GLOBAL EUROPE

Report 3: Rescuing the State: Europe's Next Challenge

Edited by Malcolm Chalmers

Contributors:
Michael von der Schulenburg
Julian Braithwaite

The Foreign Policy Centre
British Council
The European Commission
***In association with* Wilton Park**

GLOBAL EUROPE

Global Europe is a project devised by **The Foreign Policy Centre** (London) to promote new thinking on the EU's evolution as an international actor. Its goal is to provide concrete policy recommendations concerning the *European Security Strategy* and new initiatives for European action. An overview of its approach is set out in *Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy* by Mark Leonard and Richard Gowan (available at http://fpc.org.uk/publications/).

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1. *Effective Multilateralism*, edited by Espen Barth Eide
2. *New Terms of Engagement*, edited by Richard Youngs
3. *Rescuing the State: Europe's Next Challenge*, edited by Malcolm Chalmers
4. *Institutions and Identity*, edited by Richard Gowan

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Malcolm Chalmers *(editor)* is Professor of International Politics at the University of Bradford.

Michael von der Schulenburg was formerly Director of Management and Finance, OSCE.

Julian Braithwaite was until recently Director of Communications in the Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown.

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Foreword

British Council Brussels is committed to posing questions about Europe that extend beyond short-term wrangling, and to creating spaces for fresh thinking and creative new partnerships. With *Global Europe,* we aim to stimulate honest, open debate about the future of European security, rather than arrive at consensus. Some of the essays in this pamphlet, like the issues themselves, are controversial. None express a British Council viewpoint. They are the work of individual authors of distinction from whom we have sought views.

Over the past year, *Global Europe* has brought together over 200 thinkers from across the EU and wider Europe. This pamphlet is part of a series tackling four of the most pressing policy areas for the EU: the series also includes *Effective Multilateralism*, edited by Espen Barth Eide, *New Terms of Engagement,* edited by Richard Youngs*;* and *Institutions and Identity,* edited by Richard Gowan. This series of pamphlets reflects the insights of a series of seminars in Brussels, London and Oslo, and an experts' retreat at Wilton Park in June 2004.

Global Europe is part of a programme which addresses broad questions of security, identity, democracy and migration in Europe. Our work in partnership with The Foreign Policy Centre is one element of our creative programme aimed at putting such issues on the European agenda.

Ray Thomas, Director
Sharon Memis, Head Europe Programme
British Council Brussels

Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*

Preface

If the European Union has begun to develop a strategic identity, it is rooted in state-building. From the early 1990s, the need to respond to the failure of Yugoslavia has been a driving force in the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Today, the EU has primary responsibility for both the security and economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina – it is expected to become predominant in Kosovo in the years ahead. Beyond the Balkans, European funds have contributed to the foundations of a Palestinian state and governance projects worldwide.

The EU has thus contributed to state-building in both post-conflict situations where its members have a military presence, and in territories where it does not enjoy such hard power. As we argued in launching the *Global Europe* project, Europe has "developed a new type of power that starts not with geopolitics but with domestic politics."[1]

Yet the EU's reputation as a maker of states is not secure. As the 2003 *European Security Strategy* explicitly recognised, the business of Bosnia is not yet over. That of Kosovo appears, if anything, even more intractable. Further afield, four processes are beginning to test Europe's commitment to, and capacity for, state-building:

1. The enlargement of the EU towards regions of instability;
2. The post-9/11 linkage of state-building and confronting terrorism;
3. The EU's increased focus on African conflicts;
4. A growth in doubts about state-building as a strategy *per se.*

The essays in this pamphlet offer a strong case for a continued EU commitment to state-building – but a form of state-building

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[1] Mark Leonard and Richard Gowan, *Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy* (Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).

based on rethinking many current practices and assumptions. As **Malcolm Chalmers** and **Julian Braithwaite** note, it is in part a distinctly *European* case, drawing on the Union's internal experiences. But it is the issues of enlargement, terrorism and Africa that give it urgency.

The challenge of enlargement is the clearest. The expansion of the Union to a divided Cyprus and the borders of Moldova has brought it into closer proximity with a variety of small wars and frozen conflicts. Combined with growing awareness of the volatility of the Southern Mediterranean, this process has spawned a "Wider Neighbourhood" policy intended to bring strategic stability to the EU's periphery. But in cases such as Moldova, Georgia and the Palestinian territories, stability will be unachievable without long-term assistance towards political reconciliation, solid governance and economic growth.

Such cases are unlikely to demand the sort of military-civilian structures in place in the Balkans. Nor could they ever be exclusively European projects: there can be no solution in Moldova without Russia, no Israeli-Palestinian agreement without the USA. But the extent to which European states and institutions are prepared to underwrite state-building in these countries will be crucial to their stability – and to the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.

But if the EU must take on burdens in its region, the ramifications of terrorism represent a potentially greater threat to our coherence and reputation. Since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, state-building has been increasingly treated as a corollary of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation. And in Afghanistan and Iraq, European institutions and governments have engaged in the task of rebuilding the physical and political infrastructures of the state. In both, this engagement has had mixed results.

In the case of Afghanistan, European leaders have played an important part in overseeing the development of a constitutional state, building on the Bonn agreement. They have also provided

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a large percentage of the funds for its achievement. But the international community's resources and rhetoric have not been sufficient to quell an opium economy and continued (if reduced) political divisions.

In Iraq, by contrast, European divisions over the high politics of the invasion have hindered the process of reconstruction at all levels. As Richard Youngs has noted, the EU member-states managed to agree a "positive and constructive" common paper on Iraq in June 2004, but "officials have lamented the limited impact" this has had. More broadly, "no clear state-building strategy has been elaborated to guide aid work."[2] Even if the Iraqi case has been exceptionally problematic, this un-strategic approach should act as a warning: if we believe that state-building is a long-term answer to threats to our own security, we cannot go about it piece-meal.

While our practices in Iraq have been imperfect, our attitude to Africa may prove equally divisive. There is a growing trend of argument that the EU should take a primary role not only in the continent's economic development but also in its security. State-building surely stands at the nexus of the two. Yet, in Africa, the EU often appears ready to leave the task to other organisations, most obviously the UN. While this is arguably justifiable in terms of our resources and international legitimacy, it places practical limitations on the EU's strategic reach.

This has been underlined by the aftermath of *Operation Artemis*, the militarily successful EU operation in the Ituri region of the eastern Congo of 2003. This was launched to assist a hard-pressed UN mission (MONUC) and prevent the area from slipping into anarchy. The operation lasted for a pre-set period of three months, after which MONUC resumed full responsibility – the UN mandate included state-building issues. But after *Artemis*, the erosion of order recommenced, and the

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[2] Richard Youngs, *Europe and Iraq: From Stand-off to Engagement*, (Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).

International Crisis Group has since reported that Ituri has all but reverted to its former state.

This reaffirms the need for better-developed strategic frameworks for peace-building and state-building. Outside the Balkans, the EU seems to have faltered both in identifying such frameworks and mustering the resources to put them into practice. A 2004 European Parliament report concluded that "the EU rushes from case to case on an ever-larger watch-list." Another review of Europe's ability to respond to African crises was harsher: "the EU needs to vastly increase its capacity to play a greater role in dealing with politically fragile countries - this is not helped by institutional infighting".[3]

The EU is, in short, approaching the limits of it present state-building capacity. After the launch of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia in 2004, officials in Brussels admitted that the member-states had insufficient manpower to launch another such mission. A European pool of two hundred legal professionals has been created to assist in post-conflict situations – but this is held in low regard by many observers. 2004 saw the launch of a six-country European *gendarmerie*, to be put on standby for future emergencies, but in other areas inter-state and inter-institutional co-ordination remains poor.

Concerted efforts are required to resolve these dilemmas. The EU should match the proposals of the 2004 UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel Report, which has called for a UN "peace-building commission" with an attached secretariat. Within the US State Department, a post-conflict section has been formed to avoid future Iraqs. Unless it matches such reforms, the EU's claim to state-building skills will suffer.

But these practical issues are overshadowed by the fourth challenge to state-building: a widespread loss of faith in its

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[3] P. Ferreira et al, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: Opportunities for a more effective EU response to crisis affected countries in Africa,' *ECDPM Report* (2002).

efficacy. Spikes of violence in Kosovo and the ongoing troubles of Afghanistan have created concern that state-building simply does not work in many (or even most) cases – Iraq has only given this argument added venom. Some of those, such as Michael Ignatieff, who strongly advocated state-building in the 1990s, have now expressed unease over the techniques used by governments, international organisations and NGOs. In this pamphlet, **Michael von der Schulenburg** underlines the extent to which these techniques have been counter-productive, undermining the states they supposedly construct.

