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Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace

Sudan is a 'failed state' that, as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South in January 2005, has been given an opportunity to re-invent itself. But the odds against it doing so successfully remain high while large parts of the country are still mired in conflict. Violence continues in the west of the country in Darfur and the situation is also tense in Eastern Sudan. This Research Paper describes the current situation in Sudan. It also surveys the challenges of reconstruction and reflects on some possible implications of Sudan for the emerging legal norm known as the 'Responsibility to Protect'.

For historical background on Sudan and key developments up to 2004 see Standard Note SN/IA/2155, *Sudan* (4 June 2004). The crisis in Darfur has been the subject of a Research Paper and several Standard Notes since mid 2004. For the Research Paper, see *Sudan: conflict in Darfur* (04/51, 23 June 2004). It provides useful background to the conflict, which is not repeated here. The most recent Standard Notes have been *Sudan: the Elusive Quest for Peace* (SN/IA/3888, 20 January 2005), which this Research Paper replaces, and *Sudan: the conflict in Darfur* (SN/IA/3738, 22 August 2005).

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Summary of main points

- There has been progress towards implementing the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, but levels of trust are still fragile. A host of issues remain to be resolved that could yet re-ignite conflict.
- The situation in Darfur has deteriorated markedly over the past six months. Violations of the ceasefire are regular and the African Union Mission in Sudan has been able to do little to prevent them. Progress in peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, has been set back by splits in rebel ranks. The possibility of the UN taking on a peace-keeping role in Darfur is now high on the international agenda.
- Tension is high in Eastern Sudan. There has been a radicalisation of opinion there over the past year which many fear could erupt into large-scale violence. Armed opposition groups that were not included in the negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have yet to accept the legitimacy of the presence of the Sudanese Armed Forces in the region.
- US \$2bn was pledged towards reconstruction efforts during 2006-7 at the international donors' conference in Oslo, Norway, in April 2005. The Government of Sudan is due to spend \$5.14bn, the bulk of which will be raised through oil sales. Concerns remain about the Government's absorptive capacity and also about its accountability and transparency.
- Diplomatic efforts to build peace in Sudan have had to juggle competing priorities. There were fears that international confrontation with the Government of Sudan over Darfur might unravel the North-South peace process. This raises important issues about when it makes sense to push for a comprehensive peace through 'linkage' and when it may be wiser to approach conflict resolution through 'sequencing'.
- While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may well be a conceptual and substantive framework for the resolution of all Sudan's conflicts, there is an important difference between its provisions and the framework for peace that has developed regarding Darfur. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement contained no measures to address accountability for human rights violations committed during the North-South conflict, the human rights situation in Darfur has been referred to the International Criminal Court.
- The experience of Sudan suggests that the international community has yet to think through the full implications of the emerging legal norm known as the 'Responsibility to Protect'. In situations of violent conflict, there can in practice be tensions between humanitarian commitments and those rooted in human rights obligations. Similarly, the imperatives of making peace can lead to issues of need and accountability being sidelined. To eliminate such tensions and 'trade offs' in pursuit of a consistent approach will be a major challenge.

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I The Current Situation

A. North-South

A year later than was originally hoped, Africa's longest civil war formally ended on 9 January 2005 at Naivasha in Kenya with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by representatives of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA). The CPA also brought to an end the conflict in the neighbouring regions of the South Kordofan (sometimes also described as the Nuba Mountains) and the Southern Blue Nile. The CPA was based on final agreement by the parties of the 'implementation modalities' of all Protocols and Agreements since 2002. These were:

- The Machakos Protocol, dated 20 July 2002
- The Agreement on Security Arrangements, dated 25 September 2003
- The Agreement on Wealth Sharing, dated 7 January 2004
- The Protocol on Power Sharing, dated 26 May 2004
- The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, dated 26 May 2004
- The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, dated 26 May 2004

At the heart of the CPA are deals on power- and wealth-sharing. The CPA provides for extensive autonomy in the South, amounting in effect to self-government. The South has the right to its own army, access to 50 per cent of oil revenues generated under its jurisdiction and the right to run its own branch of the National Bank. It would even have the right to its own foreign policy. Further, the CPA provides the South with the right to secede after a six-year interim period if a majority of its population votes in favour of doing so in a referendum. A referendum can be held at the earliest in July 2011.

Over the past 12 months, the process of building a sustainable peace has got under way. At an international donors' conference in Oslo in April 2005, US \$4.5bn was pledged for humanitarian and reconstruction programmes. Solid progress has been made in establishing the political arrangements provided for under the CPA. In September 2005 a Government of National Unity was established. Under the CPA, 52 per cent of the places went to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent to other northern parties and 6 per cent to other southern parties. In the following month, following a number of delays, the Government of Southern Sudan was also established. An interim Constitution has also been agreed, in which a Bill of Rights is enshrined. The major political objective is to hold local, state, legislative and presidential elections by the CPA's deadline of July 2009. Until then, as part of the CPA's drive to 'make unity attractive', the SPLM and the National Congress Party are guaranteed 10 per cent of the seats in Northern and Southern state legislatures.¹ The

¹ Endre Stianson, "Perspectives on the CPA", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

major long-term economic objective is the reconstruction of war-affected areas and the promotion of development in the most marginalized parts of the country.²

The CPA survived the shock of the death of SPLM/A leader John Garang in a helicopter crash in July 2005, only weeks after he had been sworn in as Sudan's First Vice-President and President of the Government of Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A rapidly elected his deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, as his successor and he took up the position of First Vice-President in the Government of National Unity. The two main parties to the CPA appear to be cooperating well at the moment. Yet for all that the news remains good, the threats to North-South peace remain significant. Levels of trust between North and South are still fragile. The North has a long history of failing to live up to promises made in previous peace agreements, such as the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 and Khartoum agreement of 1992. There are sceptical observers who wonder whether the leaders of the NCP are simply biding their time on the CPA while they prioritize securing their objectives in Darfur (see below). There undoubtedly remain factions within the North which oppose the CPA. The ruling party is not immune from challenge on this score. In mid-2005, a group calling itself the Legal Association of Muslim Scholars issued a fatwa labelling the SPLM and its supporters as 'infidels' and called for jihad against its secular ideals.³

Others fear that the terms of the CPA have left the Government of National Unity largely under the control of the NCP and the security establishment that stands behind it. If this is so, it is difficult to envisage the Government of National Unity marking a dramatic break with the past. In addition, it remains unclear what impact the referral of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) will have on the wider attitudes and behaviour of leaders of the NCP, some of whom may in the future be indicted.⁴

With regard to the SPLM/A, observers also wonder how many of its leaders beyond the now-deceased John Garang really share his vision of a 'New Sudan'. They too may be biding their time – in their case, waiting for the referendum.

The threats to peace may also come 'from below' rather than purely 'from above'. For example, as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) return home, they may find themselves claiming land and water use rights that now have 'new owners'. Some question whether the legal and institutional frameworks can be created to resolve the inevitable conflicts that will arise effectively and peacefully.⁵ In addition, there is likely to be some mismatch between rising grassroots expectations of reconstruction and development, in a context of desperate need, and the ability of governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to disburse funds quickly and efficiently.

² The British Government has provided £380,000 to support a number of key national commissions and has provided experts to the Abyei boundary commission and the constitutional review commission. HC Deb 17 January 2006 c223WH

³ Luka Biong Deng, "The CPA: Will it also be Dishonoured?", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

⁴ Human rights groups have criticized the absence of any mechanisms in the CPA for dealing with human rights violations committed in the context of the North-South conflict.

⁵ Domenico Polloni, "Land and the Sudanese transition to peace", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

Finally, there is plenty of scope for a breakdown of the CPA in areas of the country whose ownership was disputed by the North and South. These are known as the 'Three areas' or 'Transitional Areas' of South Kordofan, the Blue Nile and Abyei. Significantly, neither party committed themselves as fully to the Protocol on Abyei as they did to the Protocol on South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. They did not claim authorship of this Protocol. This has led one observer to fear that failure to resolve outstanding issues on Abyei could turn it into "another Kashmir".⁶

On 13 January 2006, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Sudan, Jan Pronk, offered this assessment of where things stand a year on:

He said that, while the tragic death of John Garang, leader of the south, less than a month after he had been sworn in as the new Vice President of Sudan, had caused consternation and delays, neither party had found a reason to deviate from the Agreement. The parties realized that they depended on each other and that they had to move forward. The implementation of the Agreement, though slow, remained on track and was moving forward.

