100.000

31. Has Japan influence in Asia over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	3	27.273
2 Decreased	6	54.545
3 The Same	2	18.182
		100.000

32. How are relations between the US and Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Excellent	4	36.364
2 Good	4	36.364
3 Fair	3	27.273
		100.000

33. Do you agree with the following statement? "The US respects Japan"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	6	54.545
2 Agree Somewhat	4	36.364
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	9.091
		100.000

34. Do you agree with the following statement? "Japan respects US"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	36.364
2 Agree Somewhat	4	36.364
3 Disagree Somewhat	3	27.273

24. Poverty

Frequency	Valid Percent
1	14.286

25. Criminal Groups (transnational)

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

26. Nationalism

Frequency	Valid Percent
1	14.286

27. Econ. Crisis

Frequency	Valid Percent
2	28.571

28. Which country is more imp. to JP?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
US	3	42.857
China	0	.000
Equal	4	57.143
		100.000

29. Which country is more imp. to US?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Japan	2	28.571
China	2	28.571
Equal	3	42.857
		100.000

30. Has US influence in over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	4	57.143
2 Decreased	2	28.571
3 The Same	1	14.286
		100.000

31. Has Japan influence in Asia over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	1	14.286
2 Decreased	6	85.714
3 The Same	0	.000
		100.000

32. How are relations between the US and Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Excellent	1	14.286
2 Good	5	71.429
3 Fair	1	14.286
		100.000

33. Do you agree with the following statement? "The US respects Japan"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	2	28.571
2 Agree Somewhat	4	57.143
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	14.286
		100.000

34. Do you agree with the following statement? "Japan respects US"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	3	42.857
2 Agree Somewhat	3	42.857
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	14.286

100.000

35. The US-JP Alliance is vital to country's security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	7	63.636
2 Agree Somewhat	4	36.364
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

36. How reliable do you consider the US, when it comes to defending Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Very Reliable	8	72.727
2 Reliable	3	27.273
3 Somewhat Reliable	0	.000
4 Not reliable	0	.000
		100.000

37. US Military bases in JP are imp. to JP nat. security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	36.364
2 Agree Somewhat	7	63.636
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
4 Disagree strongly		
		100.000

38. US Military presence in East-Asia should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	4	36.364
2 Maintained Present Level	5	45.455
3 Decreased	1	9.091
4 Don't Know	1	9.091
		100.000

39. US-JP alliance helps regional stability/security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	10	90.909
2 Agree Somewhat	1	9.091
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
		100.000

40. Rel between JP-US should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Stronger	6	54.545
2 Stay the Same	5	45.455
3 Weaker	0	.000
		100.000

41. What is the most imp. Element of the US-JPN relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	5	45.455
2 The Economic Partnership	4	36.364
3 Socio/Cultural	2	18.182
4 Diplomatic	0	.000
		100.000

42. What should be the most imp. Element of the US-JP relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	3	27.273
2 The Economic Partnership	5	45.455
3 Socio/Cultural	1	9.091
4 Diplomatic	2	18.182
		100.000

100.000

35. The US-JP Alliance is vital to country's security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	5	71.429
2 Agree Somewhat	1	14.286
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	14.286
		100.000

36. How reliable do you consider the US, when it comes to defending Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Very Reliable	1	14.286
2 Reliable	3	42.857
3 Somewhat Reliable	2	28.571
4 Not reliable	1	14.286
		100.000

37. US Military bases in JP are imp. to JP nat. security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	2	28.571
2 Agree Somewhat	4	57.143
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
4 Disagree strongly	1	14.286
		100.000

38. US Military presence in East-Asia should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	1	14.286
2 Maintained Present Level	3	42.857
3 Decreased	3	42.857
4 Don't Know	0	.000
		100.000

39. US-JP alliance helps regional stability/security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	2	28.571
2 Agree Somewhat	4	57.143
3 Disagree Strongly	1	14.286
		100.000

40. Rel between JP-US should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Stronger	5	71.429
2 Stay the Same	1	14.286
3 Weaker	1	14.286
		100.000

41. What is the most imp. Element of the US-JPN relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	4	57.143
2 The Economic Partnership	0	.000
3 Socio/Cultural	0	.000
4 Diplomatic	3	42.857
		100.000

42. What should be the most imp. Element of the US-JP relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	2	28.571
2 The Economic Partnership	1	14.286
3 Socio/Cultural	1	14.286
4 Diplomatic	3	42.857
		100.000

43. The US-JP alliance should be the foundation of a values-based network of alliances in Asia."

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	7	63.636
2 Agree Somewhat	2	18.182
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
4 Disagree Somewhat	2	18.182
		100.000

44. Do you think that Japan should play a more proactive role in order to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Yes	9	81.818
2 No	2	18.182
3 Don't know	0	.000
		100.000

Legend:

n=19
 American = 11
 Japanese = 8

43. The US-JP alliance should be the foundation of a values-based network of alliances in Asia."

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	2	28.571
2 Agree Somewhat	4	57.143
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
4 Disagree Somewhat	1	14.286
		100.000

