A Swiss Contribution to the Partnership for Peace



7th International Security Forum (ISF)

Conference Proceedings



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Preface

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) is pleased to present the proceedings of the 7th International Security Forum (ISF). The 7th ISF, titled *“New Risks and Threats: The Challenge of Securing State and Society,”* was held at the Kongresshaus in Zurich from 26 to 28 October 2006.

As a Swiss government contribution to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the 7th ISF is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

The ISF biennial conference cycle was initially launched as the Institutes and Security Dialogue in Zurich in 1994 and has since been at the forefront of cooperation among international security professionals around the world.

This internationally renowned conference brought together over 490 experts with a security-political background, including civil servants, diplomats, military officials, academics and representatives from non-governmental organizations. The 7th ISF was a unique opportunity for participants to engage in discussions, meet colleagues and share ideas.

The conference comprised two plenary sessions, six topic sessions and six tracks of parallel panels. Overall, more than 130 speakers were invited to share their knowledge and express their views on the challenges of securing state and society, today and in the future.

Major conference partners and co-organizers included the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (HEI), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

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Introduction

Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger

Director

Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

Vivian Fritschi

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Participants and Guests,

It is indeed a great pleasure and honor to welcome you to the 7th International Security Forum (ISF), to Switzerland, to the city of Zurich, and to its Federal Institute of Technology. It is exciting to see this gathering of so many distinguished guests from more than 50 countries. Some of you may be new to the ISF. Some of you may have participated in previous forums, and a few may remember that the ISF was launched more than 10 years ago. To all of you, newcomers and familiar faces, a heartfelt welcome. Thank you for having found time in your busy schedules to come to Zurich and to contribute to the success of this event.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is much more than an event. The ISF has become a highly respected gathering for the international security policy community in the Euro-Atlantic area and well beyond. The ISF is also of course a major community building process, and you will see that the next three days will deliver a convincing testimony of the continuing relevance, timeliness and success of this process. Created in 1994, the ISF is held every two years (alternating between Zurich and region of Lake Geneva) and has become an integral and indispensable part of Switzerland's contribution to the Partnership for Peace. The ISF is the place where views, knowledge, and opinions are exchange between practitioners and academics, between policy-makers, policy-shapers and policy observers. This exchange can only blossom in a diverse and open dialogue, not just as a part of a larger community building effort but in inspiring plenaries, exciting topic sessions and engaged panel discussions. Please join us in these deliberations as we are keen to hearing your views, your critical voices and your suggestions.

What could be timelier and more relevant than a focus on the continuing transformation of international affairs since the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system? Every new manifestation of that puzzling transformation including September 11th, reminds us how these new risks and threats fundamentally challenge our traditional concepts and persisting models. More important, every new manifestation of transformation reveals our mental inertia and how difficult it is indeed to change mindsets and perceptions in the face of altered security realities.

How far advanced are we in our understanding of how to resolve security challenges for state and society? One component of an enhanced understanding is certainly a comprehensive security approach. States have developed new defense concepts along these lines. The second component underlines the pragmatic utility of multilateralism. Third and fourth components are good governance and the incorporation of multiple actors. This year the ISF revolves around these basic themes and includes six workshop tracks featuring 24 workshops, opened and closed by two plenary sessions and three parallel topic sessions on two days. On behalf of the partner institutions and organizing team, I wish to thank the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport and Swiss Federal Department to Foreign Affairs for their assistance and financial support in realizing the seventh ISF. Without their support, we would not be here.

Welcome Address

Samuel Schmid

Federal Councillor

Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

Delivered by Ambassador Raimund Kunz

Vivian Fritschi

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome you the 7th International Security Forum. This is your forum, a platform for discussion among professionals of security affairs. It is very satisfying to note that about 500 of such professionals take part and that more than 100 experts will speak at this event. This looks like a success and I am all the more pleased because the ISF is a Swiss contribution to the Partnership for Peace. The richness of this event is obvious in the program. You have many parallel events, the whole color code of the threat advisory is present, you will listen, speak, discuss and debate in green, blue, yellow, orange and red rooms; there is even a purple room. If the talk in the red room becomes too intense, for example on the topic of confronting proliferation, you may seek relief in the green room, for example with the topic on the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Ladies and gentlemen I have one, or perhaps even two confessions to make. I know what you expect me to say, and I feel I should disappoint you. You may expect me to talk with some nostalgia about the almost idyllic world, at least in our memory, of the Cold War. You are almost certain that I will declare the distinction between internal and external security as no longer useful. You may also expect me to say conventional things about non-conventional actors, about failing strategies and failed states. I shall not do that. One reason is that you are better to do it; you don't need me for this. I think that I can be of more use with another message, a message of optimism and of belief in the future. I know that pessimism usually comes across as more dignified. Those who tell about the darkness to come are more impressive than those who claim to see some light. Optimism often seems naïve and shallow; pessimism profound. But this is a trap and I do not intend to fall into it. What the pessimists say is often completely right and true, but not completely complete. They are one-sided and they lack balance.

There are many forecasts, pronounced usually by serious looking men, which did not become reality, at least not so far. Let me make one more remark on the easy, effortless and elegant life of pessimists, if things go wrong they have said so, and if things go well, or at least better than expected, nobody will remember. This asymmetry makes it attractive to play it safe, to say that the situation is bad, with worse to come. Academics, politicians and intelligence agencies can fall into this trap. Among the dire predictions that have fortunately not come true, at least so far, are the nuclear war between East and West and the accidental war between newly-nuclear states. The IT infrastructure has not collapsed. Libya, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa have not gone nuclear, even if North Korea has. When I say this, I knock on wood. Some of the predicted undesirable events may yet happen, perhaps just as we are meeting here. And some disastrous events and developments have come about without any warning. These risks are real, the perils present. The point is that permanent talk of overwhelming threats does not contribute to a solution, but rather to resignation, passivity and apathy. We cannot afford this; only those who believe in the future are good at shaping it.

It is of no use to deny the obvious: Liberal democracies are under attack by very militant people who feel victimized by these societies and justified in using every means and method. When this is done in the name of religion, or a certain interpretation of religion, neither the religious leaders nor the majority of believers are asked for their consent. It is not for me to judge on interpretations of religion, but I recognize a hijacking when I see one. The world has (time and again) seen very

determined fanatics happily convinced that their cause was just and their fight legitimate. What makes the present threat different is, first, the willingness of apparently significant numbers of people to engage in suicide attacks. Whatever may be the hidden background to this bizarre behavior, whatever system we may find behind the masks, this is a real problem, since most measures of protection have been traditionally based on the premise that attackers would be perfectly willing to sacrifice the lives of others, but not their own. Another element that distinguishes the present from past confrontations is the sensitivity, or, perhaps – I may be excused for saying – over sensitivity to perceived slights to imagined insults.

This mindset and this attitude are proliferating; like a chain reaction, once a critical mass is achieved, a new political-correctness emerges, individual responsibility vanishes, and a collective hysteria takes over. We all know the effects of exaggerated political-correctness on our domestic political discourse. I have no desire at all to see the same happen on international issues. Everyone is entitled to be treated respectfully, but no one has the right to take offence at the smallest pretext. A dialogue is a two-way interaction; it cannot just consist of one side complaining and the other apologizing. Having said that, I should add that a sustainable peace must be based on mutual understanding and insight. Neglecting, negating and ignoring other groups and their interests will lead no where. Talk of being engaged in a war does not facilitate finding a solution – this is no time to let oneself be provoked, but neither is it a time to be silent if core values are at stake.

Believe in the future. I am convinced that tolerance, liberalism and democracy will prevail and that the benefits and virtues of these concepts will be recognized where they are now contested. A count of death provides no basis for life individually or collectively. Moreover the 20th century has shown that totalitarian systems have a limited life expectancy, if and when demagogues have to tackle real problems. I see no reason why that should be different in the 21st century. It is certainly possible to suppress freedom for a considerable time, but this becomes much harder in a world where the flow of information is difficult to stop and where even the movement of people is difficult to manage. A major reason for hope is not linked to the nature of the challenge, but to the response of the challenged. Terrorist attacks have succeeded in creating short-term havoc, above all in international transportation. I imagine that flying to Zurich was this time (for some of you), more tiresome than it used to be. But terrorist attacks have not managed to cripple national or international life for any length of time. Our societies are in some ways more robust than perhaps even we ourselves thought; that people continue in their normal behavior shows the terrorists have failed in their core objectives.

Ladies and gentlemen, back in the early 1990s there was not just talk of the end of history, there was also the expectation that security affairs might become much less important in international relations. This has not come true. Our business as scientists, journalists, civil servants, military officers and politicians has not become obsolete. Our efforts, your efforts, are as necessary as they used to be, if not even more. I am proud that so many of you came to the ISF that so many bright heads are making their best efforts to overcome the present problems and bring about a better future. I wish you a good forum, and thank you for you attention.

First Plenary Keynote Addresses

Reconstituting the West: The Role of Security Institutions in the New Era

Dr. Ronald D. Asmus

Executive Director, Trans-Atlantic Center of the US German Marshall Fund

Vivian Fritschi

Thank you very much for that very generous and kind introduction. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here in Switzerland with you, including being among innumerable colleagues and friends. When I received the invitation and was asked to speak about the theme of reconstituting the West, I laughed at the thought that some poor soul in Switzerland has actually had to read all of my articles over the last 15 years. But this is a theme that, for better or for worse, has dominated my political life. I was one of those Americans trained and educated under the Cold War, and just after we started our professional careers the wall collapsed. Indeed, I was in Berlin when the wall collapsed and I remember wondering what it would mean.

I have probably been, at least in the American context, at the heart of every major debate we've had in Washington since about what the West means, who is in the West and what the West, and the United States should try to do in Europe (and with Europe). We did face a challenge in the early 1990s of what you might call the first reinvention or reconstitution of the West – I think we succeeded. As a result of this effort, Europe and America are much safer and secure than they might have been. We succeeded in anchoring Central Europe to the West and stopping genocide in the Balkans (in both Bosnia and Kosovo), and started a new relationship with Russia. I remember when leaving the State Department in 2000, that I felt we could look back and feel that we'd accomplished a vision that many of us set to accomplish some ten years earlier.

But, September 11th opened up a new phase in the debate and raised a much tougher question, one that we're still wrestling with today and that I'd like to discuss this afternoon. Can the West reconstitute itself to face a new set of more global, more difficult and more challenging threats? If historians were to judge today, if history ended at this moment and we had to draw a balance sheet, that balance sheet today would be critical. Indeed, historians would probably write that we are failing. Not that we have failed (because it's not over), but that we are failing. But there's a new debate emerging right now as we speak, that will unfold in the next year or two; we are heading into a new window of opportunity in the next 1-3 years, where there will be another attempt to rebuild or reconstitute the West.

In a nutshell, the case for reconstituting (rebuilding) the West and rethinking and reinventing our security institutions goes as follows: One, we are headed into very dangerous and in some ways scary times. If we are honest, over the next decade we are likely to face one or perhaps several more clear, immediate and present dangers. Those dangers unlike in the past, are not concentrated in Europe and but emanate from beyond Europe, but nevertheless have direct impact on the interest of Europe and the United States. Allow me to just briefly touch upon the list:

Iraq: As much as it pains me as an American to say this, we may be heading for a failure in Iraq and it is a failure that could have far reaching consequences for the region, for the West as a whole, and particularly for the global standing of the United States. I'm not an Iraqi expert – and I have stopped making predictions about Iraq because I've been wrong too often – but if you were to listen in to the American debate today, there is a sense of gloom descending upon it, a sense that we may be heading for what some are calling the greatest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam, others are saying it will be worse than Vietnam. I hope that's not the case, but I think we have to start factoring in our calculations a world in which we do not succeed in Iraq; what we're really thinking is the scope and consequences of failure in one form or another.

Afghanistan: It is not a secret, but we are not sure we're winning the war there either. Indeed, if you talk with NATO commanders who have been recently on the ground, there's a growing sense of concern that our strategy there is also not succeeding.

Iran: If I was a betting man, and I'm not, I would say that we will probably not succeed in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This is a paradoxical issue where the US and Europe have coalesced around a common strategy, but its one that very few people believe is going to work. Maybe we'll get lucky, maybe the Iranians will make mistakes, or maybe history will turn our way. But, the odds are probably not good if you ask me as an analyst. Indeed, I'd go one step further and raise the point the community has been saying for decades: We may now be getting to the point where the non-proliferation regime is eroding in such a way that is profoundly dangerous. One of the key challenges of the future is how do we readdress or re-establish a regime that contains or prevents the nuclearization of the Middle East.

I just came from Israel, as was mentioned earlier, and I'm not revealing any great secrets to tell you that there's no progress on the ground towards a Middle East peace process. Perhaps the biggest challenge we face, and on this (even though I am not a Bush supporter) I believe the president is essentially correct in his analysis of the root causes of instability, terrorism and radical, fanatical Islam in the Middle East, the question of governance, the failure of governance and how that is contributing to a new strategic threat. But I (as an intellectual and analyst) – and even though I have been bold enough write about this myself – find this is a hard question where we don't have answers as a strategic community. How do we improve governance in the broader Middle East? How to we contribute to greater freedom, democracy and pluralism. Do we have effective strategies to address what we increasingly recognize as a strategic threat? I think the answer to that today is that we're not doing a very good job.

Closer to home there's Russia. I was deeply involved in the attempt to build a new partnership with Russia in the 1990s. But, honestly it didn't quite work out the way we wanted it to. We face the rise of an authoritarian, nationalist Russia fueled by petrodollars; one that, in my view, is now pursuing a policy of roll-back, roll back of democratic developments in what it considers its near abroad (and of what we consider wider Europe). We're heading into a new phase of relations with Russia that will be part cooperation, but also part competition; the competitive element is growing, not shrinking. We have an unstable Middle East, still a more stable Europe and a more nationalist, authoritarian Russia, in between, we have the wider Black Sea region and Central Asia. (Central Asia being a key source of our future energy, and particularly Europe's future energy, with the wider Black Sea being the transit route.) I have spent a lot of my last two to three years in the region; we have no political-military framework there, we have no regional security framework that essentially works in this region, and we, as a strategic community and as political leaders, have work to do there as well.

I haven't even come to the topic of the rise of China and India in creating an international system that integrates them and brings them closer to us. One doesn't have to be a doomsayer to look at this strategic sketch that I've laid out and image things going wrong. Indeed the fundamental strategic challenge we face is primarily the region from Northern Africa, through the Middle East, up into Afghanistan and reaching to Pakistan. If you look across that region, you'll see one conflict after another; one can imagine a crisis in one or the other starting a potential chain reaction that could ignite several of them at once. This is why I think we're heading into an increasingly dangerous world.

Against this backdrop, what are we doing? The truth today is that the West today is still more divided and disorganized than at anytime in recent memory. Divisions within the West not only prevent us from pursuing a more coherent strategy to shape these issues and to prevent conflicts. We've actually left a vacuum that is being filled by other powers or by other actors who do not necessarily share our norms and values. I believe that both our weakness and our division are actually emboldening some of our adversaries. Its quite clear to me that Iran has realized that there is now a moment of opportunity: It can act and we cannot act effectively against it. It seems to me

that Russia has realized that the EU is deeply divided over Russia and is incapable of pursuing a coherent policy and has no coherent Western strategy toward Russia.

So, in my view there is a clear and almost desperate need for the West to reorganize and reconstitute itself to be a positive force for good, to be a force that can defend itself, its territory, and its interests, that can counter and prevent the rise of some of these new threats, that can organize and mobilize resources to deal with some of the very real dangers that are out there. Frankly, the problem is both intellectual but, is also political. Most of us know this; most of you aren't really shocked by what I'm saying. Very few people say it publicly the way that I do, but I think that in our bones most of us know a lot of these things, but a lot of us are discouraged by the breakdown in US-European cooperation. I do believe we are moving into a new opportunity, this new window of opportunity (this debate) is coming back in the United States and I think it will come back in Europe. The constellation of factors that is bringing us to the end of the Bush era, the end of the Chirac era in France, the changing of the guard that is coming in London, and the change of guard that's already taken place in Berlin. There's a growing sense that over the next 1-4 years, we'll somehow be able to turn the page on a very divisive and bad chapter in US-Europe relations; and maybe there's a chance to try to put it all back together again.

A number of us in that context are trying to lead, start or push a debate over what a reconstitution or reinvention of the West should look like. That's what I am going to talk to you about today. You won't be surprised that I – as an American – am going to start with NATO because I think that part of reconstituting the West does center on the North American Treaty Alliance. Because at the end of the day, it is still the sole contractual alliance between the US and Europeans and it is the vehicle through which Americans and European, if and when we need to act militarily, will act. Again, I come back to the 1990s. I believe we successfully reinvented NATO after the end of the Cold War. That reinvention was a key – it wasn't the only reason, but it was a key – condition for the success we had in establishing a new peace order that has made Europe safer than it has been at any time in recent history. We took an alliance that was focused on the Western half of the continent and on defending its own borders, and we opened it up to almost double its membership and to extend its reach across the continent as a whole. We intervened twice in the Balkans (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and created the consensus that NATO had to assume responsibility for the entire continent, and be prepared to both expand its missions and members, while reaching out to Russia. It was hard, it was controversial, but we succeeded.

In the late 1990s, we started the next debate; we walked up to the alliance and debated whether NATO should expand beyond Europe. I vividly remember my last summit, which was the Washington summit in 1999; we had the debate over whether NATO's role was essentially in and around Europe, or beyond Europe. To be quite honest, the American's lost the debate, because at that point in history, almost all of our European friends (with the exception of a few) said, "we're not prepared to take that next strategic leap." They could imagine NATO going to the Caucasus, maybe; the Balkans, yes; in and around Europe, yes; but not to Iraq, not to the Middle East. And that's where the debate ended.

Then came September 11th, which shattered that view, shattered that consensus, showed the limits, showed that we are in a world in which the greatest threats to our territory came from beyond Europe, weren't in Europe any longer and created (frankly) the opportunity for the alliance to take the next big leap. If I can be undiplomatic – we blew it and the West fractured. We came together on Iraq, and then the United States, for reasons stated under the Bush administration, decided not to take NATO up on that offer and not to use this as an opportunity to shape the new consensus, but, chose instead to rely on a coalition of the willing. We then fractured over Iraq and we're where we are today – left to pick up the pieces.

But the debate is starting again and if we go to NATO today (and living in Brussels I go to NATO a lot), the line at NATO among all my friends out there is that NATO is busy. It's busier than ever before, it's engaged in more missions and doing more stuff, but I always say "busy-ness" and strategic relevance are not synonymous. The reality is that NATO is busy, but it's less strategically relevant than it has been at any time in the last 10 or 20 years. And its relevance is actually going

down not up. And the reason its doing down is that we haven't had success using NATO to deal with the primary threats I mentioned at the beginning of my speech. So, I think that any strategy to – I call it re-reinventing NATO, has to make the strategic leap and understand that the greatest challenges we face will be beyond Europe (not within Europe). Afghanistan is not a one time mission, it is not a once-in-a-decade or once every twenty years operation, it is the paradigm, it is the future. NATO operating well beyond Europe's periphery in a coalition of non-NATO forces in an unconventional war (or an asymmetrical operation), in which the civilian component of the strategy is as important if not more important component as the military component. But we see how hard it is mobilize political support to provide the NATO-led mission with the resources it needs to succeed. NATO has made this leap and says it's going to do all these things. We haven't crossed the Rubicon intellectually, politically, or in terms of public opinion, to the point where our leaders can put more troops, more helicopters, more resources, in these missions to maximize their chances of succeeding. So, we have to succeed in Afghanistan, and if we fail there, I truly worry, about the future of this alliance.

Lebanon: I was flabbergasted. My colleagues and I spent ten years building a Mediterranean dialogue, creating a NATO response force exactly for the a scenario like we see and saw in Lebanon. Well, NATO raised its hand once and Jacques Chirac slapped it down. When I go to the Middle East, all my Mediterranean friends (Israelis and Arabs) say, "[NATO] opted out. What role does NATO want to play in this region, if when the crisis comes and it has the capability and forces to do it, it doesn't even want to be involved?" I believe that was a mistake, but I think the story may not be over. I don't want this to happen, but we may eventually face a scenario down the road where if the current UNIFIL-EU-led force gets into trouble, NATO may have to provide some support.

Iran: I just came from a NATO-Israeli conference, where Israel signed its first agreement with NATO. Israel and several Gulf States want to go much further than the status quo in deepening relations with NATO today as part of a strategy to build the political and military relationships for a scenario in which Iran goes nuclear. NATO is like this. NATO wants to have a very bureaucratic, technocratic dialogue because it's not yet mentally prepared to say "Okay, let's prepare, let's use the partnership tools and vehicles and relationships we have to try and shape this environment today." Again, I think it's a mistake.

Darfur: I think historians will condemn us and condemn NATO for not being prepared to put more assets at the disposal of this mission to stop genocide.

And there's Iraq, the biggest crisis of them all, where (for reasons I understand as an American) many Europeans understand this is America's war, not Europe's war. And NATO is playing a very modest role: training forces. But if we move into these scenarios where we fail, if we move into scenarios where Iraq may be breaking up, there are already voices in the United States (including Ambassador Hollbrook and others) who are saying NATO should consider redeploying or deploying forces to Northern Iraq, to both prevent foreign intervention and to preserve stability at least in the northern part of the country. I put these things out there just to show you not that we should be doing each and every one of them, but these are things that we should be debating in the alliance, these are the ways we should be creatively thinking about using our security institutions to try to build civility in that part of the world that poses the greatest threats to us.

This new mission's aspect is perhaps the central issue that NATO has to successfully address; the other piece of course is enlargement. Enlargement was the centerpiece in the 1990s and I think frankly it will be a little bit less so in the next decade. But it's still important. It's important particularly at a time when the doors of the EU may shutting in Europe. Where NATO may be the only institution that is capable of reaching out and anchoring fragile democracies in the Caucasus like Georgia or perhaps Ukraine (depending on how the debate in Ukraine goes). So, its absolutely critical that NATO keep the door open and use its tools for partnership and outreach much more effectively and creatively because after all, which way Ukraine goes is probably one of the best ways we have to impact on Russia, in addition to trying to support the extension of democracy deeper into the Eurasian land mass of the Black Sea and Central Asia regions.

The third and big question confronting NATO is how do we reconcile the new Atlantic project with the European project? But this is the issue we've all be laboring on in the trenches for a decade and we haven't succeeded in finding the right vehicle; until we do that, I believe it will be very hard for the United States to mobilize European will and investment into this kind of new NATO unless we figure out a way to harmonize it with the EU. NATO-Russia, again we're acting as if nothing has changed. NATO-Russia is trundling along on the steady course of limited cooperation with Russia, not taking into account the fact that Russia is changing and we're trying to figure out what this means for us. In some ways, the saddest note here is NATO is about to have a summit in less than a month and almost none of these issues are on NATO's agenda because NATO is ducking the big questions at the moment, it doesn't have the political wherewithal together to figure out a way to address them. So that's one big piece of the reinvention that needs to take place.

The second big piece is indeed the EU. Because for me (as an American) it's clear that NATO alone is no longer enough. Military power alone is not enough to deal with the kind of problems and challenges we face, and if we as internationalists and Atlanticists want the West with the US-European alliance at its core to be able to act and to project influence and power on a more global scale, we will never do so unless the EU succeeds. Because it is only through that vehicle that Europe will have the confidence and the ability to work with the United States in these conflicts further a field as complicated as they are. So a lot of us Americans have been rethinking our attitudes towards the European Union.

I confess I also have changed my mind on the European Union. When I was in the state department, I was a notorious hardliner on the EU and I was in charge of ESDP. The day I left the state department, the French ambassador who was hosting an EU Ambassadors Lunch stood up and gave a toast to my departure, because he was so happy to be rid of me because I was so combative in fighting for a certain version of ESDP. I reflected a sort of mindset or consensus that existed in Washington at that time, but a lot of us have since rethought and come to a different conclusion. We've come to realize that if we want Europe to be our partner in dealing with these challenges, this has to happen in part through the EU. If we want Europe and the EU to project power and influence with us, then we need the EU to be stronger, more confident, more effective.

We Americans need to relax a little bit, for we need the EU to succeed. America's strategic requirements have changed. Imagine a list of what America wanted from Europe during the 1975-1985 period and compare it to what we want from Europe today. The 1975-1985 list was essentially a NATO list: Seven of the 10 items on that list would have been NATO related, two of them would have been bilateral, and maybe one of them would have been something to do with the EU. If you look at the American wish list today, half or more of the items are related to the EU, because we need strategic cooperation in new areas. A good three or four are related to NATO, but this list is not as NATO-centric as it was. What we Americans need is a more global EU that can work with the United States and can work with NATO. When Tom Ridge, the first director of homeland security, stepped down, at his last press conference, he was asked, "What was the thing you regret most?" He said, "Not going to the EU sooner." Michael Chertoff on his first visit abroad went to the EU headquarters. This is just one example of areas where the new threats we face are forcing us to work together in ways that didn't exist during the Cold War and are leading us to rethink our attitudes toward the European Union.

We Americans have been ambivalent toward the EU in the past as you know and the reasons are also pretty clear: We loved the EU in the 1950s and 1960s because the European project was Atlanticist – Jean Monnet was the most Atlanticist European politician as you can imagine. We got cold feet about the EU in the 1960s when De Gaulle came to power and started to define the EU as the counterweight, the anti-American project. I think though Americans have overstated that danger, frankly, I believe the counterweight argument is losing ground. We and an Italian foundation did a study of the EU elite (commission officials, parliamentarians). It was interesting that even though some of us expected find a heavy current of anti-Americanism among senior EU officials and parliamentarians, we found they were overwhelmingly pro-American, pro-Atlanticist and pro-NATO in a way that exceeded even American numbers. Working and living in Brussels, as I do, one feels this change that's taking place.

But, the second thing that needs to happen if we are able to do this is that the EU has to be able to pursue a coherent, common foreign and security policy in these regions and on these issues that I am talking about. Bill Clinton was arguably one of the most pro-European presidents we had, he used to always say to us that the US-EU summit is the most boring event that he attended on an annual basis because we never talked strategy. We didn't talk strategy in part because we didn't want to talk strategy there, and, in part, because Europe didn't want to talk strategy there either. I remember once I put a big strategic issue on the agenda for a US-EU summit. First, the British ambassador called and said, "I'm not sure we want to talk about that with the EU commission president. We prefer to discuss that bilaterally." Then the German chancellor's office called and said it wasn't the right venue or format to talk about it; on and on it went. If we're going to succeed, we need Europe to succeed in developing a common foreign security policy and then we need to be able to coordinate it with Europe. Europe needs to get beyond what I think is a rather ridiculous notion of defining the EU as a counterweight and get to a point where its not afraid of building a new US-EU strategic partnership and the US is not afraid either.

The third piece that needs to happen is that we need to bring all this together in some new contractual way. One reason Americans are so wedded to NATO is because we know our role in NATO – we have our treaty. We have nothing with the EU, we have a lot more consultations, but at some point we are going to have to formalize that relationship and bring it together. I actually think we should do this set-by-step, I think its interesting that the Bush administration today is doing more consultations with the EU than the Clinton administration did. In Brussels, I have an assistant or under secretary coming thought almost every 10 days, something that never happened before hand, but again we need to build this into an institutionalized relationship that will require the EU to complete its reforms, to create a single foreign minister and be able to speak institutionally with a single voice that the US can cooperate with.

I would like to say a couple of things about the OSCE, although Dr. Wohlfeld knows more about the OSCE than I do. We also tried to reinvent the OSCE in the 1990s. Our goal was to make it the leading pan-European organization in the area of democracy promotion, crisis prevention and conflict resolution. The high water mark of that effort was in many ways the Istanbul Summit in 1999, which I was the American negotiator for, where we signed a new charter, we had a CFE agreement, and a whole set of other documents. But I think already at that summit we saw the problems that were coming. I remember in one of the more dramatic negotiations that I was part of, the difference between the Russian view and the US-European view became crystal clear at one point when the Russians tried to strip the charter of all the language we had spent a year negotiating. And they did so because we were trying to build this concept that security was not just security between states, but that security within societies was almost as important as security between societies. They had gone along with this in some ways, and one day they woke up and decided that the West was going to use this against Russia and against Russia's friends. And then, in spite all of our efforts to convince them that this was not the case, they got cold feet and wanted to undo a year's worth of diplomatic work.

I remember during this period I attended a dinner with my Russian counterpart (a deputy foreign minister) in Helsinki, symbolically seated in Manaheim's former restaurant and at his former table. My Russian counterpart pulled out a piece of paper and said, "Here is our view of the OSCE," and he drew two circles in Europe and said, "This is ours and this is yours." He admitted that through NATO enlargement our part had gotten a little bit bigger and his had shrunk, but explained that the OSCE was about managing his sphere of influence versus our sphere of influence. I got out my piece of paper and said, "No, that's completely wrong," and I drew a big circle that included both of his circles and said, "the OSCE is about building a set of common norms and standards that apply to all countries, and is about us working together as you become more democratic to help this entire region become democratic and finding common ground." He responded, "No, it's about managing conflict between the two of us." I think what we've seen happen since then is that Russia has become convinced, perhaps prematurely or presumptuously, that we were succeeding in turning the OSCE against it, and it has decided to block the OSCE. The issue we face in terms of reinventing the OSCE is, do we settle for the kind of minimalist agenda that the Russians will

accept at the moment? Do we try to go further? Do we stick to our high moral principles and push for a vision and agenda that probably won't be accepted, and fight for another day when Russia changes, when things open up? Or do we succumb to the direction that they are trying to push us in? But perhaps this is something Dr. Wohlfeld will talk about (as she knows much more about it) and we can talk about it in the discussion.

The United Nations: I wasn't invited to talk about the UN, so I'm not going to say much about it, I know far less about the UN than everything else that I have been discussing. But, as an American internationalist and as somebody who is considered a democracy hawk, I have to say we Americans are deeply conflicted about the UN. On the one hand, I think we recognize that the UN has to become more important, because when we think about Americans and Europeans operating further a field in non-European areas to manage these conflicts, the question of legitimacy and mandate and all those issue become so much more important than they did. Frankly, we could act in Kosovo without a full UN mandate and we did not have a legitimacy problem. Politically, we had 60-75 percent public support in many countries because everyone knew we were doing the right thing in the conduit where were felt we had responsibility.

It is different in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, etc. – we also see that. This is the problem for those Americans who are internationalists and who want the UN to work and succeed: the UN hasn't made the shift into this new era either. Many of us feel that the UN is rooted in a theory and a field of conflict that is out of date, that the charter needs to be reinterpreted and maybe re-written. Unlike in Europe, the debate we have in the United States is divided between a large body of elite and public opinion (on one side of the political aisle) that is profoundly skeptical, if not hostile to the UN. On my side of the political aisle, there are the minimalists who say we should not make a big issue out of this, try to make the UN better, try to squeeze another 20 percent of effectiveness out of it, but duck the big questions (what the UN is about, whether the UN is really the legitimating tool we say it is, whether we need to rewrite the charter, etc.). Then there is the small group of people who actually care more about the UN and would want to do a more maximalist reform but probably don't have the political clout to succeed in the United States. (And if you heard some of their ideas you might get a little nervous too.) So, I do think that depending on how the politics of the United States unfold in the next couple of years it is quite possible the things that are almost inconceivable today will be on the agenda within 2-4 years in the United States.

Where does all this take me? How do we conclude? How do we frame these issues for your discussions over the next few days? There are a few things of which I am absolutely convinced. Is there a need to reconstitute the West and reinvigorate our security institutions roughly along the lines I am talking about? Absolutely. Is it doable or is it mission impossible? It is probably harder than what we did in the 1990s, but it's also easier than what they did in the 1940s, which is sort of my benchmark. I think it will be hard to do but not mission impossible. I think this the window of opportunity will open in 2-3 years when Chirac leaves the political stage in France, when the United States is getting ready to make the political transition, and when we know who is the next British prime minister.