Yet recent episodes point to the need to reform our state-building practices, not to renounce them altogether. As von der Schulenburg argues, there are potentially more effective approaches to reconstructing local communities and authorities. These require both new technologies and new doctrines. If the EU is to develop strategic frameworks for state-building, they must be based on such innovations.

This pamphlet arguably outlines some of the elements of an up-dated doctrine of state-building. **Malcolm Chalmers** sets out both a definition of failing states but also the strategic goals that the EU should adopt in assisting them – goals that reflect not only post-conflict problems, but elements of Europe's social democratic heritage. **Michael von der Schulenburg** describes a new operational doctrine for state-building in the field, especially in its early phases, that demands greater respect for indigenous skills and ideas. **Julian Braithwaite** analyses the broader political, strategic and operational factors necessary for long-term state-building projects.

By building on these arguments, the EU can become more effective in its state-building activities both in its neighbourhood and in other regions. A key element of its strategic identity will be enhanced – and its "new type of power" will grow accordingly.

Richard Gowan, Matthew Hulbert and Mark Leonard

Rescuing the State – Europe's Next Challenge

Malcolm Chalmers

Introduction

Turning fragile and failed states into strong and stable ones is perhaps the most difficult security challenge of our time:

- The US armed forces were able to defeat opposing armies in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq within weeks. But building strong states has been more elusive, despite massive post-invasion efforts.
- In Africa, the international community is engaged in growing numbers of peace missions, with 50,000 troops now deployed, from Sierra Leone and Liberia to Burundi, Congo and Sudan. Even so, it is clear that a much more substantial commitment will have to be made, in order to adequately support peacebuilding efforts.
- Successful state-building is also central to solving ongoing conflicts in Palestine, Nepal and Haiti, as well as to conflict prevention in many other war-prone societies.

Growing attention to failing states has paralleled a rapid decline, over the last two decades, in authoritarian government: from 80 in 1985 to 28 in 2002.[1] Most of the dictatorships that remain – for example, in North Korea, Turkmenistan and Burma – are in severe crisis, unlikely to hold out indefinitely in the face of wider pressures for democratisation and economic reform. Those authoritarian regimes that have been economically successful – most obviously China – have so far defied the general trend towards democratisation, but only by embracing increasing economic freedom.

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[1] Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, University of Maryland.

The end of military dictatorship and communist totalitarianism has ushered in a new democratic era in large parts of the world, with the number of democracies increasing from 42 in 1985 to 83 in 2002. In Brazil, Poland and Thailand, stable multi-party democracies have been established, and democracy is being steadily solidified. Problems of poverty and acute inequality remain. But these are being addressed through the rough and tumble of non-violent democratic politics, not through coup and violent revolution. Far from state failure being the norm, most of the developing world has already transcended it.

Yet a growing number of states remain stranded in the no-man's land between stable democracy and effective dictatorship, with the number of transitional polities (or 'anocracies') estimated to have risen from 16 to 47. These states are at greatest risk of instability. In vital states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Congo and Nigeria, partial democratisation is raising expectations for change, only to frustrate them through corrupt and coercive political systems.

The problem of incomplete democratisation is particularly acute in Africa and the Middle East. Independence from colonial rule initially brought many social benefits: increased life expectancy, dramatic improvements in education, investment in infrastructure and rapid urbanisation. Yet many of these gains have not been sustained. The artificial borders drawn up by European powers handicapped the construction of the patriotism that is so vital to state-building. Equally important, militarisation and war has plagued both regions. External powers used both Africa and the Middle East as battlegrounds for their proxy conflicts, propping up predatory leaders and prolonging conflicts through covert operations and arms supplies. Today's most extreme examples of state failure – Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Congo – are the result of decades of warfare, financed and encouraged by outside powers.

States that fail have common characteristics:

- Central government loses control over large parts of national territory, the writ of its security forces often does not extend beyond the capital and major towns, and other government services – schools, courts, police – are largely absent. The government cannot enforce its laws or raise taxes.
- Political power, and the resources that go with it, is fought over by insurgents, warlords, traditional leaders and criminal gangs. Lightly-armed factions conquer large swathes of countryside with relative ease.
- Where they are strong enough, they may conquer state power, or establish a successful new breakaway state, as in East Timor and Eritrea. In the absence of such a resolution, failed states are characterised by intermittent, and often intense, conflict: a true Hobbesian nightmare.

The human consequences of state failure are profound. An effective state is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for development and peace. Only the state can provide the institutions and infrastructure – both the 'rules of the road' and the 'roads' themselves – that are needed in order to provide security. In its absence, territories become trapped in a series of vicious cycles, from which escape becomes increasingly difficult.

Especially pernicious – in failed states, and in fragile ones – is human flight. In Georgia and Armenia, as in Liberia and Iraq, whole generations of young people – nurtured in better times – have abandoned their homelands in search of safety and security elsewhere. With every departing doctor or professor, technician or bureaucrat, the ability of fragile states to renew themselves is undermined.

Europe and State-building

The problem of state failure in Asia and Africa has often been seen as a concern mainly for those EU member states who still harbour post-colonial illusions. Increasingly, though, there is a

wider awareness that state failure matters to Europe. As a result, both the EU and NATO are now involved in a series of unprecedented long-distance peace missions, notably in Congo and Afghanistan.

As the paper by Julian Braithwaite argues, state-building is an area in which Europe has much expertise. The EU's greatest historical achievement has been the rescue of the European state. In the 1940's, the prospects for building stable nation-states in Europe, at peace with their neighbours, seemed as remote as in much of Africa today. Yet today Europe has more than 40 such states, with their sovereignty immeasurably strengthened by the success of the institutions established after 1945.

The EU has been so successful at state-building precisely because it is not a state, but a matrix: a complex framework of mutual obligations, rights and processes that bind states together, and thus allow them to co-exist peacefully. The EU is not an attempt to create an old-style European empire. Nor is it a new, benign form of imperialism, of the type in vogue in academic circles in the US (especially amongst those nostalgic for the British Empire). Prospective members of the European Union are not asked to give up their sovereignty, submit to a foreign potentate, or accept a second-class status. Instead, they are offered a more attractive, and state-enhancing, bargain: reform and modernisation, in return for market access and money. Most of all, the EU offers dignity: full membership in the club, and the ability to share in making its rules.

Beyond Enlargement

Europe has not yet reached the limits of enlargement. Even so, it cannot be extended forever. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia will never be EU members: not because they are not European culturally (Canada and Argentina have as much claim in this respect as Ukraine or Turkey); or even because they are much poorer (Romania is less

prosperous than Brazil, and Singapore is richer than Spain). Rather, the EU's borders are constricted because geography still matters. The EU works because it responds to patterns of economic and security interdependence. As long as these are geographically-based, so too will be the European Union.

If EU enlargement is not the answer to tackling the problem of fragile states in Asia or Africa, however, nor is some new form of imperialism. Not only have Europeans and Americans not got the will for such an effort, except possibly in a few exceptional cases. More importantly, the world has moved on since the nineteenth century British Empire. The peoples of the Middle East and Africa are incomparably better educated, more urbanised, and above all more nationalistic, than they were at the heyday of European empire. There is no constituency for empire, because it is a concept that is fundamentally inconsistent with a liberal international order.

The key to tackling state failure, therefore, is not to find an alternative to the state, but to seek means of strengthening it, based on a mobilisation and empowering of progressive and liberal patriotic forces.[2]

It can be done. In the centuries before 1945, it looked as if Europe had no alternative but to choose between never-ending, and increasingly brutal, tribal wars or an imperial peace imposed by a single hegemonic power. Today, the same false choice is sometimes posed for Africa and the Middle East. But Europe's experience – and indeed that of South America and East Asia – points to a third way: strong states, embedded in strong regions, and underpinned by supportive external guarantees. Like Europe's leaders in 1945, today's African and Middle Eastern

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[2] The paper builds on the thesis of the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which argued that states have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe; but that, when they are unwilling or unable to do so, the broader community of states has a responsibility to intervene to prevent disaster and to assist in the rebuilding of legitimate state authority. ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001.

leaders are increasingly aware that another path is needed if they are to avoid more of the same.

If the key challenge is to create strong states in strong regions, though, what are the main ways through which Europe can help to translate this aspiration into reality for today's fragile and failing states? In this short paper, let me highlight five:

- Ending War
- Building State Capacity
- Investing in Security
- Connecting People to the State
- Strengthening Regions

Ending War

There are now fewer armed conflicts under way than at any time since the early 1970s, with 29 conflicts active in 2003, compared with 51 in 1991.[3] If account is also taken of their growing number, the proportion of countries that are conflict-affected is now the lowest since the early 1950s. Slowly, but surely, peace is breaking out.

