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# Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peace- building Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325

Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland



**NUPI Report**  
[Report no. 2, 2016]

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Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs  
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ISSN: 1894-650X

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Published by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

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# Summary

In 2015, three reviews in the field of Peace and Security were undertaken: the UN peace operations review, the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the review of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325. These reviews reflect the acknowledgement that the changing dynamics of conflict in the world necessitates a revision of the UN's tools in order for the organisation to maintain its relevance and ability to meet these challenges.

This report presents the key recommendations as well as common themes across the reviews. The common themes are: the changing nature of conflict; the importance of the women, peace and security agenda for the UN's work; the primacy of prevention and the need for a long-term focus; the necessity to shift towards people-centred, inclusive processes; the primacy of politics; the need for field focus and context awareness; the privileging of the military response to violent conflict is counterproductive; partnership with other actors is important; leadership and professionalisation of the UN is needed; and a call for stronger UN system coherence.

We end by offering some recommendations to the current and next UN Secretary-General:

What can the current Secretary-General do:

- Ensure that the three reviews are viewed together to ensure synergy and coherence.
- Implement the lower-hanging fruits and short-term suggestions to ensure quick wins.
- Keep up the momentum of the processes. Keep them on the agenda for the new Secretary-General without making too much of his own mark on processes that cannot be concluded.
- Push for a merit-based approach regarding the selection of a new Secretary-General.

An agenda for a new Secretary-General:

- Reorganising the Secretariat to allow for a geographical approach instead of the current siloed one.
- Changing the funding model to ensure that funding is more equally spread and more predictable. Much more funding is required for women, peace and security related activities. The

assessed contributions model must change so that there is not an automatic peacekeeping response.

- Increasing female participation on all levels including leadership is essential.
- Modernising the Secretariat and transform it into a truly international civil service.
- In order to succeed better at prevention, consider strengthening the analysis and planning capacity of the Secretariat.

The world is changing and United Nations peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 31 October 2015, announcing the establishment of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

# Introduction

2015 represented an important year for the United Nations (UN): 70 years had passed since the signing of the UN Charter; 15 years since the so-called Brahimi Report on Peace Operations was launched; and 15 years since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) was adopted.<sup>2</sup> The same year also marked the tenth anniversary of the World Summit Outcome Document, which contained several important reforms of the organisation, including the establishment of the UN peacebuilding architecture.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, 2015 was also the year in which three review reports in the field of UN peace and security were published – the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, and the Global Study report on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. These reviews were themselves a reflection of a growing recognition of the continued challenges faced by the UN in the wake of the ever changing dynamics of conflict and the resulting realisation that the Organisation’s prescribed tools are not fit for purpose.

This policy report explores the aforementioned trio of reports and the review processes of which they are products: the UN peace operations review, the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the review of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325.<sup>4</sup> Key recommendations and challenges are identified, as well as common themes between the reviews, such as: institutional/organisational challenges (the need for greater coherence within the UN); a focus on political solutions (avoiding military remedies); the necessity of building stronger partnerships; as well as the imperative of adopting a people-centered, inclusive approach (incorporating, inter alia, a strong gender dimension), which is tailored to each individual case. We end the report with a list of recommendations to the current and forthcoming Secretary-General.

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<sup>2</sup> The original name of the Brahimi Report was the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Panel was chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria.

<sup>3</sup> The decision to create a UN peacebuilding architecture was made at the 2005 UN World Summit (see, the World Summit Outcome Document, A/RES/60/1), and the architecture was established by concurrent General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) and Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/1645) in December 2005.

<sup>4</sup> The policy brief is to a large extent based upon the seminar titled *UN70: Peace and Security*, held at NUPI on 26 October 2015. This was the first seminar out of three in the UN70 seminar series, co-organised by NUPI and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in connection to the [UN70: A new Agenda project](#).



# The Three Review Processes

## The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

### Background

The Brahimi Report (2000) had a significant impact on the evolution of peace operations in the decade following its publication. It introduced a number of key lessons into peacekeeping policy, for instance that the secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear; that the UN should not deploy peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep; and that mandates would have to be matched with the requisite resources.