I've always said at least for myself, I've made a career out of challenging the conventional wisdom and I often tell the story about the article that made my career was another Foreign Affairs article in 1993 that launched the NATO enlargement debate in the United States. As I was faxing the final proofs to Foreign Affairs, a very senior US diplomat came up to me and said, "You know you shouldn't do that, that's going to ruin your career, that is such a crazy idea that no one will ever take you seriously anymore." And then a couple of years later, I was at Madeleine Albright's side in charge of NATO.

I think it's a time when we should be bold, when we as policy intellectuals should be challenging conventional wisdom, should be pushing the envelope in terms of what we can do. I think we have a period now over the next few years when we really can shape and start a debate and hopefully use the window that lies ahead.

I think we are at the end of an era – and this isn't just a Republican versus Democrat moment. I do believe firmly that the unilateralist moment in American policy is over. We are going to be moving

into a new debate that will be very interesting, tough and at times an ugly debate about the future of American policy. But I believe all the kinds of ideas that I'm talking about are absolutely open for discussion and it's quite possible that some of them could become policy. And if the US were to get its act together the way I am talking about, then what about Europe? It is conceivable that Europe could put its house in order and experience a kind of strategic renaissance and could assume the kind of responsibility and an increasing global role that I am talking about. One thing I do know is that the stakes are very high and that for the reasons I mentioned in the beginning, if we fail, we will pay a very heavy price; if we succeed, we may succeed in moving to a new era where the kind of stability you have come to enjoy and in many ways take for granted here starts to spread beyond your borders into some of those very unstable parts of the world and that we now worry about so much today.

The OSCE as a Primary Instrument of Conflict Prevention in Europe: Achievements and Limitations of the OSCE's Preventive Action

Dr. Monika Wohlfeld

Acting Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Vivian Fritschi

For my presentation I would propose to shift gears, because whereas the thesis in the previous presentation had been “think globally, act globally,” my thesis is “think regionally and act regionally,” – deal with security issues in the neighborhood. This does not mean that I disagree with a need to go globally, and that I disagree with the need to improve trans-Atlantic relations. However, my argument is that the issues in the greater European regions are palpable, immediate and must be solved. Now let me say that I understand the greater region of Europe as defined by the OCSE, which is a rather broad definition, and it includes such regions as Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia – a I think that’s important to keep in mind. But the question is why “think regionally”? I think Europe has a responsibility that stems from the fact that there’s unfinished business stemming from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, stemming from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This unfinished business constitutes a major real or potential source of insecurity and instability for Europe.

The problems we’re talking about here are actually multiple. For one there is the economic transition problem, which we see in Europe and greater Europe despite considerable economic growth in some of the countries in question. I’d like to also recall the energy dependencies here that I think are rather high on our agenda right know. Let me quote something that not much attention is paid to normally, but those are environmental problems, issues such as huge ammunition stocks or rocket fuel stocks that need to be eliminated are among those problems. Let me mention other issues, social frustrations, social frictions, very disturbing demographic developments, minority issues that haven’t been resolved, and, very important for Europe are migration aspects. Let me also mention that is also dear to DCAF that is security sector reform needs, including police aspects, I would like to refer here of course the organized crime aspect that very much affects Europe.

I’d like to turn the issues that are important for the OCSE and its work. The difficulty of democratization processes underway and human rights issues that haven’t been tackled. Further more, I’d like turn to bilateral and regional relations and here mentioned in particular protracted or “frozen” conflicts, as they have been called, which have not been dealt with. That comes on top of the fact that there’s scant non-hegemonic regional cooperation in some of the regions in question. And finally, relations with European or Euro-Atlantic organizations for many of the countries in this region are rather unclear or have no prospects at this time. I’d like to say a few words about protracted conflicts, or as they have been often called “frozen conflicts”. They are no longer frozen. It is difficult to keep up with the developments concerning those conflicts, it's difficult to understand them, it's difficult to contribute to efforts to address them at this time. The existing involvement of the international community, including the OCSE, has for a considerable time managed to keep them from sliding into more chaos, but did not resolve them. Clearly, some form of a new effort is needed. Arguably key players should put their weight behind those who are providing a framework for resolution of these conflicts. These would be the OCSE's Minsk group and the United Nations in the case of Abkhazia. Some argue that this would be dangerous, because these frameworks involve the Russian Federation, which they see as more of a problem than a contributor to a solution. But it's also clear that no solution will be found without the Russian Federation and that isolation of Russia would be counterproductive to Europe’s interest. Now the problem that we have

is that we have few sticks and few carrots as far as the Russian Federation is concerned; especially, considering the energy situation). That leads me to the European Union's and NATO's efforts in its neighborhood, the push and pull factors of the European Union and NATO are obviously clear. Enlargement prospects appear to be the most effective tool, but unfortunately it is a limited option and it will not be applied to all. The new neighborhood initiative of the European Union is a step in the right direction, but obviously it will not have the same impact as enlargement prospects. NATO's efforts should also be applauded, although I have to say that some claim that in some cases they have exacerbated tensions on the ground. Recently I received a publication and the title was "The OCSE in Crisis" no question mark, this publication of the Institute of Security Studies has been very interesting reading, but even after reading it, I conclude that the OCSE still is the only truly inclusive framework to address issues such as those frozen conflicts, apart of course apart from the UN in the case of Abkhazia. It is still a key tool in arresting protracted conflicts and it is a tool for managing East-West issues that Dr. Asmus has referred to and which as he said has continued to exist. Now interestingly, these East-West issues emerged palpable in the context of the OCSE. The OCSE seems to be a mirror, not the cause, but a mirror of political realities in Europe. And it has been said and I think I agree with this, that the problems or the tensions that beset the OSCE should not be shrugged off by other organizations, by other international actors, as normally they emerge later elsewhere. The East-West divide, as such, is actually a very dangerous concept and as such it should be used very delicately. There are issues obviously that cannot be described any other way, for example, when the CIS issues a statement criticizing the OCSE, that is clearly an East-West issue, but in many other cases, the situation is not so simple. I'll give you an example. The Kazak bid for the chairmanship of the OSCE. It would be easy to describe the difficult decision-making that takes place currently concerning this issue as an East-West issue. However, the Kazak bid is supported by the CIS countries, but also by many EU countries. And in fact I think this is positive development because it allows us to define it different terms than the East-West Divide. Yesterday, the foreign minister of Kazakhstan made an intervention at the OCSE permanent council concerning its chairmanship bid for the year 2009, this bid will be a test for the organization that has been criticized by some of its participating states who are not treating Eastern European states the same way that they treat Western European states or to put it differently, it has been criticized for not treating the same problems in different places in the same way. At this stage I think it remains to be seen what will happen next on the Kazak chairmanship bid, but that particular offer of the Kazak government to chair the organization in 2009 has really brought to the fore many difficult issues. Now why is it that the OSCE would be focusing its efforts on some regions that are the core of this East-West criticism, the counter argument is that there are only limited funds and limited possibilities for it to become engaged and spreading thin and going places where there's no value-added to its presence would be a negative development. I leave this issue open.

Let me maybe describe the role of the European Union in the OCSE. The European Union speaks with one voice in the organization and therefore occasionally its statements are really the lowest common denominator. Not always, but often, this is disappointing. The EU is also not clear enough about how it wishes to use the OCSE. Generally, and in specific cases, and I'm talking both about political (using the organization), but also the channeling of funds, projects and activities. The potential for closer cooperation between the EU and OSCE is certainly there, for example the action plans of the New Neighborhood Initiative refer to the OCSE extensively. Special representatives of the European Union for specific regions, many of them come from an OCSE background and pay attention to the OCSE. Germany is preparing its thinking on an EU strategy for Central Asia for its EU presidency and it's also likely to emphasize to role of the OCSE. But it some cases it looks rather differently, and efforts are not that well coordinated.

Something that has been raised in the context of the OCSE is the notion that the OCSE should not be the service organization of the European Union, that is, that the European Union shouldn't task it, nor that the European Union should have a first pick and the OCSE will do what's left. Many participating states feel rather firmly about this. Now the European Union of course has channels for cooperation with the United States and the Russian Federation outside of the OCSE and rightly so. And what about the United States? It is a firm defender of OCSE commitments, but it is

hesitant to embark upon any reforms or changes that have been identified by the Russian federation and its partners as necessary. It is the country that has been described by the Russian Federation and its partners as the country that benefits the most from the OCSE, by paying little, strongly influencing policies and being uncompromising on some issues, thus contributing to the East-West divide. The US also has direct channels with the European Union and the Russian Federation that are outside of the OCSE.

Next is the Russian Federation, clearly as Dr. Asmus has said, the Russian Federation is resentful of the intrusiveness of the organization's commitments in domestic matters. It is emphasizing the unfairness of a focus on the East only, it's demanding reforms of the organization and it's frustrated about a lack of willingness of partners to engage in those even on fairly minor issues such as staffing systems or legal personality. It is obviously concerned about relations with neighboring states and its influence over them and Russian minorities in those places and of course about any perceived strategic efforts to isolate Russia, internationally. The Russian federation also has channels of communication with the European Union and with the United States outside of the OCSE.

Next question is obviously where do all of these three key players meet? Well, it's obviously the UN, it's certainly the OCSE, it's possible at the G8, but there are not that many options. There is of course a set of other states, in particular the post-Yugoslav, but especially the post-Soviet republics that are in a very different situation from those described of those three key places. Their prospects for EU, NATO membership I don't want to assess, but certainly they are not the best. They have some channels of direct communication to key players, but in some cases, they are rather limited. And not only do they have concerns about so-called new security challenges, but also truly about old security threats in particular. There is an interesting document by the OCSE agreed upon its entire member states called, "*The Security Strategy for the 21st Century*", which you can find on the web. It's an interesting document because it's somewhat similar to the EU strategy but as it was subject to consensus of all the 55 OCSE states, it's a longer list of challenges, and this longer list of challenges reflects the fact that there are very different key concerns in different parts of the larger Europe. It is not an even region when it comes to security.

Now these, I think, are reasons enough to say that the larger OCSE region has to be a priority area for engagement and that stable parts of the regions have to contribute and focus on addressing the problems that I initially mentioned, these can spill over, as they have, by the way, in the case of the Ukraine gas crisis; they must be addressed in order to move forward. Let me add that of course that some of the countries that have to fight these problems do count on internationalizing them and will in fact not work against the spill-over to the same degree that we would hope for. Furthermore, the expectations of Europe's new neighbors, if I may use this term, are high and many of them may not be fulfilled, guaranteeing frustration. There is test case forthcoming and I raise this with some hesitation, because it's a set of complex issues and I don't want to be misunderstood, but, the test case in question I think would be impact of the Kosovo settlement on the region, but most importantly beyond. Managing this impact will be complex particularly concerning protracted conflicts. You may recall that there has been a referendum in Transnistria on which there's been generally said strong statements from international actors saying that it is not recognized – but not from all actors. And there is another one forthcoming in South Ossetia, the timing of these matters is difficult and in a sense the Russian-Georgian tensions may also be linked to the timing of these events. You can see this from the statement of the presidents of both countries. Thus we need close cooperation of the various players and we need to be ready to deal with the impact. Europe will not be taken seriously if it cannot address such matter when they come up in its own region and its own neighborhood, and particularly if it's not able to prevent conflicts. And that's why I come to the need for conflict prevention.

I'll speak from the perspective of the OSCE because the OCSE has been considered by many as the key regional organization that has normative and operational capabilities in conflict prevention. Of course even those advanced normative and operational capabilities are in my opinion are fairly limited. But the OCSE participating states define the OCSE as, and I quote "primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as key instrument for early warning,

conflict prevention crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation." If it is so, what are the key issues related to conflict prevention, what are the achievements, what are the limitations? Let me run through this rather quickly. The first issue is the link to early warning. Early warning means having information, knowing what's going on and being able to analyze that information. I don't think it's really a big problem in the case of the region that we are talking about, apart maybe from some remote regions in Central Asia. But it needs to be said here that the change of the OSCE center into a project coordinator in Uzbekistan, the second project coordination office of the Ukraine, that has no monitoring and reporting function in the country must be seen (if it becomes a trend of course) as potentially changing the situation and should this model become more attractive other host states the early warning function might be affected. The OCSE has also a limited capacity to analyze the information it receives and this is something that ought to be a priority right know and something that I cam quite determined to work on. It doesn't appear that having the information is a key problem, but early response that is a much more complicated situation. There are obviously no mechanisms for an automatic response and the process of agreeing on a need to respond is a very difficult one particularly when it's based on consensus as is the case in the OCSE.

A few words about links to other kind of activities, currently the bulk of financial resources of the OCSE are made available for activities in Southeastern Europe in particular for post-conflict rehabilitation. In fact, of course, activities undertaking this part of this post-conflict rehabilitation efforts could be seen a conflict prevention as well, because they do prevent a reoccurrence of conflict. But, post-conflict rehabilitation is a very costly and difficult engagement. It is impossible for me to say whether that would actually mean that countries realize that a turn to conflict prevention is the key tool or whether they actually continue to wait too long to engage on conflict prevention matters.

There is one development which I would like to mention as a footnote, and it is a rather interesting one, it is the temptation for financial and development organizations to move into conflict prevention and thus also some aspect of political conditionality, and for conflict prevention organizations to move into project implementation, which is traditionally related to development work. In my own organization I can give you one example, and that is the South Ossetia Economic Rehabilitation Program, which is aimed at supporting political negotiation processes and to benefit Georgian and South Ossetian ethnic groups in South Ossetia. It has projects such as hospitals, or water provision systems and it's actually the only currently the only game in town where we are able to move ahead and bring the parties to the same table in a very constructive way. So projects can be a good way to engage, but what happens if host countries actually say that this is all they want, which is what happens to us from time to time. I mentioned the transition to project coordination office in Uzbekistan. I was part of the team negotiation with the Uzbeks this particular transition and it has been a very difficult experience. But it remains to be seen whether there will be others queuing up to do the same. And I'd like to emphasize that such an office does not have a monitoring and reporting function.

Now two more things related to conflict prevention, one is the question of when a conflict prevention mission is completed. I think one of the reasons why states react with hesitation to the idea of early response and conflict prevention activities, may be that it is difficult to define and decide on the basis of consensus, in particular when a conflict prevention mission is completed and that ensures lengthy commitments, a lengthy engagement. Wide mandates of conflict prevention missions are a great advantage when establishing a presence in a place where conflict prevention activities are deemed necessary particularly when the security situation is unclear and the needs are somewhat unclear. The same mandates may be a liability when wrapping up such activities. It is in my opinion it is close to impossible to pronounce a wide mandate as fulfilled completely. The decision to wrap up a conflict prevention mission is not subject to a clear and articulated strategy, but is a political process prone to bargaining and sometimes also financial considerations. Efforts to create a process of benchmarking have not been particularly successful. We have an interesting case on the table right now and it is the beginning of a discussion on closure of the mission in Croatia. One interesting development in this regard is the ongoing

consideration of the possibility of the OSCE to launch so-called thematic missions that would not be geographical focused but rather would deal with specific subject matters. Theoretically, such missions could also address outstanding matters following the completion of a mission or regional issues. In Southeastern Europe should the Croatia mission be closed soon, issues that could be addressed this way could be refugee return and war crimes issues. Both of them are still open.

Finally, the issue of visibility of conflict prevention, structural conflict prevention activities receives very little visibility in the media, very little public support, when compared to actual crisis situations that may limit the interest of the various governments in becoming involved at an early stage. It is often not possible to judge when conflict prevention has been successful, but it is very easy to see when it has failed. Selling conflict prevention to the public is a very difficult job, as we have discovered and somebody has said once, “As far as the OCSE is concerned, no news is good news.” Although that does not make for very good public relations, it certainly does go a long way toward fostering peace and stability in Europe. It makes it hard though to specify which results participating countries receive for the money and of course to convince them in the first place to commit that money. Something that is becoming increasingly evident.

Let me conclude and come back the beginning of what I was saying. How do we deal with the problems of our immediate neighborhood, the problems of the larger European region? Do we know what we are doing there? Do we have clear positive experiences that could be applied, for example, in conflict prevention? On the latter question, diplomatic said, I think we are learning by doing. We have extensive experience, not always very positive, we have sometimes tools that are not congruous, we have sources of information that we don’t know how to interpret, we have some money, not a great deal as far as the OCSE is concerned, but enough to undertake key tasks. And we may have also some lessons learned, but most of them have not been really considered or shared. So, we are far from having a stable immediate neighborhood and we have to think about this in a clear and focused way, and assume responsibility for the region and for the neighborhood as such. We need to keep the focus on those matters, if we don’t want in some year's time to come back and deal with full-blown crises.

First Parallel Topic Sessions

Assessing Counter Terrorism Policies

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Sean S. Costigan

Vivian Fritschi

Abstract

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London and the growth of terrorist activities in Iraq illustrate the difficulty of judging emerging trends in terrorism. Despite the best efforts of many in intelligence circles, terrorists' ability to conduct substantial attacks against civilians and economic interests was sorely underestimated. Five years after the attacks of 9/11, policymakers remain on difficult terrain: They must prioritize counterterrorism activities amid continuously evolving strategies and opponents the world over, grasping how terrorist groups' motivations and capabilities will evolve in the future and how best to direct necessarily limited resources against them.

Lt. Col. Joseph Felter, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point

In the aftermath of 11 September, it seemed the US was facing a war, but its opponents do not fit the classical definitions of an enemy. Lt. Col Felter began with references to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu's admonitions to: know the nature of war, know who is the enemy (and who is not), and know what military can and cannot do; Felter proposed that the term "war" is not useful for fighting terror as it creates the expectation that the cause will end. A preferable term is "global counter insurgency," which creates the expectation that a threat is being managed. The distinction is important because a military cannot "win" a struggle against an insurgency in which the hearts and minds of the people is essential to success. Yet, in this sense, terrorists do not have an advantage, as they must also seek legitimacy among people. In the case of al-Qaida, its jihadi vision of transforming nations around the world doesn't appeal to the vast majority of Muslims. Its attacks on the Shia communities in Iraq have undermined al-Qaida's legitimacy – a situation that is in some ways reminiscent of the Cold War, in that communism's appeal eroded overtime.

Because the reasons people join terrorist movements vary significantly from the socio-economic, to the political, ideological, criminal and the opportunist, especially where state capacity is limited and groups have the ability to act, local government legitimacy needs to be enhanced. Military efforts will have to keep the cost of participation in terrorism high, but a purely interventionist approach may reward terrorists and may also run counter to the goal of achieving legitimacy. Thus, counterterrorism needs to be a multi-nation, multi-agency effort with a strategy that no longer relies on militaries to operate unilaterally.

Dr. Jarrett M. Brachman, Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, West Point

Dr. Brachman focused on jihadi ideology, explaining its history, intellectual proponents and traditions, and the evolution of al-Qaida as a social movement and the implications that follow as a result. The speaker also discussed the movement's approaches to recruitment, its uses of technology and education to further its aims, and its adoption of framing and identity constructions aimed to destabilize a person's sense of political and social structures, to elevate a single interpretation of Islam that instills an individual duty to fight, and to sustain the growth and development of the movement.

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Russell Howard, Director, Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Brig. Gen. Howard assessed terrorist threats from the strategic to tactical perspectives and offered an extensive list of policy recommendations.

In particular, he recommended the terms of the political discourse be changed from fighting a war to fighting an insurgent movement. Second, national security laws in the US and elsewhere need to be amended or supplanted with laws that better reflect the current security environment. Jihadi terrorism as a movement is based on an ideology that moderate Muslims must engage with their own ideas and hopefully repel. The West is in position to provide opportunities and venues for this to happen, such as supporting alternative educational opportunities.

Because insurgencies function as networks, the hierarchy and structure of counterterrorist approaches must similarly change and must develop expertise in networks and insurgencies. Finally, the focus and acquisition of intelligence must also sharpen to gain a greater knowledge of the inner workings of such movements and the spaces within which they operate. There needs to be less reliance on technical intelligence and greater access to contextual intelligence in denied areas.

Discussion

The discussion that followed the presentations focused on counterterrorism approaches. In particular, the participants addressed the issue of the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. There was broad agreement that because the current environment is complex (and because short-term priorities tend to trump long-term priorities), unintended consequences remain a risk. A coordinated effort is needed to balance the problem and address both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism. While militaries are better suited to address the symptoms, an inter-agency effort is still needed (with the military's support) to focus on root causes. Intelligence budgets should be reallocated to give greater emphasis to the analysis of available information.

The discussion turned to questions on how best to initiate a structural shift in the political discourse on counterinsurgencies, as well as an expansion of national and international laws to address the criminal components of terrorism. Participants felt such a shift in discourse is essential if moderate Muslims are to participate in and shape the jihadi discourse in Islam. There was some discussion about how the West might support moderate Muslims and local governments in a climate of hyper-propaganda, without aversely affecting their legitimacy and how to support moderate movements in countries where moderates risk violent reactions from the existing regime.

Conclusion

The participants highlighted the need to clarify and change the domestic political discourse regarding terrorism, as well as to address considerations regarding the struggle of legitimacy that terrorist movements raise.

Democracy Versus Stability? Resource Wealth in Russia, Eurasia and the Middle East

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Dr. Robert W. Orttung, Associate Professor, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC), American University and Visiting Scholar, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Jeronim Perović

Abstract

Western countries are pursuing the sometimes conflicting goals of promoting democracy where it lacks deep roots and ensuring a stable, affordable energy supply. The uncertainty of who will win elections in energy-producing countries can put at risk energy supplies for consuming countries, leading them to favor the short-term stability provided by less than democratic governments. This panel focused on the democracy-resource wealth nexus, examining whether it is possible to achieve both free government and stable energy production that benefits citizens of producing countries and stabilizes international energy markets or if necessary tradeoffs must be made.

Summary

Energy Security: Strategic Challenges

Dr. Noé van Hulst, Director, Long-Term Cooperation and Policy Analysis, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris

The first presentation provided an outlook on strategic challenges in energy security. According to IEA predictions, oil, gas and coal, which today make up the bulk of primary energy consumed, will account for 83 percent of the growth in energy demand between now and 2030, provided that there is no significant change in current energy policies. Two thirds of growth is driven by developing countries, mainly China and India.

This situation poses three challenges for the West. The first challenge is connected to the security of supply. World oil production will continue to shift away from the OECD to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): The IEA predicts that the OECD share of oil production will fall from 25 percent (in 2004) to 12 percent in 2030. The same trends can be observed for gas. For the EU, for instance, rising demand and declining output will cause net imports to surge. Another concern for energy security is transportation: Parallel to the growing concentration of oil and gas in the MENA region, additional oil and LNG exports will be shipped through the narrow and vulnerable Hormuz strait and two other maritime routes, making transportation vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The second challenge is related to growing carbon dioxide emissions which are expected to increase by 50 percent between now and 2030, assuming current policies remain in place. The share of emissions produced by developing countries will overtake what the OECD produces in 2020.

The third challenge lies in the growing inequality of energy consumption. In 2030, for example, if no new policies are implemented, there will still be 1.4 billion people without electricity, mostly living in Africa and South Asia.

The IEA predicts that even according to a realistic alternative scenario, which assumes a significant reduction (20-30 percent) of growth in primary energy demand due to energy savings, these challenges will continue to persist. Only quick and decisive government action, which

includes measures to use energy more efficiently and seeks to develop a variety of alternative sources (including nuclear power), can alleviate some of these challenges. Given the EU's growing dependency on MENA countries for energy, it urgently needs to elaborate a comprehensive strategy to diversify supply.

Oil Wealth and the Challenge of Democratizing the Middle East Rentier States

Prof. Giacomo Luciani, Professorial Lecturer of Middle Eastern Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Luciani first discussed the link between democracy and resource abundance, pointing out that oil and gas export revenues in both democratic and authoritarian countries go to the state and thus strengthen the incumbent authorities. Some regimes, however, are better suited to deal with this situation than others. In mature democracies, rents from energy exports are usually accumulated in funds that are professionally managed and isolated from politics. In authoritarian regimes, much of the rent goes to the ruling class and is managed in a non-transparent way. These regimes tend toward populist politics, reducing or even abolishing the tax burden on society and thereby reducing opportunities for the rise of a political opposition.

However, policies of authoritarian regimes may vary significantly, and patrimonial regimes in segmented societies (e.g. in the Persian Gulf) have performed especially well. An often neglected feature in the Gulf states is the role of business as a potential force of democratization. The patrimonial states of the Gulf region (e.g. Saudi Arabia) have nurtured a strong business sector, which Prof. Luciani calls a "national bourgeoisie." This class has prospered and has become a relatively autonomous force from the state with claims to political participation. Thus, democracy will eventually result from diversification and conflicts within an increasingly complex elite.

A False Choice: Democracy or Stability in Energy-Rich States

Mr. Christopher Walker, Director of Studies, Freedom House

Walker started his presentation with a comment on Prof. Luciani's thesis on the role of the business class, stating that current policies by the Gulf regimes represented a "wise co-optation" of the opposition rather than democratization. In his presentation, Walker looked at the state of democracy in the three energy-rich post-Soviet states of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. All these states suffer from the negative effects of the resource curse, which manifests itself in poor governance, growth of state bureaucracy, or a policy of fiscal pacification designed to keep the opposition at bay.

The Russian economy relies heavily on energy exports: Russia currently earns some US$500 million per day from its sales of oil and gas, 65 percent of which goes directly to the state. At the same time, all democratic indicators have gone from bad to worse in the past few years: The media is less free, the electoral system is increasingly controlled from above, and the judiciary is held hostage to politics. Freedom House is not alone in this critical observation. World Bank assessments of Russia are also negative. Similar developments can be observed in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan where democratic governance indicators point in the wrong direction.

Why is all this important? The lack of institutional checks is diminishing these countries' ability to diversify their economies and engage in structural economic reforms. One might assume that economic modernization will push countries to a critical point where political reforms and democratization will become inevitable. But, as long as world energy prices remain high, there are no incentives to modernize; as a consequence, the prospects for democratization are also diminished.

Russia and the Resource Curse

Mr. Rudiger Ahrend, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

Ahrend focused on problems stemming from Russia's resource-based economy. The root of these problems is in ownership patterns rather than resource abundance *per se*. While the problems are not fatal, resource abundance represents formidable challenges to the state, particularly the

vulnerability to external shocks caused by falling energy prices. Another challenge is the possibility of Russia becoming victim to the “Dutch disease” due to negative consequences that extensive energy income may have on other, non-energy sectors of the economy.

In general, however, the main problem for Russia does not result from the structure of its economy, but lies in the sphere of politics and the defects of Russia’s political economy, features of which are a high level of corruption, income inequality, misallocation of talents, and contestability of property rights (meaning that property rights are not protected by the state).

A way out of this situation would be further diversification of Russia’s economy; a possibility, but one that will require a lot of time. Another engine for stability would be the growth of the middle class. The example of Norway shows that a resource-based economy can be successful when society is strong and politically active.

Discussion

One set of questions concerned declining oil reserves and the prospects for the development of renewable energy sources other than nuclear. According to Noé von Hulst, there is no viable alternative to oil, gas and coal in the foreseeable future other than nuclear power, since alternative energy will be able to cover only a very small part of the world’s growing primary energy demand. Bio-fuels, for example, are extremely land intensive.

Asked about the concept of the “national bourgeoisie,” Giacomo Luciani pointed out the difference between some of the Gulf-states and the countries of North Africa: Whereas in the Gulf, a bourgeois class independent from the state had developed, a similar development did not take place in Libya or Algeria. Luciani also pointed out that the appearance of a national bourgeoisie is not a guarantee for democratization, but makes democracy a possibility.

Rudiger Ahrend elaborated on the role of the state in Russia and stressed that what is happening in Russia today can be understood as a re-allocation of resources. While the state was captured or “privatized” in the 1990s by the oligarchs, now the state is taking back what once belonged to it. State control over the economy takes the form of controlling assets as well as financial flows.

New Violence: Implications for Key Institutional Actors

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Fairlie Jensen

Abstract

In order to fully capture the security challenges facing the international community today and to begin to chart collective responses to these threats, we need to go beyond assessing the costs of armed conflict stricto senso to better understand the shifting face of violence and its implications on communities and individuals. This session therefore starts from the premise that there would be significant merit in deepening our understanding of the issues and actors involved in this area and, as a consequence, the role of security sector governance as one tool to address it. The session is intended to pose questions rather than answer them, to raise methodological and practical difficulties in developing such an analysis and to provide stimulus for further discussion on this intuitively important but difficult to frame issue.

Summary

The session opened by considering how new perspectives on war and security can reveal a chilling calculus of death. Today interstate violence is not, nor has it ever been, the biggest source of insecurity, even though the 20th century has been the bloodiest on record. During this time the state itself has been a substantial source of insecurity for its citizens, showing the importance of democratic state-building in assuring people's security, yet the fact remains that homicide and crime kill far greater numbers of people every year.

The question of whether or not lethal violence is declining depends also on the historical horizon against which the question is asked. In relation to the horrors of the most violent century on record, inter- and intrastate violence can be said to have declined but in a longer view of European history including the 18th and 19th centuries, the trend in decreasing violence is not significantly different than it ever was due to the high numbers of people affected today by other kinds of lethal violence.

A decline in violence can be attributed in part to the systemic explanation that the long and bloody process of state-formation has now been completed in most parts of the world, and thus the potential for violence will be resolved when the final status of a territory is settled (Haiti for example). Furthermore according to a kind of domestic democratic peace theory, the types of states that have been formed affects the probability of violence, in that democracies are deemed less likely to threaten their citizens. Finally, a kind of "civilizing process" can be identified as a key factor in the decline in social violence such as homicide from the peak levels of the Middle Ages. Although this phenomenon has played itself out in a cycle of peaks and troughs, the unmistakable trend is downwards as a result of states' increasing monopoly on the use of force during this time. The only remaining question is whether this process will be repeated outside the European continent. The prognosis does not look encouraging, given the unprecedented availability of the implements of violence and the continuing prevalence of indirect forms of violent death (deaths as a result of the effects of conflict that would not otherwise have occurred). In this context, there is an imperative need to build strong, accountable institutions; to create robust rules for the control of weapons; to find new ways of demobilizing former combatants; and to find a way to manage the nebulous links between national, regional and global uses of violence.

Continuing the discussion on new ways to look at violence, it was observed that the conceptual habits of the Cold War era had to be shaken off because the vision of a monolithic threat, when combined with ideology, could be very dangerous, as the Iraq war stands to prove. The way is thus opened to considering different aspects of human violence which may have been neglected in the past, massive death in various crises being one example made pertinent by questions of resource

allocation. Other forms of violence that have been overlooked include rampant social violence, for example even in Europe, spanning a range of everyday events from tribal feuds to pub brawling. The threat of indirect terrorism also appears in the context of our considerable vulnerability to major sabotage.

Despite these new perspectives, we should remain cautious in responding to the question of how the pattern of human violence is changing. It should be recalled that the Westphalian system has been at work for only three hundred years and that it was not an overnight revolution that changed the world. It may be more appropriate to understand current trends of declining violence as part of a repeating cycle rather than the achievement of a model ideal, given the fact that instead of renouncing violence Europe has tended to export it; that although conflicts occur less often, they now tend to be deadlier; and that we cannot tell conclusively whether democratization has had the desired effect on levels of conflict in certain parts of the world because of our failure to forestall other human disasters such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

The fact of the matter seems to be that today most people who are implicated in violent activities are so because they choose to be. The question of how to respond to this reality has been answered in the past by the establishment of legal systems and state monopolies on the use of force, but this can be a slippery slope leading eventually to violent state oppression. Today, responses that make violence self-defeating are what is needed.

