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Center for International Security and Arms Control

The Center for International Security and Arms Control, part of Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, is a multidisciplinary community dedicated to research and training in the field of international security. The Center brings together scholars, policymakers, scientists, area specialists, members of the business community, and other experts to examine a wide range of international security issues. CISAC publishes its own series of working papers and reports on its work and also sponsors a series, *Studies in International Security and Arms Control*, through Stanford University Press.

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Slaughter of the Innocents:
Understanding Political Killing, Including Limited Terror but Especially Large-Scale Killing and Genocide
6–8 March 1998

Workshop of the
MacArthur Foundation Consortium on
Challenges to the Study of International Peace & Cooperation
(Stanford University, University of Minnesota,
University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Pamela Ballinger

June 1998

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Slaughter of the Innocents: Understanding Political Killing, Including Limited Terror but Especially Large-Scale Killing and Genocide

The MacArthur Consortium workshop "Slaughter of the Innocents: Understanding Political Killing" focused on mobilization for large-scale killing and genocide. How does such violence become possible? Rather than concentrating on effect and prescription, participants devoted their attention to diagnosis and causal understanding. The workshop had three main areas of investigation: (1) the historical sociology of mobilization for large-scale killing, (2) the phenomenology of genocide, and (3) the role of memory in such mobilization.

In exploring a topic that has become highly problematic and pressing in the context of civil wars, the workshop addressed changing institutions of violence and issues of identity. The workshop aimed to raise as many questions as it answered, as well as to set an agenda for future interdisciplinary understanding.

Session One: Mobilization for Genocide

Examining mobilization for large-scale killings, the first session started from a series of key questions: Under what conditions does such violence occur and how are people mobilized to engage in such acts? What is the pattern of occurrence of large-scale killing over time? Why has it increased

so dramatically in the twentieth century? Can we identify characteristic patterns for the Cold War and post–Cold War eras?

In his paper, "The Wars of the 1990s in Historic Perspective: Total War," **Steve Stedman** questioned the commonplace assumption that the post–Cold War period has witnessed a dramatic increase in civil wars, wars that appear nastier and more "barbaric" than earlier Cold War conflicts. Stedman discussed the difficulties in characterizing previous wars, as well as in classifying "combatants" and "non-combatants"; statistics for soldier and civilian deaths prove unreliable in many cases. Stedman contended that the Cold War, and its end, did not represent a historical break point in the nature of warfare but rather that the 1990s reflect a longer trend since the end of World War II toward internal wars over control of state power.

In rejecting the view of contemporary civil wars as more barbaric, Stedman mapped out the lengthy genealogy of the savage versus civilized warfare distinction. This distinction has been historically invoked in order to justify "savagery" on the part of self-styled representatives of civilization toward those labeled barbarians. Sanctioned by racist ideologies, wars without restraint became a prominent feature of colonialism. Stedman further argued that various causal paths to war without restraint may best be viewed through the lens of total war.

In their contribution, "Explanation of Genocide," **Chuck Tilly** and **Bruce Jones** offered a comprehensive typology for various kinds of large-scale violence. Mapping such violence along two axes—those of degree of categorical concentration of victims and degree of concentration of state force deployed—Tilly and Jones mapped genocide as very high on both dimensions. (Random bombings in city centers by non-state sponsored terrorist groups would be low on both dimensions.) Tilly argued that in order to effectively understand causal processes scholars need to separate out the moral agenda from that of academic inquiry. The Western tendency to stress individual intentionality has hindered understanding of genocide and other large-scale killings, maintained Tilly. Jones then discussed Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi, fitting these specific cases into the general framework. The framework illuminated the different strategies employed by the perpetrators in each case. In Rwanda, for example, the state was controlled by a minority Hutu elite, to the exclusion of both Tutsi and southern Hutu. When Tutsi invaded Rwanda in 1990, the minority elite retained a monopoly of state force; this same elite directed a highly successful campaign of genocide in 1994, killing a million or so people in ten weeks. In examining different path-dependent results, Jones focused on the different degrees of underlying categorization in society, the nature of elites in each case, and the varying abilities of elites to maintain a monopoly of force.

Jones also highlighted the role of the international community, particularly in influencing elites' ability to maintain a monopoly of force.

