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Kosovo: KFOR and Reconstruction

This paper looks at the major factors affecting Kosovo and the Balkan region following the suspension of the NATO air campaign, Operation “Allied Force”, on 10 June 1999. It examines the various aspects of the military, diplomatic and economic issues that have arisen in recent weeks, including that of reconstruction.

The historical background to the conflict and developments during 1998 are covered by Library Research Papers 98/73, *Kosovo*, and 98/93, *Kosovo: the Diplomatic and Military Options*. The build-up to the NATO action is covered in Library Research Paper 99/34, *Kosovo: NATO and Military Action*, of 24 March 1999. Developments during the NATO campaign are covered by Library Research Paper 99/48, *Kosovo: Operation "Allied Force"* and Standard Note *Kosovo Update*.

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Summary of main points

On 10 June 1999 NATO suspended its air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after Yugoslav forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo in accordance with a peace package agreed by the G-8 group of nations. Under the terms of the agreement, which was formalised by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1244 of 10 June, Yugoslav forces were granted eleven days to complete their withdrawal.

An international peacekeeping force known as KFOR, consisting of NATO forces, began deploying into Kosovo on 12 June. A few hours earlier a Russian force from the NATO-led SFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia had deployed unilaterally to Kosovo without consultation with Western leaders, leading to a stand-off with Alliance forces around the airport in Pristina.

As of 17 June around 15,000 of the planned 48,000 KFOR troops had deployed into Kosovo, taking control of much of the province as Yugoslav forces continued their withdrawal. Talks are continuing in an attempt to resolve a series of outstanding issues relating to the role of Russian peacekeeping forces in KFOR and the planned demilitarisation of the KLA. A number of localised incidents were reported as KLA forces and ethnic Albanian civilians moved into the areas vacated by Yugoslav troops.

Massive population movements are taking place in the region with thousands of ethnic Serb civilians fleeing in fear of reprisals by the KLA. Tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians have also begun to return to their homes, despite warnings from international aid agencies about the dangers of booby traps, mines and unexploded ordnance. There are fears that the widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure in Kosovo could lead to a fresh humanitarian crisis as aid agencies struggle to support the returning civilian population.

International agencies are only now beginning to assess the financial implications of the conflict, not only in terms of damage to property, but also in terms of the economic impact on the countries in the region. For the longer-term, the international community has proposed a stability pact for the region to promote democracy, economic recovery and regional co-operation.

In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) both the short and long-term political and economic prospects remain uncertain following President Slobodan Milosevic's decision to accept the terms of the peace agreement put forward by the international community. Some manifestations of domestic opposition to his rule are emerging as the full extent of the damage done to the military and economy of the FRY becomes apparent. Furthermore, Mr Milosevic and four other members of the leadership in Belgrade have been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on five charges relating to crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war.

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I Current and Future Developments

A. The Diplomatic Process

On 10 June 1999 NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana announced the suspension of the Alliance air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after 78 days of strikes and nearly 36,000 sorties.¹ According to NATO estimates, the campaign killed around 5,000 members of the Yugoslav military and injured a further 10,000. Yugoslav sources place the number of military deaths at around 570. The extent of civilian casualties from the air campaign also remains unclear at the present time, although the Yugoslav authorities maintain that approximately 2,000 people lost their lives.² Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the actions of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, believed to be at least 10,000, will probably take several months to establish, and the precise number may never be uncovered.

The decision to suspend the campaign came after NATO confirmed that Yugoslav forces had begun to withdraw from Kosovo in accordance with a peace package agreed by the G-8 group of nations and presented to the Yugoslav leadership by the EU envoy, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, and the Russian special envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin. On 3 June the Serbian parliament voted by 136 to 74 to approve this package and President Slobodan Milosevic then announced his acceptance of the plan, which consisted of the following main elements:

- A verifiable, rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of all Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije or VJ), Serbian Ministry of Interior special police (Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova or MUP), and other paramilitary forces
- The deployment in Kosovo of an effective international civil and security presence under a UN mandate to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced people
- The international security presence to have “substantial NATO participation” under a unified command and control
- Following the withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel to return for specified functions, which include guarding Serb patrimonial sites and maintaining a presence at border crossings
- Establishment of an interim administration in Kosovo under the aegis of the international civilian presence (probably the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe or OSCE)
- A political process aimed at establishing democratic self-governing institutions for Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords
- The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK) to undergo “demilitarisation”

¹ Approximately one third of the 36,000 sorties were bombing missions. The remainder consisted of reconnaissance, refuelling, mission co-ordination, and air superiority missions.

