THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER

SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM IN THE GULF

ELLEN LAIPSON, EDITOR
WITH
EMILE EL-HOKAYEM, AMY BUENNING STURM,
AND WAEL ALZAYAT

April 2006

Dear Colleague,

On behalf of the U.S. Army's Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security
Series and the Henry L. Stimson Center, we are pleased to provide this report
on reform of the security sector in the Middle East region, with particular
focus on the Arabian peninsula states (the six states of The Gulf Cooperation
Council, plus Yemen). In February 2006, we convened a workshop of
former and current practitioners and academics who work on an often-
neglected topic: what is the status of and prospects for openness and
accountability in the security sector of the states in the region?

Our discussion was premised on the notions that security remains the
paramount issue for most of the governments of the Middle East, that the
goal of reform promoted by the West is not universally embraced in the
region, and that any changes in the security sector have to be assessed in
terms of their likely impact on regional security. Given the challenges of
Iraq, Iran, and concerns about terrorism, security sector reform may be an
important strategic goal, but not necessarily the current priority for regional
states.

Our workshop also considered the role of outside actors in promoting reform:
we looked at NATO's new initiative to engage with the region's military and
civilian security experts, and considered what other international
organizations and key states could contribute.

This report is a general summary of the workshop discussion. We have also
included some background to familiarize readers with the literature on
security sector reform in general, and some information on the GCC states
and their security institutions. We hope you will find this material of
interest, and will welcome hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Ellen Laipson   Major John Prior, U.S. Army
President and CEO   Program Manager
The Henry L. Stimson Center   Eisenhower National Security Series

TABLE OF CONTENTS

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Bill Angerman
Director
Eisenhower Series

Nora Bensahel
Senior Political Scientist
RAND

Jason E. Bruder
Iran Desk Officer
Department of State

Michael Eisenstadt
Senior Fellow
Washington Institute

LTC Kevin Felix
J-5
Middle East Regional

Ann Fitz-Gerald
Project Director
Global Facilitation Network-SSR

Mark Foster
J-5
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate

Catherine Guicherd
Visiting Fellow
International Peace Academy

Emile El-Hokayem
Research Associate
The Henry L. Stimson Center

Marcin Koziel
Defense Policy and Planning Division
NATO

Ellen Laipson
President and CEO
The Henry L. Stimson Center

Matteo Legrenzi
Doctoral Candidate
Oxford University

Major John Prior
Program Manager
Eisenhower Series

Timothy Reuter
Action Officer
Office of Arabian Peninsula and Iran Affairs
Department of State

Major. Reginald Robinson
Acting Section Chief for North Africa and Near East Asia
Department of State

Edward W. Ross
Principal Director
Security Cooperation Operations
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

James Russell
Senior Lecturer
Naval Postgraduate School

Richard Russell
Professor - Near East-South Asia Center
National Defense University

Eva Shinagel
NATO Policy Officer
Department of State EUR

Lt. Col. Jeffrey Sick
National Defense Fellow
Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies

Steve Ward
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
National Intelligence Council

WORKSHOP SUMMARY

Introduction

The Arab Gulf states operate in a volatile and changing security environment. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, the 2003 Iraq war, and the more recent preoccupation with Iran's nuclear program have generated new concerns about ways to enhance the security of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, as well as non-GCC state Yemen). The threat environment is defined by instability in neighboring states which could spill over, possible hegemonic behavior by regional powers, and, increasingly, from the potential for domestic instability. Gulf regimes have had to respond to these diverse vulnerabilities with traditional defensive measures, military modernization, and, in some cases, renewed commitments to political and economic reform.

Gulf leaders have not made security sector reform (SSR) an important focus of national policy, but attention to this area is growing, in part because of the new dialogue between NATO and the Gulf region that was launched at the 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul. Reform, in the eyes of Gulf leaders, must be incremental, controlled and limited; outside pressure can be seen by publics as illegitimate. Not all regimes are persuaded that reform in the security sector is needed or helpful. Security sector reform can, nonetheless, contribute in positive ways to domestic stability and to national security, and is worthy of further consideration.

On February 23, 2006, the Henry L. Stimson Center, in cooperation with the U.S. Army's Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, convened a panel of security professionals to discuss the prospects for security sector reform in the Gulf. The discussants examined the potential for security sector reform in the region in light of the different levels and concepts of defense reform, the unique needs of the Arab Gulf states, the roles and interests of international actors, the broader reform agenda in the Middle East, and the ways security sector reform could affect regional security.

What Does Security Sector Reform Mean?

Most thinking and policy action related to security sector reform comes out of experiences in post-authoritarian and post-conflict situations.[1] Post-authoritarian countries, such as in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have needed to adapt their security apparatus to civilian and democratic control. Post-conflict states in the Balkans, Africa, and Central America have needed to rebuild a security sector from scratch, building new institutions and integrating former combatants while abiding by democratic imperatives.

A key prerequisite in this regard is a clear definition of what constitutes a security sector. A security sector is composed of four main actors: the agencies authorized to use force; civil management and oversight bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; and non-statutory security forces.[2] Given the expertise of the group, it was agreed to not focus on justice and law enforcement issues, but rather on the first, third, and fourth categories of security sector actors.   The group also introduced a fifth essential component: security sector reform should promote an open security culture and stimulate an ongoing national dialogue that engages not only governmental agencies but also the media and the non-governmental sector.

> **SECURITY SECTOR ACTORS**
>
> **Agencies Authorized to Use Force:**
> armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, gendarmeries, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, reserve units, civil defense forces, national guards, and militias.
>
> **Security Management and Oversight Bodies:** the Executive, national security advisory bodies, legislatures, legislative committees, ministries of defense, ministries of internal affairs, ministries of foreign affairs, customary authorities, traditional authorities, finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units, civilian review boards, and public complaint commissions.
>
> **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions:** judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation units, prosecution services, human rights commissions, customary, and traditional justice systems.
>
> **Non-statutory Security Forces:** liberation armies, guerilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, and political party militias.

Any security sector reform initiative also requires an assessment of the existing institutional architecture that defines and constrains the activities of the security forces. This includes an

---

[1] For more information on contemporary security sector reform in general see Hanggi, Heiner & Fred Tanner, "Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood," Chaillot Paper No. 80 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, July 2005); UK Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform.* London, undated; Bryden, Alan & Heiner Hanggi. *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector.* Munster: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005.

[2] Definition and figure borrowed from UK Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform.* London, undated.

evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of security forces, the governing and oversight structures, and the presence and functionality of regional programs that enhance national security, as parallel structures. When outside states are involved in security sector reform, it is critical that security needs and requirements be well defined and mutually understood. Two states can perceive the same threat very differently and therefore define very different priorities. If the provider and the recipient of security assistance diverge on their threat assessments, then aid will likely be inadequate. Therefore, a thorough assessment and understanding of a country's strategic environment is essential to developing a viable SSR program.