In the discussion of the papers, several speakers echoed Jones in emphasizing the role played by both international actors and the international system in the shaping of internal processes. Consistent with **John Meyer's** arguments, Tilly noted the ways in which external agents constitute internal actors, while Stedman directed attention to the ways that international codes of warfare develop. **Crawford Young** pointed out that the label "genocide" becomes important to how events are perceived and unfold. There was a general consensus that in looking at large-scale killings, scholars need to expand their framework beyond the domestic or internal. **Susan Olzak** noted that this internal focus has not resulted in a great deal of useful, cumulative research and that an international framework instead holds promise.

Another line of debate centered on the issue of strategic action and racialist or exterminationist ideologies. **Ben Valentino** disagreed with Tilly's suggestion that scholars move away from the question of intentionality. A large degree of intentionality exists in most instances of large-scale killings, argued Valentino. Considering intentionality proves essential to understanding restraint, or lack of restraint, in different cases. In response, Tilly reiterated the importance of looking at strategic actions taken at the time rather than assuming, ex post facto, that presumed intention or ideological motivations explain large-scale killing. Tilly urged scholars to consider the socially constructed programs in which strategic actions, as well as intentions and ideologies, are embedded. Here, what categories are available, such as those of citizenship, become key. Other issues raised in the discussion included the role played by racism and exterminationist ideologies.

Panel on Mobilization for Large-Scale Killing

To further understanding of mobilization for genocide, this panel compared a number of empirical cases. Several of the issues raised earlier, including the role of intentionality and eliminationist ideologies, also ran through this session. In his presentation, **Bruce Cronin** identified genocide as a method of state-building initiated by leaders. Emphasizing intentionality, Cronin argued that genocide is a crime of states, not individuals. While the slaughter of ethnic populations is not unique to the twentieth century, having occurred even in the ancient Greek city-states, Cronin contends that the idea of eliminating entire cultural groups within society is a relatively recent product of the territorially based and centralized nation-state. The nation-state itself is the problem, suggested Cronin, who

added that ethnic hatred does not prove sufficient to explain genocide. The character of the state influences its strategies for dealing with diversity and, ultimately, the propensity to genocide; genocide is more likely to occur when an assimilation or absorption strategy fails, as happened in Bangladesh or Rwanda. The character of the state influences the propensity to genocide.

Valentino agreed with Cronin in rejecting the focus on race and ethnicity as independent, causal factors motivating genocide. Valentino also questioned the notion that genocide requires considerable popular support. Like Cronin, Valentino did not see mass support as necessary to a state-directed policy of genocide; there are exceptions, however, as in the case of the partition of India and Pakistan. Valentino also argued that genocide and other large-scale killing should be viewed on a continuum with conventional warfare, in which the intentional killing of civilians is often high.

Armindo Maia described the genocide in East Timor, one that began as a politicide targeting communists and over time degenerated into a full-scale massacre of civilians. The lack of international response to these killings worsened the situation, noted Maia. The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966, discussed by **Michael Malley**, prove important for understanding later events in East Timor. In Indonesia, most of the killings were carried out by civilians rather than the military, in response to an attempted coup involving army officers who were members of the Communist Party. In this case, the international climate proved generally sympathetic or indifferent toward the massacring of "communists."

Francois Nsengiyumva commented upon the recent genocide in Rwanda, arguing against the view that this violence followed solely from "tribal hatreds." Nsengiyumva maintained instead that such African conflicts typically result from weak economies and the desire to take what is left behind by killed or fleeing populations. Occurring in unsettled political systems, such genocides also have roots in colonialism. Stressing the need to diagnose and prevent further massacres, Nsengiyumva recommended that the international community work to improve economies and education in African states. While Nsengiyumva urged the need for prevention, **William Brustein** outlined his ongoing work on the historical sociology of anti-Semitism in Europe, 1879–1939. A comparative study, this research considers the development and articulations of different strands of anti-Semitic thought in Romania, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. Given that anti-Semitism alone is not sufficient to explain the Holocaust, why does Germany prove unique in embarking on an eliminationist path?