44. Do you think that Japan should play a more proactive role in order to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Yes	4	57.143
2 No	2	28.571
3 Don't know	1	14.286
		100.000

APPENDIX B

2015 Post Conference Findings

American Breakdown

1. Will my country be better in 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	5	55.560
2 Agree Somewhat	4	44.440
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

2. Who should be Asia Leader?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Other	3	33.330
2 China	0	.000
3 The US	2	22.220
4 Japan-China	1	11.110
5 The +3	3	33.330
		100.000

3. Most Imp. Economic Partner (5-10 yrs)?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 China	9	100.000
2 Europe-Japan	0	.000
3 Other	0	.000
		100.000

4. Most Imp. Security Partner (5-10 yrs)?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 US	0	.000
2 Japan	5	55.550
3 Europe	2	22.220
4 Other	2	22.220
		100.000

What role should Japan play in the world?

5. Solve Environmental problems

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	6	66.670
No	3	33.330
		100.000

6. Develop & stabilize asian economy

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	4	44.460
No	5	55.540
		100.000

7. Develop & stabilize global economy

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	33.330
No	6	66.670
		100.000

8. Help solve problems of diminishing natural resources

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

9. Solve Intl. Disputes

Japanese Breakdown

1. Will my country be better in 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	1	20.000
2 Agree Somewhat	3	60.000
4 Disagree Somewhat	1	20.000
		100.000

2. Who should be Asia Leader?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Other	1	20.000
2 China	0	.000
3 The US	0	.000
4 Japan-China	1	20.000
5 The +3	3	60.000
		100.000

3. Most Imp. Economic Partner (5-10 yrs)?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 China	3	60.000
2 Europe-Japan	0	.000
3 Other	2	40.000
		100.000

4. Most Imp. Security Partner (5-10 yrs)?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 US	4	80.000
2 Japan	0	.000
3 Europe	0	.000
4 Other	1	20.000
		100.000

What role should Japan play in the world?

5. Solve Environmental problems

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	60.000
No	2	40.000
		100.000

6. Develop & stabilize asian economy

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	60.000
No	2	40.000
		100.000

7. Develop & stabilize global economy

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	60.000
No	2	40.000
		100.000

8. Help solve problems of diminishing natural resources

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

9. Solve Intl. Disputes

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	33.330
No	6	66.670
		100.000

10. Solve Food Shortages

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

11. Develop new technologies

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	33.330
No	6	66.670
		100.000

12. Arbitrate interest and opinion in Asia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	2	22.220
No	7	77.780
		100.000

13. Arbitrate opinion in international society

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

14. Serve as bridge East and West

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	6	66.670
No	3	33.330
		100.000

What are the top three threats to Asia's regional security?

15. China

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	5	55.556

16. N. Korea

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	8	88.889

17. Environmental degradation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	1	11.111

18. WMD Proliferation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	2	22.222

19. Taiwan Independence

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

20. Pandemics

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

10. Solve Food Shortages

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

11. Develop new technologies

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	3	60.000
No	2	40.000
		100.000

12. Arbitrate interest and opinion in Asia

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

13. Arbitrate opinion in international society

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	0	.000
No	0	.000

14. Serve as bridge East and West

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Yes	2	40.000
No	3	60.000
		100.000

What are the top three threats to Asia's regional security?

15. China

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	4	80.000

16. N. Korea

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	4	80.000

17. Environmental degradation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	2	40.000

18. WMD Proliferation

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

19. Taiwan Independence

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

20. Pandemics

	Frequency	Valid Percent
	0	.000

21. Resource Shortages

Frequency	Valid Percent
2	22.222

22. Russia

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

23. The U.S.

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

24. Poverty

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

25. Criminal Groups (transnational)

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

26. Nationalism

Frequency	Valid Percent
3	33.333

27. Econ. Crisis

Frequency	Valid Percent
4	44.444

28. Which country is more imp. to JP?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
US	6	66.670
China	0	.000
Equal	3	33.330
		100.000

29. Which country is more imp. to US?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Japan	1	11.110
China	6	66.670
Equal	2	22.220
		100.000

30. Has US influence in over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	2	22.220
2 Decresed	4	44.450
3 The Same	3	33.330
		100.000

31. Has Japan influence in Asia over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	1	11.110
2 Decresed	7	77.780
3 The Same	1	11.110
		100.000

32. How are relations between the US and Japan?

Frequency	Valid Percent
-----------	---------------

21. Resource Shortages

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

22. Russia

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

23. The U.S.

Frequency	Valid Percent
1	20.000

24. Poverty

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

25. Criminal Groups (transnational)

Frequency	Valid Percent
0	.000

26. Nationalism

Frequency	Valid Percent
2	40.000

27. Econ. Crisis

Frequency	Valid Percent
2	40.000

28. Which country is more imp. to JP?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
US	1	20.000
Equal	3	60.000
China	1	20.000
		100.000

