

Greater than the sum of our parts: global partnerships for Goal 16

The purpose of this paper is to inform and guide discussion about how global multi-stakeholder partnerships can most effectively collaborate in support of the 2030 Agenda's commitment to peaceful, just and inclusive societies. A draft of the paper was prepared as background for a workshop in London in March 2016, co-hosted by Saferworld and the UK and Netherlands governments. It brought together a range of global partnerships, as well as senior governmental, multilateral and civil society representatives. The paper was refined on the basis of inputs, debates and outputs of the London workshop. It will inform the development of a strategy for global cooperation in support of Goal 16.

Overview

Meeting Goal 16 targets will depend on whether domestic actors can agree on, and take forward, solutions that fit their national contexts – nevertheless, collective action at the global level will be essential to support national efforts. The United Nations (UN) and other multilateral groupings of states will play an important role in facilitating this. However, multi-stakeholder partnerships between government, multilateral, civil society and private sector actors can also make a critical contribution by leveraging collective influence, commitment and know-how in support of national level change.

Thirteen existing multi-stakeholder partnerships have been identified that between them address the majority of issues in Goal 16 though with some aspects – e.g. governance – more fully and explicitly addressed than others – e.g. human rights. The 13 partnerships are not however directly comparable to one another, and they adopt very different approaches, including learning and peer support, commitment to action, commitment to values, dialogue, and directing support to specific countries. Existing multi-stakeholder partnerships in theory cover much of the world: of seven partnerships with formal memberships, 130 countries are represented, with 39 countries being members of only one partnership and two countries belonging to all of them.

Despite the existence of these partnerships, they will likely make only a limited contribution to meeting Goal 16 targets if they proceed with business as usual. Goal 16 offers an opportunity for greater coherence and cooperation on a shared set of priorities for action across diverse issues and actors. Support for Goal 16's objectives will need to be deepened and widened into the hands of reformers and change-makers at national level – though partnerships will also need to

address collective global challenges and transnational threats, as well as generating a shared understanding of progress.

Further discussion is needed on the nature of the challenges to be addressed and the most appropriate strategies required to meet them. Nonetheless, even with consensus on *what* partnerships should do, there are critical questions about *how* they will do this. Most importantly – depending on what priorities for collective action are identified – how much to focus on reforming and leveraging existing multi-stakeholder partnerships as opposed to forming new ones. Although neither an exhaustive list nor mutually exclusive, several multi-stakeholder partnership models have been identified that could be a basis for collective action in support of Goal 16:

- **Fill the gaps** through developing new multi-stakeholder partnerships on issues not well covered by existing partnerships.
- **Enhanced coordination of existing partnerships** through regular meetings, information exchange, and joint action on issues that affect them all.
- **Create a new cross-Goal 16 initiative** between stakeholders that are committed to widening support for a single and transformative vision of change.
- **Establish a small group of champion countries** that commit to accelerated domestic action on Goal 16 and to comprehensive national monitoring systems.

Introduction

The 2030 Agenda has now been agreed with five priorities identified for the world: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership.

This paper is primarily concerned with the relationship between two of these Ps: Peace and Partnerships. Peace should be understood as being about far more than the absence of violence: it includes good governance, access to justice and other issues related to how power is deployed for the good of people, prosperity and the planet.

The 2030 Agenda's focus on this issue is articulated most clearly in Goal 16 on peace, justice and institutions, but also features across the framework, notably in Goals relating to gender and inequality. The inclusion of Goal 16 was promoted by stakeholders working on issues related to violence reduction, peacebuilding, access to justice, the rule of law, gender equality, tackling corruption, accountability, participation and transparency in governance, protecting human rights, and social inclusion. These supporters of Goal 16 are multi-stakeholder in nature, having been drawn from governments, multilateral agencies, civil society and the private sector.

The mere existence of Goal 16 will not drive progress. Advancing this goal effectively will require leveraging collective influence, commitment and know-how across the issues championed by these stakeholders in the service of a single, transformative vision. Priorities for collective action will need to be identified. This will be central to ensuring that commitments translate into meaningful action on the ground and that progress can be monitored. The Goal's supporters must continue to collaborate with one another at global level.

The formal UN review process and the UN's various bodies and agencies, national governments and regional organisations will all have roles to play. Nonetheless, varied multi-stakeholder partnerships will also be important – not least to draw on the influence and skills of civil society and private sector actors. A number of such multi-stakeholder partnerships relevant to Goal 16 already exist, including for example the Open Government Partnership, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the Praia City Group on Governance Statistics, and the Effective Institutions Platform.

The question is how the experience, capacities and expertise of these existing partnerships can be harnessed to support countries to meet Goal 16, and whether there are significant gaps in the global landscape that still need to be filled. Three informal meetings have begun to unpack these questions in The Hague (July 2015) New York (September 2015) and London (March 2016). There was widespread interest in collective actions at global level between government, multilateral agencies, civil society and the private sector to help translate global commitments into practical actions.

