

Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage, and Resolve Conflicts in Africa

GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA



Cover Photo: An ex-combatant holds up munitions in Attécoubé, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. He is one of several to have participated in a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) operation conducted in the area by the UN mission, UNOCI. February 8, 2012. UN Photo/Patricia Esteve.

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Suggested Citation:

Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage, and Resolve Conflicts in Africa," New York: International Peace Institute, May 2015.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA is Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Email: Gilbert.Khadiagala@wits.ac.za

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication is the outcome of a joint collaboration between the African Union Commission and the International Peace Institute. Special thanks go to International IDEA for their partnership in this endeavor. Thanks also to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the United Nations Development Programme's Regional Service Centre for Africa for their support. The report draws from the outcomes of a regional workshop on "Effective and Inclusive Governance in Africa: Bridging the Gap between Norms and Performance" organized by the African Union Commission's Department of Political Affairs, the International Peace Institute, the United Nations Development Programme's Regional Service Centre for Africa, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which took place on August 5-6, 2014, in Accra, Ghana. This report was prepared as the background thematic paper for the African Union High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa, which focused on "Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance in Resolving Conflicts in Africa," held on October 30-31, 2014, in Dakar, Senegal.

The author is grateful to the team at the AU Department of Political Affairs (DPA) that spearheaded the conception and completion of this project. Special thanks go to Aisha L. Abdullahi, Commissioner for Political Affairs; Khabele Matlosa, Director of Political Affairs; and George Mukundi, Ibrahim Sanusi, and Lucy Dunderdale of the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The author also wishes to acknowledge the support from GIZ. The staff of the International Peace Institute provided critical comments that enriched the report.

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Executive Summary

In the lead-up to the African Union (AU) High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance in Africa held in Dakar, Senegal, on October 30–31, 2014, this background report was commissioned by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) at the AU Commission to shape and frame the discussions about silencing the guns in Africa by 2020. Within the framework of the African Governance Architecture and the African Governance Platform, the DPA has spearheaded the advocacy and promotion of democratic governance, constitutionalism, human rights, credible and transparent elections, participatory and inclusive development, the mitigation of humanitarian crises, and the search for durable solutions to forced displacement in Africa. In meeting these goals, the DPA has responded to the May 2013 Solemn Declaration of the AU heads of state and government to lead focused discussions on how Africa can leverage democratic governance to end wars and silence the guns. This background report is a modest contribution to these debates.

The report proposes that the management of public affairs for the common good through governance is fundamentally about creating institutions that prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in national, regional, and continental contexts. In this broad perspective of conflict transformation, therefore, effective governance provides a wide range of institutional mechanisms that are critical to this end. Specifically, African states have, singly or collectively, made tremendous strides in building institutions of governance that have, over the last fifty years, laid the foundation for mechanisms that manage diversity, foster participation, and promote participatory and inclusive development. These efforts ought to be captured and highlighted in the task of ending wars in the next five years. The report argues that harnessing the successes of the past fifty years of state- and nation-building and the postcolonial efforts toward building competitive democratic processes should be the starting point for galvanizing initiatives and energies in silencing the guns. In the same vein, however, many

countries in Africa are characterized by profound democratic and development deficits that have fostered violent conflicts, despair, desperation, and marginalization. Confronting these deficits is the collective enterprise of Africans and should proceed from an acknowledgement and ownership of these problems, which must propel frank and honest dialogues about ways to overcome them by drawing on past national, regional, and continental experiences and strengths.

Methodologically, the report is based on extensive desk research, particularly of AU and United Nations (UN) documents, plus a wealth of literature by think tanks, leading nongovernmental organizations, and academics. These sources provided both historical and contemporary perspectives of African initiatives and institutions. In addition, AU officials and leading African scholars knowledgeable on questions of democratic governance and conflict transformation were interviewed. Of critical significance to this research and the report was an expert meeting in Accra, Ghana, in August 2014, organized jointly by the DPA and the International Peace Institute (IPI) that addressed effective governance mechanisms for ending conflicts in Africa.¹ Equally pertinent was the youth forum that was convened by DPA and held in Nairobi in September 2014, and the gender forum in Kigali in October 2014, which helped enrich this report significantly with inputs from youth and women. Participants at the final meeting in Dakar also made useful contributions to the report. The conclusions and policy recommendations offered herein have been informed and shaped by the insights from these meetings.

Introduction

The African Union (AU) heads of state and government gathered in Addis Ababa in May 2013 and adopted the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration in which they pledged to silence the guns and end all wars by 2020 as part of efforts to promote an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa.² Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020 is the collective responsibility of African states that should ultimately culminate in states that can

¹ A separate report emanating from this meeting has been published by DPA and IPI. See Mireille Affa'a Mindzie, George Mukundi Wachira, and Lucy Dunderdale, "Effective Governance in Challenging Environments," New York: International Peace Institute, December 2014.

² African Union, "50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration," Addis Ababa, May 2013. See also "Towards Effective Implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance," press statement by H.E. Dr. Aisha L. Abdullahi, Commissioner for Political Affairs, June 23, 2014.

enhance dignity, prosperity, and security in national, regional, and continental domains. The peaceful resolution of wars will contribute significantly to the goals of the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the Africa Agenda 2063, both of which seek to reclaim Africa's ownership and leadership of its own development trajectory and reinvigorate the spirit of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance that has, thus far, inspired Africa's political development and integration.

Since independence, African states have made remarkable attempts to build sturdy institutions of statehood and nationhood for managing diversity, encouraging participation, promoting equitable development, and encouraging regional integration. Furthermore, Africa has made profound strides to establish systems of democratic governance that have broadened competitive politics, induced leadership turnovers, invigorated civic action, and resuscitated economies for growth and development. Yet some parts of Africa remain saddled by violent conflicts and instabilities that are linked to competition over power and resources and the mismanagement of diversity. Conflicts in Africa are driven by governance and development deficits that reflect the inability to find institutions and mechanisms that can address the strains and pressures of pluralism and poverty. Widespread state fragility and national fragmentation combined with socioeconomic inequities continue to fuel violence and social discontent in many African countries. Democratization in the face of ethnic, sectarian, and religious fissures has exacerbated conflicts that have further strained bids to build effective, legitimate, and representative states.

This report argues that silencing the guns by 2020 is an urgent imperative given the limited time frame and the enormity of the tasks. Yet the challenges should not distract from African states' renewed determination to end conflicts through improved governance. Instead, the limited time frame should inspire confidence in African states' abilities and resilience to marshal the energies that would end conflicts. This inspiration, aspiration, and optimism stem from two explanations. First, the resolve to silence the guns must build on the past and present collective successes for building stable nation-states and regional institutions that

have established the foundations for conflict transformation. These successes underscore the ability of African states, societies, and communities to promote collective initiatives for sustainable livelihoods. Thus, African states need to harness the successes and opportunities that have led to the prevention and resolution of conflicts through democratic governance and problem solving initiatives at national, regional, and continental levels. In this optimistic reading, states in Africa already have sufficient templates, formulas, platforms, and the political determination to end conflicts through the promotion of rule of law, human rights and dignity, popular participation, and the management of diversity. Second, ongoing conflicts and civil wars are grounded in the underlying problems of ineffective statebuilding, sectarianism, and dysfunctional economic systems that prevent economic growth, poverty reduction, and equality. In ending these conflicts, there is a need to draw lessons from how African states, societies, and regions have created stable governance systems that address political participation, constitutionalism and the rule of law, constructive management of diversity, and equitable, just, and inclusive development. Effective governance encompasses multiple variables that have, in many ways, contributed to the regeneration of Africa since independence. The task in ending wars is to underscore the forms of governance that have been critical in creating political and economic systems that promote peace, security, and sustainable development.

This report also suggests that analyses of a conflict-free Africa in five years must be grounded in frank and honest dialogues on the prevalence and persistence of conflicts. While appreciating the deep-seated nature of most African conflicts, the salient puzzle is why, despite considerable investment in preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, and postconflict reconstruction and development, some states and regions remain engulfed in endless wars. Despite the proliferation of normative frameworks on democratic governance, popular participation, and the management of public resources, parts of the continent are mired in conflicts stemming from dual democratic and development deficits. For this reason, a critical and instructive part of honest dialogues should be the

acknowledgement and ownership of these weaknesses as the preliminary step to find means to silence the guns and end all wars. African states should learn from their failures as they embark on positive steps to overcome them. Normative frameworks have, in part, been insufficient in ending ongoing wars because they are not fully implemented. In some other cases, these frameworks have faced difficulties of sequencing among forms of governance; for instance, the promotion of competitive politics in the context of state fragility has deepened conflicts and compromised state- and nation-building processes. Silencing the guns entails learning from best practices around balancing the objectives of state capacity building, national cohesion, participation, and inclusive development.

The report begins with a section that identifies some of the core concepts around democratic governance and its linkages to conflict prevention and management. This section aims to establish a common vocabulary for understanding the ingredients of governance such as state- and nation-building, constitutionalism, participation, and economic inclusion. The second section builds on the conceptual framework by providing an overview of landmark trends that have influenced governance in Africa since the 1950s. This section reveals that past practices and experiences of overcoming governance challenges are instructive to discussions about renewed bids to end the remaining wars. In the third section, the report identifies the causes and sources of ongoing conflicts in their national and regional dimensions. This analysis forms the backdrop for section four that focuses on the opportunities and prospects for governance in helping end the ongoing conflicts. The conclusion offers recommendations in light of the analysis furnished in the report.

