

A Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union

“Effective crisis management means having access to the full range of civilian capabilities. ... [W]e have to strengthen our collective ability to respond and develop a rapid reaction capability using non-military instruments.”

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy – May 11, 2000

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BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL
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Research Report 2000.2, June 2000 ISBN 1 874533 39 3 © BASIC 2000

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Introduction

This paper proposes the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Service (COPS) based in Europe, and aimed at filling a gap that has become more and more obvious over the past decade as the international community has struggled to respond to emerging crises: the gap between diplomacy and military force. The need to strengthen civilian capacity to support crisis management operations in Europe and elsewhere is manifest. Time and again – in Panama, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and now Kosovo – the civilian side of peace-building and conflict prevention has fallen short. The international community has managed difficult military deployments, including combat actions, but it continually fails to muster the civilian resources to support peace-building operations afterwards – let alone to prevent conflict beforehand.

Analysts at BASIC had recommended in Op-Ed articles and in *A Risk Reduction Report for NATO* before the NATO summit in April 1999 that, among other things, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and NATO give attention to the creation of “civilian intervention units.” **U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan** has called for a **study** to be completed this fall to examine every aspect of U.N. peacekeeping and make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of U.N. missions. The **OSCE** agreed at its summit meeting in November 1999 in Istanbul to develop by June 30, 2000 a capability to deploy **Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT)** to support OSCE missions. The **European Union** at its summit in Helsinki in December agreed to create a **Rapid Reaction Facility (RRF)**. The **United States** has promulgated a **Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 71)** to strengthen criminal justice systems in support of peace operations. These actions reflect a common sense of urgency to develop the capacity to mobilize and deploy civilian experts with capabilities in a variety of fields: medical, fire fighting, search and rescue, customs, administration, humanitarian assistance, mediation, crime prevention, crowd control, public security, judicial and penal enforcement. **However, none of these efforts has yet gone far enough.**

This paper presents **an on-the-ground model** for bringing into being readily deployable and well-protected teams of civilians to provide a full range of conflict prevention services. Behind COPS lies the concept of a united, hybrid force structure with a quasi-military organization and concept, but composed of civilian and non-military personnel able to handle this wide range of needs. The model solves the problem of unified command with a multidisciplinary force structure to perform the multifaceted missions we can expect to see more of in the future. The European Union is well equipped to implement this concept. Its location, its political affiliation with major regional organizations and international forums, its vocation for promoting democracy and respect of human rights, and its economic and financial resources can make the European Union an indispensable leader for crisis management. We welcome EU consideration of a Rapid Reaction Facility, and we discuss EU plans in the paper. In our view, however, they reflect traditional thinking. The times call for a bold departure. We offer the COPS vision to show the way.

Introduction (cont'd)

The essence of the COPS model is its unique meshing of paramilitary police and civilian functions into a single, integrated force structure, as opposed to today's ad hoc approach.

Paramilitary policing units have been proven to be highly effective during U.N.-mandated NATO operations in the Balkans. They have filled a gap in providing a policing role that military forces are not trained for. In the Balkans, these forces have been based around the Italian Carabinieri, which currently has battalions deployed in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Key characteristics that have created their success include: policy units have a military structure; maintain their own logistics and command control, communications and intelligence technology; and are experienced in not-fully industrialized societies. Under NATO command in the Balkans, they have developed ad hoc relationships with the range of EU, U.N., and OSCE missions.

COPS thus is based upon real-world experience in today's complex crisis environments.

Caveat:

Nonetheless, the concept and implementing models presented in this paper are preliminary. They might be thought of as a 'Version 1.0.' The authors are not experts in military or paramilitary force structure and planning, nor in large-scale administration of civilian crisis activities. Neither are we experienced in the field performing the functions we describe.

Instead, in response to positive response to earlier BASIC concepts, we are attempting to crystallize a fundamentally new tool for conflict prevention and management in Europe. We recognize that we have left many questions unanswered, including sticky questions of institutional coordination between the European Union and other international forums assigned responsibility for global security.