In order to inform future debates on the issue, this paper examines the current global landscape, identifies overlaps and gaps between existing multi-stakeholder partnerships as they relate to issues addressed by Goal 16, raises key questions going forward, and outlines four options for collaboration.

Several caveats should be noted. First, the paper focuses on Goal 16 exclusively, despite the fact that other goals are also very relevant to Agenda 2030's vision of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Second, this paper focuses on multi-stakeholder partnerships, but these are only part of global architecture: regional organisations, bilateral policies and other parts of the multilateral system also have significant roles to play. This paper does not provide an analysis of the relative strengths and weakness of the multi-stakeholder partnerships that it focuses on. Finally, the content of what any new initiatives focus on still needs to be defined through further dialogue and engagement between Goal 16 stakeholders.

1. The current status of Goal 16 targets: a snapshot

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere: An estimated 126,000 people were killed in conflict in 2014, the highest fatality rate in 20 years.¹ Nonetheless, intentional homicides account for nearly three out of four violent deaths in the world and the trend in homicide appears to be downward, from 7.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2003 to 6.2 in 2012.² While men are primary victims of homicide, it has been estimated 12 in every 100 women are violently assaulted by their intimate partners.³

16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children: While the trends are positive overall,⁴ violence kills a child every 5 minutes.⁵ 10 million children were forced to flee from their countries in 2014 – the highest number in over a decade.⁶ 1 in 6 children experience severe violent discipline.⁷

16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all: It was estimated in 2008 that four billion people live outside the protection of the rule of law.⁸ More than half of working women in the world, 600 million, are trapped in insecure jobs without legal protection.⁹ One 2010 study suggests that the 20 fastest reforming fragile states would still take 41 years to reach an average score on the World Bank's rule of law indicator.¹⁰

16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime: Between 2002 and 2011 total illicit financial flows from developing countries were estimated at \$5.9 trillion.¹¹ It is estimated that only US \$5 billion has ever been returned out of an identified US \$180 billion of stolen assets moved to offshore accounts.¹² There are an estimated 875 million small

arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide, responsible for more than half a million deaths each year.¹³

16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms: Corruption, bribery, theft and tax evasion cost some US \$1.26 trillion for developing countries per year; this amount of money could be used to lift those who are living on less than \$1.25 a day above \$1.25 for at least six years.¹⁴ Among the institutions most affected by corruption are the judiciary and police.

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels: Examining trends in the World Bank's Governance Indicators, it took the 20 fastest-moving countries an average of 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control. On most measures it will take a country like Haiti 600 years to reach the level of governance in Singapore.¹⁵

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels: Although the longer-term trends are positive¹⁶ and the majority of the world's countries are now democracies – over the past 10 years, 105 countries have seen a net decline in democracy as measured by Freedom House; only 61 have experienced a net improvement.¹⁷ Major protests have occurred around the world with increasing frequency since the second half of the 2000s.¹⁸ Of 130 countries surveyed in 2010, only 45% of people thought their elections were honest.¹⁹

16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance: Despite 2010 commitments to increase voting rights for developing countries, the vote share of developed countries actually increased between 2009 and 2014 in both the World Bank and the IMF.²⁰ The current voting shares of developing countries are 3.11 percent lower than what was promised in the Bank and 2.54 percent lower in the IMF. Europe, which has 12% of the world's population, holds 40% of the permanent seats at the UNSC.²¹

16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration: Around the world, 230 million children have not had their births registered while more than 100 developing countries don't have well-functioning systems in place to register key life events, like births, deaths and marriages.²²

16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements: The 2015 World Press Freedom Index highlighted the worldwide deterioration in freedom of information in 2014. Two-thirds of the 180 countries surveyed for the 2015 World Press Freedom Index performed less well than in the previous year.²³

2. Supporting national-level progress towards Goal 16

“All countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan” – The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The emphasis on the ‘universality’ of the 2030 Agenda is a distinct shift from its predecessor framework the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It aims to break down the divisions between developed and developing countries, challenging historic donor-recipient relationships and approaches to development. All countries have a responsibility to act on and lead on the implementation of goals and targets. In the context of Goal 16 and related targets, this means that all countries must take actions to become more peaceful, just and better governed.

National-level action is prioritised with regards to implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The framework stresses “that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development and that the role of national policies, and development strategies cannot be overemphasised”²⁴. The document goes on to stress that each government should set “its own national targets guided by the global level of ambition but taking into account national circumstances. Each government will also decide how these aspirational and global targets should be incorporated in national planning processes, policies and strategies.”²⁵ In this way, the framework establishes the end goals but not the means to getting there.