In one year, two new Constitutions had been adopted, one for Sudan as a whole and one for Southern Sudan, he continued. Two new governments had been formed and all institutions that had to be established on the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had been set up. While some had hardly met and others faced political disputes, the spirit of the agreement stood tall. The redeployment of the Sudanese Army away from the south had started, and the target of 30 per cent redeployment within a year had more or less been accomplished. The United Nations had instructed the forces on both sides to provide notification of all movements seven days in advance and so far there had been only minor violations of those instructions.

He said that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC), the only United Nations-led institution, had been the most successful one. Having started convening shortly after the adoption of resolution 1590 (2005) mandating the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it had met 15 times and been able to reach consensus on most issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of the ceasefire paragraphs of the agreement. The talks between the SPLM and other armed groups in Southern Sudan were proceeding well, which could pave the way for the integration of all combatants, either into one of the armies or into civil society.

Of course, a lot still remained to be done, he noted. The peace process had to become more inclusive, incorporating other political parties and civil society, and security laws had to be brought into line with the Constitution. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants was yet to commence and while the return of displaced persons and refugees had started, there was a lack of resources to support it. Rehabilitation and development of the southern agriculture, economy, towns and villages was yet to start, and the capacity of the new Government of Southern Sudan was still limited. Without more international support, the expectations of the people in the south would not be met.

⁶ Endre Stianson, "Perspectives on the CPA", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

The sense of optimism in the south was thus low and the people there had become suspicious, he said. Many were losing belief in the north's sincerity about giving the South a chance to develop beyond peace. The parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had agreed that 50 per cent of the oil revenues and the resulting income would accrue to the south, but there was no transparency. People in the south were becoming less and less confident that the essential element of the Agreement on wealth sharing would become a reality. Matching the cynicism in the south were suspicions in the north that the SPLM did not really want to give unity a chance in the referendum, to be held six years after the signing of the Agreement.⁷

B. Darfur

Since mid 2004, the conflict in Darfur, which flared up in February 2003 while talks continued on the North-South peace process, has dominated public perceptions and media coverage of Sudan. The main parties to the conflict are the GoS and its proxy militias, the Janjaweed, and two rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Darfur has experienced a humanitarian crisis which has claimed around 200,000 lives and displaced some two million people from their homes.⁸ The UN is currently feeding three million people in the region.⁹ Over the past 18 months, the international community has become heavily engaged in efforts to end the conflict there. A humanitarian ceasefire agreement was reached in April 2004 and Security and Humanitarian Protocols signed in November 2004. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed to verify the ceasefire and has since steadily increased in size, reaching a total of 6,848 personnel by the end of 2005.¹⁰ Ever since its deployment, some have argued that its numbers remain inadequate and its mandate insufficiently robust. The ceasefire was from its inception extremely fragile and has been persistently violated by all parties to the conflict. In March 2005, following the UN's adjudication that the human rights abuses by the GoS and its proxy militias did not constitute genocide, the Security Council provided for the imposition of sanctions against those responsible for impeding the peace process or carrying out atrocities in Resolution 1591, and voted to refer those suspected of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law to the ICC in Resolution 1593.

More hopefully, peace talks between the main parties got under way in Abuja, Nigeria, from late-2004 onwards. In July 2005, after several rounds of talks, agreement was

⁷ "CPA in Sudan stands firm, but more international support needed, Security Council told", UN News Release, 13 January 2006

Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8607.doc.htm>

⁸ In March 2005, the Head of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, stated that a reasonable estimate of the monthly death rate in Darfur would be 10,000 people per month. "UN's Darfur Death Estimate Soars", BBC Website, 15 March 2005.

⁹ "UN weighs options for Sudan's Darfur region as funds for African Union force run low", UN News, 17 January 2006. According to the Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, the UK is the second biggest national donor to Darfur, providing £75 million in 2005. HC Deb 17 January 2006, c222WH

¹⁰ *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur* (S/2005/825, 23 December 2005), para 36

reached in Abuja on a Declaration of Principles, setting out the parameters for a final settlement of the conflict. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported that the main elements included:

the importance of political freedoms, non-discrimination on religious grounds, a federal structure for Sudan and the right of return of refugees and IDPs. It provides for the proper representation of Darfuris in national and local government institutions; land issues; the equitable sharing of national wealth; and security issues to be addressed in the final agreement.¹¹

It was also agreed that any peace agreement in Darfur should be consistent with the provisions of the CPA. The Declaration of Principles, along with a lull in the fighting, led some commentators to hope that the worst might be over. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, talked in terms of a final peace agreement by the end of 2005. However, even at the time, other analysts such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), were counselling against excessive optimism. It declared that none of the parties were yet seriously committed to peace. All sides were rearming and repositioning their forces.¹²

Since July 2005 efforts to push the peace process forward have continued. However, a split within the SLM/A brought them to a standstill for a prolonged period. The split is between two leaders, Abdul Wahid al-Nur and Minni Arko Minawi and the ethnic groups that they represent: the Fur and the Zaghawa. Diplomatic efforts have focused upon trying to end this split. These efforts intensified as the seventh round of peace talks in Abuja, scheduled to begin on 29 November 2005, drew nearer. For example, a meeting was convened by the US on 8-9 November in Nairobi to try and reconcile the two leaders. Abdul Wahid attended the meeting, but Minawi did not, instead sending a delegation. On 19 November the US and AMIS successfully brought the two together in Khartoum. On 25-26 November, the two were again brought together – this time by the Governments of Chad, Libya, Eritrea and by the African Union (AU) in N'djamena. At this last meeting, they agreed to present a common negotiating platform and coordinate with the other rebel movement operating in Darfur, JEM. The British Government has been active in assisting these efforts. On 1 November 2005 it convened a meeting of senior officials from donor countries and the UN in London on Darfur.¹³

The latest round of peace talks began as scheduled on 29 November 2005. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reflected in his December 2005 report on Darfur:

All parties pledged to negotiate in good faith, and aimed to reach an agreement by the end of the year... While the parties have identified priority areas of concern in power-sharing discussions, there remains some distance between their positions, which the AU is attempting to bridge through compromise solutions. It

¹¹ FCO Website at:

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1020687852749> (as at August 2005)

¹² *The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps*, ICG Africa Briefing No. 28, 6 July 2005, p. 1, online via <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3457&l=1>

¹³ *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur* (S/2005/825, 23 December 2005), paras 28-33

will also be essential for concrete discussions on security arrangements to proceed in earnest as part of overall efforts to stop the violence in Darfur.¹⁴

News from the peace talks has been limited, but it does appear that the SLM/A and JEM were able to produce a joint position. However, this included new demands that may make agreement harder to reach. The rebels have demanded the Vice-Presidency of Sudan and the return of territory that was removed from Darfur and incorporated into northern Sudan in the 1990s. Underscoring the urgency of achieving a viable peace settlement at Abuja, Kofi Annan stated:

reports from the ground confirm the marked deterioration in the situation since September, including the proliferation of actors to the conflict, an increase in the number of inter-tribal clashes, the entry of destabilizing elements from Chad, and more instances of banditry. This is a deeply disturbing trend which has devastating effects on the civilian population. Large-scale attacks against civilians continue, women and girls are being raped by armed groups, yet more villages are being burned and thousands more are being driven from their homes. As we approach the end of 2005, the second full year of conflict in Darfur, regrettably we have to acknowledge that the most urgent needs of millions affected by the war remain largely unmet, including their protection and safety. While countless lives have been saved thanks to a massive humanitarian relief effort led by the UN, those most exposed to violence and gross violations of human rights continue to live in fear and terror. This includes the large majority of internally displaced persons, as more camps for the displaced have been attacked in recent months, and violent armed groups are consistent threat in areas surrounding many camps. Even more exposed are those who have managed to remain in their villages.¹⁵

The Secretary-General also complained that “no major steps” had been taken by the GoS to identify or bring to justice militia leaders or fighters responsible for human rights abuses. The only actions taken have been against junior officials within its own security forces. The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, set up by the Government in response to the referral to the ICC as a way of asserting that war crimes and crimes against humanity were being dealt with adequately at the national level, so eliminating the need for the involvement of the ICC, has so far convicted six junior members of the security forces.¹⁶ In mid-December 2005 it was reported that the GoS had refused to allow officials from the ICC into the country to investigate alleged human rights violations in Darfur.¹⁷ A report in the same month by Human Rights Watch declared that the person with greatest responsibility for human rights abuses there was the Head of State, President Omar al-Bashir.¹⁸ However, according to the British Government, the ICC has now visited Sudan.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ibid, paras 34-5

¹⁵ Ibid, para 39

¹⁶ Ibid, paras 17-19 and 41

¹⁷ “Sudan bars entry to UN war crimes investigation team”, *Irish Times*, 14 December 2005

¹⁸ “Darfur ‘abuses’ blamed on leaders”, *Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 2005

¹⁹ HC Deb 17 January 2006 c223WH

The deteriorating situation in Darfur has been further complicated by an influx of military deserters from Chad into the region. They have joined up with Chadian armed opposition groups based in Darfur. In November 2005, the Sudanese Armed Forces carried out operations in the Jebel Moon area of Western Darfur, ostensibly against these military deserters. The local community told UN officials that there had been no deserters in the area at the time of the attack.²⁰ Relations between the Governments of Chad and Sudan have dramatically worsened over the past month, with the former accusing the latter of harbouring rebels that wish to change the regime in N'djamena.