Governance for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflicts

Attempts to silence the guns must be anchored in ideas around the contribution of governance to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. We emphasize these three elements to make a simple point: the best way of silencing guns is to prevent conflicts, but once conflicts erupt, the challenge shifts from prevention to either management or resolution. Unlike prevention, the management and resolution of conflict denote the transformation of conflicts into peace.³ These links are critical because they emphasize the significance of institutional rules and frameworks for building peaceful and prosperous states and societies. Since the 1990s, governance has been popularly conceived as the rules and mechanisms by which states seek to promote participation, representation, accountability, and probity for the fulfillment of common objectives.⁴ From this view, governance denotes the mechanisms that states and societies adopt to reach collective compromises about the distribution and allocation of resources. As states and societies grapple with the competitive pressures of scarce resources, governance institutions provide order, predictability, and neutrality. For this reason, governance is, at heart, the array of institutions and frameworks that routinely aim to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.

As core components of governance, participation and representation speak primarily to the expansion of public voices in decisions about who governs and to what ends. Participation and representation are central to democratic governance because they focus on the rules that foster inclusiveness, manage political competition,

3 Joseph S. Himes, *Conflict and Conflict Management* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia, 1980); and John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995). This theme informs major UN policy documents such as United Nations Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping*, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992. See also William J. Durch et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

4 For wide-ranging analyses of governance, see Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako, eds., *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and Democratic Renewal in Africa* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002); G. Shabbir Cheema, *Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Reconceptualizing Governance," discussion paper, New York, UNDP, 1997; and World Bank, "Governance and Development," Washington, DC, 1992.

and minimize conflicts. Overall, the quality of participatory and representative institutions contributes to their legitimacy, that is, the ability of large segments of society to accept and buy into existing rules and norms.⁵ Accountable and transparent processes ensure institutions fulfill the expectations and mandates that the public endows them with. As the windows through which to examine the performance of public institutions, mechanisms for accountability and transparency are thus inseparable from participation and representation since the latter mirror the policy-making arena and shape the quality of overall governance. Ideally, in most democratic systems, policymaking institutions are expected to be sufficiently open and transparent, to reflect public input, and to be constantly under public surveillance. All these aspects guarantee that the public routinely holds these institutions and actors accountable.⁶

Institutions of governance are negotiated in broad territorial, spatial, and cultural domains of states, nations, and peoples. This is the relevance of state- and nation-building processes that underlines how states as territories organize identities and permit the creation of a common sense of belonging. States are territorial organizations that define national cultural boundaries, political memberships, and the space for addressing questions about resource allocation. Hence, states embody governance institutions that provide order, security, and prosperity.⁷ In Africa, modern states are colonial creations characterized by heterogeneous political and social compositions that have often compromised the tasks of state- and nation-building. In most instances, statebuilding, as the territorial extension of authority, had to address nation-building, the creation of common citizenship and common political membership. These objectives were also accompanied by the

creation of institutions that tried to promote the production of goods and services to achieve economic growth and equity. Since questions of resource endowments and scarcities heighten the stakes around participation and representation, some African states have been frequently forced to establish narrow priorities in building institutions, paying more attention to strengthening state capacities and economic development rather than expanding participation and representation. Sequencing between statebuilding and democracy building has been typically pronounced in countries recovering from civil wars.⁸

Scholars analyzing African conflicts at the onset of the re-democratization processes in the early 1990s established useful linkages between governance and conflicts through the notion of governance as conflict management.⁹ In a comparative study of politics and violence in West Africa, I. William Zartman and his colleagues suggested that governance involves the prevention of violent conflicts and the continual efforts to manage ordinary conflicts among groups who make demands in the conduct of normal politics. In this respect, conflicts arise when groups bring competing demands to public authorities or governments, forcing these authorities to step in and manage these demands. According to Zartman, “Resolution of these conflicts is often out of the question, since they are normally ongoing, recurrent, and inherent. But unmanaged, they threaten to escalate, leading to a variety of debilitating outcomes: blockage of the governing process, a widening split between state and society, outbreaks of violence, and collapse of the state.”¹⁰ As Zartman further contends:

Although governance has been analyzed from many different angles—as institutionalization, legitimation, lawmaking, problem solving, nation building, integration and allocation, to name a few—all these

5 Department for International Development (DFID), “Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID’s Work in Building More Effective States,” London, DFID, 2005; Daniel Kaufmann, “Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy,” Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2003.

6 World Bank, “Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy,” Washington, DC, World Bank, 2000; and Merilee Grindle, “Good Enough Governance Revisited,” *Development Policy Review* 25, no. 5 (2007): 553–574.

7 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

8 Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*. See also Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001): 289–313.

9 See, for example, I. William Zartman, ed., *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

10 I. William Zartman, “Governance as Conflict Management in West Africa,” in *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*, edited by I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 10.

can be related to the process of handling conflicting demands in a way that retains the allegiance and participation of the demanders in the national political system. Thus conceived, state building becomes a matter of establishing the institutions for this task; legitimation becomes a matter of building reliable support for those who carry out the task; lawmaking becomes the formulation and implementation of rules for managing conflicting demands; problem solving becomes a matter of creating the power and procedures for providing appropriate answers to the groups' demands; nation building means transferring a sense of belonging from the group to the managing state unit; integration and allocation means bringing such groups into national interaction in such a way as to provide and distribute returns to them; and so on.¹¹

The multiple functions that governance embraces are thus normally associated with the processes of building institutions for order and stability, citizenship, constitutionalism, and development, questions that are handled primarily in national contexts but also, increasingly, in regional and continental arenas.¹² The management of claims and demands around these objectives without recourse to war or violence often depicts the effectiveness and robustness of governance systems. Routine politics expressed in functional governance systems, therefore, denotes the avoidance of violent means to manage conflicts as public authorities (governments or states) negotiate with groups in society to induce compliance, forge consensus, and build reciprocities around common objectives and priorities.

Governance as institution-building is also inextricably linked to questions of capacity. This idea encompasses the often gradual process of accumulation, accretion, and acquisition of experiences and skills to better handle the tasks involved in governance. Capacity building is incremental

because of the trade-offs and sequencing that states and societies have to make in learning to effectively manage various demands and priorities.¹³ But capacity building also requires that, for states, the cumulative experiences of successful management of conflicts in certain aspects, such as state- and nation-building, should be transformed creatively to manage other emerging priorities such as constitutionalism and inclusive growth. This incremental view of institutional change recognizes that the evolution of governance capacities for conflict management occurs in small yet significant steps that permit both state and society to acquire the confidence, respect, and resources for collective problem solving.¹⁴

The links between governance and conflict management in Africa are important for three reasons. First, wars are attempts by groups to use violence to settle disputes over political power, ethnic and sectarian differences, and societal injustices, inequities, and poverty.¹⁵ By this argument, violence obliterates (or diminishes the capacity) of governance institutions to mediate routine conflicts. For this reason, ending wars is essential to the revival of governance as conflict management. African countries' determination to end wars needs to be seen as part of efforts to rebuild and reconstruct core governance institutions for order, sustenance, stability, and development. Second, in the context of the militarization that has arisen from the legacies of civil wars and conflicts in Africa over the past two decades, silencing the guns is partly about demilitarizing politics and societies. At one level, therefore, ending wars may contribute to buttressing civilian institutions of governance, restoring a healthy balance between civil and military institutions consistent with democratic governance, and, in particular, civilian democratic control over the

11 Ibid.

12 Donald Rothchild, "Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa," in *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*, edited by I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 197–241; and Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., *Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

13 Dele Olowu, "Governance, Institutional Reforms, and Policy Processes in Africa: Research and Capacity-Building Implications," in *Better Governance and Public Policy*, edited by Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako (Kumarian Press, 2003), pp. 53–71; Seth Kaplan, "Building Inclusive Societies in Fragile Societies," August 18, 2014.

14 Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance have emphasized the phenomenon of incrementalism by capturing the "baby steps" in governance that have made a big impact on growth in some African countries since the 1990s. See Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance, "The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa," *AfricaPlus* (blog), January 6, 2015, available at <https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/the-growth-governance-paradox-in-africa/>.

15 Frances Stewart, "Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries," *The BMJ*, February 2002; Frances Stewart, "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities," *Oxford Development Studies* 28, no. 3 (2000): 245–262; Frances Stewart, "Development and Security," *Conflict, Security, and Development* 4, no. 3 (December 2004): 261–288; and Abdalla Bujra, "African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment," Occasional Paper No. 4, Addis Ababa: Development Policy Management Forum, 2002.

security forces. Where societies are heavily militarized, silencing the guns involves returning the use of force to lawful and legitimate authorities with the capacity to control their use and guarantee their accountability to democratic institutions. Given the spillovers of arms and weapons into regional neighborhoods, ending wars should also entail some level of regional demilitarization. Third, it would be self-defeating to end wars without corresponding measures to address societal grievances that ignite violent conflicts in the first place. This is the critical preventive roles of effective and capable states that can deliver services, manage public resources, and permit the participation of many voices in the articulation of societal priorities and objectives. From this view, ending wars is the start of reclaiming African dignity and identity through collective collaboration to manage adversities and overcome vulnerabilities.

