


No. 1, May 2004

**Demographics and
Development in Xinjiang
after 1949**

Stanley Toops



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Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949

Two of the most obvious dimensions of change in Xinjiang since 1949 have been the demographic and economic. Different agents have considered these changes sources of either stability or tension within the region. The composition and size of the population has changed dramatically. In the early 1800s the population under the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty was roughly 60% Turkic and 30% Han. In 1953, a People's Republic of China census registered 4.87 million of which 75% were Uyghur and 6% Han. In 1964 the census documented 7.44 million of which 54% were Uyghur and 33% Han. After the beginning of the economic reforms, Xinjiang registered 13.08 million of which 46% were Uyghur and 40% Han. In terms of the 2000 census, Xinjiang's 18.46 million people are 45.21% Uyghur and 40.57% Han. The current population situation is similar to that of the Qing when many Han lived in the area (Toops 2003; XPCO 2002).

Economic development has been similarly startling. As the population has quadrupled,

the region's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has increased considerably. In 1952 GDP per capita was 166 yuan. In 1978 at the beginning of the reform period GDP per capita (in 1952 yuan) was 292 yuan. By 1990 in real GDP per capita was 810 yuan and by 2000 real GDP per capita reached 1699 yuan (Wiemer, 2003). The material welfare of most residents in Xinjiang has improved dramatically.

Yet these changes point to a number of questions: First, how does development relate to demography in Xinjiang? Can we establish a causal relationship between increases in population and wealth over time? The bulk of the population growth has stemmed from Han immigration. Have Han immigrants been the principal engine of economic growth? Or has growth, by contrast, brought about immigration? Second, how has the economic growth been distributed? It appears that some regions have amassed new wealth more quickly than others, and that Hans have garnered the ma-

majority of economic gains, particularly in the Reform Era. Is this appearance supported by statistics? What have been the sources of regional and demographic disparities? Finally, what are the prospects for future growth of both types? Are there limits on the carrying capacity of the land, such that further population growth may be ecologically unsustainable?

These questions are important because among the complaints of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the influx of Hans, the poverty of Uyghur farmers, and the outsized economic gains of Hans have been among the most important and consistent. While the Party leadership hopes economic growth will assuage separatist inclinations in the population, that growth may have no such effect if it continues to be lopsided. Party leaders in both Beijing and Urumqi have consistently advocated (and engineered) Han immigration to increase the stability of the region. Yet further immigration may only exacerbate competition for scarce land and resources, and therefore inflame Uyghur passions further.

I discuss Xinjiang's place in China's geography and consider development theory as applied to Xinjiang. I then use statistics from the Xinjiang Statistical Bureau and the 2000 census to examine the regional demographic and development landscapes of Xinjiang. Finally I consider the relation of internal conflicts in the region with Xinjiang's development and demography.

Relevance of research

The geographical value of this study exists in several dimensions. An emphasis is on the ethnic characteristics of the locality undergoing development. The ethnic characteristics of locality are a part of *place*. Place, a central topic of geographic inquiry, provides the matrix for this study. Places and their experiences need to be the stage upon which the geographer's understanding of development is based. A focus in this study is thus on the people of the place (the localities of Xinjiang), and for development as interpreted through

the locality and its people. Knowledge of place is a key tool for development. Local inhabitants have that knowledge; thus the geographer should study local knowledge to understand better the place and its experiences.

Research on issues in the developing world need to focus on the dialectic between exogenous forces, (the world at large) and endogenous forces (the locality). A geographical approach to this research requires a knowledge of place, of the locality and its landscape. This requirement is a base of the present study. The type of knowledge involved here is one of thick description—an interpretation, rather than a thin description—a recording (Geertz 1973). Neglect of place knowledge may be especially common in research concerned with traditional development conceptualization.

What is this place called Xinjiang? The Han and Tang Dynasties knew this place as *xiyu* western region. Only after the Qing conquered this land in the mid-1700s was the place known as Xinjiang. In Chinese *xin* means new, while *jiang* means territory, frontier or dominion. The character for *jiang* has in it the glyphs for the bow, the earth and fields. So in Chinese this name means that it is a new land to be protected. To Central Asians like the Uyghur or Kazak, there were many other names for this place (or places) – Kashgaria, Karakocho, Karakhanid. This land was of the desert (Takla Makan), or of the mountain (Tengri Tagh). Another designation was that of Turkistan. Or, as this place was east of the Tengri Tagh, it became an Eastern Turkistan. Knowledge of this place rests on both Turkic and Sinic roots of meaning.

Another geographical focus of the study is on the region. China's development programs are addressed to the needs of its various regions. Developmental change occurs in Xinjiang based on the dynamism of the region. Xinjiang is composed as well of different localities that vary in character and responses to government policies. Vital to geographical inquiry is a contemplation of regional change. How and why do regions change? By deliber-

ating upon development and ethnicity, this study centers on a process-oriented regional geography that integrates the various localities.

Gilbert (1988) characterizes regional studies as deriving from production, cultural identification, and societal interaction. Production in industry and agriculture as well as the tertiary sector inscribes an activity region of Xinjiang and smaller sets of regions within Xinjiang. Regions of cultural identification in Xinjiang are constituted through relations between and within ethnic groups. The region is the medium for social interaction; the relationships that link together institutions and people shape that region. The present study, with its focus on Xinjiang, a region of ethnic distinction, contributes to this geographical understanding of regional diversity by emphasizing the regionally ethnic nature of production in Xinjiang.

The modern-day regional structure of Xinjiang is three fold. 1) North. The Ili River region and the Dzungarian Basin lie north of the Tengri Tagh, (the. Tian Shan, the Heavenly Mountains). This northern region is comprised of Ili Kazak, Bortala Mongol and Changji Hui Prefectures. Substantial numbers of Uyghur and Han reside here besides the titular ethnic groups. A subset of the north is found in the industrial municipalities of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi – this is the modern day core of Xinjiang's economy populated mostly by Han. 2) South. The Tarim Basin is situated south of the Tengri Tagh and north of the Kunlun Mountains. The mostly Uyghur population populates the oases between the mountains and the formidable Takla Makan Desert. This southern expanse encompasses, Kashgar, Hotan and Aksu Districts as well as the Kizilsu Kirghiz and Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture. Many Han make their home in Bayangol especially Korla and in Aksu. 3) East. A cleft of the Tengri Tagh nestles the eastern portion of the region. The east is composed of Turpan and Hami (Kumul) Districts.

The geographic study of development has considered primarily issues of spatial or-

ganization or population-resource questions. Both of these conceptual frameworks need to include as well the cultural dimension. The cultural settings and milieus shape the flow of development. This study's geographical analysis contributes to an understanding of the role of ethnicity in development by showing the impact of local ethnic characteristics on the development process in Xinjiang.

Development theory

Historical change within human communities has occurred as the people of a territory involve themselves in and interact with the world at large. After World War II the study of such change was generally restricted to economic growth; development was considered primarily a question of economic growth. Through the 1950s, this type of development meant the ability of a national economy to sustain an annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) at five per cent or more (Todaro and Smith 2003).

By the 1960s, some states in the third world were meeting this overall requirement, yet the standard of living for many people remained unchanged. To get at the real meaning of development meant to get beyond a single statistic, GDP, and include other variables. The definition of development continued to evolve. Seers (1969) viewed the development of a country as including not just economic growth but also as involving a decline of inequality, unemployment, and poverty. "If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development' even if per capita income doubled." (Seers 1969, 3).

Broadening the concept, Seers (1977) saw development as also meaning self-reliance a reduction of cultural dependence, a more proper distribution of the world's economic bounty (redistribution with growth). These changing definitions of development are reflective of the growing critique on the traditional approaches to development (economic growth alone).

Goulet (1985) expanded the term, development, to include the achievement of political and cultural as well as social and economic goals, in short, the enrichment of the quality of human life. The good life is composed of three trans-cultural core values, or goals, held in common by all people. The first value is life-sustenance, the provision of food, shelter, medicine and protection to all people. The second value is self-esteem, a society's retention of dignity, worth and respect in the midst of contact with a materially more prosperous society. The third value is freedom from servitude, an expanded range of choice, a reduction of dependence on nature, ignorance, misery, dogma, and other societies (Goulet 1985).

For Xinjiang as well as other parts of China, the reform period's efforts at development are noteworthy. In China millions have been brought out of poverty. From Seers definition of development, in China there is economic growth and less poverty. With the continuation of China's changing economic reforms, many have been left unemployed, as the state sector has restructured. Inequalities are arising as well (all were equal under Communism, some were more equal than others). In Xinjiang many people have achieved a better standard of living. The basic needs of people in China have been met. Life sustenance in China is still major issue for the poor, who like those in the US (Black Hills, Appalachia, Deep South) are primarily agricultural, tilling poor soil, and far from markets. Of course the US and now China has urban poor as well. In China, as in the US, minority ethnic groups are relatively poorer compared to the more populous and powerful elements of society. Beyond life-sustenance, the latter two elements of Goulet's conception of development are rather more difficult to achieve. Self-esteem and freedom are goals the world over not just in China or Xinjiang.

The development from below strategy (Stöhr and Taylor 1981) is geared to the least developed regions in the third world. Development from below in contrast to development from above would require the emer-

gence of active development impulses within the less-developed areas and the control of the disastrous outflow of capital, commodities, and people away from the periphery to the center. Emphasis should be on small-scale development projects and on a fuller utilization of resources within the periphery for the periphery. Traditional center-down growth pole strategies may benefit certain areas higher up on the metropole hierarchy but the peripheral areas need a different mode of development. A development from below strategy would best work in areas with the following characteristics: 1) contiguous less-developed areas with large populations; 2) low per capita resource base; 3) low levels of living in a peripheral location; 4) few internal dynamic urban centers; and 5) a regional identity based on distinctive socio-cultural aspects.

The applicability of Stöhr and Taylor's (1981) approach to Xinjiang's development appears both in terms of the type of areas and in elements of the strategy. Stöhr and Taylor indicate that development from below programs would be useful for subnational peripheral areas that are less developed, populous, different socio-culturally, rural and poor. Xinjiang fits these criteria well. Of its over 18 million people, over half are not ethnic Chinese. The standard of living is less than China's coast and the urban centers of Xinjiang are not well suited to absorbing the large rural population. The only criterion that Xinjiang does not fit completely is that of low per capita resource base. With Xinjiang's oil and minerals, there exists certain potential for development. However, if locals do not utilize these minerals, then the locals have a low per capita resource base. China has followed a mixed development strategy, incorporating elements of development from above and development from below; Xinjiang's experience fits within China's larger scope.

Todaro and Smith's text (2003) on economic development defines the transformation as the process of improving the quality of human life. Underdevelopment, in contrast, moves in the opposite direction to where peo-

ple are worse off than before. As Meier and Stiglitz and others (2001) have discussed it, the future of development economics needs to go beyond the examination of economic growth.