One of the themes brought out in the discussion was the issue of fear versus hatred. Bruce Jones argued that, in many instances, fear proves essential in creating hostility toward the Other. This opened up the ques-

tion of propaganda, as well as that of social movements. Some participants, like Valentino, warned against assuming that large-scale killings require the support or indifference of the majority population; if this is the case, then fear is not so important. Other topics discussed included that of the positive, as opposed to the negative, content of genocidal ideologies. **Andreas Umland** noted that many eliminationist ideologies, such as that of the Nazis, stress genocide's purifying, regenerating aspects for the perpetrators. **Bob Hamerton-Kelly** raised the possibility that scapegoating and sacrifice may be universal mechanisms through which psychic balance is reestablished. **Lynn Eden** concluded that in the first session, the important question of categories, such as that of citizenship, had been raised. In the discussion, some agreement was reached on who does the killing: militaries and paramilitaries (hence, a relatively small part of the population). What remained at issue, however, are how certain categories become unusually salient.

Session Two: The Phenomenology Of Genocide

This session examined the phenomenology of genocide. What does it mean to participate in such actions? What world is created in large-scale killing and how? What preexisting world is available and manipulated to mobilize people? Are there certain characteristic patterns of killing and maiming that occur and, if so, what are they and why do they occur?

In his paper, "The Aesthetics of Genocide," **Howard Adelman** touched on a number of topics relating to the phenomenology of genocide. Adelman emphasized, for example, the Biblical roots of "purificatory" massacres and the way that in the French Revolution the Enlightenment "faith in progress" went awry and the Jacobin Terror took over. Genocidal practices also reveal a constant of violence that aims to deface the body of the (proximate) Other; mutilating the body of the Other ensures that that body can not be a member of the body politic. Adelman also placed on the agenda for discussion the question of why people of good will end up in violent factions, as well as the ways that genocide attempts to erase the traces of populations.

David Chandler took up the theme of silences and erasures in his paper, "Voices from S-21: Terror and History at Pol Pot's Secret Prison." Chandler described a secret prison in Pol Pot's Cambodia where, between 1975 and 1979, so-called "enemies of the people" were incarcerated and their confessions extracted. According to Chandler, the idea of the perpetual

revolution made for a dizzying production of enemies, which came to include former interrogators at the prisons. After giving false confessions, the fate of these prisoners remained locked away in S-21's secret archives and thus these victims paradoxically "erased" themselves in the process of "confessing" their crimes. Chandler also noted the uncanny resemblance between the prison interrogators—who served as "therapists" to the "guilty persons" (prisoners)—and Freud's practices of excavating memories.

In her talk accompanied by slides, "'We Are Not Dogs': The Phenomenology of Genocide in Ixil, Guatemala," **Victoria Sanford** urged that we consider genocide in Guatemala from the perspective of victims' memories. Discourse about Guatemalan massacres has been controlled by representatives of the state and the military, i.e. the perpetrators. Sanford described the systematic campaign of army terror conducted over the last two decades against Mayan villagers in rural Guatemala in a so-called "scorched earth" campaign. In the community of Ixil, Sanford worked as a member of a forensics team carrying out exhumations of massacre victims. She identified five phases in the genocidal campaigns conducted there: (1) pre-massacre community life, in which some community organizing occurred in the aftermath of the 1976 earthquake, (2) the massacres, (3) post-massacre life in the mountains (where surviving villagers fled), (4) transitional return to the town, and (5) return to civil control. In communities like Ixil, armed coercion was established as a means for controlling the population. In considering such violence, Sanford contended that scholars need to go beyond the binaries of innocent/guilty, killers/victims. In Ixil, for example, many villagers were forced to serve as civil patrols and, at times, participate in the violence, as well as burials of villagers and relatives. In genocide, then, lines are less clear and individualization of responsibility at the community level becomes difficult.

Sanford stressed that the act of witnessing proves important, both as a method used by perpetrators (to send a message to other members of the targeted population) and as a means by which scholars can begin to understand the phenomenology of genocide. The discussion of these three papers returned repeatedly to the theme of witnessing, visibility, and erasure. Some participants, like Steve Stedman, contended that while in genocidal wars winners get to write the history, this does not necessarily mean that those who have been killed are entirely erased from history. Adelman stated that this represents the contradiction built into genocide, the fact that perpetrators want to erase victims as *agents* of history, not erase them from history altogether. **Irina Paperno** reiterated this, noting that in the case of the Holocaust, the erasure of Jews was quite visible (with the Nazis planning to build a massive museum to the "extinct" Jewish people). Valentino

similarly argued that in some instances violence is intended to be demonstrative.