Finally, a graphic presentation of recent violent conflict showed yet another way of reading the trends. It was noted first of all that although a decline in violence has been observed, it has been matched by a rise in assaults on civilians both by state and non-state actors. The credentials of this decline in violence as a new phenomenon were also called into question as it was noted that interstate wars have always been among the less influential factors in violent human death. The broadest conclusions that could be drawn from the data presented reveal a tendency for violence to decline if levels of income and democracy increase steadily enough, Southeast Asia providing a case in point. An unsettling corollary of decreased violence seemed to be the use of repression, as has been seen in the Middle East. Nevertheless an explosion of international activism since the end of the Cold War can also be credited with contributing to the overall declining trend in violence and conflict.

The issue of measuring direct and indirect deaths from conflict was also raised with the caveat that data on such questions is notoriously unreliable. Indirect deaths from conflict are considered to be a function of the length and intensity of the fighting so an important decrease in the number of indirect deaths from conflict can be inferred from the fact that the number of conflicts, their average length and the number of people they displace have all declined. The fact that since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian aid has increased two to three times in magnitude has also contributed significantly to this decrease.

During the discussion, better control of arms stockpiles was raised as a key issue in stemming future violence and conflict. In this regard it was noted that a larger role for the NGO community could perhaps be envisaged. The empirical question was raised of the usefulness of measuring such phenomena as the decreasing number of conflicts if such measures did not also reflect a concurrent increase in the wellbeing of people, although it remained unclear as to what alternative could be more usefully measured. It was also pointed out that no place had been made explicitly in the discussion for the role of women and children in these new patterns of violence; a restraint in this respect being the severe lack of data and its unreliable nature.

Conclusion

This panel brought to light many different and unconventional ways of interpreting the latest trends in global violence. The role of data and analysis in these interpretations became an important factor showing the need for methodological innovation in order to further our understanding.

The key themes for policy makers included:

1. The need to rethink the way violence is conceptualized in order to better respond to a panoply of new threats
2. The important differences between the state-formation process in the developing world and in the European context, and the implications of these differences for human security
3. The dangerous consequences of applying rigid analytical categories to all situations and threats
4. The need to address these concerns within a security governance framework

Parallel Tracks and Respective Panels

New Threats and Counter-Measures

Intelligence and Counterterrorism

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Co-chaired by Doron Zimmermann and Stefan Brem

Stefan Brem*

Abstract

This panel will explore several interfaces between intelligence work and counterterrorism. Post-9/11 counterterrorism has emphasized the role of intelligence – arguably above and beyond any other aspect.

This panel will bring together practitioners and scholars in this field. It will highlight the role of intelligence in judicial proceedings against suspected terrorists; the interrelationship between technology and counterterrorism; as well as the cases of Switzerland and the US with special reference to the intelligence/counterterrorism interface.

Summary

Because of the sensitivity of the issue and on the request of the panelists, the panel was held under the Chatham House Rule. As a consequence, statements cannot be attributed to panelists or other participants and only general contextual information can be provided.

The panel focused on several interfaces between intelligence work and counterterrorism. Of particular interest were the role of intelligence in civil and criminal proceedings as well as the influence of different judicial mechanism on the work of intelligence services; the dependence of the intelligence and particularly the counterterrorism work on technology; and perspectives of two national approaches (i.e. from Switzerland and the United States) on intelligence and counterterrorism.

What was striking in all the presentations were the dilemmas and sometimes even paradoxes that exist in the issues at hand. There are huge differences what constitutes reliable information and how sources can and should be mentioned in the worlds of law enforcement and intelligence. Even though in practice they have to work closer together than in previous times, rules and procedures are not made for this kind of collaboration. The easiest way to circumvent possible conflict is to corroborate classified information with publicly available information. The problem with open source, however, is that there is an overload of "contaminated" information which can cripple the analytical process and does not equal "real" intelligence. This dilemma is directly linked to the next item.

Even though technology has provided important support to the intelligence work in recent years, there seems to be too heavy emphasis – or wishful thinking – on the possibilities of technical means. They are indispensable to take pictures from very large distances of sealed off countries, encrypt encoded documents and mine large databases, but there is also an almost naïve belief that there is a technical solution to every problem and that it can be solved by investing a lot of money. Not every (seemingly) connection between two events constitutes also a logical or causal relationship. At the end of the day, the best analysis is still provided by an analyst. And there is the place where more investment is needed.

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* The views expressed and any inaccuracies are the sole responsibilities of the author and are not linked to any institutional view or representation.

In the current situation, almost more than ever, there is a dilemma of how much security can be achieved without curtailing privacy of the general public too much. It is obvious that complete security is not possible – neither with huge investments nor with technical and security means –, but the reduction of privacy for the sake of gathering more information can be quite consequential. This dilemma is also directly linked with the technology devoutness discussed above.

It has been made clear that the security and intelligence services in particular have primarily two main goals: to prevent that the concerned country becomes the scene of attack and to prevent that it becomes a harbor for terrorist activities (recruitment, financing, propaganda, etc.).

Discussion

While it is only possible to provide a small sample, the presentations activated a whole set of important and timely questions.

Since the issues of data-mining, open source intelligence and confidentiality have been raised by the panel a follow-up question was related to the role of private sector "intelligence" companies. What is their role in gathering information and how are their products incorporated in the intelligence community and the decision-making process? A clear and final answer cannot be given since there are different work procedures and legal arrangements, but there is, in general, an increased role for private companies. This is particularly the case where huge datasets from public sources are concerned. They can be important news providers, but rarely crucial intelligence sources.

Reliance on technology can also lead to an overload of signals and particularly of "false alarms." While it is already difficult to respond to a huge amount of regular warnings in a time of increased tensions or (shortly before actual) incidents, the problem of technical means creating correlations, but not necessarily mapping causal relations leads more often than wanted to "false alarms." This is not only very costly, but also frustrating for the analyst as well as for those who have to act upon the alarms.

Even though it almost seems to be an academic (or rather a chicken-and-egg) question the panel was asked to rank national and international cooperation (between intelligence services). Which should have priority over the other? It seems to be obvious that national cooperation has clear priority, since the primary task of the security and intelligence services is to safeguard their own country. But in practical terms this is not always easy, since there are different institutional cultures, chain of command and authority as well as legal mechanisms. Sometimes it seems, therefore, almost easier to work with a colleague situated in another country working on the same subject than with a fellow citizen in the same country, yet another service. Even joint task forces and integrated structures cannot always overcome these bureaucratic hurdles, based on stove-piped organizations.

Related to international cooperation a participant from the audience wondered whether information sharing between countries and services has become more difficult since more and more countries are involved. Even though it is true that it is necessary to increase the international cooperation there is also a decreasing marginal utility with every country joining the endeavor – both for the increased cost of coordination but also for the sensitivity of the information exchange. Since there are different legal basis there is hardly an exchange of raw intelligence information which is, on the other hand, not even necessary and appropriate (protection of the sources). But the problem is broader since the mindset of need to know instead of need to share still persists. Attention is however appropriate: Need to share does not mean to share everything with everyone at all times, but tailored information according to the specific needs and tasks. Most of the services still are too much focused on "secret" sources and protection of sources. While the first focus should be reduced and opened up to alternative, i.e. open intelligence sources, the second certainly raises valid concern, but can be avoided if they are not included in the information sharing in the first place.

Conclusion

It has been stated that we are currently not winning the war (if war is the right term in this context, anyway), because we are still fighting the symptoms and not the illness itself. Terrorism is part of a larger confrontation and cannot be fought just by armed forces (and intelligence services) alone. It is also a fight of ideologies: Therefore we have to find back to our own values. Currently, there is an overreaction on all sides in Western societies; from those who want more freedom of action in the fight against terrorism and those who are concerned about human rights and privacy. A new balance is needed – again finding the right way out of the dilemma.

In the end – or rather in the long run – we are bound to win, but we have to realize that this is a strategic confrontation and to accept that it will take quite a while. But is an endeavor worth the investment.

DDR and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Zones

Hosted by the Small Arms Survey (SAS)

Oliver Jütersonke

Abstract

This panel examines the issue of arms control in post-conflict zones with a particular focus on a number of fragile states such as Haiti, Liberia and Sudan, as well as Colombia and the southern Philippines. The panel critically identifies and distils lessons learned from various disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs undertaken during the transition from war to peace. It offers a number of reflections on the impact of such interventions on the demand, supply and transfer of weapons in war-affected countries and their neighbors.

Summary

The issue of weapons collection in post-conflict settings is crucial to the long-term outcome of a peace process. Failure to collect and destroy weapons to effectively remove them from circulation significantly facilitates a return to conflict. It may also have serious effects on the region as a whole (Mozambique), or increase armed criminality (South Africa). This panel sought to critically assess DDR and weapons reduction initiatives, asking what factors influence the effectiveness of such programs, how to improve on previous practice and how these measures relate to security sector reform (SSR).

The first presentation began by discussing the context and rationale for DDR and weapons reduction. It was pointed out that mortality rates do not necessarily drop in the post-conflict phase (Guatemala, Haiti); the challenge is thus that the post-conflict context is often not a peaceful one, even though there has been a qualitative shift from a military to a criminal approach to dealing with armed violence. DDR occurs in fragile contexts, with arms lingering on after the end of the conflict – indeed, peace negotiations may even falter on precisely this issue of what to do with the weapons (Philippines). DDR and arms reduction are technical tools and not a substitute for what is a very political process.

Historically, DDR was conceived of as a military operation focusing on integrating ex-combatants into existing structures. Success was narrowly defined in terms of the non-recurrence of conflict and the number of ex-combatants reintegrated. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, development agencies gradually became involved in DDR programs and by the 1990s, DDR lacked a clear doctrine. Nonetheless, certain principles can be discerned: DDR occurs after conflict; it needs a clear mandate within peace negotiations; it only focuses on ex-combatants and their dependents; and it must be conceived in an enabling national framework. The UN is favoring a holistic approach, and the test cases of Sudan and Haiti will show to what extent integrated missions work. At the dawn of the 21st century, standards and guidelines are emerging, with success now defined in terms of violence reduction and security promotion. The effectiveness of this remains to be seen.

Arms reduction, in contrast, is about policing and crime control; it is focused on individuals and works with a narrow definition of success based on the number of weapons collected. Over the years, the donor community has become more involved, advocating innovative approaches such as “weapons for development,” which target entire communities and establish incentive structures for people to hand in their arms. Crucially, there has been a shift to focus on civilians, and the emergence of standards and guidelines can again be perceived. And whereas DDR is primarily a post-conflict activity, small arms control also occurs before conflict. On the ground, three approaches can be observed: a collective approach (Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique); an area-based approach (Philippines); and a community-centered approach (Sudan).

These perceived changes over the last decades suggest a move toward a more dynamic approach to DDR. Indeed, the synergies between DDR and small arms reduction are real, although there is still insufficient evidence that what has been done actually works. Thus, there remains an urgent need to readdress the standards of success by incorporating a range of indicators of human welfare.

The second presentation dealt more specifically with civilian arms recovery in post-conflict settings. It began by pointing out that unlike DDR, such civilian disarmament is mostly voluntary and has taken place in both peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping environments. Civilian disarmament must be distinguished from working with ex-combatants and usually takes place after DDR, in both urban and rural setting, with the former presenting the more challenging scenario. Civilian arms recovery is usually implemented by national authorities and is a highly political and sensitive issue dealing with citizens' perception of security.

The UNDP has been involved in civilian disarmament since the late 1990s (Albania) and is now active in more than 50 countries worldwide, with the rationale being that the Millennium Development Goals cannot be met in an insecure environment. Key features of civilian disarmament programs include the need for commitment by national institutions and actors to oversee and implement the process, and the existence of a legislative/regulative framework (amnesty laws, etc.). The feasibility of disarmament initiatives needs to be assessed beforehand, via baseline assessments of gun ownership, threat perceptions and weapons culture in society. Programs have consequently seen a shift from focusing on individuals to collective incentives (weapons-free villages on the Solomon Islands, for instance). An effective securitization discourse requires public awareness-raising by means of confidence-building measures such as the public destruction of weapons; crucial is thus also capacity-building of the authorities and the police. Moreover, civilian disarmament interventions should already be addressed during the peace negotiations, and must always linked to wider post-conflict recovery programs that are aware of regional and local dynamics.

The third and final presentation discussed the possible nexus between DDR and SSR activities, arguing that policy is tending in the direction of an integrated approach by both local and external actors in post-conflict peacebuilding contexts. The careful planning of DDR programs may create an enabling environment for the successful restructuring of the army, police and other security sector institutions. Moreover, evidence from Liberia and elsewhere suggests that private military companies (PMCs) such as DynCorp are active on both sides of the DDR-SSR equation in the same way as international organizations and the donor community. While PMCs might actually implement certain tasks more efficiently in certain circumstances, a number of questions do arise. First, PMC involvement in DDR and SSR may create unwelcome opaqueness in what are highly political processes. Second, the profit-driven nature of PMCs may undermine local ownership of the reform process, and third, the secretiveness of PMCs means that it remains unclear whether these actors have the expertise required for multi-faceted reform processes that include training in democratic civil-military relationships, and in human rights and humanitarian law.

Conclusion

During the discussion, it was again emphasized that DDR and weapons reduction initiatives require a comprehensive peace agreement. Only then might it be possible to work toward transparent and accountable processes that are integrated into broader development concerns.

Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Exploring the Nexus

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in cooperation with International IDEA

Derek Lutterbeck

Abstract

Increasingly, conflict management, human security, democracy and development imperatives have merged. Violent conflict poses the most serious threat to human security, and in the course of war termination the international community turns to democratization processes to secure the peace. At the same time, root causes of conflict lie in under- or mal-distributed development, and long-term peacebuilding equally requires the realization of a peace dividend through which socio-economic gains address the underlying causes of violence. Yet the complex nexus among these goals, and the ways in which they can be more coherently advanced, is not well understood. This panel addressed the ways in which peace could be more effectively pursued by the international community rethinking anew conflict management, democratization and development strategies. The panel featured a presentation of the findings of a major new research project to be released in fall 2006 by International IDEA (IDEA International or International IDEA?)on these themes as well commentary on the findings by GCSP faculty.

Summary

The panel focused on the complex relationship between democracy, conflict and human security. Democracy seems key in ensuring human security because inclusive and participatory regimes are both less likely to experience conflict and provide better safeguards for human rights and human development. Nevertheless, democracy today seems to be in a crisis, as there is growing dissatisfaction with democratic governance in many parts of the world. This crisis has a number of reasons. While some elected governments have failed to deliver economic opportunities for their citizens, there is also a wide-spread perception in many countries that effective power is in the hands of elites driven by personal gain. Moreover, it has been shown that at least in the short term, democracy might not necessarily lead to peace and that democratization processes can also be conflict-inducing. A final reason for the current crisis of democracy is that in the context of the global war on terror, democracy has been increasingly discredited, as democracy promotion efforts have been associated with ‘imperialist’ policies of the “West.”

The first speaker presented some of the main findings of the aforementioned report by IDEA International (IDEA International or International IDEA?). In particular, he focused on the deeper reasons for democracy’s current crisis. Taking the example of Bolivia, he highlighted the regime’s loss of legitimacy as there is widespread perception that democracy has not been able to deliver welfare for the country’s citizens. Moreover, privatization programs have not led to equal distribution of wealth but have rather deepened the polarization of Bolivian society. In other countries and regions of the world, challenges to democracy have been of a somewhat different nature. In the Balkans democracy has come under threat due to the rise of violent nationalism. In Colombia, a key issue was insufficient access to justice, while in Guatemala violence has persisted despite democratization processes. The speaker also emphasized that, ultimately, security was impossible without democracy, and that the key issue in making democracy sustainable was legitimacy. Moreover, the time factor is of crucial importance, as democracy needs to be given sufficient time to deliver on what it promises.

The second speaker focused mainly on democratization and peacebuilding efforts in war-torn societies. He began by outlining the main reasons why democratic transitions are often problematic. First, political reform is destabilizing, as in the short-term there may be threats to peace, and rapid political change implies uncertainty and heightens social conflict. Second,

democratic reform is often introduced simultaneously with market reforms, which in some cases might lead to economic destabilization and a rise in inequality. Third, traditional democratization agendas tend to view democracy as restricted to electoral and institutional aspects, and often fail to recognize that political power is also means to transform unjust socio-economic structures. The speaker also presented several key findings with regard to democratization in war-torn societies. One is that the human rights agenda plays a key role in conflict management and that the failure to integrate human rights issues into the peace process will adversely affect the credibility of peace agreements. He also emphasized that the effectiveness of any peace process depends on public trust and that peace agreement imposed from above invariably encounters obstacles to implementation. Another key point is that holding credible elections generally represents a big challenge, involving issues of security, citizenship, political party laws, election system choice and dispute resolution processes. Finally, he pointed out that democratic peace at the local level is equally important as general elections, and that informal and traditional structures of authority are often resilient right through periods of violence.

The third speaker highlighted some of the key challenges that current democracy assistance efforts are facing. In particular she pointed out that both terrorism and the global war on terror represented serious challenges to democracy. In bin Laden’s worldview democracy constituted a threat. And while democratization is viewed as an important instrument in the fight against terrorism, the current association of democratization and counterterrorism had also discredited democracy. In this context, she also raised the question of whether democracy promotion actually led to a decline in terrorism, and she pointed to the general belligerence of “new” democracies. Moreover, the main emphasis of the current war on terror, she argued, was on formal instead of substantive aspects of democracy. In practice democracy was actually being undermined by the global war on terror. She concluded her presentation by suggesting a number of remedies to the obstacles current democratization efforts were facing. First, the skepticism in many Islamic countries against democracy needs to be taken more seriously. Similarly, awareness of the growing social and economic inequality is necessary. Moreover, there is a need to put greater emphasis on substantive rather than merely formal aspects of democracy. Finally, there should be a return to the human security agenda, giving priority to human as opposed to state security.

The subsequent discussion focused mainly on the issue of elections and its relationship to the peace process more generally. While it seems clear that elections are essential for establishing a legitimate government, it needs to be taken into account that they can also widen social differences and catalyze political violence. Moreover, there is no single sequence that is best for post-conflict elections. In some cases, a “security first” approach might not be the best one, as evidenced for example by the case of South Africa. Another point made in this context was that the first election after a civil war had a strong bearing on the strength, capacity and legitimacy of the state that emerges over time.

Conclusion

The main conclusions emerging from the panel was that there was a need to move beyond merely formal toward more substantive conceptions of democratic governance. What matters are not formal institutions but rather democratic practices which embody democracy’s essential values. Moreover, ultimately, democracy will be assessed from the viewpoint of delivery, whether it is able to meet basic human security and development needs.

Planning for the Future: Uncertainties in Politics and Society

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Myriam Dunn

Christiane Callsen

Abstract

Today, security experts are forced to deal with complex problems that are distinguished by various kinds of "unknowns." These unknowns translate into uncertainty – and having to base decisions on uncertainties causes considerable difficulties for decision-makers. The panel outlined the basis for decision-making if the crosscutting and rapidly changing nature of threats and limitations on the ability to detect, monitor and report them make it difficult to generate an effective analysis of the degree of risk. The panel further showed a potential avenue for linking risk and uncertainty and (lack of) knowledge, the objective being to develop means and methods to deal with the unknown and to perceive it as an instance of "non-knowledge" with specific connotations. If the consequences of these unknowns, and the way political processes function vis-à-vis these unknowns, are understood, one can move toward a more stable basis for political decision-making in an age of uncertainty.

Summary

The first presentation by *Dr. Beat Habegger of the Center for Security Studies* was entitled "New Risk Dynamic and Increasing Uncertainty: Challenges in Politics and Society." In particular, he addressed the issue of how decision-makers can plan for the future in view of the multitude of risks in an increasingly interconnected and uncertain international environment. He called for a nuanced understanding of the accelerated risk dynamic and of the resulting complexity of the entire risk landscape. Further, understanding the relevance of uncertainty both as a characteristic of all future events and developments, and as a defining element of the international system, is a prerequisite for any systematic and comprehensive political risk analysis aimed at risk identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation.

The second presentation, given by *Prof. Christopher Daase of the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich*, addressed "Knowledge and Ignorance in Security Policy Decision-Making." Traditionally, knowledge in the security field may be factual knowledge about actors, capabilities and intentions, or may consist of methodological knowledge about concepts, methods and theories. Based on the combination of methods and facts, Daase differentiated four different categories of knowledge and non-knowledge in the realm of foreign and security policy: first, a certain knowledge of actors, capabilities and intentions, on the basis of which political programs and strategies can be developed ("known knowns"); second, the knowledge about what we do not know ("known unknowns"), which translate into calculable risks; third, the non-knowledge about what we do not know and cannot know ("unknown unknowns"), the "wild card" that can materialize as disasters and wreck the most careful planning; and fourth, the knowledge we do not want to know ("unknown knowns"). Post-war Iraq was mentioned as a case in point – the challenges of peacebuilding were foreseen by many, but ignored by policymakers for political reasons. The conclusion was that the kind of danger and the form of insecurity that we perceive in international politics depends on our knowledge or non-knowledge of it, and that different forms of danger require different forms of assessment. Knowledge and non-knowledge both being equally constitutive for the decision-making process, Daase called for an approach to manage non-knowledge and for a better understanding of the limits of knowledge in international relations.

The following subject was about “The Risk Landscape of the Future.” *Christian Brauner of Swiss Re* pointed out three key trends shaping the risk landscape. First, change is accelerating, global simultaneity is advancing, and innovation cycles are becoming shorter. Second, loss potentials are increasing due to population growth, a concentration of values and mass production. The increase of the number of serious natural catastrophes and technical disasters since the 1970s and the simultaneous decrease in accidents has lead to more “high consequence / low probability” risks. Third, the growing complexity of systems, the rapid spread of new technologies, and the lack of time to react to incidents increase uncertainty, which in turn renders risks less calculable. Brauner concluded by highlighting the growing need for early-warning systems. Efficient early-warning systems are expected to amplify weak signals received from the risk landscape to serve as a concrete basis for taking decisions and adopting a new course of action. However, initial indications of new and changed risks are often inflated into scenarios of doom, which ultimately do more harm than good. Reliable early-warning systems should compress many similar items of information that seem irrelevant when observed in isolation, and so reveal regularities from which reliable forecasts may be derived.

The final presentation focused on the military dimension of risks. *René Eggenberger of armasuisse* explored “Scenario Techniques for Better Strategic Planning – an Opportunity to Escape from Political Decision Making in the Rough,” citing the example of the ESDP Scenarios 2020 developed by the Swiss Armed Forces in order to identify the key factors of ESDP development and to describe the consequences for Switzerland’s security policy. In particular, Eggenberger illustrated how difficult it can be not only to interpret patterns correctly and to get the forecasts right, but also to draw the right conclusions. The scenario-building process of the Swiss Armed Forces highlighted the importance of expert knowledge and the challenge of converging their contributions to coherent scenarios. A heterogeneous mix of experts certainly guarantees stimulating discussions and a wide range of scenarios, but during both the scenario-building process and the scenario-interpretation process, the experts’ background and interests should be taken into account.

Discussion

During the question period, a range of issues was raised. It was pointed out that there is a clear need for risk assessment, yet questions remained, such as who should undertake that task and how to make sure an assessment is a sound basis for decision-making. In the public sphere, in particular, the notion of intelligence services conducting risk assessments may imply constitutional challenges. The response from the panel emphasized that risk assessment is and should be a multilevel task, meaning that different government departments should be involved and that different methods should be applied. It would be dangerous to involve only one agency. Furthermore, the ultimate decisions as to how to deal with risks are political, and should not be technocratic, which means that any risk assessment process has to involve actors from society. Nevertheless, it was admitted that during the Scenarios 2020 process, it had proved difficult to integrate the views from the other ministries. It became clear during the discussion round that communication, from the level of risk analysis to the level of policymaking, is crucial, and that the insights of experts, academics, international organizations and NGOs need to be included in the governance process. One of the panelists cautioned against expecting too much from risk analyses – they provide the basis for decision-making, but not for a “best way” on how to mitigate risks.

Conclusion

The main lessons of this workshop were: (1) Planning for the future demands a nuanced understanding of the accelerated risk dynamic and of the resulting complexities across the entire risk landscape. (2) It also requires grasping the relevance of uncertainty in the international realm. It is important that our view of the world be determined not by the dichotomous categories of “certain” or “uncertain,” but by a comprehension of the nuances of different levels of uncertainty, in order to formulate the appropriate strategic response. (3) Planning for the future calls for a comprehensive risk analysis process. Political risks will always defy total control, but political risk

analysts are meant to establish reliable approaches with which complex risks can be identified, assessed and ultimately mitigated.

Regional Security: Local Dynamics – Global Impact

The Middle East 2006: Change and Transition

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Sharham Chubin

Abstract

The Middle East is undergoing change unprecedented in even its recent history. Along all dimensions in Arab-Israel relations, where Hamas has been swept to office and where negotiations appear distant, through to the winds of change in respect to elections, reforms and succession, the region is in transition. This is clearly evident in relation to energy security where new actors have emerged and new leverage won by suppliers. Uncertainty accompanies the transition in Iraq and its future as it does the implications and outcome of the nuclear crisis with Iran. It is around these themes that we have planned this panel, which gives us an opportunity to exchange views and perspectives about the current strategic context.

Summary

The Middle East after the Lebanon War

The chairman started the discussion by making a number of points about the changed and fluid context of Middle East politics. He argued that the Middle East remained a “failed region” in that it was out of step with the globalizing world; had failed to create even one democratic state, and remained largely economically marginalized from globalization (relying on bloated state sectors). As the annual Arab Human Development reports attested, the treatment of women, minorities and civil liberties fell far short of what was necessary and desirable for modern societies.

The Middle East had “too much history” and remained mired in imaginary and past historical grievances which it was unwilling to let go. The tendency to use history as an excuse for current failures, rather than to transcend history, provides an argument and diversion for the failure of regimes to deal with current problems of legitimacy deficits and economic failures.

Globalization in all its forms, and especially in the way modern communications through the internet, satellite TV and blogs, undermine the state’s territoriality and control, giving populations more information and basis for comparison. The state is undermined also by its ineffectiveness in meeting the needs of its citizenry. Non-government organizations like Hizbollah or the Muslim Brotherhood or the neighborhood church are often more effective in providing social and economic services, than governments. At the same time states are often undermined also by transnational NGO’s and ideologies and appeals such as radical Islamists groupings (of which al-Qaida is only one).

If the state is under siege from above and below, leading in many cases to a reversion to primordial loyalties such as tribe, clan or sect, it is also the case that the state is still the only social unit that appears indispensable. The case of such failing states as Lebanon, Iraq or even Palestine attest to the need for strong – albeit legitimate – states, for maintaining social cohesion and delivering services.

A distinguishing characteristic of the Middle East remains its propensity for conflict. By some counts there are six conflicts on going at the present time: The Arab-Israel, the war in Afghanistan, the near civil war in Iraq, the (2nd) war in Lebanon, the conflict with Iran over its nuclear ambitions; and the war against global terrorism.[1] These conflicts interact and leave behind durable legacies that persist over time.

[1] Tony Cordesman’s characterization

The unprecedented fluidity of the region is evident also in the number of significant new trends:

1. The decline of US power and influence in the region. Military power is naturally limited and less fungible than often thought. Furthermore asymmetric strategies and over-extension have further blocked and limited it. Misconceived policies and neglect have undermined US prestige. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib have undermined US moral authority. As a result US standing in the region is at an all-time low. US allies are in disarray and on the defensive and seeking reinsurance elsewhere (China) or simply quietly defecting (Turkey, Egypt?)
2. The other side of the coin is that the "rejectionist" of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas have "returned" emboldened. The Lebanon war put Arab states that are pro-Western, on the defensive vis-à-vis the more militant "Arab street." The Hizbollah model of resistance that can dispel the "myth of Israel invincibility," that can fight Israel to a standstill, has given that movement and its backers, a new constituency and influence in the region
3. A related trend is the ascendancy of Iran. The Lebanon war was the first regional conflict that took place in the shadow of Iran's nuclear ambitions, at least as far as Israel was concerned
4. Reinforcing this in the perceptions of many is the Shi-a revival throughout the region, especially in Iraq and Lebanon. This may in turn embolden other Shi'i in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain) to be more assertive
5. The future of Iraq and especially a civil war along sectarian lines or a breakup of the country, which may see regional polarization along Sunni/Shi'i lines, is also a distinct possibility
6. Finally the region is seeing changes in the geopolitical configuration. As US power is weakened relatively, Russia is more assertive, and China and India are newer players. At the same time trans-Atlantic relations are strained and unlikely to regain the intimacy that characterized them (with gaps, 1945 - 2000)

All of this makes for a new, more complex and more risky environment.

The first speaker focused on the crisis in Iraq and its consequences for Gulf security. He did this by noting the characteristics of the current conflict with special reference to the military deployments and casualties. He then outlines three scenarios for a future Iraq:

1. The success of current efforts at elections, stabilization and state reconstitution. He suggested that the likely weakness of the state will see internal conflicts, international intervention and a spillover affecting negatively regional security.
2. If the political process collapses, he foresaw civil war, disintegration of the state, US withdrawal and regional instability.
3. The third scenario was for a last resort military coup by a revived military which then imposed order on the fractious society and militias.

In assessing the impact of the Iraqi crisis he argued that the US had been gravely weakened in the region and correspondingly Iran had been strengthened. In the final analysis the GCC states had also been put into a disadvantageous position.

The second panelist focused on the impact of the Lebanon war on Middle East politics. He distinguished between two types of impact: as a model for other crises, and from its spillover ('contagion'). He noted the admiration of the Sunni world for Shi'I Hizbollah and emergence of Hassan Nasrollah and Mohammed Ahmadinejad as new heroes. The Hizbollah model of resistance is now also popular. And this is despite costs associated with a war which Nasrollah himself admitted to have miscalculated. The admission was not well received by his new admirers, who nonetheless prefer not to focus on the question of costs. Nasrollah has become a necessary symbol to reaffirm the Arab future.

However the issue of whether there is a military solution needs further analysis, especially whether it is not a dead end. Lebanon, after all, is a special, non representative case, with a notably weak state. Inside Lebanon there was some debate whether the 2006 war was a success or failure: no victory, no defeat. Nasrollah's miscalculation of Israel's response recalled that of Abdul Nasser in 1967.

Is there a silver lining from the conflict in more opportunity for peace? Unilateral withdrawal as in 2000 in Lebanon seems less likely now. What would be the impact today? On the Palestine issue US disengagement from the process is still notable. While there is a need for addressing the toughest, permanent status issues, even the most marginal issues appear difficult.

In Iraq and Palestine, the Islamist trend has been strengthened and an increase in militant Islam throughout the region appears likely. This will be further stoked by returnees from the jihads in Iraq and Afghanistan. These militants will be more able technologically with experience of IEDs and shaped charges for indirect attacks on security forces. They will pose a challenge for many governments' maintenance of security and order. Rising anti-Americanism will increase the pool of recruits for such activities. And governments may be tempted to join the anti-US bandwagon as they see its political benefits. With unemployment on the rise and young, educated, urban, youth politicized and radicalized, the prospects for instability appear serious.

What shape might this take? Military coups appear to be a thing of the past. Uprisings and insurgencies (on the model of the intifidahs) are possible, especially where security forces are weak or doubtful. Political Islam on the model of Algeria after 1990 appears more probable than the Hamas, elected model. This in turn might see the repression of many Islamist groups preventively by governments. Generally speaking there will be either no, or limited openings toward Islamists. The exceptions will be in Iraq and Lebanon where there may be more room for influence.