Development and ethnicity on the edge

How do ethnicity and development interact in substate peripheries? The development from below approach (Stöhr 1981) merges with a dialectal perspective on ethnicity (Keyes 1981) and the distinctiveness of the periphery (Rokkan 1983). To obtain a culturally relevant perspective on development, the components of ethnicity, production and periphery are set within the broad background of the cultural dimension of development.

The interrelationships of culture and development are the focus of development theorists within and without geography. Configurations of development arise from the varying value systems of local people involved. The wholesale borrowing of development methods from the center by the periphery does not contribute to the development of the periphery when local cultural traditions are not part of the consideration.

Where does development interact with ethnicity? Concretely, development efforts will have their presence felt on ethnicity in the home, the market place and the workplace. The locus of this study is the workplace. Production sites have an economic purpose, yet the extension of ethnicity into the workplace necessitates this investigation into the culture of production. Traditional work activities and their products are a part of the conglomeration of ethnic markers that allow a group to identify itself as such. Theoretically, the nodes of intersection are a) the cultural interpretations of development present in the ethnic groups and b) the impact of development programs upon inward and outward markers of ethnicity.

Stavenhagen (1986) examines the interacting theoretical possibilities of ethnicity and development. Ethnic issues exist and confront us daily, yet much of the social, economic, geographical, and political theories of

development neglected ethnic issues up till the 1980s. A leap in the unit of analysis from the individual to larger collectivities such as the state has skipped over the impact of ethnic communities on development. Stavenhagen (1986) turned toward ethnodevelopment—the development of ethnic groups within the framework of larger society—to understand these issues. Stavenhagen (1990) goes on to examine ethnicity and development with a further discussion of ethnic conflicts and the nation state in Stavenhagen (1996).

A dialectical interpretation of ethnicity is useful to our understanding of development as it envelopes both the evolving nature and the primordial sentiments of ethnicity (Keyes 1981). While a circumstantialist perspective contributes to the realization that ethnicity articulates with development in an evolving manner, a primordialist perspective recognizes that ethnic identities contain different perceptions of development.

A common thread woven into the design of development is the necessary humanity in the development process. Without a consideration of the cultural and ethnic diversity in human community, without putting people in their development, our understanding of development is not complete. On a practical level, development projects may not achieve their expected fruition without including the ethnic factor. Development ‘from below’ approaches, with a further consideration of the cultural dimension, has added to the wholeness of development. “Culture, not economic, technology or politics, is the primordial dimension in development.” (Goulet 1985, 272). Sen (2000) sees development as freedom that involves culture and human rights.

China’s policies toward development in minority areas

The People’s Republic of China faces issues of development and ethnicity in the periphery in their efforts to develop the *shaoshu minzu diqu* (minority nationality areas). By definition the minority nationality areas are ethnic. They are also located in China’s periphery and are con-

sidered in China to be backward and in need of development. The essential elements of the theoretical construct just formulated are present in China. A goal of this research is to consider China's policies toward development in the minority nationality areas as followed under the China reform program.

The efforts to develop the minority nationality areas fit within the general context of China general program for development. Pragmatism is a key aspect to the economic reforms overall. Another major aspect of the reform period has been that plans for development were regionally based. The reformist development for minority areas is pragmatic and regional as well but also possesses an ethnic dimension.

Since its founding, the PRC has embarked on massive efforts toward control and development. China's approach to rural development until 1978 had entailed a provision of basic needs, local control of surplus, use of local resources, set in the midst of cataclysmic political change (Wu and Ip, 1981). Rural development in reform China reflects pragmatism. Rural development in the 1980s was based on the principle of according to what suits the land. This entails small-scale industrialization as well as agricultural activities that take into account local conditions of the market, human capital and natural environment (Wu 1987).

China's regional policies for development have also evolved. At the end of the Cultural Revolution (1976), priority was given to investment in the inland region (in the northwest and southwest, beyond China proper). In the early 1980s central policies encouraged the cooperation between the coastal and inland regions. In this fashion the capital, technology and management capabilities generated by the coastal region could be invested in the inland regions, thus redressing the regional imbalances in the country. The inland region has made economic gains during the period of reform, but the coastal region's gains have been of greater magnitude. Thus a temporal comparison with the past would show an im-

provement for the inland areas, but a spatial comparison with the coast does not register an improvement. The Seventh Five Year Plan of 1986-1990 considered development in China from a regional viewpoint, the Eastern, Central and Western regions each with their own role to play. The interior functions nationally as a supplier of primary products (energy, minerals, herding animals and specialty crops). Deposits of oil, natural gas, and coal play an important role in the overall development plans of the country (Goodman 1989). Later Five Year Plans in the 1990s spoke of many regions with many roles to play, but emphasized the coast and the Yangzi river (Goodman 1994).

Cannon (2000) sees China's growing economy has having major impact on the regions. Li and Tang (2000) also point out that the coastal development strategy meant more than a decade of treating places differently. The interior has many grievances as the coastal growth has been at the expense of the interior. Interior localities have a latecomer mentality and try to catch up with the coast at times to the detriment to the interior localities. As Wei (2000) has shown, the interior region's lag behind the coast is product of three actors including the state, the investor and the region. In the case of Xinjiang and other minority areas, development policy is applied to these regions. The goal of the policy is development to be sure, but also to win support from the minority population and maintain government control over these vital areas. The goals of the PRC are served by continued economic growth encompassing minority people as well as Han (Li and Tang 2000).

Within China, articles have been published in such journals as *Minzu Yanjiu* (*Nationalities Research*) and *Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Xuebao* (*Bulletin for the Central Nationalities University*) focusing on the issues of economic development in minority areas. This emphasis goes back to Zhou Enlai's 1957 speech on minority ethnic work (reprinted in 1980 in *Minzu Yanjiu*). In this speech the necessity of developing areas of both Han and minority is recognized.

A China that encompasses areas like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia and allows them to remain “backward” is not developed. Development of these areas is necessary before China can be “socialist” (Zhou Enlai 1957 [1980]).

China’s economic development program in minority nationality areas should be based on the characteristics of these areas. According to Shi Zhengyi (1983) besides ethnicity, these characteristics include locality, economy, complexity, and border location. Development should be planned in accordance with local needs and abilities. The local character may well be complex; a number of economic activities may function side by side. The general perception in China is that the minority ethnic areas are economically *louhou* (backward) in that the areas haven’t proper infrastructure or personnel to utilize their resources. The general perspective is that through proper interaction with the Han in the center, the minority in the periphery of China will be able to develop (Fei 1981).

China embarked on a “develop the west” campaign in 1999. Policies in the 1980s focused on developing the eastern coast while the western interior should prepare for future development (Shi 1988). After the coastal development strategy of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC began to turn its attention to rural poverty much of which was located in the interior. In June 1999, Jiang Zemin formally opened the western development strategy at CCP and government meetings. On June 17 in a speech in Xi’an on the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises in the Five Northwestern Provinces, Jiang Zemin first used the phrase *xibu da kaifa* (great western development). This policy elaborates on Deng Xiaoping’s coastal program by turning to regional inequalities in the west (Du Ping et al, 2000).

Reasons for the new “develop the west” campaign focus on reducing regional inequality. In the 1990s, the interior regions began to be discontent with the siphoning off of resources, human and natural, to coastal development (Lai 2002). Lack of economic growth in the west meant underdevelopment—in turn

leading to social instabilities. For western regions that have areas characterized by poverty and a larger percentage of minority population in the ethnic makeup, there is a potential for political instability as well as social instability. So the basic formula of development leading to stability is one that is followed in China.

Development in the minority area during the reform era is set within the overall framework of China’s development policy; it is both pragmatic and regional. Central policies for development have included the integration of the minority periphery into the national economy. The particularities vary from place to place in China.

Development and demographics in Xinjiang

The particular focus of this research is Xinjiang. With its border location, ethnic distinctiveness and productive resources, Xinjiang has particular facets that make useful research into the development of the western region.

Under the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the PRC commanded a great restructuring of the area. That restructuring occurred through many different programs. Their focus has been an orientation of Xinjiang to Beijing. Historically, Xinjiang’s centers of power and activity were in Kashgar, Turpan and Ili. In modern Xinjiang under the PRC, the centralizing force of the state has meant that Urumqi has become the dominant center in terms of productions, administration, culture, population, and power. For Xinjiang this has meant a re-orientation to Beijing and lessening of the status of Kashgar, Turpan, and Ili in a hierarchy of power. This re-orientation to China has created a geography of development as well as a geography of demographics. The first layer to consider is development. The next layer to consider is demographics. The reconstruction of the development landscape has meant the distribution of productive forces and their concentration in central Xinjiang. As migrants from other portions of China move to Xinjiang, a new demographic

TABLE 1
Per Capita GDP, Xinjiang, 1978-2000

| Year | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| PC GDP (yuan) | 313 | 359 | 410 | 450 | 488 | 583 | 661 | 820 |
| Pop (mil) | 12.33 | 12.57 | 12.83 | 13.03 | 13.16 | 13.33 | 13.44 | 1361 |
| Year | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
| PC GDP (yuan) | 924 | 1053 | 1347 | 1493 | 1799 | 2101 | 2477 | 2980 |
| Pop (mil) | 13.83 | 14.06 | 14.26 | 14.54 | 15.29 | 15.54 | 15.80 | 16.05 |
| Year | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | |
| PC GDP (yuan) | 3953 | 4764 | 5167 | 5904 | 6229 | 6470 | 7470 | |
| Pop (mil) | 16.32 | 16.61 | 16.89 | 17.18 | 17.47 | 18.00 | 18.46 | |

(Xinjiang Tongji Ninjian 2001, 49)

landscape is created which means further directional shift—toward Beijing.

Xinjiang's development landscape

The XUAR has followed the movement of land reform, communization, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, four modernizations, and the private responsibility system. The policies have had their impact on Xinjiang as they have had in other parts of China. With the reform period, since 1978 and especially since the quickening of reforms in 1992, development has proceeded apace. I will use statistics from the Xinjiang Statistical Bureau as well as the 2000 census to portray the development landscape.

Agriculturally, the hallmark of Xinjiang's development has been the Production and Construction Corps (PCC, *shengchan jianshe bingtuan*). As the PLA in Xinjiang were demobilized in the 1950s, the Production and Construction Corps was formed in 1954 to clear land and do irrigation work, mostly around settled areas. Large amounts of central investments and subsidies were directed to rebuilding the land. At the same time central funds and demobilized troops contributed to the consolidation of central control (McMillen 1981; Seymour 2000). Animal husbandry has

continued growth but the production policies during the collectivization period hindered the pastoralists. Most disastrous was the formation of agro-herding complexes that plowed up rangelands for grain. Xinjiang has the capacity to be a great meat producer for China. Production gains in agriculture must be understood in the context of reversals in animal husbandry (McMillen 1979; Griffin 1986; Toops 2003).