The voluntary nature of the framework creates obvious risks of non-compliance, especially given the weak follow-up and review process being proposed by member states (see Annex One). Nonetheless, the reality is that global progress on the issues included in the 2030 Agenda – including in Goal 16 – will depend on whether domestic actors can agree on and take forward solutions that fit their national contexts.

However, countries cannot be expected to make progress alone. Various forms of international support will need to be channelled to those furthest behind, along with those showing greatest potential to make progress. Transnational issues beyond the control of domestic policy like climate change will need to be addressed collectively. More broadly, the structure of the international system itself can both enable sustainable development and restrict it. While national action has prime importance, collective global action will be critical.

International frameworks and national-Level change: What does the evidence say?

The effects of high-ambition and low-enforcement international frameworks are highly contingent on the dynamics of domestic social mobilisation and existing institutions. Key findings from research include:²⁶

- Countries are more likely to succeed in those international goal areas where priorities already exist – less prescription on the means to the end tends to result in higher impact. Domestic actors need to agree on locally relevant solutions and build trust between one another.
- Leaders are generally more concerned with following global norms than being sanctioned. Intermediaries or “translators” of global norms into domestic policy play a key role in shaping the debate.
- Impact tends to be highest in countries in flux where the issues at stake are being contested domestically.
- International agreements create numerous opportunities for domestic change-makers inside and outside the state, for example by legitimising their work and creating commitments to advocate against.
- Monitoring agencies will need to be realistic about how long it will be before SDG progress becomes visible – and be careful about creating perverse incentives.
- For the MDGs, Middle Income Country (MIC) engagement was often to further strategic regional interests, while for Low Income Countries (LICs) subscription to the language and process of the MDGs appears to be related to accessing overseas direct aid.
- The huge challenge of the MDGs and the pressure to “meet” them in every country was met with simplistic solutions from the international community reliant on budget increases and technical programmes.

3. The role of multilateral institutions

United Nations (UN): The UN will play a central role in supporting member states in implementing the 2030 Agenda.²⁷ First, an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) dialogue involving member states and all relevant stakeholders on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system will be completed in August 2016.²⁸ Second, the ‘Delivering as One’ initiative is to be used to increase coherence within the UN system.²⁹ Third, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), a forum for joint policy formation and decision-making, has established an Advisory Group to ensure that the UN system lives up to the ambitions of the new development agenda.³⁰

Several UN organs will be deeply involved in the implementation process. ECOSOC and the General Assembly (GA) will both be involved in the follow-up and review through the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) and the UN Secretary-General will work with the UN statistical system to produce the Annual Progress Report (See Annex One). The Human

Rights Council can provide guidance to member states on the human rights basis for Goal 16. The UN Security Council has debated whether it can play a more significant role in promoting peaceful societies and conflict prevention. However, while some member states support bridging silos between the peace, human rights and development pillars of the UN, others argue that mandates should be kept separate and distinct.³¹

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has identified Goal 16 as particularly central to its work, alongside Goal 1 on poverty and Goal 10 on inequality.³² It is working on a support package for Goal 16 implication specifically.³³ Many of the targets contained within Goal 16 relate very closely to the work of other UN agencies. For example, target 16.4 relating to transnational issues falls within UNODC’s remit; UNICEF has been an active advocate for work to tackle violence against children (16.2), and the UN Global Compact’s governance and Business 4 Peace work support the role of the private sector to contribute to Goal 16.

African Union (AU): The AU’s Common African Position on the new development framework promoted an approach which among other things ensures peace and security; and promotes responsive and accountable global governance architecture, including through equitable representation of African countries in international financial and economic institutions.³⁴ The AU subsequently adopted Agenda 2063, which is expected to inform national and regional sustainable development plans³⁵ and emphasises the need for good governance and job creation, particularly as a solution to youth violence.³⁶

European Union (EU): The EU is committed to implementing the 2030 Agenda across a range of its internal and external policies.³⁷ The EU’s Agenda for Change (2012) already aimed to ensure policy coherence amongst member states and a greater emphasis on poor and fragile states. One of the Agenda’s policy priorities is human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance.³⁸ It recognises that good governance is vital for inclusive and sustainable development, and that EU support to governance shall feature more prominently in all external partnerships. The EU has committed that over half of its bilateral development funding will continue to go to fragile and conflict-affected states.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): The OECD aims to “promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world”.³⁹ It provides a forum in which members can share experiences and seek solutions to common problems, many of which are relevant to Goal 16. Moreover, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) brings together the world’s largest donor countries. The DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility

(INCAF) monitors international engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states and helps improve international engagement in them.⁴⁰ The DAC Network on Governance (GovNet) is a forum for experts and practitioners from development cooperation agencies of DAC countries and multilateral agencies.⁴¹ During its last meeting the GovNet discussion focused on the need for close, innovative collaboration between all stakeholders involved in supporting Goal 16.⁴²