Conclusion

All in all, the panel concluded that the region is undergoing change on multiple axis at the same time, domestic, regional and international, and from threats to regimes from all three levels. The linking of the region from the Gulf through to Palestine/Israel is more direct and real than ever. States are challenged by inter- and intra-state trends that are new and changing the map of the region. In that sense the Lebanon war reflected the new context as much as it changed it.

The Middle East and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Christoph Doktor

Abstract

The strategic importance of the Middle East for international security has further increased in recent years. Many of the key challenges Europe and the US are confronted with today, such as WMD proliferation, terrorism, soaring oil prices or illegal migration, can be closely associated with developments in the Gulf, the Levant and the Maghreb. As inter-state rivalries, the perseverance of authoritarian regimes, ever-growing demographic pressure, and the spread of fundamentalist ideologies continue to render the region instable, the Middle East is bound to dominate the trans-Atlantic agenda for the foreseeable future. Yet, from Suez in 1956 to Iraq in 2003, the Middle East has frequently represented a major source of tension in Western relations, with allies differing about threat perceptions, interests, and policies.

This panel discussed the prospect for European-US confrontation and cooperation over the Middle East in the coming years, and the likely repercussions that developments in this volatile region will have for the future of trans-Atlantic relations.

Summary

The first presentation dealt with the prospects for trans-Atlantic cooperation in the Middle East. The difficulties in cooperation between EU und US in the Middle East are partly due to structural reasons. The structural deficiency of the EU results from decision-making problems and the identity crisis that influences the EU's relationship with the US, but also affects the ability of the EU to find a common position vis-à-vis the Middle East. The US also face structural problems: US decision-making is shaped by domestic political considerations, which means that it is conducted with US voters, as well as their interests and values, in mind. On the other hand, there are significant differences between US and European perceptions of the Middle East. Europe and the Middle East have a shared history and culture. Due to its geographic proximity to the Middle East and its Muslim population, the EU is much more concerned with developments in the Middle East than the US is. The panelist examined the implications for specific conflicts such as Palestine, Iraq and Iran. In Palestine, there is no peace process or cooperation. The EU and the US are complicit in denying reality. Regarding Iraq, it is too late for coordinated action: the implications of the collapse of the US Iraq policy need to be discussed now. The West is cooperating in its policies towards Iran, but is unable to make an impact. In sum, the panelist suggested, EU-US cooperation in the Middle East is either too late or ineffective.

The second panelist focused on Iran, Iraq and the future of Gulf security. The speaker's opening remarks indicated that Europe should remember its own history, and that the US in some ways has only followed in the footsteps of the British and French colonial empires. Europe is not more at risk than the US: All parties suffer from terrorism and extremism. Regarding Iran, there are common concerns, but no common policies. The EU's critical dialogue with Iran did not produce more results than US containment. European and US policies toward Iraq in the 1990s were closely coordinated, but things went wrong at the end of the decade. In 2003, the US failed to plan for the time after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. The result, according to the speaker, has been a failure to create democracy and a government that is able to protect the country and its population. Nevertheless, one should not judge prematurely; instead, patience and endurance are needed. The panelist suggested two scenarios for the near future until the 2008 presidential election in the US: 1. Bush will try to improve his historical legacy, which means a change in policy and a return to

diplomacy, working together with allies, and learning from earlier mistakes; or 2. No major change. Bush keeps following his current strategy; corrections are only made at the level of tactics.

The next presentation dealt with the Middle East peace process and the future role of the EU. The panelist highlighted the increasing presence of the EU in the Middle East peace process. However, the EU's approach toward the Middle East has been more focused on financial help, for example in the shape of financial support for the Palestinian Authority. Politically and military, Europe has been less visible in the region, because the EU has been concerned with its enlargement and internal issues in recent years. The panelist pointed out that there is actually no peace process either in Palestine or in Iraq, but only growing violence and military confrontation. According to the speaker, it is still too soon for the EU to take on a global responsibility. Neither is the EU in a position to push forward its agenda vis-à-vis Israel nor the US. In conclusion, no single power can solve the issues in the region on its own; multilateral solutions are therefore the only way out in Palestine and Iraq.

The next speaker began with some remarks on the present situation in the Middle East. There is growing frustration in the region in view of the lack of vision and the speaker raised the possibility of bringing about a certain level of cooperation between the EU and the US to find a solution in this extremely complex environment. The engagement of the US in the region is necessary, the speaker argued, because there is a need for hard power, but hard power cannot be the only response to all problems that arise. On the other hand, the EU lacks sufficient hard power to have an impact, but as a soft power, it can serve as a complementary element in efforts to resolve issues in the Middle East.

Discussion

The subsequent discussion revolved largely around the question of the future of the Middle East and the role of the Middle East in trans-Atlantic relations. One possible future avenue for development of the region, one panelist argued, is regional rapprochement and reconciliation. That is difficult to achieve, though it may be possible in the long term. Another panelist highlighted the importance of the democratization of the region, but also pointed to the significance of other structural issues, such as demography and economy. A further speaker referred to the Middle East as the "Achilles' heel of trans-Atlantic relations"; however, the primary interest of the EU and US, is to work together to resolve the pressing issues in the Middle East region.

Conclusion

The Middle East and the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship were controversially discussed in this workshop. In conclusion, most panelists argued that cooperation between the EU and the US is the key factor in resolving the various Middle East conflicts. However, one speaker presented a rather pessimistic view, stating that EU-US cooperation in the region was either too late or ineffective.

The New Trans-Atlantic Bargain

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Christoph Doktor

Abstract

The history of the trans-Atlantic relationship has witnessed many crises, beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956. However, there has never before been a trans-Atlantic crisis as divisive as that prompted by the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. As a consequence, some scholars have proclaimed the death of NATO, the end of Atlanticism or even the beginnings of a geopolitical rivalry between the US and Europe.

This panel looked beyond the controversies of the moment and focused on enduring questions. It drew attention to structural considerations, but also focused on intellectual, ideological and political circumstances that have informed recent developments.

Summary

Dr. Julian Lindley-French

The presentation dealt with redefining the West and the future of trans-Atlantic relations. The trans-Atlantic relationship remains a big-power relationship. Because of the alleged lack of strategic seriousness that the speaker attributed to most Europeans, the new trans-Atlantic relationship will be focused on a bargain not within, or between, the EU or NATO, but between the US and the leading European states. "The West" is no longer a place, but an idea. The challenge for Western advocates of globalization is to save the system of institutionalized security by embedding new great powers that, by and large, share the values of the West and wish to join it in the quest for global stability. In the emerging virtual West, power will be organized under US leadership, with Britain and France as the leading European powers. US leadership remains vital, but it must be good leadership.

Dr. Geoffrey Edwards

The presentation focused on relations between the EU, NATO and the US. Trans-Atlantic relations have always been subject to ambiguity and ambivalence, for instance concerning US leadership and the relationship between the EU and the US as partners or competitors. The split between the French and Germans on the one side, and the rest of Europe on the other, over the Iraq invasion, which had an EU-US dimension, has illustrated these difficulties. The agreement on the European Security Strategy indicated that the Europeans wanted to resolve these difficulties; the ESS itself sets out a vision for the EU as a global actor. Europe needs to act before a crisis occurs, not by pre-emptive action, but through conflict prevention as well as crisis management. The balance between civilian and military operations and the need for effective multilateralism is critical for success. NATO still remains a key element in Europe's defense. But NATO under US leadership is no longer simply about defense: "Transformation" means a more global mission for NATO. Transforming NATO to the point where it is less concerned with territorial defense is regarded as a real danger, especially among the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Europe is beginning to become attractive to the CEECs, even as a secondary security player – especially as it allows the CEECs to exercise influence in a more equitable way than in NATO.

Associate Prof. Carlo Masala

The presentation focused on flexibility in security cooperation as a key aspect of the new trans-Atlantic bargain. Flexibility in the context of conflict resolution means lessening ties among the conflict parties in order to keep the overall structure in which conflict parties are engaged intact.

Regarding the trans-Atlantic relations, there is now no common threat, but a diverging risk and threat perception among NATO member states. As a result, it is difficult to find common positions and to undertake common actions. The presentation also pointed to the imbalance of power among NATO members and the unilateral turn of the US. Nevertheless, the Europeans are still interested in keeping the US in Europe in order to have voice opportunities, to prevent the re-emergence of a European hegemon or a European bi-gemony, and to sustain a minimum of integration among the respective armed forces. On the other side, the US is also interested in remaining a European power, to expand its hegemony to the east (enlargement), and to prevent the re-emergence of a European hegemon. Therefore, according to the speaker, flexibility is a way of keeping the alliance intact and of giving member states more options for military action; flexibility is therefore a system-adequate adjustment.

Discussion

The discussion revolved around three main issues: First, the recent problems in relations between EU, NATO, and the US; second, the question of US leadership and sharing responsibility; and third, the future development of the trans-Atlantic bargain. One panelist argued that the US and Europe face common security challenges, but not a common territorial threat. Moreover, institutions do not solve problems, while the policies of member states are guided by national interests. Another panelist highlighted that the EU is an extremely useful example of institutionalism. However, there are no signs of a new institutional framework in the relationship between the US and Europe. A further panelist pointed out the importance of US leadership and called on the Europeans to be serious partners. In order to achieve this, Europe has to develop its own capacity and capability to act and must deal with threats in and near to Europe.

Conclusion

The future of the trans-Atlantic relationship was controversially discussed in this workshop. The main conclusion emerging from the presentations and discussion was that good trans-Atlantic relations remain important for both Europe and US. However, as the discussion clearly demonstrated, there is no single vision for the new trans-Atlantic bargain and there was no consensus among the speakers on the best way to rebuild relations between Europe and the US.

Kosovo at the Crossroads

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Chaired by Ambassador Gregor Zore, Head of Operations at the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Speakers

Veton Surroi

Oliver Ivanovic

Ardian Gjini

Vlado Buckovski

Antje Fritz

Abstract

The tentative status of Kosovo, as defined by the UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) is about to change. Seven years after the hostilities in the province have ended, the parties concerned have embarked upon a negotiating process known unofficially as "status talks." Under the mediating role of the former president of Finland, Mr. Ahtisaari, and with the assistance of the so-called Contact Group, the two main stakeholders, namely the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority, are trying to define a viable outcome that would put an end to the United Nations administration of Kosovo.

Summary

The panel focused on the prospective future of the province, the development of the negotiations process, and prospects for integration of Kosovo into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The first presentation dealt with developments in Kosovo after the conflict in 1999, as well as with the current situation in the province, and gave an outlook for the future. The point was made that developments that took place in recent years were mainly positive. There have been major improvements regarding the respect of human rights, rule of law, balancing of the budget, the economy and the relations with neighboring countries. According to the speaker's view, freedom of movement is largely guaranteed and minorities are represented in all governmental institutions. It was recalled that after the conflict seven years ago there was no justice system and neither rule of law in Kosovo, while there is today a multi-ethnic police service, courts and a justice system in place. The economy is still far from being satisfactory, but compared to previous years the situation has considerably improved. The province maintains good relations with neighboring countries and seeks to build up good relations with Serbia too. The existing challenges in the energy sector will prospectively be overcome soon. A clear goal for Kosovo is EU accession, an objective which is widely supported by the government, political parties and the minorities. The integration into Euro-Atlantic structures will be a difficult and long-lasting process, however, the speaker is confident that it will be achievable in the foreseeable future.

The next contribution focused on the status talks. The point was stressed that only cooperation between Albanians and Serbs can result in a successful resolution of the Kosovo question. The speaker described the difficult conditions of the Serb community in Kosovo, including challenges regarding the involvement of the Serbs in the political process and in providing security for the Serbian communities in the province. The speaker also pointed to difficulties in negotiating the decentralization process and gave insights on the possible impact of the new constitution in Serbia.

It was stated that there is a certain likelihood of a power struggle amongst the Albanian parties after final status, an issue which supposedly could lead to a further destabilization of the situation in Kosovo. A quite pessimistic scenario was described in case the resolution of the Kosovo question would not be supported by the Serbian government. A transitional solution with the focus on EU integration for Kosovo was seen as a promising alternative. The importance of getting the Serbian government involved in the discussions was repeatedly stressed.

The next presentation dealt mainly with the future status of Kosovo and with prospects regarding its inclusion into Euro-Atlantic structures. It was stated that Kosovo should become a sovereign state, whose main objective should be the Euro-Atlantic integration. The UN administration in Kosovo proved to be a failure. The dualism in governance structures in Kosovo – a UNMIK which is functioning in parallel to the PISG – lead to a fatal stagnation, which resulted in the absence of responsibility and accountability and which hindered the launch of a truly democratic process. The point was made that the model of Kosovo as part of a sovereign Serbia failed in the past and will fail in the future. Only as a sovereign state will Kosovo have the chance to become a contractual partner of NATO and EU and thus become a factor of stability in the region.

In order for this to be achieved, the Security Council needs to adopt a clear position. Further protraction of the current situation needs to be avoided by all means. The outcome of the process must be a unified integral Kosovo, while the main role of the International Community would be to help building up governance capacity in Kosovo.

Next subject for discussion was neighboring Macedonia's view of the situation. The speaker stressed the need for a timely solution for Kosovo. A further protraction of the current situation will help strengthening radicals in Kosovo as well as in Macedonia. Kosovo is seen as a highly important factor for the stability of the region. Should the Kosovo question not be solved, the Euro-Atlantic integration process of the entire region could come to a standstill. Kosovo will be the last piece in the integration process in the Western Balkans. Once the question is solved, it will be easier for the whole region. The importance to respect the borders has been repeatedly stressed. A territorial division of Kosovo would be highly unproductive for the entire region. Multi-ethnic municipalities must continue to exist. The speaker felt that there was still a need for a regional plan, similar to the Marshall Plan, which should be promoted and supported by the International Community.

During the questions and answers period, several points were raised:

1. The importance of a quick solution of the Kosovo question was repeatedly stressed as well as the importance of proceeding swiftly with Euro-Atlantic integration. It was stated that not only Kosovo's, but the stable future of the whole Western Balkan region is to be found in the EU.
2. The point of (mis-) using the Kosovo case as precedence was raised several times. If the principle of self-determination prevails over territorial sovereignty, consequences must be foreseen for Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, Spain, Turkey and other countries. As a response to this statement it was mentioned, that Kosovo’s case cannot be compared with these countries, since it constitutes a unique case of being formerly ruled by Milosevic’s Serbia.
3. In response to a question on return of Serbian IDPs it was stated that Kosovo will make every effort to assure the return of refugees and that it is hoped that Serbia will not obstruct the efforts to facilitate the return of IDPs.
4. It was also stated that there is a lack of security for minorities in Kosovo. Perpetrators are in most cases neither put to trial nor punished. As a consequence, there is no freedom of movement in the province. Therefore it is very unlikely that Serbs will actually return to their homes in Kosovo.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the main points were reiterated and all the participants and the audience were thanked for their interest and participation.

Strategy and Doctrine I

Consolidating the OSCE

Hosted by the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (HEI)

Cristina Lopez

Abstract

More than ever before, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is currently facing a need for more coherence at the conceptual, structural and institutional levels. In view of the constant evolution of the OSCE from its initial role as multilateral forum (the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)) to the world's largest regional security organization, this panel will assess lessons learned and survey possible new avenues for OSCE activities. Particular attention will be paid to existing instruments for conflict management, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and security sector reform (SSR) in general.

Summary

The panel ran under the heading of "Consolidating the OSCE." It aimed to highlight the lessons learned by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) while discussing possible ways to consolidate the Organization. During the introduction, *Dr. Daniel Warner, Deputy to the Director for External Relations and Special Programmes (HEI) and PSIO Director* mentioned that the Programme for the Study of International Organization(s) (PSIO), created in 1996 and based at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, is both a research program aiming to further the study of international organizations, as well as a forum designated to stimulate discussion between academics and policymakers in international organizations. Its main activities include research projects involving experts in international organizations and members of HEI faculty; organization of major conferences and colloquia; and publication and dissemination of the results of research, workshops and conferences. Dr. Warner also indicated that the PSIO has a long tradition in managing OSCE-related activities involving prominent researchers, practitioners and government officials. From 1997 to 2003, the PSIO managed the *OSCE Cluster of Competence*, which gathered once a year to review the activities of the OSCE and published studies on the Organization. Since 2004, the PSIO developed a "PSIO Focus on the OSCE" program, as a flexible instrument of reflection and analysis on the OSCE. In the past years, the PSIO organized ten conferences and published thirteen Occasional Papers and four books on the OSCE.

The first presentation of this panel dealt with the challenges the OSCE is currently facing. *Dr. Alice Ackerman, Mission Programme Officer, OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Center* recalled that the OSCE has never been a static Organization but a perpetual work in progress, identifying three important phases of the Organization's evolution. After this brief historical introduction, Dr. Ackerman acknowledged important challenges the OSCE has to face today, while also remembering its flexibility and ability to adapt to new situations. Among the challenges she identified in her presentation, we can cite the changing European security landscape which obliges the OSCE to find its niche between the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); the globalization of today's world; complaints from Participating States on the election monitoring system; and its perceived lack of neutrality. According to Dr. Ackerman, the most important questions that the Organization has to answer today relate to ways of keeping states fully engaged through difficult transition processes, as well as means to increase a shared sense of ownership while ensuring that states act on implementing their commitments. To conclude, Dr. Ackerman recalled that the OSCE is owned by its Participating States and if the Organization wants to face up to its challenges, it has to be able to rely on the financial and political engagement of these members.

The second presentation focused on the role of the OSCE in the conflict-management cycle. *Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)* recalled that conflict management has always been a central issue for the OSCE. He also evoked the fact that the OSCE has to adapt itself to today's prevailing challenges of transnational risks and conflicts. According to Dr. Zellner, the OSCE reform discussion should take into account the changes in the nature of conflicts, and assess possible ways to adapt the Organization's conflict-management function and instruments to this new nature. During his presentation, Dr. Zellner raised three important issues: first, the exact significance of conflict prevention and management in today's world; second, whether the current substance of conflict prevention is still relevant for ethnic-oriented conflict; and third, today's relevance of field operations and their comparative advantage compared to the operations of other organizations. Dr. Zellner concluded his presentation by asserting that if the OSCE wants to remain relevant for addressing risks, threats and conflicts in Europe and avoid being marginalized, it has to reinvent itself once again and, more particularly, find a new form of field operations to engage in.

The last presentation dealt with the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (the Code), in the light of security sector reform (SSR). *Mr. David Law, Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)* argued that it is possible to use SSR to help revitalize, modernize and enhance the relevance of the Code. His presentation focused on four issues: the accomplishments of the Code; a comparison between the Code and SSR; the possible ways to use the Code for SSR; and finally the possible procedures to do so in practice. Mr. Law envisaged several initiatives that could enhance the implementation of the Code's existing provisions. Among other propositions, he suggested to undertake reflections on the possible means of updating the Code's provisions in order to assure that changes in the strategic environment and the innovations of SSR are taken into account. Mr. Law also pointed out that there exists various ways to modernize the implementation methods of the Code. As part of his conclusion, he acknowledged that in order to improve the Code's accountability in implementation and to enhance its credibility, the most important single step would be to take a transparent approach, which would engage civil society in monitoring and publicizing the Code's provisions.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Dr. Warner recalled the main points of discussion. He thanked all the panelists for their presentations and the audience for its participation and questions. Various PSIO Occasional Papers on OSCE issues were offered to the participants and it was confirmed that the PSIO would continue its work on the OSCE. Dr. Warner also informed the audience that the PSIO is preparing a new PSIO Occasional Paper on the OSCE, to be published in December 2006, in which the three panel presentations will be included.

Confronting Proliferation

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Sean S. Costigan

Speakers

Prof. Etel Solingen

Dr. Fraser Cameron

Dr. Oliver Thränert

Vivian Fritschi

Abstract

Curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a top priority for the international community. Whereas during the Cold War, deterrence and arms control treaties contained the critical risks, today's dangers include the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable or unpredictable regimes and terrorists or a confluence of actors. The potential willingness of such actors to use nuclear weapons should serve as a call to the international community to jointly develop strategies to control the spread of nuclear weapons. A more nuanced understanding of the goals of states with interest in acquiring nuclear weapons is needed, as is wider thought on the strategic implications of such developments.

Summary

Prof. Etel Solingen, University of Southern California

Dr. Solingen considered the question of why some nations acquire nuclear weapons and why others renounce them. The speaker explored various schools of thought regarding the state struggle to increase power relative to other states. While nuclear weapons may provide similar advantages, evidence shows the theory is overstated, for some vulnerable states renounce nuclear weapons and some states with few vulnerabilities acquire them. The definition of vulnerability is elastic: the physical survival of the regime and not only the physical survival of the state may motivate states to acquire nuclear weapons.

Dr. Solingen went on to distinguish between regimes likely to renounce nuclear weapons (those with relatively weak leadership and domestic constituents likely to benefit from regional cooperation and an export-oriented economy) and those likely to acquire nuclear weapons (such as inward-looking regimes for whom political survival is the primary concern, with favored constituents likely to resist reforms and be shielded from the global economy). Domestic political survival models that identify the interests and motivations of leaders and domestic constituents are useful for explaining why a regime initiates a nuclear program and may help shape more effective approaches to strengthening non-proliferation incentives.

Dr. Oliver Thränert, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

Dr. Thranert’s presentation focused on the weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and how regional conflict might exacerbate proliferation. The presenter cautioned that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may be close to collapsing because it has been severely weakened by member disagreements, major nuclear powers modernizing their nuclear arsenals, and the failure of Iran and North Korea to comply with IAEA obligations. The speaker considered the implications of the

NPT's collapse, noting that without the IAEA, the loss of accountability skills and information about what materials exist would be substantial and could result in greater access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.

He briefly discussed how regional conflicts will likely exacerbate proliferation concerns. For instance, in the Middle East, changes in the nuclear balance might motivate other states in the region to establish their own nuclear programs, thereby increasing the risk of access to nuclear materiel by non-state actors and proliferation networks. In addition, a nuclear Middle East would need to develop a crisis management framework for crisis prevention. He noted that analysts speculate nuclear weapons would be used as a deterrent in low-level conflicts, thereby, ultimately increasing the risk of their use. Non-proliferation frameworks must be retained and strengthened in order to undermine the threat of proliferation.

Dr. Fraser Cameron, Senior Advisor, European Policy Center

Mr. Cameron explored nuclear issues in European Union policy debates, noting that after 9/11, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came to top of agenda in the EU, at US insistence; but the discussion of nuclear issues is excluded from agreements and is not included on the primary agenda of the EU given the sensitive nature of the topic. The 2003 NPT strategic review analyzed the danger of weapons of mass destruction and urged a multilateral approach, adding the EU should address the root causes of instability.

While the speaker recommended that the EU offer greater support to effective multilateralism and move to give the IAEA more authority, he also noted that it would be difficult for the EU to develop a common strategy with the US. Although there is work on non-proliferation that is done in parallel (strengthening export controls regimes for example), the prospects for a public agreement between the EU and the US remain remote, and unfortunately, an indirect focus may be insufficient to truly avert nuclear proliferation. Members should consider alternative models and incentives to halt proliferation.

Discussion

The discussion that followed examined the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and work toward nuclear disarmament. The discussion moved to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and whether or not it is sufficient to contain nuclear ambitions and nuclear conflict, and if it will be effective in the future. In addition, participants considered the role and importance of state prestige and hegemonic ambitions, as well as the interplay of domestic concerns and regional rivalries in motivating states to acquire nuclear weapons. The session concluded with a discussion about proliferation. While there was agreement that initiatives to curb proliferation need to be intensified, participants noted that for the IAEA to have full oversight would require the support of the present powers, which would raise questions about international norms.

Conclusion

The panel session provided an intensive consideration of the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation and the overall deterioration of the NPT regime. European and US cooperation and collaboration could serve to strengthen the NPT, but would have to overcome domestic political hurdles to creating a common strategy.

Strategic Culture: The Impact of Technology on the Military

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Stephanie Neuman

Speakers

Dr. Stephen Biddle

Prof. Jack Treddenick

Dr. Kenneth W. Estes

Discussant

Sean S. Costigan

Vivian Fritschi

Abstract

Since the advent of the scientific and industrial revolutions, every generation has tended to see itself in a progressive light, with knowledge, science and technology growing at a previously unheralded rate. During this period in history, warfare, like science, underwent significant shifts, albeit in forms of increased frequency and lethality. In this most recent revolution in military affairs, the most innovative aspect comes in the claim that "netcentric" warfare can replace weapons-centered warfare, and systems of systems will dominate. Recent United States policy focuses on the "Transformation of Forces," a reduced form of RMA, recognizing the inability of military forces and allied militaries to change fundamentally under new technology.

Supporters suggest that such technologies will help achieve greater battlefield control and further strengthen militaries. Critics maintain that new technologies may reduce interoperability and that RMA presumes an enemy force will have detectable characteristics easily exploited by electronic and other surveillance means. The existing low-intensity conflict opponents do not fit neatly into this category, as shown by the current war in Afghanistan.

Summary

Dr. Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. Biddle examined the technological future of warfare based on recent experience of technology in practice. In particular, the use of technology in the combat campaign during the fall of the Taliban regime in 2002 and during US combat operations in Iraq in 2003. The speaker debunked popular views about the efficacy of stand-off precision technologies, explaining that opponent behavior determines what kinds of technologies are most effective.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq there were two types of opponents, the indigenous troops (Afghan Taliban and the Iraqi Republican Guard) and trained foreigners (including al-Qaida training camp recruits). Initially, low-tech, precision firing was used to eliminate early targets, but as the campaign lengthened, the targeted base became more sophisticated as opponents made use of camouflage, dispersion, adopted a sophisticated use of the terrain. Stand-off precision strikes are inefficient against skilled opponents; this problem creates a target acquisition problem for modern militaries. In future warfare, stand-off precision technologies will not be a panacea as their effectiveness

depends largely on target behavior. Militaries will have to strategically adapt and anticipate variations on the battlefield.

Prof. Jack Treddenick, George C. Marshall Center

Dr. Treddenick examined the link between the transformation of militaries and defense expenditures. In order to accommodate a new strategic environment that includes non-state actors, multinational operations, asymmetry and counterinsurgency, modern militaries must initiate the transformation of their military capacity to integrate new concepts into their operational and organizational structures. In particular he examined the structural shifts from hierarchies to networked command structures that allow for the multidirectional filtering and structuring of information. The transformation of militaries entails creating smaller, lighter, more lethal entrepreneurial networks with mobile communications capacity.

The speaker presented an assessment of the costs and trade-offs of transformation for countries other than the US, through an examination of military expenditures as broken down by personnel costs (pay and benefits), non-personnel costs, total number of personnel, and per capita expenditures. During transformation typically the total size of the military and its expenditures may fall, but per capita expenditures tend to increase. Countries can choose to raise defense budgets or lower the size of the military to reach the required level of per capita expenditure necessary for transformation.

Dr. Kenneth W. Estes, Senior Research Fellow, United States Marine Corps University (MCU)

Dr. Estes explored the impact of the new security environment on the global military order. He reviewed the impact of systemic changes such as major historical events and trends (both political and technological) that shape developments in the structure of society and of war. In particular, the speaker examined and compared three military revolutions and several periods of military transformation. Since the 1950s, technology has rapidly changed society and made it more complex, the emergence of non-traditional threats has given rise to a shift in perspectives and discourses on warfare and technology.

Discussion

The discussion that followed centered on two dominant themes, the nature of transformation and the role and impact of technology. In particular, participants discussed the differing perspectives about what transformation entails and how these elements will be acquired by militaries over time and at what pace. In addition, although there was consideration about how warfare will change, there was wide agreement that it may not change as much as expected. With regard to technology, there were questions about the adaptation of high technology and the prohibitive cost of transformation. Because military procurement is being redirected toward upgrades to meet current needs, some wondered if the gap between the US and its allies would continue to grow and if the US would be able to maintain the pace of transformation in the long term. Participants also noted that there's little evidence to support claims that technological advantages have a demoralizing effect on opponents, but technology might boost the motivation of the force with the advantage. However, all agreed that how technology will change human behavior in battlefield is most important.

Conclusion

Precision technology is not a strategic panacea. Combatant behavior will ultimately determine a military's technological needs. Changes in the world environment and opponent combat style is pushing the transformation of modern militaries to smaller, lighter, mobile, better structured organizations. Military transformations have historically been lead by technology, change in the international environment, and changes in military skill and advantage on the battlefield.

Information Operations: Between Feasibility and Desirability

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Elgin Brunner

Isabelle Abele-Wigert

Abstract

Information Operations are commonly defined as “those actions taken to affect an adversary’s information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems”, and thus include a broad array of actions, ranging from the protection of critical information infrastructures from hacker intrusion or outright military attack over so-called “perception management” and psychological warfare to computer network defense and attacks. Information Operations are widely recognized as constituting an overlap at the intersection between civil and military technology, and both the technological feasibility and the societal desirability of this concept remain highly controversial. Will future (information driven) warfare indeed be less lethal? What are the impacts of facilitated access to a dissemination of information and information related technologies of non-state actors for state actors? And, what are both the legal and ethical implications of these various developments?

This panel will feature a debate on these very issues with contributions from the different perspectives of technological primacy, legal considerations, military doctrine, and terrorism.

Summary

The first presentation dealt with Information Terrorism and focused on asymmetric threats in the Information Age. The point was made that it was necessary to broaden our perspective from Information Operations (IO) to also embrace terrorism – including ”functional” terrorism (means, methods, targets). Information operations and information warfare forms the intersection point of joint operations, intelligence, perceptions and information systems (infosec). Therefore the Swedish concept of information operations, that was presented, is defined as “joint and coordinated measures in peace, crises and war in support of political or military goals by affecting or using information and information systems owned by the opponents or other foreign parties.” One important feature is to affect the opponent’s process of decision-making. There are offensive as well as defensive information operations in the fields of political, economic and military relations, such as media manipulation, psychological warfare or intelligence operations. The core questions raised by the presentation were: Within how many years will acts of information terrorism be carried out and by whom? And which of the present terrorist organization would be first in line for executing such information attacks? Here the presentation suggested that it is vital for a society to be prepared.

The presentation also pointed out that one major problem will be how to trace back cyber-intrusions, as there are no borders in cyberspace and cyber-intrusions could be routed through several countries. And whose laws would apply in such a case?

The following expose dealt with a more technical view on information operations. It was stated that in Network Centric Warfare (NCW) information superiority was the crucial feature to be achieved. This could be done by collecting, processing and disseminating information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. For military operations in the information environment, the integrated employment of computer network operations, electronic warfare, operational security, psychological operations and military deception are necessary. One conclusion of the presentation was that information operations are an important contribution to the

range of military operations in the 21st century because the opponent loses trust in his own systems.

The next presentation dealt with Information Operations and Cyberwar and depicted the Swiss view on information operations. It was shown that cyberspace poses a new dimension of warfare, where competences and capabilities are needed to be able to succeed in any mission, be it on the ground, in the air or in the electromagnetic spectrum. As the interdependencies of critical infrastructures (such as government services, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, electrical energy, emergency services and so on) are one of the Achilles' Heel of our modern societies, the focus is not only on maintaining a high degree of assurance during military operations in crises or war, but assuring the capability of undisrupted decision making in national crisis management scenarios. For this reason, the usual, commercially available means of protection are not sufficient. In Swiss defense some planned capabilities include computer network defense including the establishment of a military computer emergency response team (CERT), technical analysis, information assurance to achieve an overarching concept of system security, authentication and authorization, and finally training. The presentation concluded by stating that anonymity makes cyberwar a very attractive option for both state actors and other organizations. In addition, strategic cyberwar is a realistic scenario and is used for intelligence collection already today. The use of cyberwar by terrorists is not yet "en vogue" but possible. Finally, cyberwar can only be won by filling the gap between the operational needs of decision makers and the specialists. This gap is still very profound.

