


WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER



HOW FAR IS NATO FROM
THE WESTERN BALKANS?

Debates in the Region
Case study: Serbia

N^o 5 · APRIL–JUNE 2007

Belgrade

**WESTERN
BALKANS
SECURITY
OBSERVER**

Journal of the
Belgrade School of
Security Studies

No. 5

APRIL-JUNE 2007

Publisher:
Centre for Civil-
Military Relations

Editor in chief:
Miroslav Hadžić

Editors:
Sonja Stojanović
Filip Ejđus

Illustrations:
Marko Milošević

Translation:
Ljiljana Nikolić
Nataša Jovanović

Proofreading:
Milorad Timotić
Harry Hayball

Design
Saša Janjić

Computer typesetting:
Časlav Bjelica

Printed by:
GORAGRAF,
Beograd

Circulation:
200 copies

Belgrade School of
Security Studies is
established with the
assistance of the
Kingdom of Norway.
Its functioning was
supported by the
Balkan Trust for
Democracy.

Contents

EDITOR'S WORD	3	<i>Jelena Petrović</i> FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA'S ACCESSION TO NATO	55	
REGIONAL DEBATES				
<i>Cvete Koneska</i> MACEDONIAN DISCOURSE ON NATO	4	<i>Nemanja Milošević</i> YUGOSLAVIA, USA AND NATO IN THE 1950S	64	
<i>Dr Mladen Staničić</i> CROATIA AND NATO	11	PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS		
<i>Jelena Radoman</i> MONTENEGRIN DEBATE ON ACCESSION TO NATO	14	<i>Jelena Unijat</i> INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROATLANTIC INTEGRATION		81
CASE STUDY: SERBIA		REACTIONS		
<i>Zorana Atanasović</i> PUBLIC OPINION OF SERBIA ON JOINING NATO	22	<i>Milorad Timotić</i> SERBS AND ALBANIANS	87	
<i>Predrag Petrović</i> AN ATTEMPTED DEBATE - Mapping the debate about NATO in Serbia's civil society-	31	<i>Oliver Subotić</i> BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS OF IDENTIFICATION	90	
<i>Đorđe Popović</i> NATO ACCESSION AND SERBIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS	41	REVIEWS		
<i>Marko Savković</i> WOULD NATO ACCESSION CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN SERBIA?	48	<i>Jorg Artman</i> WHITHER RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY?	92	
		<i>Marko Milošević</i> JNA FROM STALJIN TO NATO	95	
		PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTRE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS		97



NORWEGIAN EMBASSY



This journal is financed
by NATO

The Centre for Civil-Military Relations promotes the public and responsible participation of civil society in increasing the security of the citizens and state based on modern democratic principles, as well as security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Belgrade School of Security Studies is a special division of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations set up to carry out systematic research and promote academic advancement of young researchers thus contributing to the development of security studies in Serbia.

Contact

Centre for Civil-Military Relations

Gundulićev venac 48

11000 Beograd

tel/fax 381(0)11-32 87 226

381(0)11-32 87 334

www.ccmr-bg.org

office@ccmr-bg.org



SINCE THE end of the Cold War security in the Western Balkans has to a large extent relied on NATO. The compliance with the Dayton and Ohrid Peace agreements as well as implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 depended on the military-political overlay that NATO has been exercising over the region. However, as peace and democracy consolidate, Western Balkan states are gradually acquiring capacities to transform themselves from “security importers into security exporters“ through memberships in PfP and NATO. It is often debated in public how far they are from NATO membership and what should be achieved in that respect. In this issue of the Western Balkans Security Observer we turn this question up-side down and ask instead: how far is NATO from the Western Balkans? Firstly, we focus our attention to the debates on NATO accession that are parallely ongoing in Macedonia, Croatia and Montenegro. The readership will discern the convergence but also some significant divergence in the dominant public and political discourses in these three countries. Then, authors from the Belgrade School of Security Studies present the existing public debate in Serbia on NATO accession. They also make an assesment of its consequences on Serbia’s internal, economic and foreign policy. One article brings us back to the 1950s when cordial almost allied relationships existed between Tito’s Yugoslavia and NATO. The story about the extraordinary talent for Realpolitik demonstrated by the Yugoslav administration at the time should serve today’s political elites as a signpost for way forward. However, it should not be, by any means a harbourage and pretext for incomplection of Euroatlantic integration in line with national and regional interests.

Filip Ejdus

Macedonian discourse on NATO

Cvete Koneska

UDK 327.51(497.7)"199/200"

Intro: Jokes and What They Mean

In a meeting with NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap D.H. Scheffer, former Macedonian PM, Mr. Vlado Buckovski, talking about the NATO demands for 110% fair elections in Macedonia, said: "Secretary General, you're asking miracles. But I accept the miracle." This is a regular political joke, especially since the elections in Macedonia were not exactly "110% fair".¹ Yet, this statement is also indicative from another perspective – it speaks about the political discourse in Macedonia, how things are perceived, referred to and understood. Thus, it seems rather ironic, if unsurprising, that the Macedonian discourse about NATO should revolve around 'miracles' – demanding or accepting them. NATO officials have continually emphasized the 'rational' nature of NATO, its enlargement and the criteria for enlargement. There should be nothing miraculous about them! When a state is ready, when all necessary reforms and preparations in the defence and political sectors have been completed, it receives an invitation for NATO membership. In the meantime, NATO will evaluate the progress of reforms and provide guidelines and recommendations. It is as plain as that.

This article looks at recent political discourses in Macedonia, from the late 1990s to present date, focusing on NATO and Macedonian prospective membership in the Alliance. In the face of NATO integration efforts of the government, this article outlines the main pro- and anti- NATO arguments. The article claims that NATO discourse in Macedonia is predominantly symbolic, revolving around an appealing and romanticized image of NATO that Macedonians (population as well as political elites) entertain.

¹ Press Point by the Prime Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1), Vlado Buckovski and NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. 22 March, 2006. NATO Online Library. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060322a.htm>.

*The author is a research fellow of Analytica
www.analyticamk.org*



Such discourse (along with extremely high levels of public support for NATO membership) is emblematic of societies in early stages of integration. Yet, discourses, if widely accepted and dominant, tend to persevere.² Thus, today, when Macedonia is expecting to receive a membership invitation on the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, those discourses can only be damaging - distracting public attention from necessary reforms and rendering the population ignorant of the real costs and benefits of NATO membership.

Early Discourses: Equidistance

In the early 1990s, Macedonian foreign policy was structured around the principle of 'equidistance' - good relations with all, but not too close to anybody. Unlike most of the CEE states which actively and aggressively pursued a pro-EU and NATO agenda, Macedonia was not as loud in asking to be admitted to Euro-Atlantic institutions, being focused mostly on domestic, state-building challenges and the events in the region.

In 1995, Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the institutional tool NATO and US devised for closer cooperation with EE states. It was the beginning of the long road to joining NATO - a distant destination with a lot of other states already far ahead of Macedonia. Yet, the Macedonian political elites embraced NATO membership solely declaratively. No efforts were invested in reforming the obsolete army structures and modernizing the whole security sector, and overall, very scant attention was being paid to fulfilling formal membership criteria. Thus, from the very beginning, the NATO discourse lacked a distinct technical and reform component. The causal link between the progress of security sector and political reforms, in general, and NATO membership - was missing.

The Different Faces and Charms of NATO

Due to its recent statehood and even more recent challenges to it, NATO membership is primarily seen as a guarantee for the territorial integrity of Macedonia.³ Almost seven-

² Howarth, D. and J. Torfing. *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

³ Petar Atanasov, "Defence Reform and Public Opinion in Macedonia" *Osterreichs Bundesheer*. Available at: <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/>

teen years after proclaiming independence some in Macedonia still fear about its integrity and survival. The border with Kosovo is not yet demarcated and at points disputed, while after the ethnic conflict in 2001 the institutions' weakness also became apparent. Considering the region's volatility and still fluid borders, those fears are not entirely groundless. In this context, NATO membership is seen as a guarantee for the security and territorial integrity of the Macedonian state, while also as a kind of prevention from internal inter-ethnic conflicts.⁴ Whether NATO can provide all this and live up to the expectations of Macedonian citizens, is disputable, to say the least.

Kosovo and the 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslavia played an important role in re-shaping the dominant image of NATO among Macedonians. During the 1999 air strike against Yugoslavia, public support for NATO in Macedonia fell below 50%. The US Embassy in Skopje was attacked by angry citizens and the majority of the population did not approve of the government decision to allow NATO to freely use Macedonian territory and air space for the attacks on Yugoslavia. Thus, NATO lost some of its desirability in the eyes of Macedonians. Yet, by 'doing NATO a favour', Macedonians expected the good gesture to be remembered by the Alliance and repaid soon. There was a growing belief that by 'helping' NATO Macedonia has deserved at least a favourable treatment and quicker route to NATO membership. What Macedonia did in 1999 is often mentioned by Macedonian politicians as a credit towards NATO membership. Such expectations, though of dubious credibility, further distracted the focus from necessary reforms. Moreover, the Macedonian economy suffered during the 1999 Kosovo campaign when more than 200,000 refugees were hosted in Macedonia. That was perceived as a great enough sacrifice for NATO's sake. Any additional talk of further economic hardships due to reforms would have been rejected by the electorate.

However, Kosovo only reinforced the image of NATO's power – for the first time NATO used its military potential and attacked a state. It was a mighty display of military and political power – and power is always attractive, even if one dis-

⁴ Atanasov, "Defence Reform"



agrees with the purposes for which it is used. For a small, relatively poor state with marginal influence on international affairs, membership in a powerful and elite organization, such as NATO, is understandably very attractive. Yet, NATO does not only symbolize power. Since the end of the Cold War and fall of communism, a lot of efforts were invested in re-inventing NATO's role in world politics. NATO has come to embody democratic norms and values of Europe, and the West in general, towards which Macedonia strives. Being a NATO member would give Macedonians a sense of belonging to a greater community, but more importantly, a prestigious community, one that would improve the self-image of Macedonians and that would reinforce the European/Western component of their identity.⁵

In the same spirit, one of the dominant ways of perceiving NATO among Macedonians is as a preparatory stage for EU membership. EU membership, with the associated numerous tangible financial and political benefits, is the ultimate strategic goal of the states from the SEE region. Seeing NATO as EU's entrée is not very unusual as NATO and EU are often discursively linked - the reference 'Euro-Atlantic' being used for both organizations as well as the integration efforts of EE states. Empirically, as well, most (not all) states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have previously become NATO members. Thus, although NATO membership is not a guarantee for EU membership, not being invited to join NATO almost certainly means not joining the EU. Therefore, joining NATO is very important in the minds of Macedonians - as a step closer to EU membership and an additional evidence to be presented to the EU of Macedonia's suitability for accession to prestigious international organization (among which the EU).

The above components of the Macedonian discourse on NATO contribute well to understanding why NATO membership has such a great public support. The discourse shows that NATO membership is perceived in rather symbolic terms - as evidence of Macedonia's belonging to Europe and achieving desired levels security, wealth and international respect (as a member in on of the most powerful and prestigious organizations). Clearly, NATO membership contributes to an improved self-image of Macedonians. This is a positive influence, even if

⁵ For more on group identities and their dynamics see: Turner, John C. and Michael A. Hogg. Eds. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987)

such perception of NATO does not instigate further reforms. Yet, reforms are truly needed before Macedonia is ready to join NATO. And the population needs to know more about the tangible, technical aspects and the costs of NATO membership – a heavily neglected aspect in the public discourse on NATO.

On Budgets, Costs and Other Reasons against NATO

A fact that needs to be widely understood and accepted before Macedonians make a final decision regarding NATO membership is that being a NATO member costs. First, security sector reform is rather expensive. Modernization and restructuring of Army troops has extensive budgetary implications, and so does maintaining an Army according to NATO standards. Also, NATO membership implies keeping defence budgets above certain level. Therefore, NATO membership means committing scarce resources to implementing security sector reforms and fulfilling NATO standards.⁶ Naturally, those resources could be employed to other, perhaps more important, purposes. Either way, the citizens should be those who make the decision. And in order to be able to make an informed decision Macedonian citizens need to know how much NATO membership costs. However, such discussions are very rare in the public arena. Politicians rarely ever speak of the bill of NATO membership, while the media pay most attention to political problems, affairs and other high-profile aspects of NATO integration efforts.

Another important element of NATO membership is military involvement of Macedonian Army in NATO missions and operations world-wide. Being a NATO member implies an obligation to participate and support NATO military and peace missions across the world. It would mean sending soldiers and equipment to dangerous areas, or eventually, even to war zones. This should be no surprise, of course, since that is and remains the main purpose of the Alliance (despite recent efforts to re-invent NATO's identity). And besides, the closest contact most Macedonians have had with NATO is with the military troops that passed through Macedonia on their way to Kosovo in 1999, and those were armed forces ready to fight. If Macedonia joins NATO, Macedonian troops will have

⁶ For more detailed discussion on the costs and budgetary implications of NATO membership see: Marjan Gjurovski, "Mirovna Dividenda ili Poveke Maslo" in *Forum ANALITIKA*. No.7, Nov-Dec. 2006. pp.90-105.



to participate in NATO missions, and there is a possibility that some soldiers may be killed. This is a risk and potential cost that is rarely ever mentioned in the public discourse about NATO. Yet, it could deeply affect public sentiment regarding NATO membership.

Macedonia, as a partner country, already participates in NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially, Macedonian troops mostly provided logistics and medical assistance. Recently, however, Macedonian troops were also included in the military operations of NATO, under US command,⁷ despite the current trend of countries withdrawing their troops from Iraq.⁸ There was little public reaction to such a decision. Some intellectuals protested against this decision in the media, but that was all. This controversial political move was justified by increasing the chances of getting an invitation for NATO. Yet, if Macedonia joins NATO, sending troops to war and conflict zones will be the rule rather than the exception. Fortunately, no Macedonian soldier has been killed or taken hostage. However, if such a misfortune happens it could easily cause a swing of public opinion, from unusually high to very low, since hardly anyone mentioned such risks or how acceptable those risks are for Macedonian society.

Finally, by joining NATO Macedonia will be joining a powerful but not always popular club. After the series of terrorist attacks on some of the nations supporting the notorious War on Terror, and the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a worldwide threat from terrorist attacks to all states that support these operations. Admittedly, Macedonia is very small and its contribution to the whole process is rather insignificant, especially when compared to the leading countries such as the US or the UK. However, being small also means being more vulnerable. Macedonia lacks the capacities to fight serious terrorist threats or eventual attacks. It is thus potentially, and paradoxically, more exposed to threats to its security, despite the initial desire for more security behind NATO integration efforts.

Discussing NATO, or...?

To summarize, the public debate about NATO membership in Macedonia appears rather tilted towards the positive aspects of NATO membership. This is not unusual since

⁷ "Укинати ограничувањата за нашите војници во Авганистан" from *A1 News*. December 1, 2006. Available at: <http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.asp?VestID=71114>

⁸ For example, Poland is decreasing the number of troops while Slovakia and Italy have withdrawn theirs. See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm

NATO membership is among the top priorities of the last Macedonian governments. Therefore, it is expected that the governments would ‘run pro-NATO campaigns’. More interestingly, the entire discourse is coloured in symbolic nuances – there is abundant talk of power and prestige, of getting into the European/Westerners club, and preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia, but only a few technical details make it to the public arena. While such discourse reinforces the high levels of popular support for NATO membership with idealized images of NATO and Macedonian membership in NATO, it does not give a balanced and realistic idea of what NATO membership implies. There is a distinct information gap regarding the costs of NATO membership – both in terms of financial and human resources. The population seems to lack sufficient information about the costs and counter-arguments to NATO membership. Considering the majority in Macedonia, especially among the political elites, are convinced that Macedonia is likely to be invited to NATO at the next enlargement summit in 2008, it is very timely to introduce a different approach to the NATO debate. Promising and believing in miracles will not suffice. ■



Croatia and NATO

PhD Mladen Staničić

UDK 327.51(497.5)

ACCORDING to the latest survey, conducted in June by a respectable PULS Agency for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Croatia's accession into NATO is supported by 44 percent of Croatian citizens, while 28 percent are against it. In addition, the survey shows that 75 percent of interviewees, regardless to their attitude towards NATO, expect that Croatia will join NATO in the next two years. The PULS analysts say that stabilisation of support to NATO accession occurred in June, as well as that the support is no longer increasing like during previous months. Namely, according to a survey conducted by the London GfK Agency, at the beginning of June, 52 percent of citizens supported the country's accession into NATO.

This is the most recent indicator that there are still great doubts in Croatia, but also of insufficient knowledge and even a completely wrong perception of what NATO represents in the world today and what is happening with states which become its full members. This is what makes Croatia different from almost all new NATO members, as well as candidates for full membership. This has also resulted in significant strategic-political confusion, which is, for example, also seen in the result of this most recent survey – while only 44 percent of the interviewed are in support of joining NATO, 75 percent of them still expect this will happen in the next two years.

At the political level, there is a consensus on whether Croatia should join NATO as soon as possible. All parliamentary parties agree on this completely. There is a disagreement on whether there should be a referendum or not. The Constitution, namely, considers accession to an international organisation different to accession to an international integration. While EU is an international integration and the Constitution envisages a referendum in this instance, this is not the case with NATO, since NATO is not an inte-

The Author is the Director of the Institute for International Relations (IMO), Zagreb

gration, but merely an alliance. Comparing the development of these two accession processes, one can notice that politicians and even some analysts are to blame for the existing confusion. From the very beginning of gaining international sovereignty, Croatian politicians at the time inexperienced in foreign policy treated both these factions in a pair; hence they coined a completely inadequate phrase “Euro-Atlantic integration”, which was later colloquially accepted in everyday discussions on this topic. Nevertheless, some parties think that there should be a referendum on NATO accession, because this will enhance democracy, while some consider it to be unnecessary. The new President of SDP, Zoran Milanović, who has also been a National Co-ordinator for NATO for several years, is advocating for a referendum, on which occasion, as he stated himself, he will vote for joining the NATO. The public, however, insists on the referendum which is also seen in repeated statements of NGOs, who are generally against Croatia’s accession, and even against the very existence of NATO.

Reflection

These civil society organisations are most often engaged in spreading wrong perceptions, from the ones that “NATO seeks only new contingents of cannon fodder from its new members” to those that “Croatia will have to open NATO bases in its most beautiful areas, especially at the sea which will imperil greatest Croatian resources, these being the relatively preserved environment and increasingly profitable tourism.” In addition, there is also an argument that joining NATO will make Croatia a target of international terrorism. In order to give the general public real information and address false perceptions, the Croatian Government established a Croatian National Committee on NATO Membership, led by Head of Croatian Mission to NATO, H.E. Ambassador Davor Božinović. His recent statement that the cost of modernisation of the Croatian Army by 2015 would be two and a half billion euros higher if Croatia was not a NATO member by then, could be mentioned as one of the examples of issuing an official denial of false perceptions. Moreover, at various other occasions he has denied that NATO was demanding opening of new military bases at the Adriatic. He has also clarified that, following the approval in the Parliament, only professional soldiers, i.e. special forces, who already sit in lines for such assignments because of the good finan-



cial reimbursements for the participation in those missions, will be sent on peace-keeping missions.

Apart from the need for recruiting the contingents of special forces for peace-keeping missions, which is NATO's interest when accepting other members also, NATO is interested in accepting Croatia for geo-strategic and security reasons as well. Croatia will probably be admitted together with two other parties of the Adriatic Charter, i.e. Albania and Macedonia with whom it will constitute a so called security triangle for maintaining stability in the still insecure region of South East Europe, where many issues still remain unsolved, like for example the status of Kosovo, constitutional position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. And due to Croatia's specific position on the left coast of the Adriatic Sea, as well as on the so called 'Balkan Route' of smuggling various non-conventional threats from the East towards the West, NATO is interested in the development of efficient Croatian Coast Guards, who could control the area in their light, but fast vessels. Therefore, there is a mutual interest and it can be expected that at the next NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, Croatia will receive an invitation for full membership, on the condition that prior to that it solves the problem of the still insufficient support of its own citizens for that process. The ball is therefore in its court. ■

Useful links:

1. Croatian MFA's site on Croatia as future member of NATO [/www.mvpei.hr/nato.aspx?mh=220&mv=1563&id=1158](http://www.mvpei.hr/nato.aspx?mh=220&mv=1563&id=1158)
2. Croatian Mission to NATO <http://nato.mvp.hr>
3. Croatian MoD's site on PfP and NATO www.morh.hr/nato/index.asp
4. The Institute for International Relations www.imo.hr
5. *Croatian Soldier*, military magazine www.hrvatski-vojniki.hr/
6. Croatian Atlantic Council www.atlantsko-vijece.hr/

Montenegrin debate on accession to NATO

Jelena Radoman

UDK 327.51(497.16)"2007"
355.02(497.16)

THE MONTENEGRIN political scene was, for years back, a scene of intensive political campaigns promoting or opposing the option of renewing the independence of Montenegro. Confrontation of views on that issue, essential for the future of Montenegro, included all actors of its political life (institutions, political parties, NGOs, individuals) and spread to all levels of society and state. Just over a year ago, following a plebiscitary victory of the option for an independent and internationally recognized state of Montenegro a major political and generally social topic was taken of the country's political agenda. The solution to the issue of statehood opened the space for consideration of a series of other important matters of the state. One of them was the question of whether Montenegro should opt for full membership of NATO. Our intention in this paper is to review the relevant views of the main actors of Montenegrin political life, as well as present and explain the main arguments in their support so as to, finally, evaluate the quality and intensity of the ongoing debate on the potential entry to NATO in this neighbouring country.

Judging by the National Defence Strategy of Montenegro adopted by the government in June 2006, the "strategic objective of Montenegro is to become a full member of NATO and the EU in the shortest possible time".¹ The same document expresses the wish of official Montenegro to join NATO's Programme Partnership for Peace (PfP). Invitation to access the programme was issued to Montenegro in November 2006 at NATO's Riga summit. Adoption of the documents defining the security interests and objectives of Montenegro as well as the signing of the agreement on accession to the Partnership was not accompanied by an intensive public debate. The adoption of the Defence Strategy by the govern-

¹ Strategija nacionalne bezbjednosti Crne Gore (National Security Strategy of Montenegro), Vlada Crne Gore, Podgorica, Jun 2006.

<http://www.gom.cg.yu/files/1170082263.doc> (01.06.2007.)

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies



ment on 14 June this year was also marked by the absence of a previous debate. The parliamentary defence and security committee was given an hour to consider the proposed document before it was put to the government vote, ostensibly for reasons of efficiency and pragmatism.² On that same day the Montenegrin defence minister addressing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Brussels, attended by ministers of 49 NATO and Partnership countries, said that “Montenegro was committed to the process of joining NATO”.³ However, the minister could not boast of a high degree of public support to NATO membership in his country. Namely, the most recent public opinion survey conducted by a Podgorica-based Centre for Democracy and Human Rights in June 2007, shows that Montenegrin NATO membership is supported by only 32.9% of the country’s population, 39.7% were opposed and another 27.4% did not have an opinion on that issue.⁴ Compared with the data of the previous research of February this year, support for NATO membership has dropped by 3.7%, while opposition to it increased by 5%.⁵ The fact that public opinion is divided on this issue, and that the public debate on the adoption of the strategic documents was missing, account for the absence of a social consensus on the (political, security) interests of the state.

Who wants NATO membership and why?

Even a cursory look at the events on the public scene of Montenegro suffices for us to see the differentiation of its actors into supporters of the NATO accession option and its opponents. As expected, the parties of the governing coalition, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)⁶ and the Social-Democratic Party (SDP)⁷, which adopted the strategic documents defining Montenegro’s priorities, are also the most vociferous promoters of the NATO membership idea. The message from the top of the state says that “Montenegro has a clear objective – NATO membership”,⁸ continuing that “the best future for us is in NATO”.⁹ This membership, according to the DPS, SDP and DUA (Democratic Union of Albanians) spells political, security and economic benefits for Montenegro. The Defence Ministry believes that by joining the collective security system Montenegro will receive the strongest guarantees for its sovereignty and integrity and thereby in the best possible way deal with the issue of the country’s security. That is, one would say, also the dominant argument of NATO membership sup-

² Zbog brzih reformi, Vlada neće da čeka Skupštinu (Government won’t wait for Parliament due to speedier reforms), *Vijesti*, 15.06.2007. <http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/naslovna.php?akcija=vijest&id=238920>

³ Posvećeni smo ulasku u NATO (We are committed to join NATO), *Vijesti*, 15.06.2007.

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/naslovna.php?akcija=vijest&id=238918>

⁴ Političko javno mnjenje Crne Gore (Political public opinion of Montenegro), Jun 2007. CEDEM,

http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolisi/mages/CEDEM_jun07.pdf (15.06.2007.)