G20: The G20 has increased its focus on development issues with a role in shaping collective action on relevant global agendas. In 2014 G20 Leaders resolved to “support efforts in the United Nations to agree an ambitious post-2015 development agenda” and to “contribute by strengthening economic growth and resilience”.⁴³ One of its priorities in 2015 was “Buttressing Sustainability”. A number of the G20’s activities map closely with the SDGs and can be used as a guide for future action to support the implementation of Agenda 2030.⁴⁴

The Commonwealth: The Commonwealth has welcomed both the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda and sees a strong role for the organisation in the championing of its implementation.⁴⁵ There are clear links between the values of the SDGs and the Commonwealth Charter which both affirm human rights, rule of law, accountable institutions at all levels and the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF): As an example of a multilateral process focused on a specific Goal 16 issue, the FATF was set up in 1989 to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. In addition to its 36 members, through a global network of eight FATF-Style Regional Bodies, over 180 jurisdictions around the world have committed to FATF recommendations.

4. The role of global multi-stakeholder partnerships

The 2030 Agenda calls for “an intensive global engagement in support of the implementation of all the Goals and targets, bringing together governments, the private sector, civil society, the United Nations System and other actors and mobilising all resources.”⁴⁶ The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development proposed in the 2030 Agenda is an aggregation of existing partnerships under the UN, with the HLPF intended to provide a platform that helps bring them together.

Specifically, Goal 17 on the means of implementation has two targets on promoting partnerships that are multi-stakeholder:

17.6 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilise and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, particularly developing countries.

17.7 Encourage and promote effective public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development also calls for multi-stakeholder partnerships to play a bigger role in supporting the implementation of the SDGs by bringing the resources, knowledge and ingenuity of the private sector, civil society, the scientific community, academia, philanthropy and foundations, parliaments, local authorities, volunteers and other stakeholders together.⁴⁷

Aside from cutting across government, multilateral, civil society and private sector divides, there is no strict definition of what a multi-stakeholder partnership is. They can take the form of platforms, movements, networks, dialogues or alliances of some form. They can play a variety of roles: for example, they can support knowledge sharing, serve as forums for mutual accountability, act as processes for improvements in monitoring and data availability, or be vehicles for transferring financial resources and technical support to where it is most needed.⁴⁸

5. Key existing global multi-stakeholder partnerships

International Dialogue of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS): Ahead of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, the IDPS was created as a forum for political dialogue to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners, and civil society. The aim was to take renewed action to support development in some of the most fragile states. It includes the g7+, a grouping of 20 conflict-affected and fragile states, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), made up of donors, and the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). The IDPS includes 44 member states, 11 multilateral bodies, and 11 civil society groups from g7+ countries and 15 from elsewhere in the world.

One of the key outcomes from the IDPS has been the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which was created to ensure that donors and partner governments focused development cooperation on key drivers of conflict and fragility identified through fragility assessments and nationally owned plans. Given that the MDGs did not acknowledge the links between conflict and development, the New Deal has created its own five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals: inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenue and services. The New Deal

has now been piloted in eight g 7+ countries. The IDPS has supported New Deal implementation through facilitating experience sharing, building political momentum for trust and changed relations between its stakeholders, developing technical guidance and supporting country-level dialogues on specific issues. The IDPS is currently discussing how the New Deal will assist with meeting the SDGs. With regards to Goal 16, the IDPS is most relevant to targets 16.1, 16.3, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7 and 16.a.

Open Government Partnership (OGP): The OGP, a voluntary international initiative with 69 participating countries, was created in 2011 with the aim to “provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their governments more accountable, and responsive to citizens”.⁴⁹ To become a member of the OGP, participating countries must endorse a high-level Open Government Declaration, deliver a country action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to independent reporting on their progress going forward.⁵⁰ In 2014, OGP members had collectively developed more than 2,000 policy initiatives aimed at enhancing government openness, transparency and responsiveness to citizens.⁵¹ To ensure accountability, the OGP has established an Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM), which publishes reports on OGP members’ progress in implementing their National Actions Plans.⁵²

The OGP can help implement several Goal 16 targets related to transparency, accountability, responsiveness and inclusive participation, specifically OGP’s work directly support targets 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, and 16.10.⁵³ The OGP has also demonstrated a willingness to align its work with the 2030 Agenda – the OGP Global Summit in Mexico in 2015 focused on the role that open government can play in the implementation of the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda.⁵⁴

Praia Group on Governance Statistics: The Praia Group was established to address the conceptualisation, methodology and instruments for producing statistics related to governance, peace and security. It was created by the UN Statistical Commission based on the observation that governance statistics are an important ‘new domain’ of official statistics, that they help to ensure that the relationship between the State and its citizenry is transparent and accountable and that national statistical offices offer important comparative advantages for the production of relevant statistics.