The rebellion in Darfur is based on many of the same grievances which animated that in the South. They arise from the gross inequities that have existed in Sudan since independence in the distribution of power and resources. But the character of the rebellion is significantly different. For example, the rebel movements, the SLM/A and JEM, are less cohesive and coherent than is the SPLM/A. There is a real danger not just of increased violence but of that violence spinning out of control unless there is a peace agreement in the near future. There remain hopes that the SPLM/A can play an important mediating role in ending the conflict in Darfur, but the death of John Garang and the scale of the challenges it faces in establishing a credible government in the South suggest that there will be limits to how far it can meet these hopes.

Short of funds – it currently has money until March 2006 – undermanned and poorly-equipped, AMIS has been struggling to make much of an impact. On a number of occasions, it has come under attack. There have been discussions about whether UN peacekeepers might join or even replace them during 2006. The US has said that it supports a major role for the UN in Darfur.²¹ Kofi Annan and members of the Security Council met on 17 January 2006 to discuss the issue.²² A UN official in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was quoted in December 2005 as saying: “It’s just a matter of when. A decision could come as early as March, with deployment next June”.²³

Jan Pronk, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Sudan, reported to the Security Council on 16 January that a much bigger peacekeeping force and targeted sanctions are needed to end the ongoing violence in Darfur. Of the peacekeeping force, he stated: “It should be strong, able to defend itself, able to deter attacks on civilians and able to disarm militias and the Janjaweed, who should have been disarmed by the [Sudanese] government in the first place”.²⁴ On sanctions, he called for measures that targeted “the commanders and political leaders responsible for the carnage of 2003 and 2004, and those who have refused to stop the atrocities of 2005”. No steps have yet been taken to put a freeze on assets and impose a travel ban on those responsible for impeding the peace process or carrying out atrocities, as provided for in UN Security Resolution 1591. The arms embargo established under Resolutions 1556 and 1591 has also proven ineffective. Jan Pronk has called for a report by a panel of experts that lists

²⁰ *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (S/2005/825, 23 December 2005), para 8*

²¹ “UN looks out of Africa for help in ending Sudan’s cycle of violence”, *Financial Times*, 18 January 2006

²² “UN weighs options for Sudan’s Darfur region as funds for African Union Force run low”, *UN News*, 17 January 2006

²³ “Frustrated peacekeepers at end of tether in Sudan”, *Daily Telegraph*, 18 December 2005

²⁴ “UN envoy calls for stronger action on Darfur”, *IRIN News*, 16 January 2006.

Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51130> on 18 January 2006

countries selling weapons to government-backed militias and rebels in Darfur to be made public.²⁵ He was also reported as commenting that the parties to the Abuja talks had lost all sense of urgency and did not really care about deadlines.²⁶

Complicating matters considerably until recently was the fact that Sudan was due to host the AU Summit in January 2006. The host country normally takes up the position of Chair. However, African civil society organizations campaigned to prevent this from happening. There were also reports that some African countries, such as South Africa, were also opposed.²⁷ In the end, the Republic of Congo agreed to take up the position.

The challenge on Darfur remains making a real peace that can then be effectively kept. The differences about what peace should constitute in Darfur are certainly not all on the Sudanese side. Many African Union (AU) countries are privately more sceptical than the UN, US and EU countries about the impact on peace efforts of the referral of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur to the ICC. What the ICC does – and to whom – will certainly affect not just the prospects for Darfur, but also those for Sudan more broadly.

C. Eastern Sudan

The low-intensity conflict between the GoS and a rebel movement called the Eastern Front (EF) has been almost entirely ignored by the international media until only recently. Diplomatic attention has also been fitful, given its effective ranking behind the South and later Darfur as a priority for action.²⁸ In a recent report on the East, the International Crisis Group (ICG) described Eastern Sudan as “on the threshold of new conflict with no forum in which to negotiate”.²⁹ It also claimed that the humanitarian situation in the region, where there is only a small humanitarian presence, was “in some ways worse than Darfur’s”.³⁰ Below is a brief extract from that report which offers some quick facts and figures about the East:

Southern Sudan covers 336,480 square kilometres slightly more than Poland. It is a strategic region that includes Port Sudan – the country’s economic lifeline, through which most of its foreign trade passes; its oil export pipeline; many irrigated and semi-mechanized agricultural schemes; and a long border with Eritrea, with whom Sudan has had rocky relations for the past twelve years. Due in part to the region’s economic and strategic significance, as well as the military activities since the mid-1990s, the government has a heavy security presence

²⁵ “Violators of Darfur arms embargo should be revealed, UN envoy says”, *Washington Post*, 20 January 2005

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ “Sudan’s bid to chair AU puts SA on the spot”, *Business Day*, 16 January 2006

²⁸ The British Government has been the most active player. It has supported efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement since late-2004. See the ICG’s report *Sudan: Saving Peace in the East*, Africa Report No. 102, 5 January 2006, p. 26. Another useful report on the East is that by Sara Pantuliano of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, *Comprehensive Peace? Causes and Consequences of Underdevelopment and Instability in Eastern Sudan*, September 2005. The report was commissioned by a number of international aid agencies

²⁹ ICG, *Sudan: Saving Peace in the East*, p. 29

³⁰ Ibid, p. ii

involving – according to a government source – three times as many forces as in Darfur... the population of the three states – Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref – is approximately four million, a substantial part of which is the Beja nation, a confederation of indigenous non-Arab tribes whose ancestors have inhabited the semi-arid areas between the Nile River and the Red Sea for more than 4,000 years. The Handendowa is the largest Beja tribe (and one of the largest tribes in Sudan, after the Dinka of the South and the Fur of Darfur), with an estimated population of 600,000... The economy is primarily based on large-scale agriculture and the port. Both are significant sources of state revenue and make the East one of the richer regions. Although these economic activities profit the few who own the farms and port companies and provide a steady income for employees, they provide little benefit to the nomads and small-scale farmers in the rural areas... For the rural majority, survival is based on subsistence farming and livestock trade, a livelihood threatened over the past 50 years and especially the last two decades by drought and famine... Surveys suggest malnutrition levels and crude mortality rates in the East are significantly higher than in conflict-ridden Darfur... Nevertheless, the East, like other mostly rural parts of the country, has received only paltry government investments for education, health and other services. The highly centralized nature of government in Sudan gives federal authorities a near monopoly on revenue collection and control over both how much money is distributed to the states and how it is used. Mostly it is doled out as patronage to regime supporters, such as tribal chiefs, government employees and security officials.³¹

The EF is made up of the Beja Congress, which was formed in the late-1950s, and a smaller rebel group, the Rashaida Free Lions. The two organizations merged in February 2005. It is a new and fragile alliance. Dominated by the Hadendawa, the Beja Congress turned to armed opposition to the central government in 1995. The Beja Congress's political demands range from greater autonomy for the East to an end to hardline policies of 'Islamicisation' and to expropriations of traditional land by the authorities. The Rashaida Free Lions are based on the Rashaida tribe, who are nomadic pastoralists. Originally from Saudi Arabia, they are believed to be wealthier than the Beja. However, they have been mobilized by the threat of mechanized agriculture to their way of life.³² It is a much smaller movement.