Much of the credit for this trend should go to the UN. Since the mid 1990s, the international community has become increasingly unwilling to allow conflicts to continue, and has devoted more efforts to stopping them. Today, in Africa alone, 50,000 soldiers are deployed in eight separate conflict zones. More will have to be done to strengthen this capacity, with military missions in Congo and Sudan, in particular, grossly under-manned and under-equipped. But the trend is in the right direction; and with further international commitment – not least from Europe – further progress can be made in ending the wars that have devastated Africa for so long.

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[3] Mikael Eriksson et al, 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2003', *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, 5, 2004.

As the experience in Iraq has demonstrated all too well, too much intervention can cause as much harm as too little. The use of military force to topple dictatorships, however loathsome, needs to be approached with particular care, lest it unleash a process of state failure for which the intervening powers have no solutions.

While the US's approach to forcible regime change has come under increasing criticism, European approaches to the use of military force – derided by some in Washington – are more relevant to tackling the complex problems posed by most modern conflicts. Moreover, Europe is now getting its act together more than ever before. EU military planners are now focusing on the need to develop rapidly deployable forces that are able to act effectively as part of multilateral peace operations. If it is fully implemented, the November 2004 decision by EU Defence Ministers to develop up to ten 'Battle Groups' is a major step in this direction.

The EU also has much to do to strengthen other conflict prevention capacities. Its diplomatic and mediation capabilities, increasingly effective within Europe itself, need to develop further in relation to Africa and Asia. It needs to be better able to respond rapidly with the deployment of civilian experts into crisis situations, as discussed in Michael von der Schulenburg's paper in this volume. It should strongly support the proposals of the 2004 High-level UN Panel, and in particular its recommendation for a Peacebuilding Commission that integrates international conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

Most of all, though, ending conflict depends on the ability to broker a political settlement that is inclusive, equitable and liberating: laying the foundations for the long process of state-building. The ultimate responsibility for such a project must, by its nature, lie with the leaders of the state itself. But there is much that outsiders, including the EU and its member states, can do to support such a project.

Building State Capacity

Curbing conflict and getting the political framework right are essential first steps. But turning round state failure also requires the development of strong and effective national institutions. Policies are only as good as their implementation. Yet a central characteristic of failing and fragile states is that they lack sufficient capacity to implement their policies. Doing so takes time, and it is important not to overload weak institutions with excessive demands, or resources, that they cannot effectively absorb. Even so, there is much that the international community can do to support the development of state capacity.

As both Braithwaite and von der Schulenburg suggest, streamlining the international community's operations would be an important step in the right direction. Too often, weak post-conflict governments are overwhelmed by a multiplicity of conflicting external demands from well-wishers, as each aid agency and NGO seeks to fit the recipient government into its own programmes and procedures. Even worse, all too often international agencies and NGOs hire the best local personnel to ensure that their own operations run effectively. Even as millions are spent on expensive imported personnel and equipment, the national government finds itself starved of the resources even to pay adequate salaries to its own key personnel. Rather than building capacity, international interventions all too often undermine it.

This problem cannot be avoided altogether in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In order to minimise its extent and duration, however, international donors – including the EU – need to redeploy their energies as speedily as possible into state-building, and not just project-implementation:

- Skilled local personnel should be given support to work for their own governments.

- External experts should be used to build the capacity of the government, as advisors, managers and line workers. Local knowledge should be valued and rewarded.
- Donors should minimise duplication, and be more aware of the transaction costs their current approaches impose on weak recipient governments.
- If a key object of external assistance is to build commitment to the local state, then the main flag that is flown must be the home flag.
- Donors should move as rapidly as possible to direct funding of the local government, when appropriate safeguards can be put in place.
- Donors should commit to long-term support, rather than subject recipients to short-term target-setting that would be unworkable even in their own societies.
- Less 'aid' spending should go on shiny new capital projects, and more on day-to-day running costs: the health workers without whom ARVs cannot reach AIDS patients, the rural teachers without whom schools remain empty.

Investing in Security

If state failure is characterised, most of all, by the state's failure to control its own territory, then state-building requires a reassertion of that control. Foreign forces can assist the government in this task. Ultimately, however, it requires national forces that can defeat armed opponents and underwrite the state's authority throughout its territory. The success or failure of current state-building in both Afghanistan and Iraq clearly depends on their governments' ability to rebuild effective national armies, capable of outfighting, or absorbing, the many insurgents and warlords that currently threaten their survival. At the same time, security forces are also called upon to perform many other tasks essential to national development, from guarding borders against smugglers to fighting criminality.

The construction of effective national security forces is not an easy task. All too often, security forces in fragile states are

ineffective, corrupt, riddled with factionalism, dominated by patronage, and uninterested in the security concerns of ordinary citizens. Security forces can often be a threat to democratic governments, rather than a source of security for them. Such concerns often result in donors seeing security sector reform as just 'too difficult' for them to support. Such an approach is misguided. Rather, the security sector is too important to state-building to be left alone. This requires security forces that are both effective and accountable, operating within the law and providing security for citizens.

This does not mean that donors should give a blank cheque for military spending. But they should engage seriously with governments that argue that investment in security can be as important for development as investment in roads or schools. Donors, including the EU, are now prepared to support African peacekeeping forces, recognising the important contribution they can make to the containment and resolution of regional conflicts. They should also be prepared to support investment in national armed forces, when this can clearly be justified in terms of national state-building and development priorities. In Sierra Leone, for example, if the impending withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces is not to lead to a return to conflict, it will be vital that the reformed army and police are able to support the re-establishment of legitimate order in diamond-rich eastern provinces.

The case for increased attention to security sector reform is especially strong for police forces, the front-line of the state in fragile societies, but all too often the cinderella service in military-dominated security sectors. Effective and accountable police forces are an important element in building strong and stable states, and in protecting human rights and security. Donors, including the EU, should be prepared to support police reform with increased resources.

Not least, Western powers need to be careful not to overwhelm security sector reform agendas, driven by local needs, with the requirements of the Global War on Terror. The massive

resources associated with the latter can seriously distort local security policies, diverting them from addressing problems of direct national concern.

Connecting People to the State

After 1945, European democracies were able to combine economic success with social harmony through the adoption of comprehensive welfare states. Market economics was made politically acceptable, after the trauma of the Great Depression, by guarantees of full employment, enhanced universal social security safety nets, and improved social services. Conservative models of development, popular before the defeat of Nazism, gave way to a social/Christian democratic consensus. This consensus remains the basis of European political order up to the present day.

This approach is of particular relevance to middle-income states, in the Middle East and Latin America, which already have average levels of GDP per head similar to Western Europe in 1950. But, with external support, they can also offer much even to poorer countries. Amongst the areas in which investment can and should be considered are:

- Moving towards universal basic health and education. With political will, there is much that can be done in this area relatively quickly. In Afghanistan, millions more children have started going to school since the ousting of the Taliban. In many African countries, after the recent abolition of primary school fees, enrolments are now rising.

- Public works and training programmes. Even if not efficient in narrowly financial terms, these can have enormous potential to soak up excess unemployment, providing basic levels of income to the 'angry young men' who are otherwise a continuing source of instability in fragile societies.

- Basic income safety nets, especially for the disabled and elderly. As family support networks fray, under pressure from urbanisation and AIDS, an increasing number of countries are experimenting with the provision of minimal state pensions.

None of these welfare services can be provided in failed states. In many states at risk of failure, however – and with donor support – there is much that can be done. As in Europe in the post-war period, moreover, the purpose of investing in such services is both humanitarian and political. For, by giving individuals clear and visible benefits from the government – largely absent in many fragile states – it strengthens the process of state-building, and thus helps to deter rebellion and disaffection.

Strengthening Regions

The final lesson from the European experience is that strong states need strong regions. In much of Africa, in particular, countries' neighbours are too often a source of insecurity and underdevelopment. For example, Uganda, one of the continent's success stories in terms of poverty reduction and growth, remains vulnerable to the spillover effects of conflicts in eastern DRC and southern Sudan, with internal rebels being supplied from these neighbouring conflict zones. The ability of Sierra Leone to maintain its current fragile peace depends, to a significant extent, on events on its eastern border with Liberia, itself still at a difficult stage in its peace process. Even in Southern Africa, which has made considerable progress since the democratic transition in 1994, the collapsing economy in Zimbabwe threatens regional stability.

Yet there has been considerable progress in strengthening regional and sub-regional organisations, both in Africa and elsewhere. As in Europe, these organisations have often started with relatively limited mandates, and have gradually become more ambitious and more significant. In south-east Asia, ASEAN

has played a key role in supporting common security concepts since the 1960's, helping to underpin the economic development of this region during that time. More recently, in both Latin America – the South American Community of Nations – and Africa – the African Union – the European model is an explicit frame of reference for governments in different parts of the world. In the Middle East, by contrast, the absence of regional cooperation is all too evident, with accusations of destabilisation – especially from Israel and Iraq – undermining trust, fuelling the proliferation of WMD, and threatening new wars. Without regional cooperation, the prospects for successful state-building in this region will be much reduced.