Because of the organic link between survival of the regime and control of the security sector, the issue of sequencing must be a central consideration in conceptualizing security sector reform. Does security sector reform help to trigger and stimulate democratic reform, or does a country initiate security sector reform efforts after it enters the process of democratization? Or do countries believe they can pursue security sector reforms for the purpose of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces and that such efforts would have no direct political consequences or implications? Policy choices will depend on the answer to these key questions. Regardless of the answer, however, external actors must stay ahead of the curve, and have the will and capability to provide targeted assistance when requested.

When it comes to issues of reform in general, the term "reform" itself appears to some as problematic. For rulers, it suggests that something might be fundamentally wrong in the way they manage the affairs of the states, an assertion that is hard to admit. Choosing this term may be perceived as acknowledging reality and lead to more criticism of the regimes as they start thinking about change. This is why Arab leaders prefer terms like modernization or liberalization. What reform encompasses is also hotly debated because regimes are eager to define redlines that critics quickly interpret as evidence of lack of commitment and sincerity.

In the specific case of security sector reform, it is often suggested that terms like modernization or capacity-building might smooth the way. Far from being a purely a rhetorical question, this debate illustrates the difficulty of defining what needs to be achieved and how. Is defense modernization equivalent to security sector reform? Does building capacity in the military services translate into increased transparency and effectiveness? If reform is an all-encompassing concept, do technical and incremental changes fit under it? Even in the United States, where

defense transformation is the catchphrase for what the Pentagon seeks to achieve, there is debate about what it really means.

What do the Arab Gulf States Need and Want?

The workshop considered the applicability of the existing academic research and policy initiatives to the Arab Gulf. Arab Gulf states are neither post-authoritarian nor in a post-conflict phase. They do, however, exist in a changing and volatile political and strategic environment. They spend a lot on defense—the Gulf region remains the largest defense procurement market in the world—yet demonstrate no aggressiveness and little enthusiasm for military action.   Regimes have deep investments in security systems designed as much for regime protection as for "national security" and may feel little incentive to pursue ambitious reforms in the defense and security arena.   Despite these differences, however, lessons from security sector reform experiences in Central and Eastern Europe and in Africa are useful starting points for thinking about security sector reform in the Gulf.[3]

The implications of the attacks of 9/11 and strategic uncertainty in the Persian Gulf has provided new impetus for Arab Gulf states to reflect on their own security. The rise of Al-Qaeda is deeply troubling for them because al-Qaeda members include many citizens of the Gulf states, and the very purpose of this global terrorist movement is to challenge the legitimacy of the Gulf monarchs and their ties to western powers. Terrorism, even if targeted at the West, has become a deep source of insecurity for the Gulf, and has required regimes to think differently about state-society relations, and about the range of security tactics and policies used to protect regimes and their interests.

A more traditional geopolitical threat comes from growing Iranian assertiveness in general, and Iranian influence in Iraq in particular. The Gulf Arabs remember Iranian-sponsored unrest in the 1980s and Iran's historic regional ambitions. They must also prepare to engage a democratic Iraq, and begin contingency planning should Iraq break up or break down. The implications of a failed state with an ongoing and brutal communal civil war could be disastrous for some Arab Gulf states, because of Shia minorities and cross-border spillover from violence in Iraq. Iraq, for its part, believes the Gulf states are not doing enough to curb movement of terrorists and support to Iraqi insurgents, and this creates new tension between the Gulf Arab states and Iraq.

---

[3] For the Palestinians and Iraq, reforming the security sector is a front-burner issue; for the rest of the region it is not.

While the forces resisting change in the region are strong, instability, combined with notoriously porous borders, deep historical enmities, and growing limits to US power and influence in the region, provide the stimulus for the Gulf states to change their own security sectors. The Gulf states must confront and deal with a more assertive Iran historically linked to them by geography, politics, and religion. They must also prepare to engage a democratic Iraq or for the regional implications of a failed state and civil war. Finally, they must organize their security sectors to protect their citizenry from unforeseen threats from non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations, a mission that requires flexibility, transparency, and accountability.

This new security environment is creating a demand for change, thus exposing openings for external actors to encourage and support reform. This can be seen in the demand for limited cooperation within the framework of NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) on the part of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.[4] While later in this report, the specifics of NATO's engagement in the Gulf will be covered, the four nations that have adopted the ICI probably recognize the need for security reform.

The security requirements of the small monarchies are far different from Saudi Arabia's. Size, political makeup, and relative wealth translate into differing threat perceptions among GCC states, which may in part explain why Saudi Arabia has yet to join the ICI. Many of the smaller Gulf states are looking for security not only from Iran and Iraq, but also from Saudi Arabia. Many participants pointed out that in the event of widespread instability in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states will require a backstop to prevent conflict from spilling into their own borders.

Any reform agenda in the Gulf must take into account that, to some extent, these states need the security structures they already have. Arab Gulf leaders have learned from their Arab neighbors that professional militaries in the Arab world pose the most potent threat to regimes in power. Indeed, military officers initiated the most successful coups in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Therefore, caution dictated that Arab Gulf leaders avoid building powerful armies and design coup-proofing strategies. They have favored loyalty, redundancy, competition and cronyism over competence, performance, synergy, integration and interoperability. In particular, Gulf leaders were careful to not empower outstanding military officers who could later have greater ambitions, and to keep elite units under the direct and constant control of the regimes. The result was largely positive for them: coups in the Arab Gulf states occurred within the ruling family, usually involving sons

---

[4] For a description of the security structures in the Gulf states and potential reform areas see Appendix C.

overthrowing their fathers (Oman in 1970, Qatar in 1995). In terms of overall performance, however, Arab Gulf militaries have a poor record. Because of these inherent limitations, they failed to deter and counter the invasion of a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to set up a credible joint force, to establish GCC-wide defense and security mechanisms, and to harmonize their weapons procurement. In short, the national security mission was undermined by the goal of securing regime survival.

A key threshold in conceptualizing security sector reform will be defining *state* security, not *regime* security, as the central mission of security services. A genuinely reformed security sector would have undergone dramatic restructuring, including improving its operational and strategic culture, rewarding competence and performance, and establishing institutional oversight. It would also encourage an open debate about national security in the press and with non-governmental experts. Fundamentally, it would require rulers to assert their authority by enhancing their legitimacy through political processes, instead of relying on cooptation, coercion and coup-proofing strategies. This may be hard to both envision and achieve, but incremental and well-thought reform could both increase the legitimacy of the ruling elites and improve the performance of their security sectors at the same time.

What is the Role of External Actors in Promoting SSR?

In recent decades, the United States has been the main external security player in the Persian Gulf, replacing the United Kingdom's critical role earlier in the twentieth century. US relations with Arab Gulf states, built on common and complementary interests, have a significant security dimension. The United States provides a security umbrella to states that face considerable threats from their two northern neighbors, Iran and Iraq. It is one of the key suppliers of defense equipment and training, works closely with governments on military modernization, and has even engaged the region's militaries in containing and defeating Iraq in the 1990s. US presence on their soil, however, is also a political liability in countries where anti-Americanism is rampant.