In 2008 the UN published a comprehensive document, the so-called 'Capstone Doctrine', outlining principles and guidelines for its peacekeeping operations. This was based largely on the existing principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and limited use of force. It also enshrined recommendations of the Brahimi Report as well as lessons drawn from more recent peacekeeping experience. However, half a decade later it was acknowledged that there is an emerging gap between the established UN peacekeeping doctrine and many of the current missions that take place amidst on-going conflicts, revealing the limitations of the doctrine in confronting the increasingly complex conflicts of the contemporary world.<sup>5</sup>

Hence, on 31 October 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the establishment of the 17-member High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which was to be chaired by President Jose Ramos-Horta of Timor-Leste.<sup>6</sup> After a six-month extensive consultation process, the Panel presented its report on 16 June 2015<sup>7</sup> and the

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<sup>5</sup> Peter, Mateja (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*: July-September 2015, 21(3), pp. 351-370; Karslrud, John (2015) The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), pp. 40-54

<sup>6</sup> The panel consisted of the following persons (in addition to Ramos-Horta): Jean Arnault, Marie-Louise Baricako, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Abhijit Guha, Andrew Hughes, Alexander Ilitchev, Hilde F. Johnson, Youssef Mahmoud, Ian Martin, Henrietta Joy Abena Nyarko Mensa-Bonsu, B. Lynn Pascoe, Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Rima Salah and Wang Xuexian. Bruce Jones was originally appointed but withdrew.

<sup>7</sup> The Peace Operations report:  
[http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)

UN Secretary General presented his implementation report on 2 September 2015.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the perceived need to reform peace operations in order for them to fit and address contemporary challenges to peace and security, the need to contribute to a consensus concerning the use of force in peace operations and the need to strengthen the UN's credibility amongst the people directly affected by the operations, were also underlying aspirations of the review process. It was believed that for the UN to last another 70 years change is imperative.

### **Key Recommendations**

The key recommendations made in the HIPPO report constitute four shifts in the way the UN thinks and acts in connection to peace operations.

The first shift is that *politics needs to drive the type of intervention that is chosen in each case*. In other words, there is a need to move away from the template-driven deployment of nearly identical multi-dimensional peace operations into conflict areas, with very little concern for the specific circumstances of each case.

The particular political situation of the country or area into which the UN is to deploy must form the starting point for planning and configuration of peace operations. What type of intervention is needed to solve the conflict and sustain peace in each circumstance? It is not always necessary or helpful to deploy thousands of troops. Sometimes a much lighter and fine-tuned response could be more relevant and effective. The report envisages a spectrum of responses, from light teams of country experts as a preventive measure in emerging conflicts, to operations with a different political set-up than the current one when crises have exploded, and continued political presence after the peace operation has left the country in addition to a development-focused country team. Light teams can thus also play a role in the aftermath of conflict in order to prevent relapse.

Moreover, the report suggests the scale-up of peace and development advisors in the UN country teams, which may prove critical for analysing what is needed politically and for alerting headquarters.<sup>9</sup> Linked to the thinking around which type of intervention is required is the issue of exit strategy. Future operations must be based on clear formulations of what constitute success or sufficient change for the UN to scale-down or withdraw its presence in the particular case. This

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<sup>8</sup> The UNSG implementation report:

[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/357](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/357).

<sup>9</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, para 75.

requires more reflection on when and how peace can be sustained without outside assistance.

The current funding system is not tailored to privilege the political aspect of UN interventions. Political missions are not funded by the assessed contributions – only peacekeeping missions are. There has therefore been a need to secure ad-hoc funding from supportive donors for such initiatives. A new system, which secures predictable funding, is therefore a prerequisite for this suggested shift.

The second proposed shift is towards the *flexible use of peace operations to respond to changes on the ground*. In order to achieve such flexibility there is a need to change the mandate design-system, so that the mandate process becomes sequenced and adaptive to the context on the ground. By introducing a two-step process one avoids the problems that result from a rushed mandate, which is not fit for purpose. The pressure to do something visible and fast when a crisis erupts may motivate the deployment of a large amount of blue helmets, even if that is not the right response to the problem at hand. And due to path dependency the mistakes made at the outset tend to haunt the mission for its duration.

A two-stage mandate process, in which there is an initial interim deployment for the first six months (stage one), makes time for a solid analysis of the conflict dynamics and a thorough assessment of logistical and other needs, before an appropriately calibrated mission is deployed at the second stage – be it a light team focusing on a political problem or a multi-dimensional operation. The interim deployment would be aimed at stabilising the situation and could be done in partnership with, for example, the African Union (AU). In such circumstances, the UN would fund the AU operation. This approach would also allow time to ensure ownership by the host country through the drafting of a compact between it and the UN. Moreover, it would allow time for consultations with the troop contributing countries, which is often not the case under the current system.