We therefore look forward to receiving comments and suggestions in order to develop the concept further.

A Conflict Prevention Service of the European Union

Vision 2010

This model for a COPS Corps 2010 is intended to be preliminary, and to provide a basis for development and discussion. Within and around the U.N. system there have been many models of stand-by forces, most of them emphasizing peacekeeping by military forces. The lack of political will amongst some member states has prevented any of these ideas becoming reality. This vision draws on the experiences of the Kosovo Verification Mission (1998-1999) and of the Multinational Specialized Unit in Bosnia. Most important, it requires a new doctrine to govern thinking about mobilizing resources for conflict prevention.

New Doctrine

The strategic requirement is for a promptly deployable contingent of police and other non-military conflict management units. For this a new doctrine is needed among civilian planners. Ironically, they must think like their military counterparts to develop the decision-making structure, planning, training, coordination, and funding to be able to send civilian assets to a crisis area on short notice. **An EU COPS would be able to put on the ground within 24 hours a contingent with headquarters staff; operational units; communications, logistics, intelligence capability; and security elements to take charge of the situation from the first hours. The COPS would have to build up in the next days sufficient resources to carry out its assigned mission,** which could extend to restoring law and order and providing societal services on an emergency basis to a system undermined by conflict or natural disaster. The COPS must have a proper mandate, a clear mission, and appropriate rules of engagement. It must be able to operate on its own, with sufficient administrative and other support capabilities, as well as in cooperation with international military forces and, if present, other international organizations, governments, and non-governmental organizations. It must be able to continue to function until replaced, possibly for up to one-year, and beyond, from initial deployment. **It would have a unified political command, and an integrated structure of civilian experts and paramilitary police units.**

What is the ideal size of such a capability? There is no simple answer. Financial and political prudence indicate a small unit at first that would be easier to persuade national treasuries to fund. Experience in the Caucasus, the Balkans and on U.N. military peacekeeping missions is that, once created, there might be a demand for tens of thousands of personnel at any one time, with gradually declining levels from an initial peak. Longer missions require rotation, which can increase numbers threefold.

For this model, a capacity of some 15,000 has been chosen for illustrative purposes.

COPS in the Field

The basic COPS unit in the field would be a battalion-sized unit of 1,000 people. It would have a headquarters company for logistics, operational and staff support. It could include, depending on mission, a humanitarian assistance unit to manage the field activities of the European Commission Humanitarian office (ECHO), and liaise with non-governmental organizations. **For a low-tension, or “light” mission (diagram p.6),** it would include large numbers of monitors/experts and a territorial police company.

Composition of these units and the mix of paramilitary police and civilian experts would depend upon the mission, and especially upon the security environment in the operating area. In a high-tension situation, the battalion likely would be heavy on paramilitary police capability; in low-tension, it would be stronger in civilian experts to strengthen civil society and lighter on the paramilitary security elements. **COPS strength in the field would be augmented by adding additional battalions, light or heavy, depending on the level of tension, to build up to a COPS “brigade” (diagram p.7).** A COPS brigade would have additional units for providing public access television and liaison with other nations (e.g. Russia, the United States), or international organizations participating in the crisis management operation. It also could contain additional civil-society building experts, for example in human rights mediation, arms control, police and legal training.


In very unstable situations, a “heavy” COPS battalion (diagram p.8) could be placed under direct control of a regional military commander. An operational support company, modeled on the specialized police units used in Bosnia, would comprise platoon-sized units of criminal and war crimes investigators and intelligence experts; platoons for public security (riot control police); and experts in mediation, human rights monitoring, arms control, police training, and the collection and destruction of weaponry, as required. It also would include a number territorial police companies, also equipped with light armored combat vehicles for intelligence gathering, scouting or trouble shooting; and, if required, a company for engineering and mine clearance.

COPS would have its own political command headquarters under a high representative from the European Union. Alternatively, it could be assigned to the headquarters of another international political command. In any case, the political command would have a press office and a staff section for administration and logistics, intelligence and liaison, and operations. It would be wise to allow desk space for NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States and OSCE liaison officers for all operations.