29. Which country is more imp. to US?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Japan	0	.000
China	0	.000
Equal	5	100.000
		100.000

30. Has US influence in over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	2	40.000
2 Decresed	1	20.000
3 The Same	2	40.000
		100.000

31. Has Japan influence in Asia over the past 10 yrs?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	1	20.000
2 Decresed	3	60.000
3 The Same	1	20.000
		100.000

32. How are relations between the US and Japan?

Frequency	Valid Percent
-----------	---------------

1 Excellent	4	44.440
2 Good	4	44.440
3 Fair	1	11.120
		100.000

33. Do you agree with the following statement? "The US respects Japan"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	44.440
2 Agree Somewhat	5	55.560
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

34. Do you agree with the following statement? "Japan respects US"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	3	33.330
2 Agree Somewhat	6	66.670
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

35. The US-JP Alliance is vital to country's security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	44.440
2 Agree Somewhat	5	55.560
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

36. How reliable do you consider the US, when it comes to defending Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Very Reliable	4	44.440
2 Reliable	4	44.440
3 Somewhat Reliable	1	11.120
4 Not reliable	0	.000
		100.000

37. US Military bases in JP are imp. to JP nat. security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	5	55.550
2 Agree Somewhat	3	33.330
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	11.120
4 Disagree strongly	0	.000
		100.000

38. US Military presence in East-Asia should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	4	44.460
2 Maintained Present Leve	3	33.330
3 Decreased	2	22.220
4 Don't Know	0	.000
		100.010

39. US-JP alliance helps regional stability/security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	7	77.780
2 Agree Somewhat	2	22.220
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
		100.000

1 Excellent	0	.000
2 Good	2	40.000
3 Fair	3	60.000
		100.000

33. Do you agree with the following statement? "The US respects Japan"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	0	.000
2 Agree Somewhat	3	60.000
3 Disagree Somewhat	2	40.000
		100.000

34. Do you agree with the following statement? "Japan respects US"

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	1	20.000
2 Agree Somewhat	4	80.000
3 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

35. The US-JP Alliance is vital to country's security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	80.000
2 Agree Somewhat	0	.000
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	20.000
		100.000

36. How reliable do you consider the US, when it comes to defending Japan?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Very Reliable	2	40.000
2 Reliable	1	20.000
3 Somewhat Reliable	1	20.000
4 Not reliable	1	20.000
		100.000

37. US Military bases in JP are imp. to JP nat. security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	3	60.000
2 Agree Somewhat	1	20.000
3 Disagree Somewhat	1	20.000
4 Disagree strongly	0	.000
		100.000

38. US Military presence in East-Asia should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Increased	0	.000
2 Maintained Present Leve	3	60.000
3 Decreased	2	40.000
4 Don't Know	0	.000
		100.000

39. US-JP alliance helps regional stability/security

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	4	80.000
2 Agree Somewhat	1	20.000
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
		100.000

40. Rel between JP-US should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Stronger	6	66.670
2 Stay the Same	3	33.330
3 Weaker	0	.000
		100.000

41. What is the most imp. Element of the US-JPN relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	6	66.660
2 The Economic Partnersh	2	22.220
3 Socio/Cultural	1	11.120
4 Diplomatic	0	.000
		100.000

42. What should be the most imp. Element of the US-JP relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	1	11.120
2 The Economic Partnersh	2	22.220
3 Socio/Cultural	3	33.330
4 Diplomatic	3	33.330
		100.000

43. The US-JP alliance should be the foundation of a values-based network of alliances in Asia."

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	3	33.330
2 Agree Somewhat	6	66.670
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
4 Disagree Somewhat	0	.000
		100.000

44. Do you think that Japan should play a more proactive role in order to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Yes	7	77.780
2 No	0	.000
3 Don't know	2	22.220
		100.000

Legend:

n=14

American = 9

Japanese 5

40. Rel between JP-US should be

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Stronger	2	40.000
2 Stay the Same	2	40.000
3 Weaker	1	20.000
		100.000

41. What is the most imp. Element of the US-JPN relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	3	60.000
2 The Economic Partnersh	1	20.000
3 Socio/Cultural	1	20.000
4 Diplomatic	0	.000
		100.000

42. What should be the most imp. Element of the US-JP relationship?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 The Military Alliance	2	40.000
2 The Economic Partnersh	0	.000
3 Socio/Cultural	1	20.000
4 Diplomatic	2	40.000
		100.000

43. The US-JP alliance should be the foundation of a values-based network of alliances in Asia."

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Agree Strongly	1	20.000
2 Agree Somewhat	3	60.000
3 Disagree Strongly	0	.000
4 Disagree Somewhat	1	20.000
		100.000

44. Do you think that Japan should play a more proactive role in order to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
1 Yes	3	60.000
2 No	2	40.000
3 Don't know	0	.000
		100.000