This takes us to the third shift, namely towards *building stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnerships*. As argued in the report, there is presently a considerable challenge connected to the division of labour that has evolved over time whereby some member states tend to fund operations and some contribute the troops. This has caused tension between the two categories of member states. There is also friction between the Security Council and the troop contributing countries, as the former are seen to be pushing for operations that the troop contributors feel are too high-risk. Additionally, the legitimacy and the faith in the success of a mission may be harmed due to lack of P5 troop contributions.

UN peace operations are nowadays mostly deployed into areas where there is no peace to keep. More work is therefore needed on deciding how and when to use force. The report says in very explicit terms that the panel believes that UN peacekeeping missions are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations.<sup>10</sup> The report offers a list of seven considerations in this regard.<sup>11</sup> When it comes to protection of civilians, the report is adamant that the UN has to deliver proactively and robustly. However, capabilities and resources need to be matched with the mandate in order to do so. Current operations are under-resourced for this purpose and often ill-fitted to geographical and climatic conditions as well as to logistical requirements.

The fourth shift towards *people oriented and field focused operations*, requires serious reforms. With the hasty deployment of big interventions, people in the recipient societies often feel that the peace operations are not there for their benefit.<sup>12</sup> It is therefore recommended that more consultative processes are put in place, in which UN staff, mission leadership etc. consult with the host society, not only on a governmental level, but on a much broader societal level, ensuring the active involvement of a diverse set of actors from the grassroots up.<sup>13</sup> This requires a change of mind-set as well as a change to the system.

In order to contribute to sustaining peace the UN has to move away from the state-centric, blueprint-focused and technically oriented approach. A field- and people-oriented approach is needed.

There is also a need to bring the field-oriented nature of UN peace operations into recruitment processes. The current system for recruitment, it is argued, was developed for appointing people to headquarters in New York and Geneva, and is not suitable for recruiting thousands of people to work in the field. It is too time consuming and complicated, and thus slows down the process to a detrimental degree. It is also not geared towards identifying the right person for the job in terms of relevant expertise, but emphasises instead rank and hierarchy. A shift towards field-oriented recruitment also has consequences for

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<sup>10</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, para 119.

<sup>11</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, para 116.

<sup>12</sup> de Coning, Cedric (2013) Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local. *Stability*, 2(1): 6, pp. 1-6, Jennings, Kathleen M. & Morten Bøås (2015) Transactions and Interactions: Everyday Life in the Peacekeeping Economy, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 9(3), 281-295.

<sup>13</sup> See also, de Coning, C. Karlsrud, J & Troost, P. 2015. Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations: From 'Extension of State Authority' to 'Strengthening Inclusive State-Society Relations'. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 4(1): 49, pp. 1-13.

the structure of the secretariat. The report suggests moving the responsibility for recruitment for field positions to the Department of Field Support.

Let us now take a closer look at the recommendations made in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the Peace Building Architecture.

## **The Review of the UN Peace Building Architecture<sup>14</sup>**

### **Background**

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was established in 2005 and consists of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).<sup>15</sup> In line with the provisions in the founding resolutions,<sup>16</sup> the PBA was reviewed five years after its establishment. The recommendations of that review did not, however, have a significant impact. This was perhaps due to the design of the process, with its fairly narrow participation. The 10-year review, which is the topic for this paper, was designed with a view to ensuring broad participation. There was a consultative process amongst the members of the PBC in order to establish the review's terms of reference. The review itself consists of a two-stage process with broad consultations with different constituencies at both stages: First, an Advisory Group of Experts, consisting of seven persons appointed by the Secretary-General, produced a report with recommendations, based on research and analysis of a large amount of background material as well as consultations with various stakeholders and civil society actors.<sup>17</sup> Their report was presented on 29 June 2015. The second stage, which is still on-going, consists of an intergovernmental process lead by Australia and Angola. This will consider the recommendations made by the AGE and will probably lead to a resolution in March 2016 when Angola chairs the Security Council.<sup>18</sup>

The scope of the 10-year review is not only the institutions established in 2005 – the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO. Rather, the Peacebuilding Architecture is understood in broader terms as also including

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<sup>14</sup> The Peacebuilding Architecture report:

<http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/issues/psc/PBCReport.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> The PBA was established by concurrent General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) and Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/1645) in December 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Para 27.