An administration and logistics section would support COPS as a whole in the areas of personnel, training, finance, general services, medical care, logistics and similar services. The intelligence and liaison staff would coordinate the gathering and assessing of intelligence, and assure effective liaison for COPS with host authorities at national and regional levels. COPS would complement the European Union’s planned military force of 60,000 troops able to deploy in cases when NATO cannot or is unwilling. Indeed, the effectiveness of both COPS and the European military force will be enhanced by working together.

COPS “Light” Battalion

This is the COPS battalion suitable for tasks such as election monitoring, or human rights monitoring, when tensions are heightened but the situation is not particularly violent. It comprises five companies of monitors, each with three, 31-person platoons (one professional and 30 volunteers), and a headquarters section. They are supported by: a paramilitary company, consisting of three platoons each with three light armored combat vehicle squads; an expert team specializing in languages, mediation, etc.; and a headquarters company with medical, transport, logistics, command, control, and communications platoons.



KEY

XX - Division

X - Brigade

II - Battalion (400-1500)

I - Company (100-200)


●●● - Platoon (20-40)


● - Squad (8-12)


ECHO - European Community Humanitarian Office


 - Paramilitary Police (Mechanized)


 - Mechanized Infantry

 - Helicopters

 - Engineers

 - Medical


 - Transport

 - Experts/ Monitors

 - Communications

COPS “Medium” Brigade


This is a model of a brigade-sized unit specializing in conflict prevention, and patterned after the Kosovo Verification Mission. The brigade would comprise three COPS battalions, with beefed-up monitoring team units to undertake specific tasks including human rights protection, mediation, arms control verification, weapons collection and destruction, and police training. The headquarters also would involve a liaison unit with responsibility for maintaining links to other involved institutions such as the United Nations and NATO, as well as participating governments such as Russia and the United States.



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COPS “Heavy” Battalion

This is the COPS structure that would be used in a high-violence situation such as post-conflict stabilization, modeled after the ad hoc structures developed in Kosovo. Under this model, paramilitary police are more numerous within the battalion, which itself is attached to a divisional-level, regular military commander. The operational support company will include a platoon of criminal and war crimes investigators and intelligence experts, and two platoons charged with public security. The latter would have specialized training and be equipped for riot control, dispersing crowds, and restoring order. A company of engineers could be attached for de-mining, road clearing, bridge-building, and other construction. The operational support company further would include mediators, monitors, medical, and other personnel.




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Today's Threats Require...

The following sections describe the new security environment; steps the European Union and others have taken, or are planning, to address new threats; and how the COPS concept could greatly improve crisis management.

The nature of threats to the Euro-Atlantic and global community has changed. The end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation has altered the basic purpose of NATO, ended superpower competition in conflicts around the world, and changed the strategic dynamic for states along the old East-West fault line in Europe. Current threats to international security include ethnic conflict within states, mass migration, economic and social upheaval, and natural disasters. Such crises require a combination of measures to address their multiple ramifications. These crises also evolve in various phases, each requiring a different degree and type of engagement. A major task is to rapidly coordinate and deploy available human, financial, and materiel resources to best effect. The EU Conflict Prevention Network, in its June 1999 Guidebook (pp 22-23), describes the phases of a typical conflict as follows:

Engagement in the Various Phases of Conflict and Peace



...Learning the Right Lessons...

The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was established by OSCE-Yugoslav agreement signed on October 16, 1998. It deployed over a period of several months beginning in November but had barely reached its planned strength when it was withdrawn in March 1999, just days before the NATO campaign against Belgrade began. The KVM achieved much in observing and reporting violations of human rights and of the cease-fire between Serbian and Albanian forces, but was plagued with:

- Delays in staffing, recruiting, and getting personnel to the field.
- Inadequate protection.
- Unclear mandate.
- “Mission creep” and inadequate resources for the additional tasks thrust upon it.

What policy makers needed at the time – at a minimum – was a ready-to-go “force” of civilian leaders and experts able to perform all services required to carry out its mission of investigating human rights violations and violations of a military cease-fire.