⁵ Političko javno mnjenje Crne Gore (Political public opinion of Montenegro), February 2007. CEDEM,

http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolisi/mages/CEDEM_jun07.pdf (15.06.2007.)

⁶ <http://www.dpscg.org/>.

⁷ <http://www.sdp.cg.yu/>.

⁸ Izjava ministra odbrane Republike Crne Gore Bora Vučinića (Statement by Montenegrin Defense minister Boro Vučinić)

<http://www.vlada.cg.yu/odbrana> (05.06.2007.)

⁹ Filip Vujanović, Partnerstvo sa SAD od strateškog značaja za Crnu Goru (Filip Vujanović, Partnership with USA strategically important for Montenegro), *Vijesti*, 29.04.2007. <http://www.predsjednik.cg.yu/?akcija=vijest&id=1506>.

porters. The security consideration is additionally reinforced by the “regional argument”, namely the claim that it is highly desirable to become part of a collective security system comprising other countries of the region. The fact that “the entire region is, this time, looking in the same direction, or rather that all of its countries have already become either NATO or PfP members”¹⁰ is, in the view of the defence minister sufficiently revealing of the need for Montenegro to join the Alliance. That contribution to regional security is one of Montenegro’s objectives has several times already been stated by holders of highest state offices.¹¹ Another crucial argument of NATO membership supporters is of political nature. The MoD believes that Montenegro’s entry into NATO would substantially strengthen its overall political position and democratic capacities. That is argued by saying that Montenegro’s admission to the PfP itself marked the country as a democratic society and that its joining of the club of the most developed and influential countries of the world would undoubtedly improve its overall international position. Another political argument maintains that NATO membership would be a step up the ladder to the EU for Montenegro – another proclaimed objective of the young state. Foreign minister Milan Roćen claims that the EU and NATO accession processes fully correspond and are based on the same values.¹² Public surveys show that precisely those ties between NATO membership and EU integration is, for the time being, the most convincing argument of the pro-NATO option. According to a survey of the National Democratic Institute for International Relations done in June 2007, 32% of citizens are not sure as to the gains of NATO membership for Montenegro but, at the same time 39% recognize a possible advantage in terms of “making a step towards the EU”.¹³ In view of the steady support for EU membership in Montenegrin society - substantially higher than the one for accession to NATO¹⁴ - linking the two integration processes might strengthen the support for NATO, providing that the promoters of the idea successfully demonstrated a clear connection between the two and managed to persuade the citizens of the validity of their claim. In order to do that they will have to explain a statement, frequently heard in the public, namely, that “it is not the Army that enters the PfP and NATO, but rather the state”.¹⁵ For the time being representatives of the establishment seem to be doing a better job in explaining the specific benefits expectable from NATO membership, primarily for the army. In the first place the MoD expects that Montenegrin membership, initially of the PfP and eventually of NATO, would

¹⁰ Iz Ministarstva odbrane oci-
jenjeno: Bezbjedno pod šlje-
mom NATO-a (MoD says: Safe
under UN helmet), Dan,
26.04.2007.

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&datum=2007-04-26&clanak=98250>
(09.06.2007).

¹¹ Izjava ministra odbrane
Republike Crne Gore Bora
Vučinića (Statement by
Montenegrin Defense minister
Boro Vučinić),
<http://www.vlada.cg.yu/odbrana>
(05.06.2007).

¹² Milan Roćen, Prioritet evroat-
lantske integracije (Milan Roćen,
Priorities of Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration), Vijesti, 26.03.2007.

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&datum=2007-03-26&clanak=93818>
(12.06.2007).

¹³ Nacionalni demokratski insti-
tut za međunarodne odnose -
Crna Gora, Ključni rezultati,
Prateća istraživanja maj/jun
2007, 21.jun 2007.(NDI survey),

http://www.ndicrnagora.org/files/KeyfindingsJune07_CG.pdf?mod_download_id=237
(27.06.2007).

¹⁴ 78,3 % Montenegrin citizens
support the European Union
membership. Political public
opinion of Montenegro, Jun
2007, (CEDEM survey),

http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolls/images/CEDEM_jun07.pdf
(17.06.2007).

¹⁵ Milan Roćen, Prioritet evroat-
lantske integracije (Milan Roćen,
Priorities of Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration), Vijesti, 26.03.2007.

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&datum=2007-03-26&clanak=93818>
(12.06.2007).



enable the country “to implement the complex and costly security and defence sector reforms better, faster, more rationally and less costly”, and ensure it help in destroying surplus arms and explosives, which, the MoD believes, would positively reflect on two strategic areas in Montenegro – tourism and ecology.¹⁶ This already ushers the third important argument in favour of NATO membership, namely the direct and indirect economic benefits. A direct economic benefit will take the form of financial assistance for security sector reforms, thus allowing Montenegro to spare the budgetary assets it would otherwise have to appropriate for this purpose. Indirect economic gains would be revealed in the possibility to improve economic ties and increase the inflow of foreign investments due to NATO membership. Statements of certain officials refer to these and other potential benefits in the event of Montenegro’s admission to NATO (including those of geostrategic, cultural, internal, and local-regional nature).¹⁷ These statements, however, lack the backing of a serious analysis or comparative research to properly support their arguments or confirm the causal relation between Montenegrin NATO membership and any specific gains.

Montenegro’s entry into NATO has its promoters among the NGO activists, too. In late 2006 the Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro was established in Podgorica with a vision of Montenegro joining “the Partnership for Peace and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in a fast and high quality way, so as we can use the results of implemented reforms in the process of EU accession”.¹⁸ Although the most prominent, the Euro-Atlantic club is certainly not the only NGO in Montenegro that promotes the idea of the country’s NATO membership. According to a Podgorica Nansen Dialogue Centre survey, eleven of twenty one NGOs surveyed in Montenegro have a definite position on the issue of Montenegro’s membership in NATO, with nine in favour and two opposed to the idea.¹⁹ NGO activists use almost identical arguments to prove the need for Montenegro’s entry into NATO. Firstly, they offer the security argument, saying that by entering NATO Montenegro will provide the best possible contribution to regional security and thereby also increase its own. They also claim that NATO membership will give the country guarantees of its sovereignty and integrity as well as “remove all suspicions of potential attempts at internal destabilisation of the country”.²⁰ The political argument stresses that Montenegro’s belonging to the alliance of the most powerful and developed countries will make its voice heard on

¹⁶ Iz Ministarstva odbrane ocijenjeno: Bezbjedno pod šijernom NATO-a a (MoD says: Safe under UN helmet, Dan, 26.04.2007,

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Društvo&datum=2007-04-26&clanak=98250> (09.06.2007).

¹⁷ Analitičari i političari o najavama ulaska Crne Gore u vojnu alijansu (Analysts and politicians on announcements of Montenegro’s entry in a military alliance), Dan, 27.07.2006,

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Aktuelnosti&datum=2006-07-27&clanak=67188>.

¹⁸ Euro-Atlantski klub Crne Gore (Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro)

<http://www.atagc.org/> (20.06.2007.)

¹⁹ “Stvaranje uslova za informativnu, demokratsku, javnu raspravu o pridruživanju Crne Gore NATO savezu” (Creating conditions for informed, democratic, public debate on Montenegro’s accession to NATO), Nansen dijalog centar – Crna Gora, april 2007.

²⁰ Kentera Savo, Zašto sam za (Why I say Yes), 27.04.2007, <http://www.infoizbor.org/zip1.php>

the international scene. Expected benefits from NATO membership also include a higher degree of democracy in the country since “democracy is one of the main principles at the base of NATO”, meaning that its membership is inaccessible without a democratization of the political system and improved civil-military relations in the country.²¹

Opponents of Montenegro’s entry into NATO

Those who believe that Montenegro should not become a NATO member invoke ideological, political and security considerations. Some are opposed to the idea of joining a military alliance as being contrary to their personal pledge of non-violence as a way of life. However, recognizing that the idea of armed protection of peace is still deeply rooted in modern civilization and that absolute pacifism is unrealistic, they believe that the neutrality and demilitarization of Montenegro would be the most acceptable option from a pacifist point of view.²² The set of ideological reasons also includes the need for Montenegro’s distancing from its historical heritage and concept of brave warriors, as a precondition of civic reconciliation and democratization of society. The idea of a demilitarized and neutral Montenegro is also championed by the Liberal Party (LP),²³ the most serious and, for the time being, only opponent of the idea to join NATO among the parliamentary parties.²⁴ The party’s activists have mounted a campaign “No for NATO” aimed at spreading the idea of a neutral and peaceful policy of Montenegro, simultaneously insisting on a referendum as the only legitimate vehicle to pass the decision on a possible accession to the Alliance.

The debate on the (un)desirability of NATO membership juggles several political arguments. The first and most frequent is the argument related to the nature of NATO as a remarkably undemocratic institution and a Cold War relic. Opponents of the idea claim that NATO is primarily a military organization (rather than political as the supporters of the idea try to prove), under the patronage of the USA and that its survival is justified solely by the interests of its members’ military industries.²⁵ These views are substantiated by examples of NATO operations (humanitarian interventions, Iraq war, non-applicability of criminal provisions from national legislations to NATO personnel, etc.).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Zoran Živković, *Zašto sam protiv (Why I say No)*, 27.04.2007, <http://www.infoizbor.org/zip2.php>

²³ <http://www.lpcg.org/>.

²⁴ According to a public opinion survey the LP is supported by 2% of the Montenegrin electorate. Political public opinion of Montenegro, June 2007, CEDEM,

http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolls/mages/CEDEM_jun07.pdf. (15.06.2007).

²⁵ Zoran Živković, *Zašto sam protiv (Why I say No)*, 27.04.2007, <http://www.infoizbor.org/zip2.php>.



Another type of political argument is of an internal policy nature. The debate on potential NATO membership is burdened by the absence of a debate on the adoption of the documents defining the strategic interests and objectives of Montenegro in the previous period. An additional aggravating factor relevant for the debate is revealed in a legal vacuum with respect to the security sector in Montenegro, bearing in mind that the country is still awaiting a new constitution and the laws on the defence and the army. The absence of a previous discussion on strategic documents explains why certain opposition parties decry NATO membership as Montenegro's interest and objective and thereby challenge the legitimacy of the government that undertakes measures conducive to that end. Views of that kind are seen in statements of officials of the Popular Party (NS)²⁶ and Serbian Popular Party (SNS).²⁷ The NS, same as the Democratic Serbian Party (DSS) believes that Montenegro's membership in the PfP is "sufficient" and that it should not go for NATO membership. The Movement for Change (PzP)²⁸ is critical of the MoD's non-transparency, which, they suggest, has led to the establishment of a single party monopoly over the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The NS and the SNS both urge the separation of the European integration process, the desirability of which is not contested by a single parliamentary party in Montenegro, from that of joining NATO, and interpret their tie-in as "calculated confusion" created by the authorities.²⁹ At the same time, the opposition insists on a balanced and careful review of the desirability of NATO membership for Montenegro, requesting that a decision on possible membership should be made on the basis of a relevant *cost-benefit* analysis. Five opposition parties (PzP, LP, SNS, NS, DSS) believe that the decision on membership calls for a referendum.³⁰

Finally, national security is an argument used by both supporters and opponents of NATO membership. The latter claim that joining the Treaty would expose Montenegro to terrorist attacks. "NATO presence comes with terrorism, and terrorism and tourism are incompatible," says the LP.³¹ The "regional" argument is also invoked to demonstrate or deny the desirability of NATO membership. Namely, if all countries of the region are members of either NATO or the PfP, the opponents fail to see who then poses a threat to Montenegro.³²

And, lastly, the most controversial issue of the debate about NATO Membership concerns the possibility of sending Montenegrin soldiers to peace missions within NATO operations.

²⁶ <http://www.narodnastranka.cg.yu/>

²⁷ <http://www.sns.cg.yu.>

²⁸ <http://www.promijene.org/>.

²⁹ Iz Ministarstva odbrane ocijenjeno: Bezbjedno pod šljemom NATO-a (MoD says: Safe under UN helmet), Dan, 26.04.2007,

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&datum=2007-04-26&clanak=98250> (09.06.2007).

³⁰ On the issue of a new Montenegrin Constitution the PzP supports parliamentary adoption and is strongly opposed to a referendum. The DPS should give up the idea of a referendum (21.06.2007), <http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Politika&datum=2007-06-21&clanak=106093>.

³¹ Crna Gora u NATO - da ili ne? (Montenegro in NATO - yes or no?), http://www.pcnen.com/detail.php?module=2&news_id=22258 (13.06.2007).

³² Ništa bez referenduma (No way without referendum), Vijesti, 09.06.2007.

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/arhiva.php?akcija=vijest&id=238382> (23.06.2007.)

Even before receiving the Riga summit's invitation, official Montenegro stated its readiness to be part of the global anti-terrorist struggle, specifically by having its soldiers join international peace keepers.³³ Opponents of NATO membership have then, as well as during the current debate about NATO membership, offered stormy reactions to statements of Montenegrin officials announcing this kind of engagement for the Montenegrin army. Representatives of opposition parties in the parliament sought an explanation of the benefits accruing for Montenegro if it sent its soldiers to peace missions all over the world, wondering whether that could endanger the country's security,³⁴ and warning that Montenegro does not have a surplus of sons to send to war.³⁵

Conclusion

The ongoing debate in Montenegro focusing on the possibility of the country's entry of NATO primarily indicates the absence of a consensus on the strategic interests of this young state and the best ways for their attainment. By contrast from EU membership, which has the convincing support of the public opinion, NATO membership appears to be a much more controversial public topic.

There are several main topics in the debate pro and contra NATO membership. One of them is certainly the tie-in between the membership of the military organization and the notable state interest to join the EU. Contrary to the EU - perceived primarily as an economic and political community - NATO membership does not entail a clear and direct benefit for a Montenegrin citizen. He does not find the system of collective security understandable by itself, or as representing an obvious interest of the state. In order to obtain majority support of public opinion for entry of this organization, this public opinion must have both awareness and knowledge of the national security and global trends and challenges. That requires information and education of the population to qualify it for taking a rational decision. Another important element of the debate deals with the manner of deciding on Montenegro's membership in NATO. The dilemma is whether to call a referendum and give the resulting decision unshakeable legitimacy (irrespective of the waste of both money and time) or pass the decision in the parliament, which would certainly be more efficient. For the time being the parties in power in Montenegro and those that could ensure the parliamentary majority support the latter option, while the opposition

³³ Milo provocira Al Kaidu (Milo provokes Al Qaeda), Dan, 30.09.2006.

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Aktuelnosti&datum=2006-09-30&clanak=74312>

³⁴ *Ibid*

³⁵ O uclanjenju u NATO mogu odluciti samo gradani (Only citizens may decide on membership), 23.03.2007.

http://www.lpcg.org/detail.php?mod=ule=2&news_id=630 (26.06.2007.)



parties favour the former. 53% of surveyed citizens believe that the decision should be plebiscitary, while 36% find a wide parliamentary consensus a desirable manner for deciding on a possible membership.³⁶ One of the key issues that might tip the scale either way, is the one of the Montenegrin soldiers' participation in peace missions. The party that manages to persuade the public in Montenegro that its soldiers should form part of international peace missions arranged to solve conflicts unknown or incomprehensible to most people in Montenegro, will have a good chance of persuading that people that NATO membership is beneficial and desirable for Montenegro. The majority still believes that Montenegrin society is not ready for that and in their promotion of NATO tend to avoid discussion about the fact that this membership may have a price in human lives.

In order to ensure the participation of a greater number of actors of Montenegrin social life, first in the debate and then also in deciding in favour or against NATO membership, both the promoters and opponents of this idea will have to present their views and substantiate them in greater detail. NATO will not obtain more supporters in Montenegro regardless of the repeated emphasis on the link between the Alliance and support to "democracy building, human rights, and the rule of law"³⁷ until this link is proven and illustrated by specific examples. The same goes for the claims of increased security and "elimination of any thought of possible attempts to internally destabilize the country".³⁸ It is important to note that the debate in Montenegro is still of low intensity in view of the fact that (but for the LP) there are no intensive campaigns aimed at obtaining public support for either of the options. Montenegrin citizens should therefore expect that such campaigns, once they start in earnest, will present them with a clear bill of what they stand to gain and lose with this membership and at what a price. ■

Literature:

1. Enlarging NATO, The National Debates, ed. Gale A. Mattox, Arthur R. Rachwald, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001
2. The Future of NATO Expansion, Zoltan Barany, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

³⁶ Nacionalni demokratski institut za međunarodne odnose - Crna Gora, Ključni rezultati, Prateća istraživanja maj/jun 2007, 21.jun 2007 (NDI survey),

http://www.ndicrnagora.org/files/KeyfindingsJune07_CG.pdf?mod_download_id=237 (27.06.2007).

³⁷ Na Crnu Goru NATO može računati (NATO can count on Montenegro), Dan, 02.07.2007,

<http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Politika&datum=2007-02-07&clanak=85982>.

³⁸ Kentera Savo, Zašto sam za (Why I say Yes), 27.04.2007.

<http://www.infoizbor.org/zip1.php>.

Public opinion of Serbia on joining NATO

Zorana Atanasović


UDK 327.51:32.019.5 (497.11)"2003/2005"

IN THIS article we shall consider the public opinion in Serbia about NATO accession. According to the results we shall present, the public support in Serbia for joining NATO is extremely low. On the grounds of the experience of the countries which have in the last two enlargements become NATO members we shall respond to the question whether it is possible to change the negative attitudes of the general public in Serbia towards membership in NATO.

Public opinion in Serbia on Euroatlantic integration

Consensus at the national level is a necessary precondition both of successful security policy and sorting out the defence and security issues. The support of public opinion is of extreme importance since it provides legitimacy to the decisions related to security. The role of the general public and hence the role of public opinion being its component was redefined after the Cold War. The general public is today an independent agent in international relations, i.e. an inevitable element in security policy making.

Graph 1 Should our country join NATO²



The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies



The general public of Serbia holds a negative opinion towards NATO accession. Systematic research on this issue is not done in Serbia. The Centre for Civil Military Relations, non-government organization from Belgrade, from June 2003 till April 2005 carried out seven surveys of public opinion research on the military reform of the then Serbia and Montenegro, within which one set of questions referred to the security integration. In all seven circles of research the same question was raised *Should our country become a NATO member?* In the answers to this question in Serbian sample there was a trend of slight rise in support. The support for joining NATO is negligible, but we must not forget that the citizens of Serbia experienced a traumatic experience during bombing 1999. A rise in support is a positive trend which is probably a result of the circumstances that the political elite since 2000 mention Euroatlantic integration as one of the most significant goals. According to the latest findings the percentage of people against NATO membership has risen slightly. One of the most relevant questions in Serbia in the past few months is the future status of Kosovo, and NATO alliance supports Ahtisary's plan for the future status of Kosovo which the majority of Serbia³ does not go along with and probably this circumstance made an impact on the rise of the number of the opponents of NATO accession. The percentage of the respondents that are in favour of NATO accession has risen to the detriment of the undecided, the number of which in the research was about a fifth and this category is the basis of the future change of heart.. Support for NATO accession is the most pronounced among the young and the educated respondents, which indicate that additional attention and information on the positive and negative aspects of NATO membership should be focused on the elderly and uneducated citizens. The biggest percentage, about half of the respondents with slight variations was against joining the Alliance.

Although NATO membership is not welcomed by the majority of people of Serbia there is a positive attitude toward some forms of cooperation with it. The cooperation within the Partnership for Peace has according to the research till 2005 been supported by the huge majority, and the support had a growing trend, whereas the percentage of opponents did not exceed 15%.


Probably the most significant circumstance which contributed to such results is the fact that the majority of European countries belong to Partnership for Peace and that among the political elite there is an agreement that Serbia should be part of such programme. At the end of the research 72,8% of the respondents supported membership in Partnership for Peace. 15% of the opponents of this cooperation

¹ Timotić, M, The expectations of the citizens from the military reform, u Hadžić, Miroslav, Timotić, Milorad ur,*Public and Military* , Centre for Civil and Military Relations, Belgrade, 2006, page 127, the results of the research done in May in 2006 taken from Medium Gallup agency in Belgrade

² More details : <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/06-june/e0615c.html>

³ More details : www.seio.sr.gov.yu

within Partnership for Peace were against any form of cooperation with the institutions of “the West”. Comparing the percentages of the advocates of NATO accession and membership in Partnership for Peace, this is a harsh reminder that the odds are in favor of potential additional rise in the support of NATO accession in the future. If the people are familiar with the positive experience of the armed forces during cooperation within Partnership for Peace, it will probably serve as an additional stimulus for a rise in support of extensive cooperation within NATO. The fact that the armed forces will specialize in medicine and engineering which do not involve direct involvement in combat operations will most certainly have positive impact.



Trust in NATO and Partnership for Peace, which is lower than 10%, is significantly lower than the shown support for the membership. The stated results indicate that the citizens are ready to “speculate”, i.e. to support options which perhaps they do not really agree with in full, but they can foresee a certain benefit.

From the results shown one can infer that the citizens of Serbia generally do support Euroatlantic cooperation. The difference between the support for membership in Partnership for Peace and NATO is noticeable and it can be interpreted in many ways. The



question remains whether the citizens of Serbia view Partnership for Peace as NATO programme and to what extent they are informed about what NATO full membership really involves.


Relationship between European and Euroatlantic integration

Almost 40 % of the citizens hold that the country's security would benefit most from Western orientation and EU membership. According to the results of the opinion poll organized by Serbian European Integration Office, Serbia's accession to the EU in a prospective referendum would be supported by a huge majority of people - 70%. Joining the EU is a thing that many people of Serbia long for, but most of them regard the EU as merely an economic integration, although a significant part of the cooperation refers to security, mainly in the field of justice and home affairs and in the foreign, security and defence policies.

Up to now the stated results indicate that the citizens of Serbia do not see the connection between the economic and security integration. Security integration, ie. membership in NATO, is not a formal precondition of economic integration, i.e. EU accession. Experience has shown, up to now, that post communist "new" EU members had joined the EU before and that NATO membership for most of them added many bonus points for the accession to the EU.

The results of the research which was done by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy⁴ show that on average half of those who want EU integration do not want NATO membership. But still the percentage of those who accept one or the other form of integration is sufficient enough to be a firm foundation for building a larger support for NATO.

Graph 2 – Are you in favour of our country joining the EU and NATO?



⁴ It refers to the research *Perception of State and Party Divisions* done in spring 2006 more details on www.cesid.org

The experience of the countries which became NATO and EU members

The experience of the countries which became NATO and EU members in 1999 and 2004 shows that a rise in the number of those who advocate NATO joining does not seem improbable. According to the research in Central and Eastern Eurobarometer in 1996 and 1997 the NATO support was on average 30% for all countries apart from Romania.⁵ A unique inference on the basis of the opinion poll done in these countries before NATO joining was that the growth of the support was gradual, it lasted for several years and it involved the process of engaging the political elite.

In Bulgaria public opinion in the period between 1989- 1992 viewed NATO as a rival and only a small percentage regarded the Alliance as a potential partner.⁶ From 1993 till 1999 the percentage grew and levelled off from one third to one half and the growth of the support was unstable and dependent on the circumstances. At the time Bulgaria was a candidate for EU membership and member of Partnership for Peace, but the more extensive cooperation and negotiations had not yet started. Only in 2000-2001 after the commencement of negotiations with EU⁷ and after the Bulgarian armed forces started to take part in peacetime operations under the command of NATO (in 1998) has the support become extensive and stable.

The growing trend of public opinion support in Bulgaria proves that with the intensification of Euroatlantic cooperation there increased the support for NATO which shows that intensifying the security cooperation, which starts within Partnership for Peace, would be a good stimulus for increasing support for NATO accession in Serbia as well. In Slovakia⁸ the support for NATO joining reached more than half for the first time in 1997, during the term in office of a Prime Minister who did not enjoy international support and when Slovakia, contrary to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did not manage to start negotiations on EU membership. According to public opinion polls in Central and Eastern Europe in 1995, 1996, 1997, the biggest percentage of advocates of the EU membership originated in Baltic countries Estonia, Lethonia and Lithuania, but the biggest percentage of those indecisive regarding the NATO membership i.e. the third of the respondents came from these countries.⁹ They once used to be members of the USSR but they feared that their independence was imperilled by Russia again and that is why it was far easier to gain the confidence of the general public at home.

The stated data indicate that the countries which became members of NATO in the two latest enlargements have come a long way

⁵ In Romania the highest support was recorded compared to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. in 2000 the support was 59%, and in 2002. 83%)

⁶ More details : Zilberman, A and Webber, S, *Public Attitudes toward NATO Membership in Aspirant Countries*, in: Marie Vlachova (ed.), *The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*, DCAF, CCVO, Belgrade, 2003, page 47-68

⁷ 1999. Council of Europe made a decision on the beginning of negotiations with Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Malta.