It may be helpful to think about the different functions of external actors in defense matters: there is defense cooperation in the face of common threats, defense modernization, and defense reform. Some activities, such as promoting interoperability of certain systems (i.e., air defense systems) may fall in all three categories. The US, NATO, and individual NATO states all engage in defense cooperation and in aspects of defense modernization with individual GCC states. For the short term, Gulf states may wish to fold security sector reform into a broader set of cooperative

arrangements, thus muting the controversial aspect of "reform." Over time and with the right amount of resources and political will, defense cooperation and reform can reduce the need for external actors to provide sensitive security services, thus increasing the independence of the GCC states. This suggests that security partners need to be prepared to adapt to changing political conditions.

Since the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul, a new actor has emerged on the Gulf scene, with an agenda designed to accommodate Gulf needs and concerns. Through the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO is offering partnerships with Arab Gulf states, based in part on its successful support to the security sector in many of the states of the former Soviet Union. NATO is also building upon its already established relationships with the Arab states of the Mediterranean, but hopes, through ICI, to move more quickly from dialogue to practical cooperation.

As of early 2006, four countries had signed on to the ICI: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The small states are already dependent on outside support for their security, and are receptive to new ideas about security cooperation. They probably believe that working with NATO is not significantly different than working with the United States, but may be politically more palatable to their publics. In the eyes of the Arab Gulf rulers, NATO's help may stabilize their nations internally and protect them from regional instability.

Since security sector reform requires active participation and a sense of ownership on the part of the Gulf states, the role of external actors must be carefully designed to promote and assist reform efforts, while ensuring that Gulf countries develop autonomous and legitimate reform agendas. At the heart of this question is the dilemma of US presence in the region: since the United States is their ultimate security guarantor, there may be, in the eyes of Gulf rulers, little need and appetite for the services of other external actors. The defense relations they maintain with the United States probably satisfy them, and they realize that other actors, such as NATO, cannot provide the scale and scope of defense relations with the US.

NATO has developed and offered activities that could amount to security sector reform in the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The initiative's primary goal is to contribute to security and regional stability through active engagement of countries interested in NATO's menu of activities. In the ICI context, NATO will help to develop the ability of the security forces of ICI states to operate with those of the Alliance. In the same vain as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the ICI provides tailored advice on defense reform, defense

> **ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE MENU OF PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES:**
>
> 1. Border security
> 2. Terrorism
> 3. Defense reform
> 4. WMD proliferation
> 5. Civil emergency planning
> 6. Conceptual planning
> 7. Small arms proliferation
> 8. Crisis management
> 9. Military-military contact
> 10. Peace support operations
> 11. Military exercise and training
> 12. Military education

budgeting, defense planning and civil-military relations to interested countries in the broader Middle East, with an initial focus on Gulf States. The ICI is still a "work in progress" and has to date been formally joined by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

NATO's role in the broader Middle East and the Gulf region is that primarily of an advisor and partner. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI are discussion forums that promote security through cooperation and dialogue. Creating trust between NATO and Gulf states is undoubtedly an important step in creating the conditions conducive to security sector reform. It is hoped that over time, Gulf countries, thanks to their interaction with NATO, will adopt more transparent and adequate security structures and mechanisms. These Gulf structures would be comparable to those of NATO member states, based on civilian control of the military, rule of law, and performance.

The current NATO initiatives have yet to go beyond the initial "discussion" phase. This lack of progress may be due to NATO's own limited internal capacity and the absence of a clear policy framework for cooperation. Despite various requests by Gulf states for assistance in non-military matters, such as border security, NATO lacks the ability to adequately deliver since internal security services of NATO member states do not operate and coordinate their work at the NATO level. Perhaps more significantly, NATO lacks the political support of some member states to implement programs within the GCC and a fundamental consensus on what constitutes security sector reform. While individual NATO member states are working with Gulf nations on security-

related projects, there is still no overall framework at the NATO level that guides and integrates the policies of individual states.

SSR SUCCESS STORY – UKRAINE

An encouraging example of how NATO can better assist nations in the region is that of NATO's involvement in Ukraine. With the help of NATO, the new Ukrainian government is undertaking an unprecedented overhaul of its security sector that seeks to integrate all of the country's defense and security institutions. A senior-level joint working group has been established to bring together high-ranking Ukrainian and NATO officials to coordinate both defense and security sector reform efforts. Among its many objectives, the project intends to strengthen civilian control over the military and security branches (including intelligence), and to demilitarize certain ministries such as the ministry of interior and emergency affairs. Furthermore, to create a more open discussion on security matters, NGOs from Ukraine and NATO states will be encouraged to get involved in this process.

NATO can look to Ukraine as a model of success to inform its relations with ICI states. By building relations based on trust and common interests, NATO and Ukraine have achieved considerable results on very sensitive issues. Naturally, Ukraine's own strategic environment and motivations have little in common with those of the Gulf states. Ukraine sees this type of cooperation as opening the way to joining NATO and as removing the remnants of its previous authoritarian governments. Arab Gulf states operate under radically different assumptions.

If a Gulf country were to follow the Ukraine model, for example, it would have to address broader political issues that it may not be ready or willing to confront. Any attempt to increase transparency of the internal security services would require the ruling elite to relinquish or, at the very least, share certain powers and responsibilities. Gulf rulers who prefer to run key security services directly or through close relatives may not be ready for this level of transparency. In Saudi Arabia, for example, senior princes hold key security positions; King Abdallah himself continues to head the National Guard and its intelligence directorate. His half-brothers are in charge of the ministry of defense and the ministry of interior and their respective security branches. Such reforms could well require clarifying and publicizing the criteria for promotion, demotion and assignment of its personnel, which would run counter to current practice, where royals use such appointments to reward loyalty and assert their authority.

Cooperation with NATO could be hindered by the public's perception that it infringes on their country's sovereignty in a most fundamental way. Indeed, Gulf rulers have long concealed the nature and extent of defense relations with the West from their peoples for fear of blowback, and may prefer to keep any new cooperation with NATO out of the media. Security professionals themselves may also be reluctant to cooperate with NATO, out of concern that their privileges and status could be subjected to scrutiny. Workshop participants stressed the need to cautiously

approach the topic of reform to avoid alienating key stakeholders who could turn into spoilers. Thus, maintaining a low profile might be necessary at least at the initial stages of NATO's engagement.

NATO is not the only international actor seeking increased cooperation with key states of the GCC. China and Pakistan already have military and security relations with a number of Gulf states. The rise of energy-hungry China in particular has profound economic and political consequences, which could, over time, lead to more important security relationships. Arab Gulf states may well view their relations with rising Asian powers as an alternative to their security dependence on the West, although this is more speculative than reflective of current dynamics. Some argue that China will eventually compete for influence in the Gulf with Western powers, and could be a welcome alternative to reform-promoting western governments. China could be an attractive alternative as a partner for the Gulf states, as its cooperative engagement focuses on mutual self-interest, not the impulse to transform or dictate political conditions. The key question is whether China can provide the type of weaponry and security guarantees now provided by Western powers, especially the United States. There is a sense of historical irony: Gulf rulers less than a century ago awarded oil concessions to American rather than British companies due to the perceived benign and distant nature of America's intentions. NATO, and for that matter the United States, have to be cognizant of the fact that actors viewed as more benign powers can emerge as serious competitors.