Presently Xinjiang still emphasizes grain production rather than fruit. Grain has many times the acreage of fruits and vegetable. Each district has had to be self-sufficient in grain production because of transport inadequacies. If Xinjiang were to concentrate on more specialty crop production, there would need to be a concomitant increase in transport. One region that specializes in grape production is Turpan (Hoppe 1987). Local conditions of climate are good but also important are the nearby rail connections. Overall, though, Xinjiang has seen a constant growth of production.

Xinjiang's Gross Domestic Product tallied at 136.4 billion yuan in 2000 (Table 1). Compared to the rest of the country, Xinjiang ranked at 25 of 31. The GDP was increasing at a rate of 8.2%, which matched the country's

TABLE 2

Gross Domestic Product by Sector and District, 2000 (in billion yuan)

| District | GDP | Primary | Secondary | Tertiary |
|---------------|--------|---------|-----------|----------|
| Xinjiang | 136.4 | 28.8 | 58.7 | 48.9 |
| Urumqi (C) | 27.905 | 0.396 | 10.232 | 17.277 |
| Karamay (C) | 13.859 | 0.059 | 11.659 | 2.148 |
| Shihezi (C) | 2.536 | 0.328 | 1.045 | 1.162 |
| Changji (AP) | 11.982 | 4.324 | 4.182 | 3.475 |
| Bortala (AP) | 2.243 | 0.954 | 0.49 | 0.799 |
| Ili (D) | 7.383 | 3.063 | 1.965 | 2.355 |
| Tacheng (D) | 8.376 | 3.114 | 2.54 | 2.721 |
| Altay (D) | 3.15 | 1.182 | 0.93 | 1.037 |
| Turpan (D) | 5.984 | 0.747 | 3.965 | 1.273 |
| Hami (D) | 3.382 | 0.666 | 1.212 | 1.504 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 13.49 | 2.363 | 8.368 | 2.759 |
| Aksu (D) | 9.353 | 4.312 | 2.025 | 3.016 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 0.796 | 0.326 | 0.138 | 0.332 |
| Kashgar (D) | 7.543 | 4.093 | 1.132 | 2.32 |
| Hotan (D) | 2.713 | 1.499 | 0.371 | 0.842 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 50-53)

overall rate of 8.3% (XBS 2001, 759). Xinjiang's per capita GDP has increased at a faster rate than its population overall (XBS 2001, 49). Xinjiang's PC GDP of 7470 yuan in 2000 compares favorably with the national average of 7080 yuan (XBS 2001, 49).

As the region modernized most of the industrial advancements took place in the core Xinjiang area of Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi and Changji. The economy is focused on this area (Table 2). Urumqi and Karamay have the largest values in industrial production. Urumqi is well diversified in industrial output including heavy industry, petrochemicals and textiles. Karamay's industry derives mostly from oil production, besides crude oil and gas production, processing also occurs here. Karamay is connected by pipeline to Urumqi. Korla in Bayangol is a secondary industrial center. At one time in the 1960s during the third front campaign, Korla was considered as

a potential capital of Xinjiang; many large processing plants were built here. Changji and Shihezi focus on textiles and food processing and funnel into the Urumqi industrial center. Turpan is now also becoming a processing region with its oil production as well. Districts in the south, such as Aksu and Kashgar, produce mostly for local use (cement, fertilizer, food processing). Processing of the Tarim oil adds to the GDP of Korla in Bayangol; otherwise industrial GDP in southern Xinjiang is not large (Xie 1991; XBS 2001 50-53).

In terms of agricultural production, the most productive are Changji and Aksu districts. Both districts are major sites for the Production and Construction Corps. Changji supplies Urumqi with foodstuffs, while Aksu is a center for grain production. The other major producers include Kashgar, Ili, and Tacheng. This represents the traditional geography of food production. In Ili and Tacheng

TABLE 3

Per Capita Gross Domestic Product, Xinjiang, 2000 (in yuan)

| Xinjiang (total average) 7,470 | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Urumqi (C) | 15,426 | Ili (D) | 3,512 | Bayangol (AP) | 12,874 |
| Karamay (C) | 42,498 | Tacheng (D) | 6,703 | Aksu (D) | 4,548 |
| Shihezi (C) | 9,066 | Altay (D) | 5,345 | Kizilsu (AP) | 1,832 |
| Changji (AP) | 7,580 | Turpan (D) | 10,912 | Kashgar (D) | 2,241 |
| Bortala (AP) | 5,446 | Hami (D) | 6,894 | Hotan (D) | 1,659 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 50-53)

in the north, while animal husbandry plays a major role, production of grain and sugar beets is strong as the area has been the focus for water conservancy programs. In the south Kashgar is the traditional center for the production of grain, cotton, oil crops and fruit. In the 1980s, Kashgar and Ili were the leaders only to be supplanted by Changji and Aksu (Toops 2003; Xie, 1991; XBS 2001, 50-53).

The service sector is dominated by Urumqi. Regionally the north focuses around Changji and the south focuses around Aksu. Urumqi service sector is equally composed of transport/communications and trade. The service sector of Changji and Aksu are both dominated by wholesale and retail trade. Traditional centers such as Kashgar, Ili and Turpan are supplanted in this new service economy (XBS 2001, 50-53).

Gross Domestic Product per capita gives a general idea of the size of the economy relative to the size of the population. GDP per capita is not the sole indicator of level of development, particularly since industry (particularly extractive) can be more outward directed. Investments in capital intensive industry do not necessarily translate into local jobs. However GDP per capita is one of the indicators to observe in discussing development trends.

At over 42,000 yuan, Karamay leads the way, because of its oil processing and rela-

tively low population (Table 3). Urumqi, at over 15,000 yuan has approximately double the average for Xinjiang. Other leaders include Bayangol, Turpan, and Shihezi. The low points in this economic landscape are Hotan, Kizilsu and Kashgar, all in the south and far from the economic heart of Xinjiang. Ili at 3500 yuan stands at about half of the regional average. Urumqi is the new economic center. The traditional centers of Kashgar and Ili fall short, while the traditional center of Turpan has made a bit of a comeback because of oil (XBS 2001, 50-53).

All in all the impact of oil (Karamay, Urumqi and even Bayangol and Turpan) is clear (Table 4). Refining all of the oil in the XUAR would add to the GDP. For the south having more refineries in Bayangol, Aksu or Turpan would boost local GDP. Urumqi's refineries take in most of the Tarim and Turpan oil. The Turpan oil is actually in one county, Pichan (Chinese Shanshan). Most of the oil crews are from Northeastern China, for example Daqing. Thus the oil migrants add their labor force to the local areas (XBS 2001, 525).

Production is one measure of development. Other useful measures to consider are income, employment and education. There is partial data available on income and employment. Xinjiang has carried out surveys of income and expenditures in both rural and urban areas (Table 5). The data on income for all

TABLE 4

Oil Output, Xinjiang 2000 (in million tons)

| | Crude Oil | Processed Crude |
|----------|------------------|------------------------|
| Urumqi | 1.938 | 3.479 |
| Karamay | 9.200 | 6.024 |
| Turpan | 2.782 | 0.105 |
| Bayangol | 4.563 | 0.257 |
| Aksu | 0.001 | 0.135 |
| Xinjiang | 18.484 | 10.013 |

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 525)

TABLE 5

Annual Income Per Capita (in yuan)

| Year | Rural net | Urban disposable | Year | Rural net | Urban disposable | Year | Rural net | Urban disposable |
|-------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-----------|------------------|
| 1978 | 119 | 319 | 1986 | 420 | 899 | 1994 | 936 | 3141 |
| 1979 | 143 | (na) | 1987 | 453 | 977 | 1995 | 1137 | 4251 |
| 1980 | 201 | 427 | 1988 | 497 | 1099 | 1996 | 1290 | 4670 |
| 1981 | 236 | 428 | 1989 | 546 | 1223 | 1997 | 1500 | 4859 |
| 1982 | 277 | (na) | 1990 | 684 | 1356 | 1998 | 1600 | 5131 |
| 1983 | 307 | 548 | 1991 | 703 | 1495 | 1999 | 1473 | 5429 |
| 1984 | 363 | 649 | 1992 | 740 | 1790 | 2000 | 1618 | 5817 |
| 1985 | 394 | 757 | 1993 | 778 | 2391 | | | |

(based on survey data)

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 274)

people has not been published for several years. For example, in 1992 data on income was published, but then most people worked for the state rather than private, collective, or family enterprise. The pace of reforms since 1992 makes it more difficult to say clearly what the average income is. Now people work in a number of different situations and in areas where incomes are not reported clearly.

From these surveys there has been an increase incomes for both rural and urban residents. In the 1980s urban residents had higher levels of income compared to rural with similar rates of increase. From 1992 to 1996 the urban incomes began to increase rapidly. There

was a slight leveling in 1997 but rate of changes has increased again. In 2000 rural incomes stood at 28% of urban incomes, this level will decline (XSB 2001, 274).

Rural households (n=1500) from Changji, Ili, Tacheng, Altay, Bayangol, Aksu and Kashgar and Hotan were surveyed in 2000 (Table 6). There is a good distribution of poor and well off households. In the survey 24% had a net income of less than 800 yuan (less than \$100), 7% had incomes exceeding 4000 yuan (about \$500). Most of the income is from the family business – agriculture. In terms of the regional distribution, Changji has the highest level; Tacheng and Bayangol do well

TABLE 6

Per Capita Income by District, 2000 (in yuan)

| | Xinjiang | Changji | Ili | Tacheng | Altay | Bayangol | Aksu | Kashgar | Hotan |
|----------------|----------|---------|------|---------|-------|----------|------|---------|-------|
| # Counties | 30 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| # Households | 1500 | 151 | 228 | 165 | 130 | 265 | 240 | 290 | 186 |
| # Residents | 7999 | 703 | 1330 | 864 | 721 | 1458 | 1386 | 1555 | 960 |
| Gross income | 3129 | 5449 | 3110 | 4941 | 2879 | 4116 | 2982 | 2243 | 1338 |
| 1) Wages | 105 | 209 | 120 | 186 | 117 | 185 | 46 | 49 | 112 |
| 2) Family (ag) | 2927 | 5102 | 2854 | 4634 | 2652 | 3842 | 2862 | 2166 | 1197 |
| 3) Property | 40 | 22 | 64 | 32 | 104 | 94 | 67 | 60 | 126 |
| 4) Transfer | 58 | 116 | 72 | 89 | 48 | 52 | 52 | 14 | 25 |
| Disposable | 1552 | 2541 | 1835 | 2246 | 1817 | 2197 | 1482 | 997 | 755 |
| Net income | 1618 | 2745 | 1930 | 2335 | 1880 | 2260 | 1504 | 989 | 733 |

(survey of 1500 households)

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 295-296)

TABLE 7Urban Households, Xinjiang, 2000
(income statistics in yuan)

| | Urumqi | Kashgar | Gulja | Hotan | Chocek | Karamay | Yanji |
|-------------------|--------|---------|-------|-------|--------|---------|-------|
| # Households | 400 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 50 | 40 | 50 |
| Mean size | 2.89 | 3.60 | 3.34 | 3.60 | 3.22 | 3.03 | 3.06 |
| Workers | 1.43 | 1.58 | 1.46 | 1.92 | 1.69 | 1.25 | 1.65 |
| Disposable income | 7252 | 3910 | 4299 | 4715 | 5554 | 9617 | 5175 |
| Cash income | 9153 | 4476 | 5050 | 5854 | 7378 | 13197 | 6125 |
| Expenditures | 8720 | 4274 | 4845 | 5782 | 7280 | 13034 | 6019 |

(survey of 790 households)

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 278-279)

also. The lowest levels are in Hotan and Kashgar. The south, which is mostly Uyghur, has lower levels of income. The north with its access to the market has higher levels of income (XSB, 2001, 295-296).