⁸ More details: Čukan, K, *Development of Views of the Slovak Public on the Armed Forces and NATO Membership*, in: Marie Vlachova (ed.), *The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*, op. Cit, page 109-123

⁹ More details Zilberman, A and Webber, S, *Public Attitudes toward NATO Membership in Aspirant Countries*, op. cit



in confidence building and support for NATO membership. On the grounds of the research done in these countries before the NATO accession, several factors had some bearing on the change of heart of the general public.

The political elite had a significant role in the support i.e. clearcut orientation of the government institutions for the security integration in euroatlantic community.

The prevailing argument in favour of the NATO joining was that membership provides international prestige and provides propitious environment for economy boost and Slovakia stands out as a good example that even the political elite which does not lead a country to a Euroatlantic integration at the expected pace can bring about the support for joining NATO. A Slovakian crisis at an international level which resulted in the failure of Slovakia in Euroatlantic integration, during the reign of Movement for Democratic Slovakia /1994-1998/ has not stopped the growth of support for NATO joining. For most of the general public at the time NATO joining meant an instrument of change of that grim political situation. This argument is applicable to Serbia's international position as well, and can be expanded to its joining NATO as well.

The general public also held that there is a strong link between the membership in NATO and the EU.¹⁰ For instance, two thirds of the Slovakian people thought that if Slovakia is invited to join NATO, it will better its position at the moment of its joining EU. It was the public opinion that the joining of the NATO will enlarge the international prestige of the country. In Hungary as well only a small percentage believed that the EU integration without NATO accession can guarantee the security and stability of the country. Besides, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe NATO represented a symbol of the West that these countries strove for.¹¹

Being well informed on NATO has a significant role in the growth of support for joining it. In the mentioned countries campaigns were launched with the goal of bringing a better perspective on NATO. The primary goal of the campaigns launched was that the general public is provided with explanations of the conditions and the consequences of joining the alliance. Media, state and political institutions and non-governmental organizations took part in the campaigns. The example of Czech Republic is a good example of how big a role of adequate informing before joining the alliance plays. In the Czech Republic the government was oblivious to the need for a public debate on joining NATO. The people of the Czech republic were not informed about the obligations that NATO membership entails. Less than a third of the respondents after joining NATO were

¹⁰ More details: Čukan, K., *Development of Views of the Slovak Public on the Armed Forces and NATO Membership*, op. cit.

¹¹ More details in Zoltan Laszlo Kiss, *Changes in Hungarian Public Opinion on Security, Defence and the Military*, in: Marie Vlachova (ed.), *The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*, DCAF, CCVO, Belgrade, 2003, pp. 123-141

informed that the membership binds the member countries to take part in the operations such as NATO operations in the Allied Forces in Kosovo.¹²

Current affairs also had some bearing on the support for membership in NATO. Bombing of FR Yugoslavia led to the decline of support for NATO – in Slovakia during NATO bombing on Kosovo the support fell to 40%, and in Lithuania from 55% to 31%. In Poland 55% were in favour of NATO bombing in Kosovo, but only 37% of respondents said that they would be in favour of sending Polish soldiers to a conflict zone.¹³

Is a change of attitudes towards NATO in Serbia possible?

Serbia is different from other countries in Central and Eastern Europe in that it has a number of particular traits which shape its attitudes towards NATO. It seems the argument that bombing in 1999 had a goal of ending the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo was not plausible enough for the people of Serbia, and the grim impression was worsened by the fact that the operation was done without the approval of the UN Security Council. Besides, Serbia is a country which is still in a transition period ensuing after the conflict and authoritarian order and its citizens are primarily interested in improving the standard of living, and security is regarded as yet another domain in need of reform.

One part of the general public still has an attitude of Serbia not having the tradition of joining military alliances and non-aligned policy in the period after the Second World War proves it. On the other hand, most of the neighbouring countries are NATO members, candidates to join NATO or they see the membership in prospect. This argument is used by the elite, for instance by president of Serbia, as a reason why Serbia cannot remain neutral and why it is preferable to join NATO.

There is no unique and clearcut orientation of the elite in Serbia towards the security integration in Euroatlantic community. In his inaugural exposé laid in March 2007, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, put forth the goals of Serbian government. The European integration were presented as the second key programme principle of the government's policy. When security cooperation is in question, only cooperation with the EU is mentioned within the area of Justice and Home affairs. When it comes to Euroatlantic security integration it is mentioned in general that "Serbian government starting point is

¹² More details: Gabal, I., Helsingsova, L., Szayna, T., *The Impact of NATO membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military and Defence*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2002

¹³ More details: Gogolewska, A., *Public Image of Security, Defence and the Military in Poland*, in: Marie Vlachova (ed.), *The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*, op. Cit, page 89-109



that international integration, such as Partnership for Peace, should strengthen the international position of Serbia and that Serbia should join the process primarily because of its state and national interests.¹⁴ From the exposé one can infer that the Government does not hold that there is a connection between the EU and NATO accessions and that NATO accession will not be a priority in the period to come.

Unlike the abovementioned, in the Defence Strategy in 2004, the introduction states that joining NATO is one of the goals. „Serbia and Montenegro confirms a new orientation to membership in security structures, primarily for joining the programme Partnership for Peace“ of the Northatlantic Treaty (NATO), based on the democratic will of the people and other European and Euroatlantic integration“.¹⁵

The Defence Strategy is a lower document in the hierarchy than the Strategy of National Security which has not yet been adopted. Two drafts which do not have a unique approach to joining NATO have been made up. In keeping with the orientation put forth in the above mentioned exposé of the Prime Minister, in the draft of the National Security Strategy of the Government of Serbia from September 2006, it was stated that joining Euroatlantic integration are the goals of the Republic of Serbia, but further clarification has not been made on what precisely it means, whereas full membership being one of the goals was not explicitly mentioned.¹⁶ In the National Security Strategy of Serbia which was recommended by Boris Tadić, president of Serbia, full NATO membership was mentioned at the first entry – *National interests of Republic of Serbia in the field of security*¹⁷, a NATO membership and in other security initiatives is seen as participation in the preservation and building of European and world stability. In the article on security issues of parliamentary political parties in the campaigns for the parliamentary elections in 2007 which was published in the previous issue of the magazine we stated that cooperation with NATO still poses a source of discord among political parties¹⁸

When it comes to the informing the people on NATO alliance, in Serbia the governmental institutions up to now have not carried out an organized campaign, which was the case in the countries which became members in the latest two accessions. Frankly speaking, there is a positive move forward so that the representatives of Defence Ministry have on several occasions taken part in public debates on Serbia's possible membership in NATO. The biggest number of activities which have a goal to familiarize the public with NATO are done by non-governmental organizations,¹⁹ but up to now events only related to NATO have not been

¹⁴ More details: <http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vlada/>

¹⁵ *Defence strategy of the Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro*, page. 1, <http://www.mod.gov.yu/02ministarstvo/04-odredbe/0413-strategija-s.htm#001>

¹⁶ *National security strategy*, Draft, Serbian government, September 2006, page 11, 12

¹⁷ *National security strategy of Serbia*, recommendation of President of Serbia

¹⁸ Zorana Atanasović, *Security issues in the 2007 Parliamentary campaign in Serbia*, WBSO No 4, January-March 2007.

¹⁹ More details about the participation of NGOs in this debate can be found in the text by Predrag Petrovic *An attempted debate – Mapping the debate about NATO in Serbia's civil society* in this issue of WBSO.

organized. The general public and the experts were able to get acquainted with the issues as part of information on other forms of Euroatlantic integration.

Conclusion

The abovementioned results and particularly the experience of countries which became NATO members in the two latest enlargements indicate that the shift in negative attitudes towards NATO accession is possible. The decision made regarding NATO accession has always been a political decision and it called for clearcut orientation of the political elite in Serbia and unity which is nonexistent either in the ruling coalition or the Parliament.

There is a clearcut European orientation of Serbia but it is an open ended question, which is not however a subject of debate in Serbia, and it is whether Serbia can be independent of Euroatlantic dimensions. It is rather uncertain whether Serbian people bear that in mind and hence there is a need to open a debate on whether it is possible to join EU, which is a wish of most people, and remain out of NATO. The experience of countries which became members of NATO in the two last enlargements prove that the membership in NATO occurred prior to the EU membership and that full membership in NATO has made a positive shift in the negotiations with the EU.

The support of the general public for the NATO accession will remain negligible as long as the general public does not see the benefits of Serbian membership. The belief that Serbian accession to the EU will bear propitious results in economic growth and indirectly in the higher standard of living are the strongest stimuli of all. As one can see in the results shown, economic progress, i.e. the growth of investments after joining NATO was a good sign of the country's stability and thus investment safety for foreign investors. To get familiar with the experience of economic development of new NATO members would definitely lend itself to the growth of general public support.²⁰

Public opinion does accept the cooperation within the Partnership for Peace and that is, together with the strong support for membership in the EU, a solid basis for support building for NATO membership. A public debate on NATO where the arguments for and against accession are examined, has started, but on and off organization of public debates will not bring about huge shifts in the attitudes of the general public. It is necessary to stop the ambiguous wording such as Euroatlantic integration and begin an open national dialogue at the highest level on the benefits and challenges of joining NATO. ■

²⁰ More on the connection between the NATO accession and the investment increase can be found in the text by Marko Savkovic *Would NATO accession contribute to a more stable business environment and economic progress in Serbia* in this issue of WBSO.



An attempted debate

- Mapping the debate about NATO in Serbia's civil society-

Predrag Petrović

UDK 327.51:32.019.5 (497.11)"1992/2007"
 355.02:32.019.51(497.11) "1992/2007"
 355.02:061.2(497.11) "1992/2007"

ON 14 December 2006 Serbia became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and thus began its journey towards Euro-Atlantic integration. But, it seems that Serbia's political elites have failed to enlighten the citizens what the notion of Euro-Atlantic integration is about. Due to the negative heritage in the relations between Serbia, or rather the FRY, and NATO and the resulting poor image the Serbian public opinion has¹ about this alliance, the ruling political elites avoid to clearly declaring in favour or against NATO membership. Therefore, they "disguise" their commitment to membership in this organization by preferring to use the term Euro-Atlantic integration.

This is quite clear from the fact that we still do not have a single decision of a state body stating that Serbia does or does not wish to be a part of NATO.² Despite that, even before Serbia's accession to the PfP, our country had intensive cooperation with NATO in a number of areas. For instance, agreements on air and ground lines of communication with NATO have been signed, a joint group for Serbian army reform was formed (Defence Reform Group), and a large number of Serbian Army officers are being educated in NATO countries. But, the problem of a clear and public commitment of state bodies to Serbia's accession to NATO remains open, as does the question of whether it should join NATO, and if so why.

This silence of state bodies³ about a taboo topic called NATO has therefore helped prevent the development of a well-argued dialogue between the confronted political elites, between them and the citizens and among the citizens themselves. However, a part of the civil society occasionally broke this silence and attempted to provide a substantiated contribution to the process of Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, including NATO.

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

¹ According to a public opinion survey about the SCG army reform, including a battery of questions related to security integration, the majority of respondents, 40% of them, think that Serbia should not become a NATO member. This seven-round survey was carried out by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in the period from June 2003 until April 2005. Hadžić, M. and M. Timotić (2006). *Javnost i vojska*. Beograd, CCVO. For more on citizens' attitudes towards Serbia's membership in NATO see an article by Zorana Atanasović, "Public opinion of Serbia and accession to NATO," in this edition of the WBSO.

² Views offered on the issue of the PfP were more to the point. Thus Goran Svilanović, the foreign minister at the time, in his 2002 letter to George Robertson, NATO secretary general, officially requested Serbia's admission to the PfP. Kontrapunkt, internet, <http://www.kontra-punkt.info/print.php?sid=55205>, 5.6.2007. In addition, the Supreme Defence Council took a decision manifesting a wish for Serbia's membership in the PfP.

³ We may note that the talk about Serbia's NATO membership has been somewhat more clear of late. Thus the Serbian defence minister Dragan Šutanovac on 14 June 2007 at NATO Brussels headquarters said that by 2010 Belgrade would have completed all preparations for Serbia's admission to the Alliance. "Talking the decision is up to someone else, but it is my job to get the Serbian MoD ready for NATO membership," Šutanovac said. *Danas*, 15. 6. 2007, internet, www.danas.co.yu, 15. 6. 2007.

Our intention is to map the key civil society actors engaged in attempts at this debate, and present the arguments they give in the process. This text will therefore first identify the NGOs engaged in an argued promotion of the idea that Serbia's membership in NATO is a matter of necessity. After that, we shall review the actors that offer alternatives to this idea. The arguments examined in this article have been presented at several debates⁴ and are available to WBSO readers at internet presentations of the debates' participants. This text however, will not deal with individuals who publicly promoted their views on this particular issue.

NATO "pioneers"

Several NGOs in Serbia have actively argued the promotion of the idea that it is necessary for Serbia to join the Euro-Atlantic integration, and in that context, also NATO. One of the NGOs with the longest standing in Serbia is the European Movement in Serbia (EMinS). EMinS was established in 1992 and is a full member of the International European Movement, an organization with a prestigious tradition and important ideological influence on the political factors in European states.⁵ More active NGOs also include the Atlantic Council of Serbia⁶ seated in Belgrade, which is a member of the Atlantic Council Association (ATA),⁷ a network of NGOs comprising 40 national ATA members. There is also the International and Security Affairs Centre, better known as the ISAC fond, also involved in a well-argued promotion of the idea that Serbia's NATO membership is a necessity.

The main activities of these organizations generally take the form of public debates, round tables, workshops, seminars, international conferences, participation in international gatherings, educational programs, research and publishing, public and media campaigns, applied research, etc.

The starting point of the above-mentioned NGOs is the view that Serbia's membership in NATO has no alternative, that the Serbian citizens must no longer suffer the consequences of the erroneous policy pursued by Slobodan Milošević and his political allies, and that the negative heritage of the past must be overcome for a better future of all Serbian citizens. The Atlantic Council thus stresses that "the involvement of Serbia in the

⁴ The most recent debate addressing Serbia's NATO membership took place on 11 May 2007 in the Army Club. The debate was organized by the European Movement in Serbia, the Republic of Serbia's MoD, Centre for civil Military Relations and Open Communication.

⁵ European Movement in Serbia at <http://www.emins.org/>.

⁶ For more details on the Atlantic Council visit the council's web page at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.yu>

⁷ Atlantic Treaty Association's web page at <http://www.ata-sec.org/>



Euro-Atlantic integration process is of the highest priority of national interests.”⁸ Furthermore, the road to EU membership goes through NATO. All countries in Serbia’s surroundings have covered that road and Serbia will be no exception. This text will present the arguments these NGOs offer in their elaboration of this thesis. The relevant arguments may be classified into several categories as political, security, economic and historical.

Political arguments

NATO is a military as well as a political alliance - thus a group of states converged on the same ideas. The Alliance’s members share the same, liberal-democratic values which are primarily related to the observance of a wide spectrum of human and minority rights, democratic standards and good governance. All the states wishing to become NATO members must embrace these values and also observe them in their actual implementation through legislative and practical policy measures.

The particularly important and positive effect in the fulfilment of these standards has to do with the civil, democratic control and oversight of military forces. For instance, a large part of the budget is spent on military requirements and an efficient democratic control would enhance the transparency of these spendings as well as contribute to a rational economic calculation in projecting the military budget. Admission to NATO membership thus confirms that the new members have fulfilled all democratic standards and could be referred to as liberal-democratic countries in the proper meaning of this phrase. And, being a democratic country and belonging to a community of such states means living in peace, because democracies do not go to war, at least not between themselves.⁹

Security arguments

Changes brought about by the dissolution of the socialist block influenced a radical reshaping of security understanding and practices. The security dilemma and arms race have been replaced by security cooperation. By becoming a NATO member Serbia will be formally “united” with almost all its neighbours, i.e. in addition to being a good neighbour Serbia will also

⁸ Atlantic Council’s web page at <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.yu/pdf/storijat.html>, 4.6.2007.

⁹ This argument belongs to the democratic theory of peace, the validity of which is being discussed by the professional public in the absence of relevant empirical evidence. However, it is still highly influential and widespread in academic circles.

be a good ally. That will imply joint military exercises, exchange of security information, and participation in joint peace operations. That is how mutual trust among neighbours is built and makes a war between them inconceivable. The metaphor of the Balkans as a “powder keg” will become irrelevant. Serbia will thus, together with other Alliance’s members, actively participate in dealing with the modern challenges, risks and threats long before they become an immediate danger.

However, these changes notwithstanding, the main reason for NATO’S existence remains collective defence, defined by Article 5 of the Washington Agreement. It guarantees security of member countries from the external danger, which is why Serbia’s membership in the Alliance will improve its position with respect to security. Furthermore, the concept of non-alliance, i.e. neutrality of the Swiss or Austrian type had a rationale in the bipolar division of the world, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall it is difficult to remain neutral, among other things, because neutrality was guaranteed by the mutually confronted large powers. In the times of remarkable security cooperation it is utterly unrealistic to expect that Serbia may attain this privileged position.

Moreover, NATO membership will promote the armed forces, because professionalization and modernisation of the security system form a component part of accession to NATO. Namely, in order to be able to efficiently cope with modern challenges, risks and threats, the armed forces will have to establish efficient, elite and combat units in line with NATO standards and capable of fast action and interoperability in distant territories.

Economic arguments

NATO membership also spells economic gains for Serbia. In the long run, collective defence is less costly than independent, individual defence, as the supporters of Serbia’s NATO membership keep pointing out. NATO, in principle, encourages every candidate state to develop “special abilities” (e.g. military medicine). This “division of labour” within the framework of security cooperation will allow Serbia to keep less numerous military forces and thus substantially reduce the appropriations for military requirements, which will, in consequence, increase the funds for development programs.

Furthermore, Serbia’s incorporation in this security arrangement will also mean that it has made substantial progress in its secu-



rity system reforms, as well as in the more general societal reforms, and that it is therefore a stable state. That would create the conditions for a faster inflow of foreign capital and, consequently, also for faster employment of unutilized resources – a step that will make Serbia the “driving force” of the region.

Historical arguments

Finally, the supporters of Serbia’s entry in NATO also have a historical argument. Namely, the relations between NATO and Yugoslavia have, for the largest part of the past period, been good, and have reached the highest point in the so-called Balkan Pact, agreement on political, economic and military cooperation signed by Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in Ankara, back in 1953.¹⁰ Therefore, the last decade of the 20th century, marked by poor relations between the Alliance and the FRY, along with the NATO bombing of our country, represents a departure from and an aberration of that tradition. By becoming a NATO member Serbia will restore the tradition of cooperating with NATO.

No(to)NATO! Utopia

No(to)NATO!¹¹ is not a name of an NGO, but of a campaign focused on preventing Serbia’s entry into NATO, the creation of political and social conditions for an active peaceful policy in the region and the promotion of the idea of non-violence, tolerance, diversity, dialogue and social justice. It has been mounted by a group of people converged on shared values, neither subordinated nor superior to one another in their horizontal organization, without a leadership, presidents or managing boards, and operating on the principles of agreement, harmonization and voluntary engagement. They are, furthermore, independent from political parties or tycoons. Thus, it is a phenomenon referred to by political sociologists as one of new social movements.¹²

This movement, i.e. campaign, has attracted the public attention first by its notonato.org graffiti found mostly in the centre of Belgrade. It was initially believed to be just another rightwing-radical group, i.e. a “member” of the so-called patriot block, since these groups, too, oppose Serbia’s NATO membership. But, that is where similarities end, because these organizations maintain that Serbia should strengthen its security, not by joining NATO, but by

¹⁰ For more details see a contribution by Nemanja Milošević, Yugoslavia, the USA and NATO in 1950s, in this edition of the WBSO and: Dimitrijević, B. B. (2006). *Jugoslovenska armija 1945-1954 : nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje*. Beograd, Institut za savremenu istoriju.

¹¹ No(to)NATO!, web page at <http://www.neunato.org>

¹² By contrast from traditional (workers, feminist) movements, the new social movements (students, peace, alterglobalist, neofeminist, anti-nuclear, ecological) are characterized by the following features: they are not turned towards the authorities, but towards the individual and society; they have a horizontal organization: they lack class character and basis: they are single issue movements: autonomous in relation to political parties: committed to non-violent methods of action, use new methods and forms thereof (civic disobedience, occupation of streets and squares): they have a new language, build a new alternative political culture: and they have an utopian nature. For more on social movements see: Pavlović Vukašin, *Društveni pokreti i promene*, Udruženje za političke nauke Jugoslavije, FPN, Beograd, 2003.

using its own forces to make the army stronger, and by establishing firm links with Russia. However, the No(to)NATO! activists have a substantially more radical alternative both with respect to promoters of Serbia's NATO membership and the "right wing" opponents of this idea.

Demilitarization as a "safety solution"

Activists of the No(to)NATO! campaign base their opposition to Serbia's entry in the North Atlantic Alliance on extremely radical foundations. Namely, many people are deluded into thinking that militarism exists only in war. Quite the contrary, it is often the dominant principle of life, even in the case of societies that have not been at war for a long period of time, but behave as if it will break out tomorrow as reflected in their appropriation of substantial financial assets for the armed forces. Furthermore, a large number of states foster the "spirit of militarism" through the family, education and even church. All these institutions are based on the principles of power. i.e. on the superiority/submission relation, the deference of the weaker towards the stronger and rewards for subservience. Every member of the society must "know his proper place".¹³

Different people and ideas, or critical thinking, are not tolerated. That is why "people who are taught not to think but to accept, to obey authority and do what they are told are the most susceptible to fear and prejudice against those characterized by the system as *others* and different. That is how the state, from your early days, recruits you for some future army and a future war of hers".¹⁴ That is why people find it hard to accept the ideas of demilitarization.

An alternative to this society of insecurity is investment into life, "into social and health services, education, economy and culture, rather than in a machine producing sufferings and death".¹⁵ Furthermore, it is a policy that relies on tolerance, the cultivation of diversity, non-violence, culture of peace, dialogue and cooperation. Demilitarization is impossible to attain locally but only through a continuing action in regional and wider international frameworks. That is a major chance for Serbia since it could, by accepting the policy of demilitarization and trust building among neighbours, provide a substantial contribution to peace and security in Europe.


¹³ Tijana Cvetičanin, Šta je za nas (de)militarizacija? Karavan mira 2007, 03. maj 2007, at: <http://www.neunato.org/alternative.aspx?id=3135>, 5.6.2007.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.



But it is a lasting process that takes time, patience and courage. “It requires getting to know our neighbours well, seeing what’s important to them, what they fear of, what makes them feel secure. It is also necessary to let them know the same about oneself. (...) It is a difficult journey, but the question is whether we have a choice at all, if we wish to feel good and safe where we live in the future”.¹⁶ No(to)NATO! campaign activists support the idea of



social justice and therefore emphasize that the demilitarization of Serbia will not leave a large number of people from the “military sector” jobless. The money saved by the demilitarization will be used to provide retraining programs for them, while numerous military factories could convert to civilian production and a number of others could be privatized. In any case, the process is time consuming but the solution is more lasting and substantially less costly compared with NATO membership, which requires from us to pay a high membership fee and appropriate sizeable assets for adjustment of our army to NATO standards.

¹⁶ Milan Colić Humljan, NATO i mi? 28. decembar 2006, at:

<http://www.neunato.org/alternative.aspx?id=3135>, 3.6.2007.

NATO membership does not amount to a substantial split with the war politics of the previous period but, on the contrary, makes one a part of the largest world machineries of war whose “most powerful and influential member, the USA, continuously produces new and sustains the existing conflicts throughout the world”.¹⁷ It is therefore certain that the “citizens of your state will be sent to partake of wars waged by rich NATO members for their economic and political ends”.¹⁸ Finally, anti-NATO activists wonder what kind of security guarantees could be provided by military hardware if the danger lies in organized groups of people prepared to sacrifice their lives entering underground or railway stations with bags full of explosives, and conclude that only a world without poverty is a safe one.¹⁹ Therefore, the only true, substantial alternative is a radical social undertaking called demilitarization.

The referendum issue

An important part of the No(to)NATO! campaign has to do with problematizing the issue of a referendum. Namely, in addition to demanding an urgent scheduling of a referendum, the campaign’s activists also demand fair conditions for the citizens’ vote on the issue of Serbia’s NATO membership. Namely the pro NATO campaign, they claim, has been going on for some time already, and is well planned and financed. Bearing in mind that at the elections the citizens placed their trust in the politicians to conduct public affairs in the general interest, they are obliged to treat all citizens equally and consequently provide equal (financial, media, etc.) conditions for the anti NATO campaign.