Security sector reform may not even be in the West's best interests. While Western countries are pushing for reform in the Middle East, they realize that security sector reform may come at the cost of expediency and their own strategic priorities. Transparency, oversight and public debate will translate into a more complex, time-consuming and often frustrating decision-making. If genuine security reform were to be implemented, weapons procurement deals and military budgets could be blocked by parliaments (as happened recently in Kuwait), landing and basing rights subjected to many layers of consultation and decision-making, and joint military exercises denounced on television. The current system has one main advantage that is also construed as the basic security quandary: few actors are involved in making decisions regarding weapons procurement, defense cooperation, counterterrorism activities, etc.

These inconveniences put aside, internal and regional security is bound to benefit from gradual and controlled reform of security services. If citizens feel that the mission of the security forces

is re-oriented to their own benefit, that defense budgets are adopted in a more transparent way, and that leaders are willing to explain their security strategies to the citizenry, then domestic stability will improve. At the regional level, security sector reform will create more transparency and help dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings. Security sector reform can become a valuable confidence-building measure.

SSR and Regional Security

The workshop participants considered how security sector reform efforts, if undertaken, would affect regional security. The strategic picture in the Persian Gulf is worrying. First, the absence of a security architecture in the Persian Gulf creates major uncertainty as to the intentions and capabilities of local actors. The region suffers from deep historical enmities, religious and ethnic tensions, strategic rivalries, disputes over borders, and tensions over energy policy. The absence of a framework that integrates and regulates the behavior of Iran and Iraq, two countries viewed suspiciously by the GCC states, guarantees enduring volatility. Second, any significant progress on the security reform front and on the regional level requires the active participation of a still reluctant and cautious Saudi Arabia. Without Saudi assent and involvement, the best intentions of its smaller neighbors will likely not materialize. Third, while making the US presence in the Gulf all the more necessary, the imbalance of power between Iran and the GCC states, and the current tensions between Iran and the United States might have adverse effects on the GCC states. GCC states certainly worry about Iranian assertiveness, but they have few options and cannot afford to antagonize their powerful neighbor. Should a showdown take place between the United States and Iran, the Gulf states will be in a most uncomfortable situation. Finally, as the current scenarios for Iraq include civil war, state collapse, and partition, Gulf states must assess the risk of spreading instability and potential domestic repercussions. Contingency planning is required, but the traditional security dilemma suggests that the defensive measures of the GCC states might be construed as belligerent ones by Iran and Iraqi groups.

Although Arab Gulf states face common security problems, they have not developed integrated military capabilities to prevent, deter, and contain them. The absence of a GCC-wide integrated defense system despite huge military budgets and repeated official statements reflects not only the underlying mistrust that characterizes relations between Gulf rulers, but also their reliance on the United States as their security guarantor. The result is a wide range of strategic shortcomings such as the lack of joint emergency command, defense incongruities, redundant capabilities, and insufficient interoperability.

NATO, as a transatlantic defense alliance, has significant experience and knowledge in this regard. Its mission during the Cold War was to integrate and coordinate allied military capabilities to face a common threat. This history can prove most valuable should Gulf states decide to define areas of cooperation and pull together resources. With NATO acting both as a facilitator and a consultant, there is an opportunity for limited but tangible progress on the integration front. Eventually, rather than pursue independent defense procurement and capabilities enhancement programs, each Gulf state could contribute specific components to an overall Gulf security system. Besides being a more efficient and cost-effective approach, such coordination would dispel some of the mistrust that exists between certain countries.

None of these proposals are likely to materialize without Saudi involvement. Although Saudi Arabia hesitates to join the ICI as four other GCC states did, some suggest that NATO press ahead on its present course of action and demonstrate the benefits of its initiative. Others dispute this, arguing that the Saudi absence could prove a fundamental flaw for the ICI. Proceeding without Saudi Arabia could actually undermine the very goal of regional cooperation that NATO is trying to bolster.

Iran is the most significant regional challenge for Arab Gulf states. Iran is emerging as a more assertive and confident power, willing to defy the international community and acquire the capability to enrich uranium. Gulf states must cope with the various dimensions of Iranian power—religious, economic, military, terrorist, ideological, nationalistic, and technological. While Iran's current posture towards the Gulf Arabs is not overtly hostile, the Arabs fear Iranian power and its ability to stir passions among the Shia communities in the Gulf and its capacity to use unconventional warfare, including terrorism and subversion, to achieve its goals. The Gulf Arabs are already deterred from confronting Iranian power: they realize that a showdown will come at the expense of stability and economic development. For them, President Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is reminiscent of the early years of the Islamic Revolution, when it challenged them on religious and ideological grounds. But Iran is also presenting itself as a modern power that is using technology, including nuclear technology, for the good and glory of its people.

The Gulf Arab states have few military options to deter or defend themselves against Iran, other than relying on western powers. Despite heavy defense spending and procurement of advanced

equipment, few experts believe the Gulf Arab states have the air or naval power, the operational training, and the necessary manpower to provide a strategic balance vis-à-vis Iran.

Whether security sector reform would alter this equation in the short-term is doubtful. First, defense upgrading and integration will take years and will face many operational obstacles. Second, if it is undertaken with the sole objective of countering Iran, it will likely increase tensions with Iran in the mid-term. Finally, only a comprehensive security architecture that includes Iran and the United States can significantly change the calculations of all actors—something unlikely to occur anytime soon. But were Gulf states to rethink their security posture, they could become less dependent on the United States and be able to pursue a more conciliatory agenda towards Iran.

Iraq's current predicament is a factor in promoting security sector reform in two different ways. In one way, the uncertain future of Iraq has become a new vulnerability for the Gulf states. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime has removed what was traditionally seen as the Arab world's bulwark against Iranian hegemony. The prospects of a Shia-dominated Iraq or of a sectarian civil war will create unprecedented domestic pressures to intervene or side with the Sunni minority or anti-Iranian Shia groups. Gulf states are focused on preventing spillover from Iraq, by enhancing border controls, cracking down on radical Islamist elements, and trying to prevent the spread of terrorism. The Iraq situation could stimulate some regional cooperation and coordination. In another way, the radical American agenda in Iraq has changed the way the region thinks about reform and political change. While the American experiment to bring democracy to Iraq is often ridiculed in the Arab world, it has shaken complacent elites and mobilized intellectuals and political activists. Under today's circumstances, it may seem farfetched, but a successful Iraq with more modern institutions could some day be a model for the region. Whether that occurs or not, the way the region talks about reform has changed because of Iraq.