<sup>17</sup> This group consisted of the following experts: Anis Bajwa, Saraswathi Menon, Funmi Olonisakin, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Charles Petrie, Gert Rosenthal and Edith Grace Ssempala.

<sup>18</sup> For an overview of Security Council Presidency, see:

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/presidency/>

the wider system for UN peacebuilding.<sup>19</sup> This is based on the acknowledgement that:

the shortcomings in efforts to fill “the gaping hole” in the UN’s institutional machinery for building peace are systemic in nature. They result from a generalized misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding, and, even more, from the fragmentation of the UN into separate “silos”.<sup>20</sup>

### Key Recommendations

The starting point for the assessment of the PBA is the changing global context for conflict and peacebuilding, in which more complex, fragmented and increasingly intractable civil conflicts are on the rise. The drivers of violence both new and longstanding, put demands on the UN to rethink the way it seeks to move beyond conflict. The UN has been slow to adapt to the changing nature of conflict, largely due to the way the UN system is set up, with its organisational and bureaucratic constraints. The prioritising of peacekeeping in the funding system means that the organisation has been weak on peacebuilding and preventive measures. It has tended to deal with the symptoms, not the root causes of conflict. Moreover, the large UN peacekeeping operations consume so many resources that there has not been enough time and energy dedicated to other peacebuilding responses. The AGE report therefore suggests two shifts in thinking and action.

The first is a shift away from a narrow understanding of peacebuilding, where the aim is to avoid a relapse into violent conflict, to an understanding that entails *sustaining peace*. In this way one leaves behind the predominantly post-conflict focus of peacebuilding, and understands it as a more comprehensive enterprise where also prevention – controversial as it is due to perceived interventionism – is included. It is argued that the separation between preventive and post-conflict measures is artificial, since many of the tools and resources required are similar.<sup>21</sup> By introducing the concept of sustaining peace, the AGE also links peacebuilding to the current thinking around development, as the Sustainable Development Goal 16 focuses on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies in order to achieve sustained levels of peace.<sup>22</sup> While the importance of building resilient institutions is highlighted in the report, the political nature of peacebuilding is emphasised:

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<sup>19</sup> In this way it could be viewed as a conceptual review of how we define peacebuilding, as well.

<sup>20</sup> *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, paragraph 26.

<sup>22</sup> See <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-16.html>.

While capacity building, state building, institution building and development all demand considerable technical expertise, first and foremost peacebuilding must be understood as an inherently political process.<sup>23</sup>

With this shift, the set of responses that have hitherto been seen as belonging to different stages of the conflict life cycle – prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding<sup>24</sup> – would be integrated into one concept that would unite the peace and security, human rights and development pillars of the UN. It would represent a new conceptual development, which would necessitate a radical change in how the UN goes about its business. It would demand an end to the siloed responses where different department, agencies and funds specialise in particular areas and may work in conflict with each other. In relation to this it is envisaged that the PBC could act as a bridge between the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. This necessitates a deepened commitment from the Security Council, in particular. It should regularly request and draw upon advice from the PBC, and consider passing on countries on its agenda to the PBC when peace consolidation has sufficiently progressed. A strengthened and upgraded PBSO is also seen as necessary.

The report underscores the importance of realistic timelines for the success of UN peace operations, other peacebuilding engagements and development assistance. A preoccupation with the cessation of hostilities, hurried peace agreements, and the hasty execution of mandates that prioritise elections has proven to be counterproductive. Instead the focus must be on addressing the root causes of the conflict,<sup>25</sup> *inter alia* through national dialogue processes, and building legitimate and resilient institutions. This takes a long time – often a generation.<sup>26</sup> A new mind-set, acceptance and patience, is therefore required. Part of this is also an attention to, and management of, the transition between different forms of UN engagement. The continuity of leadership when the nature of the engagement changes (for example, from a UN country team to a mission or *vice versa*), is seen as critical in order to move away from siloed responses.

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, paragraph 7.

<sup>24</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) was instrumental in this understanding. Note, however, that his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995), published three years later, argued for a more comprehensive understanding. Such an understanding was also acknowledged by the Security Council in January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/5, 20 February 2001). Nevertheless, the Security Council's agenda item continues to be labelled 'post-conflict peacebuilding'.