In military terms, the Beja Congress was a junior partner to the SPLM/A, which had been militarily active in the region since the 1990s. While rebel activities have had their successes, overall the GoS has been able to prevent them from negatively affecting economic activities or communication links in the East. Contacts with the GoS effectively collapsed following the use of excessive force by the security forces in response to a Beja Congress-inspired peaceful demonstration in Port Sudan. Over 20 people were killed and hundreds were wounded. Over 150 members of the Beja Congress were detained. There are credible reports that some of them have been tortured. Nobody has been held accountable by the authorities. This has contributed to a radicalisation of opinion in the East, particularly amongst the young, which many fear could erupt in large-scale violence.³³

³¹ Ibid, p. 2-3

³² Ibid, p. 17

³³ Ibid, pp. 8-9

The conflict is essentially based on the same grievances as those elsewhere in Sudan. As we have seen, the East has suffered from marginalisation and underdevelopment. There are some grounds for optimism. The SPLM/A has long been an ally of the Beja Congress. The CPA ended hostilities between the GoS and the SPLM/A in the East. Although it is due to withdraw under the terms of the CPA by 9 January 2006 (now extended to 9 February), it can still play an important brokering role. As a member of the new Government of National Unity established in August 2005, it can prevent a flare-up of violence between the EF and the Sudanese Armed Forces over who should fill the security vacuum brought about by its withdrawal. A potential flashpoint is the town of Hameshkoreb, which the EF describes as “our town”.³⁴ However, according to the British Government, the Sudanese Armed Forces took control of positions held by the EF in the town on 11 January.³⁵ The UN has called this move the first serious violation of the CPA since it was signed. The SPLA, SAF and EF now all have positions around the town.³⁶

The East is an important test of how far the arrival of a Government of National Unity will mean a change in attitude and behaviour by the centre. As with Darfur, the problem is that the SPLM/A is fully stretched simply coping with its roles in the South and as part of the Government of National Unity. With Garang’s death, it is open to question how much it will want to embroil itself in non-South issues. Few in the East see much change in official attitudes or behaviour yet. There have been calls for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to establish a stronger presence in the East and so provide a stabilising influence.

Another cause for hope, according to the ICG, is that the NCP and the security establishment behind it “cannot afford a protracted conflict in the region on a scale comparable to the South or Darfur, since that would immediately affect the supply of food and raw materials to the capital and could seriously damage its stability.”³⁷ In addition, strategies from Khartoum of divide and rule in relation to the EF have so far not succeeded in the way that they did in Darfur. There have also been increased offers of development aid.³⁸ Yet there are many government officials who do not view what is happening in the East as a major problem.³⁹

In the view of the ICG, there is an urgent need for “comprehensive negotiations between the Government of National Unity and the EF that can produce a sustainable peace based on the CPA framework”. The ICG argues that the international community should underwrite these negotiations and work with key regional actors – particularly Eritrea, which has been a major supporter of the EF. In its recent report on the East, the ICG suggests that Eritrea may be willing to lean on the EF to take a constructive position in negotiations in return for Sudanese neutrality in relation to the current stand-off between

³⁴ Ibid, p. 17

³⁵ HC Deb 17 January 2006 c224WH

³⁶ “Sudan army commits serious ceasefire violation – UN”, Reuters, 18 January 2006
Available at: <http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/thenews/newsdesk/L18598217.htm>

³⁷ ICG, *Sudan: Saving Peace in the East*, p. 11

³⁸ Ibid, p. 12

³⁹ Ibid, p. 16

Eritrea and Ethiopia over their long-running border dispute.⁴⁰ But the situation is highly unstable and hard to predict. Eritrea might simply abandon the EF and so embolden the Sudanese security establishment to try and destroy it.

In mid January 2006, it emerged that the EF and the GoS would be meeting under Libyan auspices to explore the possibility of a negotiated solution.⁴¹

II The Way Ahead

A. One Peace or Many?

As already noted, concerns have been expressed that the diplomatic approach to building peace over the past three years in Sudan has been too piecemeal in character, in effect involving a “sequencing policy”.⁴²

Sequencing has arguably increased the incentives for conflict in those areas deemed ‘lower priority’. Rebel movements in the West and East, anxious not to miss out on ‘gains’ equivalent to those offered within the CPA for the SPLM/A, increased the intensity of their rebellions in order to avoid marginalisation. The partial peace process between North and South was perceived as a threat as much as an opportunity by those in the West and East that were not involved.

In fact, issues of sequencing have co-existed uneasily alongside considerations of “linkage” ever since the Darfur conflict erupted in early-2003. One respected analyst, Hugo Slim, has recognized that there were compelling arguments against a rigidly comprehensive approach to peace in Sudan:

For its part, the international community feared that international confrontation with Khartoum over Darfur could unravel the precious Naivasha process, achieved only after a long struggle. Initially, the enormous importance of these talks both distracted and inhibited the international community, until they were able to make a strong linkage between the two under US leadership from May 2004 onwards... It took considerable courage to see that peace in Sudan had to be treated comprehensively rather than piecemeal. But even a policy of linking the conflicts together could not be done too forcefully if it risked bring down Bashir. To many, the prospect of Sudan without Bashir at this particular time seemed likely to produce a total unravelling of the country and a situation of near anarchy that might even be worse than the tragedy involved in taking one conflict at a time. So even linkage required the international community to avoid outright confrontation with Khartoum, whose leaders it needed both to keep at one table in Naivasha and also to get to a new one in N'djamena [...] These competing political priorities were real. An earlier embrace of linkage might have been far more effective than the tacit sequencing strategy which predominated in early 2004 and which involved dealing with one war after the other. A sequencing

⁴⁰ For background, see House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/3830, *Ethiopia in Crisis*, 9 December 2005

⁴¹ HC Deb 17 January 2006 c224WH

⁴² Hugo Slim, “Dithering over Darfur?”, *International Affairs*, 80, 5 (2004), p. 822

policy would get around to Darfur eventually, but it would not stop the terrible atrocities in the meantime.⁴³

Slim concludes;

This key political choice between sequencing and linkage merits more reflection from politicians and diplomats so as better to inform future decisions around competing priorities of this kind. The need to choose between linkage and sequencing is bound to come up again. Indeed, the Naivasha-Darfur dynamic is eerily resonant of that prevailing in respect of Arusha and Kigali in 1994, when all international political energy was focused on believing in and implementing the Arusha Accords while Hutu extremists in Kigali had agreed that Arusha was a disaster and had decided upon genocide.⁴⁴

The statements of the main diplomatic actors suggest that linkage is now the driving impulse behind their strategy for peace in Sudan. As the ICG has argued, it is now accepted by all sides that “[T]he CPA provides the conceptual and substantive framework to solve Sudan’s regional wars, in the East as well as Darfur”.⁴⁵ The US has been prominent in arguing for such an approach since 2004. However, linkage is not just a question of strategy but also one of capacity. Capacity can effectively structure diplomatic interventions on sequential lines, even where the rhetoric is comprehensive. In this sense, in practice it may not be so much a case of choosing between sequencing and linkage; more of seeking the right balance between the two. This is not just a problem for policy-makers. It affects analysts too. After all, it is striking that there is no mention in Slim’s 2004 article of the potential for conflict in the East. To sum up, it seems very likely that a comprehensive peace in Sudan, if it is to be achieved, will be based on a sequence of linked agreements, in which Darfur, in theory, is next.

However, while there may be a sequence of success, there may also be a sequence of failure. If reasonably equitable peace deals are not reached in Darfur and the East within the next year, this will surely tell us something about the prospects for the CPA. This situation also raises another dilemma: how long and how far should donors support the CPA in the absence of progress towards peace in Darfur and the East? In this regard, there is a danger that the NCP and the security establishment behind it will seek to prolong peace processes without any serious intention of signing (or adhering for long to) a peace agreement.

Finally, it is worth remembering that there *is* a significant difference between the provisions of the CPA and the framework for peace that is emerging regarding Darfur. This is the referral of the human rights situation in Darfur to the ICC. While formally this is a process independent of the peace talks in Abuja, in practice the two are intertwined. One will certainly affect the other. For some observers, such as international human rights groups, this difference might be viewed as sufficiently important to indicate that there is a major “conceptual and substantive” difference between the framework in place

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ ICG, *Saving Peace in the East*, p. i

for North-South and the one that is still emerging in relation to Darfur, even though the official rhetoric claims otherwise.

B. The Challenges of Reconstruction

None of the key stakeholders minimise the challenges posed by the task of reconstruction in Sudan after decades of brutal civil war. While an ambitious plan has been developed, there remain many concerns about issues of commitment and capacity. There are also worries about the degree to which the plan can be a basis for reconstruction across the entire country, given that there is 'unfinished business' in Darfur and the East.