² BBC News web site at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 11 June 1999

- An international “Stability Pact” for the region to promote democracy, economic prosperity and regional co-operation³

Subsequent talks between NATO and Yugoslav commanders on a Military Technical Agreement to define the precise detail of the withdrawal initially ran into difficulties, and appeared at one stage to be on the verge of collapse, but agreement was eventually reached and the document signed on the evening of 9 June. The main provisions of the agreement were:

- The withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the southern region of Kosovo (Zone 1) within 6 days and from the western region (Zone 2) within 9 days.
- The full withdrawal to be completed within 11 days at which point the suspension of the NATO bombing campaign would be made permanent
- A five kilometre “Ground Safety Zone” and a 25 kilometre “Air Safety Zone” to be established along the northern border of Kosovo

Two provisions covered by the military annex to the Rambouillet Accords, which Belgrade rejected in March, were not included. These were the insistence that the proposed peacekeeping force for Kosovo - KFOR (Kosovo Enforcement Force) be composed solely of NATO forces, and the clause granting NATO forces “free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access” not only in Kosovo, but also “throughout the FRY.”⁴ Instead, it was agreed under Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the Military Technical Agreement that KFOR will “operate without hindrance in Kosovo.” The full text of the agreement is included as Appendix 3.

On 8 June it was announced that agreement had been reached among the foreign ministers of the G-8 on a draft UN Security Council resolution providing a mandate for the proposed Kosovo peacekeeping force. The following day the Alliance declared it was satisfied that the Yugoslav withdrawal had commenced and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana issued an order suspending the air campaign. The suspension of the bombing cleared the way for the draft resolution to be brought before the Security Council where it was adopted as Resolution 1244 on 10 June by 14 votes to 0. China abstained from the vote. The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is included as Appendix 2.

B. The Deployment of KFOR

On the morning of 12 June the lead elements of KFOR crossed into Kosovo from Blace in FYR Macedonia.⁵ Several hours earlier 200 Russian troops serving with the NATO-led

³ *Financial Times*, 4 June 1999 and BBC News web site at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 4 June 1999

⁴ Appendix B Paragraph 8 of the Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, HC Dep 99/893

⁵ Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

peacekeeping force SFOR in Bosnia had entered Kosovo via Serbia without informing NATO and established a presence at the airport in the provincial capital, Pristina.

A degree of confusion appeared to surround the move as the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, had earlier reassured Alliance leaders that the troops would not enter the province without prior agreement from NATO. Mr Ivanov then insisted that the move was a mistake and that the force would withdraw immediately, although it later emerged that the deployment had in fact been ordered by the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, without the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry. As of 17 June the Russian force remained in place, denying access to NATO troops seeking to enter the airport to establish the KFOR forward headquarters.

In spite of the stand-off, the initial deployment of KFOR units proceeded on schedule and by 17 June there were around 15,000 of the planned 47,800 NATO troops in the province,⁶ of which around 6,750 were troops from the British contingent. The Ministry of Defence reported that the British 4th Armoured Brigade was established in and around Pristina, while the 1st Battalion the Royal Gurkha Rifles, part of the British 5th Airborne Brigade, was patrolling around Pristina airport. The other elements of the 5th Airborne Brigade remained in reserve.⁷

By 17 June US forces in "Task Force Falcon" had consolidated their position around the south-eastern town of Gnjilane, and the French Framework Brigade was reported to be deploying ahead of schedule to the east and north of Pristina. The German 12th Panzer Brigade had begun to mount patrols in the Prizren area in the south of the province and the Italian Garibaldi Brigade had started patrolling around Pec in the west. Two days earlier it was announced that the KFOR Commander, General Sir Michael Jackson, had established the force's forward headquarters in a disused factory in the south-western part of Pristina.