In a related line of debate, **David Holloway** asked why confessions become crucial methods in cases like that explored by Chandler. The production of confessions described by Chandler reminded Holloway of Michel de Certeau's description of torture as inscribing winners' histories on bodies. By extracting confessions of guilt, perpetrators defile the victims in a manner that denies them the possibility of becoming martyrs. Chandler answered that this confessional technique was crucial to a communist repertoire of terror and violence.

Another set of issues centered on Adelman's claims about genocide as entailing a specific kind of defacement or mutilation of the body. Cronin contended that the key theme running through genocide is not passion but rationality. Adelman replied that the act of eliminating people from history doesn't entail rationality per se but rather a faith in rationality that effaces the operation of passions and emotions. Valentino and several other participants also countered Adelman's claims about mutilation as a constant feature in genocide, noting that the Holocaust represented a "clean" and sterile genocide. In response, Adelman contended that Valentino was looking only at the final phase in the Holocaust (disposal of the body), thereby neglecting various kinds of defacement and humiliations to the body that occurred earlier on.

Another theme brought out in the discussion was whether, by studying the phenomenology of genocide, we might also have insight into prevention of future genocides. When we see an elite group advocating purification and becoming the interpreter of the "national voice," offered Adelman, prevention becomes important and thus identification and diagnosis should be an important part of the model. In validating the importance of early warning systems, Jones added that insights about genocide's phenomenology should be wedded to the understandings from the first session about mobilization for genocide.

A final set of questions centered on the nature of social scientific explanation. Tilly outlined several different ideas about what explanation might involve: (1) motive explains what actors do, (2) a representation of means-ends relations explains an event, and (3) the symbolic significance attributed to an event explains it. Tilly warned against overly symbolic explanations that neglect the contingency of the strategic setting. Rather than attribute symbolic significance after the fact, suggested Tilly, we instead need to talk about what codes are available at the time for brutal action. On the basis of his own earlier work on the logic of explanation, Adelman concluded that no single form of explanation is sufficient.

Session Three: The Role of Memory in Large-Scale Killing

The final session focused on the role that memory plays in large-scale killings, particularly as it relates to mobilization, or potential mobilization, of killers and to the meaning of killing as understood by perpetrators.

In her comments on "History, Memory and Mobilization for Genocide," **Pamela Ballinger** raised a number of questions about the role memory may play in preparing genocidal campaigns. The active role that memories play has tended to receive little attention in the literature on memory and genocide, a body of work that focuses on the experiences of survivors and the effects of traumatic memory after genocide has occurred. Ballinger identified a developing sub-genre of literature, however, that to some degree addresses this issue of memory's active role in facilitating genocide, even if the problem is often phrased in terms of identity formation rather than mobilization for large-scale killing.

Works attempting to explain the violence of Yugoslavia's breakup, suggested Ballinger, often explain the bloodshed there as following out of the elite manipulation of collective memories; these memories include national founding myths—like that of Kosovo as the heart of Serbia—and imagery from living memory—accounts of fratricidal massacres during World War II. Scholars of the conflict have thus described a "verbal civil war" or the "symbolic revival of genocide" as having preceded the actual wars in Yugoslavia. The actual causal mechanisms by which symbolic genocide becomes literalized, however, remain inadequately explained by instrumentalist accounts (as well as by primordialist ones). If elites manipulate historic memory, as occurred in Yugoslavia, why did this resonate with Yugoslavs? Clearly, the images drawn upon by Yugoslavia's nationalist leaders had real significance for many people, particularly those images from World War II that remained part of living memory.

Ballinger raised the issue of firsthand traumatic memories versus memories that have been transmitted over time. What makes those who have not experienced trauma in the first-person come to identify with those who have and what, in some cases, makes these individuals carry out further violence in the name of avenging that originary trauma? This is a question that needs to be asked, given that there may be many reasons for which individuals kill. We also need to ask what kind of evidence we can look to, contended Ballinger. Statements? Actions? This points to the general problem of whether an act or ritual belies its meaning. Ballinger proposed to the group that these questions suggest an important avenue for future research. She also suggested that scholars look at specific state formations and the

possibilities for both public and private memory within those states, structural conditions that permit violence, and the issue of scale and type of atrocities. Connecting research on genocide with that on the uses of the past will permit comparative work that illuminates the role memory plays in large-scale killing.