APPENDIX C



JUSFC AND THE PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
PRESENT

"A LEGACY OF PEACE: THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP AFTER 70 YEARS"
THE PACIFIC CLUB, HONOLULU
FEBRUARY 27, 2015



PROGRAM AGENDA

- 8:00AM-8:30AM** **Registration and breakfast**
- 8:30AM-10:00AM** **Session 1: Reviewing the data**
Chair: Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS
What do the attitude surveys reveal about the relationship? How did we get here? What is the appropriate level of partnership? What are the opportunities for the US-Japan partnership? What are the obstacles?
- 10:00AM-10:15AM** **Coffee Break**
- 10:15AM-11:45AM** **Session 2: Evaluating the 70th anniversary**
How do we think about it? What does it mean? Where should we focus our efforts? Why?
- 11:45AM-12:15PM** **Lunch Break**
- 12:15PM-1:00PM** **Luncheon Keynote: Professor Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, East-West Center, on "The political legacies of the World War II"**
- 1:00PM-2:30PM** **Session 3: Breakout discussions**
Questions to consider: What are meaningful ways to commemorate the war, 70 years of peace, and the relationship? What are innovative ways to move the relationship forward? Each group will appoint a scribe and presenter and bring the group's top 5 recommendations to the plenary.
- 2:30PM-4:00PM** **Session 4: Plenary session**
Breakout groups will present their conclusions. The entire group will create a list of concrete recommendations on how the next generation thinks the US-Japan partnership can move forward.
- 4:00PM** **Meeting Adjourns**

APPENDIX D



JUSFC AND THE PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

PRESENT

“A LEGACY OF PEACE: THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP AFTER 70 YEARS”

THE PACIFIC CLUB, HONOLULU

FEBRUARY 27, 2015



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8. Ms. Mako KAWADA (JPN)

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10. Mr. Micah KOSASA (USA)

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12. Mr. Christopher OTA (USA)

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13. Mr. Constancio PARANAL (USA)

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17. Mr. Yosuke SUZUKI (JPN)

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APPENDIX D



JUSFC AND THE PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

PRESENT

“A LEGACY OF PEACE: THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP AFTER 70 YEARS”

THE PACIFIC CLUB, HONOLULU

FEBRUARY 27, 2015



LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pacific Forum Staff and Special Guests

20. Mr. Ralph COSSA (USA) - Chair

President

Pacific Forum CSIS

21. Mr. Brad GLOSSERMAN (USA) - Chair

Executive Director

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22. Mr. Denny ROY (USA) - Keynote Speaker

Senior Fellow & Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program East-West Center

23. Ms. Petra KUBALKOVA (USA/CZ)

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24. Ms. Jesslyn CHEONG (USA)

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
PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES



Matt BERRY (USA) is the associate for strategic plans and communications at the East-West Center (EWC) president’s office. Before joining the EWC in 2012, Matt lived in Indonesia for more than three years. Most recently he worked at JLL, focusing on commercial real estate development projects in Greater Jakarta and Bali. He first came to Indonesia to work with the National Democratic Institute, and served as an observer for the 2009 elections. Immediately before coming to Indonesia, Matt was based in Thailand’s rural south with Princeton-in-Asia. Matt received his BA from Pitzer College in Claremont, CA.



David CHING (USA) grew up in Hawaii and received his Bachelor’s degree in Psychology from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. He went on to earn an MBA, with a focus on Japan, through a joint program between UH and the Japan-America Institute of Management Science. After graduating, David spent time in North Carolina where he worked in the sports industry with ESPN, before returning to Hawaii. Back home, David began his current work in government relations with Hawaii Public Policy Advocates, and is currently pursuing a degree in law from the William S. Richardson School of Law at UH.



Sean DeWOODY (USA) is a graduate student at Hawaii Pacific University studying Diplomacy & Military Studies with an emphasis on East Asia Security. He received his triple bachelor’s degrees in Political Science, Sociology, and Psychology from Hawaii Pacific University. While attending HPU, Sean participated in the Pacific Forum CSIS_Hawaii Asia-Pacific Affairs Leadership Program inaugural class of 2013-14. In addition to the former, Sean also actively held leadership roles in the Student Government Association for three years, cumulating in stints as both Speaker of the Senate and Special Advisor to the President. After graduation Sean plans to pursue a PhD in International Relations and a career in the US State Department.



Koichi ERA (JPN) is from Kumamoto, Japan. He is currently an English student at the Intercultural Communications College in Hawaii and would like to pursue work in the US or Singapore in currency and trade stock. In the future, he would like to study Psychology at a US University because he believes emotions influence economic and business behavior. He is also very interested in politics and believes that the relationship between Japan and the US is very important.