Urban households (n=790) were surveyed in Urumqi, Gulja, Chocek, Karamay, Yanji, Kashgar and Hotan (Table 7). Average disposable income for Xinjiang was 5817 yuan. The lowest 10% of the households averaged 2069 yuan in disposable income, while the highest 10% averaged 13492 yuan. Karamay and

Urumqi have the higher levels of income. Kashgar, Gulja, and Hotan have lower levels of income. The new economies of Karamay and Urumqi sustain higher levels. (XSB 2001, 278-279).

Unemployment in the urban sector of the economy has remained at about 3.8% in recent years (Table 8). About half of these are unemployed youth (XSB 2001, 145).

Examination of the labor force shows that of the 12.3 million-labor force, 6.9 million are employees, 110,000 are unemployed, 1.1 mil-

TABLE 8

Xinjiang Urban Unemployment (in thousands)

| Year | Number | Percentage | Year | Number | Percentage | Year | Number | Percentage |
|------|--------|------------|------|--------|------------|------|--------|------------|
| 1979 | 121.6 | 7.4 | 1987 | 50.3 | 2.0 | 1995 | 102.4 | 3.9 |
| 1980 | 135.5 | 7.5 | 1988 | 58.1 | 2.6 | 1996 | 98.1 | 3.8 |
| 1981 | 63.3 | 3.6 | 1989 | 80.6 | 3.4 | 1997 | 102.0 | 3.8 |
| 1982 | 71.7 | 3.7 | 1990 | 96.0 | 3.8 | 1998 | 110.6 | 3.9 |
| 1983 | 84.2 | 4.2 | 1991 | 99.5 | 3.8 | 1999 | 103.0 | 3.7 |
| 1984 | 54.6 | 2.5 | 1992 | 98.1 | 3.7 | 2000 | 110.0 | 3.8 |
| 1985 | 40.4 | 1.9 | 1993 | 95.0 | 3.6 | | | |
| 1986 | 42.3 | 1.9 | 1994 | 100.0 | 3.8 | | | |

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 145)

TABLE 9

Composition of the Labor Force in Xinjiang (in millions)

| | Labor force | Employees | Urban Unemployed | Students | Household Laborer | Other |
|------|-------------|-----------|---------------------|----------|----------------------|-------|
| 1985 | 7.243 | 5.658 | 0.040 | 0.303 | 1.159 | 0.050 |
| 1986 | 7.341 | 5.747 | 0.042 | 0.310 | 1.103 | 0.245 |
| 1987 | 7.261 | 5.849 | 0.050 | 0.316 | 1.026 | 0.151 |
| 1988 | 7.448 | 5.937 | 0.058 | 0.322 | 1.035 | 0.206 |
| 1989 | 7.689 | 5.996 | 0.081 | 0.351 | 0.945 | 0.317 |
| 1990 | 7.945 | 6.177 | 0.096 | 0.367 | 0.997 | 0.307 |
| 1991 | 8.118 | 6.385 | 0.100 | 0.380 | 1.031 | 0.173 |
| 1992 | 8.304 | 6.470 | 0.098 | 0.557 | 0.842 | 0.295 |
| 1993 | 10.21 | 6.560 | 0.095 | 0.500 | 0.861 | 2.076 |
| 1994 | 10.457 | 6.575 | 0.100 | 0.525 | 0.829 | 2.367 |
| 1995 | 10.596 | 6.760 | 0.102 | 0.532 | 0.793 | |
| 1996 | 10.786 | 6.840 | 0.098 | 0.543 | 0.796 | 2.410 |
| 1997 | 10.970 | 7.154 | 0.102 | 0.553 | 0.789 | 2.370 |
| 1998 | 11.764 | 6.809 | 0.111 | 0.589 | 1.013 | 3.242 |
| 1999 | 11.859 | 6.944 | 0.103 | 0.599 | 1.029 | 3.184 |
| 2000 | 12.337 | 6.938 | 0.110 | 0.919 | 1.071 | 3.299 |

(Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2001, 129)

lion work in the home and 3.3 million are "other" (Table 9). This "other" category expanded in 1993 with the passage of more economic reforms. Some of these are self-employed or private enterprise workers. Many of these are underemployed if not unemployed.

The statistics do not show numbers by cities or districts, so it is difficult to get a sense of levels of variation within Xinjiang (XSB 2001, 129).

Another surrogate measure for development is education and literacy. According to the 2000 census, 7.72% of Xinjiang's popula-

TABLE 10
Illiteracy in Xinjiang for Population Age 15 and Over, 2000

| | Population | Illiterate # | Illiteracy % | Male % | Female % |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 13,426,449 | 1,036,842 | 7.72 | 5.74 | 9.87 |
| Urumqi (C) | 1,735,756 | 81,874 | 4.72 | 2.76 | 6.87 |
| Karamay (C) | 221,112 | 9,984 | 4.52 | 2.16 | 7.22 |
| Shihezi (C) | 480,614 | 37,509 | 7.80 | 4.21 | 11.68 |
| Changji (AP) | 1,171,960 | 107,035 | 9.13 | 5.78 | 12.85 |
| Bortala (AP) | 315,975 | 23,791 | 7.53 | 4.51 | 10.78 |
| Ili (AP) | 1,715,550 | 125,543 | 7.32 | 4.93 | 9.85 |
| Tacheng (D) | 667,472 | 34,662 | 5.19 | 3.22 | 7.34 |
| Altay (D) | 410,122 | 15,829 | 3.86 | 2.28 | 5.54 |
| Turpan (D) | 403,584 | 28,911 | 7.16 | 4.94 | 9.57 |
| Hami (D) | 386,385 | 25,819 | 6.68 | 3.79 | 9.77 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 805,016 | 53,829 | 6.69 | 4.66 | 8.93 |
| Aksu (D) | 1,492,858 | 118,000 | 7.90 | 6.50 | 9.50 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 290,015 | 2,738 | 8.87 | 7.18 | 10.67 |
| Kashgar (D) | 2,226,910 | 212,962 | 9.56 | 8.51 | 10.68 |
| Hotan (D) | 1,103,120 | 135,356 | 12.27 | 11.05 | 13.57 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 171-183)

tion is illiterate (Table 10). This compares with China's average of 6.72%. Female illiteracy is higher overall. Regionally speaking, the lowest levels of illiteracy are in Altay, Urumqi, Karamay, and Tacheng. These are northern districts. The highest levels of illiteracy are in Hotan, Kashgar, Changji, and Kizilsu. Most of these are in the south with the exception of Changji. The large migrant work force in Changji could possibly account for the variation (XPCO 2002, 171-183).

Female illiteracy can be understood as a further refinement on development measures. Female illiteracy averages 9.87%. Altay, Karamay, Urumqi, and Tacheng have lower levels of illiteracy. Higher levels of illiteracy are found in Hotan, Changji, Shihezi, and Bortala. In the case of the later three districts, migrant female labor may account for the levels of female illiteracy (XPCO 2002, 171-183).

The educational attainment of Xinjiang has

improved (Table 11). Only 7.3% have not been to school while 41.6% have been to primary school. This compares favorably with China overall as 6.7% have not been to school and 35.7% have been to primary school. In terms of education China has been promoting nine-year education school. Overall in China 45.1% have been to high school; in Xinjiang 38.7% have been to secondary. The final group is university. China overall averages 3.6% and Xinjiang stands at 1.5%. China has made great strides at the lower levels. The next areas for development are at the secondary, post-secondary (technical and training schools), and university levels (XPCO 2002, 166-177).

The municipalities of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi have the highest levels of educational attainment all above average in the numbers who have reached university. In terms of secondary school, Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi, Changji, Tacheng, and Hami have the

TABLE 11
Levels of Education in Xinjiang, 2000

| | No School | Literacy Class | Primary | Secondary | University |
|-------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 7.31% | 1.80% | 41.63% | 38.68% | 1.46% |
| Urumqi (C) | 4.66% | 0.55% | 22.25% | 47.64% | 5.84% |
| Karamay (C) | 4.49% | 0.47% | 20.79% | 51.45% | 3.70% |
| Shihezi (C) | 7.01% | 1.53% | 29.00% | 48.38% | 2.65% |
| Changji (AP) | 8.22% | 1.03% | 33.53% | 46.07% | 0.84% |
| Bortala (AP) | 6.59% | 1.19% | 35.34% | 44.83% | 0.95% |
| Ili (AP) | 6.69% | 0.95% | 41.21% | 42.20% | 0.89% |
| Tacheng (D) | 4.68% | 1.21% | 36.34% | 47.36% | 0.71% |
| Altay (D) | 3.94% | 1.03% | 38.47% | 44.66% | 0.88% |
| Turpan (D) | 6.39% | 1.93% | 44.01% | 38.85% | 0.86% |
| Hami (D) | 6.00% | 1.19% | 31.10% | 47.21% | 0.16% |
| Bayangol (AP) | 6.03% | 1.66% | 36.31% | 44.40% | 1.01% |
| Aksu (D) | 7.16% | 2.23% | 49.93% | 34.20% | 0.68% |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 7.71% | 2.99% | 53.95% | 26.23% | 0.82% |
| Kashgar (D) | 9.39% | 2.93% | 52.59% | 29.71% | 0.64% |
| Hotan (D) | 11.54% | 3.48% | 58.41% | 21.86% | 0.44% |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 166-177)

higher levels while Kashgar, Kizilsu and Hotan have the lower levels. Kashgar, Kizilsu, Hotan, Aksu, and Turpan have many who have only been to primary school. There is a strong north-south divide in terms of education. Further many of the students in the south will speak and be educated in Uyghur (XPCO 2002, 166-177).