Notions of governance as conflict management and capacity building dovetailed with the five priorities of the AU High-Level Dialogue in Dakar: (a) strengthen state institutions and advance service delivery to achieve sustainable human development; (b) enhance constitutionalism and the rule of law; (c) deepen decentralization and local governance to foster popular participation; (d) manage diversity in a constructive manner to achieve nation-building, reconciliation, and social harmony; and (e) consolidate democratic and participatory governance through credible and transparent elections. These themes touched on how African states have gradually built the capacities to manage conflicts around power and resources and how these institutions have endowed the space for the amelioration and mitigation of conflicts. In addition, the Dakar deliberations sought prescriptions for strengthening these institutions to improve their capacity to fulfill diverse mandates, broaden their legitimacy, and contribute to ending wars by 2020. The key message of this report, therefore, is that all the core elements of democratic governance are, singly or in combination, critical to further the objectives of ending conflicts. Although African states have made choices and compromises in meeting these

objectives depending on their national political and socioeconomic conditions, institutional capacities, and leadership influence, the collective efforts by the AU are geared to mobilize consensus on democratic governance as a common African good. This is the essence of debates initiated during the AU heads of state and government summit in January 2011 on “Strengthening Regional Integration through Shared Values.”

African Achievements in Conflict Management

Success in silencing the guns and ending wars must draw from the vast African experiences of mobilization and organization, as well as the various political, economic, and social platforms that have, for more than fifty years, informed politics and influenced the trajectories of states and societies. Learning from the past invariably necessitates drawing from critical practices that have advanced the collective resilience of African states and societies in managing the challenges that have confronted them in promoting identity, dignity, participation, and equity. Furthermore, these experiences are salient in the contemporary debates about reinvigorating the African spirit for ending wars.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY, DIGNITY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Initially conceived and bred in the diaspora, the evolution of the pan-Africanist movement exemplified the search for an African identity that sought to overcome the legacies of subjugation, slavery, and colonialism. For most of the formative founders of pan-Africanism, such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Edward Blyden, the reclamation of African identity was the means to achieve dignity so people of African origins could recapture their humanity and self-respect that oppression had sought to extinguish.¹⁶ Although the pioneers differed about whether the ideals of identity and dignity could be realized on the African continent or beyond it, these disagreements never overshadowed the singular determina-

16 For excellent analysis of pan-Africanism, see Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International Publishers, 1957); Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (New York: Praeger, 1962); V.B. Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (London: Longman, 1969).

tion about the regenerative spirit that would be unleashed by the reaffirmation of racial identity and dignity. Blyden, for instance, repudiated the false comforts of the Americas and returned to Liberia and Sierra Leone where he established key educational institutions because of his abiding interest in the liberating power of education for Africans. He also used the education pulpit to advocate for political integration in West Africa, one of the first voices on the imperatives of regionalism in Africa.¹⁷ In later years, the icons of what became the Négritude literary movement, the cultural renaissance, deployed the power of the pen to articulate powerful ideas around the strength of African cultures. Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, and Alioune Diop invoked the pan-African ideas of Négritude and the African Personality to lend ideological inspiration to the struggles for self-determination and decolonization.

The African leaders who gathered at the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945 were products of a durable movement that found strength in the power of the human spirit to overcome adversity and advocated ideas of contentious and organizational politics for social and political change. Thus inspired, the nationalist leaders in Manchester—Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, George Padmore, T. R. Makonnen, and others—embraced the notions of organization and agitation to underwrite the project of self-determination and decolonization. But these leaders were simply carriers of ideas that actually reflected the praxis around decolonization, witnessed in the Algerian and Kenyan armed struggles that later found further elaboration in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. African leaders had the opportunity to celebrate the first fruits of self-determination at the All-African People's Congress in Accra in 1958 following Ghana's independence. The Accra meeting also became a forum for mapping out the political contours of African unity on the eve of the decade of decolonization. Like before, while deep divisions emerged about the territorial and political delineation of African unity, the broad consensus

centered on transforming the idea of self-determination into continental institutions that would realize the aspirations of pan-Africanism.¹⁸

THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTINENTAL UNITY

The establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was the culmination of years of yearning for dignity, identity, and self-determination, ideas at the heart of the pan-African movement. Although a compromise between the grand vision of a United States of Africa and the minimalist one of a union based on the existing nation-states, the OAU reflected the realities of the immediate postcolonial period, particularly the emphasis on sovereign equality and respect for inherited boundaries.¹⁹ With independence presenting enormous opportunities for reversing the legacies of slavery and colonialism, it was unlikely that few states would have countenanced ceding sovereignty to a supranational body. Limited as it was, however, the OAU became the framework for continental problem solving, beginning the creation of institutions that contributed to order, peace, and stability in the African interstate system. Furthermore, as it embraced the banner of decolonization, the OAU continued to anchor the aspirations around the indivisibility of African freedom: all of Africa would remain chained without the liberation of all colonial territories. This idea sustained the OAU's three-decade relentless mobilization for self-determination that ended with the demise of apartheid in South Africa in 1994.

In the broad scheme of building institutions for Africa, the OAU, despite its many weaknesses, laid the foundations for an incremental process of consensus-building on issues that mirrored the priorities of the first three decades of Africa's independence. Thus, aside from decolonization, the questions that mattered most to African states during this period were: secure borders to enhance state- and nation-building; the absence of subversion to enable the consolidation of power by the new states; the promotion of African unity and solidarity in line with the spirit of pan-Africanism;

17 Hollis R. Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot 1832-1912* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

18 Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress, and Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973); and Claude Welch, *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).

19 Opoku Agyeman, "The Osagyefo, the Mwalimu, and Pan-Africanism: A Study in the Growth of a Dynamic Concept," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13, no. 4 (1975): 653-75; Z. Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU* (New York: Africana, 1977).

and the galvanization of African voices in the global arena to prevent the continent's entanglement in the Cold War. Where border conflicts flared in Algeria and Morocco, the Horn of Africa, and parts of West Africa, the OAU intervened effectively to mediate amicable solutions. Similarly, where state disintegration arose, as in the case of the Biafran war in Nigeria, the OAU stood alongside the Nigerian government in reaffirming the principle of territorial integrity. While self-determination battles raged in Sudan and Ethiopia, the policy of non-interference managed to keep neighboring countries at bay. In addition, the annual meetings of the OAU and Africa's collaborative participation in multilateral institutions helped forge the sense of identity that has remained critical to addressing subsequent challenges.²⁰

THE SEARCH FOR CONTINENTAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Although nominally committed to the objectives of Africa's economic development through self-reliance and local mobilization of resources, the OAU did not have robust programs to address these questions until the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s put considerable pressures on member states. Prior to this period, the bulk of debates around economic development were left largely to individual states, regional economic communities, and their international partners. To overcome these crises, the OAU, alongside the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), led a series of conversations that culminated in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos in 1980, a long-term vision for Africa's economic regeneration. Both the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos set the principles, objectives, stages, measures, and priorities for achieving national autonomy and collective self-reliance, as well as for establishing the African Economic Community to ensure integration in Africa.²¹

Although the LPA faced opposition from the Bretton Woods institutions because of its pan-Africanist orientation and attempts to reduce dependence on external actors, the OAU and

UNECA made further attempts to address the deteriorating economic situation in Africa in the mid-1980s through the adoption of Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery. The program was based on the LPA and sought to promote agricultural transformation as a means to foster industrial progress and improved economic infrastructure, and it proposed ways of developing human resources and responding to drought and desertification. These policies were presented to a special session of the UN General Assembly in 1985, which adopted the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). Even as most African countries bowed to donor pressures and bought into Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), in the spirit of African voices and agency, the OAU and UNECA forced debates on an alternative framework, called the "African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation" (AAF-SAP) in 1989. The AAF-SAP provided evidence about the debilitating effects of SAPs on African economies and made proposals for the transformation of African economies as the means to tackle the cause of the crises. Specifically, the AAF-SAP sought the restoration of economic growth, the transformation of production structures, and equitable development through the democratization of development.²²

The next significant opportunity to focus attention on Africa's collective vision for economic integration was the passage of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community by the OAU in 1991. Mandated by the LPA, the African Economic Community was drawn up through the collaboration of the OAU, UNECA, and the African Development Bank. Coming into force in 1994, the African Economic Community committed the continent to the path of economic integration and established the timetable for full economic union by 2027, building on the synergies and experiments of the regional economic communities.²³ The articulation of current and ongoing initiatives, such as the proposed African

20 For analyses of the achievements of the OAU, see David B. Meyers, "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity," *International Organization* 28, no. 3 (1974): 345–74; and Kassim Mohammed Khamis, *Promoting the African Union* (Washington, DC: Lillian Barber, 2008).

21 Economic Commission for Africa, *ECA and Africa: Fifty Years of Partnership* (Addis Ababa: ECA, 2008).

22 For all these initiatives, see *ibid.*, pp. 45–70. See also, Adebayo Adedeji, "The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa," in *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations*, edited by Adekeye Adebajo (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009).

23 Khamis, *Promoting the African Union*; and ECA, *ECA and Africa*, p. 47.

Monetary Fund and the Continental Free Trade Area, feeds into the gradual and incremental logic that has marked the building of collective institutions on the continent.

BUILDING NORMS OF AFRICAN RENEWAL

A coalition of nonstate actors from across Africa emerged in the late 1980s to forge alternative perspectives on Africa's future. Led by Olusegun Obasanjo's Africa Leadership Forum, this seminal movement tried to undo the dominance of governments and the OAU in shaping the parameters of continental affairs. Its debates were wide-ranging and were not just confined to civic actors; Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni gave a strong imprimatur to the meeting that led to the final declaration in Kampala in 1991 known as the Kampala Document, which established the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).²⁴ The CSSDCA emphasized African renewal through enhancement of security, stability, development, and cooperation. More pertinent, debates leading to the CSSDCA are significant because they brought questions to the African arena of notions of governance that have since become common in policy discourses: the centrality of democratic participation, accountability, inclusion, and transparency. The CSSDCA also started a chapter in continental conversations about African responsibility and ownership of the enormous challenges around governance. Furthermore, the CSSDCA transcended the pessimism that often intruded in the discussions about Africa's abilities and capacities to manage these challenges, contending poignantly that Africa's future was in the hands of Africans.²⁵ Its articulation of African agency and ownership was central to the OAU reforms in the mid-1990s that created the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (the Cairo Declaration) and subsequent policies concerning non-indifference and sovereignty with responsibility. To underscore the power of the priorities embraced by the Kampala

movement, the OAU heads of state and government in July 2000 adopted the Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa with a plan of action to strengthen democratic governance and build peace, security, and stability.

THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AND THE CREATION OF THE AU

The optimism exuded by the CSSDCA coincided with the end of colonial and apartheid regimes in Southern Africa, helping to complete the decolonization process and set the stage for new beginnings in Africa. As president of South Africa succeeding the nationalist icon, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki resurrected the pan-African ideals of renewal and rejuvenation to propel continental institution-building and transformation.²⁶ To Mbeki, the African Renaissance was a vital chapter demonstrating that Africans had the ability to shape their destinies unencumbered by external and internal constraints. The renewal of these ideals acknowledged that barely fifty years after independence, African states had made solid progress in undoing the constraints of state weakness and the dearth of economic resources, embarking on the road to self-determination with courage, conviction, and confidence. Yet the Renaissance had to be an opportunity for collective mobilization of new energies to create strong but responsible continental institutions, frank acknowledgements of the obstacles bedeviling national and continental renewal, and new partnerships with international actors who would contribute to Africa's developmental priorities. The African Renaissance coalition of Mbeki, Obasanjo, Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, and Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika was critical in reigniting the momentum toward new vistas for continental change. Although these leaders differed from Libya's Muammar Qaddafi on the shape, pace, and content of continental institutions, Qaddafi provided significant resources that contributed to the elaboration of the emerging continental institutional matrix.²⁷

24 For analyses of the CSSDCA, see the Africa Leadership Forum, "The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa," Kampala: Africa Leadership Forum, 1991; and Francis M. Deng, "African Policy Agenda: A Framework for Global Partnership," in *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance*, edited by Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998), pp. 164–171.

25 Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2002).

26 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Two Moments in African Political Thought: Ideas in Africa's International Relations," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2010): 375–86.

27 Khamis, *Promoting the African Union*.

The formation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was the culmination of these pan-Africanist renewal initiatives, lending shape and vision to the determination for new rules that are conducive to the political, economic, and social imperatives of the late twentieth century. In the Constitutive Act of the AU, African leaders pledged to maintain the pan-African spirit that had allowed African countries to weather the storms of decolonization and the Cold War and to reinvigorate the search for new programs to strengthen unity and promote accountability.²⁸ The AU seeks to speed up continental political and socioeconomic integration, the promotion and defense of common positions, and the creation of favorable conditions for Africa to play a major role in the global economy.²⁹ Cognizant of the substantive shifts in interstate relations and the emergence of new threats to African security, the AU established much stronger institutions than the OAU to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. As Khabele Matlosa suggests, this new era presaged the replacement of the culture of non-interference with the doctrine of non-indifference, and the replacement of “sovereignty as impunity” with “sovereignty as responsibility.”³⁰ Of equal significance is the proliferation of normative frameworks in Africa since the early 2000s that have contributed to the shared values that underpin integration. For the most part, these frameworks seek to secure sovereignty through democratic governance and collective restraints. Among the key normative frameworks is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which is Africa’s commitment to nurture and consolidate democratic and participatory governance.³¹

ECONOMIC RENEWAL THROUGH OWNERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY

A key part of Africa’s renewal in the early 2000s was the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Both programs

balance demands for renewal and responsibility, vital paradigm shifts in African approaches to development. The AU conceived NEPAD in 2001 as the blueprint for Africa’s ownership of its development path, and it enjoins donors to forge genuine partnerships with African countries. Among the programmatic aims of NEPAD are democracy, governance, infrastructure, information technology, human resource development, agriculture, and market access. Ultimately, NEPAD is committed to reducing poverty, putting Africa on the path of sustainable development, and halting Africa’s global marginalization. In adopting the NEPAD 2002 *Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance*, African leaders stressed that sustainable development is inconceivable without democracy.³² Similarly, the APRM was adopted in 2003 to create a regime of responsibility whereby member states pledged to be voluntarily assessed on policies, standards, and practices that promote political stability, economic growth, and accelerated regional and continental economic integration. As a mechanism that reinforces best practices and peer learning in broad governance, the APRM has contributed to deepening shared values and collective experiences through evidence-based assessments.³³

BUILDING GOVERNANCE THROUGH COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL PROCESSES

African states have made competitive elections a fundamental part of the re-democratization agenda over the last twenty-five years. These experiments arose from a combination of national and international pressures for change. They signaled deep shifts away from decades of authoritarianism and military regimes that had dominated the postcolonial era. Competitive electoral processes also recognized that most African countries had realized meaningful progress in state- and nation-building, progress that would guarantee the expansion of participatory and representative

28 African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 2000, available at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf.

29 Ibid.

30 Khabele Matlosa, “Democratization and Peace-Building: Policy Reflections and Prospects,” Background Paper for the OAU/AU Golden Jubilee and the Draft AU Agenda 2063, Addis Ababa: UNDP/AU, November 2013, 49–50.

31 Khabele Matlosa, “Pan-Africanism, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance: What Does the Future Hold?” SAIIA Occasional Paper no. 190, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, June 2014, pp. 17–20.

32 AU, “NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance,” Addis Ababa: AU, 2002; Matlosa, “What Does the Future Hold?”

33 Edward McMahon, Kojo Busia, and Marta Ascherio, “Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism,” *African and Asian Studies* 12 (2013): 266–289.

institutions.³⁴ Instead of the fears of ethnic and regional convulsions that elites conjured up in previous years to prevent pluralism, African people embraced democracy because they sought new state-society relations that would restore accountability and transparency in governance. Moreover, most perceived elections as essential to the rotation in leadership that would, in turn, herald generational changes in power and responsibility. Twenty-five years are not sufficient to yield consolidated democracies, but Africa has learned considerably from managing competitive politics, particularly as many countries have held violence-free elections and reined in political and economic monopolies that had strengthened the power of authoritarian regimes. Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation increasingly show that democratization, despite wide variations in its forms and practices, has gained popularity in the majority of African countries, particularly electoral processes.³⁵

The competitive pressures of the 1990s unleashed democratic systems of governance that were not often fully participatory as some leaders continued to perpetuate their rule through fraudulent elections. Nor has democracy led to peaceful management of diversities in all countries. Nonetheless, the general momentum for competitive politics is gaining traction as many countries pass new constitutions to stabilize political competition. Since elections are perceived to be the primary means through which power is legitimated, countries have attempted to guarantee the independence of electoral bodies and constitutional courts to reduce political violence and instability. In addition, lessons from failed electoral processes in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe have demonstrated the disastrous consequences of weak electoral administrative rules for national stability. For the majority of African states, democratic consolidation through elections has been recognized as part of forging new social

contracts necessary for order and progress. During the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU held in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009, the AU adopted the Panel of the Wise report on "Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict." The recommendations of the report are instructive in ending wars by 2020. The report emphasized that it is the responsibility of all African actors to address the root causes of electoral violence, whether they are election-related causes stemming from within the electoral cycle or are from systemic structural factors. It further highlighted the need for the AU to invest more resources in preventive measures, early warning, and early response.³⁶

Also, while some have regarded democratic competition as the precursor to economic chaos, there has been growing recognition that economic questions are better negotiated within the wider spaces that democracy affords to citizens. As Thandika Mkandawire has noted, the remarkable economic growth in Africa in recent years is partly attributable to greatly improved governance, particularly the broad trend of democratization.

A case can be made that political changes have had a positive impact on economies. The end of militarism and the greater democratization of African countries have placed economic performance at the core of the states' source of legitimation. The success of a leader, even in the remaining authoritarian strongholds, is no longer measured by the longevity of his reign, and even less so by the number of self-awarded medals on his chest, but by the performance of the economy and the stability of the political order . . . In addition, democratization—bringing greater accountability to local constituencies—over the years has made it harder for external actors to impose their preferred policies. These political changes are no small matter given the fact that Africa has had many leaders whose political aspirations never rose beyond satisfying local clients and the external masters who underwrite their rule.³⁷

34 For broad analyses of democratization trends and themes, see Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); E. Gyimah-Boadi, ed., *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); and Leonardo Villalón and Peter VonDoepp, eds., *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

35 For a summary of these surveys and indices, see the Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress* (London: EIU, 2011), p. 26; and Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014, available at www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/.

36 African Union Panel of the Wise, "Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict," *The African Union Series*, New York: International Peace Institute, July 2010.

37 Thandika Mkandawire, "Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?" *Current History* 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 174.