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
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Megumi HONAMI (JPN) is currently a third-year law student at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. She is senior editor for the Asia-Pacific Law and Policy Journal and has actively participated in classes and symposiums concerning Japanese legal issues. She was born and raised in Hiroshima, Japan and relocated to Honolulu, Hawaii in 2000. She studied History and Political Science at UH Manoa with an emphasis on Japanese contemporary history and politics. After graduation, she had worked in New York City as executive legal secretary at a cross-border law firm. Her most recent research includes “Is the Pen Mightier than Japan’s Secrecy Law?: Warning Against the Erosion of Press Freedom,” which discusses the potential impact of a new national legislation authorizing government officials to designate certain national security/diplomatic information as state information.



Leena HOWARD (USA) is a Financial Advisor with Morgan Stanley in Downtown Honolulu. A native Japanese speaker, she is originally from Chiba, Japan and attended the University of Colorado at Boulder where she earned her Bachelor of Arts in Japanese Literature and Language. While attending CU Boulder, she conducted elementary-specific study tours and professional development programs for teachers in the Boulder Valley School District. She joined Merrill Lynch in 2009 after graduating with her Master in Business Administration with an emphasis in Management from Hawaii Pacific University and recently joined Morgan Stanley in August 2014.



Akiko ISHIKAWA-TYLER (JPN) is originally from Asahikawa City, Hokkaido. Akiko has been a resident of Hawaii for approximately 20 years. She has a BS from the School of Travel Industry Management at University of Hawaii at Manoa, and served as a Concierge and Hotel Assistant Manager at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in early 2000. She has been in the international education arena since 2003, specializing in International Student Services and Admissions. She is presently the Admissions Officer and Assistant to President and Executive Vice President at JAAMS and the Chair for the Hawaii/Pacific District for Association of International Educators (NAFSA).

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Mako KAWADA (JPN) was born and raised in Nagasaki, Japan. She received her Bachelor’s degree from Osaka University where she majored in law, focusing on maritime law and geopolitics, with a particular interest in US-Japan maritime strategies. During her time at Osaka University, she was a member of a seminar group which studied and analyzed US-Japan relations. When she was senior in college, Mako was selected to participate in the Young Leaders Program, part of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum. Mako is currently a student at the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii, and an intern at the Northeast Asia Economic Forum.



Dan KAWAI (JPN) is Japanese Marketing and Sales Manager at the USS Missouri. He was born and raised in Japan where he attended Christian Academy high school. Dan obtained his BA in Asian American Studies from California State University in Long Beach.



Micah KOSASA (USA/JPN) is a fourth generation descendant of Japanese immigrants, and was born and raised in Hawaii. After graduating from the University of Oregon with BA in History, he began working in healthcare as an electronic medical record administrator. Upon returning to Hawaii, Micah began working at The Queen's Health Systems as the corporation's HIPAA privacy coordinator. He is responsible for the organization's compliance with all federal and state privacy laws. Micah is also involved in local politics as the Treasurer for the Hawaii Young Democrats in addition to being the Aiea district chair for the Democratic Party of Hawaii.



Tomoaki MORIKAWA (JPN) has been trained in the fields of Cultural Studies and American Studies both in Japan and in the United States. He received a Master’s degree in Cultural Studies from the University of Tokyo, where he focused on the works of the American philosopher and queer theorist Judith Butler. After graduating from the University of Tokyo, he went on to pursue a Master’s program in American Studies at Brown University as a recipient of the Fulbright fellowship. He is currently pursuing a PhD in American Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa in order to build his interdisciplinary scholarly foundation in the fields of historic memory, museum studies, material culture, architecture, and psychoanalysis in the context of American history and culture.

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Christopher OTA (USA/JPN) has most recently worked as an Event Manager at the USS Missouri Memorial in Pearl Harbor. Chris graduated with a BA in International Relations from Hawaii Pacific University in 2012. Chris served as Hawaii Pacific University’s United Nations Club President and participated in three study abroad programs, in which he visited the United Kingdom, Mexico, Thailand and Cambodia. During the 2011 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Hawaii, he served as an Assistant to the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States Harold Forsyth. Chris also served as a Program Intern at the Pacific Forum CSIS. His future endeavors include the pursuit of an MBA focused on international business and law.



Constancio PARANAL III (USA) is the Director of Educational Programs at JAAMS. He is responsible for designing and delivering curricula for existing and new programs, seminars and workshops, and managing student affairs. He handles the corporate relations and community affairs of JAAMS. Prior to joining JAAMS, he worked as a Sr. Management Consultant at Hewlett-Packard with a focus on Financial Services industry. Constancio is a clinical faculty of management and industrial relations and marketing at the University of Hawaii at Manoa Shidler College of Business where he teaches both at undergraduate and MBA levels. He is also an Officer and Board of Director for the Filipino Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii and the Congress of Visayan Organizations. He is currently finishing his doctorate in Education Management and Policy at the University of Southern California - Rossier School. Constancio obtained his MA in Economics and Finance at Harvard University and MBA at the University of Southern California - Marshall School. He graduated with a BS in civil structural engineering from De La Salle University in Manila.