The Praia Group may assist the IAEG-SDGs in the development of methodology and technical guidance or Goal 16 global indicators. The Group will then develop complementary Goal 16 indicators that could be used at the regional and national levels to assist countries to identify gaps and orient policies. The eight-member steering group is composed of national

statistics offices, multilateral bodies and civil society groups.

Praia Group members agreed that the scope of the group’s work should include, but not be limited to, violence and perceptions of peaceful societies (16.1), quality of democracy (16.7), corruption (16.5), institutional capacity (16.6), child protection (16.2), justice (16.3), women’s participation and empowerment (16.7), illicit financial flows (16.4) and human rights (16.10).

Effective Institutions Platform (EIP): The EIP is an alliance of over 60 countries and organisations that support country-led and evidence-based policy dialogue, knowledge sharing and peer learning on public sector management and institutional reform. The EIP supports its members in their development of accountable, inclusive and transparent public sector institutions capable of delivering responsive policies, effective resource management, and sustainable public services for poverty reduction and inclusive growth.

The EIP collaborates with a number of multi-stakeholder groups and actors working on public sector reform. It aims to work through innovative approaches to peer learning and evidence sharing, through creating a safe space to discuss both success and failures in public sector reform, and supporting motivation, leadership, strategic foresight and innovation among public officials. It seeks to work across institutional objectives and bridge local, regional and global efforts to strengthen public sector institutions. The EIP’s three pillars are: enhancing resource management and service delivery; monitoring and measuring institutional capacity; and facilitating accountability and inclusion. It is most relevant to targets 16.6, 16.7 and 16.a

Community of Democracies (CoD): The CoD is a global intergovernmental coalition of states, founded in 2000 to bring together governments, civil society and the private sector in the pursuit of a common goal: supporting democratic rules and strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world. The CoD is a group of over 100 countries with a Governing Council made of 28 countries and a parallel civil society steering committee. Parliamentarians, the private sector, academics and youth are also represented. It is most relevant to 16.6, 16.7 and 16.10.

Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT): The ICRICT is a group of leaders working to bring about significant reform of the international corporate taxation system. The Commission aims to promote the reform debate through a wider and more inclusive discussion of international tax rules than is possible through any other existing forum; to consider reforms from a perspective of global public interest rather than national advantage; and to seek fair, effective and

sustainable tax solutions for development. It was initiated by a coalition of the civil society and labour organisations and its relevance is most directly linked to 16.4.

Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children:

The Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children was set up to help deliver on the 2030 Agenda's vision to see a world where every child grows up free from violence and exploitation, with its focus heavily on target 16.2. The partnership will work with all governments who are serious about delivering their commitment and will seek to persuade others that cost effective solutions exist. The partnership will focus on developing data and evidence to establish trends in 'pathfinder countries', developing monitoring and evaluation plans, sharing knowledge on best and promising practice, and aim to launch one or more flagship initiative in 2016. Partners include UN agencies, NGOs, private sector actors and foundations.

Partnership Against Corruption Initiative (PACI):

PACI is a World Economic Forum initiative which brings together businesses who recognise the power of multi-stakeholder, collaborative action in transforming the global, regional and industry agendas on combating corruption. The PACI Principles serve as a call to action for businesses around the world to commit to zero tolerance of corruption in all its forms; and to join collective action initiatives to increase public trust in business, deliver fair markets and level the playing field by fighting corruption. As of January 2016 it had 83 corporate members. The PACI Vanguard, a subgroup of 20 CEOs lead the implementation. It is most relevant to 16.5.

Global Legal Empowerment Initiative (GLEI):

Established in 2011, the GLEI is a partnership that includes Namati, Open Society Foundation, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and Australia's AusAID, in collaboration with UNDP and the Justice for the Poor Program at the World Bank. The initiative seeks to strengthen legal empowerment approaches to justice and development through extensive empirical research, building a community of practice network, and helping to project civil society voices into the discourse shaping government and donor development policies.

Together the Open Society Justice Initiative and Namati have established a Global Legal Empowerment Network of over 900 individuals from over 300 legal empowerment groups around the world. The network is supported by a steering committee comprising 14 leading legal empowerment groups from around the world. The network's relevance is most clearly linked to target 16.3.

Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA): The VPA is a network of WHO Member States, international agencies and civil society organisations working to

prevent violence established in 2004. VPA participants share an evidence-based public health approach that targets the risk factors leading to violence and promotes multi-sectoral cooperation. Participants are committed to implement the recommendations of the *World report on violence and health*. Participants include 18 international governmental, non-governmental organisations and networks; three regional networks in the Americas and Asia Pacific, and 41 organisations in 13 countries. The alliance's focus is intrinsically linked to target 16.1 on violence reduction.