The fourth and final presentation dealt with the legal and ethical challenges for states posed by information operations. The objective of the presentation was to develop a solution within legal and communicative boundaries which would comply with the interests of the state, the people, the society and the economy. It suggested delimiting truth from truthfulness on the one hand and manipulation and indoctrination from legitimate public interests on the other hand. The legal boundaries in a direct democracy such as Switzerland were identified in the presentation, such as international law, fundamental rights, the Swiss Federal Law and the Swiss Cantonal Law. Ethical boundaries are used as guidelines, however only legal boundaries are binding for governmental actions. Swiss communications practice is governed by the "Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist" and these duties and rights serve the implementation of the demand for truth and truthfulness. Truth is created through judgment and to inform truthfully is to inform without deceiving neither oneself nor anyone else. However, "truth" is a subjective term which does not exist in information and communication. The presentation then drew the conclusion that in order to find a solution for realizable and feasible information operations, the legal boundaries for the authorities have to be consolidated with the ethical principles of information and communication according to the principles of truthfulness.

During the question period, several points were raised. Someone from the audience was interested in the kind of attacks that might occur and all the panelists were asked to present their view on the intertwining of the military and the civilian domains fostered by the adoption of the broad array of potential information operations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the main points were reiterated and all the participants and the audience were thanked for their interest and participation. There was agreement that the information operations topic will continue to be an important area for discussion and action in future military and political planning.

Strategy and Doctrine II

Mapping a Framework for PSO: New Roles for Military and Civilian Partners

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Dr. Stefano Bruno

Speakers

Brig. Gen. Dr. Alois A. Hirschmugl

Mr. Heinrich Maurer

Mr. François Sénéchaud

Christian F. Anrig

Abstract

The necessity for tighter cooperation between civilian and military efforts and means in Peace Support Operations is generally agreed. The panel focuses on challenges for partners sharing the goal of preventing conflicts and stabilizing crisis areas, in order to enhance international peace and security. What challenges do they face regarding their respective structure, their legal framework and their procedures in the light of future challenges in the field of conflict prevention and management?

After an assessment of their respective capabilities and limitations, the panel focused on the following question: What are the consequences for the framework of Peace Support Operations?

Summary

Alois A. Hirschmugl, Brigadier General (Austria)

In the new security environment, inter-state conflicts have predominantly been supplanted by intra-state conflicts. Against this backdrop, military means alone are no longer sufficient to tackle present challenges. Instead, a multi-layered approach, combining military, diplomatic, civilian as well as non-governmental actors, is required for modern Peace Support Operations (PSO) / Crisis Response Operations. PSO include:

- Conflict Prevention or Preventive Diplomacy
- Peacekeeping
- Peace Enforcement
- Peacemaking
- (Post Conflict) Peacebuilding
- Humanitarian Operations

Due to the number and variety of actors involved, CIMIC (civil and military cooperation) has become a key to success in modern PSO. It is essential for the smooth running of complex operations and for the building of mutual trust.

A further shift in PSO has been the trend towards more robust operations. While "traditional"/smaller missions are still UN-led and conducted, missions which require robust mandates have been – though authorized by the UN – conducted by military alliances (e.g. NATO), international organizations (e.g. EU) or coalitions of the willing under lead/framework nations. Next

to more robust missions, the new environment also calls for more rapid response. Hence, emphasis upon highly trained rapid reaction forces as well as rapid legal procedures for rapid deployment has increased.

With regards to non-military crisis management, the following areas have considerably gained in importance:

- Police Forces
- Strengthening of Rule of Law
- Civil Administration
- Humanitarian Support

To conclude, a comprehensive approach has become necessary, which combines institution/state building, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Heinrich Maurer, Head of Multilateral Security Operations Section (Switzerland)

The surge of PSOs in the last few years is a clear sign that these operations have become a key instrument for international crisis management and conflict resolution. Modern PSOs as such differ significantly from peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era. Particularly, three developments have taken place: 1st an extension of size – the number of PSOs and of their personnel have increased sharply, 2nd an extension of tasks – PSOs have become more complex and ambitious, 3rd an extension of the use of force – PSOs have become more robust.

Today, actors in PSOs are confronted with different challenges, which require appropriate responses. Three challenges are to be mentioned:

- More complex and multidimensional tasks for PSOs
- More complex and more risky security environment for PSOs
- Stronger linkage between security and development tasks in PSOs

With regard to the first challenge, the UN system has established so-called integrated missions, where all relevant components of the UN system are brought under the authority of a single representative of the UN Secretary General. So far these missions have focused too much on structure and too little on strategies. The recently created UN Peacebuilding Commission reflects the integrated approach at the UN Headquarter level and is an institutional response to the fact that security, development and human rights are intrinsically linked.

With regard to the second challenge, a response is given through an increase of international police units who are able to contribute to public order. Additionally, Gendarmerie-type forces which are particularly well suited for tasks such as crowd control or combating organized crime are deployed in PSOs. Nevertheless, efficient police forces require a functioning judiciary system to improve the security situation. Therefore, Rule of Law programs have become an important element in today's PSOs.

With regard to the third challenge, new tools and instruments have been created. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been established in Afghanistan, which has become in the last years a test-bed for closer cooperation between development and security actors. Another innovative approach is the UK’s Conflict Prevention Pool, which brings together in a "whole-of-government-approach" staff and financial resources from three ministries (Foreign, Defense and Development).

François Sénéchaud, International Committee of the Red Cross (Switzerland)

Over the past decades, the ICRC has shared the same theaters of operation together with a number of multinational peace support forces. On these occasions, the ICRC has advocated for a clear distinction between its humanitarian actions on the one hand and political-military action on

the other, neither because the ICRC shies away from the military, nor because the ICRC claims that there are no circumstances when a military unit might be a last resort.

Preserving the comparative advantage conferred by its neutral and independent status is in the interest of the people affected by armed conflict and is not an intellectual or theoretical issue. ICRC's raison d'être is to protect and assist the victims of armed conflict or internal violence.

Armed forces operating in a PSO are usually trying to pacify a third country. They pursue the political objectives set by the authorities of their country of origin, the UN Security Council or other intergovernmental organizations. From the ICRC's point of view, peacemaking or peacebuilding are not, however, the primary aims of humanitarian action. Its primary aims are to save lives and alleviate human suffering.

Moreover, political and military actors should recognize that the ICRC's work not only involves assistance but also protection, and that the two are closely connected. For instance, visiting prisoners to monitor their treatment and conditions of detention also comes under the heading of humanitarian action.

ICRC delegates need to be present in the field, close to those who are affected by the conflict, to answer their needs and influence the behavior and attitudes of those who are often at the origin of those needs. To do so, they need to meet, negotiate or deal with the whole range of different arms carriers: from military to police, paramilitary to rebel, child soldier, private contractor to PSO forces.

The main risk we see for the ICRC's humanitarian action in our relations with PSO is its integration into a political and military strategy to defeat the enemy; in other words, the subordination of humanitarian activities to political goals, using aid as a tool for local or foreign policy. The danger is real if insurgents, or parts of the population, perceive the humanitarian agencies as instruments of a foreign agenda.

Discussion

The panelists agreed that increased and improved coordination of the different actors in modern PSOs would lead to better results. Despite the recent thrust towards increased cooperation and integration, however, there needs to be a carved out space for humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, as impartiality is a *conditio sine qua non* for their actions. Though the ICRC is involved in military planning, particularly for purposes of self-protection, it does not actively contribute to these operations or support any political goals.

In spite of increasing coordinated and integrated action, the panelists agreed that the success rate of PSOs needed to be improved. With regards to the use of military force, one panelist argued that the militaries deployed on modern PSOs should be capable of operating across the entire spectrum of military force.

A British senior officer from the audience remarked that current PSOs basically addressed symptoms. Instead, an approach should be sought to tackle the underlying causes of instability. So far, the efforts for integrated missions are not sufficient and only scratch the surface of the problems. For the moment, despite efforts towards a more coherent, integrated and comprehensive approach to PSOs, no country has the resources to attack the seeds of instability, which are, among others, organized crime, nonexistent rule of law and lack of integrity of good policy. So far, resources are still too limited and efforts too compartmentalized. In response to this comment, the three panelists agreed that – given the current circumstances – there was no alternative to the present approach in PSOs. Furthermore, they were optimistic that, despite major shortfalls, European states were pursuing the right track.

Conclusion

Coordination, cooperation and integration of the various military and civilian partners in modern PSOs have become keys to success. Only cooperation and integration can help to make up for scarcity of resources and build mutual understanding. Next to the military and development agencies, Gendarmerie-type forces as well as deployable ROL (rule of law) experts are considered to be essential for reconstructing civil war-torn societies. Integration, however, excludes

humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, as impartiality is an essential precondition for their activities.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Emily Munro

Abstract

This panel will address the recently established United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office. Through presentations by an official from New York (United Nations headquarters), member states and expert analysts the panel members will explore the content of the Commission's developing work program and the complexities involved in harnessing the resources and know-how of the UN in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. In particular, this panel will look at the importance for International Geneva of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, including how this new institutional framework will liaise with important actors (UN and external) in the peacebuilding field in Geneva.

Summary

This panel was held in the context of the ongoing project led by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy on the Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva. The project seeks to raise the profile of the peacebuilding resources based in Geneva and leverage them for the developing activities of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Support Office (PBSO). A number of activities have taken place to bring together organizations in Geneva active on peacebuilding issues within the UN family and outside, including civil society actors and the research community, especially those with a strong field presence. The Quaker United Nations Office and the Graduate Institute of International Studies have been key partners in this project. Just prior to this panel on 25 October 2006, a large Expert Meeting was held in Geneva, the results of which were presented here.

The panel explored the progress made thus far in 2006 in the short time this new body has been established and looked ahead at the challenges and opportunities it will face. Panelists included representatives from the United Nations in Geneva, the research community and a country stakeholder in the PBC.

The first presentation focused on the impact and challenges for the PBC's work in one of the two first cases – Sierra Leone. It was noted that Sierra Leone decided to enter into partnership with the PBC of its own volition and following a dialogue. The country's experience with peacebuilding after the peace agreement points to the need for an institution such as the PBC to manage this delicate period in a more coordinated fashion from an international institutions perspective. It was stressed that the capacity for the PBC to be effective depended on the ability for the Peacebuilding Fund to dispense funding quickly and efficiently. Furthermore, it is important that the case countries identify the areas of concern for the PBC to work on as the setting of priorities is essential to target the funding.

The focus of the panel then moved in the two subsequent presentations to the role that International Geneva could play in supporting the PBC.

The discussions held at the Expert Meeting of 25 October (Geneva), held in the context of the GCSP project on the PBC and International Geneva, were summarized. This meeting brought together the Core Group of this project which was formed to guide the project and includes members of the United Nations, other international organizations and civil society and research community – a type of enlarged Core Group constituted the participants of the meeting on the 25th. The meeting served for the first time to bring together a critical mass of representatives of organizations active in the area of peacebuilding in Geneva and those ready to cooperate to build

a common platform for a substantive contribution to the PBC. International Geneva is well placed to make contributions in a number of areas, such as: security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; human rights and health. Key points discussed during this meeting included, among others: noting that the PBSO requires external analytical input which expertise based in Geneva could provide in certain areas; the importance of flexible working procedures of the PBC; and, the need for a broad mapping exercise (already begun by the Quaker United Nations Office on civil society) to fully identify the organizations working on peacebuilding in Geneva.

It was announced that the United Nations Office at Geneva would launch a project based in Geneva on peacebuilding. It will build on the work of the GCSP project and involve a wide array of partners both from Geneva and beyond, creating valuable synergies. Geneva is a unique place in terms of its resources on peacebuilding and the collective knowledge could add value to PBC if properly channeled. Activities will begin in the winter of 2007 with a symposium and continue throughout the year with high-level workshops to be held in different locations with a variety of partners. The substantive focus will be dynamic, along cross institutional and thematic lines. In this sense the outcome of each event will take into account the subsequent events – a type of forum for ongoing dialogue. It will take a coordinated and holistic view of peacebuilding and not a sectoral approach. Civil society will be invited to take part in all of the events.

The last presentation looked ahead to the prospects for the PBC and emphasized the need to look at the Commission within the broader context of UN reform, which consequently raises expectations. The presenter identified some key challenges and constraints: (1) best practices in peacebuilding do not exist and a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate, (2) governance of the peacebuilding process; the actors involved (at what stage and who), accountability of the international organizations and local buy-in are all crucial and (3) the importance of a long-term and substantial funding commitment. It was generally noted that the atmosphere at the first meetings of the PBC was very good and pragmatism permeated the discussions – this, along with the superb leadership and already high-quality (albeit low number) of the staff of the PBSO, provide reasons for an optimistic outlook.

A discussion period followed the panelists' presentations. Comments and questions were raised on the role of regional organizations in peacebuilding and the importance of the regional environment, the potentially constructive role the research and academic community in Geneva could play and the possible lessons learned from the creation of the Human Rights Council which could be useful for the PBC. It was noted that for this process to be different a certain consensus on best practices, taking into account the complexity of different conflicts, would need to be established to move beyond meetings to the operational level.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this panel served to look back at the progress made thus far following the fairly recent establishment of the PBC and PBSO, to look ahead at the opportunities and challenges for this body and to place all of this in the context of the unique place and potential role for Geneva-based actors to constructively contribute to the entire process. Generally, the sentiment expressed was one of optimism. The Peacebuilding Fund was seen as being critical to the success of this venture, with the potential for harnessing the disparate elements of funding for peacebuilding into one entity. Switzerland, although not a member of the PBC, can contribute by supporting Geneva's capacities in peacebuilding and by focusing on its bilateral programs abroad in priority countries in specific areas.

Human Trafficking: Cause or Consequence?

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in cooperation with the Global Coalition "Women Defending Peace"

Karin Grimm

Abstract

Human trafficking is a global scourge of enormous proportions. It violates human rights. In an era of globalization and increasing interdependence, no region or country is spared. Due to their precarious situation, whether lack of opportunities, injustice and discrimination, women and children have become primary targets – often tricked and forced into the illegal sex trade, but also forced labor. Human trafficking is both a cause and a consequence of women and children's insecurity. Trafficking undermines migration policies, feeds corruption and money laundering, and is closely tied to other forms of organized crime. Routes used are volatile and networks fluid, making the identification of victims and perpetrators difficult. Dismantling these sophisticated networks is a serious challenge to both the security sector and law-enforcement agencies.

The panel examined new approaches in fighting human trafficking through increased coordination between the various actors involved in political, non-governmental and private business sector initiatives to better face the challenges of anti-trafficking strategies.

Summary

The panel, moderated by Lyse Doucet, a BBC World News correspondent and presenter, was composed of representatives of a non-governmental organization (NGO), a government agency as well as of the private business sector to discuss the issue of trafficking in human beings from various perspectives.

The introductory remarks by *Anja Ebnöther, DCAF*, to the panel highlighted that human trafficking was more than a security problem in terms of organized crime. Rather, it should be dealt with as a human security issue – the challenges including human rights violations, health risks, demographic decline or forced labor. The human security concept allows for comprehensive approaches in combating human trafficking. No single institution may succeed in the eradication of human trafficking and cooperation among various actors is needed. Centers like DCAF might build bridges between the security community, governments, the private sector, NGOs and the victims.

The second introductory statement by *Dr. Aleya Hammad, WDP*, suggested that in the efforts to put an end to the terrible business of human trafficking it was important not only to focus on the "3 P's" – Prevention, Prosecution and Protection – but also on the 4th "P", which is the Private Sector. The involvement of the private sector was seen as essential as it possesses the resources, techniques and capabilities to fight human trafficking. Instead of focusing on the doom and gloom of human trafficking, the opening keynote speech of the ISF highlighted the fact that speaking constantly of overwhelming threats does not contribute to a solution but rather to resignation, passivity and apathy. Therefore, the appeal was made that in order to shape the future one must believe in it and focus on ways in which a positive future can be created. The Ethical Principles, established by the business community in Athens in January 2006, were given as an example of such an option.

Dr. Monika Hauser, Medica Mondiale, stressed that there has been a lot of discussion on human trafficking but little has changed for the people concerned. Three significant groups involved in human trafficking were briefly looked at. The first group mentioned was the traffickers who operate on local, national and international levels. It was suggested that there was a continuum of exploitation and abuse of women and girls in post-conflict societies as many of the traffickers had

already been involved in abusing women and girls during the conflict. The second group is the clients in e.g. the Western World, who simply ignore the fact that these women and girls have been trafficked. She also pointed out that in post-war and transitional societies, the clients were predominantly international soldiers and staff. The third group is the victims, mostly women and girls, who were trafficked by force, coercion or deceit. The second part of the presentation looked at the root causes of human trafficking. The main factors causing women and girls' vulnerability to human trafficking include economic poverty and a lack of social perspectives. In post-war and transitional societies this vulnerability is increased by fewer alternatives available and decreased social protection. Other significant factors fueling global trafficking of women and girls are international demand, gender hierarchies and patriarchal attitudes. The statement concluded on the effective approaches to fighting human trafficking. The point was made that fighting against human trafficking in the areas of prosecution and prevention was not sufficient as it should take place on more levels simultaneously. It was suggested that poverty alleviation programs accompany awareness raising campaigns, that programs should also work on changing gender stereotypes and that Zero Tolerance Policies be implemented more vigorously.

Naguib Sawiris, CEO Orascom, described the problem of human trafficking from the perspective of the business community. He highlighted the fact that human trafficking was not only an abuse of human dignity but also caused damaged to the licit business environment. Human trafficking is considered a low-risk, high-profit enterprise which never pays taxes and therefore is part of a “shadow economy” of a country. However, awareness about this issue is still very low within the business community as well as in the general public. The business community can contribute to the fight against human trafficking by raising the knowledge about trafficking and supporting victims. The establishment and maintenance of a free phone help line was presented as an example of such recognized corporate social responsibility by a multinational telecommunication company, the financing of short advocacy and awareness raising video-messages in airplanes and TV channels are other examples. The usefulness of codes of conduct for the private business sector such as the Athens Ethical Principles was also underlined.

Stephan Libiszewski, Swiss Federal Office of Police, focused on the situation in Switzerland, which is a destination country for human trafficking. This criminal activity is very hard to disclose because it involves interpersonal action which is difficult to prove (in comparison to trafficking in drugs or arms, for example). The responsibility of the state to prosecute the perpetrators and to protect the victims was explained along three principles, which are pointed out as being key to the combating trafficking in human beings: no prosecution without victim protection; no efficient combat of human trafficking without institutionalized inter-agency cooperation; and non-governmental organizations are an important partner of law enforcement. The speaker stressed that there could be no successful fight against human trafficking without inter-agency cooperation and partnership with the civil society. In Switzerland, statistics clearly show higher success rates in the prosecution of trafficking in human beings in the cantons where such formalized cooperation mechanisms between law enforcement, victim protection and the immigration service have been established. A coordination unit can build bridges between law enforcement agencies, which are mainly interested in the prosecution of the perpetrators, and non-governmental organizations, which are primarily concerned with victim protection.

During the question period, several issues were tackled. With regard to victim protection and regulations in Switzerland, it was emphasized that victims needed protection and support, especially as they often found themselves in illegal situations. A 30-day reflection period for victims to stabilize and decide whether they want to witness in trials against traffickers is one such tool. Another question concerned the problem of illegal labor and the response of the business community to this. It was pointed out that poverty alleviation was the most important element in the fight against human trafficking. The business sector's contribution could be to invest in the so-called regions of origin creating perspectives for young girls and women. As to the question of who are the traffickers, no simple answer could be given. The majority of traffickers are men, although the number of female perpetrators is higher than generally expected. Traffickers may have links with organized crime, but not necessarily. Often, government agents are also involved. In response

to the question of why the implementation of a “Zero-Tolerance Policy” does not work, the problem of governmental denial at all levels was mentioned as well as the fact that member countries were free in the implementation of the policy, which leads to significant discrepancies.

Conclusion

As reflected in the composition of the panel speakers, the problem of trafficking in human beings requires coordinated multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches. Cooperation between the security sector and civil society actors is therefore crucial. However, such efforts are not effective unless the root causes such as poverty, discrimination, domestic violence and gender inequality are equally addressed.

European Security: Trends and Dynamics

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Chaired by Graeme P. Herd

Speakers

Dr. Thierry Tardy

Dr. Julian Lindley-French

Dr. Graeme P. Herd

Graeme P. Herd

Abstract

The panel examined aspects of the dramatic changes in European security and trans-Atlantic relations since the end of the Cold War. *Dr. Julian Lindley-French* focused on the role of NATO in the contemporary world, in particular the direction and speed with which it is evolving into a global security actor and the implications of this for trans-Atlantic relations and European security. *Dr. Thierry Tardy* examined developments in EU institutional partnerships, including NATO, the UN and the African Union (AU), in the field of peace operations. He explored the "cooperation versus competition" issue, comparative advantages of respective institutions, and options for a division of labor in peace operations. *Dr. Graeme Herd* examined the nature of contemporary trans-Atlantic strategic dissonance. He identified its causes and likely durability and explored its implications for security governance regionally and globally.

Summary

The first paper focused on ESDP evolution. Seven years after the launching of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union (EU) is increasingly perceived as a security actor on the global stage. It has conducted 15 ESDP operations since 2003, and is now seen as an option for crisis management operations by its member states. Furthermore, the EU has elaborated a relatively comprehensive conceptual framework underlying its security agenda (European Security Strategy, Africa Strategy, SSR concepts, etc.) that is not less precise than that of many states.

The second paper examined NATO and its ability to go global, to become the cornerstone that anchors a club of democracies able to rise to the challenges of the 21st century. This move from collective defense to a limited and then global collective security role presupposes that NATO is able to match resources with necessary capabilities to project power effectively. Furthermore, it suggests that NATO needs to attain a more unified strategic culture that supports this global role.

The third paper looked at trans-Atlantic strategic dissonance and argued that the Iraq crisis demonstrated that strategic dissonance – agreement over threats but not their priority or the instruments need to address them – now prevails in Euro-Atlantic space and will do so for the foreseeable future. The reasons for the longevity of strategic dissonance lies in the fact that it reflects the material (military and economic) differences and disparities in the values, identities and interests of the five Europes (non-aligned Europe, core, new, Atlantic, periphery) and the US.

Discussion

The discussion noted that the EU could be seen as playing a role in international affairs that could not be totally associated with its member states policies. The EU still suffers important lacunas, in resources for example, and is difficult to situate in existing typologies of actors; it is however a normative and civilian actor in crisis management that is on its way to becoming a military actor as well. It also recognized that part of the function of going global is to provide support for security sector reform among the militaries and security forces of partners – essentially an extension of the democratic norms and values proliferation which takes place in PfP states; however, part also is to intervene where vital NATO member state interests are threatened. It also recognized that strategic dissonance may not be constructive and there was some discussion over whether strategic realignment might now be possible.

Conclusion

Integral to the West having a voice and role in managing global security concerns is the extent to which the EU and NATO can find roles that are effective. Dissonance within and between these organizations, within Europe and between Europe and the US complicates this effort.

State Failure and State Building

Promises and Pitfalls of Mediation between State and Armed Non-State Actors

Hosted by the Mediation Support Project of the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and swisspeace

Chaired by Simon Mason

Speakers

Ambassador Thomas Greminger

Chris Coleman

Dr. Julian Hottinger

Prof. Mari Fitzduff

Judith Niederberger von Wyl

Abstract

The UN blue ribbon report recommends that the UN make greater efforts in the area of preventing internal violence "…through the appointment of skilled, experienced and regionally knowledgeable envoys, mediators and special representatives, who can make as important a contribution to conflict prevention as they do to conflict resolution." This raises the following questions: What are the potentials and limitations of mediation between state and armed non-state groups? What are the policies regarding such mediation/facilitation engagements from a state or IGO perspective? How can one constructively deal with asymmetry of power and "legitimacy" between these actors in third-party-assisted negotiations? What role does civil society play, how can it participate? What are the preconditions for talks to be successful?

Summary

Types of third-party intervention

The first part of the discussion revolved around potentials and limitations of third-party engagement in a conflict between state and armed non-state actors (ANSA). It was argued that mediation or facilitation is an indispensable tool of conflict resolution, particularly in protracted conflicts. However, third-party engagement with ANSA is dependent on state party approval. Third-party governments therefore distinguish between three types of engagement: 1) direct: when the state actor approves of a third-party engagement, direct contact with the conflict parties is established; 2) semi-direct: when there is only tacit approval for third-party engagement, contact will have to be maintained through proxies (NGOs, private people); 3) indirect: when the state actor formally and explicitly prohibits third-party engagement, no contact is possible. In certain situations, NGOs involved in the peace process may be supported.

Problems linked to armed non-state actors (ANSA)

As party to the conflict, ANSA needs to be part of any facilitated approach. This stance is compounded by three problems. Firstly, key exponents of a non-state group may make amnesty a prerequisite for talks, yet if they have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) this cannot be granted. It was argued that in the interest of ending hostilities as fast as possible and in order to prevent further human rights violations, a third-party engagement might be considered all the same – yet within the framework set by the ICC. At the same time, clear bottom lines have to

be defined and permanent contact with the ICC needs to be established. It was added that ICC indictments were not necessarily stumbling blocks to a peace agreement. The challenge faced by the mediators is how to integrate existing indictments into the peace process and uphold the principles of reconciliation, accountability and justice. In this context, it was also pointed out that mediators must consider the odds, and that the ICC was beneficial for mediation as it clarified the framework within which the process could take place. Central to the "peace-justice" question is the sequencing of when which measure has priority. In the interest of preventing further bloodshed it is at times advisable not to insist on punishment and justice, so as to deal with those ANSA that can influence the process. Whereas in other situations it is better to set priority on justice, in particular when it is apparent that a quick fix might not endure. Sequencing and timing is the key.

A second problem surrounding ANSA is the fact that some of them have been listed as terrorist groups. It was argued that this practice rendered the peace process more difficult as it prevented ANSA representatives from traveling to peace talks. In addition, it not only strengthens the state party through increasing its legitimacy but also leads that party to behave more aggressively. It was added that governments could not be associated with an organization that was declared an illegal terrorist group and they take a considerable risk when agreeing to talks all the same. If talks take place, they are therefore kept strictly informal, use proxies and/or involve no high-ranking government officials.

A third problem that needs to be addressed is the fact that ANSA are often not as well prepared for peace negotiations as state actors. Mediation and facilitation can only work, however, if all parties are treated equally and are given the same opportunities. To bridge the capability gap between state and non-state actors, ANSA need to be provided with expertise. In this context it was viewed as vital that third parties providing expertise maintain all-partisanship, full transparency and permanent contact with the main facilitator of peace talks. Various uncoordinated third-party efforts can derail a process.

Means of bringing parties to the negotiation table

Another topic discussed was third-party exertion of pressure and capacity to contact ANSA, in particular during the pre-negotiation phase. It was argued that interplay of pressure and dialogue was needed in order to get conflict parties to the negotiation table. In this context, pressure does not necessarily mean imposing sanctions but offering incentives and exerting positive influence. Such positive influence can best be applied by neighboring states, or states and NGOs with long-standing relationships with the conflict parties.

A relationship of trust between conflict parties and the mediation team can serve as another source of positive influence. It was emphasized that the process of confidence-building starts very early, often years before peace talks are even on the agenda. Many ANSA have been fighting for decades, leading a life in nearly total isolation. As a result, they often sink into their own logic, create their own reality, and continue to perceive state and society as they were decades ago. In order to convince ANSA to come to the negotiation table, a third party will therefore need to invest a considerable amount of time to learn their logic and win their trust. In addition, the third party will have to help the ANSA to overcome their fears, as ANSA are well aware that they know far better how to fight than how to talk. It was added that it might help at this stage to bring in expertise from other peace processes, for instance by getting Sinn Fein in contact with the ANC or the LTTE with Sinn Fein.

In the context of helping ANSA overcome their reluctance to stop fighting, reference was also made to NGOs that train selected members of armed groups in politics, thus giving them the capacity to attain their goals through peaceful means. Another such program focuses on introducing paramilitaries to a different way of life as a means of facilitating their integration into society, family and community.

Training and competences of mediators

Questions from the audience focused primarily on training and competencies of mediators. Panelists agreed that mediation methods and techniques could be trained, yet they pointed out that factors such as personality and experience were much more pertinent. In addition, a mediation team is often led by a charismatic figure with high standing among the conflict parties but no formal training in mediation. However, people in the mediation team are often trained, and training is essential for the support team, which needs to provide the mediators with expertise in areas as diverse as process management, constitutionalism, allocation of tax money or DDR-SSR.

Conclusion

Mediation or facilitation by third parties is an indispensable tool of conflict resolution. As a party to conflict, ANSA need to be included into this process. This requires that third parties not only invest time and patience, but also resolve problems such as dealing with ANSA listed as terrorist groups.

The Aftermath of the Colored Revolutions: Prospects for Democracy in Eurasia

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Jeronim Perović

Oliver Möhl

Abstract

Prospects for democracy in post-Soviet Eurasia remain bleak. What initially began as a transition from communism to democracy had soon become a transition to autocracy. Recent years saw new and hopeful democratizing trends with peaceful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Even in Central Asia, the bastion of post-Soviet authoritarianism, the so-called "*tulip*" revolution in Kyrgyzstan in spring 2005 indicates that change is possible. Other countries, including Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, have managed to resist these trends so far.

The bloody suppression of anti-government demonstration in Uzbekistan has given a sense of the potential of violence to be expected in the future. What are the key obstacles to establishing democracy in post-Soviet countries? Is change likely to be violent or peaceful? What are policy options for the West?

Summary

Prof. Timothy Colton, Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University: Russia: Putin's "Managed Democracy" and the End of Revolution

Over the last three years, the expression "managed democracy" has become popular to describe state governance in post-Soviet Russia. It accurately determines Moscow's transitional position half-way between democracy and authoritarianism.

However, a new concept has lately been suggested by Vladislav Surkov, an influential presidential assistant. For the Kremlin's chief ideologist, the term "sovereign democracy" determines the Russian way of governance under the condition of economic globalization. It stands for a properly integrated state controlling all key strategic business sectors.

This model of stability does not only illustrate the mentality of consolidated small elite around Putin. It ultimately appeals to the Russian society longing for order and recovery after chaotic years under Yeltsin. In light of these circumstances, the future perspectives beyond the presidential elections in 2008 are vague.

Dr. Andrew Wilson, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution

Ukraine's prospects for democracy remain ambivalent. On the one hand, mass media enjoys freedom and is marked by strong pluralism. Despite still existing fixed ownership and clan structures, a remarkable new media culture has emerged.

On the other hand, real democracy cannot be achieved as long as virtual politics continue to shape the country's destiny. Faked political parties, information wars, poor deployment of administrative resources and rent-seeking oligarchs constrain democratic developments.

Dr. Alisher Ilkhamov, School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London: Uzbekistan: Prospects for Democratic Change

The speaker considers the expression "neo-patrimonial state" as useful to describe Uzbekistan's regime. Patron-client relationships are coupled with modern forms of government. The rule of law prevails only as far as it does not endanger the interests of the state leader and his relationships.

Two categories of patrimonial rule may be distinguished. The soft form (exp. Kyrgyzstan and Russia) contains some democratic elements, but the regime type is basically authoritarian. The hard form (exp. Uzbekistan) leaves no space for societal or individual self-determination. A rigorous patrimonial regime consists of the state leader, his family and trusted clan members. Under these circumstances, the initiation of democratization processes is difficult, but not impossible.

Mr. Richard Giragosian, Independent Analyst: The State of Democracy in the South Caucasus

In the Southern Caucasus, the "revolutions of fruits and flowers" contrast with less successful agitations. The accomplished revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and partly Moldova showed that three conditions have to be met for a successful regime change: trends (misrule, corruption, illegitimacy), tools (foreign support, viable opposition) and triggers (false elections, reaction of voters).