Sarah PHILLIPS (USA) is the Education and International Initiatives Manager for the National Science Foundation Partnerships for International Research and Education (NSF-PIRE) “US-Japan Cooperative Research and Education on Terahertz Dynamics in Nanostructures” grant at Rice University. In collaboration with the PI and Education Director, she manages all aspects of the NanoJapan: International Research Experience for Undergraduates Program. Sarah works remotely from Hawaii where she is currently pursuing a PhD in Educational Foundation at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. In the spring of 2015, she began a graduate assistantship in the Center for Southeast Asian Studies as the Research & Development Coordinator. From 2001 - 2006 she worked at the

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Institute of International Education (IIE) on the US Department of State funded Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship and completed a brief assignment at the IIE office in Doha, Qatar. She received an MLA in International Studies from the University of St. Thomas, Houston and a BA in History, Political Science, and East Asian Studies from Minnesota State University, Moorhead. She also completed a post-graduate certificate at the East-West Center as a participant in the 2013 - 2014 Asia Pacific Leadership Program.



CAPTAIN Brent SADLER (USA) is currently assigned to Pacific Command as the lead for Maritime Strategy and Policy. He is also on the Commander's Rebalance Task Force, tasked with coordinating execution of the President's Defense Strategic Guidance - Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. He is a native of Springfield, Virginia, and a 1994 honors graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering and a minor in Japanese. He was also on the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) personal staff advising on Asia-Pacific issues. He graduated with distinction, and received the National Defense University's President and the Navy League of the United States writing awards from National War College in Washington, D.C. In 2012 he became a Navy Foreign Area Officer, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific. His military awards include the Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Battle Efficiency, Expeditionary Medal, Sea Service, and expert rifle. He also serves as a member of the Executive Committee of the US-Japan Leadership Forum based in New York City and Tokyo, and was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow Hitachi Fellow in Tokyo the summer of 2014.



Mari K. SKUDLARICK (USA/JPN) is the Program Manager at Pacific Forum CSIS. Since joining Pacific Forum in 2012, her responsibilities have included public relations, outreach, and development, program management, maintaining Pacific Forum's website and social media accounts, and administrative support. Previously, she provided staff support at Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley in San Francisco, a Bay Area law firm. Mari also holds over five years of experience working as an assistant at Kama'aina Golf & Ski Travel, an agency providing customized travel packages to the US Mainland, Asia, and Canada. Mari received her BA in International Relations from Hawaii Pacific University. She is interested in US-Japan relations and its impact on Hawaii. Mari was born and raised in Honolulu, and has lived in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

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Yosuke SUZUKI (JPN) is temporarily working at JTB Hawaii organizing the Honolulu Festival, one of Hawaii’s largest events held annually in March. Yosuke was a government employee working for Shizuoka prefecture in Japan where he was born and raised. He moved to Hawaii last April to participate in the Asia Pacific Leadership Program (APLP) hosted by the East West Center. In this program, he dealt with a lot of international issues and fostered the creation of multilateral partnerships with participants from 14 other countries.



Tina TSUCHIYAMA (USA/JPN) is a current first year law student at the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii and recipient of the Pacific-Asia Business Scholarship. Born in Honolulu but raised in Tokyo, she has walked a cultural gray area and has been aware of the symbiotic relationship between Hawaii and Japan from a young age. In Japan, she was a freelance blogger for the Wall Street Journal, focusing on innovative foreign businesses in Japan. Additionally, she worked at Expedia, Inc. to cater and implement international marketing tactics/platforms to the Japanese market. Tina received her bachelor’s degree in economics from Barnard College in New York City. During her time in New York, she worked at a variety of companies (Ogilvy & Mather, AOL, Inc., Women’s World Banking, Columbia Business School) and industries, all with an international focus.



John K. WARDEN (USA) is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS where he works on East Asia security issues including US alliances, Japan’s island disputes, extended deterrence, and non-proliferation. He received his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University, where he also served as a research assistant and as editor-in-chief of the Georgetown Security Studies Review. Previously, he worked as a program coordinator and research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, contributing to projects on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and US alliances. He served as executive director for working groups on US-Russian arms control and US-China nuclear dynamics, managed a project on the US nuclear posture, coordinated the US-Japan-ROK Track II Trilateral Dialogue on Nuclear Issues, and twice directed the Nuclear Scholars Initiative, including editing the accompanying journals. Mr. Warden has published articles in Proceedings Magazine, PacNet, Infinity Journal, The National Interest, and The Diplomat. He earned his BA in Political Science and History from Northwestern University.

APPENDIX F

US-Japan Conference Proposals (Group 1)

Agricultural Exchange

Description: This idea was drawn from the readings that noted that Japan is seeing a decrease in national agricultural production do to aging demographics and less participation from younger generations of Japanese youth (specifically college & young professionals). This consequently is also seen in the United States demographically, with less participation from our own youth. To offset this lack of engagement with younger generations in this field, we propose an agricultural exchange that would allow encourage young individuals from both the United States and Japan to participate in this area by bringing more prestige and recognition.