Security Sector Reform and Broader Reform Issues

Security sector reform in the Gulf is one spoke in the wheel of the broader Middle East reform agenda. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, both the United States and the European Union identified Middle East authoritarianism as the source of the region's ills and set out to assist and encourage gradual democratic reform agendas in the Middle East, often to the displeasure and dismay of their Arab allies.

At first reluctant and unconvinced, regimes in the region gradually defined timid and incremental reform programs, mostly because of the convergence of external pressure with significant domestic demands for change. Then-Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia launched a National Dialogue, Egypt held parliamentary and presidential elections, and Jordan's King Abdallah encouraged the drafting of the National Agenda, a comprehensive reform document. But the electoral victories of Islamist parties and the deteriorating situation in Iraq have slowed down this liberalization process.

In other ways, change is occurring. The burgeoning of Arab satellite television has created new space and opportunity for political debate. Indeed, while debate is still stifled in Parliaments and in the print press, Arab satellite television has broken many of the political taboos that constrained societies and citizens, and created unprecedented—but still limited—demand for transparency and accountability. Given the culture of the *mukhabarat* state and the lack of publicly-available knowledge about security institutions, it took time before the discussion addressed security issues in general. Security has been labeled the "last taboo" and the "final frontier," terms that suggest that security sector reform often comes at the end of reform process. Now, however, security issues are openly covered and addressed, within limits. For example, more candid interviews of government officials are commonplace now on satellite news stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, during which interviewers boldly ask about national security policy or military expenditures.

Another positive development has been the strengthening of the civil society in general and of the policy community in particular. While defense and security issues have long been monopolized by the *diwans*, the community of academics and policy analysts at universities and research centers is emerging as an important voice in the debate. Gulf think tanks have developed serious defense and security expertise and have become centers for creative thinking about regional security. In the absence of elected representatives, civil society actors can introduce new ideas, challenges government policies, and educate the public about security issues.

Military officers are a key constituency that can both demand and benefit from security sector reform. If Arab military officers start seeing themselves and are dealt with as professionals first, and if they are given the capacity and flexibility to execute missions, they will accomplish their duties more effectively and become valuable assets in terms of national security. Already

engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation or enrolled in foreign military schools, officers realize the potential for progress in the security field and are hungry for professional recognition. It is possible that, since the military is one of the most visible and important institutions in a non-democratic country, military reform, a small but necessary piece of security sector reform, could drive change in the rest of the country. Cooperative agreements like NATO's ICI can contribute to this process by stimulating military-to-military cooperation.

Conclusion

Security sector reform is a new issue for the Gulf. It has important links to the current US policy agenda of promoting peaceful political change and reform, and it could be a constructive factor in the enduring search for more sustainable security for the peoples and states of the region. The Arab Gulf states, with their growing interest in cooperation with NATO, have an opportunity to create a more modern security culture. Such a culture, with more interaction between military establishments and civilian institutions, with greater openness and accountability, could, under the right circumstances, serve to enhance regional stability and the security of each state and its citizenry. There may be no rush to embrace security sector reform, and there are other acute political and political-military issues on the agenda, but over time, this issue is likely to garner more traction and is worthy of study and policy attention.

APPENDIX A:

DEFINING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FOR THE GULF
Macro view – Moving from Regime Security to National Security

Oversight/Accountability Issues

1. What is the role of legislatures in setting defense policy and in determining defense budgets?
2. Is there oversight of cabinet officers' performance?
3. Are there oversight bodies (auditors, human rights commissions, etc.)?
4. How is military procurement negotiated and approved? Who has authority over procurement?

Transparency in Security Decisions and Structures

1. What does the public know and when?
2. What are the trends in the availability of archives, memoirs?
3. To what extent does the make-up of security sector forces reflect society at large?
4. How transparent are defense structures? Are organizational charts available to key audiences (MPs, oversight bodies)?
5. Do the relevant ministries publish white papers/reviews explaining their objectives and strategies to the wider public?
6. Are the criteria for promotion, demotion, and assignment of security officials available to key audiences?

Training/Professional Development Issues

1. Is there adequate training for security sector professionals (military, police, customs, etc.) including non-lethal means, human rights standards, and management/governance?
2. Is there professional mobility in the security professions?

Creating a More Open Security Culture

1. What is the media's role in informing the public about security matters?
2. Are there active think tanks working on security issues?
3. Are there substantive debates on security issues within Parliament?
4. Is there adequate training for media, academics, and parliamentarians (scholarships in security studies, etc.)?

Regional Trends and Interactions

1. Does the GCC engage in cooperative policing of borders, counterterrorism efforts, and maritime security?
2. Are the nations engaged in joint training exercises for security professionals?
3. Is there an active regional dialogue on security issues?

APPENDIX B:

SELECTED READINGS ON GULF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Alani, Mustafa. "Arab Perspectives on NATO." *NATO Review*. Spring 2005. 5 March 2006.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/art3.html>.

Al-Najjar, Ghanim. "Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait." August 2004. 6
March 2006. <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/ 142.pdf>.

Al-Qallab, Musa Hamad. *The Regional Role of NATO and its Potential Role in the Gulf Region*.
Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2005.

Bensahel, Nora and Dan Byman. *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East: Conflict,*
Stability, and Political Change. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2004.

Blanche, Ed. "United Arab Emirates builds armed forces against a volatile backdrop."
International Defence Review. 01 February 2005. 6 March 2006.
<http://0www8.janes.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/c
ontent1/janesdata/mags/idr/history/idr2005/idr03685.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&
keyword=UAE%20military&backPath=http://0-
search.janes.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu:80/Search&Prod_Name=IDR&>.

Chubin, Shahram. "The Persian Gulf: Security, Politics, and Order." June 2001. 12 March
2006. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/Global%20Century
%20%20June%202001/C44Chubi.pdf#search='Shahram%20Chubin.%20%20The%20Persia
n%20Gulf%3A%20Security%2C%20Politics%2C%20and%20Order>.

Cook, Steven A. "The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform." *Foreign Affairs*. 85 (2005): 6
March 2006. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8115/right_way_to_ promote_ arab_reform
.html>.

Cook, Steven A. "The Unspoken Power: Civil Military Relations and the Prospects for Reform*."*
The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World. 7 (September 2004).

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War.* Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Military Balance in the Gulf." *Center for Strategic and*
International Studies. 2005. 17 February 2006. <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/
050413_MEMilBalGulf.pdf>.

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Nawaf Obaid. "The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and
Security Services-Challenges and Developments." Paper presented at the Geneva Centre for
Democratic Control of Armed Forces workshop on Challenges to Security Sector Governance

in the Middle East, Geneva. 12-13 July 2004. 6 March 2006.
<http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/147.pdf.>.

Foley, Sean. "The UAE: Political Issues and Security Dilemmas." *Middle East Review of
International Affairs. 3*.1 (March 1999).

Kamrava, Mehran and Roy Lechtreck. "Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in
the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly.* 115 (2000): 67-93.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S. Policy." *PAIS International*. 24 March 2005.
19 February 2006. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf>.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Kuwait: Post-Saddam Issues and U.S. Policy." *U.S. Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service*. 28 June 2005. 6 March 2006.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50259.pdf>.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy." *U.S. Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service*. 28 June 2005. 6 March 2006.
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf >.