NATO has subdivided Kosovo into five areas of command responsibility. The British contingent will control the central region around Pristina, extending north-east to the provincial border with Serbia. US forces will be responsible for the south-eastern sector along the border with Serbia and FYR Macedonia. The French deployment will control the northern region with Italians in the western sector around Pec. Finally, the German contingent will take responsibility for the south of Kosovo centred on Prizren. Of the planned total force of 47,868 troops, the United Kingdom will form the largest national contingent with around 13,000. The German contingent will number around 8,000, and France and the United States have pledged around 7,000. Italy is to contribute 5,000 troops, the Netherlands 2,000, Spain 1,200, Belgium 1,100, and Greece 1,000.⁸

⁶ At the time of writing there were approximately 26,300 KFOR troops in theatre. NATO press briefing, 17 June 1999

⁷ *Kosovo Situation Report*, 17 June 1999 from MOD web site at <http://www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/>

⁸ BBC News web site at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 13 June 1999

A series of small-scale incidents occurred during the first few days of the deployment as KLA fighters moved in to take control of the areas vacated by Yugoslav units. On 17 June US Marines in the south-eastern village of Zegra disarmed 200 KLA fighters who had refused to hand over their weapons. Three journalists died after being attacked by Serb gunmen and German KFOR troops shot dead several Yugoslav troops who opened fire on them. A number of reprisals by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs were also reported.

As of 17 June the withdrawal of VJ and MUP units appeared to be proceeding relatively smoothly after NATO agreed to extend by one day the original deadline of midnight on 15 June for the withdrawal from the southern border areas and the capital. NATO said the extension was justified as Belgrade was making a “sincere effort” to withdraw its troops, but was being hampered by a number of factors, not least the large numbers of refugees on the main routes. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said on 17 June:

Over 26,000 Serb ground forces, that is over half of the total, have now departed; 110 tanks, which is over half of the total; 210 APCs, three-quarters of the total; and 151 artillery pieces, about half of the total. Those are what we computed as of yesterday, so today they will probably be higher as the withdrawal continues, and we assess that all significant aircraft and major surface to air missile systems have also been withdrawn.⁹

Under the terms of the Military Technical Agreement Yugoslav forces have eleven days after entry into force (i.e. until 20 June) to complete the full withdrawal from Kosovo.

The deployment of KFOR has enabled war crimes investigators from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to enter the province.

C. Russian Involvement in KFOR

One of the main issues yet to be resolved regarding KFOR is the relationship between the proposed Russian contingent and NATO forces. Broadly speaking, the two points of disagreement relate to the issue of command and control and the question of whether Russian forces should be given their own national sector within the province. Talks in Helsinki involving the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and Russian officials have so far failed to reach agreement. To a certain degree, the situation has been further complicated by the deployment of the Russian Airborne troops in Pristina, although NATO leaders insist that they welcome Russia’s participation.

The decision to deploy the troops could be interpreted as a political move by President Yeltsin for the benefit of his domestic audience, and it has certainly generated widespread

⁹ NATO press briefing, 17 June 1999

political and popular support in Russia. Another view is that the episode serves to demonstrate the lack of control that the Russian President exerts over the military. In this view, Mr Yeltsin may have been forced to act by his military officials, annoyed at what they perceived to be a capitulation to the West and a betrayal of Belgrade by Mr Chernomyrdin.¹⁰

However, the unilateral deployment does appear to have been carefully calibrated to gain both domestic support and to provide Moscow with a useful bargaining chip in its dealings with NATO, while at the same time not going so far as to alienate the West, on whose financial support Russia continues to depend.