Resources for Development

Yet, with so many demands on it, a new EU commitment to tackling the problem of fragile and failing states will not come cheap. Opening markets for developing country producers is important, both in the North and through regional trade liberalisation. But those who will benefit most will be countries like Brazil and South Africa that already have considerable capacity to respond flexibly to emerging market opportunities. In fragile low-income states, by comparison, external aid will have to play a central role in building state capacity for many years, until domestic tax revenues grow sufficiently to make aid unnecessary.

At present, however, too high a proportion of aid flows have been to countries in intense crisis, responding to immediate humanitarian emergencies. The most extreme example of this is Iraq, which is currently attracting US aid equivalent to more than total OECD aid to sub-Saharan Africa.

Yet, as experience in Iraq and elsewhere suggests, spending money effectively in countries at conflict can be highly inefficient: building schools only to have them blown up by insurgents. By comparison, investments in fragile – but not yet failing – states

can have a greater, if less immediate, return in terms of long-term stability.

Here, the EU should have a comparative advantage, given its experience of forming long-term relationships with applicant states. But investing in protection against state failure raises a series of new challenges for the EU and its member states that will require a major reorientation of their approaches. This pamphlet is a contribution to the debate on how such a reorientation might be achieved.

Peace-building Needs More Effective Tools

Michael von der Schulenburg

Recent military interventions in so-called failing states have brought back to us the old wisdom that peace cannot be won by military force alone. Military interventions must be accompanied by civilian interventions that take over peace-building operations with the aim of re-establishing a stable new local government, viable state institutions and functioning public services.[1] Civilian interventions are thus critical to winning the hearts and minds of the local population and so create stability and give peace a real chance. Yet we must ask whether international civilian interventions are up to this task.

Peace-building can only be as effective as the operational instruments and tools at the disposal of such civilian interventions for turning policies into concrete actions in the field. The problem apparent in many recent peace-building efforts – whether or not they are accompanied by military interventions – is not so much the result of ineffective policies, but rather because civilian interventions have had ineffective tools to implement those policies. This is most evident in international civilian interventions in failing or failed states.

It is, therefore, important to pay closer attention to analysing what works and what does not work in peace-building, and to have a fresh look at what could be done to improve the way civilian interventions are organised and conducted. This article focuses mainly on international assistance to post-conflict reconstruction as part of overall peace-building operations in failing states. It sets out to identify present short-comings and

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[1] The term 'civilian intervention' is used intentionally to emphasise the special character of international peace-building operations in a failing or failed state as compared to traditional international assistance programmes that take place at the request of an existing government. The term also helps to draw attention to the similarities with military interventions.

proposes three tool-sets that could be developed to make civilian interventions more effective and, ultimately, more credible.

The Credibility Gap

The *International Herald Tribune* recently described Iraq as a 'reconstruction fiasco'. This is not attributable to a lack of money – Iraq received one of the largest pledges in external financial assistance in recent history and is able to rely on considerable internal resources. The problem has been the lack of concrete plans for what should be done after the fall of Saddam's regime. The initial military success was not followed up by actions to secure and build peace. In other words, the military intervention was not matched by a sufficiently credible civilian intervention to rebuild local government infrastructures and local institutions able to provide security, basic justice and vital social services to the people of Iraq.

This has left a vacuum at a most critical time and further contributed to the deterioration of the security situation. Iraq may be the most flagrant recent example of the difficulties caused by botched civilian interventions, but it is surely not the only one. Indeed, most – if not all – international interventions in failing or failed states are plagued by serious problems of delivering on promises that were made to the populations in those countries.

In Afghanistan, two and a half years after the Taliban were ousted from power by a military operation, the actual results of reconstruction efforts and the impact on the lives of most Afghans are at best modest in spite of overwhelming international support for a new interim government and the disbursement of over US$2 billion in foreign assistance. When asked to describe the impact of international assistance on the lives of average Afghans, a high UN official replied bluntly: "probably not much!" In Kosovo, five years after a benevolent autocracy of an international administration took over and spent billions in foreign assistance, electricity supplies (so critical for

any economic recovery) remain highly unreliable and Kosovars continue to be subjected to long hours without light and heating.[2]

At the same time, people in these countries continue to hear from the radio and other media of international donor conferences in which, for them, often astronomical amounts in international assistance are being pledged. Those living in capital cities witness new offices being set up of all sorts of international organisations, agencies, NGOs and, more recently, also of private sector companies. They become used to acronyms of aid organisations they never knew existed and to seeing long lines of white four-wheel-drive vehicles with a myriad of walky-talky-waving international civil servants, experts and well-intentioned aid workers rushing through their narrow streets. They quickly learn that the best paid jobs are not with their own administrations but with those foreigners that have come to support those local administrations.

All of this tends to create a parasitic, unsustainable – but very visible and hence resented – local economy that caters to a large expatriate community and their entourage. This brings with it special labor markets, rent markets, special shops, antique dealers, restaurants, bars and other less salubrious services. It is no wonder that the discrepancy between stated policies and the reality on the ground quickly develop into a **credibility gap** that leaves the local population wondering about the real intentions of an international intervention.

A recent BBC Pashto Service programme aired the plight of the Afghans who complained that people have not seen any basic improvement in their daily lives and asked where the promised foreign assistance had gone. These Afghans probably spoke for many of their compatriots. An Iraqi school director north of Baghdad expressed similar sentiments of many Iraqis when he criticised, on an N-TV programme, the substandard renovation

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[2] In the region north of Mitrovice/a, electricity supplies are more reliable – they come from Serbia. Ironically, a number of international experts have moved from the south to live in the north to benefit from more stable electricity supplies.

job on his school, carried out under a contract with with a large US-based construction company for an alleged US$ 120,000. "We could have done a much better job for US$ 10,000," was his sad – and most likely correct – conclusion. One may also note that in Haiti, people have taken the French abbreviation for international organisations (O.I.) and harshly dubbed them 'organisations inutiles'.

Even in countries where an international community was welcomed as liberators, the anger over cumbersome international assistance practices quickly changed local attitudes. In October 2000 Xanana Gusmao expressed East Timorese frustrations, arguing that the nation's experience is limited to watching hundreds of international experts and consultants being driven around Dili, receiving a succession of regulations passed by a UN administration and being reduced to the status of "observers in their own country". Similarly, one minister in Kosovo has declared that his local administration is now in competition with the international community over competencies.

Hamid Karzai, on whom a great deal of hope lies for a stable future Afghanistan, could have spoken for most of the so-called recipient States of foreign generosity when he stated at the 2002 donor conference for Afghanistan: "there are too many groups of donors, reconstruction groups, assistance groups. I don't know the names of all of them…" He went on to criticise long bureaucratic delays and the constant demands by such groups for new reports.

For the local population, reconstruction and with it hopes for new opportunities and a better life are the most important and tangible aspects of peace-building. Whatever the initial resentment to foreign intervention – in particular military intervention – may have been, it will always be mixed with high expectations that things *will* get better. Western countries and the economic well-being they have been able to create for their societies are greatly admired. It is Western economic wealth that is so attractive to local populations - they may not necessarily

also subscribe to the associated political and social value systems.

In this context, effective and efficient international reconstruction and economic assistance programmes are key to a local society, which has (in most cases) gone through long periods of disturbance, increased poverty and traumatic experiences. It is, therefore, surprising how hastily this strong suit is dissipated. Once on the ground, international assistance quickly ceases to represent modern, transparent and efficient management that could create new opportunities and wealth. Furthermore, as in Kosovo and Iraq, when the international community starts to tap into local revenues to pay for their presence and assistance programmes, the loss in credibility, trust and goodwill may be irrecoverable. The limitations and inefficiencies of international assistance programmes are seen with such disbelief by even educated local groups that some argue the real reason for those failures must be a deliberate and sinister plan to keep target societies poor, dependent and exploitable.

It does not take much for hope to turn into disillusionment, for high expectation to turn into deep resentment and formerly welcomed international intervention to turn into an unwelcome and ineffective foreign domination.

Unintended Consequences

We have all seen pictures of Western politicians and famous goodwill ambassadors holding babies and promoting the work of one aid organisation or another. For the Western viewers, this gives the comforting feeling that donations arrive where they are needed, and are doing the most good. Local viewers may see things differently. They perceive foreigners – not their own new government – providing more care for them, fueling accusations that the government is simply a puppet regime at the mercy of international support. Such publicity, therefore, represents a missed opportunity to promote the capacity of the new local government (instead of an international organisation) and to help

it in establishing its credentials within their country by delivering a "peace-dividend" to its people.