This model may explain the failure of revolutions in other states in the region. Whereas both Armenia and Azerbaijan lack a strong opposition, Russia has so far effectively counteracted revolutionary activities by streamlining the media sector, restricting foreign NGOs and organizing youth movements.

Prospects for democracy in the Southern Caucasus remain bleak. However, Western democratization efforts are required and should take into account the following two points: First, political stability is by and large dependent on the local economic situation. Therefore, the role of business may not be neglected. Second, institutions matter more than individuals. Thus, Western actors should stop to support single persons.

Discussion

The discussion focused mainly on two subjects. With regard to Ukraine, it was stated that the country was completely divided. Given the contradictoriness between the Russian and the Western perspective, the question was raised about Moscow's current impact. According to Dr. A. Wilson, particularly the Russian special services have become more careful after the rude intervention on the occasion of the presidential elections in 2004.

The second major point of discussion concerned the role of NATO within Central Asia and the Caucasus. Mr. R. Giragosian stressed the importance of an enhanced NATO engagement in the region. According to him, the PfP program was highly needed and successful so far, whereas unilateral US presence rather caused additional problems.

Conclusion

This panel about prospects for democracy in Eurasia exhibited first and foremost two facts. First, it is delicate to compare democratic movements, their success or failure on a cross-national basis. As political, economic and societal spheres significantly vary between Eurasian countries, the premises for democratic developments differ. Second, both democratic and authoritarian forces and trends may simultaneously be identified in almost all Eurasian states. Given these often contradictory circumstances, it is difficult to outline any future perspectives.

Even if prospects for democracy in Eurasia remain bleak, the Western state community may play an important supportive role by strengthening local socio-economic institutions. These multilateral activities should – wherever applicable – be coordinated with Russia.

Fostering Human Security after Conflicts: Lessons from the Fight against Landmines and Small Arms and Light Weapons

Hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), in cooperation with the Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva (HEI)

Suzanne Damman

Abstract

It is generally accepted that the Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) communities have been relatively slow to learn from each other. There have been few obvious attempts – particularly at the multilateral and strategic levels – to identify, much less bridge, the respective approaches of Mine Action and SALW. In order to promote norm development and focused interventions, proponents of both causes have focused on their own areas since the early 1990s.

A recently published GICHD study "*Identifying Synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons*" has shown that Mine Action and SALW have the potential to share a range of objectives, strategies and practices. For example, both Mine Action and SALW draw from normative guidelines established by the international community. At the operational level, Mine Action and SALW practitioners have broadened their optic from an exclusive concern of dealing with hardware – whether anti-personnel mines, small arms and light weapons, unexploded ordnance or weapon and ammunition stockpiles – to an emphasis on impact reduction, positive transformations in real and perceived security, enhanced development opportunities and community-centered strategies. A cooperative approach to learning, sharing experiences and joined-up programming is in the mutual interest of both communities, and is already happening at the operational level in some cases.

Summary

The panel focused on identifying synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons management. So far, there had been few successful attempts to find similarities between the two communities. The panel showed, however, that Mine Action and SALW do share a range of objectives, strategies and practices. The panel also introduced a recently published GICHD study "*Identifying Synergies in Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons*" to the audience. The study formed the background material for the panel. During the introduction it was briefly explained how the study came about and what each of the panelists would cover.

The first presentation looked at synergies between Mine Action and SALW from the Mine Action perspective. This panelist described the Mine Action sector first. Mine Action deals with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and is based on five separate pillars: landmine and ERW clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy. Mine Action can be part of emergency and humanitarian operations in or after conflicts, reconstruction efforts, peacebuilding efforts and/or peacekeeping operations, confidence building measures and development agendas. After studying the synergies between Mine Action and SALW it was found that there has been little collaboration so far, and what there had been, was mostly opportunistic and *ad hoc*. It was found that SALW management was less standardized than Mine Action and that there were few donor incentives to encourage partnership. However, in some cases there has been meaningful collaboration such as in the case of stockpile destruction. Other potential synergies could for example be found in the developmental approach, impact of the weapons, victim assistance, management and harmonizing legislation.

The second exposé looked at synergies between Mine Action and SALW from the SALW perspective. This presentation dealt with the scope and nature of SALW, before looking at

synergies between the two fields. According to the panelist, the problem of managing SALW was about 10 times greater than the landmine problem, even though it had about one-tenth of the resources available for Mine Action. The attention for landmines has been unique and Mine Action is a very concrete field whereas the management of SALW is much less controllable. Furthermore, the management of SALW is not one problem, and the issues relating to SALW differ greatly over the various parts of the world, which makes the problem very difficult to address. The SALW community has also missed out on ideas from the Mine Action community because of the different time scales of maturity of the sectors. It is difficult to find synergies between the two communities in practice, but it is a first step and there is potential for synergies in: data collection and developing common indicators, stockpile and ammunition destruction, awareness and sensitization campaigns and victim assistance.

The third panelist had experience dealing with both landmines and SALW and could therefore look for overlap between the two communities. During the session a country specific analysis of Cambodia was given to illustrate the more general remarks from the first two panelists. The panelist emphasized that every situation was different and should therefore be looked at case by case. Cambodia is a country that has taken major initiatives with regard to both Mine Action and SALW. However, there was little evidence of deliberate attempts to realize possible joint approaches to dealing with landmines / ERW and SALW. The few joint approaches were the result of practical arrangements on the ground, largely in the area of stockpile destruction. Joint approaches were often limited by vision, organization and funding choices. Possible synergies could be found in: clearance, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, victim assistance, linking to development, security sector reform and good governance and community-based programming. Another important indicator for potential synergies is that donor assistance could influence actors to pursue such synergies.

During the question and answer period, several important points were raised. One of the remarks stated that the European Parliament passed new laws on arms control issues every year, to show that within the EU progress in this field could be made. The panel agreed that Brussels was the main driving force behind some of the progress made. One of the issues raised afterwards was that for many countries Mine Action was now linked to development and that it was important for donors to start treating arms control as a development issue instead of a purely military issue. Another point stated that illicit trafficking of SALW should also be addressed. It was also remarked that since the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the initial driving force behind the global effort to ban antipersonnel landmines, it would have been very useful to have an ICRC perspective on the panel. The panel stated that it would certainly take this advice into account in the future.

Conclusion

The main conclusion from the panel was that although there are not many synergies between the Mine Action and the SALW community at the moment, both communities have the potential to share a range of objectives, strategies and practices in the future. Another important point raised was that there is no immediate efficiency gain from simply saying there are synergies between the two communities; instead, a proactive approach about where the links are should be taken on board. Finally, the influence of donors should not be underestimated. They are indicators of change as well as a possible positive influence on the formation of synergies between the Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons communities.

The Challenges of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Security, Welfare and Representation

Hosted by the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI)

Oliver Jütersonke

Abstract

Following on from the insights presented in a special section of the journal *Security Dialogue* (Volume 36:4, Winter 2005), this panel continues the discussion of how best to perceive the often conflicting notions and aims of peace, security and development in post-conflict environments. With the advent of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, understanding the requirements of a comprehensive approach to what is in effect a "state"-building agenda seems all the more urgent, both conceptually and practically.

Summary

The central message of the special section of *Security Dialogue* 36:4 is that the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding (PCPB) can best be captured along the three broad themes of security, welfare and representation. Dr. Rolf Schwarz began his presentation by outlining such a functional understanding of the state, stressing that a comprehensive approach to PCPB requires policy-making to incorporate all three elements, as often a strategy drawn up in one issue area may have serious consequences and repercussions in another. Schwarz pointed out that peacebuilding was effectively state building, and that the central question of peace support operations was not only about when to intervene, but also about what kind of state to rebuild. Conceptually, what is thus needed is a functional understanding of state failure, rather than an institutional understanding of state collapse. Such an understanding of the state measures statehood against the fulfillment of core functions of the modern state, including the provision of internal and external security, welfare and wealth, and a certain level of representation. Armed with such a toolbox that critically examines blueprint social-engineering policies, is context-specific and highlights local ownership, it might begin to be possible to assess the adequacy of international responses to state failure and state building in post-conflict scenarios.

Mr. Achim Wennmann then went on to discuss the economic dimensions of PCPB, focusing on the sustainability of peacebuilding activities, the issue of peace dividends, welfare entitlements and the financing of conflict recurrence. In a post-conflict setting, parallel economies are a legacy of conflict economies and affect PCPB by providing a space for illicit and illegal economic activities parallel to the state or transitional administrations. Such activities do not only weaken the welfare functions of the state, including taxation systems and redistributive mechanisms, but can also be an important element in sustaining welfare in post-conflict situations, when the state is so dysfunctional that its citizens must rely on the parallel economy to survive. If the international community is not sensitive to the actors and factors contributing to parallel economies, conflict financing and the recurrence of conflict, the agenda of peace spoilers may prevail, with the money invested into PCPB most likely lost. The challenge for policy, Wennmann concludes, is thus to find the right balance between cooptation and confrontation in such a way that the parallel economy is effectively dealt with while not undermining the security and welfare of the individual.

In the third and final presentation, Dr. Rama Mani reiterated the importance of rebuilding a state's representation function in the aftermath of violent conflict, calling for the need to construct an inclusive political and civic community. Success or failure of PCPB will ultimately depend on local ownership, and on finding the balance between engaging the "right" locals and avoiding the presence of too many "externals." For the UN, reconciliation has generally meant national

reconciliation, and this, Mani argued, might run counter to societal or individual reconciliation, especially with the prevailing "security first" attitude of many peace support operations. Moreover, the reconciliation agenda has been pursued through some measure of transitional justice that is expected to yield the by-product of reconciliation between people and communities in addition to delivering some measure of justice. In practice, however, this is often not the case, as it excludes those who do not fall into the directly identified groups of "victims" and "perpetrators." Mani thus advocates a form of "reparative" justice that encompasses both the legal and psychological harm suffered during conflict by essentially constituting a "survivors' justice," rather than a "victors'" or "victims'" justice.

During the discussion, attention was directed towards the role played by non-state actors in the peacebuilding process, who often fulfill functions traditionally attributed to the state: Hizbollah (welfare, reconstruction), tribal groups in Somalia and Afghanistan (security, justice), or militias or private military companies in Iraq, for instance. The functional understanding of statehood nevertheless remains a useful heuristic tool to analyze PCPB, as it allows the focus to rest on what public goods are provided, and by whom (state agents or non-state actors). This is also the case in situations of trusteeships or international protectorates, which raise the question of the distribution of sovereign prerogatives in world politics.

The discussion then turned to the issue of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Mani pointed out that the challenge would be to find a balance between trusteeship and local ownership, and to find the basis for broader inclusion already from the mediation stage. It is important for the Commission to recognize that there are no blue-print solutions for each case, but that there nonetheless are certain essential elements that do reoccur in every scenario. The focus should thus be on lessons learned, and on a degree of self-reflection in all action undertaken.

Conclusion

Prof. Keith Krause thanked the panelists and audience for their active participation, reiterating the need to continue thinking conceptually about the issue of peacebuilding and the need for comprehensive strategies. Copies of the issue of *Security Dialogue* were handed out to interested participants.

The Privatization of Security

Revisiting the Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Fairlie Jensen

Abstract

The monopoly of violence and the provision of security and public order are widely considered cornerstones of modern (Westphalian) state legitimacy. It is echoed by Max Weber's definition of the state as an organization that has the legal monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. In the course of modern state building in Europe and beyond, the exercise of legitimate violence became the sole preserve of the state, even if there were significant and widespread derogations from this principle. Since the end of the Cold War, however, we seem to be witnessing a rapid and substantive weakening of the state's monopoly on legitimate force for a variety of reasons, including the privatization and internationalization of violence. This panel discussed two key manifestations of this trend – private sector and armed non-state actors' activity in the realm of security – and explored the possibilities and constraints of reconstructing the public monopoly of legitimate force.

Summary

This panel began by clarifying the relationship between the state and its monopoly on the use of force, noting that security requires the control of the use of force and the means of violence. The state-based international system has traditionally legitimized the state's monopoly in this area. However, today important caveats indicate the need to revisit our concept of the state's monopoly of force both in terms of the nature of the state's legitimacy and the actors who have a stake in it. It remains to be established whether a state's legitimacy is an inherent quality or the product of certain kind of state (for example democratic); equally the government-governance dynamic shows to what extent security is no longer solely in the hands of the state but influenced by processes of privatization both from above as from below. Both of these themes were further elaborated in the presentations beginning with considerations of the nature of privatization from above.

Privatization of the security sector presents a fundamental challenge to the state's monopoly of force but it is by no means a new phenomenon, the first steps in this direction having been taken during the Cold War era. It is also a process that is largely the result of state dynamics, as strong state militaries outsource services and weak states issue invitations to private military and security companies (PMCs and PSCs) to help them assure basic security functions. In the context of demanding international operations, the same market forces are at work driving the demand and supply for privatized security services as have led to the introduction of privately managed prisons and hospitals.

Today new concerns are evolving as centers of technological innovation have shifted from the public to the private sphere, meaning technologies with dual-use capabilities can be on the open market before government is even clearly aware of the security implications of their various applications; nanotechnology is a pertinent example of this.

The complexity of private sector roles in security is also increasing as private industry can be implicated as victims, as accomplices and also potentially as partners. There are, for example, substantial security risks associated with potential attacks on vital infrastructure, which is overwhelmingly owned and administered by private concerns. This shows that measures to involve the private sector in planning for security contingencies as well as the creation of safer ways of doing business are clearly required. However, it was carefully pointed out that this need for regulation implied generating not just *new* regulations but *effective* regulations, taking into account the needs of the private sector while also profiting from their often exclusive knowledge regarding

the possible applications of new technologies and their dissemination. There is also a substantive role for civil society to play in defining these issues, analogous to what we have seen in the case of the "greening" of business; opportunities in this regard have so far been underexploited by civil society actors.

The panel discussion complemented these comments by shifting focus to consider the implications of privatization from below in the form of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and their usurpation of the weak state's monopoly of force.

Resolving a fragile state's tentative hold on its monopoly of force is a key issue in assuring security at local, regional and global levels. It is also essential in meeting transnational threats and is a natural prerequisite for Human Security. Even so much as the mere presence of ANSAs can contribute to the perception of the state as weak and, in extreme cases, they can undermine and even replace the state.

Starting from the base definition of actors ready and willing to use force without any formalized association to the state, a typology of idealized ANSA profiles was presented in hope of creating useful analytical categories that will aid in defining further research on effective counter-strategies. Recent trends in ANSA activity were also explored, noting particularly their new tendency to transnationalization and the dissolution of the combatant/non-combatant distinction.

The nature of fragile statehood and its role in the government/governance dynamic as well as the need to consider the role of ANSAs in post-conflict settings, led to a brief discussion on tactics for spoiler management in which a spectrum of options was discussed ranging from political negotiations to coercion.

Finally, these phenomena of bottom-up and top-down privatization of the state monopoly of force led to a discussion on the need to reform the very concept of the state monopoly of force. Processes of globalization, the reduced legitimacy of the state monopoly of force, resulting from international interventions and the inability of weak and failed states to exercise force, were all identified as contributing factors in the redefinition of authority over the use of force. The idea of a multilevel monopoly of force was posited as a redistribution of authority over the recourse to violence across the different levels of governance from local to national to regional to global.

Rooted in a philosophy of cosmopolitanism, the system would function according to two principles: firstly, the principle of subsidiary in all recourse to violence meaning that the lowest levels of governance would first make their best effort to solve any dispute before turning to the upper echelons for assistance; and secondly, the principle of normative supremacy where global values would be firmly established as fundamentals.

A potential advantage of such a system is that local ownership of policy would receive more attention although running the risk of perpetuating poor existing structures at the lowest levels. At the regional level, more capacity founded on common values would have to be developed to ensure that regional bodies could overcome the tensions caused by infighting and overlapping responsibilities which plague their function today. Finally, at the global level, the paradox must be overcome of an institution (the United Nations) whose legal authority to intervene in times of crisis is based on the good of the people, yet whose internal processes are notoriously undemocratic. Related to this is the question raised of the severe perversions that could characterize such a system as a result of the democratic deficit of the international system and its politicized decision-making processes.

Conclusion

The key theme of the panel was the need for redefinition of the state's relationship to the use of force and the role of armed non-state actors in the delivery of security. There was a general consensus that the traditional state monopoly of power has been eroded as a consequence of both top-down and bottom-up privatization. However, different and to some extent diverging, suggestions were made on how to address or redress this issue. Furthermore, the potential for a new field of law was noted as was the under-explored potential of international organizations and

civil society in determining national policy course in response to the challenges of a new kind of state monopoly of force.

Engaging Armed Non-State Actors

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Fairlie Jensen

Abstract

The privatization of security has significant implications for security governance, notably in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding. Security privatization includes both top-down (the provision of military and security functions by corporate entities) and bottom-up privatization (insurgents, paramilitaries, organized criminal groups etc.). This panel considers the challenges posed by the latter category of armed non-state actors. In particular, given the prevalence of intra-state armed conflicts, it addresses the need for flexible, context-specific responses by the international community to these influential security actors.

Summary

The panel session opened with a discussion of the role of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in underdeveloped security eco-systems, explaining the need to engage them more productively, and especially in post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks. The importance of finding strategies that can foster locally owned transformation, rather than reform, was highlighted.

ANSAs have come to symbolize the instability of conflict situations and challenge states at every level from the local to the transnational: Insurgents can make use of the processes of globalization to muster moral and material support for their causes on a transnational scale. Their movement across borders can internationalize conflicts, suggesting that national issues of security governance should be attracting closer attention at the regional level.

These trends suggest that to de-escalate tense situations an adapted multi-level response is necessary, including diplomatic, political and military efforts balancing hard and soft options. “Hard” options such as military responses have often yielded disappointing results in terms of putting down insurgencies because they tend not to target the motivations of those engaged in violence; the image of Israeli military impotence in the face of terrorist suicide attacks being a case in point. “Soft” options can be less expensive and more effective and might include such measures as establishing conflict observatories to provide early warning; engaging in mediation and negotiation; and interrupting supply routes.

In considering an example of concrete engagement with ANSAs, the panel was introduced to the work of *Geneva Call*, an organization encouraging ANSAs to abandon the use of landmines. Through their activism the organization has been confronted with the undeniable influence of ANSAs in conflict and post-conflict settings and thus sees the need to engage them constructively as all the more pressing, and not least because of their disenfranchised status under international law.

Insights gained from experience in the field show the usefulness of working incrementally towards binding agreements with ANSAs because of the flexibility that this strategy affords, especially in cases that pose serious moral dilemmas. Monitoring of agreements has also become essential if external actors are to preserve their credibility and legitimacy as third-party actors under the Geneva Conventions; to this end, operating in complete transparency is important. This kind of engagement has been complicated by the war on terror, which has tended to marginalize moderates within groups and criminalize intermediaries by labeling them as terrorists; new strategies need to be developed to overcome these complications.

Working with ANSAs in this way has also proved to influence state decisions, as was the case with the signing of the Ottawa Treaty. Such processes of negotiation can also build positive momentum

between parties to a conflict and can thus become confidence-building measures in themselves; sometimes even entering the negotiation process can represent a significant, positive evolution. There is also an important gender aspect to this kind of engagement because the way women are involved in conflict and affected by it can present different openings to working with ANSAs.

Finally, the panel turned to the experience of West Africa as an example of the privatization dynamic. An overview of the cast of characters implicated in the West African security sector showed that the activity of non-state actors was a prevalent and significant phenomenon from the global to the sub-state level.

At the international level, such actors as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch play a role in influencing the management of security; and private military companies and mercenaries have been used to propping up governments. At the national and sub-national levels, local mercenaries have exacerbated refugee flows through their use of violence and intimidation, switching allegiances according to the rate of pay; criminal networks profit from the chaos to traffic in drugs, weapons and human beings; local weapons producers have kept up a steady supply of armaments; private security companies have become the largest industry after natural resource extraction; and armed groups of rebels, with more or less political agendas, now number 25 in only nine West African countries. At the same time, civil society has been prevented from playing its natural role in the formation of policy, and although this tendency is now beginning to change in some places, such openings do not typically extend to political dialogue on security policy. Among these myriad actors, certain individuals have also been able to play important roles, and it was noted that their influence is often overlooked because of the tendency to focus on the role of group actors.

A nuanced understanding of the various natures and roles of each type of actor provided an example of the kind of context-specific treatment of the privatization dynamic that will ultimately lead to better policy recommendations and a healthier balance between the private and public in security sector governance. Locating this information within the context of Africa's experience of foreign interventions from the colonial era to the post-independence phase and beyond, shows that precedent affects context and has to be an essential component of any approach dealing with ANSAs.

In the question period which followed, the problem was raised of how external actors should face the moral dilemma of deciding which parties to a conflict to address. It was also observed that engaging ANSAs did not have to amount to a moral compromise. In response, the panel suggested some criteria which might be useful in such decisions including taking into consideration a group's history of respect for human rights; the extent of its ambition to serve the community; its history of political engagement; the level of popular support it attracts; and international consensus on the legitimacy of its cause. It was also pointed out that despite the focus on the negative consequences of ANSA actions, they have also performed positive functions when Western forces were not available. Nevertheless, improved oversight in the form of enhanced transparency and increased accountability was deemed essential.

Conclusion

The findings of the panel demonstrate the importance of a "governance" approach to security and development issues that is active at each level from the sub-state to the international sphere. More effective strategies for engaging ANSAs require more detailed information about their nature and motivation in order to avoid inappropriate responses. For policy makers, this means that successful engagement of ANSAs has to be based on a flexible and nuanced appreciation of each specific context; the challenges of a shades-of-grey reality cannot be met by axiomatic, black and white responses. A better understanding of context will ultimately determine the success of external interventions, and highlights the need for states to face the realities of their own security environments despite political sensitivities.

Regulating Private Military and Security Companies

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Fairlie Jensen

Abstract

Private military companies are firms providing services outside their home states with the potential for use of lethal force, including the provision of training and advice for militaries that can significantly affect their strategic capabilities. Despite being increasingly central to national and international security, including the actions of humanitarian actors, the industry remains largely unregulated. Action to control PMCs and PSCs has been ad hoc and sporadic. While most countries recognize the need to prohibit the activities of mercenaries, few have developed laws to support existing international agreements. The matter of PMCs and PSCs operating abroad is more complicated, with only the United States and South Africa having implemented legislation aiming to regulate the export of their services. The absence of regulation in the private provision of military and security services, the difficulty of democratic control, as well as the inadequacy of measures to hold the companies and their employees accountable, are of particular concern and will be explored in the panel.

Summary

Regulatory Systems: The American Case

The first part of this panel focused on the lacunas in present regulatory frameworks in the United States. Recent publishing has shown that not enough is known about the new manifestations of the privatization phenomenon. The professionalization of this maturing industry is apparent in the smaller number of companies operating at a larger scale and their new political influence and lobbying skills being brought to bear in pursuit of lucrative contracts.

Despite industry efforts at self-regulation, the key concern remains that although codes of conduct make reference to a variety of international regulations and American domestic legislation as sources of legitimacy, they are invariably based on retroactive clauses that allow for recourse in the case of misconduct but do not demand any minimum standard of behavior from firms operating in the field. This fact in turn suggests that in the American case, it is not so much a problem of suitable regulation but rather a lack of political will and the necessary bureaucratic mechanism to translate intent into policy. Hence calls for further regulation are often met with the rejoinder that what is really lacking is the transparency and oversight capacities that could make existing regulations more effective. National legislation cannot respond fully to these challenges given the ease with which such PMCs and PSCs can switch countries, indicating the need for an overarching, international licensing scheme.

Regulatory Systems: The South African Case

The second speaker elaborated on how the question of private force and accountability has been managed by the South African regulations, sparking a national debate on the nature of the legitimate role of PMCs and PSCs.

The first South African licensing system was introduced in 1998 to regulate the operation of PMCs and PSCs; however, a decision-making process centered on the executive rather than the legislature politicized the application process at the cost of transparency and parliamentary oversight. The perception of the licensing process as inherently political harked back to memories of colonial era mercenarism and the process was essentially ignored by its target audience; a fact that explains why only a small number of licenses have been granted in the history of the regime.

Prosecutions of misconduct under the act were also problematic given that loopholes in the law made testing the legislatory framework potentially too costly, thus all convictions so far have been obtained indirectly through plea-bargains. The consequence of this is that the regulatory architecture has never been submitted to a robust legal examination. Doubts have also been raised about the relevance of the regulations for humanitarian actors as well as the efficacy of fines as punishment for infraction.

The situation in Iraq has triggered a re-write of the legislation that began as a demand for objective legislative oversight and has since degenerated into an executive focused initiative. Although many of the most important flaws in the document have since been revised, the on-going questions of how to handle foreign enlistment continue to prevent the passage of this draft legislation into law. This process has underlined the limitations of national laws in meeting regulatory needs and highlights the need for the African Union to formulate a policy for PMC and PSC conduct in peacekeeping operations.

Regulatory Systems and Humanitarian Actors

Finally, the panel turned to the needs of humanitarian NGO actors regarding the private security sector, noting that although the services of these companies have been vital to the successful operation of NGOs in the field, they can also pose a damaging risk to the normative neutrality which is so vital to the success of humanitarian missions.

It was hoped that NGOs, as an important market for PMCs and PSCs, could exercise some influence on the industry forcing them to conform to higher standards of conduct in exchange for the legitimacy their companies stood to gain by association. However, this has not come to pass partly due to the larger demand for private security services coming from states, and thus indirectly conferring on PMCs and PSCs the legitimacy they had previously lacked. Indecision on the part of NGOs about the nature of the relationship they wished to establish with military organizations has also been a contributing factor as has their inability to recognize the potential for positive working relationships as well as intra- and inter-organizational tensions.

Recognizing that regulations cannot solve the problem entirely, it was suggested that NGOs stood to gain from pooling their collective experience of PMCs and PSCs in order to build a better knowledge of possible means of collaboration. The work of the ICRC in sensitizing the private security sector to the issues of humanitarian law and means of aid delivery was also deemed important in this respect. Given the so-called stretching of the term *humanitarian* both by private security actors and NGOs themselves, as well as the fact that NGOs have already become associated de facto with state agendas suggests that the neutrality of the NGO actors will only come under further pressure in the context of the continuing privatization of the security sector.

During the discussion period, several points were raised concerning the feasibility of regulating the private security sector in a more efficient way. Suggestions put forward for improving transparency and oversight included establishing a database containing all contracts between the state and private companies, as well as creating public screening systems and encouraging executive disclosure. Positive examples of successful self-regulation were cited in the chemical industry as well as recent efforts to improve tendering standards when approaching developing countries. It was pointed out that large companies have enough profile and power to demonstrate their good faith independently should they wish to but that in terms of improving their relationships with NGOs, the onus to act lies first and foremost with humanitarian sector. Further research is clearly needed on the positive roles that PMCs and PSCs have played in such cases as Darfur, in order to inform any policy debate and avoid devolution into mercenarism discourse.

Conclusion

The key themes raised in the panel noted the difficulty of effective democratic control and the insufficiency of present regulatory regimes, suggesting an urgent need to develop new solutions to the problems posed by unregulated PMC and PSC operations. In this regard, the need for further research on ways to successfully regulate PMCs and PSCs was clearly articulated.

Children in an Insecure World

Hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

David Nosworthy

Abstract

The world is an insecure place in which children are often the first to suffer both in times of conflict but also in daily life. The security sector has a key role to play in ensuring the protection of children but what are the implications for delivering this protection in a changing security landscape?

While progress has been made by the international community in recent years to strengthen the international legal framework for the protection of children, much remains to be done in translating intention into action. Ensuring that states live up to their obligations to guarantee children's rights is already a challenge in itself, but this can only become more complex as non-state actors, whether armed opposition groups or private companies, become increasingly important players in the security sector. Strengthening the monitoring and reporting of abuses, as well as the mechanisms to ensure that state and non-state actors live up to their responsibilities to children will be required. This panel will explore these issues and the international efforts to address them.

Summary

The panel presented a range of issues affecting children's security, in particular the challenges involved in engaging the security sector in recognizing their obligations towards children. Establishing this linkage not only has resonance in improving children's security today but also has implications for the security issues of tomorrow. While one of the key-note addresses on security policy had requested delegates to "Think Global, and Act Global," delivering effective child protection is equally about actions at a local or community level.

David Nosworthy introduced DCAF's Children in an Insecure World project, aimed at highlighting the role and responsibility of the security sector in providing child protection. The first stage of the project is a publication targeting actors within the formal security apparatus, and considering their role within a broader definition of the security sector, stretching from civil management and oversight bodies, to non-statutory civil society groups. Focusing on freedom from fear, the approach is embedded in a human rights framework that clearly establishes security sector actors as key duty-bearers in delivering children's security and protecting their rights.

The first speaker, *Elizabeth Jareg, Senior Adviser, Save the Children Norway*, presented some of the findings of the UN Study on Violence against Children and the need to protect children against all forms of violence. In childhood, security or the lack of it affects the child's developmental potential and life pathways. Although not all children who grow up with violence become violent adults, childhoods filled with violence and abuse are common backgrounds among violent adults. Insecure childhoods will have extensive social, economic and human security implications. Paradoxically, the study revealed that the greatest source of our human security, to be found in our relationships with one another, is also the source of our greatest insecurity. Multiple types of violence are being committed against boys and girls of all ages, in their homes, communities, schools, institutions, at the hands of law-enforcing agencies, perpetrated by the very people that children should be able to trust to protect them.

The main message of the UN study is that violence against children is preventable but that urgent action has to be taken. Ending violence will require a monumental change of attitudes and behavior on the part of adults everywhere.

In its recommendations the study calls on governments to commit to end violence against children in all settings. A specific proposal is that they establish comprehensive national child protection

systems. Save the Children Norway has identified a series of criteria characteristic of such systems, namely: close inter-sectoral cooperation between government departments (including justice and security); legal reform and policy development; public education on violence against children; and a permanent research program to support evidence-based actions.

As identified in the earlier UN study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (Graça Machel Study, 1996), war-related violence is frequently accompanied by an increase in general levels of violence against children. One of the main recommendations called for special attention to be given to children in peacebuilding processes, recognizing their urgent need for protection, security and development. For Save the Children, this approach is taken a step further by engaging the active involvement of the younger generation in national efforts to build safe and peaceful societies. It is important that children not be viewed only as victims; but that their energy, fresh ideas and hope be harnessed to fight violence.

Enrique Restoy, Programme Manager for the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers then focused the discussion on non-state actors, in regard to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. While the recruitment and use of children in official armed forces declined between 2001 and 2004, tens of thousands continue to be involved in a variety of armed opposition groups. These groups present some of the largest challenges to ending under-age recruitment, operating as they do outside the framework of national legal systems and as non-state entities not being able to sign or ratify international treaties.

The Coalition has initiated consultations over the past year in order to develop a coherent strategy on how to influence such armed groups. Part of this reflection has focused on a number of the different dimensions to the involvement of children in armed groups namely, human rights, humanitarian, developmental, military (perceived military advantage) and political dimensions (manipulated in peace negotiations). These various dimensions to the issue hint at the range of approaches that agencies could take to influencing armed groups. Above all, what has become clear is the need for coordinated approaches to armed groups, not only of those who work on child soldier issues, but also those other actors working to influence armed groups on other issues.

These various dimensions also have implications for the monitoring and reporting mechanism created by UN Security Council Resolution 1612 to monitor six grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict (these include the recruitment or use of child soldiers). The denunciation approach associated with the human rights dimension can impact on the humanitarian dimension that is based on neutrality and impartiality. One of the major concerns is the potential for compromising the safety of those providing information, particularly if subsequent measures are taken based on the reporting. Also, while the mechanism can be commended for encouraging the involvement of local and international NGOs at the national level of monitoring, it does not allow them a role in the drafting of the final report. The Action Plans of those parties identified in the United Nations Secretary General's report on children and armed conflict must be central to the monitoring mechanism, and violations need to be a trigger to real action through targeted and graduated measures.