To the right of NATO

It is interesting to note that, despite the major mistrust of NATO manifested by the citizens and their opposition to Serbia’s membership of this organization, with the exception of No(to)NATO! campaign, there is not one association of citizens demonstrating its opposition to Serbia’s possible NATO membership in a rounded-off, systematic and well argued manner.²⁰

True, some extreme right wing organizations voice their principled opposition to NATO. Thus, the homeland movement “Obraz” in its basic guidelines points out that it supports “precious freedom instead of slavery to Euro-Atlantic false liberalism”, as well as “Serbian noble army and the police, instead of NATO occupation”.²¹

¹⁷ Tijana Cvetičanin, Šta je za nas (de)militarizacija? Karavan mira 2007, 03. maj 2007, at: <http://www.neunato.org/alternative.aspx?id=3135>, 5.6.2007.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid, <http://www.neunato.org/alternative.aspx?id=3135>, 5.6.2007.

²⁰ There are two internet portals that have given some space to NATO-related articles: Nova srpska politička misao, internet, <http://www.nspm.org.yu/> and Glas javnosti, internet, <http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu/danas/srpski/NATO.shtml>. However, neither of the two portals pursues a systematic and organized public-oriented debate about Serbia’s NATO membership.

²¹ Otačastveni pokret obraz, <http://www.obraz.org.yu/>.



“Nacionalni stroj”, a neo-Nazi organization in Serbia, participated in organizing a memorial rally “occasioned by the eighth anniversary of NATO aggression”,²² with a statement that “for seventy eight days and just as many nights, children and civilians were killed, houses, factories, bridges, railways, hospital schools... destroyed. Shrines, graves were set on fire”.²³ Another neo-Nazi organization in Serbia, called Blood and Honour (Krv i čast), points out that in addition to fighting “the new world order and its false values, the Shquiptari terrorists, homosexuals, drug addicts, religious sects and Islamic fundamentalists”, it also fights “NATO occupation of Serbian Kosovo”.²⁴

In addition, a number of internet portals, e.g. that of the “Komentar-Informacioni centar”²⁵ or “Vidovdan”,²⁶ consider Serbia’s relation towards NATO in a wider, geopolitical context: NATO-Russia,²⁷ NATO-USA and NATO-EU.²⁸ The alternative to our country’s membership in the alliance may only be “glimpsed” in their support of strong strategic links with Russia. However, none of these organizations, initiatives and portals pursues an organized campaign against Serbia’s NATO membership, and does not have any substantial influence on the Serbian public opinion.

Next move: up to the state

In view of the arguments offered in favour and against Serbia’s entry into NATO we may draw certain conclusions without siding with either of the “camps”. Namely, champions of accession to the Alliance speak only of positive aspects, without mentioning the negative consequences of this organization’s membership. In their view, Serbia does not have an alternative. However, the No(to)NATO! activists offer an alternative in the form of demilitarization, which they see as a radical social action implying the building of a society of tolerance, non-violence, dialogue and cooperation among neighbours. They still do not offer practical policy measures, or rather the ways to realize these general ideas. The impression is, therefore, that although humane, their argumentation is fairly general and incomplete, which is why it is not clear how it could be implemented in practice.

The ultra right alternative in this matter takes the approach marked by racist and chauvinist positions, but does not give it much attention. That is why the question, referred to at the beginning of the previous chapter remains outstanding: Why is it that the nega-

²² Stormfront, at <http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/1053-1040-1062-1048-1054-245784.html>, 27.6.2007.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ NIN, Krv i čast, broj 2742, 17 jul 2003, at <http://www.nin.co.yu/2003-07/17/29894.html>, 27.6.2007.

²⁵ www.komentar.co.yu/.

²⁶ www.vidovdan.org.

²⁷ Aleksandar Petrović, NATO ili Rusija, Komentar-Informacioni centar, at <http://www.komentar.co.yu/index.php?id=269>, 26.6.2007.

²⁸ Nebojša Dobrović, NATO samit u Rigi - šta su srpski mediji prečitali, Komentar-Informacioni centar, internet, <http://www.komentar.co.yu/index.php?id=269>, 26.6.2007.

tive attitude the citizens take towards NATO has not been manifested in a more organized and substantiated manner. This leaves a large empty space between the extreme left and extreme right options, both of which do not have any substantial foothold in the Serbian society. Is it realistic to expect from the citizens to become actively engaged in an anti-NATO campaign, if an official and clear decision of a state body still does not exist and Serbia is not heading towards NATO. Maybe the Serbian citizens think that their opposition to NATO membership is so strong that most of them do not feel the need to become self-organized in civic associations and instead rely on the “political strategy” of indirect action through political parties. Or, perhaps, they want the parties to do their “dirty” work for them.²⁹ The review of this debate has actually opened a series of questions.

Regardless of the deficiencies of the reviewed arguments and the whole debate in general, it is still a good thing that some kind of a dialogue on this topic has been initiated. Bearing in mind that Serbia’s (non)admission to NATO strategically determines its position, we expect the state bodies to join the debate on Serbia’s accession to NATO in a more serious way, or rather we expect them to be the initiators of a public discourse based on a cost/benefit analysis of Serbia’s NATO membership. This discourse will have to encompass political parties, NGOs, media and other civil society actors, as well as experts in this particular area. Civil society has proven that it can do that, and the next move has to be made by the state. We only hope that this dialogue would not resemble the one on the Serbian constitution. ■

Literature

1. Atanasovic, Z. (2007). *Bezbednosne teme u kampanji za Parlamentarne izbore 2007. Godine u Srbiji* [Security topics in the campaign for 2007 parliamentary elections in Serbia], CEEOL: 69.
2. Dimitrijević, B. B. (2006). *Jugoslovenska armija 1945-1954 : nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje* [Yugoslav army 1945-1954: new ideology, soldier and arms]. Beograd, Institut za savremenu istoriju.
3. Čehulić, L. (2003). *Euroatlantizam* [Euro-Atlantism]. Zagreb, Politička kultura.
4. Hadžić, M. i M. Timotić (2006). *Javnost i vojska* [The public and the Army]. Beograd, CCVO.
5. Janković, P. (2003). *Reforma sektora bezbednosti* [Security sector reform]. Beograd, G17 Institut.
6. Pavlović, V. (2003). *Društveni pokreti i promene* [Social movements and changes], Fakultet političkih nauka.

²⁹ For more on the attitudes of key political parties related to this issue see Atanasovic, Z. (2007). *Bezbednosne teme u kampanji za Parlamentarne izbore 2007. Godine u Srbiji*, CEEOL: 69.



NATO Accession and Serbian Domestic Politics

Dorđe Popović

UDK 327.51:323 (497.11)
355.02(497.11)

WITH ITS intentions to make up for lost time and at the same time to politically and economically undergo transformation the same way as the countries of Eastern Europe,¹ Serbia encountered a dilemma of either joining NATO or remaining a member of Partnership for Peace Programme. The debate ensuing from this dilemma formed primarily in the wake of two sets of reasons. The fact that in Serbia seven years after the democratic changes the political constellation has radically changed and that the democratic political order has been implemented belongs to the first set of reasons. Contrary to that, still lingering memories of NATO bombing and destructions in 1999 belong to the second set.

The ongoing debate about possible Serbian membership in NATO has been followed by impassioned statements which in this case are omnipresent compared to the much needed expert analysis which will point to the merits and drawbacks of such integration. This article aims at showing the impact that the possible Serbian accession to NATO would have on the home affairs in this country. Briefly we shall put forth a reminder of how Serbia, i.e. the then Yugoslavia, has come all the way from an important NATO ally to the first country against which the alliance has used military power. However, the issue this article will place an emphasis on is the system of values which will have to be adopted in Serbia if it were to join NATO, as well as what the consequences to its internal stability, democratization and reform of the security sector would be.

From friend to foe

The history of NATO-Serbia relations has not been so short lasting and unfruitful as it would seem with hindsight. Namely, the then Yugoslavia had been one of the most significant NATO allies

*The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School
of Security Studies*

¹ See: Political position of Serbia and Montenegro with a quick look at joining Partnership for Peace ... http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/spopo/I/Prioriteti/results_priorities_s.htmln, downloaded 08.06.2007.

during the 1950s. It is not a well known fact that at the time NATO cooperation was more extensive than that of today. This period was also the period of the most thriving development of the Yugoslav army.² Yugoslavia signed the NATO agreement in 1951 on military aid which at the time likened the Partnership for Peace of today.

However, this programme has been even more intensive than its counterpart today since the member countries were required to take active and swift role with the aim of precluding the Communist peril from appearing.³ Yugoslavia signed this, for a communist country perhaps an odd statement, in the light of rather tightened relationship with the USSR. This fact shows that the then Yugoslav top political echelons sorted out the peril of endangered territorial integrity by way of a clear getting nearer to NATO. Perhaps today's political elite could have learnt a lesson from this.

Fifty years later, the country which has been at the forefront of defence from USSR and as such a very important NATO ally, found itself being almost smashed to pieces by the very same alliance. What led NATO to use force for the first time in its history against an independent country is yet to be delved into. One of the reasons is undoubtedly undemocratic nature of the Milosevic's regime and the system of values this regime was based on.

System of values

The debate of the possible Serbian accession to NATO should be led towards the necessary adoption of modern democratic values. The conversation so far has boiled down to war reminiscences and ungrounded calculations that membership in NATO will not bring more cost than benefit. It is essential that we distance from this line of thought and commence the serious expert debate. The debate should point out that membership in NATO represents ultimate anchoring in the Western civilization and acceptance of the most valuable premises this civilization has reached in its history. This consequence would be of invaluable importance for Serbia much more than a mere financial benefit this country could cash in from it.

A question arises what the alternative for NATO in terms of mere benefits would be. There are two possibilities mentioned in the public debate on this issue in Serbia. The first possibility would be the nearing to Russia and establishing firmer security cooperation with it. The champions of this opinion are predominantly the mem-

² Dimitrijević B. (2005/2006), „An outline of alliance half a century ago“, *Euroatlantic Review* No 1, Belgrade

³ Ibid.



bers of ruling political parties before the democratic changes - Serbian Radical Party and Socialist Party of Serbia, and a number of analysts.

All of them emphasize the role of NATO during the 1999 conflict, and the fact that Serbian foreign policy of today turns its head towards Russia and there is no logic behind seeking help from Russia in resolving the status of Kosovo and striving to join NATO.⁴ The advocates of this opinion allow for Serbian membership in the Partnership for Peace since the members of this Programme are Russia and Belarus but they fiercely oppose NATO membership.⁵ They pose a question who would Serbia be protected from by using NATO umbrella, are these Russia, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Syria, or China? They claim that NATO would protect us from those we don't need any protection against, whereas NATO would not go to any lengths of protecting us from Turkey, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Bulgaria which are member countries of NATO as such or are about to become.⁶ This division model into traditional friends and enemies stand in silent testimony to the system of values its advocates hold.

Another possibility which is being brought up in the forthcoming security arrangements is neutrality. The example of the countries which share the Western democratic values is brought into perspective but they decided on not joining any of the collective security systems. The most exemplary are the cases of Switzerland, Sweden and Austria. This principle does not epitomize a bad solution and it could perhaps be the best for Serbia, provided Serbia was capable of maintaining neutrality on its own. Regrettably though, it is not the case. Serbia is dependent in many respects in terms of economy and military on the NATO member countries. To refuse to join NATO in this alliance would lead to the aid denial coming from these countries which in turn would not deem it as their own interest to assist the country which claims that it can survive independently.

To maintain a democratic system of values in Serbia is one of the main prerequisites to sustain internal stability. The argument in favour of joining NATO is certainly the fact that member countries of this alliance share democratic values and that their application is guaranteed. The preamble of the Washington agreement from 1949 which instituted NATO as such, among other things reads that the countries which signed the agreement are adamant to preserve freedom, heritage and the civilization of

⁴ See the column Debates – Serbia and NATO on New Serbian political thought website http://www.nspm.org.yu/in_srbija_i_NATO.htm

⁵ Atanasović, Zorana Security issues in the campaign for parliamentary elections in 2007 in Serbia, Western Balkan Security Observer, No 4 Belgrade January –March 2007

⁶ Tubić, Dušan, „Yes “ – To Partnership , „No“ to Nato, New Serbian political thought, http://www.nspm.org.yu/Debate/2006_tubic_nato.htm, downloaded 27.06.2007

its people, which are based on democracy, personal freedoms and the rule of law.⁷

This system of values is based on the key values of the developed Western hemisphere such as the protection of democratic premises and rule of law and citizens' freedom.⁸ One of the most pragmatic values of guaranteeing democracy to member countries is the existence and functioning of democratic institutions which is the prerequisite for membership as well.⁹

These values are the principal elements of all the contemporary democratic countries which are the role models for the Serbian political elite in its efforts to join Euro Atlantic mainstream. Accepting new democratic values is not, as some opponents of further integration claim, a proof of servility of home government towards the leading world powers. One tends to think that in this case it is a matter of survival in contemporary circumstances. Thus the adoption of a new way of thinking cannot be taken as denial of the national values, but as concern that the society does not lag behind at the far end of history.¹⁰ To eliminate Serbia from the course of history would have severe consequences for Serbia and its people. If the European and Euro Atlantic integration were to slow down it would make its international position, internal economic growth and the process of stabilization in the region far too torpid.¹¹

For instance, in the Czech Republic, the strongest source of support given to NATO accession was indeed the viewpoint of the political elite, since that way the Western values could be adopted. The smallest significance was given to NATO as an institution of defence.¹² NATO is not only a military but a political alliance. As the time passes by, its political component is becoming more and more important. Consequently it is not surprising that the membership in the alliance has the consequences onto the home affairs of each member country apart from its huge contribution to its security. NATO has a stabilizing role and a role of a guarantee of democratic progress of each member state.¹³

But, we are left with the issue of whether there is such form of perception in Serbia. Is a dominant identity in Serbia complementary to such thinking? In Serbia today so called traditionalist forces prevail. Due to its rigid and scrutinizing rapport to the ongoing changes they are not able to come up with ways of positioning Serbian society in the process of globalization.¹⁴ These political elites participate in the making of the public opinion and its values. Hence we must agree with Latinka Perovic's statement that Europe

⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>, downloaded 26.06.2007.

⁸ Milinković, Branislav, *Turnover with a good direction*, Defence, No. 23, September 2006.

⁹ *The ways to become NATO member*, European Forum, 01-02, Beograd, January-February 2007.

¹⁰ Milinković, Branislav, *Turnover with a good direction*, Defence, No. 23, September 2006

¹¹ Milanović, Milan, *Country of Trust*, Defence, No. 23, September 2006.

¹² Mattox, Gale A., Rachwald, Arthur R., *Enlarging NATO, the national debates*, Boulder, 2001, London.

¹³ Milinković, Branislav, *Turnover with a good direction*, Defence, No. 23, September 2006.

¹⁴ Dimitrijević, Aleksandar, *Two faces of Janus's Serbia*, New Serbian political thought website http://www.nspm.org.yu/debate_2007/2007_dimitrijevic1.htm, downloaded 27.06.2007.



is not the trauma of common Serbian people, but it is a trauma of the Serbian elite and it manifests itself as a burden of relentless lagging behind.¹⁵ Only by getting over this burden will Serbia be able to become an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Democratization

One of the main arguments put forth by the advocates of NATO accession is that membership in this alliance stabilizes democracy. Advocating the idea of enlarging the alliance further south, American president Bill Clinton said that NATO can do for Eastern Europe all that it did for Western Europe - it can prevent the resurgence of local rivalries and stabilize democracy and thus provide refuge against the future threats.¹⁶ By integrating Eastern Europe into NATO, among other things the division of the Continent has been precluded, existent up to that very moment, into the self-sufficient and safe West and unstable and volatile East.¹⁷ The same principle could be applicable to the Western Balkans, as well as to Serbia, as the biggest country in the region, but the country in which tension may arise during the eventual sorting out of the Kosovo crisis.

The process of consolidation of democracy in Serbia has only just been started and if NATO accession accelerated it, it would be yet another consequence of crucial proportions for the whole of society. In the Members Action Plan which is made for each candidate country for the NATO membership, the list of conditions each country must meet so as to become members of equal status is clearly laid out. It is believed that one of the conditions is that new members of NATO must be consolidated democracies.¹⁸ Even though it has not been the case with all the countries which have joined the alliance, the case of Turkey being a good example, which even today does not meet the criteria, it is certain that Serbia's accession to NATO would to a great extent speed up the process of democratic consolidation and getting nearer the developed countries of the West.

Joining NATO has had a threefold effect: unimpeded establishment of security and foreign affairs orientation, a deafening signal for foreign investors for direct investments and acceleration of already begun reforms of the security sector, which is mirrored in the general democratization of society.¹⁹ Thus it is no wonder why

¹⁵ Perović, Latinka, *People, events, books* Helsinki Board for human rights, Belgrade, 2000.

¹⁶ Barany, Zoltan, *The Future of NATO Expansion, four case studies*, Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Milanović, Milan, *Country of Trust, Defence*, No 23, September 2006.

most Eastern European countries have found themselves in this system of collective security. There is no reason why one should not believe that Serbia will experience the similar if not even the same effects.

One of the most significant gains of NATO membership which is very significant for the process of the democracy consolidation in a post conflict and post authoritative society, is security sector reform. The resistance to a country's faster accession to NATO often comes from security structures wanting to preserve the privileged position within the government and certain controlling functions over civil institutions and society as a whole.²⁰ Such resistance can only be eradicated by way of democratic civil control over the security sector. Such form of control leads to democratization of the security sector and represents one of the preconditions which NATO puts forth to all candidate countries. This in practice means that the Serbian military would be under the control of executive and legislative authorities, that the law would stipulate a clear cut division of jurisdiction between the military and the executive bodies, that the Constitution must stipulate in which cases the military can be employed in peacetime, that the executive and legislative power must participate in the allocation of defence budget, that the budget must be depoliticized, that the military establishment must be democratized and that there must be civil experts to stand as advisors on defence issues and the defence ministry as well.²¹ Many of these premises of democratic civil control of armed forces already exist in Serbia, but membership in NATO would provide a full guarantee. The already mentioned Membership Action Plan as one of the membership prerequisites stipulates the establishment of civil democratic control of defence forces. However, it is worth mentioning that this plan does not only assess the existence of the institutions which would carry out the civil democratic control – the so called the first generation of security sector reform,²² but their functioning in practice as well which makes up the second generation of the reform.

Current situation

Bearing in mind the existent defence potential of Serbia, the establishment of more stable cooperation with NATO is not only commonsensical but completely justified as well.²³ If we take into consideration the statement by, until recently Assistant Minister of Defence Snezana Samardzic Markovic, the topmost echelon seems

²⁰ Svilanović, Goran, *Serbia into NATO*, Blog B92, <http://blog.b92.net/arhiva/node/2250>, 26.09.2006

²¹ See: Barany, Zoltan, *The Future of NATO Expansion, four case studies*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

²² Edmunds, Timothy, *Security sector reform: Concepts and implementation*, in: Flury, Phillip and Hadžić, Miroslav (Ed.), *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform*, DCAF/CCMR, Geneva/Belgrade, 2004.

²³ Janković, Pavle, Jević, Zoran, *Preparations for security integration*, Euroatlantic review, Br. 1, Beograd 2005/2006.



to have grasped the reality. She says that at this very moment of international relations the premise of relying only on our own security forces and the defence as a rule is substituted or complemented by the membership in one of the associations of collective security. If we look at the issues that way, our interest is obvious.²⁴ A very clear cut statement for all those wanting to here it.

The fact that the National Security Strategy draft made by President Tadic's team of experts puts forth Serbian membership in NATO as one of the foreign policy goals of Serbia clearly shows that Serbia is safely but securely walking the path of joining NATO.²⁵ Although this draft has not yet entered the procedure, it appears as a novelty since all the currently valid strategic documents clearly and succinctly determine NATO membership as one of the goals for the political elite to carry out. Just as a quick reminder, the valid Defence Strategy from 2004 served as a preface into such attitude towards NATO, stipulating that Serbia and Montenegro concur in Euro Atlantic security values and is inclined to join Euro Atlantic space²⁶. However, such a statement did not suffice so that one can say it is the goal of Serbia to join the alliance. If the National Security Strategy draft put forth by the President is adopted, any dilemma on whether Serbia will join NATO will recede. One must mention that there is one more National Security Strategy draft which was made up by the Prime Minister Kostunica's team. This draft does not mention NATO unequivocally but it speaks of the concept of cooperative security, within Euro Atlantic security structures as well as within other regional security associations.²⁷

Of course this all has to do with national politics. It is insufficient for NATO membership. Without a broad national consensus proven by way of a referendum it will not be possible for Serbia to join NATO. The issue whether it will happen or whether it is possible in Serbia is yet to be seen. One thing is sure, a burning debate is forthcoming, a debate where politicians and experts must show their own reliability and familiarize the people of this country with what NATO membership has in store for them and what it does not. Joining NATO would be a final proof of democratization and stabilization of Serbia. Some would tend to say that to shake off the tarnished image, be it the only benefit, is a good enough reason to join. They are to convince the people of Serbia of the same belief. ■

²⁴ Samardžić-Marković, Snežana, *Good will all round*, Defence, No. 23, September 2006.

²⁵ *The priority of joining NATO*, Danas, 12. October 2006. <http://www.danas.co.yu/20061012/ronika1.html#11>

²⁶ Janković, Pavle and Jeftić, Zoran, *Preparations for security integration*, Euroatlantic review, No. 1, Beograd 2005/2006.

²⁷ Atanasović, Zorana, *Security issues in the campaign for parliamentary elections in 2007 in Serbia*, Western Balkans Security Observer, No 4, Beograd, January – March 2007

Would NATO accession contribute to a more stable business environment and economic progress in Serbia?

Marko Savković

UDK 327.51:338.121(497.11)

AT THE press conference which had been organized in Belgrade upon the issuance of the confirmation of the Serbia's membership in the Partnership for Peace, the Defence Minister Zoran Stanković declared that "this event is a clear message to prospective foreign investors that they can safely invest in our country, which is the prerequisite for our further economic development."¹ It is our intention in this text to analyse this line of argument of the Defence Minister, which is by the way oft used by the advocates of Euro Atlantic integration. First of all, we shall try to give an insight into what makes up a stable business environment. Afterwards, we shall consider the setbacks which stand in the way of a stable business environment in Serbia and assume a critical approach to its connection with security integration. Eventually, our attention will be focused onto the defence industry which places high expectations from Euro Atlantic integration

Causal or correlative bond

In the ongoing public debate in Serbia on the Euro Atlantic integration economic arguments are rarely put forth as important. It is the European Union as an organization which has formed its appealing aura on its exquisite economic achievements, and not NATO. Therefore, the economic arguments are a very powerful weapon in the hands of those advocating membership of Serbia in the EU.²

So, the director of the NATO Directorate in the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ambassador Milan Milanović

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

¹ Serbia joined Partnership for Peace – importance and perspectives 2006. Internet presentation of Ministry of Defence of Republic of Serbia. http://www.mod.gov.yu/partnerstvo_za_mir/partnerstvo.htm (June 19, 2007)

² According to the research of "Medium Gallup" which was done in May this year, about 72 % of citizens holds that Serbia should join European Union, 14% are against joining EU family" and the rest of 14% are undecided. 57% support joining Partnership for Peace programme, 26% are against it, and 17% are undecided. However, almost half of the people are against Serbian integration in the NATO – 51% are against that Serbia should join NATO, 31% support the idea of joining NATO, whereas 18% are undecided. Radio Television of Vojvodina: *For EU 70%, at the end of the list of priorities.* June 20, 2007. http://www.rtv.co.yu/sr/vesti/drustvo/drustvo/2007_06_20/vest_20814.jsp. (June 28, 2007)



speaks of the system of joint courts, with the underlying „security – stability – improved international position – investment – economic progress – more integration with the Euro Atlantic structures – higher standard of living“. The proof for his claim Milanović finds in the increase of foreign investment which has been recorded in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania in the period from 2000 to 2005.³ In order to give this claim the benefit of the doubt, we must first of all examine to which extent membership in NATO led to the economic progress of these countries, taking into account that at the same time a parallel process of the EU accession has been underway. We shall have answer it by way of comparing the criteria for joining the two organizations, as well as the data about the economic ramifications which the processes of accession have created in the candidate countries.