Global Partnership for Social Accountability

(GPSA): The World Bank established the GPSA in 2012 with the purpose of bridging this gap, enhancing citizens' voice and, just as importantly, supporting the capacity of governments to respond effectively to their voice. The GPSA is based on constructive engagement between governments and civil society in order to create an enabling environment in which citizen feedback is used to solve fundamental problems in service delivery and to strengthen the performance of public institutions. It provides we provide strategic and sustained support to civil society organisations and governments for social accountability initiatives aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. It has 265 partners in over 50 countries and it is most relevant to target 16.6 and 16.7.

Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR):

The StAR is a partnership between the World Bank Group and the UNODC that supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds. StAR works with developing countries and financial centers to prevent the laundering of the proceeds of corruption and to facilitate more systematic and timely return of stolen assets. To date, more than 720 participants from 70 countries have participated in regional and national training in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The initiative is most relevant target 16.4.

The Global Partnership for Sustainable Data:

Established in 2015, the Global Partnership for Sustainable Data is global network of governments, NGOs and private sector actors who will work together to strengthen the inclusivity, trust and innovation in the way data is used to address the world's sustainable development efforts. While it is not exclusively focused on Goal 16, mapping data gaps in this area and channelling resources and expertise to meet them will likely be part of its work.

6. Taking stock

Although the thirteen multi-stakeholder partnerships reviewed above are some of those most directly relevant to Goal 16, this is not a comprehensive list. Nonetheless, it is clear that there are already a number of partnerships which can be built upon as we consider what can be done at global level to catalyse and support progress in meeting Goal 16. The

membership structure varies from partnership to partnership (with some, for example, placing greater emphasis on the role of the private sector than others). The inclusion of individual countries is largely represented through formal government participation, though this is not the case in all of them. With this caveat in mind, a quick review found a total of 130 countries covered by the seven partnerships which have formal memberships: the IDPS, OGP, EIP, VPA, CoD, GLEI, and GPSA (the Praia Group is still developing its membership). Only two countries (the USA and Canada) were members of all seven partnerships. On the other hand, only 39 countries were members of only one grouping (see figure 1).

The modalities of the partnerships reviewed are diverse and in many cases not directly comparable to one another. Their focus areas vary between a broad set of issues that cut across a number of Goal 16 targets to others focused on very specific issues. The approaches adopted vary greatly. Many partnerships – including the EIP, VPA, Praia Group and GLEI - focus on learning and peer support. Some emphasise commitments to action, such as the OGP and the Partnership to End Violence Against Children, while others focus on commitment to values, such as the CoD and PACI. Partnerships like the ICRICT and the IDPS, on the other hand, are more focused on dialogue. More broadly, some partnerships are focused on directing outside support to a specific set of countries, others are focused on collective domestic policy actions, while others again focus on transnational issues.

The vast majority of issues contained in Goal 16 are covered by these existing partnerships. Issues of accountability and participation in governance, institutional effectiveness and corruption are well covered. Violence is touched upon, though it should be noted that a wider focus on peaceful societies is missing. Justice is explicitly focused upon by one partnership and is a component focus of others. Transnational issues related to illicit financial flows and stolen assets are covered, though the true multi-stakeholder nature of these initiatives is questionable and no multi-stakeholder partnerships were identified on arms or organised crime. Global governance reform appears not to be explicitly addressed, nor does the issue of legal identity. Surprisingly, there appear to be few multi-stakeholder partnerships focusing on human rights – though it should be remembered that a whole pillar of the UN system is dedicated to this issue. Indeed, any analysis of existing partnerships needs to be put into the context of the wider international architecture. Furthermore, the targets in Goal 16 are not directly comparable; for example accountable and participatory governance (16.7) is an issue of a different scale to legal identity.

The world will not make progress towards meeting Goal 16 if we carry on with business as usual. There is no global structure ready to catalyse and support progress across multiple levels. As noted, Goal 16 is itself a basis for partnership – a vehicle for cooperation and coherence across diverse issues and actors. The goal itself is an opportunity to change how we do things.




Figure 1: Coverage of the world by seven multi-stakeholder partnerships

The content and priorities for collective action between Goal 16's stakeholders still need to be defined and will be central to determining what sort of partnerships are formed in the future. Evidence suggests that key characteristics of an effective partnership are: a shared understanding of the problem, coherence around a common solution, a simple mission with clear strategic direction, a well-articulated theory of change which underpins their chosen structure and interventions, a focus on results, and an inclusive governance structure.⁵⁵ What matters most is how global multi-stakeholder partnerships can support tangible changes at national level. It is still far from clear how the 2030 Agenda – and Goal 16 – will be aligned with national development plans and policy processes in different countries. Furthermore, we still need to define a shared vision of transformative change across the partnerships and the most effective way to support this.