There was considerable time to ready such a force, were it already in being or on stand-by. The diplomacy leading to establishment of the KVM began as early as June 1998, when the Serbian leader agreed to allow diplomats in Belgrade full freedom of movement to monitor the situation in Kosovo. The United Nations resolution, which became part of KVM’s authority, was passed in September, and agreement with Yugoslavia was obtained in mid-October. While military planning and positioning for an eventual fight was already underway long in advance, civilian planning for the civilian mission of the Kosovo Verifiers became by comparison a last-minute cobbling together of resources from wherever they could be found. Had it been a military operation, the KVM might have featured an ability to deploy immediately upon the political decision and international mandate.

A truly “rapid” reaction force, as envisioned in COPS, should be able to move quickly to deployment readiness. Its ability should equate to, for example, the 1- to 24-hour stand-by status of elements of NATO-nation special forces, the NATO Allied Mobile Force and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. It also needs a “tail” of other professional, cadre, volunteer and reserve resources capable of “echeloning” into the deployment, alongside perhaps military and non-governmental elements.

...Learning the Right Lessons (cont'd)...

I. **Numbers and costs** - The ability to move immediately requires a professionally employed and trained “force.” The Kosovo Verification Mission was limited to 1,800 personnel, but it took several months to build up to that number; which proved insufficient to the overwhelming tasks faced on the ground. Assuming an average gross cost for 4,000 personnel, across all grades, of about 50,000 euros per annum, an annual personnel budget comes to 200,000,000 euros. A basic complement operating a three-unit rotation cycle – with the alternative, temporary option of deploying two or even three such units simultaneously – would involve some 12,000 deployable personnel, organized from a pool of standing units and reserves, with a headquarters and training establishment of, say, 3,000, for a total of 15,000 personnel. At 50,000 euros each, the total annual personnel cost would be 750,000,000 euros. There are probably standard ratios in public bodies, police, and the large aid and development non-governmental organizations from which formulas to estimate costs for recruitment, training, transport, support, and overhead can be drawn. If such expenses are roughly equal to the personnel costs, then that totals about 1.5 billion euros or, liberally, 2 billion euros for total annual costs of a COPS force. This seemingly enormous sum of appears much more reasonable, however, when compared to the total military spending of EU-NATO members, which comes to approximately 156 billion euros.

II. **Capabilities** - As discussed, the specific functions required in the field will vary upon the nature of the crisis. A high-violence crisis likely would require a heavy military contingent for general security supported by “specialized units” for police support, crowd control, and crime prevention and investigation. Humanitarian assistance, fire-fighting, search and rescue, de-mining, medical, mediation, judicial-legal and other services would be added as required. A low-violence situation would need less paramilitary strength and probably more in the area of civil services. It will be necessary to define type of experts and monitors clearly. A range of skills will be needed for any individual crisis, and one person can have several but not all. Planning the right mix will depend on intelligence about the situation to be faced, and will change as the crisis evolves.

As COPS doctrine develops, the police and expert functions may began to merge. While civilians initially may be concerned about becoming “militarized,” it must be remembered that existing emergency services, such as fire fighters, are organized along a military model. The COPS force would be designed as, and would remain, a civilian service.

...New Strategies...

EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten

Berlin, 16 December 1999

“The European Union has to envisage action right across the whole range of the instruments at its disposal – military and non-military. The idea is to bring together national and European capabilities and to establish a mechanism for coordination and rapid deployment.”

U.S. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-71)

February 2000

“A fundamental aspect of a successful peace operation at the end of a military conflict is to reinforce effective indigenous law and criminal justice systems.”

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan

U.N. 1999 Annual Report

“Implementing prevention strategies – for wars or disasters – requires cooperation across a broad range of different agencies and departments. Unfortunately, international and national bureaucracies have yet to remove the institutional barriers to building the cross-sector cooperation that is a prerequisite of successful prevention.”