Further strengthening the democratic trends over the last two decades has been the normative shift of the OAU/AU against unconstitutional change of government, once a prevalent feature of African politics. Since the OAU adopted the *Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government* in Lomé, Togo, in 2000, this principle has been captured variously in subsequent documents and platforms. The constant reiteration of the principle has been critical in the marked decline of military coups.³⁸ Popular uprisings in North Africa in 2011 challenged the solidity of unconstitutional changes of government, but in the aftermath, the AU has made alterations that accommodate popular aspirations to political change, and it is gradually refining the normative framework on unconstitutional changes of government. The appreciable decline of unconstitutional changes of government through military coups may be attributed to the OAU/AU norms developed since the late 1990s. Norms alone, however, cannot deter egregious behavior. As demonstrated by recent cases of unconstitutional changes of government by militaries, the AU and regional economic communities have exerted tremendous pressure on these countries to restore constitutional legality.³⁹

GOVERNANCE FOR EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

Africa has started to move away from decades of negative growth that were popularly depicted as the “lost economic decades.” In recent years, these optimistic perspectives of changing Africa’s economic fortunes have been captured in the fact that six of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies are in Africa.⁴⁰ The explanations for the sharp surge include: improvements in governance

and democratization; improved earnings from exports because of better terms of trade; increases in foreign direct investment in extractive industries and information, communication, and technology.⁴¹ Despite the persistence of economic inequities, Africa also has witnessed a fall in absolute poverty rates measured by the one-dollar-a-day limit. Attempts by many governments to manage socioeconomic inequalities have revolved around the idea of inclusive growth that seeks to improve investments in agriculture, education, industry, and infrastructure to jump-start growth and equity. Many countries, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, have launched impressive plans to propel them to middle-income status in the next twenty-five years. Some states, such as Mauritius and South Africa, also have experimented with social protection and welfare programs that target the poor and vulnerable groups.⁴²

The global financial crisis of 2008 led to the weakening of the Washington Consensus, a free-market doctrine that had dominated economic discourse and shaped the engagement of donors with many African countries. Broadly, the Washington Consensus tilted economic reforms more toward markets as institutions for the allocation of resources rather than states and governments as the drivers of public policy. Thus, the weakening of the Washington Consensus has been a blessing in disguise for Africa, because it has recreated a healthy balance between states and markets in meeting the fundamental objectives of economic governance.⁴³ Recognition that both markets and states are critical in resource allocation has allowed governments to be more proactive in forging industrial and employment policies; public investment to correct the errors of previous

38 Matlosa, “Democratization and Peace-Building,” pp. 49–51.

39 Some of the recent cases are Madagascar (2009), Mali (2013), and Egypt (2013). See Michael Vunyingah, “Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: An Assessment of the Relevance of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Policy Brief no. 44, Pretoria, Africa Institute of South Africa, March 2011; and Ulf Engel, “Unconstitutional Changes of Government: New AU Policies in Defense of Democracy,” Working Paper no. 9, Leipzig, University of Leipzig Graduate Center of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2010.

40 “Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent,” *The Economist*, March 2, 2013, available at www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august; and Karin Strohecker, “The ‘Africa Rising’ Narrative Rings True Despite Headlines,” *Business Day* (Johannesburg), November 11, 2014, available at <http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/11/11/the-africa-rising-narrative-rings-true-despite-headlines>. For critics of the narrative, see Rick Rowden, “The Myth of Africa’s Rise: Why the Rumors of Africa’s Explosive Growth have been Greatly Exaggerated,” *Foreign Policy*, January 4, 2013.

41 Mkandawire, “Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?”

42 Francis Chigunta, “Inclusive Growth and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Experience of Zambia,” n.d.; Steven Kayizzi-Mugerwa, “Inclusive Growth in Africa,” presentation at the Global Development Network Conference, Manila, June 19, 2013, available at www.gdn.int/admin/uploads/editor/files/2013Conf_Papers/SteveKayizzi-Mugerwa_ppt.pdf.

43 Mkandawire, “Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?”

decades; and social policies that redress severe inequities. By the same token, governments are now able to engage private actors in policy dialogues about all facets of development. Although the cheerleading about Africa's economic growth spurt needs to appreciate the many obstacles to the reduction of inequalities, many countries are on the path to harnessing their human and natural resources to build strong economies, large middle classes, and democratic societies.

REBUILDING STATES AND SOCIETIES AFTER CIVIL CONFLICTS

Civil wars that engulfed many African states in the 1990s often arose from the mismanagement of diversity, authoritarian political leadership, and economic marginalization. At the heart of many civil conflicts was a crisis of governance as a large number of weak and impoverished states failed to contain the fissures of state- and nation-building. In a majority of these states, competing political identities surged in importance just as the formal structures of government were least prepared to manage them. Structural violence stemming from ethnic and regional competition lent ferocity to African conflicts, because states failed to be mediators of these conflicts. Yet civil wars are declining, testimony to the international and regional investments in peace processes and postconflict reconstruction strategies.⁴⁴ Often lost in the analysis of conflicts in Africa is that the track record of stabilizing fragile states over the past two decades has yielded a number of relative successes, including in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda.⁴⁵ Although manifesting various levels of fragility, most of these countries have improved immeasurably because of regional and international stabilization efforts. For countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, it may take a long time to shed off the label of fragility, particularly with the health threat of Ebola compromising recovery efforts. Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, and Mozambique have, however, graduated remarkably from postconflict countries

to relative stability and have been on the path of sustainable development.

Reconstruction initiatives offer many lessons learned, including the sequencing of their objectives. Initially, postconflict reconstruction was hampered by multiple ambitious goals such as democracy-building, security sector reforms, gender equity, and service delivery. In recent years, the most frequent measures that are given priority are security sector reforms, programs for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and programs against the proliferation of small and light arms. With the establishment of such measures, postconflict societies are able to build the confidence to undertake political and economic reforms.⁴⁶ African countries have accumulated sufficient experiences in ending wars. Learning from the wealth of these experiences is important to find effective and efficient means of informing future efforts to end wars. Overall, although postconflict countries face difficulties in the transition from state failure to recovery, successful reconstruction has entailed the rebuilding of both physical and institutional infrastructure. Further, reconstruction requires both sustained global interventions and local leadership initiatives.

REGIONALISM FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING

In postcolonial Africa, regional cooperation and integration has offered tremendous opportunities to negotiate collective approaches to economic and security needs. For African countries, too many problems are beyond the scope of any individual country to resolve, especially given weak institutions and limited resources. Even before the Abuja Treaty of 1994, regional economic communities underlined the commitment to economic cooperation and integration. Regional economic communities and other intergovernmental organizations have proliferated to exploit geographical, cultural, and political proximities as a means to leverage economic exchanges for the common good.⁴⁷ Before the civil conflicts of the 1990s,

44 Scott Straus, "Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa," *African Affairs* 111, no. 443 (2012); and Jakkie Cilliers and Julia Schunemann, "The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa: More Violence or Greater Peace?" ISS Paper no. 246, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, May 2013.

45 Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, eds., *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012); Kenneth Omeje and Tricia Redeker Hepner, eds., *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).

46 Robert Muggah and Christian Altpeter, "Peacebuilding and Postconflict Recovery: What Works and What Does Not?" New York: International Peace Institute, June 2014.

47 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Institution Building for African Regionalism," ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 85, Manila: Asian Development Bank, August 2011.

regional economic communities, such as the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), had made significant advancement toward enhancing trade and labor mobility through customs unions, free trade areas, and, increasingly, monetary arrangements.

In East and West Africa, the adoption of free movement protocols is a testimony to the political will to strengthen integration. For instance, the EAC is leading the way by relaxing work permit restrictions for citizens of member states, allowing freer movement across borders and minimizing cross-border tariffs. Common EAC passports now allow citizens of member states to travel and—in the future—work freely in the region. Kenya and Rwanda have already removed requirements for work permits for all EAC citizens. In West Africa, the ECOWAS protocol on free movement is in force, allowing citizens to freely enter and establish themselves in member states. The protocol has substantially increased regional labor mobility, which has boosted investment and trade among West African states.⁴⁸ However, the recent outbreak of the Ebola crisis has put enormous strains on regional integration in West Africa as many states seek to close their borders with Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia to prevent infections. New border closures are reversing the gains from free movement of peoples and continental attempts to build a borderless Africa.

Many regional economic communities still face considerable obstacles, highlighted in the fact that integration has not boosted intraregional trade, which still accounts for only about 10 percent of African countries' overall trade.⁴⁹ Moreover, while some regions such as East, West, and Southern Africa have managed to establish fairly functional institutions, other regions, such as the Maghreb and Central Africa, still lag behind. But if regional integration is going to be at the center of ending wars, lessons can be learned from past experiences in political and economic collaboration for stimulating regional energies to promote economic and security needs. Building a greater sense of

regional identity is one of the first steps in creating problem-solving institutions to promote integration for ending wars.

Obstacles to Building Governance for Peace

In the annals of political development, fifty years is merely a point in the momentous and protracted journey of building durable states with sound capacities to meet the multiple tasks of democratic consolidation, integration, and development. Africa has made noteworthy strides in creating national and continental structures that provide future vistas and visions to strengthen governance for conflict management. Thus, silencing the guns by 2020 should be inspired by the accumulated knowledge and experiences undergirding the past.

But harnessing the past to build the future should not lead to extravagant triumphalism, because Africa faces a whole host of challenges that continue to prevent the solidification of past and ongoing experiences. The obstacles enumerated in this section demonstrate that, in the short to medium terms, not all forms of democratic governance reduce conflicts; in fact, some states have been able to manage conflicts through dampening the pressures and expectations of democratic governance, particularly in deeply divided societies. In other cases, some states have focused on economic development and the delivery of services at the expense of the promotion of human rights and competitive electoral politics. The popularity of Africa's developmental dictatorships or developmental patrimonialism for regenerating conflict-prone states has been prominently highlighted by some scholars and policymakers as instances of successful rebuilding of states.