Administration: Our proposal would see this program nested within either the Department of Agriculture who already has grant programs in place with various academic institutions throughout the US. On the Japanese side of the partnership we envisioned integration of the [Association for International Collaboration of Farmers](#) or Japan Agricultural Cooperative, the former of whom already has an established program for Japanese nations to study abroad, and could benefit from integration into this program.

An additional point that we believed would be beneficial is that we allow private sector organizations from both countries to volunteer individuals for the program (young professions) with the government subsidizing the program costs for these groups. This encourages greater participation, and will allow for these professions from both parties to build greater cultural understanding and networking between these countries.

Program Benefits: Encourage greater participation from the younger generations in agriculture by making this program prestigious and rewarding. Builds connections between program participants and the institutions/individuals they visit during the exchange. Increases cultural awareness of both cultures for program participants. Allows for the sharing of innovative ideas in agriculture, and growth of professional/business networking between both parties.

Innovation Fair

Description: Both the United States and Japan are recognized as world leaders in innovative development and design. As such we believe it would be beneficial to establish an annual/bi-annual conference that aims to bring together up in coming innovators from both countries to share their work and foster great cooperation between these two nations. We would propose that this conference be held here in Hawaii because of its central location to both parties, and its robust facilities that could easily support this event.

Administration: We envisioned this event being sponsored through the [Department of State's Office of the Science & Technology](#) who already offers a wide range of [initiatives](#) in this area, or could even be joint sponsored by the Department of Defense through their Research and Engineering wing. The participants for the event would be selected from amongst the various academic institutions within both countries. The selections process could be administered by the embassies and consulates within each country would could "ping" institutions to volunteer their best and brightest students for the event.

As with the first proposal we would like to see this event opened to the private sector that could offer funding and networking opportunities to these innovators, and encourage greater flow of technological innovation between these parties.

Program Benefits: This program has several large benefits. First and foremost it allows for the transfusion of innovative ideas to be shared between both the United States and Japan. This carries the benefit of not only encouraging these technologies to be shared, but also collaborated on and expanded on through joint-engagement from various parties. In addition to this the event would allow for innovators from both parties to be exposed to different cultural prospective and ideas that may further their own research and foster greater understanding between these two countries. A final note would be the potential to increase student exchange should innovators identify a project they would like to participate in overseas.

US-Okinawa Community Projects

Description: Due to the tense relationships between the people of Okinawa and the United States forces stationed on the island, we believe it would be beneficial to encourage greater community engagement through public works projects. The initial goal would be to have the Department of Defense or State Department and Okinawa government determine a yearly public works or community outreach project that could be collaboratively worked on by both parties to build mutual trust and understanding. These could take the form of public works such as school or housing renovations (ex. Painting, cleanup, etc.) or community engagement such as volunteering to teach English at local schools or participate in community events. The overarching goal is to foster greater community bonding through participation.

Administration: The coordination for this project would need to be handled through the State Department, DOD, and government in the Okinawa Prefecture. Leaders or their representatives from each party would negotiate a project for the year, such as 1000 hours of English language lessons for school age children or renovating two neighborhood schools on alternating weekends. Once the project was identified the DOD or base command could determine whether they would want to make it voluntary or if they would assign it as a “work” day.

Program Benefits: The obvious benefit of this program is community building between the US forces stationed in Okinawa and its people. This would not only help in easing tensions about the stationing of troops within this prefecture, but also help generate leverage in political and diplomatic talks regarding the moving of bases and personnel. An additional benefit is the socialization of US troops with the Okinawans, and vice versa. This would hopefully help enrich both parties, and improve relationships by forming connections with community figures and organizations.

Concurrent Festivals

Description: This program would seek to encourage American citizens to get greater exposure to Japanese culture by increasing the push for tourism to Japan. Hawaii enjoys a great deal of tourism from Japan do to the vast amount of tourism marketing that encourages the Japanese to visit Hawaii for its various festivals. To reciprocate this economic and cultural benefit, the United States could encourage US tourism organizations to push for greater travel to Japanese festivals throughout the various prefectures, with emphasis given to visiting sister cities within Japan (ie. Tokyo & Honolulu/New York).

Administration: This idea is the most complicated to implement as it would rely heavily on encouraging and shaping the tourism sector within the US to push for greater focus on Japan.

This can be done through government contracting or incentivizing with the larger tourism associations and organizations.

Program Benefits: The direct benefit of this program would be increased exposure of United States citizens to Japanese culture. This is an important aspect as it encourages great understanding of Japanese culture, history, and its people. The indirect benefits is increased exposure of the Japanese population to United States culture, increased tourism revenue for Japanese markets, and better relations between the nations.

APPENDIX G

US-Japan Conference Proposals (Group 2)

Promoting Student Exchange

Description:

A. Veterans of opposing sides: Explore opportunities to bring veterans from Japan and United States together in the same room to educate youth and share different perspectives in the same space.