Traditional tools of international assistance to failing states include inter-agency needs assessment missions, joint consolidated appeals, international donors and pledging conferences, multiple trust funds, and the mushrooming of post-conflict units in most international organisations. Yet all these mechanisms do not appear to do the job of reconstruction, or at least do not do it effectively enough. No doubt, each international aid organisation can report real achievements, but the total of their individual achievements appears just not to add up to a greater total. They tend to make reconstruction efforts supply–oriented as well as create an elite international community that marginalises local initiatives. While the key issue in failing states should be to create functioning local institutions, international assistance tends to take over and to sideline local administrations. The ***unintended consequence*** of such international assistance approaches is to weaken – in the extreme cases even to undermine – the very local governments they have come to "assist".

Strong international support for a peace process in a failed state and large donor pledges usually trigger a rush of equally large numbers of international organisations, multi-lateral development banks, bi-lateral agencies, hundreds of NGOs and (more recently) also private sector companies. They all come with good intentions and the desire to help. However, they also come with their own priorities, development approaches and aid conditions. Despite declarations to the contrary, organisational priorities and not local requirements will quickly dictate the nature and approaches of international assistance programmes. Each organisation is usually headed by a senior representative, a director or an ambassador – all of them claiming respect and independence as well as the right to negotiate only with the highest levels of the new government. Effective coordination among such a multitude of international players – especially by a nascent new local administration – is virtually impossible.

Even in places like East Timor or Kosovo, where the international community had taken over the role of a government, international organisations still set up their separate representative offices. One can therefore find colleagues of the same organisation sitting on opposite sides of the table discussing programme priorities and the distributions of donor funding. This situation quickly takes on a life of its own, leaving the local new administrations with only a minor supporting role.

International organisations and agencies bring with them their own layers of bureaucracies. Hence local administrations will be faced with the different administrative and programmatic procedures of the various organisations and agencies operating in their country. These include different disbursement conditions, different procurement and recruitment rules, different salary scales, different reporting procedures, and so on. In many cases local governments have little or no influence on the use of assistance resources and their roles are often limited only to thanking external donors for their generosity.[3] Indeed, in many cases, local administrations have no choice but to accept international programmes and their conditions or risk loosing foreign donations. Local ownership remains at most a lukewarm long-term goal.

The national administrations quickly find themselves faced with a resource rich international sector, with large numbers of international civil servants and experts supported by the best local talents, with well equipped offices, new vehicles and other gadgets such as modern communication and IT support infrastructures. All this may appear modest from the point of view of an international expert who has agreed to work under difficult circumstances. However, seen from the local perspective, these are beyond the reach of those local administrations on whom the

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[3] Even in Afghanistan, where Hamid Karzai and his Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani aggressively pursue a policy of national ownership over international assistance programmes it is estimated that less than 20% of international donations are even somewhat managed by Afghan authorities. Over 80% of foreign aid is directly controlled and disbursed through international organisations.

long-term success or failure of international interventions ultimately depend.

Compared to local scales, international organisations and agencies pay highly inflated local salaries. This creates a local labor market in which a new government has no chance to compete. Internationally paid local salaries can be 200 to 400 times higher than those paid by the local administration; and the local administration can not even guarantee to pay on a regular basis. The employment of the most educated locals by international organisations, the NGO community, embassies, the private sector and the extensive expatriate community easily go into the tens of thousands.

In most countries this will quickly drain those local administrations of the talent that is so urgently needed for the core task of building a functioning and credible national civil service. Often local professionals find themselves in minor – but better paid jobs – for internationals. Those local professionals who are employed to do expert jobs in international organisations are lost to the government and unintentionally contribute to marginalising the role of local administrations. As a result, we have seriously weakened the ability of local governments to organise themselves and to become a visible and effective supplier of services to their people.

All this exacts a high price. The fragmentation of international assistance programmes, their dependence on international civil servants and experts and on extensive infrastructures that are required to sustain them is expensive and absorbs huge portions of the funding intended for reconstruction. The allocation of international assistance funding is often channeled through complicated loops and handed from one agency to another before it finally reaches its destination. Each transit point demands new conditions and, unfortunately, also added overhead charges, which are deducted from the originally pledged amounts. The result is that the original donor (the tax payer) gives considerably more resources than the ultimate recipient of the aid programmes will ever see. At times as little as

10 per cent of the original pledged amounts might reach those for which they had been intended.

But the largest cost of ineffective civilian interventions is the loss in credibility among the recipient local populations. As they start raising questions about the intentions, purpose and integrity of international assistance programmes, the negative impact on the whole peace process can make it even more difficult.

Building the Tools for a New Capacity for Civilian Interventions

Operational capacities to mount and conduct international civilian interventions must be substantially reformed in order for future peace-building efforts to become more effective and credible. The coherence of operational activities and the speed of their delivery must be increased; their impact on local populations must be augmented, local ownership must be created and accountability to donors improved. For this purpose, civilian interventions need to be more responsive to political direction and oversight in establishing clearer objectives, in allocating and matching resources, and in reporting back on the progress of their activities. They also need dedicated operating procedures that are adapted to the special character of their operational necessities, mechanisms to enable the rapid deployment of operations, and better communication among the various international and local organisations involved. In other words, a new capacity through specially designed tool kits must be built for civilian interventions to enable them to carry out and complete their tasks successfully.

We propose three approaches for developing new **'tool kits'** that may help rendering civilian interventions more effective:

- The first deals with the ***target of civilian interventions***; the failed state, and proposes creating a support capacity for re-establishing its local institutions and a working civil service.

- The second deals with the ***organisational mechanism of civilian interventions*** and suggests creating a management capacity for the rapid and flexible deployment within civilian crisis management organisations.
- The third deals with improving ***inter-organisational communications during international interventions*** among major civilian and military crisis management organisations. The aim is to provide civilian interventions, prior to being deployed, with a set of ready-to-use 'tool kits' on which they can draw in order to ensure a more rapid, effective and, ultimately, more credible implementation of their respective operational activities. It is important that all three 'tool kits' are interconnected, meaning that the creation of a new capacity for civilian interventions would require all three to develop simultaneously.

Creating Tools to Re-establish Local Institutions and Government Services

The foremost aim of any international civilian intervention in failing states must be to create – or better to recreate – local institutions and to revive local civil services able to provide security, basic justice and vital social services. This must be done as quickly as possible in order to allow a newly formed national government – be it an interim government or not – to establish its credentials with its population and be seen to provide the peace-dividend. In spite of all their political, social and humanitarian problems, failing states also represent a unique ***opportunity*** for reforming state institutions and for streamlining government services. Indeed, the very fact of a collapsed state system bears in it the potential for making a quantum leap in improving local management practices and in introducing modern management support systems for which more traditional and functioning states – because of legacy systems and an entrenched bureaucracy – would need years to implement.

Political processes such as those set up to accommodate various local interest groups, actions leading to the formation of an interim government, the negotiations leading to a new constitution and elections to legitimise future governments remain largely an art and not a science. On the other hand, the re-establishment of functioning local institutions and the formation of a working civil service are mainly managerial tasks that need experience and hard work. Whereas the political processes are unique to specific countries, the approach to institution-building and the provision of basic governmental services are more universal and could, to a large degree at least, be standardised.

This is an important consideration for civilian interventions as this would mean that one could develop ready-to-apply concepts for the institution-building aspects of peace-building and design the corresponding tools to implement those concepts. The level of complexity of management support systems for government services will vary greatly from country to country, but the essential components will surely be very similar.

Re-establishing local institutions with internationally accepted tool kits would create a unity of purpose for all international players and also respond to donor demands for more transparency and reliable reporting. As suggested, such a tool box could be developed prior to any civilian intervention and teams could be trained in implementing and, where necessary, adjusting them to specific local conditions. This would make civilian interventions more focused and target-oriented, thus allowing for more effective international assistance efforts. Much of the roll-out of those tools, the training of local managers and the monitoring of progress could be done from outside the country. This could be particularly attractive in countries where the security situation makes it difficult to work on site. In this way one could make civilian interventions produce quicker results and have a more direct impact – even under adverse local conditions.

Initial discussions have taken place around developing pre-arranged civilian intervention tools aimed at establishing local institutions. In June of this year, the former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari chaired a high-level workshop in New York that included representatives of a number of key donor countries, high United Nations officials and senior managers of large international private sector companies.[4] They came together to discuss a concept entitled "Government out of a Box". Central to this concept is a proposal to develop basic management approaches and ICT-based support tools that would allow introducing easy-to-apply tools to new local administrations. It was suggested to start building such a tool box for local community level first that could include simple modules to manage civil registration and local security services, as well as basic education, basic health, local water and sanitation, and community based poverty programmes. Those 'tool boxes' would be carried and supported by selected and trained expert teams that could be mobilised at short notice to adjust the tool boxes to fit local conditions and to train local staff in their use.