However, it is clear that leadership will be decisive for progress under Goal 16. The impact of financial or technical support will be contingent on political momentum to take on the challenges outlined in the goal. Support for Goal 16's objectives will need to be deepened and widened into the hands of reformers and change-makers at national level – whether they sit within government, civil society or the private sector. At the same time, Goal 16 must prove itself relevant and useful for their objectives. How mutual support – including the currency of political will and energy – can be channelled between countries will need to be carefully considered. Moreover, there will also need to be a way for stakeholders from different countries to collaborate in order to address global challenges that are proving a common obstacle. Finally, a shared understanding of what progress is being made will need to be established without resorting to context-insensitive or arbitrary metrics.

7. Critical questions

Taking into account all of the analysis above, there are a number of critical and interrelated questions that need to be explored by Goal 16's stakeholders:

- Are existing partnerships really delivering change on the ground; and, if so, is this change transformative? Are these partnerships really energising tangible action – or do they preside too much over *inaction*?
- What types of links do existing partnerships have with: national-level actors and institutions? Relevant multilateral structures? Do they span blocs and disciplines, or reflect thematic and bureaucratic silos?
- Given their expansive membership base, can we leverage existing partnerships so that they collectively act upon challenges that are relevant to all of them and to Goal 16? (For example every partnership could commit to protecting civil society space or to strengthening capacities to monitor Goal 16).

- If we assume that the individual issues within Goal 16 are addressed by existing and effective-enough partnerships, does this suffice for global support towards meeting the goal? Or do we need something additional to drive collective action so that the whole adds up to more than the sum of its parts?
- How can we reach out beyond the usual suspects and engage with a wider set of actors who have significant influence over issues in Goal 16, including for example activists involved in social movements or, on the other side of the spectrum, hard security actors?
- How can we reconcile the need to channel international support to countries that face the most significant challenges in meeting Goal 16, the need for every country to act on this agenda domestically, and the need for action on transnational issues?

8. Options for more effective collaboration

Although further discussion will be needed on the “what” before we define the “how”, we have identified several multi-stakeholder partnership models that could be considered. It is clear that these are not mutually exclusive, rather different options that can be brought together in a number of configurations.

1. Fill the gaps: This approach would identify where there are significant gaps in the existing partnership architecture – for example, on peaceful societies or on access to justice – and develop new partnerships to complement what we already have. A more comprehensive mapping exercise may be needed to fully understand where gaps in issues and capacity exist.

Pros:

- There is little appetite for a new bureaucratic body or top-heavy partnership, but a new light-touch partnership with very clear objectives and value added would be much more likely to gain traction.
- New partnerships could be launched by smaller scale groupings of actors concerned with the specific issues at hand to sit alongside other partnerships – see option 2 – without requiring risk of replication or reallocation of resources.

Cons:

- A ‘fill the gaps’ approach may be perceived as uninspiring and piecemeal without capitalising on the opportunity to drive change under a single, holistic vision for Goal 16 and even creating further silos.
- It may prove difficult to identify a particular gap to ‘fill’ given that some existing partnerships cover a broad spectrum of Goal 16 issues, risking some replication.
- There is a risk of placing additional strain on national stakeholders to partake in yet another global partnership.

- New issue-specific partnerships may require more resources and attention than envisaged.

2. Partner the partnerships: This approach would bring together co-chairs or secretariats from existing partnerships on a regular basis in order to exchange information about progress on their respective issues, to coordinate around the 2030 Agenda follow-up and review process, and to identify specific issues that merit collective action.

This approach could rely on a set of strong anchor organisations which would be responsible for leading and coordinating the partnerships, mapping key political entry points, and shaping the course of collective actions between the partnerships.

Pros:

- Significant appetite exists to increase the coherence between existing partnerships, particularly in relation to building capacity to monitor progress and to ensure that Goal 16 is appropriately considered at follow up and review processes.
- There are opportunities for mutual learning.
- This approach would allow existing networks to be multiplied and to also maintain the cross-sector engagement that was a (beneficial) hallmark of the negotiations around Agenda 2030.
- A partnering of partnerships could be an optimal way of aggregating sub-optimal resources and tapping into a wider range of funding sources at the outset.

Cons:

- Existing partnerships may be unable to sufficiently adapt to fit what is required to truly partner the partnerships – whether in terms of mandate, representativeness etc.
- This option would still likely require some form of leadership, secretariat or dedicated resources to make it meaningful. Existing partnerships may be reluctant to move resources or limited attention away from core activities into new coordination structures.
- Cohering action on Goal 16 around a range of partnerships may be challenging; different partnerships will seek to push forward their own particular interests.
- There are questions about whether this option would inspire sufficient action to implement Goal 16.

3. A new cross-Goal 16 initiative: This approach would seek to establish a new partnership, alliance or network of stakeholders, who each commit to widening and deepening political support for a holistic vision, to learning from one another about what works, and to coordinating action around key events or on specific transnational issues. This could take the form of a group of high profile individuals, including serving or retired political leaders, activists, business leaders, or philanthropists.

Pros:

- A clearly defined cross-Goal 16 initiative could generate more momentum than other options due to a dedicated focus on Goal 16 as a whole, the ability to generate or support political will, and create a shared vision between multiple stakeholders.
- A new dedicated Goal 16 initiative can still draw on the resources and strengths of existing partnerships by working between them and seeking to get them to work with one another.
- A group of committed individuals would be flexible enough to engage across different multilateral processes, multi-stakeholder partnerships, sets of countries or specific issues.

Cons:

- Partnership fatigue means that a weakly defined agenda and strategy would struggle to get the necessary investment from political stakeholders.
- This option would likely require resources in order to really drive change (i.e. dedicated staff) and sufficient political influence to get existing partnerships working with one another or national stakeholders to buy-in to their vision (i.e. require high level participation).
- Any grouping of individuals would have to be representative and balanced – their influence would be defined by their legitimacy.

4. A group of champion countries: This approach would focus on a limited number of countries that commit at the highest political level to accelerate action on Goal 16 domestically by creating national action plans and investing in a comprehensive national monitoring system. This group could develop best practice and be progressively expanded.

Pros:

- This option would be clearly focused on national level action, which is where change will happen.
- There is significant appetite for an initiative that both increases political will and develops an evidence-based package of interventions which can be adapted to country-specific approaches.
- This option could address fears of introducing an overly bureaucratic new organisation.
- This option would be well suited to engagement with formal UN follow-up and review processes.

Cons:

- A grouping of the 'usual suspects' will not widen support beyond Goal 16's existing constituency.
- Any group of champions will require resources and potentially some bureaucratic structure.
- It could be difficult to decide on the right number of champion countries. Barriers to entry need to be high enough to make sure only the most committed join – but not so those who would benefit from joining are excluded.

Annex One: Follow-up, review and monitoring

Member states have agreed to a follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda which will be overseen by the HLPF, a hybrid body which sits between the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the UN General Assembly (GA).⁵⁶ A key task for the HLPF will be to conduct regular reviews of country-level implementation and thematic reviews of progress on the SDGs globally. The HLPF will meet annually under the auspices of ECOSOC as well as every fourth year under the auspices of the GA to provide high-level political guidance, identify progress and emerging challenges as well as mobilise further action to accelerate implementation. The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) has proposed arrangements for the review process including the annual themes for review. Goal 16 could be reviewed in 2019 under the theme: 'Empowering people and ensuring inclusiveness: peaceful and inclusive societies, human capital development, and gender equality' (2019).⁵⁷ The UNSG also suggests that a forum for countries in special situations, including conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, could be held immediately prior to the HLPF.

There are close links between the follow-up and review and monitoring processes. An annual SDG progress report will support the follow-up and review, which will be based on global indicators for the 2030 Agenda as developed by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG). The IAEG proposal of global indicators has been adopted on a technical basis by the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) but still needs to be politically accepted by member states

through the ECOSOC and the GA.⁵⁸ 23 global indicators have been proposed for Goal 16's 12 targets. These global indicators will be complemented by regional, national and thematic indicators. The UNSC has mandated the IAEG to provide technical support for the implementation of the global indicator framework over the next 15 years.⁵⁹

Several challenges will need to be overcome in order to ensure effective and inclusive follow-up and review and monitoring processes. Given the voluntary, state-led nature of the follow-up and review, its success will ultimately depend on the willingness of member states to engage actively in the process, submit progress reports and ensure a meaningful role for civil society. Additionally, national statistical systems face the task of having to gather highly disaggregated data for 229 indicators – but even after 15 years, data is far from comprehensively produced for the 48 MDG indicators. Goal 16 also includes indicators not traditionally gathered as part of official statistics. Political independence for statistical agencies to track contentious issues will be key; in some cases independent non-official or multilateral bodies may be better placed to gather sensitive data. Indeed, given not only the scale of the challenge but also the multi-stakeholder nature of the 2030 Agenda, research organisations, civil society groups, UN agencies, the private sector and citizens themselves will all need be empowered to help collect data. This means that capacity support and political space will be needed across society and new innovative approaches to data-production partnerships formed.

About Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in nearly 20 countries and territories across Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

Saferworld – 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK
Registered Charity no 1043843
Company limited by guarantee no 3015948
Tel: +44 (0)20 7324 4646 | Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4647
Email: general@saferworld.org.uk
Web: www.saferworld.org.uk

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