What is the nature of the development landscape in Xinjiang? Overall the levels of education and literacy are good for Xinjiang. The limited data for income and unemployment point to rising problems in unemployment with many people still at or below the poverty line. Production is up as is GDP per capita. However these two measures show only part of the picture. Much of the rise in GDP is due to the processing extractive products; there is an over reliance on oil to describe a rosy scenario. Much of labor force is still in the agricultural sector. To use the terminology

of Goulet, Seers, and Todaro, many basic needs have been met. The difficulty comes with seeing the regional differentiation. There is an underdeveloped south compared with developed north. The historical economic centers of Turpan, Kashgar and Ili have been superseded by the new modernized economic centers of Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, and Korla.

To develop southern Xinjiang along the lines of northern Xinjiang would require significant amounts of capital investment. The new "develop the west" campaign would seem on the surface to bring new investment to Xinjiang, but most of those capital and labor flows will be directed to northern rather than southern Xinjiang.

The railroad to Kashgar is an interesting strategy for development. The railroad does bring access to markets for Kashgar's products. Kashgar's products though are mostly

agricultural and light industrial goods without high value added. Most likely the railroad to Kashgar will make it easier to flood Kashgar with relatively inexpensive goods from other parts of China. This will in turn disrupt the growth of industry in Kashgar. The railroad, though, does link Kashgar to the world (but only through Urumqi and China).

One of the focuses should be education and literacy for southern Xinjiang. Investment in human as well as natural resources is a key sustained development. Education though needs to be followed by employment. Education without employment is a short ticket to disastrous development.

Another issue is that of language. Would Xinjiang be able to follow a path of bilingualism? Can a Uyghur get ahead in society without also being fluent in Chinese? Can a Han get ahead in society without being fluent in Uyghur? Given the current answers to these questions (probably no and definitely yes) the language of instruction is critical for Xinjiang. The universities in Xinjiang are now moving from a bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) to a monolingual system (only Chinese); this will be a very difficult change for the Xinjiang educational system with ramifications on down to primary school.

Having examined development, the next step is to turn to the demographic portion of the equation.

Xinjiang's Demographic Landscape.

The link between demography and development provides is a strong one. Yet many studies on China have examined these in isolation, demography or development. rather than demography and development. This section utilizes the recently available 2000 census to elucidate the demography-development relationship. The demographic-development relationship has several facets—region, sex ratio, age ratio, nationality, and migration.

The size of regional population and their growth reflect socioeconomic changes occurring within the population. Population growth is not necessarily related to economic growth.

More hands make more labor, but also mean more mouths to feed. Regional differences in population do show if an area is overpopulated or underpopulated given the amount of resources available. China's regional difference in population is quite telling. In the 2000 census 42% live in the eastern, 35% live in the central and 23% live in the western regions (Fan 2002, 433).

The 2000 census shows Xinjiang as having 18.46 million people; the 1990 census registered 15.16 million (Table 12). Using the regionalization developed earlier, the North has 47.08% (the core municipalities account for 15.94% of the total), the South has 47.27%, and the East has 5.65%. So there is a good balance between north and south. The south has continued grow naturally, while the north has seen many migrants since 1949. The large populous districts of Kashgar and Ili represent historical centers while Urumqi functions as the new modern center. In southern Xinjiang given the paucity of water resources, the region is overpopulated. In the Ili valley region, there is sufficient water. Urumqi uses the water from the glaciers in the Tengri Tagh. Given the growth in Urumqi's population (1.31 million in 1990, 2.08 million in 2000) the water situation is a bit difficult there as well. While there may be quite a bit of room in Xinjiang compared to other areas of China, there are not enough water resources to go around. The limiting factor is water not land in Xinjiang (XPCO 2002, 4-8).

The male to female sex ratio shows the basic profile of region. If the ratio is high, with many more males than females, then the area can be a frontier zone where male labor is sought after. Of course, there is also a question of female labor force participation rates. If most women work, then this ratio is less indicative. In China's case, the sex ratio is quite high due to discrimination against women. In the 2000 census the sex ratio is 106.74, one of the world highest (Fan 2002, 430).

Xinjiang's male/female sex ratio is 107.24 for the 2000 census; in 1990, the ratio was 106.67 (Table 13). This increase shows the re-

TABLE 12
Population by District, Xinjiang, 2000

| Xinjiang (total) 18,459,511 | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| District | Population | Percentage | District | Population | Percentage |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,081,834 | 11.28% | Turpan (D) | 550,731 | 2.98% |
| Karamay (C) | 270,232 | 1.46% | Hami (D) | 492,096 | 2.67% |
| Shihezi (C) | 590,115 | 3.20% | Bayangol (AP) | 1,056,970 | 5.73% |
| Changji (AP) | 1,503,097 | 8.14% | Aksu (D) | 2,141,745 | 11.60% |
| Bortala (AP) | 420,040 | 2.30% | Kizilsu (AP) | 439,688 | 2.38% |
| Ili (D) | 2,367,876 | 12.83% | Kashgar (D) | 3,405,713 | 18.45% |
| Tacheng (D) | 892,837 | 4.83% | Hotan (D) | 1,681,310 | 9.11% |
| Altay (D) | 561,667 | 3.04% | | | |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 4-8)

sults of the population planning policy, favoring sons over daughters. As well the male/female sex ratio is high due to the number male migrants coming to Xinjiang. District variation ranges from Kizilsu 104.87 to Karamay 113.23. The highest ratios are in Karamay, Bayangol, Tacheng, Changji, and Urumqi. These areas have a concentration of a young male work force. The sex ratio varies by ethnicity as well as region. The Han have a ratio of 112.91 while the Uyghur have a ratio of 103.45. This difference is due to the population control policy (Toops 2000; Toops 2003; XPCO 2002, 4-8).

Age ratios are also an indicator of the health of the population. If many are healthy, they will reach old age. A large percentage of children indicate a growing population. Ratio of adults in the work force to the elderly and children gives a good indicator of the economic health of the population. In China the population on the whole is living longer. The 65+ population is about 7%. The working age cohort 15-64 is now about 70%, children 14 and under account for 23% (Fan 2002, 429).

For 2000, Xinjiang's age distribution skews younger than China's overall population (Table 14). The 65+ population is 4.52%, the 15-64

population is 68.17% and the 0-14 population is 27.3%. Anyone who has been to Xinjiang remarks on the large number of children. For 1990 the figures are 65+, 3.91%, 15-64, 63.04% and 0-14, 33.05%. So compared to previous periods there are relatively fewer young people. Regionally speaking, the south (Kashgar, Kizilsu, and Hotan) has higher levels of children compared with urban centers of the north (such as Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi). For those past retirement age, there is less regional variation. The northern urban centers of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi have the larger percentages, while peripheral areas such as Bortala, Altay, and Hotan rank the lowest. Many in the urban centers are retired state employees. The grandparent award goes to Kizilsu with the highest percentage of centurians. For the working age population, the highest levels are found in the northern urban centers as above, the lower levels are in the south, (Kashgar, Kizilsu, and Hotan). Demographically speaking there are two Xinjiaings, the older north and the younger south. The 15-64 population must support a larger percentage of the population in the south as compared with the north (XPCO 2002, 118-141).

Ethnicity or nationality (China *minzu*, Uy-

TABLE 13

Population by Sex and District, Xinjiang, 2000

| | Total | Male | Female | Sex Ratio |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 18,459,511 | 9,552,181 | 8,907,330 | 107.24 |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,081,834 | 1,090,387 | 991,447 | 109.98 |
| Karamay (C) | 270,232 | 143,500 | 126,732 | 113.23 |
| Shihezi (C) | 590,115 | 305,253 | 284,862 | 107.16 |
| Changji (AP) | 1,503,097 | 786,932 | 716,165 | 109.88 |
| Bortala (AP) | 424,040 | 219,745 | 204,295 | 107.56 |
| Ili (D) | 2,367,876 | 1,218,411 | 1,149,465 | 106.00 |
| Tacheng (D) | 892,397 | 463,175 | 429,222 | 109.91 |
| Altay (D) | 561,667 | 288,281 | 273,386 | 105.45 |
| Turpan (D) | 550,731 | 283,888 | 266,843 | 106.39 |
| Hami (D) | 492,096 | 254,129 | 237,967 | 106.79 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 1,056,970 | 552,524 | 504,446 | 109.53 |
| Aksu (D) | 2,141,745 | 1,114,422 | 1,027,323 | 108.48 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 439,688 | 225,067 | 214,621 | 104.87 |
| Kashgar (D) | 3,405,713 | 1,743,674 | 1,662,039 | 104.91 |
| Hotan (D) | 1,681,310 | 862,793 | 818,517 | 105.41 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 4-8)

ghur *millet*) is another important factor to consider in development. If one ethnic or national group is much better off than another, then there are inequalities in the society. The population growth rate of the nationality groups varies also due to regional factors and also government policies. China's population planning policy varies according to urban (one child), rural (second child possible, if first is a girl) and minority nationality (two in the city and three in the countryside). The impact of this variable population planning policy shows up in the numbers. In 1982 China had 6.68% minority while in the 2000 census minorities account for 8.41% (Fan 2002, 428).

In terms of the Xinjiang 2000 census, Uyghur account for 45.21%, Han for 40.57%, Kazakh 6.74%, Hui 4.55%, and the rest account for 2.93%. (Table 15) All minority groups account for 59.43%. The only region in China that has a higher percentage of minorities is

Tibet. In 1990, Uyghur accounted for 47.47%, Han 37.58%, Kazakh, 7.30%, Hui 4.50%, and the rest accounted for 3.15%; the major change is the relative increase of the Han, mostly through migration.

Where are the nationality groups located? The Han population is located in northern corridor—Hami, Urumqi, Changji, Shihezi, Karamay, and Bortala with southern branches in Bayangol. The Uyghur are located in the south—Kashgar, Hotan, Kiziksu, Aksu, Turpan, and north, Ili. The Kazakh are located in the north—Altay, Tacheng, and Ili. The Hui are located in Ili, Changji, and Urumqi. The Kirghiz are located in the south—Kizilsu. The Mongol are located in Bayangol and Bortala. The Dongxiang are mostly in Ili. Tajik are in Kashgar, Xibo in Ili, Manchu in Urumqi and Ili, Uzbek in Ili, Russian in Tacheng and Urumqi, Tibetan in Changji, Zhuang in Urumqi, Daur in Tacheng, and Tatar in Altay.