Peace-building is only possible through national ownership. Civilian interventions should therefore be designed to rely on local infrastructures and local talent from the very beginning. An essential advantage of implementing ready-made "Government out of a Box' tool kits would be that it reduces the number of international staff, experts and consultants required to implement them and allows national authorities to assume quickly the responsibility – and ability - to provide social services and for implementing national reconstruction programmes. Such a concept would hence promote local ownership and make international peace-building operations become what Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi had called a "light foot-print" that respects local dignity, self-esteem and self-reliance.

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[4] The high-level workshop on State-building and Strengthening of Civilian Administration in Post-Conflict Societies and Failed States was held in New York on 21 June 2004. The report and background papers can be found on the website of President Ahtisaari's Crisis Management Initiative: www.ahtisaari.fi.

Creating Tools for a Civilian Rapid Reaction Capacity within Organisations

The military has developed the practice of implementing standard operating procedures based upon comprehensive war-fighting doctrine.[5] Similarly, civilian organisations could develop a purpose-built management capacity, able to turn political decisions into operational activities with speed and flexibility while maintaining transparency and clear lines of accountability. That would require developing political mechanisms for setting operational priorities and for reporting back on their achievements. It would also require establishing an operational system with clear-cut responsibilities and authorities for decentralised decision-making. Bureaucratic rules, regulations and procedures would have to be demystified and adjusted to operational requirements of civilian interventions.

There are examples where this is being tried. The OSCE is undergoing a major management reform with the aim of introducing a new management concept that enables the organisation to implement rapidly political decisions made by the Permanent Council and to mount, maintain and close any kind of field operation anywhere in the OSCE region. For this purpose its programme budget process was strengthened to identify concrete operational priorities and allocate resources accordingly. The command and control structures have been sharpened to allow a task-oriented and fully decentralised management of its field operations. The newly developed OSCE management system calls for assigning clear individual responsibilities, corresponding approval authorities and, with it, lines of accountability. The entire regulatory framework is being remodeled to reflect streamlined operational requirements and simplified administrative work processes. As a result, the efficiency and transparency of management will be significantly

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[5] A military doctrine provides the framework of guidance for the conduct of military operations and determines how they are directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered.

improved and, at the same time, administrative costs can be reduced by about one third from their former levels.

To achieve these reforms, the OSCE has introduced a modern ICT-based management system called IRMA,[6] a tool that allows the integrated management of all aspects of its field operations from setting of operational objectives, to mobilising and managing resources and to reporting back on progress to senior managers as well as to its participating states. IRMA provides managers of field operations a simple-to-use tool called the Dashboard.

The Dashboard, a kind of electronic command screen, is geared to each and every individual function and allows OSCE managers at all levels of command to plan their future programmes, to communicate with the senior management and the political bodies of the organisation, to obtain agreement for operational priorities and the approval of necessary resources. IRMA provides all OSCE managers with real-time information on the resources available and allows to mobilise new resources through a simple system-supported recruitment and procurement application. IRMA connects programme managers electronically to ready-to-use support systems such as expert rosters, electronic advertising, applications of candidates and the recruitment of contracted positions. It also links them electronically to capitals of participating States for the identification and recruitment of 'seconded' positions. It connects programme managers electronically to a virtual warehouse to identify and transfer existing equipment and, where this is not possible, links directly to private sector suppliers working for the OSCE under pre-arranged framework contracts. IRMA is independent of location and OSCE managers can operate it with the help of a simple laptop that is connected to mobile communication systems. Indeed, he/she would not even need an

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[6] IRMA stands for Integrated Resource Management but goes much beyond the management of resources. In fact, it will allow the management of all aspects of programme planning, implementation and reporting.

office but could manage his/her programme from a tent or the back of a vehicle in any remote area.

The OSCE reforms and IRMA are presently in their final stage of being implemented. It is estimated that all components will be fully up and running this year. It is an interesting and innovative approach towards creating a management capacity for a rapid civilian reaction capability within peace-building organisations.

Creating Tools for Better Inter-Operability Among Organisations

Despite all the inter-agency coordination mechanisms put in place over the past years, international assistance organisations are notorious for failing to either communicate sufficiently with one another or work more closely together. In fact, today most field-based organisation have developed their own management and information systems that can no longer communicate with each other. The joint implementation of mutually supportive operational activities remains the exception rather than the rule.

This problem is somewhat inherent in the way different organisations are set up, and is made worse by conflicting and overlapping mandates, and by competition for the same funding from the same donors. However, much can and should be done to increase the technical infrastructure for more inter-operability among organisations involved in civilian interventions by creating compatible management information systems and the communication facilities to exchange information. This would be particularly important between military and civilian organisations but in the end could also include nascent local administrations. This could boost the inter-agency cooperation and the coherence of respective programmes.

First steps have already been taken to develop an electronic inter-agency management and information system. The Information Technology and Crisis Management (ITCM) project by President Martti Ahtisaari has brought together important

international players in crisis management that include the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE and NATO, focusing initially on joint concerns for staff safety.[7] It has developed a first prototype and is presently running a trial in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much still remains to be done to fully develop an inter-operable management information system, However, for it to succeed, there must be the political will among the major crisis management organisations to also use it and share information with each other.

Invest in Civilian Interventions – a Final Thought

There are many similarities between civilian and military interventions. Civilian interventions – just like military interventions – are all about being credible. Both must be fast and decisive in order to take advantage of short windows of opportunity. Both require clearly defined objectives and tasks to prevent the fragmentation of their efforts. And both must also be equipped and resourced adequately to be able to reach the defined objectives and tasks.

Despite real differences, military and civilian interventions follow the same underlying logic and, as stated, civilian interventions could learn much from the military. For this reason, many of the proposals made under the three suggested new approaches adopt ideas and concepts that have been developed for the military. The idea of preparing for possible scenarios of interventions, of acquiring the tools necessary for dealing with each scenario and of training the staff to apply those tools in the case of an intervention is no different from that in the military. Concepts of developing a rapid deployment capacity to mobilise if and when required, of introducing new command and control systems to implement operational activities efficiently and of establishing reliable and efficient communications facilities to coordinate among the different actors in the field of operations are all concepts that are used in military operations. Why don't

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[7] Information on the project Information Technology and Crisis Management (ITCM) can be found under www.itcm.org.

we make use of those, even if the tools for civilian interventions will look somewhat different?

As it invests to upgrade its military capabilities, the international community must invest in civilian intervention capabilities through the use of modern technologies, above all in the information and communication fields. As the military invests during peace time in order to be prepared for war, investments in civilian intervention capacities must take place prior to an international crisis.

Considering their importance, it is surprising how little is presently invested in enhancing civilian intervention capabilities. Investing in civilian intervention capabilities would still be a fraction of the investments that are being made in military intervention capabilities. And there is no doubt that investing in civilian intervention capabilities would give a better return on investment. An effective and efficient civilian intervention capability would not only apply to failing states but could just as well be applied in the context of conflict prevention in states with weak governments. In such cases, credible international civilian interventions may even help prevent a situation to arise in which a military intervention becomes necessary. It could hence save lives and billions of dollars that are otherwise lost during military operations.

Investing in new tools for civilian interventions will require strong political will, international legitimacy and access to modern technologies. The political will can only come from the major donors who finance civilian interventions, the legitimacy, in particular for aspects that aim at re-establishing local government services, can only come from the United Nations and the technology is available only among private sector companies. For that reason any effort and investment to improve the capacity for civilian interventions must be build around a Donor – United Nations – Private Sector partnership.

This must be of particular relevance to the European Union, the twenty-five members of which add up to by far the world's largest

donor group to peace-building operations. The EU has therefore a special responsibility for making the tools for civilian interventions more effective and efficient. The EU owes this to the new local governments it has pledged support – and to its own taxpayers.

State-building and the European Union

Julian Braithwaite

Any discussion about the effectiveness of EU foreign policy tends to revolve around our crisis management capabilities. Against that yardstick the EU has not generally been considered a notable success. One only has to look at Bosnia in the early 1990s.

But in many ways that misses the point. Committee-led institutions are rarely suited to the real-time, high risk, decision-intensive business of crisis management. And the EU will be a committee-led organisation as long as democratic accountability largely resides in 25 national capitals.

And yet while the EU has at best a mixed record on crisis management, it has been an outstanding success at one of the greatest foreign policy challenges facing the world in the early 21st century: state-building.