The final speaker, *Pierrette Vu Thi, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF*, expanded on the Security Council monitoring and reporting mechanism aimed at holding to account those who deliberately target, abuse or exploit children. Six categories of child rights violations are covered: the killing and maiming of children, recruitment or using child soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, rape and other grave sexual violence, abduction of children and the denial of humanitarian access.

The monitoring and reporting mechanism is coordinated by UNICEF in cooperation with the Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG). A Task Force is established at the country level in coordination with other international organizations and NGOs on the ground that reports back its findings to headquarters, and on to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. Seven pilot countries have been designated by the working group: Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Nepal. The Working Group reviews the reports and makes recommendations to the Security

Council for actions to be taken against parties that continue to violate children's security and rights. Issues of particular concern to UNICEF are gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS, for which Resolution 1612 provides an additional advocacy and programming tool to promote access to health, psychosocial and legal support. UNICEF encourages the future expansion of the mechanism to all countries where children are affected by armed conflict.

While Resolution 1612 does not explicitly refer to HIV/AIDS, the Security Council has recognized the threat that HIV/AIDS poses for peace and security. UNICEF reaffirms this concern and is committed to comprehensive programs that prevent and address the consequences of HIV/AIDS.

Conclusion

While violence against children is preventable, it will require leadership on the part of all governments to implement comprehensive national child protection systems. Monitoring is essential, and particularly for children affected by armed conflict, must be backed-up by appropriate programs to prevent and address violations. The security sectors are key duty-bearers in this respect. Speakers and discussants affirmed that a majority of security sector actors were not yet aware of their responsibility to provide a protective environment for children.

Second Parallel Topic Sessions

Present Threats, Future Risks

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Dr. Anne Deighton, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Governing Body Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Oxford

Speakers

Prof. Dr. Christopher Daase

Dr. Michael Oborne

Mr. Radboud van den Akker

Christiane Callsen

Abstract

Today, decision-makers face a complex and uncertain world with urgent problems on a global scale. Various forces are driving change at great speed and in sometimes unexpected directions. It is an increasingly daunting challenge to try to prioritize those broader global trends which may account for a wide range of security risks. Assessments of risk and insecurity are often both contentious and contended, and can depend upon political as well as objective judgments. At the same time, conventional policy strategies to limit insecurity can have unexpected outcomes. This panel aimed to address avenues for dealing with future risks in order to ensure effective strategies now and in order to move towards a more stable basis for political decision-making in an age of uncertainty.

Summary

The first presentation, given by *Prof. Christopher Daase of the Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich*, addressed the topic of "International Risks and the Perils of Proactive Security Policy," and reflected on the usefulness of the concept of risk as a tool to understand today's security environment. Daase raised three main questions: First, what are risks and how do they differ from threats? Second, what strategies are available to address international risks? Third, what are the risks of risk strategies themselves and how can these be mitigated? With regard to the difference between a threat and a risk, Daase defined risks as incomplete threats. Threats require actors, intentions and capabilities: If one of these elements is missing, the threat becomes a risk. Loose nukes are a risk, but can become a threat if they fall into the hands of terrorists. Risks, then, are distinguishable from threats when one or more elements of the threat trio (actors, intentions and capabilities) are unknown. These "unknowns" can be studied, assessed and measured. The most basic formula for measuring uncertainty and assessing risk is to multiply damage by probability, for the degree or probability of damage through human agency is a crucial element in the definition of risk.

Reactive security policies pursued during the Cold War aimed to avert known threats, whereas proactive security policies need to address future risks. Proactive security policies may be directed either towards the causes (preventative strategy) or the effects of a risk (precautionary strategy). Depending on whether the strategies are based on political coordination and collaboration or on political and military coercion, we arrive at four ideal-type strategies called cooperation (cooperative – preventative), intervention (repressive – preventative), compensation (cooperative – precautionary), and preparation (repressive – precautionary). Each strategy has its specific

strengths and weaknesses, and the limitations and unintended consequences of each should be taken into account before applying such strategies:

- Proactive security cooperation aims to reduce the probability of future damage through political coordination and collaboration. However, the exchange of information and the implementation of joint programs may also increase the perception of risk in a society and create demands for further action
- Proactive security intervention reduces the probability of future damage through political or military coercion (e.g., by application of military force to destroy military camps). The US war in Iraq is a prime example of this strategy and its paradoxical effects on security (increase of the risk of terrorism)
- Proactive security compensation aims to reduce the extent of future damage through political cooperation. However, investing in emergency management capabilities may be problematic and result in distributional conflicts
- Proactive preparatory measures aim at anticipating risk consequences (e.g., if a terror attack happens, its consequences can be mitigated if political, economic, judicial and military instruments are available to deal with the situation in an effective manner). The danger of a particular strategy may lie in the undue compromising of civil liberties and democratic values

In his conclusion, Daase emphasized the usefulness of the concept of risk to identify the structure of the dangers that states and societies face, and called for proactive strategies. The combination of preventative or precautionary efforts with cooperative or coercive elements leads to a wider variety of strategic choices. However, the unintended consequences of proactive policies still need to be better understood.

The second presentation, given by *Michael Oborne of the OECD*, focused on “Risk Management and Burden Sharing: Shifting Responsibilities in an Evolving Risk Landscape.”

The growth of the global population and the concomitant acceleration of urbanization and migration, climate variability, the rise of economic activities and of human interactions on a global scale, the increase in complexity of technology, in speed and size of impacts, and the fragmented governance of global risks – all account for current and new sources of risk. As a result, risks transcend national boundaries, and the effects of incidents are highly inter-correlated. Difficulties arise in connection with the conceptualization, assessment and communication of risks – policymakers, business, academia, NGOs, and individual citizens may have key strengths, but at the same time pursue specific partisan interests that limit their capability for risk assessment, management and communication. Current approaches are problematic, as risk assessment is often done by specialists in professional communities in a technical, top-down manner, without taking into account social and psychological elements. Oborne called for the use of more transparent objective information on the evidence of risk via common, universal communication tools, and discussed the best way to involve individuals and get them to assume responsibility.

“Providing Security in an Uncertain World: New Perspectives on Security, Risk, and Crisis Management” focused on a more practical dimension. *Radboud van den Akker of NATO* pointed to the substantial progress achieved during the last few years in addressing new and complex security challenges, and argued that NATO had been at the heart of this process. The first area of progress is the broad recognition that projecting stability has become the central tenet of modern security policy. Today’s major threats to transatlantic security emanate from regions outside Europe and have to be tackled where they emerge. NATO’s assumption of the main stabilization role in Afghanistan, its support for the African Union in Sudan, and the humanitarian relief it provided after the Pakistan earthquake demonstrate the organization’s move from a geographical, “Eurocentric” approach to security to a functional one. The second element of NATO’s transformation is the ongoing restructuring of the armed forces of its member states away from territorial defense to conducting out-of-area missions, including high-intensity combat, counterinsurgency and long-term stabilization. A third area in which there has been significant

progress is in NATO's engagement with its partner countries. NATO has promoted defense reforms, institution-building and the democratic control of armed forces; it has successfully engaged partner countries in missions, and has, in the process, contributed to the emergence of a Euro-Atlantic security culture. More recently, NATO has extended its cooperation program across the Mediterranean and into the Middle East. Van den Akker then highlighted three remaining challenges: First, NATO needs to build closer ties with global partners (e.g. Australia, New Zealand and Japan) and with international organizations, in particular with the EU and with the UN, which remains the major source of legitimacy and has a high level of expertise in peacebuilding. A second challenge concerns public opinion; to better inform the general public about the new security environment, and NATO's role – together with other international actors – in meeting the new risks and challenges. The third challenge relates to enhancing NATO's political role. NATO must not only be a tool for generating military forces for missions; the organization must also be a forum for broader strategic debate on all issues that may affect the common security and shared values of its member nations.

Discussion

The question round showed that audience members were interested in the still-unsolved issues of how to create a public culture to assess risks and to make choices, and of how to conceptualize cultural-specific risk perceptions. In addition, the difficulties of forecasting, risk assessment and risk aversion were debated, with the panelists agreeing on the inherent challenges of any such undertaking. Finally, the concept of proactive security was debated, and the point was reiterated that dealing with risks always involved the danger of undermining norms of international law.

Conclusion

The panel presentations and the ensuing discussion highlighted the broad range of perspectives on security challenges and on current developments. The main findings of the panel included the following points: (1) the acknowledgement that the concept of risk is still under-theorized today and that proactive policies may entail unintended consequences; (2) the difficulties arising in connection with the conceptualization, assessment and communication of risks; and (3) optimism with regard to the progress achieved during the last few years in addressing fundamental security issues.

Failed States, Post-Conflict States and Reconstruction

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Simon Mason

Abstract

Building peace in a post-conflict situation is perhaps an even greater challenge than ending war. Almost half of all post-conflict states fall back into violent conflict within a decade. Yet this is not unavoidable: experience shows that there are ways to rebuild the fabric of society and create institutions that enhance sustainable peace. The example of Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that EUFOR played a decisive role not just in the traditional security field, but also in supporting local authorities and fighting corruption. Afghanistan has gone a long way from the Taliban regime, where women had no public role to play, but it is still plagued by a weak government, insurgencies and narcotics trade. Sudan is torn by conflicts; a federal model requires not just sharing power, but also wealth. Guatemala has gone far in demilitarization, democracy is working, but crime and the legacies of the authoritarian past still cast their shadow. Private sector financial and technical support is vital in all post-conflict countries to create jobs.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

David Leakey[2]: One of the key tasks of EUFOR (ca. 7,000 soldiers) was to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second key task was to support the high representative mission implementation plan (involving reform of the economy, reform of the rule of law, restructuring of the police and defense reform). EUFOR therefore used its intelligence and surveillance to act as a coordinator, to support the local authorities. There was resistance to this, i.e. “Soldiers don’t do this,” but we overcame this opposition. Organized crime and corruption are always a problem in post-conflict countries; we have not yet sufficiently addressed this challenge.

Afghanistan

Shinkai Karokhail Zahine[3]: Afghanistan is a newly established government. We still have to face the greatest challenges: the government is weak; there are great socio-economic problems, insecurity, corruption and al-Qaida/Taliban to name a few. The invading forces after 9/11 decided to make an alliance with the warlords against the Taliban. They may have initially saved international resources, but it legitimized the warlords and made them stronger than they really were, i.e. with negative results, such as insurgencies in the south and east, narcotics trade, etc. The Afghan cabinet is very large; there are many inexperienced people in it. It is also made up of returnees with no knowledge of the country. The country is very dependent on foreign aid, IGOs and NGOs pay high salaries, causing a brain drain from the government. Justice is neglected and customary law often plays into the hands of warlords. The neighboring countries also love to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. We are very worried that the world will forget Afghanistan and resources will be poured into another “crisis.” We are worried we will be left alone to those who want a weak Afghanistan. We do not want to go back to a Taliban regime, where women have no social role to play. The bombardment of villages in the south is not the way forward. What is needed is money and technical assistance to make the government stronger. The role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams? They do not deal sufficiently with the communities, but build what they want. We need to adapt the idea, to work with local communities.

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Sudan

Julian Thomas Hottinger[4]: Sudan can head toward peace, but it is a very complicated situation, with about 3.5 conflicts. First: the North-South conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 partially resolved this. Yet in south Sudan it is not just a question of rebuilding a state, but building it in the first place. Second, the Darfur conflict, involves three provinces, together about the size of France. Darfur is perhaps at its worst phase now; Jan Pronk was expelled by the government. It is not a new problem, however, it has flared up many times over the last decades, e.g. already in 1926. Darfur is very poor; desertification is putting the existing form of life into question. Third, the conflict on the eastern border, in the Beja area. It is a low intensity conflict, and now there is a partial agreement, but the implementation is still unclear. And finally, the "half" conflict in the south, in relation to the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is based in Uganda, but also is active in Sudan. So Sudan is a country that is torn: When one conflict is over, it flares up in another area. A federal model does not just require sharing power, but also sharing wealth. If the UN is not wanted in Darfur and cannot deploy, do we see which countries would be more acceptable to Sudan, or do we give greater support to the 7,000 troops of the AU, which now have no mobility, no logistics and are paralyzed by the task? Concerning the question of a forceful entry of the International community, the problem is not just simply gaining an acceptable entry, but holding the ground. An international entry that does not have the go ahead of the government will have an impossible task. Furthermore, which countries are ready to deploy?

Guatemala

Bernardo Arévalo de Leon[5]: Ten years after the peace accords, we have moved far, we have the hardware of democracy, but it is operated in an authoritarian culture, the "software" is missing. Much has been done toward demilitarization, to curtail the military, such as a reduction in the military budget. Democracy works, the opposition always wins. Yet there is too much turnover in terms of leaders; hardliners follow those who work for change. So we have a post-conflict security crisis, with high crime, new organized crime, youth gangs, a general feeling of insecurity and incapacity of the state to deal with the situation. The focus is on the short-term goal of "putting out fires" instead of sustainable change. Guatemala lives with the legacy of an authoritarian past. It is an unconsolidated democracy, which is vulnerable. But the country has one strength: Change was based on internal agency. This is my hope.

Private Sector

John Maresca[6]: The idea is to support local entrepreneurs; they need special help in the post-conflict situation. People need jobs to be stable "good" citizens. NGOs and aid often create temporary work, but the private sector creates sustainable jobs. The private sector is often hesitant to invest, but we have to look at how to attract investment from the beginning, immediately after a conflict, as it takes time. The tasks are to support with financing, to give practical help to the local private sector (e.g. business plans), and to give support for the external private sector coming in. Often the incentive is to pay a percentage to the foreign investor.

Conclusion

- No size fits all, but one can learn from different experiences and build on them
- Organized crime and corruption are key problems in a post-conflict situation. Military can also take on the role of coordination and support of local authorities in dealing with such problems
- The challenge of military peace operations is not simply the entry mandate, but how to hold the ground. If not accepted by the host country, it can be difficult or even impossible (e.g. Sudan). Another challenge is how to get enough international troops available for such tasks

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- The choice of local alliances (e.g. warlords) at the beginning of an invasion (e.g. Afghanistan) legitimizes these forces and can negatively shape the future of the country
- Private sector investment needs to be supported to create jobs

The Law of Armed Conflict and the Principle of Sovereign Equality of States

Hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Chaired by Prof. Daniel Thürer

Speakers

Associate Prof. Bardo Fassbender

Prof. Ruth Wedgwood

Prof. Michael F. Noone

Vivian Fritschi

Abstract

The principle of equality as expressed in the UN charter, the Geneva, Hague and Vienna conventions and the obligations implied by these treaties with respect to humanitarian law are challenged by the complicated circumstances that have emerged with the rise of asymmetric warfare and the internationalization of conflicts with non-state actors. This session explores the traditional separation of legal concepts (such as *jus ad bello* and *jus in bello)* and the principles of reciprocity, symmetry and the law of armed conflict and the ways that international law as a whole is increasingly strained by and may need to be adapted to the changing international security environment.

Associate Prof. Bardo Fassbender, Humboldt University

The session opened with historical examination of the principle of sovereign equality and the law of armed conflict by Prof. Fassbender. In particular, he discussed the emergence of the principle of equal status of independent states, its codification and how it has shaped contemporary law of armed conflict – which gives equal status to parties of a conflict irrespective of their actual military or political power or their ideological or political alignment – and he detailed its presuppositions. The speaker further noted how this classic view of equality was reflected in the 1949 and the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the latter of which clearly defines non-state parties to an internal conflict (using terminology guided by the analogy of state sovereignty and territorial control) and also binds them to the same principles.

However, the application of the principle of equality of parties to an armed conflict in asymmetric warfare is unclear and problematic. Both the substantial difference of status and functions of the parties to asymmetric conflicts (especially in cases where one party does not recognize or concede the status of the other) and to the asymmetric type of warfare strain this classical view. While the principle can be applied to international conflicts between state and non-state entities (because international law recognizes to a certain degree the legitimacy of an armed group's effort to gain control over a state's territory and to take over the respective government), international law does not recognize the aims and means of terrorism. What remains to be determined is if new rules can be introduced that fit the new circumstances and preserve international humanitarian law without dissolving the traditional link between conflict and equality.

Prof. Ruth Wedgwood, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

The second speaker focused on the application of humanitarian law to non-traditional conflicts. In particular, Prof. Wedgwood examined the traditional stance that *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are separate, and demonstrated that this is unclear in certain kinds of situations. She noted that during

the Nuremberg trials the prosecutor argued that *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* were connected – that every act of the German state was a war crime – despite the disagreement of the court. Propositions that *jus ad Bello* and *jus in Bello* can always be separated are questionable, for example when dealing with terrorism. Prof. Wedgwood explored the related implications for states exercising the duty to protect their own civilians and facing greater international calls for a normative obligation and imperative to intercede and protect civilians; which in itself gives rise to complicated moral calculations by deeming passivity during attacks on civilians as insufficient. In asymmetrical warfare, the responsibility to protect civilians from non-state actors may lead to the application of some harsher aspects of the laws of conflict, especially in cases of terrorism and genocide.

Prof. Wedgwood further examined the principle of symmetry, the law of reprisals and the law of armed conflict, as well as the scope of their application in The Hague and Geneva Conventions. She noted that while there were normal rules for suspending the enforcement of a treaty if the interlocutor ceased obeying it, these rules did not apply to humanitarian law, which is granted an exception from the ideas of reciprocity, symmetry and treaty observance under the Geneva and Vienna Conventions. Furthermore, the natural law clauses of the Hague conventions stipulate that even if humanitarian law is not locally codified, no one has the right to abridge it.

Prof. Michael F. Noone, Columbus School of Law, the Catholic University of America

All great theorists have said the successful warrior is an asymmetrical warrior. In recent times, the term has become pejorative because it has been used to describe warriors who do not subscribe to the principles of international law. The third speaker, Prof. Noone, rounded the session with a presentation on the dilemmas facing soldiers on the field regarding humanitarian and human rights laws. Dr. Noone first examined how the law of armed conflict was fundamentally based on reciprocity. Because a primary characteristic of asymmetric warfare is that non-state actors do not treat prisoners according to the rules of international law, consequently, it undermines the argument that soldiers should treat their enemies well when their enemies do not reciprocate. Because reciprocity does not exist in asymmetrical warfare, it is harder to enforce the rules among soldiers in the field.

Prof. Noone also considered the possibility of shifting to a legal regime based on deterrence. Such a regime would be similar to that of law enforcement systems comprised of norms in which deviants from the law are identified, apprehended, sent to trial and punished. He noted that in criminal law enforcement systems, police officers did not expect to be treated fairly if held by opponents, but expected to face deadly force; while soldiers acting under the current regime of reciprocity did expect to be treated fairly.

International peacekeepers and other soldiers are limited by the restrictions buried in the rules of engagement. Peacekeepers in particular are restrained from doing anything controversial that might provoke an asymmetrical attack. This is further complicated by the fact that human rights law is designed to treat *rational* criminals. But in asymmetric warfare the opponents are *irrational* – deterrence has no effect on a suicide bomber. While the concept of reciprocity is interesting in theory and under certain conditions, in asymmetrical warfare it is extremely difficult to use in practice. Where opponents can violate international law using weapons or tactics that are otherwise forbidden, soldiers are neither trained to use these weapons nor do they have these weapons at their disposal. The remaining option for reciprocity is to attack civilian targets. However, there is no civilian population or civilian target that would warrant equivalent asymmetrical reprisals, so this is not an option field commanders can consider.

Discussion

The presentations gave rise to a discussion on reciprocity, the law of armed conflict and the role and impact of international tribunals. The presenters noted that while international tribunals had a symbolic function by removing war crimes from bilateral settings and guaranteeing the principle of humanity, the laws created to protect humanity and encourage more humane behavior were not having a great effect. As such, the tribunals may not profoundly change international behavior

because the number of people prosecuted and the extended duration of the trials have no direct impact or consequence in relation to events in the field.

The International Criminal Court is not well-fitted to deal with certain types of war crimes, and may shift its focus toward the great violations of human rights, such as genocide. Some commentators added that war crimes prosecution would not substitute for reciprocity and may not be sufficient deterrence. The presenters cautioned against adopting super-ergative moral norms and imperatives that could ultimately become negative externalities against the people they mean to protect by aversely shaping the rules of engagement and limiting all responsive measures; ultimately they may become a cruel obstacle to victims and advocates who have human values at stake.

Second Plenary Keynote Addresses

The New Security in the 21st Century

United States Senator Gary Hart

Wirth Chair Prof., University of Colorado

Vivian Fritschi

I want to add my own personal thanks to Dr. Wenger and all of those affiliated with the International Security Forum for the opportunity to be here with you. I am deeply gratified by their invitation, and have been remarkably influenced by the very high caliber and quality of the sessions that we have had for the last couple of days.

As a child of the Cold War, and witnessing its abrupt termination in the fall of 1991, like many of you, I have spent a good deal of time trying to visualize the post-Cold War world. We used an analogy during that almost half-century of Cold War quite often of the chessboard. And of course, the chessboard during the Cold War involved, if you will, the white pieces being the Western democratic alliance, NATO and others, faced-off against the black pieces, namely the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies and others. And on that chessboard, maneuvers were made by one side or another involving deterrence, involving containment, involving fighting the ideological struggle, much of it in the Third World, in the back alleys of the Third World using unconventional means. Well, surprising to almost all the observers, that era ended in a 72-hour period at the end of August 1991. We in the United States at least drifted through the next decade without a clear compass or definition of what our role in the world was, because the central organizing principle for over 45 years – the containment of communism – was no longer relevant.

And in trying to visualize the post-Cold War world – it seemed to me starting about 9/11 – to keep the same image, we had moved to a three dimensional chessboard. There were no longer just nation-states facing each other, in what was increasingly an economic competition, but also non-state actors (or stateless nations, if you will) comprising a third dimension on that chessboard. That third dimension became very evident to us in the United States and the rest of the world, on the occasion of 9/11 and the attacks on New York and Washington. That new dimension has caused many of us to begin to rethink the nature of security in this new century, and it is that topic that I would like to address very informally, if I may, for a few minutes this morning.

As many of us analyzed this new three-dimensional chessboard in the new century, we suddenly became aware of the fact that the new century was not simply a continuation of the 20th century. We spent a good deal of time analyzing the so-called Y2K problem; worried that all of our computers might suddenly shutdown with the turn of the century. It turned out to be not a matter of great concern. But what we often overlooked were the revolutionary tides that had begun some quarter-century before and these were revolutions on multi-levels. First of all, obviously, globalization, where the internationalization of trade, finance and commerce is a huge, epic historic revolution in and of itself. Whether that began sometime at an arbitrary date in the 1970s, no one knows. But many of us woke, in the United States at least, to find cars in our driveways made in Europe or in Asia, clothes made somewhere else, wristwatches made somewhere else, television sets made somewhere else, and simultaneously began to see our great industrial power symbolized by our steel and auto plants going cold – and that trend continues.

Simultaneously, with this revolution of globalization, however, occurred another revolution of equal historic importance and that of course is the information revolution, a revolution as profound historically as the industrial revolution of the early 19th century. It has transformed the economy of the United States and much of the West. Those two revolutions together, globalization and the information revolution – occurring more or less at the same time – have produced two other revolutions. One is the decline of the sovereignty of the nation-state, as borders are reduced

because of this trade and commerce and free flow of information. The sovereignty of the nation-state, a post-Westphalian creation began to be seen and nations began to fail, particularly those artificial nations created after World War I or World War II. That, in turn, has led to the fourth revolution, which is the transformation of war and the changing nature of conflict. So these revolutions seem to me to have flooded into the world of the late 20th and early 21st century. And those revolutions of globalization, information, the declining sovereignty of nation states and the changing nature of warfare have created and contributed to a whole host of new realities with which we all must deal.

One of those, obviously, is jihadist terrorism, the surfacing of a holy war directed in large part, but not totally, against the United States. Many of you in Europe have had similar if not as profound experiences with it. As I have said, a second new reality is the beginning disintegration of nation-states and the phenomenon of failed states, not only in the former Yugoslavia, but in other artificially created nations as well. Part of the result of the United States invasion of Iraq is to reveal the implications of disturbing the stability of an artificial nation created some 85 years before. Clearly, the proliferation of WMD encompasses the increasing capability not only of nations to create nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons, with a fourth form of mass destruction being cyber warfare. In the case of cyber warfare and biological weapons of mass destruction, the great threat of course is that these can be conducted in small venues and laboratories, not detectible by overhead reconnaissance means.

We have seen a dramatic increase in the last decade in the competition for oil supplies. We have begun to recognize, although some in the US belatedly, the impact of climate change and global warming. We were concerned some months ago, more than now, with viral pandemics and the possibility of Avian flu – and that is still an important new reality as well – then, finally, massive South-North migration. It has become a great political issue in the United States. The immigration question and many of my fellow citizens believe we are unique in the world in having 12 million or more undocumented workers in our country. But we need to remind ourselves quite often that you in Europe face many of the same challenges. Indeed, this will continue as unemployed or underemployed cheap labor in the southern half of the globe migrates northward in search of a higher standard of living.

So these seem to me to be some of the new realities that we face together. An entirely new environment and those new realities seem to me share two things in common: one they do not lend themselves to a military solution, and two, none of these new realities can be solved by one nation, including one superpower by itself.

The first of those new realities, the jihad – we call it terrorism wrongly, I think, its jihadis using terrorist methods – as we discussed in a previous panel this morning, has caused a great deal of confusion as to how it should be combated. It is well known that President Bush declared war on terrorism, but it seems to me a great deal of reflection could go forward in forums such as this, as to what the nature of the jihad really is and whether the war paradigm is the best way to approach it. As I indicated, one of the new realities and revolutions is the emergence of the stateless nation and that clearly the so-called terrorist organizations that do not share the characteristics of nation-states, indeed they have no capital, in many cases they make no political demands, they wear no uniforms, they do not comply with international law or Geneva conventions. Many of us think that the analogy of crime better fits the way to approach the jihad. Jihadists, it seems to me, share many more characteristics with criminal syndicates than they do with traditional armies of nation-states. What has confused this a great deal, I think, is the difference between Afghanistan and the rest of the Jihad worldwide. Almost all nations in the world, almost all peoples in the world supported the United States' retaliation against al-Qaida harbored in Afghanistan by the Taliban government. There was little (perhaps token) disagreement with our retaliation, our invasion and our effort to bring al-Qaida to justice. But then of course we migrated to Iraq, and the consensus globally collapsed and the United States did not have the support of many of its allies. And that I think was the product of the president of the US and our government continuing the war analogy beyond the borders of Afghanistan. It seems to me that we could have much more profitably

considered going after al-Qaida and other jihadists, using the means used internationally against organized crime.

If we think about how that might be done, it requires us to consider new means; first of all, the integration of intelligence services. Now this is very difficult. Secrets are secrets, and secrets are proprietary, and it has been the practice even during the Cold War of allied nations to keep their own secrets to themselves and to share them reluctantly. It seems to me that that day is over, at least where combating the jihad is concerned. We in the US, first of all, must get our own intelligence services to talk to each other and that has been a problem. I think most of you are aware of the concerns and problems that we face in the United States between our domestic intelligence services and our international intelligence services – that has to be overcome and there are many critics of the current situation who believe it still has not been done. So just getting the intelligence services of a single democratic nation integrated is a challenge; to integrate the intelligence services of many democratic nations is a great challenge – but it must be done. Now, clearly, we have cooperation in tracking individual terrorists or jihadists, and hopefully, although it is difficult to tell as a civilian (or concerned citizen), we hope that information is being shared across national boundaries in a free-flowing way. We have to overcome national prejudices in doing so, and that is key if we're serious about combating the criminal syndicate of the jihad. I think we are going to have to integrate our special paramilitary forces, if I am right that the jihad has more in common with crime than with war, different kind of forces, when force is necessary, must be employed. We of course have our own paramilitary forces, the Delta Force, the Rangers, the Seals and so on. These belong to separate military services. Some of us have been advocating the integration of those special forces into a fifth military service. What is peculiar, as some of you witnessed in the operations in Afghanistan (particularly using the Delta Force), these are people also that don't use uniforms who try to integrate into the native surroundings in which they find themselves, and they increasingly do not resemble traditional military forces and don't resemble, for that matter, traditional police forces, either. So what is happening is the evolution of a new kind of paramilitary capability that has yet to be named. I think sometime in the 21st century, sooner rather than later, serious discussion must be given to the creation of what I would call an international peacemaking force. Many Americans are critical of UN peacekeepers and rightly so, but much of that criticism is unjustified.

Those of you in this room and beyond know there is a great deal of difference between offensive military forces and defensive forces, both in terms of the way they are trained and the way they are equipped. You cannot send peacekeepers into a combat zone and expect them to be effective. You have to have people offensively trained and equipped to make the peace, before the peace can be kept. There should be increasing discussion I think, among peaceful nations about the creation of a peacemaking capability to be used in venues such as Rwanda, perhaps Darfur, and other places. We know that conflict can spread across national boundaries; even if it doesn't, to witness genocide within national boundaries is increasingly unacceptable. Right now, the world reacts or does not react, by trying to form coalitions of the willing to suppress violence. Violence springs up too quickly in the 21st century for that paradigm to continue to operate, so I think we ought to be giving serious attention to the possibility of a standing international peacemaking force that also is a force that can be used to combat the jihadist criminal syndicate.

I think we will increasingly need an international counter-proliferation capability. Not simply a UN inspection capability, but a much more vigorous and forceful way of countering the proliferation of weapons, particularly weapons being proliferated by stateless nations. Again mafias, cartels and terrorist organizations are operating across national boundaries and potentially increasing their own capabilities in the biological and chemical arena. We're going to need increased international guarantees of sea lanes communication, which have been referenced in a couple of discussions here at this forum, that the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and others are critical choke points in the international commerce of energy.

So, what I'd like to suggest is a new concept, if you will: the security of the commons. I think increasingly in the 21st century peaceful nations, nations concerned with order and stability, must begin to think about security in extranational terms, in international terms, and think about global

security as security of the global commons – and much of what I've been suggesting is meant to follow that model, or that idea.

The nature of security in the 21st century fundamentally is changing. Throughout the Cold War, we in the United States at least, thought of security on two levels: first, as I said, the containment of communism, that central organizing principle that characterized about seven or eight American administrations of keeping the Soviet Union and its allies from encroaching on Western Europe. But also secondly, through deterrence and negotiation, prevention of the exchange of nuclear missiles between the East and the West. This was a military concept of security. Increasingly, in 21st century security must be defined both in my country and around the world in much broader terms. It must increasingly mean not only the prevention of terrorist attacks or jidhadist attacks across national boundaries or even within national boundaries, but it must also include the security of livelihood, the ability of individuals to look after their families and provide a decent standard of living.

I think it must increasingly include the security of communities, the ability of communities to have an economic, political and security base that is dependable. I think it must, in my country at least, increasingly include energy security – the sense that world energy supplies can continue to flow and operate with a degree of predictability. And I think finally security in the 21st century must include security of the environment. If you have pretty much a guarantee that you will not be killed by terrorists, and if you have a job and can take care of your family, and if you know that you can get back and forth to work every day, but you have found out that your children are suffering from some medical disorder as a result of the declining quality of the air that they breathe or the water that they drink, you are probably not feeling very secure. And this gets us, as I said before, into the area of climate change. So what I would like to suggest here today is that we all begin to think about security beyond the traditional militaristic, if you will, concepts to include much broader categories.