The economic criterion for joining the EU requires that the candidate country prides itself on a well – functioning market economy and that it is capable of withstanding the pressure of competition within the EU.⁴ Consequently, in the Central and Eastern European countries stable macroeconomic indicators and the completion of structural reforms are deemed as a goal of economic reforms. The confidence placed in the positive outcome of the reform process has its grounds in the trade contacts with the old members, relevant foreign investment and efficiency, which has been achieved by way of adopting the principles of market economy.⁵ Grading of whether the progress has been made in adopting 80 000 pages of *acquis communautaire* was done by the European Commission. By plainly demonstrating the normative power toward the candidate countries, the EU has instigated the process of social reforms and made a positive impact on its economic progress. Since the triumph of the project of European integration is heavily dependent on the success of the common market, the economic prerequisite of accession carried more weight. Simply, the economic well being achieved has meant a lot for the old members and it could not be disputed.

On the other hand, NATO membership is open to every European country which is capable of abiding by the contract stipulations and which contributes to the security of NATO

³ Milanović, Milan. 2006. A country of trust: Economic effects of joining Partnership for Peace Defence. A special addition No 12: Serbia and Partnership for Peace. http://www.mod.gov.yu/partnerstvo_za_mir/ODBRANA%20-%20Partnerstvo%20za%20mir.pdf (June 20, 2007) Milanović, Milan. 2006. Diplomacy and Partnership. *Euroatlantic Review*. Summer – Autumn 2006, year 1, No 3. Euroatlantic initiative, Belgrade: page 54-55. <http://www.eai.org.yu/download/EvroatlantskaRevija3.pdf> (June 28, 2007)

⁴ European Commission: Accession Criteria.

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm (June 18, 2007)

⁵ European Commission. 2006. Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2006/ocp24en.pdf (June 18, 2007)

⁶ <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.html>

⁷ Other criteria provided that a candidate country treat minorities in a way that is not in line with the guidelines of Organization for European Security and Cooperation (OESC), that it sorted out all the conflicts with the neighbouring countries and that it is committed to a peaceful solution of conflicts", that it possess the wish and potential to contribute to the Alliance and it can achieve interoperability with the armed forces of other countries", and finally, that it is dedicated to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures. *Enlargement: What does it mean in practice?* <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/practice.html> (June 18, 2007)

⁸ NATO. 1995. Study on NATO Enlargement. Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles of Enlargement. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9502.htm> (June 19, 2007)

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. 2006. World Investment Report (FDI From Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development). United Nations: New York and Geneva: p. 156. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf (June 19, 2007)

¹¹ Kovačević, Milan R. 2005. Foreign investment in Serbia – possibilities and achievements. In: *MAP („Monthly analyses and prognoses“)*, No 10 – 12, February 2005. Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade: p. 59.


¹² Fabris, N. and Galić, J. 2003. Improving the Business Environment in the Process of Transition of Serbia. Second ASECU conference, Belgrade: page 3 – 4.

territory.⁶ However, the process of joining this organization has been altered to a great extent by the end of the Cold War. The study on the enlargement, back in 1995, has put forth five additional prerequisites of accession. For Serbia, functional democratic establishment and market economy are of vital importance.⁷ Though, for NATO the economy represents merely one facet of security as a broader concept.⁸ The emphasis is placed on new security architecture⁹, and not on economic integration. That is the reason why the connection between Serbian membership in the Partnership for Peace, i.e. NATO membership and economic development may be only a correlative and not the causal one.

If the security integration is not crucial, what is it that makes the investor invest in another country? According to World Report on Investments for 2006, which was published by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, this decision is preconditioned by the presence (or absence) of so called “host country drivers” or “pull factors”. The size of the market of the country in question, production costs, labour cost, or geographical distance of its market can have an appealing or off putting effect on the foreign investors.¹⁰ A list of factors is not exhausted in this manner. The pointers aiding the investors in their decision are the economic policy of the government, i.e. the country, and ultimately its business environment. The business environment, or the “investing climate” (the buzzword in economic terms) is principally determined by the growth and the structure of investments, the home currency trustworthiness and the degree of risk from a foreign country.¹¹

In Jelena Galić and Nikola Fabris’s research from the Institute of Economic Sciences in Belgrade, Improving the Business Environment in the Process of Transition of Serbia, the top executives in more than 400 companies were supposed to assess (by the grading system from 1-5) how huge a setback for investments is each of eighteen factors presented in the questionnaire.¹²

Fabris and Galić’s key findings are that of five biggest setbacks in the making of propitious business environment in Serbia, four depend on the decision makers designing and leading the economic policy. This is why the first in a row is



the insecurity in terms of the economic policy of the Government, as a result of a decade of economic insecurity in the planning of economic policy, which in turn makes business planning farfetched.¹³ However, it is crucial for our research that the integration of a country itself is not considered a factor influencing the business environment.

Thus, the making of a firmer business environment heavily depends on a plethora of factors and most importantly on the government institutions' operations in home and foreign affairs. As opposed to the advocates of Mr Stanković's belief at the very beginning of this text, we tend to infer that the security integrity of a country is relevant, but on no account the most significant factor which unequivocally facilitates the decision making of likely investors.

Defence industry is not to lose by membership in the Partnership for Peace

Despite the poignant opposition of his party to the policy of joining NATO,¹⁴ the Serbian Radical Party delegate, retired general Bozidar Delić admits that NATO membership would lead to certain investments in the military industry. Even though he has expressed a doubt that this would lead to investments in other industries,¹⁵ this statement has proven that this awareness that the defence industry is likely to be a winning party in the process of accession into NATO is a thought of those who oppose the idea of Euro Atlantic integration as well

One of the aims of the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace is the development of the military capacity to join forces with the NATO member countries.¹⁶ Undoubtedly, a relevant part in the development of these capacities will be played by the defence industry as well. The director of Zastava Arms Industry, Dragoljub Grujović, therefore maintains that on the grounds of the Framework Document it is possible to mutually jumpstart the development and the production of arms and military equipment: "Beside the defence industry, which makes the final parts of some products, there is the accompanying industry which will

¹³ Ibid, str. 3 – 4.

¹⁴ On a rare occasion is the resistance of Serbian Radical Party policy to Euro Atlantic integration as open as in the "Political Last Will" of Vojislav Šešelj, Party's lifelong leader, which was proclaimed in December 2006.

¹⁵ Papić, Gorislav. 12 April 2007. Serbia and NATO: seeking the ways to the West. *NIN* No. 2937. Downloaded from <http://www.neu-nato.org/aktuelno.aspx?id=3132> (19 June 2007)

¹⁶ Petrović, Đorđe. Adapting to circumstances of today: Mechanisms of Partnership Programme. *Odbrana Magazine*, special addition No 12. Serbia and Partnership for Peace. http://www.mod.gov.yu/partnerstvo_za_mir/ODBRANA%20-%20Partnerstvo%20za%20mir.pdf (June 20, 2007)



more or less be employed and rebuilt. [...] I firmly believe that the cooperation of our country with the world in the field of arms and military equipment will be instrumental in introducing new technologies, which will be applied gradually in the civil production as well and hence boosting the economy to a higher level".¹⁷

**Bulgarian experience:
Talk with Vassil Toutchiev**¹⁸

Was the logic of economic development used in the debate on joining NATO held in Bulgaria?

Yes, it was. This argument has been used to a great degree in the parts of Bulgaria in which the allocation of American armed forces was planned at the time (*Toutchiev refers to the Air force bases of Basmer and Graf Ignatievo, as well as the base of land forces Novo Selo – author's comment*). These bases are primarily the need of the US armed forces, but they were used for the NATO needs as well. Above all, new job opportunities were much sought after and expected in the service industry, whereas the obligation to improve the accompanying infrastructure was seen as a chance to better the living standard of the locals.

Bearing in mind the Bulgarian example, what are in your opinion the benefits of security integration?

Foreign investments increase is primarily related to the process of modernisation and investment in the defence industry. Aware of the incumbent duties to attain interoperability, the Bulgarian government has approved the defence industry privatization programme. One of the obligations of the investor was to rely on the resources available in Bulgaria, and the other to subcontract local companies for certain jobs. A new employer has proven its worth by providing specialized training for the defence industry personnel.

Director of Zastava Arms can look for advice in our own neighbourhood. Some of the problems the Bulgarian defence industry faced at the turn of the 90's – policy makers who have not yet heard that the Cold War has ended, obsolete technology, unfamil-

¹⁷ Švedić, Mira. 15. January 2007. Recovery of defence industry; interview with the Director of Zastava Arms Dragoljub Grujovic: Defence, year III, No 32. Ministry of Defence, Belgrade: p. 8

¹⁸ Previously engaged in Atlantic Association and employed with the Council of Ministers (Government of Bulgaria), Toutchiev holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from University of Cambridge. The interview was made during the Conference of Atlantic Association of young political leaders in Belgrade (14 -16 June 2007)

ilarity with the marketing techniques¹⁹ – today are the thing of the past.

The Bulgarian government has made an effort to prompt the defence industry by way of connecting the issue of its defence to the NATO requirements. By the decision of the Council of Ministers in 1998, the “Programme of restructuring, privatization and government interest in the defence industry” was approved. The companies were supposed to make an active effort for NATO bids and programmes for consulting, commanding and control. The aim of the Programme was to achieve the interoperability and the reconstruction of this torpid industry. Since NATO requires that 2 percent of the GDP is spent for the defence system, facing the task of modernization Bulgaria partly rests upon regular financial aid from the EU. In sum, the whole amount of this aid has reached 8.6 billion dollars.²⁰

To put it succinctly, Serbian membership in the Partnership for Peace and a strategic choice to join NATO represents an important, but not crucial factor in deciding upon the foreign investment allocation into Serbia. We maintain that for that matter the process of European integration is more important. It is the defence industry that duly expects to benefit most from the Partnership for Peace and prospective NATO membership. ■

¹⁹ Stoykov, Latchezar. 2003. Prerequisites for stabilization and competitiveness of Bulgarian Defence Industry Sector. BDIA (Bulgarian Defence Industry Association). <http://bdia.tripod.com/bulgariandefenceindustryassociation/d8.html>. (June 21, 2007)

²⁰ Business Monitor. 2007. The Bulgaria Defence & Security Report (including 5 – year industrial forecasts). <http://www.businessmonitor.com/defence/bulgaria.html>. (June 21, 2007)



Foreign policy aspects of the Republic of Serbia's accession to NATO

Jelena Petrović

UDK 327.51(497.11)

THE PRO-EUROPEAN orientation of the new Serbian government has been clearly stated in the inaugural exposé by Prime Minister Koštunica.¹ However, the presented program makes not a single reference to a possibility of Serbia's membership in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. Without going into the conceivable meanings of this issue's absence from the priority agenda, one can still notice that the Serbian public is nevertheless engaged in a debate as to whether or not Serbia should join NATO.² One of the arguments most frequently invoked by promoters of Serbia's NATO membership is the "unofficial Copenhagen condition" for entry into the EU, i.e. the fact that ever since the end of the Cold War the Union has not admitted a single post-socialist state unless it had previously joined NATO.³ Bearing in mind that, according to Prime Minister's statement, Serbia's cooperation with and membership of the EU takes a high second place on the list of priorities, this argument merits special attention. Furthermore, other foreign-policy aspects of the possible membership should also be taken into account as part of a more extensive "cost benefit" analysis.

We shall, in this text, try to present the analysis of foreign policy arguments "pro" and "contra" Serbia's accession to NATO drawing, among other things, on the experience of other states, although mindful of the specific nature of NATO-Serbia relations. This specificity, in the first place, has to do with the historical heritage deriving from the 1999 bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO troops' presence in the southern Serbian province Kosovo and Metohija (KiM).

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

¹ Full text of the text is available at http://www.b92.net/info/dokumenti/index.php?nav_id=246774 (retrieved on 19 May 2007).

² For more on the public debate see Petrović, P. (2007), An attempted debate, *WBSO*, no.5.

³ From the end of the Cold War five countries have joined the EU without previously becoming NATO members. These are: Sweden, Austria, Finland, Cyprus and Malta.

Does Serbia have an alternative to NATO membership?

The modern security environment, created after the disintegration of the bipolar system, has almost entirely eliminated the possibility of conventional conflicts between states on the European continent. However, the newly emerged security vacuum was filled with new security challenges, risks and threats essentially characterised by being asymmetric and transnational. Precisely this transnational nature of the present day threats is an important factor of the states' need to join collective defence and security systems, i.e. to maintain these systems with necessary adjustments to newly emerged circumstances. Even the countries that opted for the policy of neutrality (e.g. Switzerland and Austria) have not remained outside the process of interlinking with other states in the security and defence domain. Both these countries are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and participate in NATO-led peace operations.⁴ That supports the claim that in the present day security environment international integration is a matter of necessity rather than choice.

The Organization of the United Nations (OUN) is the largest collective security system in the world. However, due partly to political factors manifested predominantly through the Security Council (SC)⁵ and partly also to its bulky organization and differences between its members, the UN proved insufficient to guarantee security to its participating states. An additional argument for this claim is the increasingly frequent transfer of UN's competencies to regional organizations like NATO. Therefore, states are to a growing extent turning towards membership of regional organization in their search for security cooperation and guarantees.

One of such institutions active on the European soil is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although it covers a wide spectrum of security-related cooperation areas this organization still lacks operational possibilities to employ coercion should a need arise. In other words, the OSCE could sooner be qualified as a prevention organization as opposed to NATO whose essential mission is precisely to act in specific situations (like those anticipated by Article 5 of

⁴ Austria participates in ISAF and KFOR, as does Switzerland. More on that issue see at: www.nato.int (retrieved 19 June 2007).

⁵ Each of the five permanent Security Council members has the right to veto a decision taken by this body.



the Washington Treaty). That is why the OSCE cannot fully respond to the need for international security cooperation and can only cover a part of it.

The EU, too, develops independent defence capacities (through the European security and defence policy, which has assimilated the competences and tasks of the West-European Union – WEU under the Amsterdam Agreement), but NATO still remains the primary framework for collective security and defence on the European continent. At NATO Prague summit in 2002 its members agreed to enable the EU access to the Alliance’s resources for missions wherein NATO is not engaged and the idea was operationalized with the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement between NATO and the EU. The fact that the defence of most EU members still predominantly depends on NATO and the USA indicates that the Union’s security, and above all defence, capacities are still insufficiently developed. That is why a country’s membership in the EU alone is in most cases an insufficient guarantee of its security.

Serbia’s geostrategic position has been drastically changed over the past 17 years. The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and a war in its territories brought Serbia its independence as well as new neighbours with whom it has yet to develop foreign-policy and security relations relieved of the legacy of war. Parallel changes in the world order, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have reduced the strategic importance that the Balkan peninsula had for western and eastern actors during the Cold War period. The new geostrategic position of Serbia is characterized by the presence of foreign troops on part of its territory as well as the fact that all of the neighbouring states have established some form of cooperation with NATO. Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are the Alliance’s full members. Macedonia, Albania and Croatia are in the Membership Action Plan,⁶ while Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted to the PfP last November, together with Serbia. This disposition would make Serbia a “surrounded country” if it reduced or discontinued cooperation with NATO and would, in the event of a conflict with one of NATO members or the Alliance itself, bring its chance of defence down to zero. Due to these circumstances it appears necessary to examine

⁶ Membership Action Plan (MAP) is the last step to NATO membership.

whether Serbia's possible admission to NATO would pay off, bearing in mind that, in defence terms, Serbia has no alternative to NATO membership. It may be that precisely the specific position of Serbia makes the foreign-policy aspects of its membership the most important part of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that should facilitate decision-making for the Serbian authorities.

Foreign-policy risks of NATO membership

One cannot assess how worthwhile NATO membership may prove to be for Serbia without knowing the possible negative aspects, i.e. the "costs" it implies. In foreign policy terms these costs could rather be called risks because they are more difficult to anticipate compared with other (e.g. economic) aspects of membership.

One of the first risks pointed out by participants in the public debate is Serbia's increased exposure to new security challenges, risks and threats, in the first place international terrorism. Theoretically, this thesis was supported by the events in Spain and Great Britain in 2004 and 2005 respectively when the two states were targeted by international terrorists. However, the data for the previous years give us a different picture. According to the findings of the "Terrorism Research Center"⁷ in the period from September 11 attack on the USA in 2001, the total of 45 terrorists attacks with at least one casualty were registered on the territories of European NATO members. As many as 38 attacks were carried out by members of two terrorist organizations operating in Turkey (PPK and KFF⁸), one was mounted in Corsica by an unknown group of perpetrators, while two were done by ETA⁹ in Spain. The remaining four terrorist attacks with fatal outcomes¹⁰ in almost six past years in European NATO member countries are the responsibility of Al Qaeda. The toll of these four attacks spanned over six years is 300 dead and close to 3450 injured people. By way of comparison the victims of traffic accidents in Serbia in 2006 numbered 899 dead and 18405 injured.¹¹

From the beginning of this year the total of 620, both successful and abortive, terrorist attacks were registered in the world. Only 10 per cent of that number, i.e. 62 attacks or attempted attacks were launched in European NATO member states. This number could be additionally shrunk knowing that the Center counts the 15 cases of civil disorder as terrorist attacks. Of the remaining number 47

⁷ The Terrorism Research Center, www.terrorism.com (retrieved 20 June 2007).

⁸ KFF – Kurdistan Freedom Falcons; PKK – Kurdish Workers Party.

⁹ ETA- Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom).

¹⁰ 15 and 20 November 2003 Istanbul, Turkey; 11. March 2004. Madrid, Spain, and 7 Jul 2005 London, UK.

¹¹ Quoted from: "Poginulo 899 ljudi" (899 people die), *Večernje Novosti* <http://www.novosti.co.yu/code/navigation.php?id=4&status=jedna&vesti=100220&datum=2007-02-23> (retrieved on 27 June 2007).



attacks or attempted attacks 3 were abortive, eight were arsons (with unreliable data on perpetrators) while 7 were carried out by unknown attackers. As for the remaining 30, according to the Centre, only one was positively identified as an act of international terrorism (an Al Qaeda threat in Barcelona on 28 May), while the majority of others were the work of internal terrorist groups like the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) operating in Turkey. Only six attacks in European NATO member countries in 2007 ended in at least one death and all six were the work of the PPK. These data suggest that the problem of international terrorism cannot be so important for Serbia to serve as a valid argument against its possible membership in NATO.

A much more probable risk of Serbia's NATO membership is its exposure to increased pressures concerning the contents of its foreign-policy decisions and attitudes that may influence the interests of NATO and its leading members (USA in the first place). The fact that all NATO decisions are taken by a consensus, i.e. "an agreement reached by common consent - a decision that is accepted by each member country"¹² may add to the pressure of larger on smaller states (influential on less influential) because a decision cannot be taken without the agreement of all. That is particularly noticeable when fast action, and thereby also fast decisions, are required. Several days after the March 1999 bombing of the FRY had started a number of NATO members (including France, Greece, Germany and Italy) opposed the idea of proceeding to Phase 3¹³ of air strikes invoking a resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in October 1998. The resolution stipulates that a decision on escalation could only be passed unanimously by all members.¹⁴ However, already on 30 March 1999, according to an article posted on the BBC site under the title "NATO's inner Kosovo conflict", NATO secretary general at the time Javier Solana, together with generals Clarke and Neumann, informed the ambassadors of member states that the old plan with political brakes was discarded. The above mentioned states were promised that NATO would attack only military targets in exchange for their consent.¹⁵ This case reveals two lines of pressures which do not necessarily have to form a "package". Therefore, it is possible that Serbia, if it joins NATO, will be exposed to these forms of pressure. However, the question is how large a freedom of decision-making Serbia would have even if it remained outside of NATO. It is likely that the two cases would not substantially differ in terms of the amount and force of pressure, but in their "prefix", namely the fact

¹² Quoted from: <http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html> (retrieved on 20 June 2007).

¹³ Phase 3 implied the bombing of even such targets as buildings downtown Belgrade or electric power plants.

¹⁴ Quoted from: *BBC News*, NATO's Inner Kosovo Conflict, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/425468.stm> (retrieved 20 June 2007).

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

that the pressures on Serbia as a member of NATO would be those of her allies. The only thing supporting the thesis that Serbia would be compelled to make more concessions as a NATO member is the fact that, as a full member of the Alliance, it would have influence on a much wider range of security decisions, which is, in effect, a double-edged sword. More precisely, with NATO membership the possibility of pressuring Serbia would increase, but so would her influence on actual security developments.

The foreign-policy analysis of costs and benefits in the event of Serbia's entry of NATO must include its relations with Russia. Namely, Russia has thus far been opposed to any expansion of the Alliance. According to Vladimir Branovsky, one of the reasons for that is the fact that Russia still perceives NATO as a possible challenge to Russia's security interests,¹⁶ followed by another, namely "Moscow's wish to prevent the central security role in Europe being played by a structure to which Russia does not and will not have direct access". Russia has demonstrated strong sensitivity when former post socialist countries joined the Alliance, especially those who had previously been part of the Soviet Union. Still, there is no record of a more drastic aggravation of relations between Russia and these states.¹⁷

In geostrategic terms Serbia is certainly less important to Russia than the states in its immediate surroundings and a geostrategically motivated opposition of Russia to Serbia's NATO membership (with Serbia being geostrategically "surrounded") would be far smaller. As for economic cooperation, the Serbian Chamber of Commerce data show that during the first eight months of 2006 Russia imported 195.7 million dollars worth of goods from Serbia and exported 1423.7. This structure within this import/export ratio is also an important indicator, especially the fact that close to 85% per cent of Serbia's imports from Russia are energy products (oil and gas). Russia is one of the most important foreign trade partners to Serbia (ranking first or second), which supports the thesis that an aggravation of relations with Russia could be seriously damaging for the Serbian economy. The specific importance Serbia has for Russia is seen in the problem of the future status of KiM, which is where the interests of the two states apparently coincide. Russian support to Serbia's diplomatic efforts aimed at preserving its state borders is motivated by its own interests in relation to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,¹⁸ i.e. Russian interests for peace and stability on its own borders that would be endangered by the struggle for or actual independence of these two instable areas. Another major foreign policy

¹⁶ Baranovsky, V. (2001), NATO enlargement: Russia's attitudes, Paper for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels.

¹⁷ According to an article by Made, V. (2006) Estonian conception of foreign policy and international relations. Estonia's entry into NATO officially stopped eliciting Russian resistance with the Arrival of Vladimir Putin in power.

¹⁸ For more see Radoman, J. (2006) Future Kosovo status - Precedent or universal solution, WBSO, no. 3.



activity of Russia over the past months has to do with the missile shield the USA intends to install in the Czech Republic and Poland.¹⁹ In view of the tense relations between Russia and the USA, and Russia and NATO, there are grounds for concern that Serbia would find it more difficult to attain its interests with the Russian Federation if it became a member of the Alliance thus getting still closer to the USA.

Possible foreign policy gains from Serbia's NATO membership

Risks are not the only thing Serbia may expect from its NATO membership. Full membership of the Alliance also has its advantages. If it were embraced by NATO Serbia would obtain a powerful protector since, according to the Washington Treaty, any attack on an Alliance's member shall be deemed to constitute an attack on the Alliance itself. In addition, participation in the Alliance's activities is one of the largest advantages of its membership. The already mentioned consensual type of decision-making, in addition to increasing the possibility for pressuring its member states, proportionally increases their influence on the negotiating processes and decision-making in security and defence areas. Concern that decisions taken by NATO solely depend on the will of US officials is exaggerated, as best illustrated by the fact that not even the USA succeeded in having its way in NATO due to the powerful opposition of several members, especially France, Germany and Canada to support the use of force against Iraq in 2003.²⁰

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council enables partner states active participation in the debate on a large number of security topics. A quality step forward for Serbia's participation in political fora of that kind has been made with its admission to the Pfp. Having secured itself a place at this Council's negotiating table, Serbia has also obtained a chance to broach the security topics it considers important and take an active part in the dialogue. However, partner states do not have voting rights. The voting right and a place at a still more important table – that of the North Atlantic Council, where the most important decisions related to NATO and its member countries' interests are taken, would additionally reinforce Serbia's foreign policy position in relation to the Alliance and its members.

An additional argument in favour of reinforcing this foreign policy position is the fact that NATO membership would contribute to Serbia's rapprochement with important actors of global interna-


¹⁹ Rice, Russian Clash Over Kosovo Plan, Missile Shield, *Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/30/AR2007053001952.html> (retrieved, 20 June 2007).

²⁰ US Asks NATO for Indirect Military Support Against Iraq (2003), *The Boston Globe* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030116-iraq02.htm> and EU Allies Unite against Iraq War, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2683409.stm> (retrieved on 20 June 2007).

tional and security relations, primarily the USA. The largest distinction between partner and allied states derives from the increased interdependence of the allies. The principle of sovereignty and the “one state-one vote” rule contribute somewhat to reducing the large differences between the member states and offer the less powerful a possibility to influence security developments in the world more than they could as non-members.

Furthermore, bearing in mind that all states of the Balkans have either joined NATO or set out in that direction (except BiH and Montenegro, both of which have only been admitted to the PfP same as Serbia), one should expect accelerated development of regional cooperation and the overcoming of obstacles in relations between neighbours, resulting from universal NATO membership of all countries of the region.