DEMOCRATIZATION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM

Progress on building effective institutions of participation and representation is hampered in many African states by weak elite adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law. Democratic

48 For these recent attempts in East and West Africa, see Khadiagala, "Institution Building for African Regionalism."

49 African Union, "Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade," available at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan%20for%20boosting%20intra-African%20trade%20F-English.pdf.

governance has rejuvenated many African societies, but the features of democratic deficits—manipulation of constitutions, electoral polarization, the absence of the rule of law, decreasing avenues of mass participation, and severe democratic reversals—are emerging as threats to the democratic gains of the last twenty-five years.⁵⁰ Fundamentally, democratic transitions in most African countries occurred in the absence of investments in constitutionalism—substantive checks on the power of states and governments—and liberal ethos and practices around civil liberties and individual rights. While some countries have addressed these questions through new constitutional arrangements, the specter of weakly instituted democratization continues to haunt most African states. Compounding these illiberal environments are questions of economic inequities that have widened mass distrust of democratic processes, particularly elections.

Global comparative studies reveal that autocratic regimes are more prone to large-scale violence than democratic ones because democracies are better equipped to handle challenges to the authority of the rulers, garner more legitimacy, and accrue adequate capacity to meet societal goals.⁵¹ Throughout the democratization processes in Africa, some states have witnessed the deterioration in their capacity to manage conflicts precisely because of state- and nation-building cleavages unleashed through democratic competition. The electoral violence that has induced fears in the electorate of many African countries stems, in part, from this facet of democratization. But electoral conflicts are also more about insufficient institutions for managing diversities rather than a singular indictment of democratization.⁵² In countries that have experienced electoral violence, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, renewed efforts at constitution-making have run against the ingrained cultures of ethnic intolerance and crude majoritarianism that continue to reproduce systemic instabilities. In Lesotho, creative institutional energies to manage electoral competition and reduce the history of violent contestations have been wasted in recent years by

intermittent elite squabbles that have forced the military to become the most significant arbiter of political conflicts.

In many African countries, democracy has failed to gain traction because elites continually invoke sectarian, ethnic, and regional cleavages to postpone the evolution of institutions of participatory and representative governance. The outcomes are periodic elections devoid of democratic content. Some regimes have used similar statebuilding arguments to discredit the popular uprisings in North Africa, contending that the groundswell of opposition to autocratic regimes has led to new civil wars, unstable governments, and economic downturns. Yet the ostensible stability under undemocratic regimes that is frequently touted is precisely what produced the uprisings in the first place. Rather than acknowledging the transitional pains North African states are confronting in finding better governance systems for the future, the critics make wholesale condemnations of the value of popular pressures in institutional change.

Equally worrisome, democratization trends in some African countries have failed to yield important changes in the quality of leaders. In fact, some elections in recent years have resulted in either the emergence of demagogic leaders who then run roughshod over the existing weak democratic institutions or leaders who are unable to effectively govern for a host of reasons. Since in most competitive political systems leaders reflect the education, the sophistication, and cosmopolitanism of the electorate, most African countries are still struggling to find the right balance between their leaders and the electorate. Years of investment in civic education programs to create informed citizenries have yet to consistently produce outcomes whereby elections lead to more transformational leadership in Africa. Although unconstitutional changes of government through military coups have declined appreciably, other forms of constitutional abuses remain prevalent and are increasingly compromising many African countries' consistent promotion of the values of

50 Bruce Baker, "Can Democracy in Africa Be Sustained?" *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 38, no. 3 (2000): 9–34.

51 Seth Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (New York: Praeger, 2008).

52 African Union Panel of the Wise, "Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence." See also, Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert Khadiagala, and Victor Shale, eds, *When Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election-Related Conflicts in Africa* (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 2010).

constitutional governance. In addition to regimes using fraudulent and illegitimate means to win elections, wanton constitutional changes and novel forms of dynastic successions are rife across Africa, reflecting both the arrogance of power and the insularity of leaders who have been in office for decades. Democratic governance has not taken root uniformly throughout Africa not because of the dearth of democratic values and practices, but because some leaders have remained consistently oblivious to them.

DEVELOPMENTAL DICTATORSHIPS

The attempts to reaffirm the centrality of participation and representation as African governance values to prevent and manage conflicts are challenged by the patterns of governance exhibited by developmental dictatorships or developmental patrimonialism. These states' experiences are similar to those in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s where governments focused primarily on economic growth, reduction of poverty, and provision of public goods. At the same time, while they have nominally adhered to some basic principles of procedural democracy, such as regular elections, developmental dictatorships are typically characterized by the suppression of political challengers and the use of draconian means to curtail civil liberties and freedom of the press.⁵³ Similarly, most developmental dictatorships arose in the aftermath of civil conflicts. Subsequently, they made visible steps to restore state effectiveness and capacity. By the same token, developmental dictatorships have remained essentially de facto one-party states where the military plays disproportionately larger political roles.

Developmental dictatorships continue to derive legitimacy from sustained economic growth and improvements in the standards of living, but political repression and severe restrictions on alternative political voices potentially create conditions for future strife and violence. Already, some of these regimes are facing internecine conflicts among the once cohesive elites, revealing cracks that may not be overcome without transi-

tions to more open and transparent societies. The economic trajectories of developmental dictatorships also have potentially destabilizing consequences. As they have funneled investments through militarized ruling parties, they have created economic monopolies that have hindered the evolution of genuine middle classes who can support future democratization. There are apt lessons for developmental dictatorships from the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt, which, at some point, embraced some of the core features of developmental dictatorships.⁵⁴ The demise of North African regimes reinforces the indivisibility of democratic governance whereby the values of accountability, participation, representation, and transparency must work together for sustainable development. In the long run, the prevalence of developmental dictatorships compromises African states' pursuit of common values on democratic governance. Equally uncertain is also whether developmental dictatorships are creating the long-term conditions for conflict prevention.

CORRUPTION AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Corruption remains a scourge in African governance, undermining the rule of law, sapping resources away from productive activities, and discouraging investment that would drive economic growth and reduce poverty. At its heart, corruption is a governance deficit, a problem of the prevalence of opaque accountability institutions and entrenched political and economic monopolies. Weak countervailing mechanisms of participation and representation worsen corruption. In most of Africa, corruption also epitomizes economic impunity whereby elites wantonly abuse public resources without sanctions. Despite African states' embrace of regional and international conventions on anti-corruption, reforms on corruption legislation, and creation of numerous anti-corruption bodies, the problem of corruption is getting worse, even in some of the better governed states.⁵⁵ Globally, undemocratic governments frequently have corruption rankings that are

53 David Booth and F. Gooloba-Mutebi, "Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda," *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2002): 379–403; Hilary Matfess, "Authoritarian Resilience in Rwanda and Ethiopia," *Fragile States*, available at www.fragilestates.org/2014/05/04/authoritarian-resilience-rwanda-ethiopia-hilary-matfess/; Lovise Aalen, "Ethiopia after Meles: Stability for How Long?" *Current History* 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 192–196; and Joel Barkan, "Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011.

54 Frederic Volpi, "Revolution, Reform, and Stasis in the Maghreb?" *Current History* 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 185–191.

55 Stefan Gilbert, "Is Africa Losing the Battle Against Corruption?" Institute for Security Studies, September 16, 2014; Philippe Le Billon, "Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Corruption," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (2008).

40–50 percent greater than democratic systems at comparable income levels. These trends are confirmed in Africa where robust democratic institutions' low levels of corruption contrast sharply with autocratic regimes' higher levels of corruption. The annual surveys by Transparency International reveal that most African countries have not made palpable improvements on their rankings; these findings are also supported by local surveys in most African countries that confirm that a majority of their populations consider corruption as a serious public policy issue.⁵⁶

The new attention on illicit financial flows out of Africa is recognition of the negative impact of such flows on Africa's development and governance. It is also an attribute of weak state capacity and the absence of accountable and transparent institutions. In 2013, the African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity observed that Africa lost \$1.4 trillion in illicit financial flows between 1980 and 2009.⁵⁷ The trend has been increasing over time and especially in the last decade, with annual average illicit financial flows of \$50 billion between 2000 and 2008.⁵⁸ The level of illicit financial outflows from Africa far exceeds the official development assistance to the continent, which stood at \$46.1 billion in 2012.⁵⁹ Transparency International continues to report on government leaders who have amassed wealth through illicit means, in the majority of cases by channeling public funds into their foreign private bank accounts.⁶⁰ The hemorrhaging of Africa's public resources guarantees that few countries will achieve the broader socioeconomic transformation envisioned by the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

Curbing illicit resource flows is a governance matter of transparency, institutional capacity, and the creation of strong legal frameworks. African

states will not end wars if the causes of structural violence persist, and corruption needs to be accurately seen as one of its drivers. In addition, since ending wars aims, in part, to strengthen state efficacy, corruption has corrosive effects on the capacity of governance institutions to perform effectively.

Alongside the conclusion of civil wars in recent years, African governments and international actors have made efforts to reverse the so-called "resource curse," by using Africa's natural resources for the betterment of states and societies. Thus, there has been growing momentum to join international schemes for natural resource governance such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Kimberley Process on the certification of diamonds, and the Open Budget Initiative. All these initiatives seek to encourage governments to institute accountable and transparent mechanisms to ensure that revenues from extractive industries are spent for the benefit of the people.⁶¹ Regional and continental initiatives such as the Africa Mining Vision also have been created to ensure the harmonization of laws and standards on accountability, transparency, and property rights protection around natural resources. Given that the combination of resource abundance and poor governance is lethal in resource-rich Africa, ending wars will entail a judicious mix of governance measures that involve governments, communities, and the private sector in productive use and management of natural resources.⁶²

PRECARIOUS REGIONAL NEIGHBORHOODS

Africa contains vast territorial regions in which the reach and authority of states has not been adequately secured. In these regions, governments compete for resources, legitimacy, and loyalty with groups and movements that have diverse grievances and contest violently among one

56 Oluwaseun Bamidele, "Corruption, Conflict, and Sustainable Development in African States," *The African Symposium* 13, no. 1 (June 2013).