<sup>25</sup> On this, see also Cedric de Coning & Eli Stamnes, *UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The First 10 Years* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

<sup>26</sup> *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 30.

The second shift proposed in the AGE report is one towards a focus on *fostering inclusive national ownership*. National ownership has traditionally been taken to mean the acceptance by, or inclusion of, the national government in decisions related to the peacebuilding process in order to avoid charges of imposing measures from the outside. Governments, however, can be authoritarian and are often not representative of the whole society in conflict-ridden states. Therefore, the AGE report argues for inclusive national ownership, involving a broad range of actors, such as political opposition, labour organisations, political parties, civil society and minorities in addition to the government. The inclusion of women and youth is emphasised in this context. Whereas peace processes so far have tended to privilege the belligerent parties, an inclusive process would bring in grass root actors who are engaged in peacebuilding activities and other peaceful agents for positive change. The constructive role women can play in ending violence and sustaining peace is highlighted here.

The AGE report emphasises that peace cannot be imposed from the outside. A real inclusive process would ensure that the responsibility for the efforts to sustain peace is shared by all key social strata and divides of the society itself. The UN's role would therefore be to enable a variety of actors to play their role, not to act in their place.

The UN must also work in partnership with outside actors. The challenge of sustaining peace requires the involvement of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as regional and sub-regional organisations, e.g. the African Union. The AGE report recommends closer strategic and operational partnerships with these actors, emphasising that this should be prioritised.

The need for more predictable funding for peacebuilding is highlighted. In addition to the pooling of funding with international financial institutions and other multilateral and bilateral donors, the report also argues for a change in the UN funding system. The PBF, perhaps the most successful element of the PBA, should be enabled to play to its comparative advantage as a rapid, impactful, procedurally light, risk-taking investor by receiving 1% of the UN's assessed contributions or 100 million US dollars (whichever is higher) annually. Moreover, it is suggested that the assessed contributions are also used for the programmatic dimensions of peace operations mandates.

Let us now turn to the third review discussed here, the Global Study on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.



## The Review of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325

### Background

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) was passed in 2000 as the culmination of a process set in motion by women's NGOs and the backing of supportive member states. It was partly a response to a decade of peacekeeping failures in Africa and the Balkans, which had underlined the limitations of UN operations in dealing with widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

The resolution represented a historic landmark in that it made gender a matter of international peace and security, acknowledged the differential effects of armed conflicts on men and women, and addressed the lack of inclusion of women in broader peacebuilding efforts. After SCR 1325, six additional resolutions on various aspects of this topic followed in its wake.<sup>27</sup> All these resolutions are the subject of the review process, which was initiated by Security Council resolution 2122.<sup>28</sup> This resolution invited the Secretary-General to commission a global study and convene a high-level panel to assess the progress in implementing SCR 1325 on the international, regional and national levels.<sup>29</sup> The ten-year review, conducted in 2010, had found the implementation to be very weak, uneven and under-resourced, and in SCR 2122 the Security Council remained

deeply concerned about persistent implementation deficits in the women, peace and security agenda, including in: protection from human rights abuses and violations; opportunities for women to exercise leadership; resources provided to address their needs and which will help them exercise their rights; and the capacities and commitment of all actors involved in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions to advance women's participation and protection.<sup>30</sup>

The subsequent Global study was led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict and former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. A High-level advisory group of 17 experts was appointed to provide guidance for the study and to provide feedback on its policy recommendations.<sup>31</sup> Extensive consultations

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<sup>27</sup> Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1969, 2106, 2122. In October 2015 resolution 2242 was passed. This was in part based on the findings and recommendations of the Global Study.

<sup>28</sup> S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013.

<sup>29</sup> S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013, para. 16.

<sup>30</sup> S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013, preamble, pp. 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> In addition to Coomaraswamy, the panel consisted of Patrick Cammaert, Anwarul Chowdhury, Liliana Andrea Silva Bello, Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, Leymah Gbowee, Julia Kharashvili, Youssef Mahmoud, Luz Mendez, Alaa Murabit, Ruth Ochieng,

were held with diverse groups of stakeholders and focus groups; country visits were conducted in addition to commissioned research, an online portal for exchanging views, and a civil society survey. The resulting 480 page long report, the *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, launched 14 October 2015, highlights good practice, gaps, emergent threats and challenges.

The report is very comprehensive in scope and offers concrete recommendations after each chapter as well as a set of general recommendations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all chapters in depth. The key recommendations are, however, outlined below.