On 9 March 2005, a six-year recovery and development plan for Sudan was launched by the national authorities (meaning the GoS and the SPLM/A). The document, entitled "Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication in Sudan", was the outcome of a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) organised by the UN and the World Bank. The press release put out ahead of the launch stated that "although priority needs and costs are distinguished for war-affected areas of North and South Sudan, it is nevertheless a *jointly* agreed programme for the whole country – a peace dividend crucial to the peace process as a whole".⁴⁶

The press release provides a useful summary of the "Framework" document:

The total assessed needs through 2007 are about \$7.8 billion (\$4.3 billion for the North and \$3.5 billion for the South). The per capita expenditure in the South is considerably higher than that of the North. Of the total, only \$2.66 billion is being requested from the international community. Sudan itself will contribute considerably more than the international community towards the pro-poor recovery programme.⁴⁷ Precise commitments in this respect are made through the budgets of the forthcoming National Government and Government of South Sudan.

Taj el Sir Mahjoub, the Government's JAM Team Leader explains: "This is not just a run-of-the-mill appeal document. It is a statement of intent and a political commitment on our part to be fully engaged in the reconstruction of our country. Yes, we need external assistance, but we will more than match that with our national resources."

The JAM is divided into two phases: the first, from July 2005 through the end of 2007, represents immediate and detailed needs, particularly for the expected massive return of displaced people from inside and outside the country; the second, from 2008 to mid-2011, is the period when many major infrastructural programmes will be undertaken, and when Sudan can hope to meet some of the

⁴⁶ Joint Assessment Mission Press Release, 9 March 2005
Available at: <http://www.unsudanig.org/JAM/contacts/JAM-Press-Release-March09.doc> at 25 January 2006

⁴⁷ Its contribution should be \$5.14 billion

development targets represented by the international Millennium Development Goals...

[...]The JAM covers the recovery/development basic needs for Sudan. It does not include the substantial peacekeeping and demobilization costs. Nor does it include the massive humanitarian requirements for Sudan (notably Darfur) which are outlined under the UN Work Plan for 2005.⁴⁸

The full report includes sectoral reports on: institutional development and capacity building; governance and the rule of law; economic policy and management; productive sectors; basic social services; infrastructure; livelihoods and social protection; and information. There are also linked reports on gender and HIV/AIDS.⁴⁹ The full report contains measurable benchmarks for each six months until the end of 2007.⁵⁰

As noted earlier, at the first post-war international donors' conference in April 2005 in Oslo, US \$4.5bn was pledged. Some \$2bn of that is for reconstruction in terms of the JAM report, leaving a funding gap of some \$600m. Some \$1.1bn was pledged for humanitarian programmes. The UN's Work Plan for Sudan for 2006 was left underfunded. It is seeking \$1.9bn.⁵¹

Two multi-donor trust funds, one for the North and one for the South, have been established, to which donors are sending their donations. \$500m is to be channelled through them during 2005-7. \$102m has materialised so far. Following the publication of the "Framework" document, a Joint National Transition Team (JNTT) was also established to turn the programmatic outline provided by JAM into firm project proposals.⁵²

The bulk of the revenues to meet commitments made on the Sudanese side will come from oil sales. The UN's Team Leader on the JAM, Jon Bennett, has set out the challenge that lies ahead in ensuring that these revenues bring tangible benefits to the South and the contested states of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei:

The peculiarity of Sudan is that it is now poised – thanks to its newly acquired oil wealth – to become one of Africa's richest countries while simultaneously having some of the continent's worst development indicators [...] As global uncertainties continue to push up oil prices the GoS's revenues will continue to increase. However, unless the absorptive capacity of the GoSS to handle revenues is quickly increased, and unless accountable and transparent governance is developed, oil revenues could – as has happened in Angola and other post-conflict states – result in corruption and the entrenchment of unaccountable elites...⁵³

⁴⁸ Joint Assessment Mission Press Release, 9 March 2005

⁴⁹ Available via: <http://www.unsudanig.org/JAM/drafts/index.jsp> at 25 January 2006

⁵⁰ Jon Bennett, "Joint Assessment Mission provides road-map for peace", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

Also available via: <http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/24/03.doc> at 25 January 2006

⁵¹ Toby Lanzer, "Pledges versus commitments", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

⁵² Jon Bennett, "Joint Assessment Mission provides road-map for peace", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

⁵³ Ibid

Bennett goes on to reflect on the strategic importance of the Transitional Areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei for reconstruction efforts, where much oil exploration has taken place in recent years:

Situated on the frontline of the civil war, they are at the heart of national and local contests over resources, particularly water, land and oil [...] Due to their geographical position, 30 per cent of the population of the region have been displaced – around 75 per cent of the inhabitants of Abyei have fled the area or are displaced within the state. The Three Areas will see a large inflow of returnees and serve as a major transit routes for returning populations [...] Food security in the Three Areas remains fragile and land ownership highly inequitable. Existing tensions between pastoralists and farmers over the use of natural resources have been exacerbated by the spread of large-scale mechanised farming and oil exploration. The return of IDPs and refugees is likely to result in increased conflict over access to ancestral land. The presence or fear of mines continues to be an obstacle to productive use of land in some areas, while other areas suffer from over-usage due to the returning population.⁵⁴

Following the publication of the “Framework” document, Dr Taj es-Sir Mahjoub, the GoS’s JAM Team Leader, was interviewed about aspects of the JAM. When asked about the degree to which the language in the draft “Framework” in relation to Cluster 2, Governance and the Rule of Law, had been watered down by the final version, he replied:

We do not agree with those observers who thought that Cluster 2 issues were sensitive. The themes in cluster 2 – the role of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies etc – are topics that we ourselves are concerned with. The language was watered down not because the government considered it unacceptable but in order to make it culturally acceptable – something which people often find difficult to understand. I think the final report submitted did describe correctly and sufficiently the issues mentioned above. If you look at the monitoring matrix you will see that all these issues are very sufficiently addressed. The peace agreement talks about these same issues and people are now in the process of putting them into the proper Sudanese context.⁵⁵

He was also asked about the capacity of Sudan, particularly the South, to absorb \$4.5 bn worth of aid:

I think we have a reasonably good absorptive capacity. Capacity building was the task of one of the JAM Clusters. We were encouraged by the fact that the World Bank approved support from the LICUS (Low Income Country under Stress) fund even before the conclusion of the peace agreement in order to ensure timely building of capacity.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Dr Taj es Sir Mahjoub and Christoph T. Jaeger, “Reflections on making peace: interview”, *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

Also available via: <http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/24/03.doc> at 25 January 2006

⁵⁶ Ibid

No periodic reviews of progress and problems in implementing the recommendations of the “Framework” document appear to be in the public domain. However, a critique of the general approach recommended by the JAM has been produced by Michael Kevane, an academic at Santa Clara University in California. He argues that JAM’s budget

... is an interesting reflection of contemporary development thinking but also of continuing misplaced priorities. Building schools, health clinics and roads takes up the biggest chunk of the budget. When public expenditures suddenly soar, builders are the first beneficiaries. Land policy in southern Sudan is accorded \$200,000 but, bizarrely, \$48m is allocated to the region’s media. So 240 times more will be spent on the media than on developing policies to avert the risk that land disputes will endanger peace. The budget doctors have allocated \$119m to the functioning of Sudan’s central bank but a mere \$1.9m for mainstreaming gender into government policy and practice.⁵⁷

He goes on to assert that it might be better simply to give individual beneficiaries their proportionate share of the funds:

When we consider that reconstruction spending is to target around 20m marginalised Sudanese... then you have spending of about \$160 per person... Most poor people would undoubtedly prefer to receive such a sum as an income supplement rather than as a bundle of services. Why did the JAM authors assume that they could plan more wisely, and government counterparts in the GoS or SPLM could spend more effectively, than poor citizens in Bahr al-Ghazal or the Nuba Mountains or the Red Sea Hills?⁵⁸

He also criticised the absence of any provision for restitution or justice for victims of human rights abuses:

Diplomatic whitewashing leaves a lingering impression that the only leader who bears any responsibility is Jaafar al-Numeiri, the military strongman ousted from power two decades ago. Sudan’s civil war is instead presented as an almost inevitable bursting forth of local tensions arising from pressure on a diminishing resource base. The JAM’s focus on local-level conflict implies that the poor... were responsible for war and now need to be taught how to cooperate. And since they were the cause of the war, and nothing was taken from them, there needs to be no restitution.⁵⁹

Kevane’s critique has been met by a robust response from one of those involved in the JAM. He writes:

Consolidating a still-tenuous peace requires a rapid and visible redress of the underlying structural causes of conflict and underdevelopment. Redistribution of wealth must be accompanied by an overhaul of the governance apparatus. Without these issues very firmly on the table, long term development and poverty reduction will never succeed in Sudan. Handing out cash, while leaving the rules