B. Technology to preserve stories: Technology should be used to record oral histories that otherwise might be lost. This same technology can allow youth to speak with veterans when it is not possible to physically meet.

C. “Rhodes scholarship for Japan:” In the spirit of the Rhodes scholarship (Oxford), Gates Scholarship (Cambridge), and the newly launched Schwarzman Scholars (Tsinghua University) (see: <http://schwarzmanscholars.org/>), an equivalent opportunity could be created for Americans to study in Japan. All of these programs essentially provide a full scholarship to pursue a graduate degree, and come with a certain amount of prestige/recognition and an on-the-ground community to connect into, as well as alumni network. Such an opportunity could expand the number of Americans that consider graduate study in Japan among their available options. This could help to promote certain Japanese institutions in the US, in addition to sending talented US graduates to Japan, which will result in further linkages.

Administration: Creation of joint US-Japan cultural institute that would allow for these initiatives to transpire.

Program Benefits: Encourage student exchange and cultural understanding from both perspectives.

Disarm the Political Element

Japan, the United States, South Korea and other relevant partners should undertake activities, at the highest levels of political leadership, to demonstrate that they embrace the reality that different sides may never agree on certain issues. However, these sides should still be able to reconcile their differences sufficiently to allow for a greater focus on future collaborations.

An example would be the leaders of Japan, the United States, and South Korea all visiting the Yasukuni Shrine together and then making a statement immediately afterwards to explain that while there is strong disagreement, this does not mean they can't move beyond such a disagreement to work together. It is important to see leaders come together on an emotional issue.

Administration: Creation of joint US-Japan cultural institute that would allow for this initiative to transpire.

Program Benefits: Greater understanding of emotional attachments and cultural links that are interdependent when commemorating sensitive historical events.

Visits and Immigration

A. Immigration Reform: Both countries have immigration systems that could be made more efficient – if a primary goal is to encourage exchange between each country. Especially to

support those Japanese that would like to pursue careers in the US; and those Americans that would like to pursue careers in Japan. Immigration reform should be looked at with an eye towards increasing opportunities for professional exchange.

B. “Birthright” for Japan: Youth of Jewish heritage can travel to Israel free of charge (www.birthrightisrael.com/), and a similar organization could be created to support Japanese Americans that wish to explore Japan. There was discussion about different approaches to make such trips as inclusive as possible to all interested Americans, including requiring a Japanese American heading on a trip to bring a non-Japanese American. There are prominent business people that could be interested to support such an initiative.

“Nobel” prize for Asia

Establish a prize to recognize, highlight, and reward collaboration on important regional issues.

Administration: Creation of joint US-Japan cultural institute that would allow for these initiatives to transpire.

Program Benefits: Heighten emphasis on shared knowledge, development and innovation that would promote each other’s market economies and further align them economically.

Media/Perception Related

A. Media Fund: Create a fund that can be used to produce media projects (movies, shorts, documentary, etc.). These projects can have a positive impact towards increasing understanding of historic events.

B. Kickstarter Fund: Support start-ups and related initiatives in the US and Japan, with funding provided by the two countries and other sources. This can help to build more collaborative networks that include Japanese and Americans.

C. Social Media: Recent social media events, such as the Ice Bucket challenge, remind us all that building large scale awareness does not always involve Hollywood-style production and the associated budget. Awareness can also be built through “flatter” approaches. Such initiatives should not be overlooked.

Administration: Creation of joint fund that would support each initiative.

Program Benefits: The direct benefit of these fund initiatives is to promote and increase the social media presence of both nations that would strengthen their collaborative networks.

APPENDIX H

US-Japan Conference Proposal (Group 3)

Increase US-Japan economic integration

Description:

- a. An executive exchange that would explore market opportunities in the United States and Japan and possibilities for joint ventures
- b. A US-Japan Joint-Venture Fund—money provided by each country to an independently managed fund that is tasked with funding joint ventures between US and Japanese companies. The fund will, in particular, try to encourage entrepreneurship and start-ups.
- c. Agricultural exchange

Administration:

Program Benefits:

US-Japan Partnership Strategy

Description: create a joint, official document that outlines priorities for non-military US-Japan regional engagement and identifies areas where the respective countries will take the lead.

Administration:

Program Benefits:

World War II History Conference

Description: A regional World War II history conference. Invite professors from major universities in all the countries that participated in the Pacific war for a colloquium. The conference would ideally come to a consensus about common facts about the war, but more realistically would encourage an exchange of ideas that would improve curricula and education in the participating countries. Could also include a high school component.

Administration:

Program Benefits:

Commemorative Event

Description: An commemorative event or initiative highlighting “70 Years of Collaboration” between the United States and Japan. An opportunity to use the anniversary of the end of the war to highlight the many non-military areas of cooperation—education, economic, diplomatic, etc.—between the two countries. A way to promote the cultural ties between the two. Could be associated with the Partnership Strategy.

Administration:

Program Benefits:

