



OCGG Security Section

Advice Program
Effective Multilateralism

Governance Area
Conflict Resolution

Project
The Middle East

The Middle East after Arafat: New Prospects for Peace

Advice to

The Palestinian Authority
 Hamas
 Islamic Jihad
 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
 Israel
The United States of America
 Syria
 Lebanon
 Iran
 Saudi Arabia
 Egypt
 Jordan
The European Union

by Simon Roughneen

MAIN POINTS

The death of Arafat provides Israel and the Palestinian Authority with an opportunity to reengage in the peace process. This requires international support within the region and from important players such as the EU and particularly the US. The political needs of all sides involved need to be balanced.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ABOUT THE OCGG

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INTRODUCTION

The Middle East, one of the most conflict-ridden areas in the world, has a tremendous strategic importance for international security and the world economy. Achieving a lasting peace in the region - a peace that is built on respect for human rights and can foster economic prosperity among all the parties - is therefore one of the main priorities on the global agenda of good governance.

This first OCGG Security Advice assesses the prospects for peace in the post-Arafat era. As a new generation of Palestinian leaders assume power, new opportunities arise, but also new challenges.

This assessment is followed by a set of recommendations to the key actors in the region: the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Israel, the United States of America, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the European Union.

A lasting peace in the region can only be accomplished if these players mobilize the political will to take some tough decisions and act with a certain degree of coordination. They need to move towards a shared vision of a better and more secure Middle East. That would indeed be one of the greatest contributions one could imagine towards a better and more secure world.

ASSESSMENT

It was said of the late Yasser Arafat that he would never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Now, with Arafat laid to rest in his battered Ramallah compound, the conventional wisdom is that another opportunity has presented itself to the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to revive a peace process buried by four years of suicide terrorism, occupation, fence-building and dramatic changes in global geopolitics.

In this case there is much to be said for the conventional wisdom. However, it must also be remembered that any opportunity, no matter how good, is still just that – an opportunity. To realise the opportunity requires demonstrated good will and reciprocity, trust-building, mutual recognition of constraints and needs – and in terms of a process that it is both step-by-step but is simultaneously focused on the endgame. The process must be inclusive and flexible – and all involved must be aware of the pitfalls and promises – and emphasise the latter over the former in order to create the critical mass necessary to drive the process to its conclusion.

These normative abstractions acknowledged, there remains much to do to allow Israel and the Palestinian Authority re-engage effectively. The requirements of and opportunities presented by this operate on three distinct but interrelated levels. Firstly, Israel and the Palestinians must be helped and help each other to quickly re-engage in substantial and sustainable talks. These should be based on but not necessarily wedded to the exact format of the Roadmap. Secondly, the needs and implications for the Arab region and Muslim world need to be accounted for and addressed. This has particular implications for the ongoing US occupation and attempted transition to democracy in Iraq. In turn both the Middle East peace process and Iraq require a greater degree of international, and more specifically, transatlantic engagement than there has

been of late, and a recognition of the broader effects and benefits this promises.

MEETING NEEDS, CREATING DIVIDENDS: A ROADMAP TO THE ROADMAP

Commenting on Arafat's death and on the future of Palestinian political identity, Mohammed Dahlan - Fatah's chief in Gaza - said that 'the era of the symbol is over'. However, the dominance exerted by Arafat over Palestinian politics over the last 40 years will not be cast aside overnight. Any legitimacy of a successor will be derived from connections to Arafat, which is both a necessity and an unavoidable aspect of Arafat's legacy. However, underneath the often overbearing control exercised by Arafat, he encouraged pluralism, partly as means to prevent any serious rival powerbase from materialising. Palestinians need to remould this from a sort of managed chaos into a unified negotiating position, with the endgame as the focus. With this in mind, Israel and the international community need to be realistic about the capabilities and context for any negotiating partner that emerges on the Palestinian side.

Immediately, however, Palestinian people need to enjoy the free movement. Second, there has to be complete Palestinian Authority (PA) control over all PA areas. In other words, Israel has to withdraw its forces from PA areas and stop its incursions, assassinations and arrest campaigns in these territories. Third, all Palestinians in the occupied territories, that is the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, must enjoy full right of participation in the elections – something granted by the Israeli government. These requirements are stipulations of the elections protocol, which was one of the chapters of the Oslo II interim agreement.

A new World Bank report hinted at possibilities for economic revitalisation as aspects of normalisation (such as those outlined in the first stage of the Roadmap) take root. During the brief easing of violence in 2003, 104,000 jobs were created in the Palestinian territories, as border controls were relaxed and violence declined if only slightly. 37% of youth remain out of work, and overall 47% remain below the poverty line. Easing these socio-economic pressures can only offset the structural factors that make jihad and martyrdom appear the sole option for Palestinians who seek to carry the fight into Israel.

Any such peace dividend would also pay off for an Israel whose economy, as US Senator George Mitchell described to me in Belfast recently, has been contracting by 3% per annum since start of the second Intifada. More generally, the issue of structural violence and its relationship with physical violence has been infrequently and unsatisfactorily addressed by the literature, much less the policy, in this conflict. This has implications for Israel's internal political economy and governance structures, as economic and social marginalisation of Palestinians in Israel has not been dealt with. Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens – about one-fifth of the population - are somewhat removed from the cultural, economic and political mainstream. Although they have political rights unknown to many in the region, they are subject to various forms of discrimination, some direct and official, others less so.

After Arafat, the specific roles and competences of the Palestinian Authority (P.A.), the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (P.L.O) and Fatah respectively will become more apparent and defined. Organisational and institutional structure in each case will have to match popular legitimacy – particularly the working of the Palestinian Basic Law and the Office of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis the President. Democracy here, if it is to succeed, cannot be allowed become the type of 'illiberal' democracy described by Fareed Zakaria and practiced in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and elsewhere in the Arab world . The alternative is an illegitimate negotiating partner on the Palestinian side, as viewed by Palestinians. This

would spawn resentment and possibly violent dissent within Palestine and against Israel.

Palestinian militants need to cease violence directed against Israelis, something they can contribute hugely to by helping develop a unified platform under an elected negotiating partner. This in turn implies a need for the Palestinian partner to get whatever Israeli co-operation and international assistance is necessary to facilitate this. The recent policy of castigating Arafat's admittedly patchy record in dealing with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, while keeping him under house arrest in Ramallah, and toughing out the decline in security with a policy of occupation and reprisal, needs to be recalibrated in this new context. Thus Israel's ability to deliver in a peace deal will be enhanced, as the security issues important to them are overcome, making irrelevant the most reasonable opposition to any negotiation – based on the idea that no negotiation is permissible with terrorists. Most importantly however, both sides need to co-operate and reciprocate in a context where the endgame of a settlement is constantly referred to.

This means a return to the Roadmap, but perhaps with a different phasing, allowing for more focus on final status issues earlier on, as stage one issues such as military occupation, checkpoints, curtailing terrorism and Palestinian democracy are dealt with. This will allow the Palestinian leadership take bold steps with hardliners, as they will have a defined end-game in mind and in the public domain as they engage with the Israeli government. For the Israelis, this will allow them tell their public, and opposition, that there will be limits, as there must be, on what they must give up in any endgame, and that they are locked into a mutually-beneficial process that does not compromise the basic needs of the Israeli state and guarantees Israeli security internally and in the region, something that Israel has not had since its foundation.

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND BUILDING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Palestinian elections are not the automatic panacea for internal legitimacy that people may assume. Candidates may well run and the election be used as a means to set up a partner for a peace process, with the scope for manoeuvre open to the winner limited by the power struggles in Palestinian politics. Legislative elections may well be more revealing – by either empowering or hindering the new President. The current leading candidate, Mahmoud Abbas, certainly does not control Fatah. That organization's new head is Faruq Qaddumi, a hardliner who is much more popular than Abbas and who reflects more faithfully the ideas of the Fatah leadership and membership. The hardliners of all factions discount Israeli concessions as tricks while simultaneously portraying them as victories won by armed struggle. The most prominent of these is Hamas, who will not contest the Presidential election, but who will field candidates on the Legislative elections, where they could capture up to 30% of the popular vote.

How intra-Palestinian rivalries affect legitimacy is perhaps something that Israelis themselves will pick up on and in turn become influential on domestic electoral politics. Currently, Israeli public opinion is split on whether to co-ordinate a pull-out from Gaza with the PA, but 60% of them do want the withdrawal to take place, according to a poll discussed in Ha'aretz on 12 November 2004. However, two-thirds of Israelis believe that Palestinians have not accepted Israel's existence, and the same opinion survey shows Israelis to be divided on whether peace is possible with the P.A., post Arafat. To offset this, a Palestinian referendum should be held, with the popular vote asked to recognise Israel's existence and support a two-state solution. All indicators are that that this would be passed by a sizeable majority, based on support for parties in the Palestinian territories. It would offset any political manipulation of domestic Israeli fears or cynicism by making those emotions irrelevant to the internal debate on a peace process.

To help build a peace constituency, Israelis and Palestinians require facilitation and assistance from the political classes in building upon existing civil society and cross-community peacebuilding and conflict transformation work. Efforts by local and international NGOs in this area should be facilitated and encouraged by local authorities, and be given funding guarantees as part of any peace agreement. The model of Northern Ireland is instructive here – a number of multi-million euro ‘Peace programmes’ have ran over the past decade, empowering community relations work, grassroots initiatives and attempts to curb interface violence, often providing resources for peace where the state and/or politicians have been unable or unwilling to do so. A similar venture should be initiated in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. This could create a peace constituency, which, though not to be overestimated in terms of political influence, can contribute to mutual understanding at a grassroots level, and empower the peace camps at the political level by adding to their votebase.

Sharon is in a precarious position domestically, after the withdrawal of the National Religious Party (NRP) left him with a minority governing coalition in an already unwieldy secular-religious alliance. This withdrawal was due to differences with Sharon over the Gaza withdrawal plan, indicative of how contentious any shift in policy or apparent concessions could be perceived by elements of the Israeli right. Any negotiations will be scrutinised closely by these elements, and Sharon will need to build consensus elsewhere to offset the potential destabilisation presented by dissidents in Israel opposed to any peace process. The Palestinians in turn need to be sensitive to this, and their own refuseniks will need to relent on principles and violence. Sharon is also vulnerable from the left – as Likud’s alliance with the religious right is viewed disdainfully by Shinui, an urban middle-class coalition partner. At time of writing, Sharon’s governing coalition was teetering on the brink – as Shinui refused to support subsidies to religious groups. However, it is possible that Labor will be invited to form a new coalition – which may mean a more nationally-representative unity government for the purposes of any peace process.

It is clear, therefore, that the internal demands on both Israeli and Palestinian politics are mutually-dependent, and will become more so as any peace process is set in train. Sensitisation to each others' needs, to use language familiar to conflict transformation, needs to be combined with international recognition of and political support for these needs. For example, Arafat apparently contributed to the electoral destruction of the peace camp in Israel, slowly after the first Oslo Accord, and rapidly after the failure of the 2000 Camp David and Taba talks. Arafat – rightly or wrongly – was blamed for the collapse of both sets of talks, and the perception grew that both sides were not sensitive to, emotionally or intellectually, the needs and interests of each other. This is something that will require rectifying in any new peace process via a consistent mediation and facilitated dialogue process. Otherwise the terms of any deal - no matter how precisely worded - will be understood completely differently by each side. At best, this will cause the process to falter – as witnessed in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. At worst, this will facilitate manipulation by opponents on both sides, decrying any deal as a sell-out, thus potentially begetting a new spiral of mutual mistrust and incrimination, even violence.

Ultimately therefore, any successor to Arafat needs to follow the example of Anwar Sadat, and act in a way that is not fearful of possibly emulating his fate. For Israel, Sharon could also do well to heed the example of Rabin, and be similarly oblivious to the consequences. For both leaders to attain the required level of statesmanship requires confidence-building between and consensus-building within Israeli and Palestinian politics be undertaken as part of a mutually-assured win-win process, where magnanimity, goodwill and reciprocity are made core norms, in an active sense, of their relations from now on.

PEACE AND THE REGION: REACTION, REQUIREMENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Against some odds, successful Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan recently, and like in Palestine, these will be followed by parliamentary elections next year. Iraqi elections will take place soon after the Palestinian Presidential elections set for the 9th January. It has never been entirely clear just how exactly ordinary Muslims political worldview is shaped by the fate of Palestine, beyond the Arab world which has had inconsistent and, from the Palestinians viewpoint, wholly unsatisfactory relations with the Palestinian people and the various representative organisations and institutions, from Fatah to the PLO to the Palestinian Authority, that have represented the Palestinian national cause. However, some evidence has emerged in recent years, particularly since the start of the second Intifada that the Muslim world in general views relations with the west and politics in general via a prism that is coloured significantly by the fate of Palestine. This, incidentally, does not account for al-Qaeda's belated conversion to the Palestinian cause in 2000-01, but to the galvanising effect that the Palestinian issue has acquired in broader legitimate political consciousness from Algeria to Indonesia.

Israel did not have any real internal debate about what the removal of Saddam and the occupation of Iraq by their US ally would mean for them internally and for their role in regional affairs – beyond the general feeling that it was in their interests to be rid of the man who fired missiles at Israel in 1991 and offered financial aid to the bereaved of Palestinian suicide bombers. As Israel moves toward a peace process with Palestinians, it will need to look at its alliance with the US in terms of regional affairs. An Israel realising that peace with Palestinians means normalisation with the region will also realise that its automatic identification with the US would have to be either diluted or re-imagined – both as a necessity and perhaps as a natural unravelling brought about by a peace process with Palestinians. King Hussein, writing in *The New*

York Times on November 11, said that Israel 'must be integrated into the entire region'. Complete regional recognition of Israel and restoration/inauguration of full diplomatic relations is a requirement that Israel would inscribe into any peace deal, imagined to its fullest extent, and outlined in part by the Saudi peace plan put forward in 2002 by Crown Prince Abdullah.

For their part, neighbouring states, beginning with Syria and Lebanon, need to engage with the Middle East peace process both in terms of their own political settlement with Israel and in terms of enabling the Israeli-Palestinian process to progress. This means adopting a policy of carrots-and-sticks with militant groups and a public display of support for the emergence of a working democracy and negotiating partner in the Palestinian Territories. A key player in this may well be Iran. An ongoing game of nuclear cat-and-mouse is being played between Tehran, Washington, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various European capitals. Israel's own nuclear capability may well have to be contested, within the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), if Tehran is to be persuaded to acquiesce. Regionalising the peace process in the Middle East – as surely must be done if a sustainable deal is to be realised – would therefore need to include Iran and nuclear weapons, given Tehran's historic leverage over Lebanese Hezbollah, and the potential for the latter to act as spoilers in any peace process.

Regional leaders will be in a bind – a democratic Palestine will make them look authoritarian by contrast – but might also contribute to drawing the sting from the extremists whose professed target remains the varyingly authoritarian pro-western rulers of Jordan, Egypt and especially Saudi Arabia. The US too will be put to the test by the ripple effects of a successful peace process in the Middle East – as any destabilisation of pro-US regimes will be watched with trepidation in Washington. Arab leaders may well view the next elected leader more favourably than Arafat, who was viewed with suspicion at best, and outright hostility at worst, by many Arab states.

The US will likely seek to shore up Abbas as leader, if elected, and this time may (and should) demand Israeli help in this – unlike during Abbas' abortive spell as Prime Minister under Arafat in 2003. The flipside of this is that any elected leader must be supported or facilitated in a manner that does not allow recidivists portray him or her as a US-Israeli lackey – something that would jar with the historically defiant image of Yassir Arafat, something that will loom large in Palestinian consciousness for some time. It seems that intensive work is occurring behind the scenes to manage the election process to ensure that a candidate suited to all interests is elected. This perhaps prompted Abbas to get a temporary agreement from Marwan Barghouti not to run in the Presidential election, and spilt the Fatah vote.

However, given that Barghouti has since changed his mind, he may well prove a strong candidate. This will pose severe problems for the US and Israel, who have aligned on a policy of not negotiating with this they deem terrorists while simultaneously espousing democratic values. In terms of a viable conflict transformation or resolution process, the US and Israel must act in good faith, and do so irrespective of who is elected as President of the PA. A failure to respect the democratic will of the Palestinian people could have profound ripple effects across the region, across the Arab world and among the entire Muslim population.

Bush's speech of June 24 2004 remains a litmus test of US goodwill and intent. He required Palestinians to 'elect new leaders...not compromised by terror' and urges them 'to build a practicing democracy' – as a prelude to entering into negotiations with Israel and US support for any initiative. If this is disrespected in this new post-Arafat context, then US attempts to democratise Iraq and the region - as espoused in the Greater Middle East Initiative – will surely fail.

ENCOURAGING SIGNS – NEAR AND FAR

Before Arafat's recent decline and passing, Ariel Sharon apparently wanted any peace process to stop, or be stopped, after and by the Gaza withdrawal. The idea may well have been to wait until a new generation of Palestinian leaders emerges, in 10-15 years time – and when demographic issues in the west Bank combined with the security fence may have created a different reality for any process. However, the new generation are knocking at the door already, and any new Palestinian leadership, even if they are largely Arafat's men, will have to enter into a compact with the new guard, both Hamas and the younger elements of Fatah itself.

In any case, the context has changed with Arafat's passing. Encouragingly, Sharon may well be going along with this changed reality, as seen by his November 19 statement that the Palestinians no longer have to tackle militant groups ahead of a resumption of negotiations.

The US role in influencing Israeli politics – particularly the right, is crucial also in the sense that a confrontation with Washington led to the fall of the previous Likud prime ministers, Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu. This will weigh heavily on Sharon's mind as he ponders how to deal with a revived peace process and the possibility of a change on tone from Bush's compliance with Sharon's policies on the West bank and Gaza.

For their part, the US had Colin Powell in Jerusalem last week – a good signal of a positive engagement by the new Bush administration, but one that must be tempered with the fact that Powell is coming to the end of his tenure as Secretary of State, and we cannot know how seriously the Israelis or Palestinians were taking his diplomacy as the Middle gospel according to Bush, or more pertinently, how well they were supposed to take it.

Also encouraging, though at a sub-policy level was the November 26th Defense Science Board (a Pentagon Advisory Panel) warning that US talk of bringing democracy to Muslim nations is seen as 'self-serving hypocrisy', citing the chaos and suffering endured by the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the report states, 'Muslims do not hate our freedom, they hate our policies' and 'the overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favour of Israel and against Palestinian rights'.

However, it remains to be seen whether a US administration can muster the pragmatism necessary to deliver. A sincere, even devout, desire to bring democracy to the Middle East needs to be conditioned by even-handedness in how the regional protagonists are viewed in Washington. However, this requires what are unashamed ideologues to contradict their own worldview. This set of precepts, popularised as neo-conservatism, equally unashamedly does not see Israel as in any way a cause of conflict, or see its own alliance with Israel as a potential hindrance to the aim of spreading democracy elsewhere, given that this same alliance is regarded as unconditional and not offset by what Arabs see as Israeli oppression of Palestinians.

M I D D L E E A S T D E A L I N G = T R A N S A T L A N T I C H E A L I N G ?

The US could use the European interest in Middle East peace to its own advantage elsewhere. While this again requires some more ideological revision by an administration predisposed to unilateralism - it also requires the EU to vary its policy of being 'the Palestinian partner' to being an entity that can engage both sides effectively. The US must become more than just the Israeli ally - something that could improve its standing across the Arab and Muslim world.

The US could reasonably demand a greater European input into Iraq as part of any commitment to change in the Middle East. While this would imply retrospective revisionism of some European positions on the invasion of Iraq, it is likely that an acceptable formula for this could be worked out in the event of the US moving on resolution in the Middle East.

The reality of transatlantic economic interdependence and weariness with transatlantic squabbling means that – despite the cultural and ideological divisions separating the Bush administration from many of its European counterparts – some peace-building of a different sort is both required and desired, from Boston to Brussels to Berlin. Certainly, this cannot have been far from Tony Blair’s mind when he sought Bush’s word that the Middle East would be prioritised in the latter’s second term in office.

The wholly pragmatic and mutually-beneficial quid pro quo outlined above – Israel-Palestine for Iraq – would allow the US and Europe re-engage on a set of common purposes that would require negotiation, interaction, reciprocity and demonstrated goodwill. However, this does not mean that both sides are going to suddenly see the world in a similar light, or that a common European foreign policy will emerge on the back of such a process. As regards transatlantic relations, the competing views of American hegemony as espoused in the 2002 National Security Strategy and the French desire for a multipolar world remain fundamentally at odds – as do many intra-European foreign policies, generally conceived. However, there is a common EU position on the Middle East, and this can be used as part of a give-and-take process with the US, in terms of the greater Middle East region. Bush previously believed that the road to Jerusalem ran through Baghdad – a metaphor developed into policy by policymakers in Washington. Europeans may well be able to convince Bush that the metaphor is actually the other way round.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Oxford Council on Good Governance presents the following advice to the key actors in the Middle East in order to facilitate peace:

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PALESTINE AUTHORITY

1. Take all feasible measures to curb terrorist attacks on Israel territory, notably indiscriminate violence against Israeli civilians.
2. Take all measures possible and necessary to ensure free and fair elections in the Palestinian territories.
3. Hold a referendum on the issue of Israel's existence and a two-state solution, with full support given to agreement with both.
4. Engage in a cohesive and inclusive internal dialogue to ensure that all aspects of political opinion are included in any post-election negotiating process.
5. Engage forcefully and creatively with Israel and the international community if and when a negotiation process resumes.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO HAMAS, ISLAMIC JIHAD, AND AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE

1. Cease all attacks on unarmed and innocent Israeli citizens.

2. Cease all attacks on Israeli territory.
3. Offer full support for any Palestinian negotiating partner as elected by the Palestinian people.
4. Contribute to the creation and development of a functioning and sustainable democratic political system in the Palestinian Territories.
5. Recognise Israel's existence and the political legitimacy of a two-state solution.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ISRAEL

1. Facilitate and assist in the staging of elections in the Palestinian Territories by utilising all means necessary and feasible without compromising security for Israeli civilians.
2. Engage with the PA on a phased and mutually-agreeable prisoner release programme.
3. Relax border controls and checkpoints between the Occupied Territories and Israel.
4. Halt construction of the security fence.
5. Ease travel restrictions for Palestinian political figures and civilians.
6. Engage in dialogue with an elected Palestinian leadership on a withdrawal from Gaza.
7. Cease settlement building in the West Bank.

8. End all targeted assassinations of Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities.
9. Recognise the democratically-expressed will of the Palestinian people by engaging sincerely in a peace process with an elected negotiating partner.
10. Fully account for its own nuclear capability and agree to negotiate denuclearisation under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as part of regional peace process whereby Iran and Israel establish diplomatic relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. Offer financial and other support to cross-community and civil society peacebuilding initiatives as a complement to and built into any official peace process, with requirements that Israel and the PA facilitate such work.
2. Give all necessary diplomatic and material support to the staging of Palestinian Presidential and legislative elections.
3. Respect the democratically-expressed will of the Palestinian people, and thus, Re-engage with PA leadership as part of any peace process.
4. Condition military and financial assistance for Israel on a commitment to working with a viable Palestinian partner.
5. Take steps to ensure that political resolution of the Middle East conflict is done on a regional basis.

6. Offer international partners in the process, including key Arab and Muslim states, and with an emphasis on the EU and member-states, a clear role based on their own interests and capabilities, and as part of a regional process dealing with conflict elsewhere, particularly Iraq.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N T O S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N

1. Participate fully in any peace process, supporting an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and engaging with Israel to resolve mutual differences and establishing diplomatic solutions.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S T O T H E I R A N

1. Cease all military and financial support for Hezbollah as part of the above.

2. Recognise Israel's right to exist and establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.

3. Fully account for its own nuclear capability and to disarm under the terms of the NPT and as part of a regional peace process and engagement with Israel.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N T O S A U D I A R A B I A , E G Y P T , A N D J O R D A N

1. Cooperate in attaining full diplomatic recognition for Israel by all Arab League member states, as part of a viable peace process between Israel and the PA, as outlined in the Abdullah Peace Plan of 2002, where this fits in with the Roadmap, and/or any new agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. Take full and accountable measures to counteract anti-semitism in member states, by a mixture of public diplomacy, awareness raising and due process against offenders.
2. Consider a Peace fund for Israel-Palestine along the lines of the Peace Programmes for Northern Ireland.
3. Engage with the Israeli government as an equal partner and avoid any intimations of partiality.
4. Demand and ensure full financial accountability for funds allocated to the PA.
5. Work in a spirit of partnership and compromise with the US on conflict resolution in the Middle East and the wider region, with particular reference to Iraq, but to do the latter at the level of member-state contributions if necessary.

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