⁵⁷ Michael Kevane, “Reflections on the Joint Assessment Mission”, *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Ibid

of the game unchanged, does not equal empowerment or promote sustainable poverty reduction.⁶⁰

III The Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from Sudan

The Responsibility to Protect (RTP) is an emerging legal norm whose origin is to be found in the 2001 report of the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS was established at the behest of the Canadian Government in response to a challenge to the international community issued at the Millennium Summit in 2000 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to build a new consensus on how to respond in the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law.⁶¹

At the UN World Summit in September 2005, paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document stated that member states are:

Prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter 7, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.⁶²

The most recent report on Darfur by the UK Parliament's International Development Select Committee (IDC) notes:

This is a huge step forward; it shows that there is, in theory, a political endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect. That, in itself, is important legally as well. State practice and intent are crucial components when identifying legal norms and codifying international law. From a legal perspective, Paragraph 139 is also important because it does not limit Member States' actions to intervening only in cases where the problem has spilled over from one state to another. Therefore, the Responsibility to Protect could apply to violence solely within one state.⁶³

The Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, commented when giving evidence that making the RTP meaningful and tangible was an issue of capacity

⁶⁰ Jeni Klugman and Maude Svensson, "Standing up for the JAM partnerships", *Forced Migration Review*, No. 24, November 2005

⁶¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, IDRC, 2001. The Commission concluded that an absolute right to intervene exists only in situations where there is a policy of genocide. In January 2005, to the disappointment of many in the human rights world, an International Commission of Inquiry established by Kofi Annan at the request of the Security Council ruled that what was happening in Darfur did not reflect a policy of genocide. For further details, see House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/3738, 22 August 2005, *Sudan: The Conflict in Darfur*

⁶² <http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>

⁶³ *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, para 18

as well as political will, and that this could only be generated over time.⁶⁴ The IDC, arguing that AMIS had not demonstrated its effectiveness, responded that time was one of the many things that the people of Darfur lacked and that “[T]his is an area where political will is paramount. Until there is a change of heart, despite the endorsement of the concept at the 2005 Millennium Review Summit, the Responsibility to Protect will remain just an aspiration.”⁶⁵ It concluded: “Given the expiry of the AU’s mandate at the end of March [2006], we are convinced of the urgency of the need to put resources in place, whether through the AU or the UN, to ensure effective protection for people in Darfur. This needs to happen immediately.”⁶⁶ Since the report was published on 26 January 2006, momentum towards greater UN involvement in peace-keeping in Darfur after March 2006 has been building.

In its first report on Darfur, the IDC – quoting the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières – described the initial humanitarian response to the conflict in Darfur as “a staggering failure”.⁶⁷ In its response, the Department for International Development (DFID) accepted that the international community had been “too slow” and that constraints of capacity had also subsequently hindered the effectiveness of the response.⁶⁸

Nonetheless, the importance of the emergence of the RTP should not be underestimated. In a “preliminary review” in late 2004, Hugo Slim offered a mixed assessment:

... the picture is not all bad. Indeed, there may be indications of some positive new twists to the usual tale of avoided responsibility and late response. The Darfur emergency also shows key elements of the international community working to very high standards and with a consciousness unmistakably influenced by the experience of Rwanda.⁶⁹

He referred, *inter alia*, to high quality UN fact-finding and advocacy; to the US Government’s public use of satellite images to show what was happening on the ground in Darfur; examples of effective diplomacy by key governments; the genuine engagement of the AU; and, in peace talks, “the strategy of moving seamlessly between humanitarian and political discussion of the crisis”.⁷⁰ Most positive of all, comparing Darfur with the international response to the Rwandan genocide, he claimed that:

... key states, UN organisations and NGOs did respond with this new post-Rwanda sense of responsibility. They were never in denial about Darfur. They never downplayed the violence or misrepresented it as something other than it was.⁷¹

⁶⁴ Ibid, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2005, Q47

⁶⁵ Ibid, para 19

⁶⁶ Ibid, para 21

⁶⁷ *Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect*, Fifth Report of Session 2004-5, HC67, para 15

⁶⁸ *DFID Response to the Report of the International Development Committee*, Cm 6575, 30 March 2005, paras 4 and 12

⁶⁹ Slim, “Dithering over Darfur?”, p. 812-3

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 821

He added:

Many states now share a moral and activist consensus around civilian protection in war and genocide. Most powerful democratic donor states are also far more sensitive to the charge of bias in their response to crises and to the accusation that they are opting for humanitarian action as a cover for political neglect... Most powerful western states now pursue, and want to be seen to pursue, a twin-track approach that combines equally engaged political and humanitarian strategies. The fact that NGO rhetoric also asks them to do this without integrating or 'blurring' these two tracks is, of course, somewhat challenging in practice and a typical example of unrealistic NGO demands.⁷²

Slim's note of caution at the end is also significant. It may not just be NGOs that are "unrealistic". It is open to question whether the international community has yet honestly addressed what the RTP can or should mean. The form of words produced at summits are the fruit of negotiation and bargaining by states. At points, they are exercises in studied ambiguity. Perhaps the most important issue that has yet to be explicitly addressed is how easily the responsibility to protect citizens from genocide and crimes against humanity can be squared with other responsibilities – for example, the responsibility to protect people from starvation or death from disease in a 'complex emergency'. The latter conception would clearly prioritise humanitarian access. The former would not necessarily do so. Past experience suggests that there *can* be tensions between humanitarian commitments and those rooted in human rights obligations. While it may be possible and desirable to minimise such tensions, this may more likely be achieved if their existence is openly acknowledged.

To complicate matters further, the imperatives of making peace have often led to issues of need and accountability being sidelined. To maintain that is not the case would be to deny what has happened in Sudan.

The IDC stated, in its first report on Darfur:

We do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice to be made, between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable peace, then justice and accountability are required. Political negotiations with those responsible for crimes against humanity are hardly a sound basis for a sustainable peace.⁷³

In its response, DFID appeared to concur.⁷⁴ Yet, as has already been pointed out, justice is playing a much larger part in peace-making in Darfur than it has done in relation to North-South. No independent observer disputes that war crimes or crimes against humanity took place in the context of the North-South conflict. Should it not follow from the position taken by the IDC and DFID that support to the CPA should be reduced, if not eliminated, until a sufficient degree of judicial accountability has been inserted into the process? This would, of course, run the risk of 'unscrambling' the peace deal. If justice

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ *Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect*, Fifth Report of Session 2004-5, HC67, para 104

⁷⁴ *DFID Response to the Report of the International Development Committee*, Cm 6575, 30 March 2005, para 69. It states: "We agree that accountability is essential to achieving long-term security".

was to be truly fair and even-handed, it is likely that SPLM/A leaders would also have to be indicted and tried.

The realm of international law, whether emerging or fully realised, does not deal explicitly with potential 'trade offs' and 'tough choices' of this kind. Those acting (or not, as the case may be) in 'realpolitical time' cannot always avoid them. Some argue that it might be better for the international community to acknowledge openly that it will often struggle simultaneously to manage overlapping but different priorities in countries such as Sudan.

Returning to Slim, he explores why international action "was still hard to achieve" in the case of Darfur. For example, he states: "The time it takes to form a coherent and assertive international response when people are being killed is always surprising. And, once again, over Darfur it took far too long".⁷⁵ He also criticises the Arab world, in particular key organisations like the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Countries, for their lack of response to what was happening in Darfur.⁷⁶

Slim also looks at the dilemmas thrown up by competing priorities but largely limits his detailed discussion to the questions of 'sequencing' and 'linkage' in pursuit of peace that were discussed earlier.⁷⁷ However, in some of his other writings he has directly addressed the complex inter-relationship between the humanitarian, human rights and political spheres when trying to "do the right thing".⁷⁸ For example, he looks at the provision of humanitarian aid to Hutu refugees in then Eastern Zaire in the mid -1990s, following the Rwandan genocide, which he presents as 'aid without justice'. He argues that it was justified to provide humanitarian aid here on the grounds that it would have been dangerous to withhold a definite good or benefit (aid) for the sake of a desirable but uncertain future good (justice). Another writer, Alex de Waal, has disagreed with views of this kind, arguing that the greater good here, given that many of the refugees were 'genocidaires', should have been justice. Accordingly, he opposed any efforts to prevent the Rwandan Government and its surrogates from enforcing a less than fully voluntary repatriation of hundreds of thousands of the refugees in 1997 through military action.⁷⁹

However, in his analysis of Darfur, Slim restricts himself to the pertinent observation that "having the will to do something is not the same as knowing what to do or being able to do it."⁸⁰

IV The International Response

This section of the paper summarises the role of key regional and international actors and the assistance that has been provided by each toward peace efforts in Sudan.