Khalaf, Abd al-Hadi. "Political reform in Bahrain: end of a road?" *Middle East International
Online Edition*. 15 February 2006. <http://meionline.com/features/ 194.shtml>.

Kraig, Michael Ryan. "Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf." *The Stanley
Foundation Policy Analysis Brief*. Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. January 2006.

Kraig, Michael. "Going Beyond U.S. Hegemony: A Military Strategy for Persian Gulf Security."
Courier. 47(Spring 2005): 8-9.

Larrabee, F. Stephen. "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies." *In
RAND/GCSP Workshop on NATO's New Strategic Concern and Peripheral Contingencies:
The Middle East Conference*. 15-16 July 1999. 7 March 2006.
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/CF149.pdf>.

Luethold, Arnold. "Security Sector Reform in the Arab Middle East: A Nascent Debate." In
Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi.
Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 2000 – 2006.

Mokhtari, Fariborz. "Security in the Persian Gulf: Is a Security Framework Possible?" *American
Foreign Policy Interests*. 26 (2004): 1-10.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly.   "NATO and Persian Gulf Security." 2004. 14 February
2006.<http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.asp?SHORTCUT=676>.

Pollack, Kenneth M. "Securing the Gulf." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2003. 18 February
2006. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15401/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-
the-gulf.html>.

Rathmell, Andrew, Karasik, Theodore, and Gompert, David. "A New Persian Gulf Security
System." *Rand.* 2005. 24 February 2006. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/
issue_papers/2005/IP248.pdf>.

Rubin, Barry. "The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. 5 (2001). 6 March 2006. <http://meria.biu.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html>.

UK Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*. London. 2000.

U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. *Bahrain*. 28 Feb 2005. 20 February 2006. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41719.htm>.

Ward, Adam. ed. "The GCC and Gulf Security: Still Looking to America." *ISS Strategic Comments*, 11(November 2005). 6 March 2006. <http://www.iiss.org/stratcom>.

APPENDIX C: COUNTRY BRIEFS*

BAHRAIN

Security Challenges
- Large Shia population 65% - 75%
- History of Iranian interference
- Depletion of oil reserves (10-20 years)
- Tension with Qatar

Defense

The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against external threats but also monitors internal security. The armed forces and military strategy are under the absolute control of the ruling family. However, Bahrain's military procurement is expected to slow down due to the establishment of a 40 member national parliament following the death of longtime ruler Sheikh Issa al-Khalifa in March 1999. As a result, parliament is expected to exert greater scrutiny on spending than before. For example, the legislature cut defense spending for 2004-05 by $10.6 million.

- Personnel: 11,000 (Army), 1,500 (Air Force), 1,200 (Navy)
- Defense Budget (excluding procurement): $526 million (2005), partly subsidized by other GCC states.

Interior Security

The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It controls the Cost Guard and the Public Security Force (police) and the extensive security service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The ruling family maintains effective control of the security forces.

Government
- Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief: King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa (March 1999)
- Crown Prince: Salman bin Hamad
- Prime Minister: Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa (since 1971, brother of King)
- Minister of Defense: Major General Khalifa bin Ahmad al-Khalifa
- Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Abdullah bin Salman al-Khalifa
- Elections: None; the monarchy is hereditary; prime minister appointed by the monarch
- Legislative Branch: Bicameral Parliament consists of Shura Council (40 members appointed by the King) and House of Deputies (40 members directly elected to serve four-year terms)
- The Khalifa family retains other positions such as the assistant chief of staff for operations, the chief of naval staff, and the commander of the air force.

*These country briefs were prepared by Wael Alzayat, Intern and Georgetown MSFS Candidate and Amy Buenning Sturm, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow.

KUWAIT

Security Challenges
- Lack of commitment to constitutional rule (All major security crisis in Kuwait have coincided with an absence of Parliament, 1976-1981 & 1986-1992)
- Foreigners represent over 70% of the population and make up approximately 40% of the security forces
- Comparative size/advantage with its geographic neighbors: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. Historic border tensions with all three neighbors
- The current instability in Iraq, which requires the protection/security guarantee of the US military

Defense
Kuwait is the only GCC state with Parliamentary oversight over the security sector. The Kuwait military apparatus was revised following the Gulf War and coincided with the purging of foreigners from the armed forces (but granted citizenship to the 3,000 foreigners that remained in service). It is headed by the Ministry of Defense (appointed by decree) and maintains a relatively high level of civilian oversight in comparison with the Interior Ministry. The military is well equipped with modern weaponry purchased from the United States, Russia, Great Britain, among others. However, efficient training is still lacking within the Kuwaiti military. The presence of 25,000 US military personnel in the state currently guarantees Kuwait's security.

- Personnel: 15,500 (Army), 2,500 (Air Force), 2,000 (Navy)
- Defense Budget: $4.27 billion (2005)

Internal Security
Kuwait's police force is headed by the Ministry of the Interior (a member of the royal family). In contrast to the Defense Ministry, over 90% of the Interior's department heads are also police officers. The Criminal Intelligence Department is responsible for maintaining order and combating crime, whereas the State Security Department (which reports directly to the Minister of the Interior) is responsible for intelligence. Kuwaiti intelligence has always lacked a strong external focus. They have a small Coast Guard for maritime security.

Government (New as of February '06)
- Chief of State: Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah (January 2006)
- Crown Prince: Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah
- Prime Minister: Nasser Mohammed al-Ahmad al-Sabah
- First Deputy Premier (new position encompassing both the defense and interior ministries): Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak al-Sabah
- Elections: None; the Emir is hereditary; prime minister and deputy prime ministers appointed by the Emir
- Legislative Branch: Unicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-Umma (50 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)

OMAN

Security Challenges
- Armed forces are not well-equipped
- Border tension with Yemen
- Sultan controls Defense and Foreign Policy

*Oman may be one of the most ideal settings for SSR reform in the GCC given Sultan Qaboos' gradual liberalization policies, relatively peaceful relations with GCC neighbors, and historic military cooperation with the United States

Defense
The Sultan makes all military and foreign policy decisions with advice from his cabinet and the Omani Council. Oman has a longstanding political and military relationship with the UK and a security agreement with the U.S. that dates back to 1979. Oman has been a major contributor to the US War on Terror, especially during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Omani Armed Forces have participated in joint training exercises with the United States.

- Personnel: 41,700 (Army), Air Force (4,100), Navy (4,200)
- Defense Budget: $3.02 billion (2005)

Internal Security
The Royal Omani Police, commanded by the Inspector General of Police and Customs, operate under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior. The Directorate General of Criminal Investigation is responsible for criminal investigation, and a separate security division protects Oman's oil industry. A small Coast Guard and mounted security force provide border and maritime security. Additionally, the "home guard" (furqat) – a paramilitary tribal police once trained by the British Army in counterinsurgency remains involved in internal security in a nebulous fashion. Oman has been receiving US security assistance in International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and related security. In 2005, it is estimated that Oman received approximately 20 million dollars through these programs.