Conditions for admission to NATO²¹ and the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership²² largely overlap. The largest differences are, in fact, the military criterion²³ anticipated by NATO enlargement study and the greater importance attached to economic criteria by the EU. Due to this overlapping (Figure 1) the above-mentioned references to an unofficial Copenhagen condition are not entirely unfounded.



To the extent that the fulfilment of conditions for admission to NATO simultaneously accounts for the fulfilment of conditions for EU membership and to the extent that this fulfilment is confirmed in the form of invitation to NATO membership, one may expect this confirmation to imply an additional guarantee to the EU that the state concerned is a reliable ally. This certainly does not trigger an automatic process, i.e. it does not mean that admission to NATO would certainly result in admission to the EU, since the approvals of both organizations, in addition to condition fulfilment, mostly

²¹ Defined by NATO enlargement study of 1995.

²² Formulated at the Copenhagen 1993 summit.

²³ For more see Szayna, T. (2000), NATO enlargement 2000-2015, RAND Corporation



depend on the political will of the respective members and the decision they may take.

An aspect where Serbia's gain in the event of NATO membership is certain has to do with her foreign-policy image. Burdened with the legacy of the past, armed conflicts and years-long authoritarian rule, Serbia has yet to win an equal place among the states complying with Europe's value system resting, primarily, on good government and the respect for human rights and democratic standards. Admission to NATO, which declares for the same fundamental system of values, would be a kind of acknowledgement for Serbia and her admission to the circle of European democratic states, and would largely improve her international reputation as well as mark the end of the country's decades-long isolation.

Risk evaluation: to win or not to lose

An analysis of Serbia's possible gains and losses in the foreign policy sphere is a difficult and insufficiently reliable exercise being based on projections and conclusion derived from other countries' experiences, which certainly could not be fully applied to the case of Serbia, in the first place due to the specific nature of its relations with the Alliance. However, we believe that the preliminary analysis presented above still offers sufficient arguments for some conclusions on the foreign-policy aspects of NATO membership. Using a rationalistic approach to the possible foreign-policy benefits and risks, the balance seems to incline towards Serbia's membership in NATO. To put it simply the advantages of membership, leastwise where foreign policy is concerned, largely outnumber the possible risks. However, the conclusion on the overall advantage cannot rest on quantitative and/or rationalistic approaches alone.

The assessment of whether by joining NATO Serbia stands more to gain or to lose in the foreign policy sphere will be the outcome of a normative inference. More precisely the benefits deriving from this membership may best be estimated on the basis of previously established cost-effectiveness criteria, based on the system of values and hierarchy of the above mentioned aspects, i.e. the view on whether it is more important to gain or not to lose something through NATO membership. In view of the subjective nature of the value system, Serbia's attitude on its possible membership in NATO will depend on the value base adopted by its political elite and, more generally, on the system of values at the base of the public opinion in Serbia. ■

Yugoslavia, USA and NATO in the 1950s

Nemanja Milošević

UDK 327(497.1:73)"195"
327.51(497.1)"195"

ABSTRACT: The Serbian state is today a member of the Partnership for Peace and has stepped on the road of further Euro-Atlantic integration. The issue of its membership in NATO is still outstanding. That matter is also closely connected with the country's relations with the USA. Numerous debates unfolding of late in the professional as well as general public revolve around two confronted positions, based on the view that, historically speaking, close relations with the USA and NATO do not exist and a diametrically opposed stand that during the 1950s Yugoslavia was for all intents and purposes a NATO member. This article shall offer clear and well documented facts attempting to prove that neither of these two positions is entirely correct. We shall here analyse the events related to the Yugoslav state relations with the USA and NATO in the 1950-1955 period.

Introductory remarks

The end of the Second World War placed two super powers - the USA and the Soviet Union - on the international scene. Their struggle for supremacy in matters of international politics was marked in the next forty five years of European and world history as a period of the Cold War and the formation of two blocks (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). Under conditions of a bipolar division of power, the fate of formerly large and regional powers, as well as "small" states was turned towards one or the other pole. In this whirlpool between Scylla and Charibdis Yugoslavia followed its route bypassing both blocs, definitely siding with neither. Until the conflict with the Cominform it did not seem that Yugoslavia would in any way leave the "eastern bloc" or establish closer military-political relations with the USA. The 1950s however represent a period of most intensive relations between Yugoslavia, the USA and NATO. At that time, the North Atlantic Alliance was still in the initial period of its creation and an actually

Author is independent researcher from Belgrade



relevant military power in south-eastern Europe would have really been a desirable addition to the NATO camp. On the other hand, the Yugoslav state considered it important to obtain Western support at the time of its conflict with the Soviets, but accession to NATO was bound to result in the change of the internal order of the state, which was naturally inadmissible to the party leadership. In the period of time examined in this paper, both sides had clear political and military-strategic interests to establish and deepen mutual cooperation. For the USA and NATO this cooperation was naturally conducive to Yugoslavia's accession to NATO, while the Yugoslavs believed that closer contacts could only be realized through a Balkan Pact.

Beginnings of Yugoslav-American rapprochement

After a period of almost hostile relations, accompanied by numerous incidents, starting from deprecatory press writings to the downing of American planes over Yugoslavia after WWII, the year 1950 was uncertain for both the Yugoslav and American sides, as well as marked by a completely different quality of relations that were, compared with the period after WWII, distrustful and probing. The rapprochement of the two sides started after the rift between Tito and Stalin, i.e. Yugoslavia and the USSR. The “wedge strategy”, still in the stage of initial theoretical and practical development by circles that created the American foreign policy, could be applied precisely to Yugoslavia. Separation of a respectable military power from the “eastern bloc” represented the backbone of that strategy. The Yugoslav political leadership needed political, economic and military assistance to defend its independent position towards the super powers, especially the Soviet Union, and to ensure the survival of their state. The danger threatening from the Soviet Union was judged as real by both administrations and in itself pointed to the need for cooperation. George Kennan, the famous author of the “Long telegram”,¹ a State Department advisor at that time, concluded that Tito’s “defection” substantially contributed to the success of communists in China. Paul Nitze, who in that same period headed the PPS (*Policy Planning Staff*), believed in a real danger of an armed attack on Yugoslavia due to the Soviet fear that the Chinese could follow

¹ <http://www.coldwarfiles.org/files/Documents/Kennantelegram.pdf>
Keenan's "Long telegram", known in history precisely because he, while serving as a diplomat in Moscow on 22 February 1946 sent an eight thousand word telegram to Washington presenting his ideas as to what kind of policy towards the Soviets should be pursued.

in Tito's footsteps, bearing in mind that they did not receive the expected degree of support from Stalin and the USSR for their own revolution.²

Representatives of the US administration feared that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia may indeed happen, while the Yugoslav statesmen actually kept expecting it to come if not today, than tomorrow. Contacts between the two sides grew increasingly frequent and their mutual talks gained diversity in terms of both their contents and participants.

The American administration did not plan to ask for any political concessions from Yugoslavia, in exchange for assistance, not because of Yugoslavia's principled policy, its reputation and the



respect it commanded, but simply because it was the US interest. Finally, the USA, same as the Yugoslav leadership, had a simple calculation to preserve Yugoslavia just as it was. If Yugoslavia made a definite turn, crossed to the West and, eventually, took the western state and social system, it would blunt the wedge strategy, since in that case, Yugoslavia would no longer be a country snatched from the "eastern bloc" but a fully-fledged western ally and, as such, no longer an attractive model for other countries with communist constitution. At the same time, confrontation of the two super powers reached the peak of tensions. A direct conflict was inconceivable, even for the American and Soviet officials, in view of the catastrophic consequences of a possible atomic war. The famous *Pax Atomica!* But, that is why a war on the peripheries of the two powers' spheres of interests was a high possibility. A similar conclusion is given in NSC-68,

² L. Lis, *Održavanje Tita na površini. Sjedinjene Države, Jugoslavija i hladni rat*, Beograd 2003, p. 122.



rightly inferring that the Soviets do not wish a big war but are prepared to intimidate, spend their resources and test the firmness of the Americans and their allies.³ Soviet expansionism, embodied in an uncompromising Stalin and his rigid attitude towards the West was – according to the analyses of American analysts, politicians and military experts - faced with the dilemma of whether to turn the cutting edge of its attack towards Europe, the Balkans and Yugoslavia or the Far East, southeaster Asia and Korea?

The uncertainty concerning the attack on Yugoslavia was dispelled on Sunday 25 June 1950 when North Korean units crossed the 38th parallel, thus starting the Korean War.⁴ This naturally did not rule out the possibility that the Soviets will start another hot bed of crisis on the European soil, as they did in Asia. The assumptions of the CIA and PPS analysts rested on the premise that the attack in Korea was the Soviet overture to a more extensive war, although Kennan dismissed this assumption. The circles of the US foreign policy decision makers divided along two lines, one of which was headed by Kennan who supported the thesis that the Korean war was a limited conflict the Soviets would not expand any further, and the other by Acheson (who had the majority support in the Department of State and the General Staff), who believed that similar conflicts should be expected in Western Germany and Yugoslavia.⁵ This turn of events made the reinforcement of NATO a priority task for the American administration. Admission of West Germany, Greece and Turkey was presented as the most important task and entrusted to the new NATO commander, General Eisenhower.⁶ From that time onwards the American administration did not see Yugoslavia only as a model for the application of the “wedge strategy” but also as part of a strategic defence of Europe from a Soviet invasion.

American assistance to Yugoslavia was increasingly based on strategic and military requirements. Appearing before the Congress the US administration explained its assistance proposal in terms of direct interests of the USA and their allies in Western Europe, as well as Greece and Turkey, and pointed out that the Alliance’s countries had agreed to provide the assistance, considering the defence ability of Yugoslavia vital for the security of the North Atlantic area. Opponents of the assistance in the Congress who condemned the policy of giving concessions to Tito’s regime, for the first time broached the idea of requesting Yugoslavia to join NATO.⁷ Meanwhile, the western allies in their talks discussed a tripartite programme of possible military assistance to Yugoslavia. Harmonization of the allies’ views was slow and political issues at hand controversial, which is

³At: http://www.coldwarfiles.org/files/Documents/NSC_68.pdf

⁴ D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955*, Zagreb 1988, p.160.

⁵ L. Lis, *op.cit.*, p. 127, D. Bekić, *op.cit.*, p.168.

⁶ L. Lis, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

⁷ Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (A JBT), Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije (KMJ), I-3-b/789, Marjan Savišek, *Uloga vojne pomoći u spoljnoj politici SAD*, Beograd, 1963, p. 36.

why the representatives of the US government realized that they have to mount an independent political action. Still, in early October the first meeting of the tripartite commission for military assistance was held in Washington. The Americans demonstrated their readiness to deliver to Yugoslavia large quantities of arms and equipment free of charge and to receive a Yugoslav officer who would explain and negotiate the military and technical details.

Yugoslav-American negotiations on military assistance

Vladimir Velebit, a member of the negotiating team sent to work out the agreement of the World Bank to finance several economic projects met Black, as well as a number of American politicians and intelligence men, including president Truman's foreign policy advisor Averell Harriman, deputy chief of the PPS Robert Joyce, deputy director of CIA Frederick Reinhardt and others, and broached the issue of a possibility to obtain free military assistance from the USA.⁸ Following Velebit's return, a meeting was called of the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) highest leadership comprising Tito, Kardelj, Ranković, Gošnjak and the chief of staff Koča Popović, who decided to draw up a list of the required war material. The decision was confirmed at a session of the LCY Central Committee Politburo. The meeting elected Koča Popović, chief of general staff at that time, to act as the Yugoslav representative.⁹ The CIA-developed evaluation solicited by the US administration in 1951 stressed that an attack of Soviet satellites on Yugoslavia was a serious possibility and that high Yugoslav officers were concerned over the movements of troops towards the Yugoslav border with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.¹⁰ An attack of this kind could endanger Yugoslavia's independence and the administration found it inadmissible. In early 1951, Yugoslavia actually started preparations, as if a war was impending and, in addition to military measures, the government micro-filmed the archived and other documents and stored them in secret caves in the central part of the country.¹¹

Despite the clear position of the American administration that Yugoslav "defection" from the Soviet Union should be supported, the crucial impetus to finally take the view that this assistance, in addition to its military part, must be equally political and economic, came from a conversation between president Truman and the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe gener-

⁸ I. Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951-1958*, 28-34, Beograd, 2005, MSc. Paper at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade; D. Bekić, *op.cit.*, pp. 207-209, Bojan B. Dimitrijević, *Jugoslavija i NATO (1951-1957)*, Beograd 2003, p.16.

⁹ Lorejn Lis, *op. cit.*, 142-143. I. Laković, *op.cit.*, p. 34, D. Bekić, *op.cit.*, pp. 193-194, 232-233, B. Dimitrijević, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁰ http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_foja_yugoslavia.html, National Intelligence Council, CIA Historical Review Program Release in full: NIE 29, *Probability of an invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951*.

¹¹ L.Lis, *op.cit.*, p. 143-144.



al Dwight Eisenhower. In a very concise manner, guided by the basic postulates of the American geopolitical thought, the General conceived the defence of Europe by comparing it with a bottle, the neck of which - Western Europe – was surrounded on all sides by seas controlled by the Americans who concentrate large naval and air forces on the north of Europe (Denmark, Norway) and in the Mediterranean. He, therefore, believed that it was necessary to give arms to the Turks and Yugoslavs. In line with his vision of Yugoslavia's strategic role, the embargo on the delivery of strategic material to Yugoslavia was lifted on 2 February. When, in early February, V. Velebit came to learn the response of the State Department to the list made in Belgrade and submitted by him, he was given a catalogue of available material.¹² In March that year President Truman endorsed the NSC18/6, which anticipated a more active role of the USA and NATO in sustaining Yugoslavia's independence. In mid-April president Truman approved assistance to Yugoslavia based on the Act on mutual defence assistance. The agreement was concluded by means of an exchange of notes.¹³ In mid-May, general Popović arrived in Washington with his wife Lena. He did not travel incognito but under his full name, Konstantin. However, he stated that the reason for his travel was personal –to visit ambassador V. Popović. The Americans thus concluded that the Yugoslavs do not wish to give this issue too much publicity.¹⁴ General Popović used his visit to Washington for a conference with general Edelman and talks with other representatives of the US administration. In his talks with A. Harriman, American president's foreign policy advisor, Popović said he had expected the talks to have a wider basis in terms of defining the military political situation in the region and the relation between the level of danger for Yugoslavia and the USA readiness to help. A. Harriman responded that the Yugoslav representatives could not expect the quality of their relations with the USA to equal that of Great Britain or France, due to the fact that Yugoslavia was not a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Responding to this clear allusion ambassador Popović said that Yugoslavia's accession to NATO would be in contravention with the overall interest to preserve peace in the region and that precisely the Yugoslav non-accession to either of the blocks had substantially contributed to fighting the aggression. Harriman expressed his understanding of the Yugoslav positions, but said they must realize that the American concept of joint defence from aggression in Europe is the system of collective security, as the

¹² D. Bekić, *op.cit.*, p. 253-255.

¹³ L. Lis, str. 147-150; A JBT, KMJ, I-3-b/800.

¹⁴ Vojni arhiv (VA), GŠ-2, k 14, f 7, rb 1/1; L. Lis, *op.cit.*, p. 150; I. Laković, *op.cit.*, p. 38, B. Dimitrijević, *op.cit.*, p. 17, D. Bekić *op.cit.*, p. 282.

Atlantic Alliance clearly demonstrates, and that a form of a collective contract would be required for reasons of military nature.¹⁵ General Popović also spoke with the US chief of staff General Omar Bradley and the secretary of state D. Acheson. He went to see the state secretary immediately before he left the USA. This half-hour meeting, which was more of a courtesy call, brought nothing new. Both sides repeated the positions they had during military talks, although general Popović did ask why the talks had not been of a wider scope and said that he thought it too early to establish a major American military mission and organize a technical conference on the Yugoslav soil.¹⁶ Following his return from the USA on 10 June 1951, general Popović met NATO commander general D. Eisenhower at the American embassy in Paris.¹⁷ Popović told Eisenhower that a consignment of military material had already been dispatched to Yugoslavia and that the second one was under preparation. Eisenhower brought up the possibility of equipment transfer between Yugoslavia and Italy, in view of the crisis with Trieste. Popović readily answered that he saw no obstacles to that. The most interesting question, both due to its directness and substantial importance, was asked by NATO commander and addressed to the Yugoslav chief of staff: “Would the Yugoslav army based on a communist order fight against the Soviet system alongside western capitalism?” Popović explained that the Yugoslav authorities have broken their friendly relations with the Soviets due to the imperialist nature of the Soviet state and that Yugoslav soldiers would fight that aggression together with West-European soldiers. At the same time he dismissed the matter of coordinated military planning with the West prior to the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁸ Eisenhower wrote down in his diary that these talks opened topics beyond the gains anticipated by the wedge strategy. He believed that the problem of European security could be solved by creating the “United States of Europe”, wherein, in addition to the countries belonging to Western Europe at that time, he also saw Western Germany, Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece.¹⁹

The talks in Paris were important primarily because that is when the possibility for joint military engagement of Yugoslav and NATO troops was mentioned. The refusal of the Yugoslav general to undertake harmonization of plans with the North-Atlantic strategists, defined the future thinking of the American planners who sought to develop a mode acceptable to both sides, taking into account Eisenhower’s views on the need to include

¹⁵ A JBT, KMJ, I-3-b/796, *Zabeleška o razgovoru s Averel Harimanom i R. B. Džojksom, članom Policy Planning Staff u State Departmentu, 10 juna 1951 na večeri kod ambasadora V. Popovića*, 198-200.

¹⁶ United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Europe: political and economic developments (in two parts), Volume IV, Part 2 (1951), Yugoslavia, No. 908, *Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 1815-1816; ? ???, ???, I-3-?/796, Zabeleška o razgovoru u State Departmentu kod državnog sekretara, Achesona 18. juna 1951*, 204. Information on talks with general Bradley comes from indirect sources, namely already quoted documents: D. Bekić, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

¹⁷ L. Lis, *op. cit.*, p.152, B. Dimitrijević, *op. cit.*, p. 20, D. Bekić, *op. cit.*, p.302-303. Bekić gives a wrong date for the meeting, as rightly pointed out by B. Dimitrijević.

¹⁸ L. Lis, *op. cit.*, p.152; B. Dimitrijević, *op.cit.*, p. 20-21.

¹⁹ L. Lis, *op. cit.*, p.152-153.



Yugoslavia into a defence system aimed at preserving the necessary security of Europe. During 1951 the American administration approached its most loyal allies, the UK and France, in order to resolutely continue economic assistance to Yugoslavia. At the first tripartite conference held in London in mid-June, the allies even agreed on the percentage of assistance each of them should provide to Yugoslavia. According to this agreement the USA were to share with 65% in the anticipated program of economic aid, followed by the UK with 23% and France with 12%.²⁰

In the second half of the year, Broz used every opportunity, addressing the people on the occasion of celebrations, or in interviews to foreign and domestic press, to present Yugoslavia's relations with the West as partnership. At a celebration of the uprising in Montenegro (13 July) he said the Yugoslav people needed modern armaments, to be obtained with no strings attached. In his speech at the construction site of the Dobož-Banja Luka railway, he repeated that although Yugoslavia received western assistance it did not "sell out", which increased its reputation in the eyes of that same western world even more. Some time later in Užice, he characterized the relations with the West as an agreement "between equals" and pointed out that Yugoslavia freely pursued its independent foreign policy. "We have never wanted to be satellites of Russia and neither shall we be satellites to the West. We want to be an equal member of the international community."

On one occasion, asked by the foreign press what exactly America gained from its military assistance to Yugoslavia, Broz promptly responded that America gained a lot, as did the whole of Europe.²¹

While these talks were going on the US Congress adopted a Mutual Security Act (MSA) and anticipated Mutual Security Programs (MSP) to include diverse military and economic assistance schemes such as the MDAP and ECA. The Act furthermore enabled the expansion of military and economic assistance to NATO member states and any European country the president found of direct importance for the preservation of peace and security in the north Atlantic and the USA. This law formally ended the existence of the Marshall Plan. However, assistance could not be provided to a state which would not agree to help the promotion of international understanding and preservation of peace and would not undertake all measures to develop its own defence capacities. In order to make Yugoslavia eligible for military assistance, the Department of State requested the incorporation of the

²⁰ United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Europe: political and economic developments (in two parts), Volume IV, Part 2 (1951), Yugoslavia, No. 906, *Final Report of the Tripartite Official Conversations Concerning Economic Aid to Yugoslavia, 1802-1814*.

²¹ B. Dimitrijević, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; J.B. Tito, *Govori i članci*, knj.VI, pp. 48, 151-152, 164-165, 248-249.

American-Yugoslav military assistance agreement into the text of this law prior to its adoption.²²

During the visit of the US General Collins to Yugoslavia, the strategic importance of Ljubljana gate for the Americans, as well as for NATO, was clearly emphasized. This visit left three questions outstanding – Yugoslavia's support to NATO defence plans, expansion of western assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of war and Yugoslav needs for assistance in creating a respectable air force. John Campbell said he believed the Yugoslavs never really intended to use the military material obtained only for the Alliance's defence of the Ljubljana gate.²³ This fact notwithstanding, on 14 November 1951 the Agreement on military assistance between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the US was signed by Marshal Tito and the US ambassador to Yugoslavia Allen.

Balkan pact instead of NATO

In early 1952 the Yugoslav press published that the country had overcome the consequences of the Cominform blockade owing to its links with the West, that it was an esteemed and respected member of the United Nations and contributed to the western collective security system.²⁴ Yugoslavia managed to survive under the threat of the Soviet Union and J.V. Stalin's rage, but her resistance did not attain the very goal that prompted the American decision makers to conclude that it would be useful for the USA to support the resistance of the Yugoslav communists, namely the successful implementation of the wedge strategy, bearing in mind that not a single "satellite" in the eastern bloc followed in the steps of Yugoslav dissidence. That meant that the US administration had to turn towards the second best gain from Yugoslav "dissidence", namely the completion of the "strategic wall" towards the Soviet Union, the main pillars of which were to be Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Western Germany. Accession, or at least rapprochement to NATO was a priority in the next period of Yugoslav- American military and political relations. In contrast to the Truman administration which primarily sought to attain clear benefits using the wedge strategy, that of Eisenhower was more concerned with luring Yugoslavia into joining NATO.

Therefore, the resources sent to Yugoslavia were intended as a catalyst for Yugoslav integration into a series of strategic negotiations leading to firmer links with NATO and the creation of a

²² A JBT, KMJ, I-3-b/800; L. Lis, *op. cit.*, p. 154; M. Savišek, *Uloga vojne pomoći u spoljnoj politici SAD*, Beograd 1963p.35; B. Dimitrijević, *op. cit.*, p. 36-37.