Zara Kinnunen's paper, "The Intersection of Memory and 'Fact' in the Witnessing of Large-Scale Killing and Genocide," focused on witnesses' memories and the difficulties social analysts have in using such memories to explain mobilization for genocide. Interviewers often pose questions within a rational framework, for example, that proves alien to the narrations of witnesses. Traditional fact-finding assumes one truth of memory while traumatic memories may prove contradictory, as well as non-chronological. Kinnunen added that since discourse is inherently dialogic in nature and testimony is a discursive practice, witnesses are not free to frame their own responses. For Kinnunen, the truth of memories proves less important than whether a group regards its memories as true.

While collective memory constructs social identities, a dialectic exists between "popular" social memory of the past and conscious manipulations of the past by elites; in many cases, contended Kinnunen, national collective memory is strengthened through mobilization for large-scale killing. Given all this, scholars should seek new ways of framing their questions about memory and thereby go beyond a purely legal or historical approach. While a single truth may be nonexistent or unattainable, suggested Kinnunen, the goal in accessing memories of large-scale killings is to have "more of the truths."

In the discussion that followed, Adelman pressed Kinnunen on her point about the intersubjectivity of memory. Traumatic memory entails memories that are independent of intersubjective correction, argued Adelman. Maia raised a similar point about the kinds of methodologies scholars can use for understanding contradictory accounts. Kinnunen reiterated her insistence that we should evaluate survivors' statements for the truths they contain rather than for "objective" references.

Another set of debates centered on the issue of memory and reconciliation. How can reconciling memories be created? Might forgetting be necessary in some cases? What practical lessons can be drawn for truth commissions? Holloway and Ballinger both argued that erasure does not make for reconciliation, at least in cases like Yugoslavia. Stedman pointed out that tolerance and the plurality of memories do not necessarily bring about reconciliation, while Kinnunen questioned the need for reconciliation per se.

How stories are constructed and whether narratives explain behavior dominated the final part of the discussion. Tilly advised that scholars look

at the construction of stories which constrain action. Brustein questioned whether narratives really explain behavior, suggesting instead that these scripts might merely be provided for the listener to understand ex post facto. The crucial question, interjected **Eric Weitz**, is not whether the narrative explains the event but rather the various scripts that are available.

Concluding Discussion

The final discussion focused on three issues: the nature of explanation, progressive radicalization, and the production of social scripts that shape action. Adelman noted that there are many modes of explanation: descriptive (narrative); correlational studies; a shift to empathetic reconstructions (Dilthy); a positivist reference to objectivity; a phenomenological reference to experience; and structuralist. Where Adelman once believed that it was possible to systematically reconcile the logics, he now accepts that they play different roles. The places where these logics prove irreconcilable create opportunities for contentious (and productive) dialogues. In the larger scheme of studying genocide, suggested Adelman, we need to consider what our aim is: to prevent genocide or to provide reconciliation?

Other participants, responding to Eden's description of a continuum of violence beginning with terror killing and culminating in elimination, emphasized that scholars should look at the progressive radicalization whose end result is genocide. Eden directed attention to the goals of government bureaucracies, asking why elimination may ultimately become the goal. In response, Holloway suggested that Eden's scheme proved too focused on government action. In the Soviet Union, for example, the machine of terror depended upon many external actions, like denunciations, that fed it and thereby furthered a cumulative radicalization. Brustein instead suggested that we look to a much earlier stage in the process of radicalization in order to understand how publics are prepared to be indifferent toward genocide.

Tilly gave the final comment, in the process summarizing the accomplishments of the workshop. To varying degrees, argued Tilly, the group had begun to create a story about a political process in which one outcome is the mass extermination of a categorically defined population. How do external actors, local bureaucracies, military organizations, and state apparatuses control a process where, in some contingencies, the result is limited terror or mass extermination? The group reached a working consensus against sui generis accounts of genocide, added Tilly. The group also

placed the production of accounts firmly on that agenda. We've agreed that accounts at the time, after the fact, and by observers are all important, continued Tilly, and that where those come from is not simply a by-product of the political process but is part of the political process.