Government
- Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance: Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id al-Said (1970)
- Council of Ministers (Cabinet Advisors)
- Minister of State Responsible for Foreign Affairs: Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah
- Minister of State Responsible for Defense: Badr bin Saud bin Harib al-Busaidi
- Minister of Interior: Sayyid Saud bin Ibrahim al-Busaidi
- Legislative Branch: Bicameral Majlis Oman consists of an upper chamber or Majlis al-Dawla (58 seats; members appointed by the monarch; has advisory powers only) and a lower chamber or Majlis al-Shura (83 seats; members elected by popular vote for four-year terms; body has some limited power to propose legislation, but otherwise has only advisory powers)

QATAR

Security Challenges
- Historical conflicts with Bahrain, UAE, and especially Saudi Arabia make GCC cooperation inconsistent.
- The large percentage of foreign labor in Qatar will make developing a professional security sector difficult.
- All military authority lies with the Emir.
- Iran and Saudi Arabia pose large external security threats.
- Possesses limited oil reserves compared with other GCC states (but more natural gas).

Defense
Qatar has a relatively small armed force (especially when compared to some of its neighbors). More than 60% of the military is made up of foreign nationals, who are predominately Omani. Despite spending 10% of GDP on defense, the military suffers from poor equipment and the lack of professional training. Nevertheless, Qatar deployed fighting units during the first Gulf War and is currently engaged in cooperative training and operations with the U.S.

- Personnel: 12,400 (Army), 2,100 (Air Force), 1,800 (Navy)
- Defense Budget: $2.19 billion (2005)

Internal Security
Qatari security is made up of the regular police and the General Administration for Public Security. Under the GAPS structure is the Investigatory Policy, or the Mubahathat. Additionally, the armed forces incorporate an intelligence component that has been used for both external and internal security. There is also the Emiri Guard (mobilized in 1996 to prevent an alleged coup) that is used for regime security. While overlapping security structures are built into the Qatari security sector, they are not as elaborate as other Gulf States, likely because the transitions of power between Emirs consisted of non-violent coups in recent decades.

Government
- Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief: Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (1995)
- Crown Prince: Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (2003)
- Prime Minister: Abdallah bin Khalifa al-Thani (1996)
- First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir al-Thani (2003 & 1992)
- Council of Ministers: Cabinet Advisors who rule by consensus and are appointed by Emir
- New Constitution took affect on 9 June 2005 allowing for a change to the Advisory Council (currently exists as an appointed 35 member Majlis-al-Shura). Elections scheduled for early 2007, after which 2/3 of the members of the Council will be elected (the remainder appointed)

SAUDI ARABIA

Security Challenges
- Sunni extremism and terrorism (al-Qaeda)
- Iranian influence in Iraq and potential nuclear weapons program
- Shia unrest in oil-rich provinces
- Undefined boarders with UAE and Yemen
- Economic and demographic pressures

Defense
The security apparatus has undergone major changes since the Iraq War and the emerging Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia has a modern military force, but is still lacking in areas such as management, manpower, and quality. Civilian control of security apparatus is exercised through the royal family, under the King. It includes consultation with all relevant princes at the ministerial level, supported by outside advisors and technocrats within the key security ministries. There is no parliamentary oversight of military procurement, expenditure, or policy.

- Personnel: 124,500 (Army), 18,000 (Air Force), 16,000 (Air Defense), 15,500 (Navy), 75,000 (National Guard)
- Defense and Security Budget: $21.3 billion (2005)

Internal Security
Internal security is dealt with by using a complex mix of paramilitary and internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior. There is a lack of clear and well established procedures for collective planning and review. Thus, coordination across security sectors is tenuous at best. The creation in 2005 of a Saudi National Security Council (NSC) that is chaired by the King can be viewed as an attempt to rectify this problem.

- Branches: Intelligence, Police, Civil Defense, Border Guard, Coast Guard, Passport & Immigration, Mujahadeen, Drug Enforcement, Special Security, and the General Investigative Bureau

Government
- Chief of State, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief, head of National Guard & National Guard Intelligence Directorate, and Chair of National Security Council (NSC): King Abdullah bin Abdul al-Aziz Al Saud (since 2005)
- Minister of Defense and Civil Aviation: Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul al- Aziz Al Saud (Since 1962). Also, head of Military Intelligence
- Minister of Interior: Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud (since 1975).
- Foreign Minister: Prince Saud al-Faisal (son of King Faisal)
- Cabinet: Council of Ministers is appointed by the monarch and includes many royal family members
- Legislative Branch: Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (120 members and a chairman appointed by the monarch for a four-year terms)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Security Challenges
- Geographic scale and military capabilities vis-à-vis regional powers Iran & Saudi Arabia.
- Territorial disputes with Iran over Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands (occupied by Iran since 1971).
- Competition between the seven emirates especially that between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
- An indigenous population that is outnumbered almost three to one by expatriate workers. Thus, the UAE relies heavily on the expertise of specialist expatriates in the armed forces.

Defense

The armed forces organization reflects the political structure of the federation itself, where each emirate retains broad autonomy from the central government in Abu Dhabi. The military is not standardized due to the procurement of weapons systems by individual emirates. Other problems persist such as poor organization and low quality of military personnel. Moreover, the chain of command remains ambiguous and subject to abuse or rivalries.

The UAE has invested heavily in recent years in building up a strong defense posture. Recent acquisition of in-flight refueling aircraft enhances the Air Force's striking and penetrative capabilities. Also, the Navy is being upgraded from a coastal defense force to one with blue-water capabilities and reach. And the Baynunah program, valued at US$776 million, is the centerpiece of a nascent indigenous military industry led by Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding (ADSB).

Personnel: 50,500 (Army), 4,000 (Air Force), 2,500 (Navy)
Defense Budget: $2.65 billion (2005)

Internal Security

Each emirate funds paramilitary and security forces that monitor the expatriate community, the military and foreign soldiers. The federal government administers the Border Police and Coast Guard.

Government
- Chief of State President: Khalif bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan (2004). Also, ruler of Abu Dhabi (2004)
- Vice President and Prime Minister: Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktum (2006)
- Council of Ministers: Appointed by the president
- Federal Supreme Council (FSC): Composed of the seven emirate rulers; the FSC is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation; meets four times a year
- Abu Dhabi and Dubai rulers have effective veto power over decision

APPENDIX D:

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: THE FINAL FRONTIER?

By Ellen Laipson[5]

As the reform agenda for the Arab world continues to expand, it is time to integrate the issue of security sector reform into the discussion. Only in Iraq and Palestine is security reform a vibrant topic for local debate and for support or intervention by the international community. In those two cases, the debate is on because of acute shortfalls in security capacity, whether police, other law enforcement, or intelligence and military capabilities. For the rest of the Arab world, the problem may be the reverse: excess political clout and too much coercive capacity by the security professionals is leading to a mutual interest by leaders and security officials in postponing or avoiding reform.