### Key Recommendations

The findings of the Global Study demonstrate the substantial challenges that remain in implementing SCR 1325. There have, for instance, been very few prosecutions in connection to sexual violence in conflict.<sup>32</sup> Despite the existence of a strong normative framework, little has changed on the ground.<sup>33</sup> There are also persistent challenges with regard to the implementation of 1325 in the fields of peacemaking and peacekeeping. According to the report, the rates of women's participation in formal peace processes are very low (9% in 2010), albeit slowly rising. In peace operations, only 3% of military staff are women, and most of them work as support staff. Only 28% of UN member states have national action plans for implementation of 1325, and these are process-oriented rather than focusing on concrete measurable outputs.<sup>34</sup> Very rarely there are actual budgetary allocations for its implementation, and there are few accountability mechanisms in place.

The new and emergent challenges in world politics have not made the situation any easier. The rise of violent extremism, which is given much importance in the report, threatens women's lives and leads to a cycle of militarisation of societies. Militarisation has been proven to have an adverse effect on women's security. It also put women peacebuilders in an ambivalent position as the rise of violent extremism in their societies means that they are working in increasingly dangerous

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Pramila Patten, Bandana Rana, Madeleine Rees, Elisabeth Rehn, Igballe Rogova and Yasmin Sooka. Maha Abu Dayyeh served as a member until her passing on 9 January 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Skjelsbæk, Inger (2012) Responsibility to Protect or Prevent? Victims and Perpetrators of Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts, *Global Responsibility to Protect* 4(2): pp. 154–171.

<sup>33</sup> Tryggestad, Torunn L. (2009) Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, *Global Governance* 15(4): pp. 539–557; Tryggestad, Torunn L. (2014) International Norms and Political Change: 'Women, Peace and Security' and the UN Security Agenda. PhD thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo.

<sup>34</sup> *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, p. 15.

environments while counter-terrorism policies place restraints on their work and restrict their access to critical funds and resources”.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, despite considerable rhetorical support for the women, peace and security agenda and the norms established, not much has changed in terms of the abysmally poor funding situation – only 2% of peace and security funding and 6% of bilateral aid goes to addressing gender issues.

Based on the findings, the Global Study report offers ten recommendations:<sup>36</sup>

1. No to militarisation, yes to prevention. All other means must be exhausted before resorting to military force.
2. The women, peace and security agenda must be respected as a human rights mandate. The agenda should never be ‘securitised’. Women’s agency must be respected, and their autonomy prioritised.
3. Mediators of peace processes and leadership of UN field missions must be proactive with regard to women’s participation. Such participation makes peace sustainable.
4. Perpetrators must be punished and justice must be transformative. Impunity must come to an end and various reconciliation efforts are important after intense warfare.
5. Localisation of peacebuilding programmes must involve women at every level and be supplemented by a comprehensive security plan to protect women and girls in the aftermath of conflict. Peacebuilding processes must respect the local context and women’s participation is crucial for them to be sustainable. Without a Rule of Law system violence against women intensifies.
6. Funding women peacebuilders and respecting their autonomy is one important way of countering extremism. There is a correlation between women’s rights and a lack of extremism in society. Women peacebuilders have a better understanding of local realities and expectations and are thus best equipped to fight for their rights.

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<sup>35</sup> *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, p 224.

<sup>36</sup> *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 394-396.

7. All key actors must play their role. Member states, regional organisations, media, civil society and youth must all do their part to promote and implement the women, peace and security agenda.
8. It is crucial to move towards a well-informed Security Council that applies a gender lens to all issues that come before it. An informal expert group should be created in order to sustain the attention to the women, peace and security agenda.
9. Across the board, 15% of all peace and security funding should be earmarked for programmes impacting women. There is a need to address the persistent failure to adequately fund the women, peace and security agenda.
10. It is necessary to build a stronger gender architecture at the United Nations. The women, peace and security agenda should be made a priority in the field and at headquarters, through a variety of measures.

The report ends with a call to action. Women play important roles as peacemakers and peacebuilders, but are often rendered invisible and unnoticed. Attention must therefore be turned to these crucial women, to the support and funding of their efforts, so that they can develop and build upon existing local, regional and international networks in order to stem militarisation and mindless violence.