Finally, the group examined a number of different actions and offered a series of theories about possible outcomes of actions. These actions are socially constructed because they are given through history but they depend partly on imagination and on practical knowledge. They prove the collective result of previous experience and they constrain interaction. Tilly added that accounts are always discrepant in some sense and that this discrepancy matters. Beliefs are conversationally based and strongly constrained by political behavior. Tilly concluded that the workshop had placed on the agenda a demand for intellectual devices that integrate the production of stories.

Center for International Security and Arms Control,
Stanford University
MacArthur Consortium Workshop

"Slaughter of the Innocents: Understanding Political Killing, Including Limited Terror but Especially Large-Scale Killing and Genocide"

Wattis Room, Littlefield Center, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University, 6–8 March 1998

Friday, 6 March 1998

Friday afternoon	Room check-in at the Stanford Terrace Inn, 531 Stanford Avenue, Palo Alto (Ph. 1-800-729-0332)
7:00 pm	Welcoming dinner for out of town participants at restaurant "Zibbibo," 430 Kipling Street, Palo Alto. Please feel free to join us if you arrive late.

Saturday, 7 March 1998

Starting at 8:30 a.m.	Coffee, juice, and other breakfast items served in the Wattis Room
8:45 a.m.	Welcoming remarks by David Holloway, Stanford University
9–12:30 a.m.	**Session One: "Mobilization for Genocide"** Under what conditions does large-scale killing occur and how are people mobilized to engage in such acts? Have the political and social processes that lead to, and are associated with, large-scale killing changed over time, or are there similar characteristics—in the nature of ideology, mobilization, organization, strategy, demographics of killers, etc.—causing and shaping most large-scale killings? What is the pattern of occurrence of large-scale killing over time? Why has it increased so dramatically in the twentieth century? Were there characteristic patterns during the Cold War? Are there characteristic patterns since the end of the Cold War?
9:10–9:50 a.m.	Presentations by: Stephen Stedman, Stanford University "The Wars of the 1990s in Historical Perspective"

	Bruce Jones, London School of Economics, Charles Tilly, Columbia University "Explanation of Genocide"
9:50–10:30 a.m.	Discussion
10:30–10:45	Coffee Break
10:45–11:45 a.m.	Panel on Mobilization for Large-Scale Killing Bruce Cronin, University of Wisconsin–Madison Armindo Maia, University of Minnesota Michael Malley, University of Wisconsin–Madison Francois Nysengiyuma, Former SSRC MacArthur Fellow Benjamin Valentino, MIT William Brustein, University of Minnesota
11:45–12:30 p.m.	Discussion
12:30–1:30 p.m.	Lunch buffet, Wattis Room
1:30–4:30 p.m.	**Session Two: "The Phenomenology of Genocide"** What does it mean to participate in large-scale killing? What world is created in large-scale killing and how? What preexisting world is available and manipulated in order to mobilize people? (This is a question of both mobilization and phenomenology.) Are there certain characteristic patterns of killing and maiming that occur and, if so, what are they and why do they occur?
1:30–2:45 p.m.	Presentations by: Howard Adelman, York University "The Aesthetics of Genocide" David Chandler, University of Wisconsin–Madison "Voices from S-21: Terror and History at Pol-Pot's Secret Prison" Victoria Sanford, Stanford University "'We Are Not Dogs': The Phenomenology of Genocide in the Ixil Triangle" (Slide Presentation)

2:45–3:00 p.m.	Coffee Break
3:00–4:30 p.m.	Discussion
7 p.m.	Dinner by invitation at the "Blue Chalk Cafe" restaurant, 630 Ramona Street, Palo Alto

Sunday, 8 March, 1998

Starting at 8:30 a.m.	Coffee, juice, and other breakfast items served in the Wattis Room
9:00 a.m.–12:15 p.m.	**Session Three: "The Role of Memory in Large-Scale Killing"** What is the role of memory in large-scale killings? In particular, what is the role of memory as it relates to mobilization, or potential mobilization, of killers, and to the meaning of killing as understood by perpetrators?
9:00 a.m.–9:30 a.m.	Presentations by: Pamela Ballinger "History, Memory and Mobilization for Genocide" Zara Kinnunen, University of Minnesota "The Intersection of Memory and 'Fact' in the Witnessing of Large-Scale Killing and Genocide"
9:30–10:30 a.m.	Discussion
10:30–10:45 a.m.	Coffee Break
10:45–12:00 noon	Wrap-up
12:15 p.m.	Optional lunch buffet, Wattis Room

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