Consider Greece thirty years ago, run by a military junta. Or Poland fifteen years ago, a Soviet puppet dictatorship laid waste by command economics. Or even France before the Fifth Republic was founded in 1957: politically unstable, economically weak.

Today, many members of the European Union can justifiably be considered among the most effective states the world has ever seen. A continent that was infamous for instability, a source of global conflict, is now united from the Arctic to the Mediterranean by a shared commitment to democracy, open markets, social justice, and the rule of law.

The EU has transformed the continent of Europe beyond recognition and for the better. But its significance has been poorly understood, particularly in the US. The historic decisions

it has taken have often been obscured by the acrimony and horse-trading that has always characterised the EU's deliberations. And it has changed the behaviour of its neighbours not through the tools of diplomatic or military intervention, but by the promise of Europe and by the grind of process and standards.

The fundamental question is whether the EU can have anything like the same transformatory effect on states that will never become members.

The answer is important not only for Europe, but also for America. Today's global security threats come from terrorists and criminals operating out of failed or failing states, or from rogue dictatorships. Even if successful, military intervention in these situations does not in itself guarantee greater global security and stability. Long-term success depends on the emergence of stable states based on democracy and the rule of law. If the EU could bring the comparative advantage it has shown in state-building to situations outside Europe, it would therefore be able to play a highly valuable role in securing global stability and security, albeit a very different one from the United States.

The EU's recent experience in the Balkans sheds some light on whether the EU is capable of playing such a role. While the countries of South East Europe hope ultimately to join the European Union, the Union itself has also started to develop policies and institutions there that may well be applicable beyond Europe's borders.

This is particularly true of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU has now taken over the leadership of the peace implementation process. The EU spent over 100 million Euros in Bosnia in 2004. In January 2003 it took over the police training mission from the UN and in December 2004 it took over the leadership of the 7,000 strong peace-keeping force from NATO. The local currency is pegged to the Euro. The EU Commission Delegation is ever more heavily engaged in the classic state-

building activities of promoting the introduction of effective taxation and customs systems, and the development of an independent judiciary.

Bosnia is slowly becoming a normal European state. The Dayton Peace Agreement, and the international civilian and military missions that implement it, deserve much of the credit, as do the long-suffering people of the country. But the process of making Bosnia viable in the long-term now increasingly depends on the EU and its institutions on the ground.

There are five factors that have contributed to the EU's effectiveness in Bosnia, in addition to the leverage of potential membership. First, the EU has had a genuinely united policy towards Bosnia in recent years. Second, the situation did not require external crisis management. Third, the US supported the EU taking a leadership role. Fourth, the EU had a detailed contract with the Bosnian authorities that gave legitimacy to their actions both domestically and internationally. And fifth, the EU has increasingly pooled and delegated its authority for maximum leverage.

The EU had a united foreign policy because the EU agrees that Bosnia's stability is fundamentally important for Europe and that the EU cannot afford to fail in Bosnia a second time. As a result, EU member states are prepared to pay for reconstruction and provide troops, year after year.

Bosnia's problems are also significant, but thankfully not urgent in the sense that they require day-to-day intervention by capitals. The EU institutions have been left to get on with the things they do best: the patient application of processes, standards and conditionality, year after year.

With their focus elsewhere the United States has taken the strategic decision to cede responsibility in Bosnia to the EU. This has played a crucial role in the EU's growing effectiveness. It has meant that all the international organisations based in Bosnia are now increasingly working together to implement a

strategic reform blueprint agreed in Brussels. Individual Bosnian leaders have been unable to play the US off against the EU to advance their narrow interests. Given the enormous role the US has played in the country, that has required considerable forbearance on their part.   EU-US relations in Bosnia are excellent.

But perhaps most fundamentally, the EU's role in Bosnia is underpinned by a legitimacy founded on a detailed agreement with the Bosnian authorities about the role of the international community.   This agreement is based on the Dayton Peace Accords, signed in 1995 by the political leaders of the warring factions, the US, the EU and others.   It is now being supplemented by reform programmes that take the country beyond Dayton, as part of the process of European integration.

All of these conditions – political consensus on the strategy, the chronic nature of the situation, US support, an agreed basis for intervention – have provided the circumstances for an unparalleled pooling and delegation of EU authority. In effect, Javier Solana and Chris Patten have run the EU's policy towards Bosnia day-to-day. The EU has also appointed the current High Representative and guardian of Dayton, Paddy Ashdown, as the EU's first Special Representative to Bosnia. Over the last year, the EU has strengthened the authority of the EUSR, giving him political oversight of the EU police and peacekeeping missions and huge de facto influence over EU reform priorities and related conditionality. He has also played a major role in informally coordinating EU positions in the IMF, the World Bank, the UN and NATO towards Bosnia. By providing a focal point for the EU's combined authority, he has greatly increased the EU's political influence and ability to get its way.

In effect, Paddy Ashdown has been playing the role that EUSRs may well be able to play formally if and when the new European Constitution is ratified.   His hand has been considerably strengthened first by the formal authority he wields as High Representative, and by the lure of EU membership.   But it may also be true that such an institution, even without Dayton or the

promise of EU membership, could dramatically enhance the EU's collective effectiveness in certain situations.

Such situations will have to be self-evidently important enough for EU capitals to agree a strategy, and the resources to implement it. They will have to be sufficiently serious for EU capitals to agree to pool and delegate all the authority at the EU's disposal. This is a necessary precondition if the EU is to maximise its collective impact, and therefore its chances of success. But such situations will also have to be amenable to the application of long-term processes, standards, and conditionality. It will be a very long time before EU capitals are prepared to delegate the authority to an EU institution to take decisions in crisis situations. The decision to put troops in harm's way remains a national prerogative.

All this suggests that the EU is likely to be most successful at engaging in chronic rather than crisis situations. Chronic situations also lend themselves to detailed agreement, another pre-requisite for effective EU action. There needs to be time for the EU to agree on its goals and then negotiate with a third party – not the case in fast-moving crisis situations. Such agreements are essential in the way a contract is essential. They set out common objectives, what each side says they will do and in return for what, and the penalties for non-compliance. As with Dayton, such agreements are necessary for getting political consensus from EU capitals to pool the EU's resources; for providing the domestic legitimacy for effective external intervention over the long-term; and for providing a road map to track progress and apply conditionality.

Painful though it is for some to recognise, the support of the US is also likely to remain a requirement for EU success. Without it, it will be difficult to achieve any EU consensus on strategy or resources, or to secure the effective support of the other international organisations – the UN, IMF/WB, the OSCE – who have important roles to play in state-building and state-stabilisation.

Even if all these conditions are met, the EU is not of course going to have the same impact it has had in say Greece, Poland or even Bosnia.

But even without the prospect of membership, the EU has significant leverage if it can only pool it and link it to specific objectives. The EU has the largest combined aid budget in the world. Collectively, the EU has more votes that any other entity in the IMF and the UN Security Council. It is the world's greatest trading power, controlling access to the world's largest market. It has a currency that countries outside the EU are already adopting or pegging to in order to import macroeconomic stability. It may not match the US in terms of war-fighting, but it has some of the best peace-stabilisation forces in the world. And last but not least, it has the well-honed state-building skills of the European Commission, developed over many decades.

The European Union – the institutions, the Member States – need to be willing collectively to empower a single negotiator to use all this leverage to get maximum cooperation from states that seek its help, in the form of an agreement based on detailed conditionality. Once such an agreement or contract is drawn up between the EU and that state, they also need to be prepared to delegate the authority to manage the EU's combined assets in response to progress, or lack of it, in implementing the agreed objectives. That might in practice mean accepting a single EU representative on the ground, whose job it would be to judge when the local authorities are living up to the milestones and standards set out in the agreement.

Afghanistan and Iraq in the longer-term would clearly benefit from such an approach. But both may be too distant or too controversial to command an EU consensus to commit the necessary resources. More realistic, perhaps, would be an enhanced and more comprehensive EU role in Sierra Leone, Congo or Cote d'Ivoire, perhaps the Caucuses. The EU is likely to be more successful where individual member states have major long-term interests and commitments, yet where they may be prepared to share decision-making with the rest of the EU in

return for sharing the burden and increasing the legitimacy of any engagement.

The real prize would be Palestine, should the US succeed in promoting a two-state solution. The EU might well be prepared to pool and delegate substantial resources to helping Palestine become a stable democracy should the opportunity arise. But if the US wants to count on the EU for this sort of assistance, they will have to involve the EU from the beginning and get their support before any solution is agreed, as they did in Bosnia.

The EU will not be able to match the ability of the US to intervene decisively in crises for many years, if ever. But it has the resources, the institutions and the processes to be the world's best state-builder.

And that might just be the basis for a new trans-Atlantic security partnership: one in which the US consults the EU in managing crises, because of the EU's comparative advantage in building states.