OSCE Summit Declaration

Istanbul, November 1999

“To address the challenges in the OSCE area quickly and efficiently new instruments are required. We welcome the establishment, in the Charter, of a Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) programme for the OSCE.”

There is increasing recognition that international crisis management efforts need to take a new direction:

- **Case-by-Case Approach**
- **Multidisciplinary Response**
- **National and International Cross-sector Cooperation**
- **Rapid Coordination**
- **Long-term Prevention**

...New Responsibilities...

Future crises are likely to emerge in the surroundings of European Union territory. The Balkans, the Middle East, Northern Africa, the former Soviet-controlled territories in Asia all represent potential threats to future peace and stability. Particularly after its enlargement process is completed, the European Union will play an even stronger role in projecting world peace and stability. In the 21st century, Europe will be as essential as the United States has been during the last 50 years for promoting democracy, assuring respect of human rights, and defending the world order.

In **June 1992**, the **Western European Union** sets the concept of **“Petersberg tasks”**: conflict prevention and crisis management.

In **1996**, the European Union adopts this concept under the **Amsterdam treaty**.

In **June 1996**, in Berlin, the European Union decides to implement the so-called **European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)**, which pledged creation of a common foreign and security approach.

The 1990s have produced valuable debates about the need to provide a coherent response to emerging crises and erupting conflicts. The decade, however, was a lost opportunity in translating words into actions. The recent EU decision to bring together the civilian and military sides for a broader and more comprehensive approach to crisis management and conflict prevention represents a step forward in confronting the new threats, and it can be the foundation for the establishment of COPS.

In **April 1999**, at the **NATO summit in Washington**, the ESDI concept is supported within the transatlantic alliance's **New Strategic Concept**.

In **June 1999**, **EU summit in Cologne**, the ESDI evolves into the **European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)**, and a plan for creating mechanisms to support that policy.

December 1999, EU summit in Helsinki
“Headline Goals”:


- to develop by 2003 an autonomous EU-led military capacity (of 50,000 to 60,000 troops deployable on short notice and sustainable for a year) to be used in cases where NATO as a whole is not engaged.
- to establish a **non-military mechanism to effectively use civilian means and resources in crisis situations.**

“The idea is to bring together national and European capabilities, and to establish an effective mechanism for rapid coordination and deployment.”

Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations in Berlin, 16 December 1999

...and New Institutional Frameworks

To implement ESDP and to respond directly to a call by the Helsinki European Council on April 12, 2000, the European Commission Directorate General for External Relations submitted a proposal to the Council for a regulation creating a **Rapid Reaction Facility (RRF)** to mobilize civilian crisis instruments. The proposal reads: “The RRF will have no geographical limitation. It is intended to be used where situations call for: rapid intervention in situations of emerging crisis, in crisis or conflict situations or to address the immediate needs in the aftermath of conflicts; interventions with a short life-span; a mixture of instruments.”



Mobilizing Resources

The European Union has all the resources to face regional crises. It has technical know-how for sending emergency rescue teams to earthquakes in Greece or Turkey; it has long-standing diplomatic and commercial links for mediating territorial disputes in the Caucasus; it has highly-trained paramilitary police, such as the Italian Carabinieri and the French Gendarmerie. The crucial task is to mobilize and coordinate all these national resources for effective and rapid deployment. The European Union is conducting an overall inventory assessment of EU-wide assets and capabilities. Member state and EU institutions with capabilities in various fields will be identified. A database in Brussels will hold this information, allowing for the maintenance and sharing of information. This will facilitate the identification and matching of member state assets for specific EU deployments (e.g., through pairing of one member state's helicopter lift with a specialist medical team from another). In building the infrastructure, the European Union will use personnel and materiel already existing at the national level. While the end goal is a standing force, this will take time – and interim steps – to accomplish.

Much of what the European Union is doing to prepare its Rapid Reaction Facility is a good start for building COPS. To move forward, the following steps are recommended:

- Coordination and planning to provide economies of scale and greater efficiency must begin on an urgent basis.
- Interoperability problems must be identified and resolved.
- Interagency and intergovernmental cooperation in emergency preparedness must become normal practice for EU members.
- Funds must not only be earmarked to finance a crisis response, they must also be found to finance the infrastructure necessary to build the new capabilities (i.e. recruiting, training, organizing, and maintaining “readiness.”)