# Coherence between the Reports

## Introduction

In terms of the process leading up to the reports, there are differences in the working methods of each review. However, one important similarity is that the work of all three included substantial consultations with a variety of actors, albeit to varying degrees. This is an important signal for similar processes in the future, and reflects the value put on broad consultation in all three reports.

The HIPPO report, the AGE report and the Global Study report are all bold in the sense that they make recommendations aiming to change the UN system in fairly radical ways. However, one could also argue that on some points, they are far from radical. They are simply aiming to narrow the gap between policy and practice so the UN can be better equipped to deal with current challenges.

In order to avoid discrepancies becoming excuses for rejecting change, it has been seen as important that the three processes work in harness together and in particular that there are no contradictions between the recommendations made in each of the reviews. An awareness of this has been evident throughout the processes, in that there have been consultations between the HIPPO and the AGE; members of each panel have been present in common consultations; and through the appointment of Radhika Coomaraswamy and Youssef Mahmoud to both the HIPPO and the Global Study panels.

However, in order to gather institutional and member state support for the proposed changes, it is also important not to give the impression to the member states that the three reviews constitute a take-it-or-leave-it package. As such, one should not underestimate the importance of letting the different committees and member states go through the various recommendations and pick some low-hanging fruits.

The fact that the three reviews follow different tracks and are to be implemented by different institutions may reinforce this. Nevertheless, this very same fact also highlights the siloes that are so characteristic of the UN. In order to seek to mitigate this, the Office of the President of the General Assembly has taken the initiative of organising a high-level thematic debate of the General Assembly in May 2016, providing a platform to reflect on ways to draw out synergies from these three reviews. Ahead of the meeting, a series of consultations will be conducted, seeking to identify key common themes and set a future reform agenda.

## Common themes across the reports

When it comes to the substantive coherence between the reports, the following themes are highlighted in all of them:

### The changing nature of conflict

The changing global context for conflict and peacebuilding forms the backdrop for all the reports.<sup>37</sup> This includes the rise of violent extremism, sexual targeting of women and children, challenges arising from transnational networks fostering illicit trade, weapons proliferation, etc. The implications of the changing nature of conflict for the civilian population, including women and girls, are highlighted, together with the need for the UN to change its modus operandi in order to address these changes.

### The importance of the women, peace and security agenda for the UN's work

Both the HIPPO report and the AGE report deal with SCR 1325 at length.<sup>38</sup> The particular impact on, and needs of women and girls in violent conflict are highlighted, so also the need for increased female participation at all levels, including leadership. HIPPO and the Global Study emphasises the need to mainstream gender sensitive analyses into the UN's work. Gender expertise at headquarters and in the field is addressed in both the HIPPO report and the Global Study, while the AGE echoes the Global Study in proposing the 15% 'gender marker' for funding of gender equality measures.<sup>39</sup> Finally, there is also agreement between all three reports, that women's involvement is crucial for sustaining peace.

### The primacy of prevention and the need for a long-term focus

Prevention is a controversial issue amongst UN member states, as some fear that it can be used as a pretext for undue involvement in their internal affairs. Nevertheless, the HIPPO report, the AGE report and the Global Study all argue that prevention must be prioritised in order to build lasting peace.<sup>40</sup> The HIPPO report shows that a preventive

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<sup>37</sup> *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 20-21; A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 7-16; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, paras 10-21.

<sup>38</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 192-193; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, paras 51-56, 77-82.

<sup>39</sup> Para 81.

<sup>40</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 62-81; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory

response may only require a light form of intervention, and the AGE reports makes the case for doing away with the idea of a conflict life cycle in which preventive measures are restricted to the pre-conflict phase. According to the AGE, with a focus on sustaining peace, a preventive mind-set is central, uniting the peace and security, human rights and development pillars of the UN. The Global study on its part, sees prevention as a way of avoiding militarisation, and argues that military means should only be used as a last resort.

### **Shifting towards people-centred, inclusive processes**

As an organisation made up of states, the UN has tended to deal with governments and heads of states. To the extent that local ownership has been sought, this has been taken to mean ownership by the government of the state in question. However, governments are not necessarily representative of its citizens and may even be a major part of the problems sought solved. Hence, all three reports argue for a shift away from this towards more consultative engagement and the involvement of broad sections of the society in which the UN operates. The participation of women as active agents of peacebuilding, youth, opposition and minorities are highlighted in this context.<sup>41</sup> Such inclusivity would lead to real, broad-based ownership and responsibility of the process of sustaining peace. The UN's primary job in this would be to play a more facilitative role, enabling and ensuring the participation of a variety of actors.