²³ L.Lis, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁴ L.Lis, *op. cit.*, p. 160.



joint defence concept. NATO military experts already in 1951 considered the possibility of defending Western Europe in the event of an attack from the east, even before Greece and Turkey officially joined the Alliance. That is why their accession to NATO was necessary, since if “an attacker came in possession of the Mediterranean area”, the most important mainstays for Europe’s defence would have been lost. We have found this same position with General Eisenhower in the previous chapter. NATO strategists believed it was important to provide Yugoslavia guarantees for its security, although they did not reckon with its membership of the Alliance.²⁵ The Yugoslav leadership sought reliance in the West fearing possible attacks by the USSR and its allies, and tried to obtain financial and military support to deter these attacks without at the same time assuming any obligations with respect to NATO. In other words, the prevailing view considered it useful to conclude certain arrangements that would indirectly incorporate the country into the western defence system, and simultaneously preserve the maximum of foreign-policy and military-defence independence. The action aiming to attain that objective developed in two directions: towards the conclusion of a regional military political alliance with Greece and Turkey and towards joint strategic planning, coordinated military action and NATO logistic support in case of an aggression on Yugoslavia.²⁶

In early July 1952, generals Edelman and Olmsted arrived in Belgrade with an officially proclaimed objective to learn about the Yugoslav military requirements and the possibilities of the country’s military industry. A conference with American generals took place from 7-13 July and was, on the Yugoslav side, attended by generals Peko Dapčević, Danilo Lekić, Mile Kilibarda, Miloš Šumonja and Franc Poglajen. Deputy chief of staff general Dapčević welcomed the guests and pointed out that Edelman and Olmsted were the first US generals who understood the need to help the Yugoslav Army and expressed his hopes that the visit would deepen the relations that kept improving since General Collins’ visit. The Yugoslav army is the first echelon facing the aggression threatening from the east, believed Dapčević, and those who give it arms may rest assured that it would be properly used. Edelman expressed his appreciation of the warm welcome and noted that it was a good thing they had a meeting with marshal Tito scheduled for tomorrow, expecting the talks to be useful for both sides. Despite the US engagement in Korea and Indochina, which used up large resources from the military budg-

²⁵ A JBT, KPR I -4/3, *Strateška situacija snaga Atlantskog pakta.*

²⁶ D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, Zagreb, 1988, 414.

et, Yugoslavia will be the first to obtain assistance in case of an aggression. As for the program, they had to manage within the framework of funds placed at Yugoslav disposal by the highest bodies of the American state.²⁷ During their talks with Tito they expressed the American intention to realize the appropriated assistance with the delivery of 200 tanks, while Yugoslavia was expected to deploy the forces so armed in the north-western part of the country, so as to make them available for the defence of Ljubljana gate and northern Italy in the event of a Soviet aggression. Tito himself made a positive move stressing that the time had come for talks to agree on the modalities of joint defence and the best use of the existing military capacities. The American generals had a series of meetings with the JNA general staff where they formulated an "Additional program of military assistance for 1952", which partly removed the largest deficiencies of the previous arrangements.²⁸ At the same time the US assistant defence secretary Frank Nash visiting Josip Broz hinted at additional military assistance if Yugoslavia established close cooperation with NATO. Tito was very grateful for the assistance given, but said that he had no intention of sharing his defence plans with NATO, although he did not object British and French participation in military contacts or talks on closer cooperation with Greece and Turkey.²⁹ In early 1953 already, more intensive communication between Yugoslavia Greece and Turkey was established with active participation of NATO, the USA and other western countries.³⁰ NATO military circles were concerned that a tripartite pact would do more to distance Greece and Turkey from NATO than to bring Yugoslavia closer to it.³¹ What the West really cared about were the modalities of linking the Balkan pact with NATO. Thus the US secretary of state Dulles visited Turkey, the closest US ally in the Balkans.³² Furthermore, the regular NATO session in April and May 1953 discussed the Balkan pact. A sub-commission of the political council was given the task to examine whether the tripartite cooperation was at variance with NATO interests, and concluded that it should still be tolerated without however, making an official public statement to that effect, since that was bound to damage NATO's interests. The Americans and the British already had different views on the Yugoslav role. The Americans believed that it should be viewed as a military factor enabling the continuity of the front towards the eastern block, while the British underlined the Yugoslav role in separating the satellite countries from the USSR. Most member countries on

²⁷ VA, GŠ-2, k 14, f 9, 1/1.

²⁸ VA, GŠ-2, k 14, f 9, 1/58.

²⁹ United States Department of State. Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII, 1952-1954, No. 645, *The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, 1297-1298*; L.Lis, *op. cit.*, p. 163-164.

³⁰ VA, GŠ JNA, Sedmo odeljenje, k 374, f 1, eksp. br. 84 – Military envoy in Washington Lekić reported to the general staff that he had talks on the harmonization of defence plans of Yugoslavia with the basic plans of NATO, as well as Greece and Turkey, but that the whole thing required more time, since they were all NATO members, except Yugoslavia, although it did not mean that the western powers wanted or pressured Yugoslavia to join NATO; D. Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955*, Beograd, 2000, 76.

³¹ VA, GŠ JNA, Sedmo odeljenje, k 374, f 1, eks. br. 220. The Americans warned the Greeks that they should not hurry with the conclusion of a military pact for two reasons: first, it would create them (the Americans) difficulties in Italy and politically reinforce the position of Yugoslavia and, secondly, once this arrangement was made, any pressure on Yugoslavia to join NATO would be superfluous because NATO would undertake obligations indirectly through the Greeks and Turks, which was the best solution for Yugoslavia (VA, Sedmo odeljenje GŠ JNA, k 374, f 1, eks. br. 199)

³² D. Bekić, *op. cit.*, 508.



NATO's political committee believed that Yugoslavia would join the Atlantic Treaty and that the Tripartite Agreement was only a roundabout way to get there.³³ In effect, NATO gave an unofficial agreement to continue military cooperation with Yugoslavia. In early 1954 Yugoslav military attaché in Athens Vojvodić reported that in his talks with the high military representatives of Greece he learned of American's open disagreement with the policy of regional pacts. They attached more importance to bilateral agreements such as the one they had with Greece, and even placed the policy of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance second, stressing the Trieste problem as the largest obstacle for the conclusion of a military arrangement between three Balkan countries.³⁴ But, since a high degree of agreement on all disputable issues was achieved on 31 May 1954 the USA, UK and Yugoslavia signed an agreement solving the problem of Trieste. The Trieste zone was not *de jure* abolished by the agreement, but was *de facto*, divided between Yugoslavia and Italy. Governments of the USA and the UK undertook to make a statement not to support anyone's territorial aspirations, after the agreement was also signed by Italy. It was anticipated that France should join this statement, too. Finally, with the adoption of a memorandum of understanding between Yugoslavia, USA, UK and Italy on 5 October 1954, the Trieste problem was "taken off" the agenda.³⁵

Contours of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation

At the same time, ever since Stalin's death until early 1955, the new Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev tried to normalize relations with the Yugoslav state and party leadership. Tito's voyage to India and Burma in late 1954 testified to the beginning of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. All these facts worried the American representatives. On January 27 1955 Aleš Bebler told the American ambassador Riddlberger that the Yugoslav government agreed with the American initiative to negotiate cooperation with NATO. The western powers responded with an Aide memoire of February 10, proposing to hold consultations between Yugoslavia and representatives of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). However, this open approach of the western powers was not received well by the Yugoslav leadership. Koča Popović told Riddleberger that Yugoslavia's rapprochement with NATO was out of question and

³³ VA, GŠ JNA, k 374, Sedmo odeljenje f 1, eksp. br. 835 i eksp. br. 903.

³⁴ VA, GŠ JNA, Sedmo odeljenje k 375, f 1, eksp. br. 24.

³⁵ D. Bogetić, *op.cit.*, p. 140-141; D. Bekić, *op. cit.*, 652; ed. John C. Campbell, *Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954. An appraisal by the Five Participants*, p.20.

as for cooperation, a technical conference could be arranged. This kind of refusal preceded by trade agreements with eastern countries, recognition of the People's Republic of China and the support to its requests to join Formosa (Taiwan) to the mainland, indicated the West that the Yugoslav foreign policy was gradually moving towards neutrality.³⁶ The visit of American admiral Cassady to Josip Broz in late March was intended to confirm or deny what the West interpreted as a new foreign policy orientation. The motive for the visit was the hostile attitude of the Yugoslav administration towards the US military mission headed by General Haynes. Cassady proposed two joint military exercises – naval and combined manoeuvres of the fleet and land forces. Tito refused the former proposals saying that an exercise of the type had already been agreed with the British and entirely dismissed the latter, on political grounds, reducible to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership believed that the Soviets had abandoned their aggressive policy, or had been gradually doing that from the time of Stalin's death.³⁷

Even before these talks one could note that the year 1955 was a turning point for the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. It was announced by Tito having returned from a trip to southern Asia, in a speech to the people of Rijeka. He said that “we wish friendship with all countries – those in the West as well as those on the East. I think that this road is the only right one if we want mankind not to fear the danger of a new war ever again...”³⁸ Decreasing interest in a Balkan pact from the Yugoslav side, additionally affected by antagonisms between Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus, clearly revealed the Yugoslav tendency to “pull out” of closer military arrangements with the West.³⁹

In the talks with American and British representatives that ensued during the following months the Yugoslav leaders maintained that it was not the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation that had changed but rather the situation in the world, that Yugoslav foreign policy commitment remained the same – namely struggle for peace, implying cooperation with all who supported the preservation of peace in the world and worked towards that end. Military talks with the Western powers were now out of question for the Yugoslav state leadership. In a conversation with western diplomats Tito once said that if Yugoslavia was made to choose between talks with NATO and discontinuance of assistance it would opt for the latter.

³⁶ D. Bogetić, *op. cit.*, p..192.

³⁷ Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova (DA MSP), PA, st. pov, 1955., f-2,214. *Zabeleška o prijemu admirala Kasadjia Predsedniku, na Brionima 29.marta 1955.godine*; D. Bekić, *op. cit.*, p..741.

³⁸ J.B.Tito, *op. cit.*, p.,knj.X, str.84.

³⁹ More on the end of Balkan pact functioning see in: D. Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad...*, pp. 232-237; T. Lečić, *Uzroci krize u funkcionisanju Balkanskog saveza*, saopštenje sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa *Balkanski pakt 1953/1954 održanom u Beogradu novembra 2005.*



When it was finally released that a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev would visit Belgrade in late May, the information caused a lot of anxiety among the diplomatic representatives of the USA, UK, France, Greece and Turkey in Belgrade. The Yugoslav foreign minister received them all and briefly informed them about the history of normalization of relations and the facts related to the visit itself. In his explanation to foreign diplomats he pointed out that this was not a change of the Yugoslav foreign policy, but that the visit represented the victory of all peace-loving forces.⁴⁰

The fact that an alliance of Eastern block countries was formed in Warsaw in mid-May could not leave the Americans indifferent to the obvious change in the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation.. Dulles believed that Tito had three possibilities – to form closer links with the West, to pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality or revert to his pre-1948 policy. The American secretary of state thought that Tito would opt for the second possibility.⁴¹ Still there were serious concerns that the Soviets were trying to supplement the only just created military pact with a belt of neutral states from Finland to Yugoslavia that would largely weaken the effect of West Germany's entry into NATO intended to give the North Atlantic Alliance final supremacy over Soviet military power. All Western speculations appearing these days and even weeks were dispelled by the Belgrade Declaration of the Soviet and Yugoslav governments. It clearly revealed that the Soviets came to Belgrade to revert the “renegade” Belgrade to the Eastern block, while the Yugoslavs sought the confirmation of their independent policy in both ideological and political sense. The Declaration was signed on the basis of the Yugoslav concept following Khrushchev's withdrawal of the substantially different Soviet proposal.⁴²

Belgrade declaration had thus partly alleviated the fears of the American administration and western allies but it did not fully neutralize the concern about what could happen in the coming period. Still, this position of Yugoslavia showed the American political planners that they cannot reckon with the possibility of gains in the military political sense, i.e. with the Yugoslav entry into NATO and that it was necessary to focus on the somewhat forgotten benefits that might derive from the wedge strategy implementation. The US representatives and western allies were still more concerned over the news that Tito accepted an invita-

⁴⁰ed. Glennon, John P., United States Department of State Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Central and southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, *Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State*, 650-651; D. Bogetić, *op. cit.*, p. 199-200.

⁴¹ ed. Glennon, John P., United States Department of State Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Central and southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, 645-647.

⁴² D. Bogetić *op. cit.*, p. 205-206.

tion of the Soviet leadership to visit Moscow.⁴³ The Yugoslav-American military cooperation in this period was also blocked, even with respect to the most important deliveries of the American side, i.e. jet aircraft. Still greater shock for Washington was the news that the chief commander of the Yugoslav air force general Zdenko Ulepič was heading a military delegation on a visit to Moscow to negotiate the delivery and licence sale of soviet MIG-15 fighter planes.⁴⁴ In mid-August the US state secretary Dulles informed President Eisenhower that experts no longer saw any future in military assistance to Yugoslavia. Dulles still believed that Tito did not seek to revert under the leadership of Moscow but rather had aspirations to lead a block of non-aligned communist countries.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav political leadership saw a possibility of passing between Scylla and Charibdis exploiting the fact that on the global level the gains of one side were clearly the losses of another. Whether the Yugoslavs were aware of the wedge strategy and the possibility that it would be used on them is not overly important. What does matter for a foreign policy of a country is to have a leadership capable of perceiving the nature of international relations in a specific historical moment and thus clearly estimate its position and then, based on that position, make moves leading to the increased power of the state by adding gains of all the parties who considered it their interest to draw it to their camp. If the Americans were aware that the Yugoslav dissention of 1948 would serve as a practical experiment for the theoretical assumptions of the wedge strategy, so were the Yugoslavs clear that the West did not need an ideological convert but rather an ideological example. Immediately following the rift with the USSR the Yugoslav leadership had to ask itself a question of whether it could preserve the power in the country on the principles built over the past few years, i.e. whether it was possible to safeguard the ideological identity and at the same time protect itself from the Soviets counting on the unconditional assistance of those who until recently were their enemies from the West? Once the question was answered positively, “the throttle was opened” to normalize the relations with the West, primarily the USA and then also to achieve a rapprochement that will, in the future, enable a

⁴³ D. Bogetić, *op. cit.*, p.,213-218.

⁴⁴ DA MSP, PA, st.pov., 1955, f-4, 332.



partnership and, perhaps, alliance. As the years went by it became clear that no one from the eastern bloc would follow the Yugoslav example in an equally drastic way, and the appetites of the American side increased in the sense that implied specific steps towards a military political partnership. That was a new challenge for the Yugoslav political elite. That challenge was bridged in a remarkably resourceful diplomatic way: instead of joining NATO Yugoslavia formed a military political pact with two NATO member countries and thus remained sufficiently close/far from siding with either pole. This did not mean that the Yugoslav leadership was not faced with serious pressures, such as the Trieste problem, but the art of sailing the ship through a stormy sea of complicated international relations was manifested by the Yugoslav leadership towards the end of 1954 when it successfully dealt with the Trieste crisis and signed the military pact with Greece and Turkey. In this way, I dare say, Yugoslavia acquired complete freedom in conducting and creating its foreign policy. This bold statement is supported by pictures of the visit by the Soviet leader Khrushchev and US secretary of State Dulles in 1955. These pictures clearly show that the USA and the USSR, the only two superpowers in the world, actually competed for the favours of the Yugoslav leadership. Tito's voyage to India and Burma in 1954 and subsequent development of close relations with the Egyptian leader Nasser, represented the guidelines of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation which implied equidistance from both blocks, with the emphasis on developing a leading position in a movement that will yet emerge – one of the non-aligned countries. The Yugoslav political elite did not, in the period covered by this paper, have an intention to join the Alliance and still less to embrace the western values and become a full-fledged factor of the system we could call Western civilization. For the Yugoslavs, these values were backward and retrograde, and above all imperialist, just as the ones of the Soviets. But, in contrast to the relations towards the West the Yugoslavs believed that only the Soviet leadership was imperialistic, and still shared the values that were the heritage of the Russian and Soviet elite. The Yugoslav state in the mid-1950s managed to use great diplomatic skill, and, counting on sharp block divisions which ensured that poor relations with one side spelled good relations with another, managed to preserve an independent position and ensure its survival. The survival of the state was the supreme national interest, the constant and unchangeable value all Yugoslav political lead-

ers were attached to. Ideology was irrelevant in the relations of the two countries until the time that the Yugoslavs achieved what mattered to them most – the survival of the state. This achievement was largely realized due to the economic and military assistance provided by the USA. In this way Yugoslavia increased its own hard, as well as soft power, having emerged out of the isolation it found itself in immediately following the break with the Cominform. The hard power, embodied in substantial military assistance in theoretical real politics frameworks meant that the main principle of international policy – self-help – was achieved. Waltz believed that the power of the state may be increased in two ways – by means of armament in internal policy and, in foreign policy, by making alliances that last as long as the state has an interest for participation. Yugoslavia did both. It acquired arms, modernized its army, joined the Balkan alliance to bridge the pressure to enter NATO. When in 1954 Yugoslavia found itself in a highly favourable international position it could turn towards increasing soft power. Historical facts show that the road it started to clear in 1955 led Yugoslavia into the position of a respected state in international politics. That reputation was based on a respectable military force and a large quantity of soft power. Still, it is important to note that at the moment when the survival of the state was secured ideology once gain resumed an essential role. For the Yugoslav state the road towards the West was not the headway proclaimed as its objective but a sideway on route to creating a special socialist system embodied in self-management. The Americans have only partly attained what they wanted with Yugoslavia. The momentary success in implementing the Wedge strategy and “pulling” an important regional actor from the Soviet orbit. However, in a military strategic sense the American foreign policy failed on the issue of Yugoslavia. This scenario largely contributed to increasing the number of Yugoslavia’s enemies in the US Congress and Senate and in the US foreign policy in general. Using a superpower without concrete and “tangible” concessions has never been a recommended course of action in foreign policy. It may be yet another factor that cannot be bypassed in considering Serbia’s present day position in international relations. ■



Institution-building in the context of Euroatlantic integration

Jelena Unijat

UDK 355.02(497.11)"2004/2007"
327.51(497.11)"2004/2007"

IN THE first article of the agreement by which the *Partnership Action Plan in Defence Institution Building* was adopted it is stated that efficient institutions of defense are under the effective civil and democratic control of fundamental significance for establishing international security cooperation.¹ The process of institution building includes the introduction of legal regulations relevant for the establishment and functioning of institutions, and the building of good practice and overcoming of practical problems. Practical problems are overcome by way of investing in staff trainings, personnel strengthening and building of efficient administration. In Serbia, the transformation of old and introduction of new institutions related to the reform of the defence system can be done in keeping with the process of NATO accession, or independently, without establishing contact with Euroatlantic integration.

The issues Serbia has to face are similar to those experienced by the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the process of NATO accession.² The political will and the will of the citizens are insufficient: to overcome these setbacks, a few more steps need to be made. Above all, it is necessary to enable the exchange of information with NATO, which is one of the prerequisites for cooperation even today when we are a member country of Partnership for Peace. Furthermore, it is necessary to reach the satisfactory level of civil-military relations in Serbia. The tradition of civil, but not democratic control of the armed forces in Serbia makes the task particularly difficult. Finally, obsolete laws on military and defence are to be rescinded and new laws in keeping with the new roles of the military are to be passed.

Using this text we will show recent arrangements and changes which are made in correlation with NATO standards – so as to achieve democratic and civil-military relations in Serbia. At the same time we will prove that these changes contribute to the establish-

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

¹ NATO Online Library. 2004. Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b040807e.htm>. (29. jun 2007.)

² It refers to the problems of inadequate constitutions, laws, obsolete security and defense capacities, outmoded military doctrines and undeveloped mechanisms of democratic civil control of armed forces in: Willem, Donnelly Christopher: Security sector reform and NATO enlargement: Success through standardisation of standards?, DCAF, 2003.

ment of Serbia as a legal state, regardless of whether we shall go the way of Euroatlantic integration or not. Finally, it is worth mentioning that a list of institutions already built which we present in this text as well as the steps we recommend for the forthcoming period is not an exhaustive list of tasks for Serbia on its path to Euroatlantic integration but only those which the author regards as key at this very moment.

What has been done so far?

Six months of procrastination to form the new Government of Serbia have resulted in the fact that in 2007 little has been done in the process of Euroatlantic integration. Still, Serbia had, even before membership in the Partnership for Peace, joined certain institutional arrangements of NATO. The structure of the respective Ministry has undergone certain changes as well. On 26 May 2004 at the Supreme Defence Council a new organizational structure of Ministry of Defence was adopted. The General Staff of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro became a part of the organizational structure of the Ministry on 6 May 2002 whereas the structure of the General Staff of Serbia and Montenegro was rearranged in keeping with the NATO standards. The military intelligence and Military security agency are excluded from the jurisdiction of the General Staff and were merged with the Ministry. A noticeable progress was made by way of establishing the Service for Public Relations of Ministry of Defence, necessary for the provision of defense system control by the public. The purpose of its work is to inform the citizens by way of the media on the affairs occurring within the defense system and these could be of general interest to the public.

Definite steps have been made by way of ratifying the transit agreement LoC³ and by opening a NATO Liaison Office. The LoC agreement was signed in July and ratified in November 2005 in the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. This agreement at the same time reflects the readiness of a country to sign Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)⁴ which, besides the transit, regulates the position of NATO forces installed in the related area. The NATO Liaison Office, formed in September 2006, is in charge of carrying out the stipulations of the LoC agreement, and it is doing so together with the Operational Centre of the General Staff defence system. The transit agreement refers only to the Balkan countries, so as to ensure the passage of troops where needed, in Kosovo and Metohia. The focal point of the LoC agreement are thus two transit routes, Harold

³ In English , *Line of Communications*

⁴ The first agreement which has regulated this issue and became a model for later agreements, , *Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces* in 1951, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/t/b510619a.htm> (21 June 2007)



and Fitzroy, by way of which the troops are positioned in Kosovo and Metohia with those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this act the whole legal regime of transit is rounded up because before it many international legal instruments were valid. Another document which is to be passed are the Instructions for transit of foreign military troops across Serbian territory. However, LoC implementation is impossible as long as the security agreement is not concluded.

Security agreement about the exchange of information with NATO

Out of three countries which joined the Partnership for Peace last year, only Serbia has neither presented its Presentation Document, nor it concluded the agreement on the exchange of confidential information with NATO, which ensues after this document. In terms of the future cooperation, only the act of accession without the aforementioned documents, has no essential impact.

The reasons for passing the Security Agreement are stated in the White Papers of the Defence⁵ and Strategy of Defence of Union of Serbia and Montenegro.⁶ A particular Registry System deals with all confidential documents in NATO. Consequently each ratifying country of this Agreement is legally bound to set up the Central Registry and Subregistries responsible for the internal distribution of confidential data and the filing of registries⁷ being placed at the level of the Ministry, at the level of sectors and the commanding levels. Depending on the organizational type of the registry, COSMIC Control Officer (CCO) is appointed, i.e. the person who is in charge of the highly confidential information management. For the civil servants to work with the confidential information, they must hold certificates for such assignments, and be acquainted with the consequences of mishandling and nonapplication of the protective measures. Before the commencement of the exchange of confidential information, the Department for NATO security checks whether all the requirements are met in terms of the protection of such information.

The Ministry of Defence, otherwise in charge of these activities, made a draft of the decree referring to the confidential data. This does not seem as adequate solution, because, bearing in mind the importance of this matter, we had better regulate it by legislation and not by bylaws. The National Commission for Information Security would then establish the Central Registry and specialized registries respectively: in the Mission of Serbia with NATO, Serbian Ministry

⁵ White Papers of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Sector, April, 2005., page 25

⁶ Defence Strategy of Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Official Gazette Serbia and Montenegro, No 55/2004.

⁷ We choose our own way, Defence, 1. September 2006

of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, BIA and others, subject to demand.

Only when the Security Agreement on the exchange of security information and on making the conditions for its implementation have been concluded will it be feasible to operationalize further cooperation. In the long run, the harshest consequence of belated signing of the agreement is further postponing of the establishment of the Serbian Mission with the NATO alliance in Brussels. Besides, the delay in passing the Security Agreement precludes the implementation of the transit agreement, and sending our soldiers to partner countries to get education there, holding joint military and police manouvers as well as other activities in the process of Euroatlantic integration.

Establishing democratic civil-military relations in Serbia

One of five additional prerequisites of NATO accession defined in the Study on Enlargement from 1995⁸ is to establish democratic and civil control over the military forces. Civil-military relations were first mentioned in The Constitutional Charter in Article 54 which states that Serbia and Montenegro⁹ possesses the Military which is under the democratic and civil control. However, the legislator went no further. Therefore never have the laws been passed to stipulate who is to control, in which way and in which cases.

The new Constitution of Serbia also does not contain a suitable solution. It contains only one stipulation on civil-democratic control (Article 141), which refers to the Military but not other parts of the security sector. The Defence Strategy which was passed in 2004 mentions this form of control in two places. In the part which deals with the basic premises on the system of defence of Serbia and Montenegro, for the first time it mentions that the defence system is under the civil and democratic control. For the second time, the control obligation is connected to the issue of transparency and control in defence planning and financing. However, of the possibility of the Parliamentary boards carrying out control in charge of defence and security, little or nothing is said on budget and finance inspections. To make matters worse, the proposition of the Strategic Review of the defence contains not a single stipulation on democratic-civil control. To seek a similar stipulation in an obsolete law on defense and military is a silly thing to do.

Since there are grounds in the Constitution of Serbia and the Defence Strategy, it is necessary that the law on democratic and civil

⁸ The basic prerequisite of NATO joining is laid out in Article 10 of 'Atlantic agreement' The study on enlargement mentions another five prerequisites. See NATO. Study on Enlargement, http://www.nato.int/issues/study_on_enlargement/index.html, downloaded: 29.06.2007

⁹ The Constitutional Charter of Confederacy of Serbia and Montenegro, Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, No/21/2003



control be passed, or at least designate an extract for it out of the future law on military. We hold that the law upon its passage must first of all stipulate and determine particular mechanisms of the work of parliamentary committees for defence and security. Furthermore, it must establish the institution and the jurisdiction of ombudsman and military ombudsman and finally, possibilities for internal control.