“The European Union, more so than many international organizations, is already in a strong position to use its longstanding experience and considerable resources on the non-military aspects of crisis management. This is one area in particular where the EU can offer added value.”

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy

“[The] experience with humanitarian aid, election monitoring, police deployment and training, border control, institution building, mine clearance, arms control and destruction, combating illicit trafficking, embargo enforcement and counter-terrorism shows how comprehensive the Commission's roles already are.”

Chris Patten, European Commissioner

Training

For COPS to work, common training standards should be developed to facilitate the integration of field expertise from different nationalities. Training will need to be organized at various levels:

- **Civilian Functions:** at the national/regional level, courses based on EU standard programs and aimed at providing skills for civilian functions – civilian police training in a crisis state – and in combined civilian and military operations; electoral monitoring; generic training applicable to virtually any international conflict prevention situation, including English language courses, driving in high-risk situations, and communications in an international environment.
- **Leadership:** at the European level, leadership programs geared to train military leaders in civilian capacities and civilian managers in military and police operations. The need is to develop a cadre of elite commanders who maintain their national roles, but also can double-hat in order to handle broad tasks within the overarching, hybrid force structure of COPS.
- **Pre-Mission:** short specialized training at the European level to orient personnel to the specific area of deployment (i.e. training on political, social, cultural and economic conditions of the Balkans; security aspects of the area; nature of the disputes to be mediated; and the interests of the various parties involved.)
- **Simulations and Exercises:** the European Union should develop a library of detailed crisis response plans built on “lessons learned” from past experience; crisis simulations should be set up; and the efficiency and effectiveness of organization, planning, and personnel – individually and as a team – should be tested regularly.




Funding Up-Front

Under current EU plans, the Rapid Reaction Facility “will operate through a separate budget line reinforced by the authority of the European Commission to decide quickly on urgent interventions of up to 5 million euros. Each intervention would have a cost ceiling of 12 million euros and a time limit of nine months”, says the European Commission release of April 11, 2000. A total endowment of 70 million euros is envisaged to run the Rapid Reaction Facility until 2006, with up to 30 million for 2001 and 40 million for the following years.


The principle of earmarking money beforehand, rather than asking at the time for national donations to send a force, represents a major step toward making rapid reaction possible. European Union funds serve as a guarantee – a reimbursement mechanism – in order for nations to be willing to front the costs involved. Funding is also necessary, however, to maintain training schools at the national level, for example the Sant’Anna School for election monitors and conflict management officers in Pisa, Italy. In general, funding will be crucial for the infrastructure training described in the previous section. Funds from existing European Union programs – such as PHARE and TACIS for Eastern European countries, police and electoral assistance, the Stability Pact – and relevant EU budget line items that exist for Common Foreign and Security Policy activities can be drawn to finance deployment and training.

Additional allocations will be necessary, however, to implement the COPS vision. Yet, even those much larger amounts pale by contrast with what the EU members of NATO spend each year on defense.

Mission Funding for Nine Months: OSCE Budget Items in 1999 vs. EU Rapid Reaction Fund




Funding for COPS vs. EU-NATO Military Expenses (one year)



International Coordination...

COPS could help the European Union become a more effective partner in the international security network.




...with the European Union as Catalyst

When the European Union wishes to take the initiative either with or on behalf of the OSCE or the United Nations, it will also have to coordinate quickly with those institutions to identify available resources, comparative advantage and interoperability with EU assets, as well as effective matches to the needs of the given crisis. Contingency coordination, early warning and communication will be paramount.

The REACT capability under development at the OSCE will provide a pool of skilled personnel, which could augment EU capabilities and vice versa. Contacts between the Policy Unit of the European Council and the REACT Task Force have already been established to begin close collaboration on this issue. EU Commissioner Chris Patten's expansion of the European Union's non-military capacities, to include election monitoring, civilian policing and the like, will prepare the EU rapid reaction mechanism to operate as a bloc or in tandem with others within these international organizations.