57 African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, "Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource Transfers from Africa: 1980–2009," May 2013.

58 Ibid., p. 1; and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), "Former President Mbeki to Chair the High Level Talks on Illicit Financial Flows," June 14, 2013, available at www.uneca.org/media-centre/stories/former-president-mbeki-chair-high-level-talks-illicit-financial-flows#.VUJzKvB8u5I.

59 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), "Former President Mbeki to Chair the High Level Talks on Illicit Financial Flows," June 14, 2013, available at www.uneca.org/media-centre/stories/former-president-mbeki-chair-high-level-talks-illicit-financial-flows#.VUJzKvB8u5I.

60 Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2013* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013).

61 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Global and Regional Mechanisms for Governing the Resource Curse in Africa," *Resource Insight*, no.12, July 2014.

62 Matthias Busse and Steffen Gröning, "The Resource Curse Revisited: Governance and Natural Resources," Research Paper no. 106, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2011.

another. In recent years, they have been characterized as “ungoverned” or “ungovernable” spaces to highlight the fact that they are the breeding grounds for criminal activities and violent confrontations that have led to regional instabilities. These regions also confront the traditional security concerns of porous borders and border disputes that have wrought new forms of insecurities. The Horn of Africa, Central Africa, the Great Lakes region, and the Sahel illustrate well the security and governance dilemmas facing some of the core states that have been entangled in regional conflicts. Long before the Horn of Africa confronted threats from Islamic fundamentalist groups, the prevalence of marginal pastoral communities surviving in harsh environments and neglected by central governments had been a key source of perennial conflicts. For more than two decades, the disintegration of the Somali state has been the source of regional insecurity for Somalia and neighboring countries. Countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda have expended resources to contain the fragility that has come to characterize the Greater Horn of Africa. In Central Africa, governance problems have been the explanations for violent conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In turn, neighboring countries have been sucked into these conflicts.⁶³

Endemic conflicts in the vast Sahel predate the civil war in Mali and the emergence of Islamist movements such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM). The combination of large territories and sparse populations has always presented obstacles to the consolidation and stabilization of authorities by many of the states in the Sahel. The travails of state- and nation-building in the Sahel have been magnified by abundant natural resources, which ignite the involvement of diverse international actors and further strain the capacity of states to pacify these regions.

Ending Africa’s wars requires prioritizing these neighborhoods through rebuilding governance systems at national and regional levels. States need to address the grievances that propel dissidence

among marginal groups through negotiations and inclusive governance. Such engagements would reduce the necessity of militarization strategies that states have typically employed in these regions. Finding regional governance mechanisms that meet the problems of such neighborhoods poses some dilemmas: regional institutions are needed most in these areas because of the scale of conflicts, but by the same token, these conflicts prevent the evolution of stable institutions for managing conflicts. This explains why, despite attempts by local and international actors, regional institutions remain weak in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, the Great Lakes region, and the Sahel.

THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE MEANS OF VIOLENCE

Democratic governance entails civil-military relations that privilege civilian control of the military. In postconflict states in Africa, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and other security sector reforms have tried to redress the imbalance between civilian and military institutions. But in most of Africa, there has been an increase in the privatization of security, witnessed in the proliferation of security companies that, in some instances, have replaced legitimate state institutions in the provision of basic security. As states have abdicated the core functions of policing by ceding primary protective responsibilities to nonstate actors, they have made their societies more vulnerable and insecure. The privatization of security yields the militarization of societies, which is a major governance challenge.⁶⁴ Similarly, despite national and regional initiatives, the spread of small arms and light weapons remains a key factor in militarization that contributes to the escalation of crimes, while also strengthening the hands of actors that have little stake in peaceful approaches to managing conflicts. Silencing the guns involves diminishing the role of private actors in the security arena, or, at a minimum, reversing the situation where state institutions are increasingly being marginalized from the security realms.

63 Thean Potgieter and Clive Schofield, “Poverty, Poaching, and Pirates: Geopolitical Instability and Maritime Insecurity Off the Horn of Africa,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (2010): 86–112.

64 Željko Branović, “The Privatization of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment,” Occasional Paper no. 24, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, April 2011; and Rita Abrahamsen, ed., *Conflict and Security in Africa* (London: James Currey, 2013).

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES AND THREATS

Many African countries remain vulnerable to global actors and forces that exploit weak state and regional institutions to promote conflicts and plunder resources. As a result, transnational crimes have dire consequences for national and regional security, economic stability, and democratic institutions. Threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrimes are increasingly taxing Africa's scarce resources and undermining governance. The existence of large territories that have remained marginal to the centers of power in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghreb provides fertile grounds for anti-statist claims with links to international networks. Thus, the growth of terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram have tapped into transnational Islamist grievances and flourished in the circumstances of statelessness and marginality. In addition, these movements have succeeded in recruiting and radicalizing African youth who are marginalized within their own societies. With unprecedented youth unemployment in most African countries, radical movements have found fertile recruitment grounds. Meeting in Nairobi in August 2014, African security and intelligence chiefs urged African governments to urgently address the lack of employment among the youth to avoid their alarming recruitment into terror cells.⁶⁵

Piracy across Africa's eastern and western seaboard has emanated from the combination of weak states and the lack of credible maritime security policies. In the Horn of Africa, piracy was an outcome of the collapse of the Somali state, the growing youth unemployment in Somalia, and the economic opportunities furnished by the lucrative Indian Ocean trading routes. International policing efforts plus the gradual resuscitation of state authorities in Somalia have, in recent years, curtailed piracy. Nonetheless, regional maritime institutions are the long-term solutions to a problem that is only in abeyance.⁶⁶ For example, in

the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has coincided with the rise in economic crimes such as oil bunkering, underscoring the glaring weaknesses in maritime security. Although the increasing incidents of piracy have forced ECOWAS to accelerate initiatives to prioritize cooperation in maritime security, it will take a long time for these efforts to make a difference without better coordination of resources by multiple state actors. An effective response to counter maritime security threats requires human resources, technical resources, and coordinated systems.

Environmental crimes have traditionally received less attention in policy circles, even though they are a growing threat to African states and societies. Equally vital, they constitute a new source of exploitation in which transnational actors with superior technologies and resources collude with local actors to deprive indigenous communities of their access to traditional means of sustenance. Forest encroachments, illegal logging, over-fishing, bio-piracy, and poaching are some of the growing environmental crimes in Africa. On Africa's coastlines, the most prevalent environmental crimes relate to fishing by foreign companies that use illegal fishing methods, such as trawling, that lead to overfishing and environmental pollution. Bio-piracy occurs when technologically advanced firms use illegal means to engage in the commercial development of naturally occurring biological materials, such as plant substances or genetic cell lines, without compensating the communities where these materials are originally discovered. Although the poaching of animals has been part of environmental crimes, its escalation has been attributed to the increasing demand of products such as ivory and game meat in China and Asia.⁶⁷

Old and new transnational crimes have increased because of the intersection of weak governance systems and corruption in Africa. In circumstances of weak rule of law, criminal networks have infiltrated and co-opted political actors and intelligence agencies to profit from crimes. In some countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, the growing

65 "African Intelligence and Security Chiefs Raise Concerns about Youth Unemployment," *Daily Nation*, August 21, 2014. See also Jakkie Cilliers and Timothy Sisk, "Prospects for Africa's 26 Fragile Countries," African Futures Paper no. 8, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 2013.

66 Potgieter and Schofield, "Poverty, Poaching, and Pirates."

67 PricewaterhouseCoopers, *Global Economic Crime Survey 2014*, available at www.pwc.com/crimesurvey.

nexus between military institutions and transnational criminal organizations has contributed to political instability and undermined the building of democratic institutions. Corruption fuels transnational crimes, but states are not innocent as criminal agents build alliances with politicians, financial institutions, and security agencies to undermine democratic governance, free press, and judicial institutions.

Recent continental discussions about the creation of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights acknowledge the threats posed by transnational crimes. The proposed court is supposed to have jurisdiction over corruption, money laundering, human and drug trafficking, and piracy—in addition to war crimes and crimes against humanity. This broad jurisdiction is in recognition of the deep links that exist between conflict, corruption, terrorism, and other transnational crimes.⁶⁸

Opportunities for Silencing the Guns through Governance

Striving toward a conflict-free Africa is a clarion call inspired by the Africa Agenda 2063, which is Africa's long-term development vision, and the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which is the continent's medium-term development plan. Within the context of this two-pronged strategic vision of the AU, the opportunities and prospects for silencing the guns and ending all wars in Africa by 2020 lie in the resilience of African societies and states, the galvanization of national initiatives to build functional polities and economies, and a renewed commitment to employing collective energies in the service of regional and continental integration. Binding all these efforts together is governance, the array of institutions that channel the centrifugal disintegrative dynamics of violent contestations into centripetal, productive, purposeful, and integrative outcomes. Africa has surmounted the challenges of slavery, colonization, exploitation, neocolonialism, and imperialism. It has demonstrated a firm determination to craft free,

just, and open societies, by rejecting unconstitutional changes of government, human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities. And it has embraced continental unity, integration, peace, and stability, which are all necessary pre-conditions for sustained, inclusive, and equitable socioeconomic development. This section identifies some of the priority areas that African states and regional organizations need to focus on in their efforts to end conflicts.