⁷⁵ Slim, "Dithering over Darfur", p. 823

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ See pp 17-19 of this Research Paper

⁷⁸ H. Slim, "Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War", *Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief*, 6, 1997

⁷⁹ A. de Waal, "Becoming Shameless. The Failure of Human Rights Organisations in Rwanda", *Times Literary Supplement*, 21 February 1997

⁸⁰ Slim, "Dithering over Darfur", p. 826

A. The African Union

The African Union (AU) has played a major mediating role in peace negotiations and has also become involved in peace-keeping on the ground in Darfur.

The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was created following the signing of the first ceasefire agreement in April 2004, when a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) was established comprising representatives from the parties to the conflict, the AU and the international community. AMIS is in effect the operational arm of the CFC. It has a mandate to observe and verify the ceasefire and to take measures to reduce friction points between the parties. A protection element for AMIS, comprising around 300 armed troops and endorsed by the UN Security Council, was deployed in August 2004 due to concerns about the continued absence of security. The mandate for the protection element included protecting humanitarian workers and AU observers, and protecting civilians should they come under attack, or be threatened, while AU forces were in the vicinity.

Concerns over whether AMIS was strong enough to carry out its tasks led the AU to decide in October 2004 to strengthen its capacity to 3,320, including 1,703 for the protection force. In April 2005, the AU agreed to further expand the force to 7,731.

By January 2006 AMIS had reached a total of 6,992 personnel, comprising 721 military observers, 1,320 civilian police, 58 international civilian staff, 11 CFC personnel and a protection force of 4,882 troops.⁸¹

Many commentators argued that AMIS was not coming up to complement quickly enough and that the figure of 7,731, when reached, would still not be enough. In addition, a mixture of logistical delays and obstruction by the GoS has impeded the effectiveness of AMIS. AU officials have at points suggested that a further expansion to 12,000 could take place during 2006.

In December 2005, with funds due to run out by the end of March 2006, the AU Commission undertook an assessment mission of AMIS. At the AU summit in Khartoum in January 2006, the organisation called for the UN to take over peace-keeping in Darfur. *Africa Confidential* argues that it did so because “its troops cannot operate without the financial and logistical support the international community promised but hasn’t delivered.”⁸²

By the end of January 2006 a decision in principle had been taken within the UN Secretariat to establish a blue-helmeted peace-keeping force in Darfur, pending approval by the Security Council. It looks likely that the mandate of any such force will be stronger than that of AMIS, in order to provide more effective protection of civilians. But it is unlikely to be ‘on the ground’ until September 2006.

⁸¹ *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, 30 January 2006, para 28

⁸² “Beyond that now”, *Africa Confidential*, 20 January 2006

It remains to be seen how the GoS will respond to the prospect of a UN peace-keeping force in Darfur. Some have long suspected that its enthusiasm for AMIS was based on a calculation that it “would lack the money, aircraft and signals technology to find out what was really going on...”⁸³

B. The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) has played an important role in promoting peace negotiations. The Security Council has adopted measures to pressurise the parties to the conflict in Darfur to come to the table. The UN has also become involved in peace-keeping activities in the context of the CPA.

The Security Council, in Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to support implementation of the CPA – including, when necessary, through armed action to protect civilians – and to play a coordinating and monitoring role regarding humanitarian assistance and the promotion and protection of human rights across the whole of Sudan.⁸⁴

The UNMIS web page provides the following information:

<p><i>Authorized strength</i> Up to 10,000 military personnel including some 750 military observers;</p> <p><i>Proposed strength</i> 715 police, 1,018 international civilian staff, 2,623 national staff and 214 United Nations Volunteers</p> <p><i>Strength as of 31 December 2005</i> 4,765 total uniformed personnel, including 4,009 troops, 467 military observers, and 289 police supported by 526 international civilian personnel, 1,023 local civilian and 71 United Nations Volunteers</p>	
<p>Contributors of military personnel</p>	<p>Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgystan, Malawi, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zeland, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sweden, Switzerland,</p>

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ See *Agreement between UN and the Government of Sudan regarding the Status of UNMIS*, 28 December 2005

Available at: <http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/sofa.pdf> (as at 3 February 2006)

	Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Contributors of police personnel	Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrain, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Financial Aspects	<i>Method of financing:</i> Assessments in respect of a Special Account <i>Approved budget:</i> 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: \$969.47 million (gross)

It continues:

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces, and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect United Nations personnel and to ensure their security and freedom of movement, as well as, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese Government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

The Security Council also requested the UN Secretary-General, through his Special Representative in Sudan "to coordinate all the activities of the UN system in Sudan, to mobilize resources and support from the international community for both immediate assistance and the long-term economic development of Sudan, and to facilitate coordination with other international actors, in particular the African Union and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of activities in support of the transitional process established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to resolve all ongoing conflicts in Sudan."⁸⁵

According to the Secretary of State for Development, Hilary Benn, in early November 2005, the number of UN peace-keepers in Southern Sudan at the time had reached 2,500.⁸⁶ More recently, *Africa Confidential* has estimated that there are now 4,000 UNMIS troops, many of which are still in Khartoum.⁸⁷ It is anticipated that the UN peace-keeping force now envisaged for Darfur will have a comparable mandate to that which

⁸⁵ Available at: <http://www.unmis.org/english/mandate.htm> (as at 3 February 2006)

⁸⁶ *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2005, Q18

⁸⁷ "Beyond that now", *Africa Confidential*, 20 January 2006

UNMIS already has under the CPA. However, it seems unlikely that it will be on the ground until September 2006 at the earliest, leaving AMIS to struggle on for a further six months.⁸⁸ It is not clear which countries will provide the troops needed.

UNMIS has worked closely with other UN agencies. For example, it has assisted the work of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has produced periodic reports on the human rights situation in Sudan. UNMIS Human Rights Officers collect the information for the OHCHR. The most recent report was published in January 2006 and covered the second half of 2005.⁸⁹ It has developed a Work Plan for 2006 to co-ordinate humanitarian operations and is an active party in reconstruction initiatives.

Other important UN Security Council Resolutions on Sudan are:

- 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004, which imposed an arms embargo with immediate effect on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur, Sudan, and demanded that the GoS disarm the Janjaweed militias
- 1591 of 29 March 2005, which expanded the arms embargo to include all parties to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur, and provided for the imposition of sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban) on those responsible for impeding the peace process or for carrying out atrocities
- 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred those suspected of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur to the International Criminal Court

The UN Sanctions Committee established under Resolution 1591 was due to publish a report on Sudan in December 2005 that would make recommendations about who should be subject to either an assets freeze or a travel ban. However, it has not yet come out.

C. The European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have provided military assistance to AMIS. The EU has also been a major supporter of UN peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. It has also supported reconstruction initiatives in Sudan.

In April 2005, the AU submitted a request to NATO and the EU for military assistance in expanding AMIS. Rather than launch a separate EU or NATO operation along the lines if

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ *Second Periodical Report of the OHCHR on the human rights situation in Sudan*, 27 January 2006
Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/press/docs/Sudanreport2.doc>

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the aim was to ensure that ownership of the peace-keeping mission remained in African hands but that the expansion of the operation was made effective by the contribution of key supporting capabilities such as strategic airlift and training. By the end of July 2005, agreement on the exact nature of military assistance had been agreed.⁹⁰

The total package of military assistance has included:

- Strategic airlift of AMIS personnel
- Training – specifically, in command and control and operational planning
- Improvement of the AU's intelligence-gathering capabilities
- Equipment

A small number of military observers have also been provided by the EU and NATO to support the AU on the ground. However, no troops from either quarter have been deployed in Darfur.

In addition to military assistance, the EU has provided a civilian police component to the AU.⁹¹ It has also provided approximately 70m Euros to support AMIS.⁹²

D. The United States

The US played an important role in Sudan since 2001, when President Bush appointed former Republican Senator John Danforth as a Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan. In 2002, Congress passed legislation approving aid for southern Sudan and requiring the Administration to impose sanctions on the GoS if it failed to negotiate in good faith in the North-South peace process.