TABLE 14
Population by Age Cohort (%) and District, Xinjiang, 2000

| | Population | 0 to 9 | 10 to 19 | 20 to 29 | 30 to 39 | 40 to 49 |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 18,459,511 | 16.22 | 20.41 | 19.61 | 18.39 | 10.05 |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,081,834 | 10.79 | 14.08 | 23.69 | 23.34 | 11.28 |
| Karamay (C) | 270,232 | 12.05 | 11.69 | 20.32 | 26.51 | 13.64 |
| Shihezi (C) | 590,115 | 11.79 | 11.97 | 17.90 | 25.02 | 11.04 |
| Changji (AP) | 1,503,097 | 13.24 | 16.23 | 20.03 | 22.13 | 11.61 |
| Bortala (AP) | 424,040 | 14.80 | 18.81 | 19.83 | 21.70 | 10.63 |
| Ili (D) | 2,367,876 | 10.87 | 21.25 | 20.05 | 18.73 | 9.81 |
| Tacheng (D) | 892,397 | 15.00 | 18.73 | 20.66 | 20.35 | 10.99 |
| Altay (D) | 561,667 | 15.09 | 22.06 | 20.38 | 18.89 | 10.12 |
| Turpan (D) | 550,731 | 15.50 | 21.08 | 20.53 | 18.31 | 10.07 |
| Hami (D) | 492,096 | 12.95 | 15.83 | 19.32 | 22.18 | 12.27 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 1,056,970 | 13.87 | 17.99 | 20.00 | 21.80 | 10.77 |
| Aksu (D) | 2,141,745 | 18.60 | 22.53 | 18.82 | 17.20 | 9.15 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 439,688 | 19.23 | 26.46 | 18.86 | 13.29 | 8.74 |
| Kashgar (D) | 3,405,713 | 20.85 | 24.52 | 17.31 | 13.26 | 9.01 |
| Hotan (D) | 1,681,310 | 19.92 | 25.97 | 18.62 | 12.78 | 8.37 |
| | 50 to 59 | 60 to 69 | 70 to 79 | 80 to 89 | 90 to 99 | 100 + |
| Xinjiang (total) | 7.47 | 5.11 | 2.06 | 0.57 | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| Urumqi (C) | 7.84 | 6.53 | 2.03 | 0.39 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Karamay (C) | 7.57 | 6.57 | 1.41 | 0.22 | 0.02 | 0 |
| Shihezi (C) | 10.52 | 8.26 | 2.82 | 0.62 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| Changji (AP) | 8.30 | 4.78 | 2.16 | 0.52 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Bortala (AP) | 7.36 | 4.02 | 1.60 | 0.39 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Ili (D) | 6.88 | 4.83 | 1.81 | 0.44 | 0.05 | 0 |
| Tacheng (D) | 7.38 | 4.74 | 1.71 | 0.42 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Altay (D) | 6.76 | 4.63 | 1.62 | 0.40 | 0.05 | 0 |
| Turpan (D) | 7.28 | 4.71 | 1.97 | 0.50 | 0.08 | 0.01 |
| Hami (D) | 8.20 | 5.26 | 2.31 | 0.48 | 0.05 | 0 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 7.64 | 4.30 | 2.13 | 0.54 | 0.07 | 0.01 |
| Aksu (D) | 7.02 | 4.54 | 2.21 | 0.65 | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 6.40 | 4.10 | 2.06 | 0.69 | 0.16 | 0.02 |
| Kashgar (D) | 7.37 | 4.54 | 2.20 | 0.77 | 0.18 | 0.01 |
| Hotan (D) | 7.14 | 4.06 | 0.92 | 0.82 | 0.20 | 0.01 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 118-141)

TABLE 15
Population by Nationality and District, Xinjiang, 2000

| | Total | Uyghur | Han | Kazakh | Hui | Kirghiz |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 18,459,511 | 8,345,622 | 7,489,919 | 1,245,023 | 839,837 | 158,775 |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,081,834 | 266,342 | 1,567,562 | 48,772 | 167,148 | 1,436 |
| Karamay (C) | 270,232 | 37,425 | 210,980 | 9,919 | 6,018 | 96 |
| Shihezi (C) | 590,115 | 7,064 | 557,808 | 3,426 | 13,712 | 38 |
| Changji (AP) | 1,503,097 | 58,984 | 1,129,384 | 119,942 | 173,563 | 124 |
| Bortala (AP) | 424,040 | 53,145 | 284,915 | 38,744 | 19,053 | 86 |
| Ili (D) | 2,367,876 | 568,109 | 945,104 | 474,711 | 250,996 | 14,758 |
| Tacheng (D) | 892,397 | 36,804 | 522,829 | 216,020 | 66,458 | 1,870 |
| Altay (D) | 561,667 | 10,068 | 229,894 | 288,612 | 22,116 | 50 |
| Turpan (D) | 550,731 | 385,546 | 128,313 | 321 | 35,140 | 2 |
| Hami (D) | 492,096 | 90,624 | 339,296 | 43,104 | 14,636 | 10 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 1,056,970 | 345,595 | 607,774 | 983 | 52,252 | 153 |
| Aksu (D) | 2,141,745 | 1,540,633 | 570,147 | 189 | 11,811 | 9,748 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 439,688 | 281,306 | 28,197 | 42 | 432 | 124,533 |
| Kashgar (D) | 3,405,713 | 3,042,942 | 311,770 | 162 | 5,046 | 5,078 |
| Hotan (D) | 1,681,310 | 1,621,215 | 55,946 | 76 | 1,456 | 793 |
| | Mongol | Dongxiang | Tajik | Xibo | Manchu | Uzbek |
| Xinjiang (total) | 149,857 | 55,841 | 39,493 | 34,566 | 19,493 | 12,096 |
| Urumqi (C) | 7,252 | 621 | 216 | 3,674 | 7,682 | 1,406 |
| Karamay (C) | 1,842 | 17 | 9 | 635 | 785 | 170 |
| Shihezi (C) | 787 | 345 | 26 | 147 | 678 | 13 |
| Changji (AP) | 6,062 | 2,908 | 14 | 490 | 2,828 | 2,189 |
| Bortala (AP) | 23,927 | 1,587 | 7 | 321 | 317 | 100 |
| Ili (D) | 27,426 | 41,443 | 81 | 27,357 | 3,036 | 4,921 |
| Tacheng (D) | 29,759 | 5,500 | 8 | 1,536 | 693 | 293 |
| Altay (D) | 5,486 | 1,724 | 13 | 67 | 316 | 277 |
| Turpan (D) | 158 | 79 | 2 | 18 | 254 | 5 |
| Hami (D) | 1,970 | 121 | 0 | 101 | 1,293 | 9 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 43,544 | 1,044 | 4 | 126 | 840 | 41 |
| Aksu (D) | 775 | 330 | 4 | 46 | 374 | 47 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 52 | 11 | 4,662 | 5 | 47 | 109 |
| Kashgar (D) | 634 | 93 | 33,611 | 37 | 307 | 2,496 |
| Hotan (D) | 183 | 18 | 836 | 6 | 43 | 20 |

(continued next page)

TABLE 15 (continued)

Population by Nationality and District, Xinjiang, 2000

| | Russian | Tibetan | Zhuang | Daur | Tatar | Other |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 8,935 | 6,153 | 5,642 | 5,541 | 4,501 | 38,217 |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,603 | 665 | 878 | 369 | 767 | 4,441 |
| Karamay (C) | 441 | 50 | 183 | 90 | 55 | 1,517 |
| Shihezi (C) | 200 | 636 | 312 | 16 | 3 | 4,904 |
| Changji (AP) | 609 | 1,090 | 546 | 58 | 968 | 3,338 |
| Bortala (AP) | 133 | 211 | 459 | 31 | 11 | 993 |
| Ili (D) | 1,179 | 629 | 889 | 396 | 900 | 5,941 |
| Tacheng (D) | 2,948 | 600 | 451 | 4,533 | 448 | 1,647 |
| Altay (D) | 355 | 165 | 231 | 11 | 1,236 | 1,046 |
| Turpan (D) | 38 | 105 | 88 | 5 | 6 | 651 |
| Hami (D) | 77 | 191 | 119 | 6 | 22 | 517 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 176 | 389 | 431 | 18 | 23 | 3,577 |
| Aksu (D) | 95 | 743 | 405 | 2 | 5 | 6,391 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 3 | 32 | 28 | 1 | 18 | 210 |
| Kashgar (D) | 68 | 530 | 521 | 5 | 30 | 2,383 |
| Hotan (D) | 10 | 117 | 101 | 0 | 9 | 481 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 40-99)

Among these groups the Dongxiang, Tibetan and Zhuang are usually not thought of as being “native” to Xinjiang (although I think that the Dongxiang should be considered as such). All other nationality groups have fewer 4500; there are 109 people of unclaimed nationality and 58 foreigners resident in Xinjiang.

Han populations match up well with urban and transportation linkages, roads and railroads; migrants tend to follow transportation lines. Xinjiang has distinctive nationality concentrations. The cities as well have distinctive ethnic neighborhoods, for example, Uyghur in Urumqi, or Hui in Turpan (Toops 2000; Toops 2003; XPCO 2002, 40-99). Uyghurs live in the south, which is the poorest area. Han live in the wealthier urban corridor of the north.

When one region is better off economically, all things being equal, migration occurs. This population movement goes toward the better off region. Another sort of population

movement, toward lesser developed regions, occurs when those regions are perceived as having resources or frontier development possibilities. In China’s case, the state since the 1980s has relaxed migration controls, creating flows of migrants similar to other countries. Most migrants are economic. Many of these are circular migrants returning to their origin after a period of work. Many migrants are a part of the “floating population” in that they do not have permanent residential status in their destination. China’s floating population is difficult to register and may account for the 1.8% undercount in the census. Estimates range from 100-140 million (Fan 2002, 433).

The 2000 census like the 1990 included questions on migration (Table 16). Respondents were asked if they were registered in other localities. In Xinjiang, over 1.4 million people (7.64%) indicated they were registered elsewhere; I assume most of these were Han or Hui, most likely not Turkic minorities. Not

TABLE 16

Registrants From Other Provinces, Xinjiang, 2000

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| North | 343,490 | Northeast | 7,725 | East | 100,665 | Central | 140,075 |
| Beijing | 732 | Nei Menggu | 2,193 | Shanghai | 7,983 | Hunan | 20,099 |
| Tianjin | 869 | Lioaning | 3,141 | Jiangsu | 63,214 | Hubei | 42,851 |
| Hebei | 12,711 | Jilin | 2,391 | Zhejiang | 29,468 | Jiangxi | 4,263 |
| Shanxi | 6,297 | Heilongjiang | (na) | | | Anhui | 72,862 |
| Shandong | 36,363 | | | | | | |
| Henan | 286,518 | | | | | | |
| Southeast | 13,146 | Southwest | 463,734 | Northwest | 337,775 | | |
| Fujian | 7,938 | Chongqing | 31,281 | Shanxi | 69,945 | | |
| Guangdong | 3,263 | Sichuan | 426,437 | Qinghai | 15,727 | | |
| Guangxi | 1,453 | Guizhou | 3,405 | Gansu | 219,757 | | |
| Hainan | 492 | Yunnan | 2,399 | Ningxia | 32,346 | | |
| | | Xizang | 212 | | | | |

(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 470-478)

all migration data from the census has been released. Census migration data does not include military or floating population. The census has a 1.8% undercount overall. These factors need to be considered in Xinjiang as well. The registrants came from all over China, primarily from the Southwest, North, and Northwest. Major sources for the registrants are Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu. The Sichuan migrants (over 400,000) are well known in Xinjiang, witness the large number of Sichuan restaurants. Sichuanese have been coming to Xinjiang since the 1950s. There are many registrants who have come to Xinjiang from the Three Gorges area. The Henan people coming to Xinjiang are Yellow River people. There are many ties from the north China Plain to Xinjiang going back to the 1950s. The Gansu people are true northwesterners who have moved along the Hexi corridor into Xinjiang. These migrants are working in industry and agriculture, in oil and in cotton, in households and in government, as cadres and as maids. Like any immigrant group they are seeking a better life, in this case primarily economic life. Xin-

jiang is a very different place from Sichuan or Henan, not so different from Gansu. Migrants are aided and recruited. There are centers in Urumqi, Korla and other major cities to facilitate the flow of the migrants for jobs and housing. Or recruiters, whose original home is in Sichuan, go back to Sichuan to bring labor to Urumqi. Since there is a surplus of labor in Sichuan, since the people speak the same dialect, since jobs are scarce in Sichuan and the population is large, why not go to Xinjiang for a time to make some money? (Toops 2003; Toops 2000; XPCO 2002, 470-478).