### **The primacy of politics**

Connected to the point above is the shared claim that peacebuilding must be understood as an inherently political process. The UN's responses have tended to deal with the symptoms of violent conflict and act as a 'band-aid'. All three reports argue the need to deal with root causes and structural drivers of conflict instead.<sup>42</sup> There is acknowledgement that such an approach would be much more long-term oriented than current engagements.

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Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 7; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 190-219, 394, 405-406.

<sup>41</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 60-61; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, paras 41-50; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 164-188.

<sup>42</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 43-48; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 7; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 15, 398-399.

### **The need for field focus and context awareness**

All three reports argue that the UN needs to pay more attention to the context in which it deploys measures of any kind.<sup>43</sup> Currently there is a lack of attention to the real needs and conflict dynamics on the ground, including gender dynamics. Mandates tend to be designed around a template, which privileges big, multidimensional interventions. Instead of this one-size-fits-all approach, arguments are made for tailored and flexible engagement suited to each individual case. In the case of the Global Study in particular, context awareness is also seen to involve attention to the gendered dimensions of crises. The need for fine-tuned and better responses would require substantial changes to the planning process, to the skills of personnel involved, as well as to the institutional set-up.

### **The privileging of the military response to violent conflict is counter-productive**

All three reports offer a critique of the current privileging of huge, military-heavy peace operations.<sup>44</sup> The current financing system favours this response to crisis and conflict, and this is exaggerated by the imperative to be seen to act quickly and decisively. All three reports see the UN's preoccupation with militarised solutions as an obstacle to lasting peace and something that needs to change. The Global Study is very explicit with regard to the fact that militarised solutions, and the resulting militarisation of society, are detrimental to women's security. This is a claim that is based on a solid body of research.

### **Partnership with other actors**

Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports emphasise the importance of partnering up with regional organisations, such as the AU, sub-regional organisations and financial institutions.<sup>45</sup> In particular in the AGE report, there is an emphasis on economic, strategic partnerships. The

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<sup>43</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 June 2015, paras 59-61; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 58; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 15-16.

<sup>44</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 43-46, 107-108; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, p. 8; para 7; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 15, 394.

<sup>45</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 192-193; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 164; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 395.



Global Study highlight local, regional and international grass-root networks as important agents for change.

### **Leadership and professionalisation of the UN**

Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports argue for the increased professionalisation of the UN. This implies recruitment based on merit and relevant expertise rather than rank and hierarchy, including for the new UN Secretary-General. It also implies the need to bring the field-oriented nature of UN peace operations into recruitment processes, making them suitable for recruiting thousands of people to work in the field. Greater professionalisation is associated with accountability: holding UN personnel properly accountable for their acts, including sexual abuse.<sup>46</sup>

### **UN system coherence**

In different ways all reports argue for more integration and system coherence: Greater inter-governmental coherence, greater commitment and involvement from the Security Council, greater coordination between three pillars human rights, development and peace and security.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, paras 268-291; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 84; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 410-411.

<sup>47</sup> A/70/95- S/2015/446, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, 17 June 2015, para 147; *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, paras 6-7, 36-40, 61-66; *Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 14 October 2015, pp. 346.

# Concluding remarks – the way forward

The policy implications of the HIPPO report, the AGE report and the Global Study are wide-ranging. In conclusion of this synthesis report we suggest the following list of tasks for the current and next UN Secretary-General.

## **What can the current Secretary-General do:**

- Ensure that the three reviews are viewed together to ensure synergy and coherence.
- Implement the lower-hanging fruits and short-term suggestions to ensure quick wins.
- Keep up the momentum of the processes. Keep them on the agenda for the new Secretary-General without making too much of his own mark on processes that cannot be concluded.
- Push for a merit-based approach regarding the selection of a new Secretary-General.

## **An agenda for a new Secretary-General:**

- Reorganising the Secretariat to allow for a geographical approach instead of the current siloed one.
- Changing the funding model to ensure that funding is more equally spread and more predictable. Much more funding is required for women, peace and security related activities. The assessed contributions model must change so that there is not an automatic peacekeeping response.
- Increasing female participation on all levels including leadership is essential.
- Modernising the Secretariat and transform it into a truly international civil service.
- In order to succeed better at prevention, consider strengthening the analysis and planning capacity of the Secretariat.





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