The following extracts are taken from the US Embassy in Sudan's current 'list of US accomplishments':

- Deputy Secretary Zoellick announced at Oslo Donors Conference, April 11-12, 2005, U.S. commitment of \$853 million in FY 2005 for Sudan reconstruction and immediate humanitarian needs. Received \$175 million, plus additional food aid, from Congress through the FY 2005 supplemental. Requested significant additional funding for FY 2006. Total approximately \$1.7 billion.
- World's leader in providing humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan and Darfur. Within the amounts noted above, to date in FY 2005 provided more than \$433 million in humanitarian assistance to populations in Darfur and for approximately 200,000 refugees in Chad. During FY 2003-2005, provided more than \$692 million in humanitarian assistance for Darfur emergency.
- To intensify U.S. efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur and implement the CPA, Deputy Secretary Zoellick was designated as the Administration's point person on

⁹⁰ Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, Official Journal L 188/46, 20 July 2005

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, Lord Triesman, Oral Evidence to the IDC, 8 November 2005, Q15

Sudan. Has already made three visits to northern and southern Sudan, and to Darfur.

- Helped facilitate high-level attendance to support inauguration of new Presidency of the Government of National Unity (GONU) on July 9, 2005; attended by Deputy Secretary Zoellick. GONU providing further recognition of and continuing momentum for CPA.
- Assisted African Union (AU) mediated peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, producing important agreements leading to the recent signing of the Declaration of Principles. This paves the way for final talks to achieve a political settlement by the end of the year.
- Leading support for expansion of the AU mission in Darfur. Committed more than \$150 million to date to support AU Mission in Sudan, including pledge of \$50 million at AU Donors Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 26, 2005.
- Obtained NATO agreement to assist the AU expansion, and obtained Sudanese government agreement to NATO role.
- Began on July 17 airlift of 1,800 Rwandans. President Bush directed on July 15, 2005, drawdown of up to \$6 million from Department of Defense to support transportation of AU forces to Darfur.
- Have mobilized international pressure for action on Darfur. First nation to declare on September 9, 2004, that genocide had been committed in Darfur. Did not stand in the way of the adoption of Resolution 1593, calling for UNSC referral of human rights crimes and atrocities committed in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.⁹³

USAID will be spending \$109m in Sudan in 2006. \$21m is to be spent on supporting the peace process; \$9.85m on governance; \$10.25m on education; \$19m on health; and \$48.9m on promoting economic recovery.⁹⁴

Although it is consistently denied by the US, there have always been observers who believe that its interest in Sudan is motivated more by oil than altruism.⁹⁵

The US holds the Presidency of the UN Security Council during February 2006, when a resolution on extending the remit of UN peace-keeping to Darfur may be tabled.

E. The International Governmental Authority on Development

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African body that seeks to improve regional co-operation, has also played an important role.⁹⁶ During June and July 2002, it hosted talks in Kenya that resulted in the Machakos Protocol. This protocol created a framework for the eventual CPA. It has continued since to play a significant mediating and supporting role. For example, it established a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) of 29 monitors from amongst its member states to monitor, verify

⁹³ US Embassy in Sudan, List of Accomplishments. Available at: <http://khartoum.usembassy.gov/accomplishments.html>

⁹⁴ Figures taken from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/sd.html>

⁹⁵ See, for example, 'Oil is the key to peace in Sudan: so Bush is helping to end one of Africa's most brutal civil wars', *The Guardian*, 6 August 2002

⁹⁶ IGAD comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Somalia. See the organisation's web site at: <http://www.igad.org>

and investigate any violations of the ceasefire agreement reached in 2004 between the GoS and the SPLM/A.⁹⁷

F. China

40 per cent of Sudan's oil business is reportedly conducted with China. It has been reluctant to become actively involved in diplomatic initiatives on Sudan and until early 2005 did much to prevent effective international action on Darfur through the UN Security Council.⁹⁸ Since then, it has been less diplomatically protective of the GoS. However, it remains highly sceptical about the prospect of sanctions and about the referral of Darfur to the International Criminal Court. By contrast, China has supported AU involvement in Darfur, most notably in the form of AMIS. China's abstention, if not support, will be crucial if the UN's peace-keeping mandate is to extend to Darfur during 2006. It may be that China will seek to ensure that there is little further action on the sanctions front in return for its acquiescence over UN peace-keeping.

According to *Africa Confidential*, the UN Sanctions Committee on Darfur has found Chinese ammunition casings and other materiel in the region. It adds: "The UN arms embargo (also up for renewal in March) forbids Khartoum to use new military supplies in Darfur. We hear the regime has ordered more fighter jets from China; their military purpose is unclear."⁹⁹

This extract from a recent press release by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following a meeting between President al-Bashir of Sudan and the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister at the AU summit in Khartoum in January 2006, gives a flavour of the amicable nature of the relationship between the governments of the two countries:

On January 24, 2006, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir met at the Hall of Friendship in Khartoum, the capital, with Special Envoy of the Chinese Government & Vice Foreign Minister Lv Guozeng, who was attending the 6th African Union Summit.

President Al-Bashir thanked for China's enormous assistance for a long period of time and indicated that he is full of confidence about effective cooperation between both sides in various areas. He hoped that both sides will further strengthen economic and trade cooperation especially in the area of agriculture. Vice Foreign Minister Lv congratulated Sudan for successfully hosting this African Union Summit and indicated that the Chinese government attaches great importance to developing friendly cooperative relations with Sudan and would like to strengthen consultations and coordination with Sudan in international and regional affairs. Both sides also exchanged views on the African situation, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and other issues.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Taken from http://www.igad.org/pds/sudan_peace.htm

⁹⁸ *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2005, Q34

⁹⁹ "Beyond that now", *Africa Confidential*, 20 January 2006

¹⁰⁰ "President Bashir of Sudan meets with Special Envoy of the Chinese Government, LV Guofeng", Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 18 January 2006. Available at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t232979.htm>

G. Norway

Norway has taken a lead role in post-conflict reconstruction initiatives on Sudan. In September 2004, it organised a donor planning meeting in Oslo that was designed to support the recently established Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). Norway also organised the international donors' conference on Sudan in April 2005, which was convened in Oslo after the CPA was signed.¹⁰¹

H. The United Kingdom

The British Government has played an important role in supporting peace efforts in Sudan.

In a Written Statement on 13 June 2005, Hilary Benn, announced that the British Government would be providing £19m toward the costs of expanding AMIS, bringing its total contribution to £32m since the inception of the mission.¹⁰² The funds have gone towards additional vehicles for AMIS and further rapid deployment equipment. The UK has also supported EU assistance efforts.

In giving oral evidence to the International Development Committee on 8 November 2005, the Secretary of State provided the following additional information regarding current levels of British support to Sudan:

As far as our humanitarian programme is concerned, we are giving £75m to Sudan, including Darfur and including eastern Chad this year. This includes \$45m for the UN Work Plan of which around £25m will be sent to the South.¹⁰³

He added that the British Government has been supporting discussions as to whether a different approach to peace-keeping in Darfur might be necessary:

I think the AU and the rest of us should be open to looking at all the potential options, frankly, which might provide a solution to the problems of insecurity in Darfur. What the AU thinks about this is going to be hugely important.¹⁰⁴

More widely, on the obstacles to peace in Darfur, he added:

[...] My sense is that I think the Government of Sudan is willing to negotiate. The real problem actually has been the rebels because the rebels have been responsible for an increasing proportion of the attacks and insecurity.¹⁰⁵

On progress in implementing the CPA, he stated:

¹⁰¹ Available via: http://www.igad.org/psd/sudan_peace.htm

¹⁰² HC Deb 13 June 2005 c3-4WS

¹⁰³ *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2005, Q19

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, Q22

As I say, it has taken a bit longer than people hoped but I say so far so good, but people have to demonstrate they are going to continue to use these new mechanisms and work together. I think one of the big tests for the new government is: how does it then hope to deal with the problem of Darfur?¹⁰⁶

At the international donors' conference in Oslo in April 2005, the British Government pledged to contribute £288.7m towards humanitarian operations and reconstruction initiatives between then and the end of 2007.¹⁰⁷

Africa Confidential claims that the position of the British Government is that it will not be able to provide any troops towards UN peace-keeping in Darfur due to its heavy commitments elsewhere in the world.¹⁰⁸

During the visit of the President of China, Hu Jintao, to London in November 2005, the British Government tried to persuade him that China should use its influence to assist peace efforts in Darfur.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, Q25

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, Q23

¹⁰⁷ FCO Country Profile on Sudan

Available at:

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1020687852749>

¹⁰⁸ "Beyond that now", *Africa Confidential*, 20 January 2006

¹⁰⁹ *Darfur: The Killing Continues*, Second Report of Session 2005-6, HC657, 26 January 2006, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2005, Q34

Appendix Map of Sudan



Map No. 3707 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

Source: UN Cartographic Section. Available at:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf>