COPS combined with EU plans for a separate military-led peacekeeping force would assure the European Union a robust conflict prevention and crisis management capability.



Action Plan To Implement COPS Vision 2010


The European Union's efforts so far go in the right direction, but the vision is not nearly ambitious enough to supply the sufficient capability to use effectively in crisis situations as they have developed in Europe this past decade – let alone what might come in future. The planning so far is too modest and too incremental. The COPS vision is designed to provide effective tools between those of diplomacy and military force to use in conflict prevention and to assure the necessary capabilities to deal with post conflict stabilization.

The COPS 2010 vision is ambitious, but it provides a sure way to achieve requirements of unified command, rapid deployment, and a flexible combination of civilian, institution-building expertise and police security. What is needed is a practical action plan to build the capability step by step.

1. Adopt a target goal to create a COPS force of 15,000 by 2005.
2. Identify EU personnel resources and requirements for such a force.
3. Evaluate the cost of developing the force and establish EU and national budgets to do so.
4. Increase with EU funds the existing national capabilities of Carabinieri/Guardia Civil/Marechausse/Gendarmerie/Border Guards and similar units to produce the additional forces needed.
5. Hire on a EU-basis the necessary cadre of civilian experts in the entire range of tasks that might be needed from accounting to verification.
6. Train, with EU funding, the paramilitary personnel and the civilian cadres jointly, each in their own specialties but also operating as units. Leadership personnel would be trained across skills.
7. Develop a common doctrine for deployment and joint operations in the field through training and exercising, as units, the paramilitary personnel and the civilian cadres.
8. Begin liaison and “command post” exercises with leadership representatives from other nations and international organizations likely to be participating with the European Union in peacekeeping activities.

COPS Timeline

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2010
Decide to do it	Budget legislation	Develop first paramilitary police units (approx. 2,000)	Intensify training	Form COPS battalions (total: 4,000-6,000)	Begin full-scale deployments as required	Force is seasoned, ready for any kind of deployment
Identify personnel	Establish EU Leadership Structure	Hire civilian experts (approx. 3,000)	Add additional paramilitary police units & civilian experts (approx. 2,000)	Conduct full training exercises	Continue training and exercises	4,000-6,000 ready to go
Evaluate Costs	Establish EU-wide planning staff and coordination structure	Begin training at national and EU level	Begin exercises with likely partners	Begin establishing components of stand-by units and reserves	Complete establishment of stand-by units and reserves	9,000-16,000 in stand-by units and reserves
Begin planning	Inventory resources		Begin small scale deployments if required	Continue joint exercises with likely partners – Russia, U.S., U.N., OSCE, others	Give them deployable experience as feasible	
	Set up data bases					



Why COPS

Establishment of COPS will not be easy or cheap. But it can – and should – be done, and at reasonable cost. COPS will complement the European Union's planned military force of 50,000 to 60,000 troops – in fact, early civil intervention can avoid the need for military force – resolving a crisis at much less cost.

It will bring further dividends. A robust COPS force potentially numbering up to 15,000 paramilitary police and civilian experts will:

- **Strengthen** the European Union in its common foreign and security policy by providing an additional, many-faceted instrument of conflict prevention.
- **Enable** the European Union to act – decisively – to reduce conflict or stabilize broken societies after conflict.
- **Provide** a strong tool to fill the gap between diplomatic and military options.
- **Save money** on the military side by helping defuse or contain conflict that might otherwise require a heavy military intervention, or
- At a minimum, **buy time** to continue diplomatic efforts and/or to accomplish necessary decisions, planning, and readiness to deploy military force.
- **Help reduce** U.S. political sensitivities regarding a European military force separable from NATO.

***This report was made possible by the generous support of CarEth Foundation, W. Alton Jones Foundation,
The Ford Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.***

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Research Report 2000.2, June 2000 ISBN 1 874533 39 3 © BASIC 2000