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UK PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EU LEGISLATION
Sir Digby Jones
April 2005
£4.95

Half of all UK legislation which imposes burdens on businesses originates from the European Union. This figure will continue to grow as new and different policy fields are drawn into the area of European competence. Yet, given the depth of involvement of the EU in the UK's regulatory regime, the British public are surprisingly ignorant about the EU, its policies and institutions – and many MPs do not follow events across the Channel. As a result, measures affecting millions of people and cost millions of pounds pass through UK formalities whilst barely causing a ripple. In this paper, Sir Digby Jones identifies four key principles for reform and argues that such reforms are needed to keep the British public informed on how the European Union really operates.

FOREIGN MINISTER OF EUROPE
Brian Crowe
February 2005
£4.95

The creation of an EU Foreign Minister is one of the most innovative proposals of Europe's proposed new constitution; yet there is still very little understanding of what the position would entail and what challenges the new minister would face. In this

paper, Sir Brian Crowe, former Director General for External and for Politico-Military Affairs in the EU Council of Ministers, argues that empowering a new EU Foreign Minister is crucial for putting flesh on the bones of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Fundamental changes are needed if the EU is to develop the capability for coordinated, effective, and rapid action.

THE REFERENDUM BATTLE
Mark Gill, Simon Atkinson and Roger Mortimore
September 2004

The Referendum Battle is the first comprehensive study of British public opinion towards the EU constitution. It finds that a majority of Britons remain open to persuasion on whether the UK should sign up to the constitutional treaty, despite the headline figures showing a strong lead for the No camp.

GLOBAL EUROPE:
Implementing the European Security Strategy
By Richard Gowan
February 2004; available free online

The European Security Strategy emphasised the need to spread good governance and build more effective multilateralism. The Foreign Policy Centre has published the first major action-plan for achieving these goals.

BRITISH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF 'SCHISMS'
Mark Leonard, Andrew Small with Martin Rose
February 2005
£9.95

The war in Iraq has had a seismic impact on international perceptions of Britain and British foreign policy, yet there is a big contrast between the cacophony of debate in the United States on the political and diplomatic fall-out of Iraq for US grand strategy, and the relative lack of public and political debate about how UK public diplomacy needs to change to reflect these new realities. In this book, the authors argue that a major rethink is

needed in the approach taken to public diplomacy to respond to these shifts. Neither a redeployment of old Cold War propaganda tools, nor the 1990s variant of Cool Britannia will do. Instead, there should be a new set of trust-building practices that address the gaps in worldview and significant public opinion challenges that exist in our relationships with key allies, major new powers and the rest of the developing world.

A NEW GRAND BARGAIN FOR PEACE: TOWARDS A REFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LAW
Greg Austin and Ken Berry
February 2005
£4.95

This paper argues that growing support for reform of the Security Council provides a unique opportunity to address these other concerns. States can now work towards a new grand bargain that will begin to bridge the growing gulf between, on the one hand, US and European perceptions of the international legal and political order and, on the other, those of the 'non-West'. Only when these other concerns are addresses will reform of the Security Council be meaningful and durable.

INDIA AS A NEW GLOBAL LEADER
Prasenjit Basu, Brahma Chellaney, Parag Khanna and Sunil Khilnani
February 2005
£9.95

In 30 years India's economy could be larger than all but those of the US and China. In this collection of essays, with a preface by the Indian High Commissioner to the UK, Kamalesh Sharma, four leading thinkers on India explore how it can carve out a world role that best serves its goals and interests.

FREE *AND* FAIR: MAKING THE PROGRESSIVE CASE FOR REMOVING TRADE BARRIERS
Edited by Phoebe Griffith and Jack Thurston
November 2004
£14.95

Drawing on public opinion analysis from key countries (the US, France, Britain, Germany and India) this collection of essays analyses how the case for free and fair trade can be most effectively made. The diverse set of authors share an optimism that it is only a progressive case for trade liberalisation, a case that recognises and addresses the possible downsides of free trade, that will command the widespread public support needed to deliver the benefits of open markets.

PRE-EMPTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER
Amitai Etzioni
October 2004
£9.95

Leading communitarian author, Amitai Etzioni, argues for a shift in international counter-terrorism resources toward more focus on preventing attacks with nuclear weapons. The best way to do this, he argues, is to limit greatly the damage the damage that terrorists will cause by curbing their access to nuclear arms and related materials. He argues for a robust and intrusive campaign of 'de-proliferation'- making states surrender such materials. He pleads for more attention to failed and failing states (Russia, Pakistan) than to rogue states (Iran, North Korea), on the grounds that each failing state is like hundreds of actors with too wide a variety of motives and too low a visibility for them to be easily deterred. On the other hand, rogue states- which have singular and effective governments- might be deterred.

ENERGY EMPIRE: OIL, GAS AND RUSSIA'S REVIVAL
Fiona Hill
September 2004
£9.95

On the back of windfall revenues from oil and gas exports, Fiona Hill argues that Russia has transformed itself from a defunct military superpower into a new energy superpower. Instead of the Red Army, the penetrating forces of Moscow's power in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are now its exports of natural gas, electricity, cultural products and consumer goods.

DARFUR AND GENOCIDE
Greg Austin and Ben Koppelman
July 2004
£9.95

The unfolding of the Darfur crisis since January 2003 shows that the United Nations, the USA, the UK and the EU have not lived up to their promises for more effective conflict prevention or their obligations to monitor, prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The lessons of failure to prevent the Rwanda genocide have not been fully institutionalised. This pamphlet lays out the sort of measures that need to be taken in such cases and that could have been taken much earlier in the Darfur case. Policy must focus on the perpetrators. The start point has to be measures personally targeted against them. Early measures for preventing imminent genocide must also include contingency planning for multinational military intervention as a means of bolstering diplomatic pressure.

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS
Joshua Cooper Ramo
Spring 2004
£9.95

The former Foreign Editor of Time magazine, Joshua Ramo, argues that there is a new 'Beijing Consensus' emerging with distinct attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of power. It is driven by a ruthless willingness to innovate, a strong belief in sovereignty and multilateralism, and a desire to accumulate the tools of 'asymmetric power projection'. Though it is often misunderstood as a nascent superpower, China has no

intention of entering an arms race. Instead, it is intent on projecting enough 'asymmetric power' to limit US political and military action in its region. Through fostering good international relations, it is safeguarding the peaceful environment needed to secure its prosperity, and deterring the attempts of some on the fringes of US politics to turn it into a pariah. Ramo argues that China offers hope to developing countries after the collapse of the Washington consensus. It provides a more equitable paradigm of development that countries from Malaysia to Korea are following. Based on more than a hundred off the record discussions, *The Beijing Consensus* captures the excitement of a country where change, newness and innovation are rebounding around journal articles, dinner conversations and policy-debates with mantra-like regularity.

MORAL BRITANNIA?
Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy
Nicholas J Wheeler and Tim Dunne
Published on 26 April 2004
£4.95

Moral Britannia? examines how far reality has matched the famous promise made by Robin Cook to formulate 'a foreign policy with an ethical dimension' in the first weeks of the new government in 1997. The phrase came back to haunt Labour on issues as varied as arms sales to support for Bush in Iraq – and, according to authors Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, led to one of the great foreign policy debates since the 1930s. *Moral Britannia?* sets out ten lessons to rescue the ethical foreign policy and re-establish relations with the rest of the world based on internationalist values and multilateralist institutions.

Also available from British Council Brussels:

EUROPEAN CIVIC CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION INDEX
Andrew Geddes and Jan Niessen
March 2005

The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index has been
conceived to fill a knowledge gap on civic citizenship policies and
inclusion at a European level. It is important for Member States
to think about issues of immigrant inclusion at a European
perspective, in order to keep up the reality of EU-level
policymaking and the rapidly emerging EU Common Space of
Justice, Freedom and Security. This is the first attempt to
present the EU's policies governing civic citizenship and
inclusion in a concise and comparable format.

THE DEMOCRATIC PAPERS
Edited by Paul Hilder
In association with DEMOS, Opendemocracy.net and Vision.

The Democratic Papers contains rich, challenging and exciting
analyses of the future of governance in Europe and beyond.
Twenty-three contributors from twelve countries take a
penetrating look at real issues that matter to real people all over
the world, aiming to help shape new debates about what
democracy can and should mean, and how we can meet its
demands.

TURKEY IN EUROPE: MORE THAN A PROMISE?
Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey
In association with the Open Society Institute

The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March 2004 to help defuse tensions surrounding the possibility of opening accession negotiations with Turkey. The Commission's report examines in detail opportunities and challenges presented by Turkey's possible membership of the European Union to help shape a more rational debate. Chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, its nine members include former heads of state, foreign ministers and European Commissioners.