The ground seems to be shifting now for several reasons. Virtually every Arab country is more worried about internal threats—from domestic Al Qaeda groups to civil unrest—than about external enemies. Demands to reduce defense spending and pressure from the international community to create a more secure environment for energy sector workers, diplomats, and other expatriates also contribute to the shift. Addressing these needs requires some new thinking about how best to use the security forces, including how to achieve better communication among different security services. Such integration still gives pause to many in the region, however, who deliberately developed systems of checks, balances, and mutual mistrust among security services in order to make incumbent regimes coup-proof.

There are a few signs of greater willingness to talk about the issues. In January, two nongovernmental organizations, Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, held a conference in Amman that addressed the need for security forces to disengage from their excessive involvement in the media, education, and bureaucratic appointments, and the need for more parliamentary and cabinet oversight of security institutions. Jordan may be a case ripe for change, due to its relatively stable political culture and the role of the king as an intermediary or buffer between the military and the political institutions. With his support, the debate can happen. Security issues are also more openly addressed by the burgeoning nongovernmental community in the Gulf. So far, the agenda is modest, focusing on

---

[5] *This piece originally appeared in the March 2005 edition of the Arab Reform Bulletin.*

practical improvements rather than the more theoretical issues of civilian control of defense forces and more transparent and accountable systems.

In some quiet ways, the international community is also trying to contribute. In the aftermath of the Oslo process in the early 1990s, the Arms Control and Regional Security exchanges (ACRS) provided an unprecedented venue for security professionals from across the region to meet each other and talk about issues affecting long term security. While the ACRS process, which formally ended in 1995, was not explicitly about reform, it created more space to discuss security beyond the immediate national interest of each state, established relationships across former forbidden boundaries, and strengthened civilian expertise on previously restricted military issues.

A decade later, NATO is creating new opportunities for security professionals to come out of their bunkers and talk about common concerns. First NATO offered its technical expertise to security officials in the Mediterranean, and, in June 2004, the concept was expanded to the Gulf region and pushed from dialogue to partnership. NATO hopes to work with security communities to promote more efficient and interoperable capabilities, to encourage cooperation in defense reform, and to coordinate counter-terrorism activities. Since counter-terrorism policies can work at cross purposes with political reform (particularly with respect to privacy and freedom of expression) NATO can offer the experience of fully consolidated democracies in managing the difficult tradeoffs in combating terrorism while protecting basic freedoms, a vital goal of the reform process.

Security sector reform has clear implications for and connections to political reform. Security professionals from police to soldiers will become more competent if they are trained better, from general education to learning about the rights of their fellow citizens. Citizens need more competent security to create the environment for peaceful political participation and change; in conditions of heavy-handed, old-style security, political openness cannot flourish. Newly established or empowered parliaments need to address security issues as a core responsibility, not be told by palaces that security issues are off-bounds. And more transparency and clarity about civil-military relations and the boundaries between them are necessary conditions for political change and reform at the strategic level. Trying to promote political reform while continuing business as usual in the security sector simply will not work.

APPENDIX E:

NATO'S NEW MISSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Ellen Laipson[6]

N ATO is picking up the pace of its engagement in the Middle East, putting aside any lingering doubts about "out of area" missions. This new activism can contribute to regional stability and can add security sector reform to the reform agenda in the region. To succeed, however, regional players will have to get comfortable with a NATO role, and will have to demonstrate a willingness to open up security policies to greater scrutiny.

One year ago, NATO announced at its summit in Istanbul a new initiative towards the Middle East region, with an initial focus on the six countries of the Arabian peninsula which comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council. In its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), NATO offers a rich menu of options for training and collaboration, on topics ranging from counterterrorism to greater transparency in defense budgeting and decision making. This initiative is also an effort to transform its relations in the nearby Mediterranean countries from a decade-long "dialogue," which often got bogged down in Arab-Israeli discontent, to a more dynamic and practical partnership.

NATO is driven by the post-Cold War need to define new missions for the alliance. Building on its success with the former Soviet states, NATO has become more confident about its ability to offer practical security assistance to countries beyond traditional Europe. Today, NATO is deployed in Afghanistan, is training troops in Iraq, and in May responded to a request from the African Union to help logistically with the AU's expanding commitment in Darfur, Sudan.

The new interest in the Middle East also represents NATO's desire to align its priorities with those of Washington, the G-8, the EU and other groupings that collectively represent western power. It is the Bush Administration's energy for "transforming" the Middle East that has persuaded NATO to move more actively into the sometimes stormy waters of the Gulf. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has promoted this new relationship. In a recent speech

---

[6] *An Arabic version of this commentary appeared in Al-Hayat on August 20, 2005.*

he said "…the willingness to look at NATO in a new way is clearly there. And that must include a fresh look at how NATO can contribute to Middle East security." For the Gulf states, this means not identifying a particular threat (certain large neighbors are not named in NATO communiqués) and not insisting on a common plan for all Gulf countries. This means that one state may choose to work on maritime surveillance skills, while another may want to work on land borders, or integration of security services.

In theory, NATO's offer to the Gulf states could also be an important contribution to democratization trends. NATO offers help to partnership countries on ensuring civilian control of the armed forces, transparency and oversight of defense spending, and other forms of accountability that are virtually unheard of in the Gulf region, with the exception of Kuwait, and perhaps, the new Iraq. Most Gulf states will not be ready any time soon to invite the alliance into the inner sanctums where defense policies and budgets are decided, but NATO should keep talking about it.

Some may worry that helping military and other security services modernize and professionalize works at cross purposes to the core values of democracy, with its emphasis on individual expression and freedom. NATO's experience in the former Soviet Union suggests that NATO technocrats are willing to proceed with security cooperation in an apolitical manner, with no judgment about a particular partner's democratic credentials. But that may be changing, and the Secretary General is personally committed to viewing cooperation between NATO and partners as part of a process to share and inculcate values, not just technical expertise.

The region is still learning about this new initiative. Four of the Gulf states – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – have officially indicated their desire to participate. Regional elites are responding positively so far, in part because a NATO role could be a means to reduce, at least cosmetically, the American footprint in these small states. NATO is working hard on the public diplomacy dimension, to encourage a conversation between government and influential citizens, so that any decision to invite NATO in will have the support of the governed.

Cooperation with peaceful states on shared concerns such as terrorism, proliferation, smuggling, and environmental degradation should not be too controversial, but for the region, many questions remain. Will NATO's roles in Afghanistan and Iraq associate the alliance too much with unpopular American policies? Can the small Gulf states cope with one more large institutional actor? And no one should expect NATO to have magic solutions to the region's

fundamental security vulnerabilities: insecure regimes of questionable legitimacy, the existential Arab-Israeli dispute, and socio-economic imbalances that could disrupt even the best intentioned initiatives. NATO has done the right thing – for itself and for the region – but one should have realistic expectations. This is a supporting role, not a transforming one.