Where are the registrants going? (Table 17) Large numbers of migrants are going to the northern urban corridor of Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, Bortala, Changji with the outlier to the south of Bayangol (especially Korla). The lowest levels of external registrants are in the south—Hotan, Kizilsu, Kashgar—and in the north in Altay. As much of this migration is chain migration (people move from a village to a new place, then tell their cousins and others in the old village to also move to the new place), there is a predominance of migrants to

TABLE 17
Registration by District and Source, Xinjiang, 2000

| | Total | External Registrants | % External Registrants | Henan | Sichuan | Gansu |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Xinjiang (total) | 18,459,511 | 1,411,096 | 7.64% | 286,518 | 426,437 | 219,757 |
| Urumqi (C) | 2,081,834 | 374,526 | 17.99% | 68,368 | 86,446 | 52,922 |
| Karamay (C) | 270,232 | 37,620 | 13.92% | 7,905 | 10,412 | 3,103 |
| Shihezi (C) | 590,115 | 98,926 | 16.76% | 29,018 | 25,807 | 20,613 |
| Changji (AP) | 1,503,097 | 163,572 | 10.88% | 29,325 | 36,511 | 41,509 |
| Bortala (AP) | 424,040 | 54,425 | 12.83% | 17,620 | 13,135 | 7,744 |
| Ili (D) | 2,367,876 | 129,832 | 5.48% | 31,290 | 40,113 | 22,634 |
| Tacheng (D) | 892,397 | 55,805 | 6.25% | 11,670 | 12,693 | 12,408 |
| Altay (D) | 561,667 | 14,471 | 2.58% | 2,839 | 3,458 | 2,638 |
| Turpan (D) | 550,731 | 33,797 | 6.14% | 3,661 | 7,314 | 7,634 |
| Hami (D) | 492,096 | 34,966 | 7.11% | 4,163 | 4,763 | 15,190 |
| Bayangol (AP) | 1,056,970 | 133,250 | 12.61% | 27,312 | 53,232 | 12,500 |
| Aksu (D) | 2,141,745 | 176,582 | 8.24% | 31,083 | 89,716 | 12,512 |
| Kizilsu (AP) | 439,688 | 6,565 | 1.49% | 1,082 | 3,337 | 444 |
| Kashgar (D) | 3,405,713 | 85,458 | 2.51% | 19,971 | 34,406 | 7,176 |
| Hotan (D) | 1,681,310 | 11,301 | 0.67% | 1,511 | 5,094 | 730 |

(AP) Autonomous Prefecture, (C) City, (D) District
(Xinjiang 2000 Census, 470-478)

areas known to them through the grapevine. The major destination for the Henan people is Urumqi, for Sichuan it is Urumqi and Aksu, and for Gansu it is Urumqi and Changji. Most of these destinations are in the northern corridor. The exception is Sichuanese in Aksu. Aksu has a large Production and Construction Corps, many who have Sichuan ties. The further question besides where is when or how long? How long will the migrants live in Xinjiang and maintain registration externally? Some have been doing so since the 1950s these are the *lao Xinjiang ren*, old Xinjiang people, whose identity is tied up in Xinjiang. Some of those have gone back to their old homes (*lao-jia*) to visit or perhaps retire and find it is no longer the same (perhaps they miss the kebabs and melons). As time progresses and China's migration policy is perhaps freer, there will be people who move out to Xinjiang to work for

a few years but will go back home. People tend to go where they want to go and follow their own lead. Forced migration to Xinjiang is a thing of the past. There are as of now inducements and incentives; the "develop the west" campaign has some of that flavor, but that state subsidy is difficult and costly to maintain (Toops 2000; Toops 2003; XPCO 2002, 470-478).

What is the nature of the demographic landscape in Xinjiang? The population is concentrated in two segments, the corridor on the northern foothills of the Tengri Tagh and the arcs of oases to the south of the Tengri Tagh. In both cases the roads and now railroads linking the settlements have proved to be the major paths for migration. The population has a male/female ratio comparable with the rest of China, the Uyghur have a lower male/female ration than the Han. Xinjiang's

age profile is younger than other parts of China; southern Xinjiang is particularly young. In terms of nationality (*minzu/millet*) the Uyghur are still in the south and the Kazakh are in the north. The Han are migrating in a steady stream into the central area and following paths of migration to the other urban centers. Major sources of migrants are from Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu.

What direction does this young, ethnically diverse population with large numbers of migrants take? If the border were open to cross border migration, some Kazakhs might move to Kazakhstan or Uyghurs to Central Asia. But there is no Uyghur land across the border. Indeed if the border were open there might well be many Han in Kazakhstan and Central Asia rather than the few who are there now. South to Pakistan, north to Russia and Mongolia does not seem readily possible, although the local connections to these neighboring countries are strong. Given economic tendencies Han migrants are looking not to Xinjiang but to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and further afield to US, Canada, Australia or Europe. 50-60 million Han live outside of the country as *huaqiao* overseas Chinese.

What of the Uyghur and Kazakh outside of Xinjiang? Do they have a bridge, a *koru* as well? Certainly with the advent of World Wide Web, satellite communications, email, and electronic chats, communication from Kashgar to Keokuk, from Urumqi to Utah, from Hotan to Hawaii, from Turpan to Texas is much easier than previously.

Looking across the border to Kazakhstan, one sees a similar situation a young ethnic diverse population, with a large number of migrants from Russia rather than China. Of course, since 1990 the political situation is now quite different.

Xinjiang's demographics show a population that is getting older little by little and more urban. The demographic trends also show a population that is becoming less ethnically diverse with more migrants. That is the future of Xinjiang's demography.

Discussion

Xinjiang has certainly prospered materially. I first studied in Urumqi in 1985; since then cell phones, cable TV, computers, and 20-story buildings are commonplace. There has been a technological growth. Transportation improvements in air, rail, and highways connect the region together, focusing on Urumqi.

The Han hold many of the technological jobs in Xinjiang. A higher percentage of Uyghurs have advanced education than in the past, but to get a good job is not so easy in Xinjiang. To do so one needs connections or *guanxi*. Tapping onto the network of connections one relies on government, university, family, kith and kin. Connections for Han are more forthcoming than for Uyghur. Of course a well-connected highly educated Uyghur has more chance than a poor Han peasant from Hunan. A well-qualified individual has a better chance among his or her own ethnic group. Han migrants have contributed greatly to the economic development of the region but not necessarily to the local inhabitants of Xinjiang. Those who have worked in technical fields training local Uyghur and Kazakh population have also contributed to the social development of the region and its inhabitants.

Second, how has the economic growth been distributed? Certainly northern Xinjiang with its oil and industry is more developed economically. Most of the population in southern Xinjiang works in agriculture; more poverty is present. From government statistics and the population census, several indicators of regional economic disparity are present. The south registers lower levels of GDP per capita, lower levels of income, higher levels of poverty and unemployment, lower levels of education and literacy.

The current plan for development in Xinjiang tied to the "great western development" program places a great deal of emphasis on physical infrastructure (roads and railways). For example, World Bank loans are sought for improving the highway between Urumqi and Turpan, between Kuitun and Sayram Lake. In contrast the Tarim Basin Project is aimed at

poor farmers in the south. China also has a World Bank Project aimed at education among indigenous peoples in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. This is a good example of a project that could be adapted to southern Xinjiang. (World Bank Projects).

Finally, what are the prospects for population growth? Population growth continues in Xinjiang, as does the migration to the region from other parts of China. If anything, the migration seems to be increasing in recent years, particularly with the addition of the floating population. This migration will ensure a larger percentage of Han in the region. The focus for the Han population will continue to be northern and central Xinjiang around Urumqi. With the completion of the railway to Kashgar, migration flows into southern Xinjiang will continue. Already the Han proportion of the population in southern Xinjiang has begun to increase. The only real limit to population growth in the region is access to water, not access to land. The state has decided to tap into local aquifers and is using that water for agricultural expansion, oil production, construction and industry, and residential use. In the oases of southern Xinjiang, overexploitation of water points to a serious ecological disaster in the making (Toops 2003b)

Is the current political unrest in Xinjiang related to issues of demography and development? A reading of the Uyghur websites points to human rights and politics being main concerns. Also underlying the political concerns of Uyghurs are development and demography. Certainly one topic of discussion is the "great western development" program (Marquand, September 26, 2003). Another item to consider is the large number of Han moving into Xinjiang. (Marquand, September 29, 2003). Local Uyghurs' dissatisfaction with the policies of the state fuel the political difficulties in the region.

An examination of the internal conflicts in Xinjiang shows a number (~10) of violent incidents in the region since 1990 (Millward, 2003). The locations of the incidents are in and

around Kashgar, Hotan, Gulja, and Urumqi. The development/demography dynamics of these areas point to several elements. Kashgar has a population that was mostly Uyghur but has increasing numbers of Han. Tensions in Kashgar are increasing due to the number of Han migrants getting jobs in the area, as well as the wholesale urban renewal of the downtown area near the Id Kah mosque. This urban restructuring involves demolishing Uyghur architecture and putting up new buildings of a modern style (Marquand September 26, 2003). Tensions increase over Han and Uyghur access to jobs as well.

Areas such as Hotan are among the poorest in the region. While few Han live in Hotan, or migrate to the area, there is a perception that the poverty in the area is related to government policy. Unrest in Hotan is more related to poverty rather than Han influx.

Gulja was the site for a complex incident in 1997 in which government authorities arrested Uyghur religious students, local people followed with demonstrations, and authorities countered leading to escalating violence in which several demonstrators were killed. The unrest here seems to be directed at repressive religious policies of the state. Development issues may have provided underlying tensions. More Han are moving into Gulja and surrounding areas of the Ili District.