The Committee for Defence and Security, the first institution on the agenda to undergo reform, is to be divided into sub-committees which would be in charge of the control of the work of the military, police and security services. Since the Committee Members are the delegates who lack the proficiency in supervision and control, additional infrastructure in terms of skilled personnel is needed in the Committees. So as to make the work of the Committee efficient, it is necessary to work out proper regulations, to provide its members accessible information relevant for their work and assign adequate resources. If necessary, the Committee Meetings should be allowed behind closed doors so as to evade the public pressure on their work.¹⁰

The authorities of the ombudsman must be emphasised. He or she would inform the Parliament, the competent Committee, Defense Minister and the Government on relevant facts he or she would come up with in the investigation. Furthermore, the ombudsman would initiate the procedure to assess the constitutionality before the Constitutional Court, she would submit periodical reports to the Parliament, in which he/she would indicate the further steps of possible improvement of the defense legislation. Also, he or she would be entitled to file a criminal suit against the accused persons.

An efficient system of external control of the security services can be done by way of a military ombudsman.¹¹ Potentially, the most significant authority of a military ombudsman towards security services can be that he/she can take off the confidentiality tag from the data gathered during investigation, where they had been proclaimed confidential so as to hide the breaking of law or other regulations. At the same time the military ombudsman deals with the control of constitutionality and legality of the acts passed in the defence system and the protection of human rights of the members of the defence system. Since it does not require huge financial costs and since he/she is not to be a member of any political party, the institution of an ombudsman represents an acceptable form of defence system control. Besides the foreign control, one should mention internal control of the military which can be more efficient since it is done by professionals from military structures. One possibility is that it is done through the work of Inspectorate, at the forefront of

¹⁰ Đurašinić Dragana: Parliamentary control of defense sector Cvijan Vladimir, Reljanović Mario (eds.): A review of legislation of defense system of Republic of Serbia, Institute for comparative law, Belgrade p. 48

¹¹ Reljanović Mario: Democratic civil control of defence system in :ibid., page. 172.

which there would be the general inspector, sub-ordinated to the Defence Ministry.

Further building of civil–military relations involves transparency of the military budget. It is particularly important to regulate the work and competences of budgetary and financial inspection. Government Auditing Institutions (GAI) regulated by the Law should be established as soon as possible. Confidential supplies of the Ministry of Home affairs and Ministry of Defense, where the current level of control is not satisfactory, must be under the vigilant eyes of the Government Auditing Institutions and the assumptions among the general public will cease to exist on what is behind such supplies and who cashes in a lot of capital on them.¹² GAI is legally bound to if it uncovers certain abuse in business doings which indicate that there is a criminal act committed, to list the documentation about it, seize it and inform the authorities about it.¹³ The subjects of the auditing are legally bound to submit all required documents to auditors relevant for the auditing to be carried out, including the confidential data.¹⁴ The authors of the Fundamentals of the Strategy to improve the system of the public acquisitions¹⁵ recommended that a special Committee of the Serbian Parliament be formed which will follow the work of GAI and the control of the public acquisitions. Its members should be auditing, public and tax law, budget system, accounting and public supplies experts as such.

* * *

We find two inferences the key ones. The first one from the NATO point of view the institution building in charge of information exchange is more relevant in order to maintain operational cooperation. Although the conditions for NATO membership are less confidential when it comes to their objectivity and more politically oriented, this one is necessary since it enables the communication with the member countries. The second one, for Serbia and its citizens the building of institutions which would boost the democratic civil control of the armed forces would be of vital importance. Such positive changes, initiated by Atlantic integration, could transform Serbia into a modern country, in which the human rights are respected with the stipulated rights and duties of the authorities and the civil servants in the field of security. By way of the institutional mechanisms mentioned the responsibility at work could be given utmost priority and the citizens of this country will be very well acquainted with all related issues. ■

¹²Auditor only at face value. Clean hands, <http://www.korupcija.org/default.asp?st=c&str=1&lis=1&ci=1528322>, downloaded: 6.11.2006.

¹³ Law on State auditing institution, Official Gazzette, RS, No, "101/2005 i 54/2007, čl. 38

¹⁴ Ibid., art. 36

¹⁵ Department of public acquisitions and OSCE The fundamentals of strategy for public supplies system Belgrade, , 16.06.2006., page 7



Serbs and Albanians

Patrick Hondus, „Can Serbs and Albanians live together“,
WBSO, no. 4, January-March, 2007.

Milorad Timotić

SERBIAN-ALBANIAN relations have, for some years already, drawn the attention of the general as well as scholarly public. The ferocity of mutual hatred, manifested several times during the past decades has prompted scientists and researchers attempt's to trace and explain its roots, in order to help overcome the present state of affairs and establish normal conditions allowing tolerable coexistence in the shared space. That was the principal motive for a London-based independent researcher Patrick Hondus to write his article for the previous edition of West Balkans Security Observer.

An independent researcher predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon political sphere Patrick Hondus seeks to provide the answer to the challenging question of the Balkans: Can Serbs and Albanians live together? To this end he has read a pile of books by various Balkan and world authors. He interpreted this extensive reading and experts findings with the best of intentions, wishing to prove his starting hypothesis that Serbs and Albanians could indeed live together. He thus quotes medieval data on cooperation and inter-marriages, when the relations between Serbs and Albanians were harmonious and mutually beneficial. Invoking the works of Branko Horvat and Miranda Vickers he speaks of numerous blood ties of the time as an important indicator of good relations. Among others he cites Branko Horvat's view that tsar Dušan's mother may have been Albanian and Skenderbeg's Serbian, that one of Skenderbeg's sons married despot Lazar Branković's daughter Jerina. These claims are for the most part true, except the one about tsar Dušan's mother being Albanian. History tells us that the emperor's mother Theodora, the first wife of Stefan Decanski, was a daughter of Bulgarian tsar Smilec, who ruled from 1292 until 1298. (It is odd that the author quoted Branko Horvat who is an economist, rather

*The author is a retired colonel and vice president
of the menaging board of CCMR*

than a historian!) Stefan Decanski married Theodora between 1299 and 1305 and tsar Dusan was the offspring of their marriage. Theodora died in 1322, immediately following Stefan's accession to the Serbian throne.¹

Naturally, these are all details a foreign researcher who may be encountering these problems for the first time cannot be expected to know in depth. The important thing is to point to a few crucial historical events decisive for the present situation of Serbian-Albanian relations. These are: (1) the islamization of most Albanian tribes that assumed more substantial proportions only in the 17 and 18 centuries; (2) the first Serbian uprising of 1804; and the Balkan war of 1912.

By embracing Islam Albanian tribal leaders also converted their tribes and thus ensured them the status of full-fledged subjects of the Ottoman Empire.² Serbs who did not convert to Islam remained disenfranchised *raya*, and that period marks the beginning of a cultural and social distancing of the two ethnic groups, as well as of their mutual animosities growing ever deeper in the course of time.

A large number of Albanians participated in Turkish expeditions against the Serbian rebels from 1804 until the final recognition of its autonomy. These wars against the Serbs in northern Serbia encouraged local Albanian tribal leaders to intensify terror against the Serbs in Kosovo. The events in Serbia suggested the possibility of a similar development in Kosovo, which is why the Albanians kept pressuring the local Serbs and their institutions (in the first place churches and monasteries) attempting to weaken them and force them to move so as to thus prevent a possible uprising and unification with the northern part of Serbia. This terror steadily increased until the end of the 19 century.³

In the 1912 war Serbs annexed Kosovo and Metohija to the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia. There is no doubt that this process was accompanied by some Serbian revanchism against Albanians, as well as by Albanian armed resistance in part of Kosovo and Metohija, and in Western Macedonia, all of which naturally only deepened the existing animosities.

Finally, we should also say that throughout the time of socialist Yugoslavia Serbian population was continuously under the pressure to move out of Kosovo and Metohija, which ultimately resulted in the huge numerical superiority of the Albanian population.

Therefore, in my view, cooperation between the members of the two nations before the islamization of Albanians is clearly irrel-

¹ These details should show young researchers that the quoting of unreliable sources is misleading. Those who seek to arrive at proper conclusions in this matter are referred to the following scientific dissertations: a. Novaković S. (1891) *Hrisovulj cara Stefana Dušana grobu majke mu kraljice Teodore*, Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije no. 9, Beograd.

b. Grujić R.(1926), „Kraljica Teodora mati cara Dušana”, *Glasnik Skopjskog naučnog društva*, no. 1, Skoplje.

c. Malović M.(1979) „Stefan Decanski i Zeta”, *Istorijski zapisi*, no. 41, Titograd.

² See: *Istorija srpskog naroda*, SKZ, Beograd 1993, p.23-41

³ For a detailed description see Bataković T. Dušan (1988), *Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852 – 1912*, Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd.



evant for the present situation of their relations and for the prognosis of their future development alike. That was the time when these nations, Serbs as a whole and the majority of Albanians, belonged to the Orthodox Church, which was the main factor of both cooperation and intermarriages. Furthermore, that was the time when ethnic affiliation was a matter of hardly any concern, as opposed to mutual obligations and alliances, and the fact that emperor Dusan distributed holdings in Greece to Albanians is not revealing of good relations between Serbs and Albanians but only of the reality that he was in Albanian debt for some sort of service which would have merited equal reward had it been rendered by another ally notwithstanding his ethnic affiliation.

At the end, how to answer the question posed at the beginning of this brief comment: Can the Serbs and Albanians live together? Whether to agree with the author of the text and his benevolent conclusion, with all reservations and caution, that in spite of everything we should turn back to the tradition of good relations from medieval times and forget "old hatreds"? A nice, humane and in all respects desirable and worth of praise conclusion. Unfortunately, the social reality in Kosovo and Metohia hardly support it. In case Kosovo gains independence, there is no doubt that perfidious forms of pressure, which Albanians mastered during Turkish rule and Socialist Yugoslavia, against the remnants of Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohia will be resumed until it becomes ethnically cleansed. It is difficult to anticipate any option of survival of Serbs in an independent Kosovo and Metohia. ■

Biometric Systems of Identification

Filip Ejdus, „And God Created Civil Rights: Serbian Resistance to the Introduction of Biometric ID Cards“, *WBSO*, no. 4, January-March, 2007.

Oliver Subotić

THE ARTICLE entitled *And God Created Civil Rights: Serbian Resistance to the Introduction of Biometric ID Cards* written by Filip Ejdus and published in the last issue of *Western Balkans Security Observer* (no.4 January-March 2007) represents an important incentive for the academic debate regarding biometric systems of identification and their social implication. This topic has rarely been discussed in Serbian public from a critical and academic point of view. Articles and attitudes presented by the Ministry of Interior (their arguments abounded in arbitrary statements and mistakes) and other ignorant opponents and commentators in the tabloids usually lacked any critical judgment.

In contrast to all of them, the article written by Ejdus is a methodologically correct way to explore this problematic -introduction, thesis development and conclusion all substantiated with a critical apparatus and bibliography. The author well remarked that the problem of (mis)usage of biometric systems of identification is something that should be assessed from the perspective of liberty and through questioning and undertaking comparative phenomenological analysis. The main novelty introduced with this article is a political analysis of the biometrical project in the Republic of Serbia including also sociological and security related observations. The author is obviously knowledgeable in the field while relying on quite an academic literature for an article of such a size. Special non-academic contribution is a call sent to passive political and NGO circles to join the struggle for information privacy and liberty.

Apart from the appraisal, it is important to mention some shortcomings of the article. Firstly, I want to give comment on a few technical details, most importantly on the claim of the author that the contents of the microchip in Serbian ID cards can be read from

The author of Biometric Systems of Identification: a critical study, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade 2007. (in Serbian)



distance. Unfortunately, the author didn't provide any evidence for this, which could help to identify the source of the mistake. The author was probably led by the fact that contactless microchips exist in some versions of biometric ID cards and electronic passports in the world. Although one can have a presentiment that such microchip could be implemented in the future, one should still be consequent and realistic. The main objection, however, is not technical in nature (because the article is not primarily technical) but relates to the author's assesment of the role played by the Serbian Ortodox Church in the struggle against this project. The author said that the Church reacted primarily for religious reasons, which is only partially correct. Ortodox Christians, confused by connotations with the book of Revelations and possible future totalitarian substratum suitable for total surveillance of citizens, sought the answers from the Church. It was not, however, mentioned in the article that it was the Church which organized the first scientific conferences with the participation not only of the clerics but also information scientists, jurists, sociologists, economists, matematiicians, cryptologists and military experts. Moreover, it wasn't said that the first expert reaction was made on the initiative made by the Church (because of indolence of academic elites and NGO sector) and that the Church was the first to put this problem into the context of individual liberty.

In spite of above mentioned objections, the article is a rare case of a good quality and critical work dealing with this question written by a Serbian author. It will certainly enter into the history of the struggle against information totalitarianism in our region and represents another voice of conscience for a slumbering academic community in Serbia. ■

Whither Russian foreign policy?

Jibladze K. (2007) "Russia's Opposition to Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 5(1):45-51.

Mankoff J. (2007) "Russia and the West: Taking the Longer View", *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(2):123-135.

Jörg Artmann

TALK OF a new ice age and a return to a Cold War atmosphere abounded after recent tensions between Russia and Poland and Estonia. These tensions had been preceded by Western criticism of the Politkovskaya murder and the tough crackdown on the Russian opposition. How serious a rift has arisen between Europe (the West) and Russia? Does it really come as a surprise that liberal, democratic values are not fully shared by Moscow? Kakha Jibladze reviews the tense relations between Georgia and Russia in light of Georgian ambitions to NATO membership and concludes rather pessimistically that there is indeed a difference between Georgia's westward orientation and Russia's new assertiveness which is more reminiscent of Cold War reflexes. Jeffrey Mankoff provides a deeper analysis of Russia's foreign policy motives but comes to the same conclusion: Russia has left the West. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that a new confrontation is at hand. Instead, the policy observable today is an amplification of tendencies visible since the Primakov era, which seeks to re-establish Russia as a great power.

Seeing Russia from the near abroad: the Georgian perspective

Kakha Jibladze's review of the Russian-Georgian relationship focuses on the conflicts surrounding Georgia's quest for NATO membership. His perspective is clearly a geopolitical, strategic one although the article is not explicitly theoretical. Instead, the reader

*Author is a consultant and free-lance foreign policy analyst.
j.artmann-alumni@lse.ac.uk*



is presented with a more narrative overview of policy developments, from Georgia's early attempts to conflict resolution in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which did not yield any specific results¹ to the 2006 Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The author - without providing any convincing evidence - makes this dialogue responsible for Moscow's economic sanctions of September 2006.² Jibladze then moves on to the presentation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia problem, deploring Russia's support for Eduard Kokoiti, elected in November 2006 as leader of the South Ossetia province. Similar to other analysts, he considers Russia's oil and gas reserves as the key reason for the West's inaction over Georgia's problems. He illustrates his point with Georgia's futile attempts to induce a Western condemnation of Russian peace-keeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and further argues - more convincingly - that the leverage of WTO membership negotiations was disabled by Washington's acceptance of eventual Russian WTO membership. Ultimately, Jibladze concludes, productive bilateral relations with Russia are hampered by two distinct political orientations, Georgia's westward orientation and Russia's newly assertive policy in the near abroad which uses Georgia's weak spots Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without further support from NATO member States, this grip on the near abroad will be difficult to overcome.

Less change than meets the eye: adopting a long term view on Russian foreign policy

Is the Georgian example yet another case of a newly assertive, confrontational Russian foreign policy in the near abroad which fends off Western criticism through its oil and gas reserves? Jeffrey Mankoff argues with great circumspection that such a conclusion would be an overreaction. His central argument is that Putin's current actions are based on a foreign policy consensus which had already emerged in the Primakov era. The fundamental component of this policy is not concerned with challenging the West, "but proving that Moscow still matters internationally." What has changed however is the level of autonomy given to the Kremlin through higher oil prices and American embroilment in Iraq. Mankoff's article which also adopts a realist perspective, retraces the evolution of Russian foreign policy priorities from the early Yeltsin era's pro Western line to the more assertive stance adopted by Primakov in

¹ One of the leading analysts of the regional security dynamics observed that "active efforts by the GUUAM subgroup of CIS states [which includes Georgia] to balance Russian security preponderance have been diluted by the disparate objectives and capacities and the geographical dispersal of the countries involved. The GUUAM grouping has not worked effectively as a basis for significant self-sustaining regional security cooperation and has failed to project a regional security identity." Allison R (2004) Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia, *International Affairs* 80(3):463-483.

² These sanctions were imposed after the Georgian government accused Russian officers of espionage.

the second half of the nineties. The leitmotiv which survived into the Putin era is that of a multipolar world order in an otherwise anarchic international system where Russia would be one of the poles. Putin's acceptance of NATO expansion and the Kosovo intervention can be considered as a sign of relative weakness and domestic consolidation.³ Now that higher oil prices have comforted Russia's economic situation, it is more openly using its power to exert geopolitical influence. But this does not mean that Russia seeks a confrontation with the West. Instead, the differences in values both foreign and domestic are now becoming clearer. Overall, Mankoff argues, "a Russia that is sure of itself and of its standing in the world is likely to be a more stable, predictable partner for the West, even if it will not always agree with decisions made in Washington or Brussels." Seen from this perspective, the Georgian tensions with Russia are an inevitable result of a changing geopolitical situation and there is indeed little or no room for Georgia's NATO ambitions.

A stable projection of power?

Both contributions reviewed here base their analysis on realist assumptions to argue that Russia has become stronger and more assertive in its policy towards the West. Meanwhile, the question why this strong Russia presided by a popular president needs to crack down on its domestic opponents remains unanswered. If attention is drawn to more constructivist approaches which focus on Russia's contradictory identity, the question of both the stability and pragmatic orientation of its foreign policy should be evaluated in a more pessimistic light.⁴ ■

³ George Breslauer argues that Putin's presidency is an example of political consolidation with its focus on strengthening the role of the State and the control over concentrations of societal political or economic power. Breslauer GW (2005) *Regimes of Political Consolidation: The Putin Presidency in Soviet and Post-Soviet Perspective*, chapter 3 in Alex Pravda (ed.) *Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective*, Oxford: OUP.

⁴ An example of this pessimist view is Hanson SE (2007) *The future of Russia's weak State authoritarianism*, *East European Politics and Societies* 21(1):67-81.



JNA* from Stalin to NATO

Dimitrijević B. Bojan, (2005), *JNA od Staljina do NATO pakta*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd.

Marko Milošević

THE BOOK *JNA from Stalin to NATO* by Bojan B. Dimitrijević has seen the broad daylight in 2005 and it represents a part of the author's doctoral thesis together with the book *Yugoslav Army 1945-1954*.

The main topic of the book is a radical turnover in the foreign policy of SFR Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union and its satelittes, to the countries of NATO pact. The author maintains that the turnover was a matter of tactics not strategy and this thesis is upheld by the insights which suggest that SFRY sought weapons and guarantees of military support from the Western countries, whereas in Yugoslavia there was never a profound wish to join NATO. The reason for nonexistent intentions to join NATO was, according to the author, that fear of the elite that the monopoly of the Communist Party would be imperiled. The genesis of these relations is delineated through three thematic units of the book.

In chronological terms, the relations are depicted in chapters: In rank of National Democracy and Yugoslav Military Deployment, and Under the Protection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1951-1958. The book deals with the early Soviet influence upon the then Yugoslav Army, touching on the process of independence during the crisis with USSR, to the cooperation with the Western countries, ending in the progressive description of the relations between Yugoslavia and NATO reaching freezing point.

It is worth mentioning that this book was made by using a very extensive bibliography. Most bibliographical units and sources are from this country, though there are some foreign sources. During the analysis of the reports of military press about the conflict in 1948, besides the domestic military media, the author did research the Bulgarian military newspapers. The unavailability of the materi-

The author works as research fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

* Yugoslav Peoples' Army

al and lack of proficiency in the language are the likely causes of the scarce usage of a broad original reading in other foreign languages. The part which deals with the relations with the West is covered by the foreign sources in English as well. The rest of the material was systematically gathered in the archives of the institutions and military units, by word of mouth, various documents, military journals, scientific articles and monographs. The problem with the sources which the author uses is that the material is in Bulgarian, and thus due to its similarity with the Serbian language is quoted in the original Bulgarian, without the readers necessarily knowing Bulgarian. Another problem is that depicting the rapport with the USSR, the author used the publications from the period of the conflict with Stalin and the period after 1991 when the negative critical tones were brought to public notice.

The value of this book is in that it can be read as a well researched historical reading, as well as a piece of work which deals with contemporary problems of the military and society. The context in which the book was published is compelling - the author was at the time of its publication Serbian President security advisor, the country which was recently admitted into the Partnership for Peace. This book initiates many issues and allows for the parallels between different periods in the history of this country's foreign affairs. Namely, during the 50s and today, there are parallel though rather contradictory processes: simultaneous getting nearer NATO and distancing from it. In both periods, the process of getting nearer to NATO was the consequence of mutual interests, whereas the opposite process of distancing from it happened in the wake of territorial conflicts, in the beginning the Trieste conflict, and in the second one in a row - the Kosovo and Metohia conflict. The historical analysis of the situation, the conditions of which likened those of today, can come in handy in understanding today's situation, so as not to repeat the mistakes from the past. ■





Publications of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations¹

¹ Most of the publications are available for free download from www.ccmr-bg.org

Model Laws on Security and Defence

*Prepared by Miroslav Hadžić and Bogoljub
Milosavljevi, Centre for Civil-Military
Relation, Belgrade, 2006.*





Armed Forces Reform – Experiences and Challenges

*Miroslav Hadžić (editor), The Centre for
Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2003.*

The Yugoslav People's Agony

*Professor Dr. Miroslav Hadžić, Dangraf and
the Centre for Civil -Military Relations,
Belgrade, 2004*



The Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia – Causes, Dynamics and Effects

*Collection of papers, M. Hadžić (ed),
CCMR, Belgrade, 2004*



Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Goragraf, Belgrade/Geneva 2004.

The Role of Parliament in Security Sector Reform in the Countries of the Western Balkan

Collection of papers and discussions, M. Hadžić (ed), CCMR, Belgrade, 2004.





The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe

Marie Vlachová (ed), The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2003.

Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives

Volume I and II, J. Trajane, P. Fluri, (eds), (in English), DCAF (CCMR as the executive publisher), Geneva- Belgrade,




Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector

DCAF, Inter-Parliamentary Union, CCMR as the executive publisher, Belgrade, 2003.



Protection of Human Rights in the Army and Police

M. Hadžić (ed), CCMR, Belgrade, 2003.



Security Inclusion of the FR Yugoslavia into Euro-Atlantic Community

*M. Hadžić, P. Fluri (eds), CCMR and DCAF,
Belgrade, 2003.*

Looking Ahead: Security Challenges in the Balkans through 2010

*I. Gyarmati, T. Winkler, (eds),
DCAF, CCMR, Belgrade, 2002.*



Legal Framing of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Realities

*B. Vankovska (ed), DCAF, CCMR,
Belgrade, 2001.*

Compendium of Yugoslav Laws on the Security Sector: Human Rights and Democratic Oversight Aspects

P. Fluri, M. Hadžić, (eds), CCMR, Belgrade, 2002.

Civilian Control of the Army and Police

M. Hadžić (ed), Media Centre, CCMR, Belgrade, 2000.

WBSO


CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji
Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd

327.56 (497)

WESTERN Balkans Security Observer :
journal of the Belgrade School of Security
Studies / editor-in-chief Miroslav Hadžić.
Belgrade (Gundulićev venac 48) : Centre for
Civil-Military Relations, 2007 – (Beograd
: Goragraf). - 24 cm

. - Ima izdanje na drugom jeziku:
Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana = ISSN
1452-6050
ISSN 1452-6115 = Western Balkans Security
Observer
COBISS.SR – ID 132633356

N^o 5



The Western Balkans Security Observer is a journal emerged in the academic community of the Belgrade School of Security Studies. The School is a special unit of the Centre for Civil- Military Relations set up to carry out systematic research and promote academic advancement of civilian researchers thus contributing to the development of Security Studies in the region. Articles published in the Western Balkans Security Observer are focusing on regional security issues but also deal with national and global security problems. The journal welcomes papers that explore security transformations from an interdisciplinary approach and which manage to use the strong points of different schools of thoughts. Both theoretical and empirical accounts are welcomed. A review section introduces relevant resources in Security Studies, Political Science, International Relations and related fields.

Standards for publishing:

Length of the texts: 1,500 - 3,000 words. Font: Times New Roman. Spacing 1.5. Chicago Referencing Style. Each text needs to have an abstract (150-200 words) and 3-5 keywords. Each author needs to submit a short biography. The biography should be submitted in a separate file, in order to assure full anonymity during the process of selection and evaluation of the texts by the editorial board.

Centre for Civil-Military Relations
Gundulićev venac 48
11000 Beograd
tel/fax 381(0)11-32 87 226
381(0)11-32 87 334
www.ccmr-bg.org
office@ccmr-bg.org