ENHANCED STATE CAPACITY

As in the past, the vision for ending wars hinges on building capable states that fulfill basic governance requirements, notably inclusiveness and participation; accountability and transparency; the reduction of social and economic vulnerabilities; the mobilization of public resources for productive uses; the protection of civilians; common and cohesive national identities; and impartial and fair legal systems that guarantee equality, property rights, respect for human rights, youth empowerment, and women's empowerment and gender equality; and the constructive prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. Capable states derive legitimacy and acceptance from meeting these goals, but more critically, they strive to create sustainable institutions that can effectively respond to shocks, adversities, and future emergencies. This is why African states have embraced democratic governance as the foundation for political and economic institutions that also serve as preventive measures against conflicts and insecurities.

SECULAR AND TOLERANT STATES AND SOCIETIES

Secular state institutions are the antidotes to the extremism manifested in both Christian and Islamic fundamentalism throughout Africa. The decline of mainstream religious organizations coupled with despair arising from poverty and marginalization has consigned large parts of Africa to extremist traits that are compromising gains in nation-building, state-building, and democratic consolidation. But extremism goes beyond religion, captured in the increasing ethnic, racial, gender, and regional intolerance even in societies that had previously made phenomenal efforts in building national cohesion. Tolerance is the glue

⁶⁸ Don Deya, "Is the African Court Worth the Wait?" Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, March 6, 2012; and Sonya Sceats, "Africa's New Human Rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?" Briefing Paper, London, Chatham House, March 2009.

that binds nations and allows for strength to be derived from diversity and difference.

The agenda of ending wars is inextricably tied to reviving forms of national and regional identities that abjure fundamentalism of all forms, bigotry, narrow-mindedness, and all forms of discrimination. And intolerance needs to be addressed through deliberate political and economic processes: the polarization stemming from contested elections, the skewed allocation of public services, and corruption-infected national resource governance systems all sprout the political economy of intolerance. The crass materialism and opulence that minorities display amid the hunger and squalor of the majority also fuels intolerance. Democratic governance has the potential to revive Africa's traditions of tolerance and accommodation by offering economic and political opportunities and heightening the processes for fair allocation of public services and equitable distribution of natural resources. Spreading the economic gains of a "rising Africa" more evenly through improved infrastructure, investment in agriculture, and access to education will eliminate the structures of extremism and intolerance. Ultimately, nation-building to end wars will require a legitimate political order based on consensus about national identity, agreement about the boundaries of the political community, and collective mobilization of national priorities.

JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Fighting impunity is a priority of the AU, and its member states have pledged to end the legacy of widespread abuses of power by individuals. The old OAU doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of member states has been replaced by the new doctrine of non-indifference to mass abuses of human and peoples' rights within member states. These efforts coincide with new international norms and strictures that are giving prominence to ending mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Since impunity is the absence of accountability, the focus on democratic governance throughout Africa recognizes that states, societies, and communities can recover from wars by building creative mechanisms that prevent its recurrence. The national, regional, and continental commitments to end impunity mark a significant phase in Africa's democratic renewal. As governance systems in postconflict societies are

reconstructed, questions of ending impunity; encouraging accountability; promoting reconciliation, national healing, and social harmony; punishing perpetrators; compensating victims of mass atrocities; and ensuring justice are all part of initiatives that should contribute to silencing the guns in Africa.

DEMILITARIZATION OF POLITICS

The militarization of politics is in direct contrast to democratic governance and occurs partly where political parties and movements in some countries have developed strong ties with military institutions. This conflation of the state, party, and military institutions impedes democratization and reduces military professionalism. Unresolved conflicts and the upsurge of criminality such as terrorism have invariably forced governments to increase the scope of military engagement in domestic politics to the detriment of democratic governance.

Ending wars and silencing the guns in Africa is about the demilitarization of politics, redefining civil-military relations to ones where civilian authorities play disproportionately larger roles while militaries remain as the core defenders of the state from external threats. In some cases, demilitarization may remove the opportunistic mobilization of militaries by political elites in attempts to frustrate democratic governance, a practice that has become common in recent years. In the past, militarization of politics has frequently led to civil wars, particularly where power and resources are concentrated among ruling elites and groups. For example, in the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, the militarization of conflicts within the leading movements has contributed to conflict escalation, diminishing the role of a negotiated political settlement. Military professionalism and stable civil-military relations are some of the ways that permit recourse to governance for conflict prevention and management.

REGIONAL DISARMAMENT

African regions confront unsustainable arms races that have decreased security. There needs to be imaginative thinking on reducing military spending throughout Africa with funds reoriented toward expenditures in education, health care, employment, and strengthening of the rule of law and administration of justice. Typically, military

expenditures consume up to 40 percent of national budgets, and these resources should be channeled into investment in efforts to prevent and manage conflict. Regional disarmament could be accompanied by efforts to build regional military arrangements within regional economic communities, along the lines of those contemplated by the AU's peacekeeping African Standby Force that can meet some of the security threats such as terrorism and transnational crimes. But disarmament as the start of the demilitarization of regional politics cannot succeed without strengthening regional mechanisms of democratic governance and common visions for peace, security, and development.

FROM NORM-SETTING TO CONSOLIDATION AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Arguably, the OAU and AU have developed a robust normative framework for silencing guns and ending wars on the continent over the last fifty-one years. The regional components of silencing guns by 2020 may not require development of new norms. Rather, efforts to end wars and silence guns will largely depend on reinvigorating regional and continental institutions supported by shared values, norms, and policy convergence on governance. Africa's common continental commitment to democratic governance has flourished over the last two decades, expressed in various instruments and declarations. New efforts are needed to guarantee that these instruments contribute to institutional regeneration through ratifications, domestication, and implementation. The broad articulation of these norms has invariably formed a large body of common African knowledge and experiences that have been encapsulated within the AU shared values agenda. In addition, the establishment of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) are visible blueprints and policy approaches that are starting to lend steady institutional standing to these principles. Finding stronger and functional synergies between AGA and APSA, however, remains an ongoing exercise that requires further elaboration and thinking. To end wars, these architectures will need to work together to develop common programs, shared visions, and mutually reinforcing strategies.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Silencing the guns is the collective enterprise of African actors and institutions, supported by international players who have a role in these objectives. Collective efforts underscore the enormity of the task, but they also reinforce the shared nature of these goals. An integrated, united, peaceful, and prosperous Africa, driven by its own citizens and playing a dynamic role in the global arena is essential to the promotion of global security and prosperity. This report has acknowledged that ending conflicts is not a linear process; equally vital, it has contended that building institutions for democratic governance is a difficult and contested process that often responds to distinctive national needs, priorities, and obstacles. Nonetheless, Africa has accumulated a wealth of experiences and practices on how to leverage governance for conflict resolution that should be instructive for ending wars. For this reason, the report calls upon various actors and institutions to play their respective roles in contributing to the urgent task of silencing the guns.

1. African States and Governments

Silencing the guns and promoting good governance is the responsibility of governments and states that prioritize people's participation in political and economic processes, promote sound and equitable livelihoods, and reduce violence at all levels of society. Governments must remember that there are many normative governance frameworks at the regional and continental levels that they have signed. Governments should take urgent measures to domesticate these frameworks in national laws and institutions. Those that have not signed these measures should do so before 2020 as a demonstration of their determination to contribute to the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration adopted by African leaders in May 2013. African states and governments, working closely with their citizens, must prioritize the establishment and effective functioning of national infrastructures for peace that allow early detection, prevention, management, and resolution of violent conflicts, at all levels of the nation-state. These national peace architectures are essential if Africa is to play a key role in resolving Africa's problems. This is where

Africa-specific and locally responsive methodologies and culturally embedded strategies for conflict transformation, such as the *gacaca* community courts in Rwanda, the *ubuntu* system in South Africa, and the *mato oput* ceremony in northern Uganda become extremely useful, and these should be strengthened and reinforced.

2. Regional Economic Communities


Regional economic communities are the building blocks of the AU. They are also a critical bridge between the AU and its member states. Thus, efforts to silence guns by member states and the AU may not achieve many results if they are not complemented by the efforts of the regional economic communities. The future of a democratic and peaceful Africa lies in solid regional economic communities that are taking gradual steps to build the African Economic Community. In specific efforts to silence guns and end wars by 2020, regional economic communities should consolidate their current efforts to implement regional collective security and governance frameworks that promote peace, enshrine common democratic values, and foster disarmament and military reductions consistent with regional resources, such as the ones existing in ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS, and others. The gap between norm-setting and implementation must be bridged.

3. The African Union

The AU has established elaborate normative frameworks around governance, conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In ending wars and working toward Agenda 2063, the AU should step up efforts to push more vigorously for the implementation of these normative frameworks. As stated above, the relationship between the APSA and AGA need to be markedly improved and scaled up to build synergies between the objectives of ending wars and building a peaceful Africa. Enhanced crossover between these two frameworks must be bolstered to demonstrate the institutional will to provide leadership on African governance that is essential to silencing guns.

4. The International Community

Few African countries manufacture guns. Efforts to end wars, therefore, need the support of the international community in cutting the sources of armaments that have fueled African wars. The international community has a responsibility to renew attempts to clamp down on unsustainable arms flows into Africa. Africans have raised their voices regarding arms and conflict entrepreneurs at many international fora. The international community, through its diverse institutions, should make a commitment to ending Africa's wars by 2020 by placing a moratorium on arms flows to Africa.



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777 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017-3521
USA
TEL +1-212-687-4300
FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3
1010 Vienna
Austria
TEL +43-1-533-8881
FAX +43-1-533-881-11

51-52 Harbour House
Bahrain Financial Harbour
P.O. Box 1467
Manama, Bahrain
TEL +973-1721-1344