Finally, what I have been suggesting is the creation of some kind of new international order. It is interesting to me that Americans think very fondly and respectfully of the creative work done by our leaders in the mid-20th century – Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, along with other global leaders – in creating the international framework that led to more or less a peaceful second half of the 20th century. I think that same kind of visionary thinking is required today. The institutions created 50 or 60 years ago have worked, despite the criticism that many in my country rendered against them. But that does not mean that they are going to operate equally as well in this century of revolution that I've tried to outline here this morning. The UN was created in 1945 for a much, much different set of circumstances and its were powers proscribed as much as anything by my country, unwilling to ceded sovereignty to the UN, limiting its capability and often not even paying our dues. The same is true of NATO, an organization created to secure Europe and the Western world against the perceived communist threat and many of the other mid-20th century institutions. What I'd like to suggest is that the leaders of our respective countries think in the same scope and magnitude as the leaders of the mid-20th century. What are the kind of international institutions that are needed for this new revolutionary world? If they don't exist today can they be created? I've already suggested an international peacemaking force, an offensively trained and equipped international police force, or army if you will, capable of suppressing violence wherever that may occur. I think there ought to be an international nation-building capability, so that when nations fail or begin to fail, it is not left to one nation, my own or any ad hoc group of nations, to try to prop that country up, but there should be a permanent standing capability – not necessarily military – of those that can go into failing states and help them re-establish themselves. I think we have to think about integrating our respective national public health services to be prepared for global pandemics and not have to react once one starts spreading across the globe. I think we have to start thinking about an international environmental protection agency with real enforcement capabilities. Its going to take a lot of work to convince Americans that this is necessary, given the resistance to Kyoto, but it will inevitably have to happen.

And finally, I think that we are going to need some kind of international capability to guarantee energy supplies, prevent competition from evolving into friction and friction from evolving into

energy wars. But some kind of long-term ability of producing nations and consuming nations to guarantee the free-flow of energy in the marketplace. What I think what I would call “the security of the commons” gets down to is one word (the key word, political word in the 21st century) and that is sovereignty. What prevents this new kind of international order from emerging is of course the traditional three or three and a half-century commitment to the nation-state and the sovereignty of the nation state. Everyone of the new realities we face, as I said, has in common the fact that it cannot be solved by one nation alone. Increasingly these new realities force all of us to begin to think of ourselves as global citizens, not simply citizens of our own nations and that will increasingly cause us to begin to think and leaders such as yourselves to think about new institutions and new capabilities across national borders, to address the challenges and security threats if you will, but also the opportunities of the 21st century and the security of the commons.

State Building: How Practice Differs from Theory

Sir Hilary Synnott, KCMG

Senior Consulting Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Vivian Fritschi

Good Afternoon Ladies and Gentleman,

I've checked my Swiss watch and it tells me its the afternoon, but in my third career, I'm becoming a quasi-academic, and I have to say that on the basis of the evidence available, I cannot be sure whether its the afternoon or not, but I still tend to rely on intelligence sources, and I was advised it was a slam-dunk, so that made me feel better. But then I came across a politician who said to me, "you must take my word for this," so I became very doubtful. I'm not going to bother to ask a diplomat, because I know they are going to say it all depends on your perspective.

I'm really honored to be here this morning, I'm a bit intimidated because I'm going to talk about theory and practice to an extremely distinguished group of theoreticians and practitioners. I'm gong to have a go. I'm afraid that I'm going to be telling stories largely of failures. I've been told to speak for about 35 minutes. I've got my Swiss watch, so I'll know when I overrun, but actually I am really looking forward to the discussion afterwards, so I'll try not to bang on too much. I'd like to talk about success, but quite honestly in the field of state-building there have been very few successes in recent years, and even fewer of these have been long lasting. So, what I am going to do is start with some illustrations of the contrasts between on the one hand theoretical and political aspirations, and on the other their practical manifestations. I'm going to go on after that to some specific illustrations of what might be called "the ground reality," which is drawn from my own experience in Iraq, and I'm going to finish by trying to address the very difficult issue of lessons learned. And at the risk of sounding like a pastor at a church sermon, I'm going to begin with a quote, which goes like this: "Well, let me just make on thing clear, if the commanders on the ground want more equipment, armored vehicles, for example, more helicopters, that will be provided, whatever package they want, we will do." That quote came from Prime Minister Tony Blair, on 7 October 2006, the 5th anniversary of the start of the Afghan campaign. I had heard a similar undertaking from the British prime minister on the day that I left for Basra in Iraq at the end of 2003. Both pledges, I'd like to suggest – and I don't mean any disrespect to the British prime minister – were examples of theory, statement of political aspirations. What was the practice?

In the first case, which related to Afghanistan, very recently, a senior officer on the ground was recorded by a journalist, who was immediately observing that what was needed above all in Helmand province was helicopters, but these were simply not available. In the second case, my own personal experience, this arose after I'd been able to asses the situation on the ground by about September 2003. I put in a request for 37 civilian specialists to arrive in Basra as soon as possible. I also bid for 20 armored vehicles to enable them to meet Iraqi managers, engineers, doctors, teachers and so on, in their own offices. I put these modest requests in for these resources, primarily because they were needed, although many more were needed, but I also wanted to test the reality of the promises which I'd been given, because a judgment on this would affect how I set about my task in the future. If I wasn't going to be supported, I needed to know this very quickly. Now what happened was, to the annoyance of a great number of British bureaucrats who wanted to cost the whole lot first, the same day that my message arrived in London, Number 10 Downing Street instructed that my request should be met in its entirety. So, I had no basis for any a lack of political support, at least from the prime minister, for what we civilians were trying to do in Iraq. But in practice, by the end of 2004, four months later, less than half the requested personnel had arrived and many of those who were already there (who were on a three-month appointment) had already left without replacement. Armored vehicles simply did not exist in the

world market in the numbers required; manufacturers were able to name their price for these vehicles, but they couldn't simply supply what was not there. This was to prove to be the pattern of many other aspects of civilian operations in Iraq and I believe it still applies today in Afghanistan, which I visited a few months ago.

Another example – and its a bit flippant, but I'm going to show it anyway, although unfortunately, you probably won't be able to see this properly – this is a Foreign Office in-house magazine designed to keep diplomats happy. It shows a young man (who goes by the name James Roscoe) in a Flack jacket apparently hauling up the Iraqi flag on the building where we were located in central Basra, in good range of rocket-propelled grenades, car bombs, snipers – everything. He appears to be hauling up the flag. Now this is an illusion, because what actually happened, was the day before a senior Iraqi cleric had been assassinated and we decided that – first of all we carried the Iraqi flag above our building not the British, American or any other flag – we should haul the flag down to half-mast. Unfortunately, the flagpole was only slightly taller than James Roscoe, and if we were to haul it down to half-mast, the flag would not be visible at all. So what we decided to do was tie a broomstick on top of the mast so it appeared as if it was half-mast. That is what James Roscoe is doing at that moment. To my mind, that encapsulated the sort of challenges that we were facing in Southern Iraq.

Now, I want at this stage to emphasize, that I'm not on this occasion seeking to join the many critics of the genesis of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We all know that the planning process that preceded the coalitions' occupation of Iraq was deficient. We all know that the expectations or rather the hopes about what would happen after Iraq's so-called liberation were not soundly based. In practice, with the collapse of Saddam, the entire state apparatus of Iraq imploded. The effects of this were exacerbated by the decisions to send some two to three hundred thousand army personnel home and to institute de-Baathification. All of this is well known, there's no need to go into that now. Nor do I want to dwell now on the issue of whether or not such misjudgments were avoidable or culpable, you'll have your own views. Instead, what I want to do is to illustrate what can happen in practice after a war is perceived to have been won and when it become necessary to build peace – it's not of course as easy as it may seem. Wars and conflicts can produce as many problems as they solve. Its fashionable now to recall Clausewitz's ideas, and its right to do so, I think, because he's often seems to be forgotten in practice. Everybody recalls his quote, which famously suggested that war is an extension of political activity by other means. Quite so. I therefore suggest it is desirable that politicians who embark upon wars in order to pursue their policies should have a reasonable idea of what wars entail. Particularly, they should have some knowledge of how armed forces work, what they need, what they can do, and what they cannot do. The ultimate objective of war after all is not victory, it is peace. Even Clausewitz was criticized that he focused on war to the detriment of peace. Once the war is over and more conventional political activity resumes, then the balance between military and civilian engagement shifts, or it ought to do so. So, it is also desirable that administrations which pursue war should be ready for the aftermath too. The practice, however, as I shall illustrate has not been like that. The main part of what I have to say is an account of what happened in Southern Iraq in the later half of 2003, that is, after what John Keegan has called the "21-day war," and after the *USS Abraham Lincoln*, with President Bush aboard who announced "mission accomplished." I must emphasize that I'm not speaking about other parts of Iraq, some of which were very much more hazardous and less permissive than in the south. But I think it is also the case, that while much has been written and talked about Baghdad, the green zone, and the difficulties in central Iraq, not much yet has emerged about the four southern provinces.

In considering the post-conflict operations in Iraq in 2003, some people, including Ambassador Jerry Bremer head of the CPA, have drawn parallels with post-war Germany or Japan when the Allies occupied, administered and ultimately handed back sovereignty to defeated nations. I think that such parallels are pretty weak. The occupation and attempted liberation of Iraq was an exceptional and extraordinary endeavor, and raised challenges which seemed in some respects closer to the 19th rather than the 20th and 21st century – challenges that the invading coalition proved to be singularly ill-equipped to deal with. The civilian outfit in Iraq at the end of the so-called

conflict started out as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHA), but it very quickly transformed into the Coalition Provision Authority in May, just a month after the conflict. The CPA was itself wound up 13 months later in June 2004 having clearly failed in the tasks which it had set it self. And it returned full sovereignty to Iraq. These changes of approach illustrate that the US and the UK, which had been designated as the two occupying powers by a resolution of the UN Security Council, were not quite ready for what happened. My own tenure in the south started off with the premature departure of my Danish predecessor, who left after only a couple of months on the job, and I was quick to understand why he might have wanted to go. My remit was the civilian aspects of the four southern provinces and this geographical area was the same geographical area of the remit of the commanding general, who is British, who commanded the military forces and those forces comprised 11 different nationalities. My civilian outfit had a similar number of nationalities. By the time I left (and if you include all the support staff) we were up to 22 different nationalities. With the departure of my Danish predecessor, in fact, it proved that there were real practical advantages in having the regional coordinator (me, a civilian) and the general officer commanding of the same nationality. Why? It increased our clout within the British government, and it increased our clout with the United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Those three entities were by no means synonymous. Our approach in the south, our resources available to us and our methods and those of the other coalitions countries who worked with us, turned out to be very different from those of the United States, which was dominant in the other three regions of Iraq (one of those was Baghdad). While we know that the coalition had done very little preparation for managing Iraq after a conflict, assumptions about immediate humanitarian crises proved to be unwarranted. The US State Department's "Future of Iraq" plan was reject by Secretary Rumsfeld when he was put in overall charge in January 2003, just two months before the start of military operations. The British government's efforts were no better; first of all, Britain never expected at all to have a leading role in the civilian operations, the Danes had been co-opted, indeed they'd volunteered. And the British political effort had been concentrated on first trying to forestall a conflict and then on maximizing support for the coalition. This focus proved to be at the expense of civil planning, because in practice the same officials were involved in both aspects and political demands took priority over planning, for which you earn no brownie points; this was further exacerbated by powerful divisions within the British cabinet. There were also British assumptions which proved to be quite false in retrospect, that the UN would fill much of the gap. And whatever hopes there were for that, after the bombing of the UN headquarters in August 2003, the UN's role diminished significantly. So, where were we? It was up to us on the ground. In practice, as a civilian administrator on the spot, I found myself with no guidance arising from prior planning and an absence of the most basic support materiel. In contrast, I must emphasize to the military, who of course maintain the resources, maintenance staff, staff officers and management structures, which are available for every sort of contingency. That's what the military do. For my part, I sent my dispatches back to Whitehall, after I borrowed a laptop from my American colleagues, using Yahoo and Hotmail. We were established initially in a building set in the center of Basra, in a building which had been previously used for processing electricity accounts. If I had more time, which I don't think I have, I'd give you some funny anecdotes about that.

But more importantly, these inconveniences, in the absences of traditional diplomatic commercial and academic ties with Iraq (don't forget there'd been 12 years of sanctions) there was an enormous ignorance of the situation on the ground. There were many false hopes and assumptions, for instance, about the state of Iraqi infrastructure and the conditions of power generation and distribution, fuel production and water supply. Crucially, I think we had very little knowledge of the personalities in the south, other than those of exiles, whose evidence (as we all know now) was unreliable and self-serving. Local Iraqis expected a rapid return not to the pre-conflict situation, but the pre-sanctions situation. We were responsible for the sanctions, directly if not indirectly. Saddam was indirectly responsible, we would argue. They wanted this return to prosperity at once, and they blamed the coalition for not preventing the looting and as the direct cause of the sanctions. If a country that could put a man on the moon – we were always told –

could not immediately supply electricity for all, so the argument went, it must be for some malign reason: oil, perhaps.

Nor could we secure Iraq's borders from smuggling and outside political influences. The public and their leaders in the south made it clear to me, very vigorously, that just because they were glad that Saddam had been ousted, and they were because the Shi'a and Saddam had oppressed them, that did not mean that coalition, who had not been invited, was welcome. On the other hand, the coalition's perception in July 2003, before the bombing of the UN, appeared to be that the south was peaceful, and the task of the Brits and other minor coalition members was simply to keep things that way. The task was to deliver the Shi'a in the South. Baghdad and Sunni triangle was to be the main focus of the political and economic effort.

Perceptions about the south changed quite quickly after the events of August 2003, when during very hot weather in the high 50s centigrade, the CPA building was host to about three demonstrations every morning. Some of these demonstrations sadly led to deaths, following temporary difficulties over fuel distributions. The breakdown of the major power station just outside Basra threatened Baghdad's wider objectives about electricity supply for the country and it brought home to Baghdad the relevance of the south to overall national interests. So what were we going to do about all of this? It was clear to me that the civilian effort in the south was largely dysfunctional, there were very few civilians on the ground, little impact had been made over economic regeneration, or in interacting with civilian managers. Civilian communications (telephone, email) were entirely inadequate, two coalition countries and the UN pulled out altogether, and the CPA headquarters where we were based was physically insecure, as well as being extremely uncomfortable and unsanitary. The military were carrying the load *per force*. (I'm not trying to make criticisms, I'm just trying to make simple statements of fact.) These were in my view an inevitable characteristic of a newborn bureaucracy such as the CPA, which was created out of nothing, from nowhere.

Our building was centrally located, vulnerable to every conceivable form of attack. By September, we had more protection personnel in our small building than civilian experts. We were not able to bring volunteers from other countries in because there was nowhere to house them, because we were getting more and more private armies on our side. (You might call them militias). We needed both to relocate and to get on with our task as best we could. So, we established four strategic priorities, three of these are very familiar, but I'm going to repeat them anyway, and I want to emphasize the interlinking nature of these priorities, because this really is the nub of my message today. The first strategic priority, most obviously, was security: security for Iraqis and security for ourselves. The second was reconstruction and economic development, essential services, agriculture (not a field the army can or would do), health, education, including crucially capacity-building of Iraqi managers when the top four tiers had been de-Baathified. Thirdly, governance, which I put as no more than sowing the seeds of democracy, by which I meant a greater involvement of representative groups, so that people felt they had some greater degree of say in their future than they did under Saddam. The fourth one was perceptions, Iraqis needed accurate knowledge of developments, and when there were false stories circulated those stories needed to be set right. And I make a distinction between accurate perceptions and spin which I regard as counterproductive. I focus then on two operational imperatives: first, staffing. I needed more staff with real specialist expertise, to gain credibility on the ground with the Iraqis and, incidentally, with the British army who were distinctly unimpressed by our civilian contribution. That's why I put in my bid for these 37 technical experts and 20 armored vehicles. I was enormously helped by volunteers from other countries, many of whose governments, for one reason or another, preferred to focus their support for the coalition in the south rather than elsewhere. We ended up with a sizeable civilian team actively engaged in almost every aspect of governance and management to a much greater extent than even the talented and versatile British military and other militaries could possible aspire to. The second operation imperative, with the army, we drew and started to implement what we called an emergency reconstruction plan, and its objective was to provide highly visible, quick impact and tactically important projects in essential services. We wanted to show results before the bigger, but, initially, almost invisible central CPA contracts came to fruition.

In retrospect, its clear than many of those big central CPA projects started in mid-2003 have never come to fruition. This became one of our main activities (this emergency reconstruction plan) and one of my own principle, personal focuses of effort. My background before I became a diplomat was incidentally in electrical engineering, which was quite incidental I think. Even if I hadn't been an engineer, I still would have focused on this issue and I certainly wasn't an engineer while I was there. But by the time I left, there were more Iraqi technical managers than coalition members attending my main weekly meetings, and later on, lots of CPA observers from Baghdad came to see what we were doing in this field. Meanwhile though, there was a chronic unemployment problem, and although many members of the Iraqi army and many thousands of teachers received stipends, despite these stipends they were essentially out of a job.

Our efforts of course were made easier by the relatively permissive environment in the south. And these two factors let to a virtuous spiral: as we showed results, so we gained more support. Because we could move relatively freely, several times a week, I could for instance open water purification plants, I could visit reconstructed schools, I could present books and equipment to university faculties and to hospitals, I could speak to students and to womens' groups – all this had local television and newspaper coverage, though the international media didn't seem too interested in good news stories. Though the Financial Times did cover my fascinating meeting with Sheikh Rahim. At that meeting incidentally, one of Sheikh Rahim's fellow sheikhs on the council said, "I am tired of hearing all these promises which come to nothing." At which point I have to say I responded, "Sir, if you are tired, I have some pills which will keep you awake because we still need to talk." I got a laugh out of the group, I must say, despite of Sheikh Rahim's fieriness. But as an example in agriculture, we gained a lot of support in the countryside for preventing what would other wise have been failures of the winter tomato crop in Basra. But actually the Basra winter tomato crop provided 75 percent of all the tomatoes consumed in Iraq; tomato was a staple part of the diet. We also prevented the failure of the wheat crop, in Maysān province, which was very difficult then and remains a very difficult province. Any such failure, this wasn't just a matter of agriculture, any such failure would have led to increased unemployment and food shortages, and this would have brought people out onto the streets, directly affecting security. And all these tasks were carried out with the closest possible liaison with the military and the Iraqis. In such circumstances, a degree of humility was essential. We needed to recognize the extent of our ignorance on the state of the country, the nature of the people and of the personalities. Expertise on developing countries was more relevant and valuable than political theorizing and ideology. Perhaps, just perhaps, Iraq was not a particularly evil example of the Arab world, as it had been under Saddam, but a country with a proud heritage and a distinct (albeit complex) personality/identity. Some of those in whom we initially put trust owed their position to Saddam, others had no real authority or influence, many were primarily interested in the accretion of power. Getting beyond prejudices and instinctive first impressions – like somebody who looks you straight in the eye and gives you a firm handshake: "he must be a good man" – into the ground realities was difficult, would take a long time and still will. My tour was a mere six months, the same as our military commanders. Most tours for American and British civilians in the early days were only three months. This was quite inadequate for the task, so capacity-building as I mentioned for Iraqis was crucial. Senior managers had been figuratively decapitated by de-Baathification, and in some cases, they'd been literally decapitated by the settling of old scores. Middle managers urgently needed to be transformed into senior managers, and had to be encouraged to get on with the job themselves, where previously independence of mind meant being killed. We also had to keep an eye on the emerging political parties that largely, of course, started from nothing and that very quickly grew with the new oxygen that we had provided. We first needed to convince the Iraqis that we were really trying, that we were actually on their side. We were liberators, rather than occupiers. We then needed to convince them that there were real limits to what we could do; in other words, we were determined to move as fast as possible, but we couldn't go faster than what was possible. We needed to gain supporters, we needed to earn consent. And it was in October, during Ramadan, when I used to give Iftars to meet local Iraqis, in the hope that I would be invited back to Iftars, which I was. The governor of Basra said to me for the first time during Ramadan that the security situation had improved, and that the general conditions of life, such as essential

services, were getting better. About the same time, our Iraqi technical contacts changed their approach from just presenting us with repeated lists and demands for equipment and plants, and started to give us their trust and consult with us about priorities for specific projects. The south's main religious leader told me at an Iftar that Ramadan was a success because of four reasons: Saddam had gone; second, people were allowed to assembly freely at an Iftar – there were probably 20 people at our Iftar, this was inconceivable under Saddam; third, the lights were on, which they were; fourth, he said, "We are eating bananas." I thought that was strange, but bananas had been a rare luxury item, now they were being sold at every street corner. Just as in London where you get your windscreen washed whether you want it or not, in Basra, you got a banana thrust through your window.

Crucially, various groupings started actively assisting military operations to a very positive effect. Governance on the other hand, political strategy (grand strategy), didn't impinge much on our daily lives or on the southern Iraqis, although it took up an enormous proportion of the CPA leadership's effort in Baghdad, and in Washington and in London. Such a concentration on top-down governance and the relative neglect of bottom-up political processes risked leading to 18 different arrangements for local governments in each of the 18 different provinces – and that's exactly what happened. We had 18 provincial governments that operated on completely different bases. The fact was that in southern Iraq at least people were more concerned with their daily life (with their security, their family, jobs and opportunities, in roughly that order). The success or otherwise of local political processes and the results were very varied, and enormously depended on personalities. I think I want to emphasis that Basra – I'd worked a lot in developing countries, in poor developing countries – southern Iraq was not a poor developing country, it was a middle income developing country and in my first few weeks when I went out into the souks, much against the will of my American bodyguards, I asked "how's business?" Business was booming. There was a lot of money around, these stipends and subventions very quickly got into the economy. Of course there were a lot of people out of work, but there were a lot of people in work and trading was very brisk. In the six months that I was there, the increase of wealth (concentrate wealth, certainly) became very evident. The goods on sale changed from essentials to white goods, TVs, videos, satellite dishes and DVDs. The director of irrigation who took me around the famous marshes at the end of January told me he did not watch much television, but he also said that he had three satellite dishes.

All these developments hinged on the prevailing security situation and it all deteriorated rapidly, particularly after April 2004, the first Falluja operation. But security – and here I really come to the gist of my sermon – cannot be an exclusively military issue. In terms of the local population, it was closely linked to a state of mind and it is affected by perceptions of well-being and perceptions of the prospects of improvements and opportunities. Although the British Army knows this well and has enormous skills in engineering, construction, medical services and military policing, civilian skills are needed too. These factors can give rise to friction between civilians and the military. The military may resent undertaking tasks which they think should fall to civilians, and be irritated by a seeming slowness in producing results or by political sensitivities. Civilians, for their part, may look askance at military methods and what they may perceive to be insensitivity, a lack of subtlety, or impatience for progress. Integration of these two aspects will never be easy, but it is essential. The default mode is for soldiers, intelligence people and civilians to work in separate compartments, which is the road to chaos. I see that the US Army in its Quadrennial Defense Review has distanced itself from the "We Do War" approach, where it has often treated conflict as some sort of exclusive function. And it is reassuring, I think, that the US Army is now producing a counterinsurgency field manual. (I don't want to sound patronizing, but from what I've seen of it, it looks very sound.) It is not at all clear yet, of course, to what extent these concepts will find favor in practice.

Theoretically, it is quite an achievement that in a period of 12 months the Iraqi people went to the ballot box no less than three times, culminating in elections last December, to form a government on the basis of a democratically agreed constitution. But its far from clear (of course, as we all know) that this will prove sustainable. What is clear, however, is that what is happening now is very

different from the ambitious objectives which Donald Rumsfeld and Jerry Bremer set for the Coalitional Provisional Authority in mid-2003.

Finally, then, let me turn to some possible lessons for the future, and a lot has been said and written about this already and this shows it is not an easy issue. A month or so ago, I heard an eminent and distinguished practitioner who has real hands-on experience in another theater, itemize a list of seven major lessons. To me, however, with the experience in other places (and his experiences: his seven lessons all fell down at the first. His first lesson was, I quote, “It is imperative to quickly establish a secure environment.” No on can disagree with that, but that to my mind is not a lesson, it is a description of the problem.) It is problem that Pakistan has been wrestling with for the last 59 years, as it has tried to build up its young state. It is still a problem in Afghanistan, five years after the start of the bombing campaign and for decades before that. It is still a problem in Iraq three and half years after the start of that campaign. I also recently heard an academic who was fascinated by reviewing experiences in Northern Ireland and the mistakes which were made there. There were very considerable mistakes made by the British in Northern Ireland. And his conclusion was, “We cannot afford to learn from experience, we must get it right the first time.” This too, was very well meant, but it doesn’t belong to the real world. We will make mistakes and we must be prepared for unforeseen and unintended consequences of our own actions.

From my perspective, I’d single just out a quite different need, that is, if we want to help a state that is dysfunctional for whatever reason, we will need contributions from civilians with appropriate expertise, who arrive on the ground quickly and in adequate numbers, and who are able and prepared to operate in a hazardous environment. Their roles will not be the same as traditional development assistance personnel. Of course military functions are needed too, but these will not succeed without civilian underpinnings. At present, I don’t believe that Western governments are able to meet such a requirement, yet I also believe that we shall be facing the need in many different places in the years to come. Without adequate civilian involvement it will fall to armies to fill the gaps, whether they like it or not. But even if soldiers adapt their skills accordingly, and its not clear that they will, they cannot alone build up a failed state. Short of that then, it may be better not to embark on hazardous interventions unless and until we have first prepared ourselves through planning through the establishment of administrative structures, and with appropriate human and financial resources to enable us to see them through. We need to fill the gap between pledges and our ability to deliver. We need to match ends to means. We need not only to learn lessons, we need to implement them. As one experienced war-fighting general, whom I know well, was fond of saying, “Hope is not a plan”.

Closing Address

Dr. Michael Ambühl

State Secretary and Political Director, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)

Vivian Fritschi

Thank you Chairman, Excellencies, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Recently I'm told a meeting took place between the president of the European Commission, the NATO secretary general and God. At the end of their conversation, the two mortals took the opportunity to ask God one last tricky question. The president of the European Commission wondered when the EU could adopt a new constitutional treaty; God's answer was short and to the point. "This is something that you will probably not see happen during your term of office." The secretary general of NATO in turn then asked when Switzerland would join NATO. God sighed and said, "This is something that I will probably not see happen during my term of office."

Ladies and Gentleman, even though Switzerland has no intention of joining NATO, we share many common security interests. Our participation in the Partnership for Peace program gives the opportunity to maintain an intensive security dialogue with NATO and to implement specific projects on a flexible basis. This December will mark the 10th anniversary of Switzerland's membership in PfP. During these years, we have made numerous contributions to planning and implementing specific activities in such areas as security sector reform, critical infrastructure protection, international humanitarian law, and we have been active in training initiatives. But we have also participated in discussions on security-related issues that go well beyond the scope of the Euro-Atlantic region; these include the question of failed states, a source of instability, proliferation and terrorism, as well as that of the delicate balance between preserving stability and promoting democracy and many more.

Ladies and Gentleman, I would like to focus here on two particular issues you have debated and approach them from a Swiss perspective: security sector reform (SSR) and the peace support operations. Firstly, SSR: the basic principle of this concept, namely, is the transparent and democratic control of security structures. Together with the idea that foreign policy, development policy and security policy are interlinked. These concepts are widely shared by many countries and several international organizations alike, among them the UN, OECD, EU, NATO and OSCE. Security sector reform not only applies to the defense sector, it also includes border security, justice and police, private sector companies and other security-related actors, and it's the whole of government approach. In this respect, I would like to pay tribute to the wide-ranging work of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), through which Switzerland and other contributing countries promote good governance and the reform of the security sector. I strongly believe in the usefulness of the center's activities and can only encourage other governments and institutions to support it. As for the second issue, the peace support operations, I note that with more than 90,000 personnel currently on the ground, operations have reached an unprecedented level. According to a recent statement by the under secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, it is very likely that this figure will rise to 140,000 in the near future. Today, almost 110 countries are involved in the 18 on-going UN peacekeeping missions. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in PSO missions led by regional organizations such as NATO, EU, the African Union, and ECOWAS. PSOs have not only changed quantitatively, they also have adapted to the new security environment. They have been transformed into complex and multidimensional operations covering a broad spectrum of tasks and pursuing the ambitious goals of sustainable peace. This comes with the fundamental understanding that there can be no security without development and no development without security. The importance of this inter-linkage between the economy, development and security was recently recognized by the Nobel Peace Prize committee when it honored Muhammad Yunus from Bangladesh for his efforts to created economic and social development from below.

Switzerland is also endeavoring to strengthen its PSO engagements; its foreign affairs and defense ministries are working together to increase Switzerland's PSO capacities step-by-step. We are aware that we could and should do more. And we are keen not only to provide about all highly sophisticated and quality-based contributions, but also to achieve a quantitative level that corresponds to our core capacities. It is my conviction that as a neutral country without a colonial past and without vested interests, Switzerland actually is well-suited to contribute to PSOs. Participation in peace support operations is complementary for other foreign policy activities. I see it is as an integral part of our peace and security policy contributing both to peace and stability, as well as strengthening our position as an honest broker. In addition, we have specific “know-how” to offer, in particular, in the area of civil-military cooperation. Typically, as a result of the very specific militia-type structure of our army, Swiss soldiers remain fully integrated in the civilian, professional and political life throughout their military careers. As a consequence they have a good understanding of everyday problems and needs related to the interaction between civil and military elements. This is because they are accustomed to looking at issues from both perspectives.

Ladies and Gentleman, in conclusion, I would like to highlight the fact that there are of course many more security issues where Switzerland plays an active role beyond those I have just mentioned. I could cite for example arms control, disarmament, development, peace, conflict prevention and others. But as a rather small international player, it is important to have a coherent and focused approach. More often than not, focusing one's available resources on a few areas can produce much better results than making small contributions to many unrelated areas.

Finally, ladies and gentleman I wish you a safe trip home. The end of summertime tonight provides you with an additional hour to continue the discussion on these interesting and important subjects. I wish you all the best, and I look forward to welcoming you again to the next forum.

Background Information

The International Security Forum (ISF) was launched as the Institutes and Security Dialogue in Zurich in 1994 and has since been at the forefront of cooperation among international security professionals around the world.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) and the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) have played a key role in that process, together with:

- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
- The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (HEI)
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The main financial contribution to the ISF comes from the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

As one of the institutions that support and participate in the ISF conference cycle, the ISN has established itself as a leading information service that combines IT leadership with the study of international security.

The ISF has established itself as a forum for discussing ways to increase communication and cooperation between institutions engaged in research related to international security in Europe, North America and beyond. Over the years, the ISF has brought together hundreds of researchers, academics, civil servants, military officials and media representatives from some 50 countries. The conference is biennial and is held alternately in Zurich and Geneva. Due to the success of the ISF, the Swiss government continues to support the conference cycle with its international co-sponsors and partners. The ISF cycle has the following specific objectives:

- To create a platform for discussion and an exchange of views on academic, military and practical aspects of security policy
- To discuss humanitarian aspects of security policy and to encourage dialogue with humanitarian organizations
- To promote practical cooperation between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) member states
- To encourage professional education and the free flow of information on issues relating to international security
- To foster an international and multidisciplinary dialogue that will identify future issues and trends in international security

Past Conferences

- 6th International Security Forum (04 - 06 October 2004, Montreux)
- 5th International Security Forum (14 - 16 October 2002, Zurich)

4th International Security Forum (15 - 17 November 2000, Geneva)

3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes Networking the Security Community in the Information Age (19 - 21 October 1998, Zurich)

2nd Institutes and the Security Dialogue (12 - 14 September 1996, Palais des Nations, Geneva)

1st Institutes and the Security Dialogue (26 - 28 April 1994, Zurich)