In Urumqi the population is now mostly Han with distinct Uyghur districts in the southern parts of town. Urumqi is the economic center of Xinjiang; many Uyghur come from other towns of the region for employment or for education. Many Han migrate from other parts of the country also looking for work. There is economic competition among these groups of job seekers. Unrest in Urumqi in the 1990s was limited to a few bombings of buildings and buses. Political issues were probably at the forefront.

All in all, the development and demographic inequalities in Xinjinag are more underlying factors for the unrest rather than specific causes. There have been demonstrations in Xinjiang where these issues have been

brought to the foreground. One day in 1985, several thousand Uyghur university students demonstrated in downtown Urumqi (Yuan 1990; Toops 2000). I was studying in Urumqi that year and recall that there were few Uyghur students on campus that day. Several issues were voiced including nuclear testing in Xinjiang, jobs for college graduates, Han migration to Xinjiang and the application of birth control policy to minorities in Xinjiang. Basic issues of development and demography underly the internal conflicts in Xinjiang. Human rights violations provide the flashpoints of unrest.

Conclusion

How do the paths of development and demographics intersect?

The development and demographic center for Xinjiang is now Urumqi, indeed in Xinjiang all roads lead to Urumqi. To sit at the bus station in Urumqi and see all the buses headed out to all corners of Xinjiang is to see demographics and development intersect. The train station and the shiny new airport play a similar role. Are the passengers on their way to America? Are they up from Kashgar to visit relatives and see the big city? Are they fresh from a three-day train trip from Sichuan to transit to work in the cotton fields of Aksu? Xinjiang is in a state of flux with many different turns in the track lying ahead.

The ingredients to development include the resources both human and natural. The demographic component comes into development as labor, capital and markets. One does not exist without the other. A healthy population is one that has developed. A population that attains equality, employment, education, and production is one that has development.

Xinjiang *polo*, the fabulous rice pilaf, has a number of ingredients: rice, lamb, carrots, raisins, water, oil, and spices, of course. Where do the ingredients come from? Rice from Kashgar, lamb from Altay, carrots from Kucha, raisins from Turpan, water from the Tughri Tagh, oil from the Tarim (poetic license here) and spices from round the world. The ingredients are not the only element that makes the pilaf taste great (*polo yahshi boptu*, pilaf good becomes). How to cook is the key. Otherwise the water is too much, or the oil is too little. You must poke holes into the pilaf to allow steam to escape. If the pilaf burns because the heat is too high or there is not enough carrots, a real disaster is in the making. If the heat is left on too high in Xinjiang, the pilaf will burn.

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Project Information

The Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia

Project Rationale, Purpose and Outline

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Rationale

Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian political landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups d'état, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Many have been protracted; several have far reaching domestic and international consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan, Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those countries; although the political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems in these countries as well as in Vietnam continue to confront problems of political legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India. In all, millions of people have been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced. And the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner (especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negative consequences for domestic and regional security.

Internal conflicts in Asia (as elsewhere) can be traced to three issues—national identity, political legitimacy (the title to rule), and distributive justice—that are often interconnected. With the bankruptcy of the socialist model and the transitions to democracy in several countries, the number of internal conflicts over the legitimacy of political system has declined in Asia. However, political legitimacy of certain governments continues to be contested from time to time and the legitimacy of the remaining communist and authoritarian systems are likely to confront challenges in due course. The project deals with internal conflicts arising from the process of constructing national identity with specific focus on conflicts rooted in the relationship of minority communities to the nation-state. Here too many Asian states have made considerable progress in constructing national communities but several states including some major ones still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent conflict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and international stability.

Purpose

The project investigates the dynamics and management of five key internal conflicts in Asia—Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, the Moro conflict in southern Philippines, and the conflicts pertaining to Tibet and Xinjiang in China. Specifically it investigates the following:

1. Why (on what basis), how (in what form), and when does group differentiation and political consciousness emerge?
2. What are the specific issues of contention in such conflicts? Are these of the instrumental or cognitive type? If both, what is the relationship between them? Have the issues of contention altered over time? Are the conflicts likely to undergo further redefinition?
3. When, why, and under what circumstances can such contentions lead to violent conflict? Under what circumstances have they not led to violent conflict?
4. How can the conflicts be managed, settled, and eventually resolved? What are policy choices? Do options such as national self-determination, autonomy, federalism, electoral design, and consociationalism exhaust the list of choices available to meet the aspirations of minority communities? Are there innovative ways of thinking about identity and sovereignty that can meet the aspirations of the minority communities without creating new sovereign nation-states?
5. What is the role of the regional and international communities in the protection of minority communities?
6. How and when does a policy choice become relevant?

Design

A study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigated in the study. With a principal researcher each, the study groups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries including the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, the United States, and Australia. For composition of study groups please see the participants list.

All five-study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C. from September 29 through October 3, 2002. Over a period of four days, participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertaining to the five conflicts investigated in the project. In addition to identifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facilitated the development of cross country perspectives and interaction among scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion at the meeting five research monograph length studies (one per conflict) and twenty policy papers (four per conflict) were commissioned.

Study groups met separately for the second meeting. The Aceh and Papua study group meetings were held in Bali on June 16-17, the Southern Philippines study group met in Manila on June 23, and the Tibet and Xinjiang study groups were held in Honolulu from August 20 through 22, 2003. The third meeting of all study groups was held from February 28 through March 2, 2004 in Washington D.C. These meetings reviewed recent developments relating to the conflicts, critically reviewed the first drafts of the policy papers prepared for the project, reviewed the book proposals by the principal researchers, and identified new topics for research.

Publications

The project will result in five research monographs (book length studies) and about twenty policy papers.

Research Monographs. To be authored by the principal researchers, these monographs present a book-length study of the key issues pertaining to each of the five conflicts. Subject to satisfactory peer review, the monographs will appear in the East-West Center Washington series *Asian Security*, and the East-West Center series *Contemporary Issues in the Asia Pacific*, both published by the Stanford University Press.

Policy Papers. The policy papers provide a detailed study of particular aspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 10,000 to 25,000-word essays will be published in the EWC Washington *Policy Studies* series, and be circulated widely to key personnel and institutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media in the respective Asian countries, United States, and other relevant countries.

Public Forums

To engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunction with study group meetings.

Two public forums were organized in Washington, D.C. in conjunction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cosponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, discussed the Aceh and Papua conflicts. The second forum, cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and the Sigur Center of the George Washington University, discussed the Tibet and Xinjiang conflicts.

Public forums were also organized in Jakarta and Manila in conjunction with the second study group meetings. The Jakarta public forum on Aceh and Papua, cosponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, and the Southern Philippines public forum cosponsored by the Policy Center of the Asian Institute of Management, attracted persons from government, media, think tanks, activist groups, diplomatic community and the public.

In conjunction with the third study group meetings, also held in Washington, D.C., three public forums were offered. The first forum, cosponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, addressed the conflicts in Aceh and Papua. The second forum, cosponsored by the Sigur Center of the George Washington University, discussed the conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang. A third forum was held to discuss the conflict in the Southern Philippines. This forum was cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace.

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Background Information

Background of the Xinjiang Conflict

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as it is officially known to the Chinese (Uyghur nationalists call it “Eastern Turkistan” or “Uyghuristan”), is a vast region in the northwest corner of today's People's Republic of China. Occupying one-sixth the total area of China, it holds only a fraction more than one percent of China's population, some eighteen million. Xinjiang possesses rich deposits of oil, natural gas, and nonferrous metals. Chinese officials value it as a space to absorb migrants, a source of resources crucial to economic development, and a link to Central Asia. They desperately want to maintain hold of Xinjiang, fearing its loss would incite Party collapse and possibly the secession of Taiwan and Tibet.

While Qing (1644-1911), Republican (1912-49), and Communist governments all laid formal claim to the territory and inhabitants of what is today Xinjiang, locals have resented and resisted each assertion of authority. Official Chinese sources claim that Xinjiang and the Uyghurs have been part of China “since ancient times,” dating incorporation to the first century BCE. Yet only in the mid-18th century was the whole of the region conquered militarily from the east, and then by the Manchu Qing empire. Qing rulers made the region a province only in the late 19th century, fearing its loss due to foreign incursions or internal rebellion. Between 1867 and 1877, for instance, Qing rulers lost control of the region when Yaqub Beg established an independent kingdom that achieved diplomatic relations with Turkey and Britain. Opposition to rule from Beijing (and for a time Nanjing) continued after the collapse of the Manchu empire and the founding of the Republic of China in 1912: Turki leaders twice established independent states of “Eastern Turkistan,” once briefly in the southwest from 1933 to 1934, and again more successfully in the three northwestern prefectures of Xinjiang from 1944 to 1949.

Nor has the Chinese Communist Party been immune from challenges in the region. Though the Party killed, imprisoned, or co-opted nearly all advocates of independence soon after taking power in 1949, Uyghur aspirations to independence did not disappear. Uyghurs within Xinjiang organized a number of opposition parties in the first post-revolutionary decade, nearly all quickly squelched by the party-state. Uyghur émigrés in Soviet Central Asia and Turkey continued to harbor the dream of establishing an independent Uyghur state. While the high socialist era in Xinjiang (1958-76) witnessed little secessionist violence, Chinese officials claim to have exposed several underground parties. In 1962 tens of thousands of Uyghurs and Kazakhs rioted in the northwest city of Ghulja, and over sixty thousand fled Xinjiang for the Soviet Union. Uyghur nationalism found renewed public expression in the Reform Era (1978 to the present), and participants in several demonstrations in the late 1980s called for independence. Peaceful demonstrations disappeared in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Since 1990 a series of violent episodes in Xinjiang have drawn international attention. The Baren Uprising in April 1990, in which several dozen Uyghurs attacked the regional government and police, was the most violent clash. Bus bombings in Urumqi in 1992 and 1997 left over ten dead and led some to label Uyghur separatists as terrorists. A peaceful demonstration in Hotan in 1995, and a much larger one in Ghulja in 1997, turned violent after police attacked the demonstrators. A spate of political assassinations of regional officials and religious clerics has maintained a sense of uncertainty in parts of the region. Nevertheless, since 1949 there has not been a “hot conflict” in Xinjiang like those in Palestine, Chechnya, Aceh, or Mindanao. Underground Uyghur organizations in Xinjiang are all but unheard of, and there are no independent militias. Partly in consequence of the relative scarcity of collective violence, no international agent has explicitly called for intervention or mediation.

Uyghur Autonomous Region, China



- Cities
- ⎯ Prefecture boundaries
- ⎯ Provincial boundaries
- ⎯ National boundaries

The Uyghur Autonomous Region contains several non-Uyghur majority prefectures. These are: Kizilsu (Kirghiz autonomous prefecture), Altay, Tarbaghatay, and Ili (Kazakh autonomous prefectures), Bortala and Bayangol (Mongol autonomous prefectures), and Changji (Hui autonomous prefecture).

Note: Map boundaries and locations are approximate. Geographic features and their names do not imply official endorsement or recognition by the UN.