Dr Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute argues that the decision demonstrates Moscow's determination to be taken seriously by NATO and not to be forced into a subordinate role. He believes that the move also reflects a degree of frustration on the part of the Russian Government that Alliance leaders are apparently interpreting UN Security Council Resolution 1244 as

...a blank cheque allowing the alliance not only the sole command of the force, but also the ability to change the mandate at will, by imposing particular conditions on the Yugoslav military's withdrawal and threatening to resume air strikes if these are not met.¹¹

In his view Moscow sees the establishment of its own sector as vital because

...once a Russian sector is created, the option of granting independence to Kosovo without Moscow's approval is precluded; the Russians are therefore guaranteed a say in whatever happens on the ground in the future.¹²

However, NATO has expressed strong opposition to the establishment of a Russian sector within Kosovo. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said on 13 June that the Russians

...could not have their own sector, because one of the things we want to avoid and will avoid is a partition of Kosovo, and that would contribute to it.¹³

NATO officials believe that ethnic Albanians would be unwilling to return to any areas controlled solely by Russian forces, which are perceived to have a pro-Serb bias. Instead, it is feared that a Russian controlled zone could become a magnet for ethnic Serbs within the province, leading to *de facto* partition. Question marks also remain over the eventual relationship between the KLA and Russian forces, especially on the issue of disarmament,

¹⁰ *Financial Times*, 14 June 1999

¹¹ BBC News web site at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 14 June 1999

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *International Herald Tribune*, 14 June 1999

as Russian commanders may be inclined to take a particularly tough line on the hand-over of KLA weapons. There have already been reports of tension between the Russian contingent at Pristina airport and the KLA after a rocket-propelled grenade was fired at the Russian troops.

On the issue of command and control Moscow insists that its forces should have a separate command structure from NATO. The Alliance on the other hand believes that KFOR should have a unified command, and that Russian forces should be folded into the NATO force as is the case with the 1,700-strong Russian Airborne Brigade attached to SFOR in Bosnia. The Brigade is attached to the US Army in the US-led Multinational Division (north), but instead of reporting to the NATO SFOR command, it reports directly to a US General and Russian liaison officer based at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Annex 2 Paragraph 4 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provides a mandate for the international peacekeeping force, is rather ambiguous on the issue, stating simply that KFOR “must be deployed under unified command and control”.

Mr Talbott said on 13 June that the US was considering giving Russia a “zone of responsibility”,¹⁴ adding that “there will be parts of Kosovo where Russian participation will be important and manifest.”¹⁵ This appears to indicate that Russia could be given areas within which their troops would be predominant, but with elements of other KFOR national contingents also present. President Clinton and President Yeltsin are due to meet on 20 June at the G-8 summit in Cologne, raising hopes that the issue may be resolved in the coming days.

Russia has pledged not to take any further unilateral action without agreement with NATO, although it has emerged that Moscow had sought permission from both Hungary and Bulgaria for use of their airspace to fly an further 600 paratroopers into Pristina. Both countries refused.¹⁶ A Russian convoy with supplies for the contingent at the airport arrived in Pristina on 16 June after approval was given by NATO.¹⁷

Any Russian involvement in KFOR could be hampered by financial constraints and the poor state of the Russian military, which may force Moscow to reduce significantly its initial pledge to deploy up to 10,000 troops.

¹⁴ *CIS Reuter Textline*, 14 June 1999

¹⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, 14 June 1999

¹⁶ *Financial Times*, 15 June 1999

¹⁷ NATO press briefing, 16 June 1999

D. The Demilitarisation of the KLA

One of the main obstacles to international peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo may prove to be the issue of KLA demilitarisation. Under the terms of the Rambouillet Accords signed by the ethnic Albanian delegation on 18 March 1999 it was agreed that the KLA would submit to demilitarisation. Chapter 7 Article V Paragraph 1 states that all forces other than the VJ and MUP, which are covered elsewhere in the Accords, must

...publicly commit themselves to demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR [the KFOR Commander], renounce violence, guarantee security of international personnel, and respect the international borders of the FRY.¹⁸

The subsequent offensive by Yugoslav forces during March, April and May raised doubts as to whether the KLA would be willing to demilitarise once a peace deal was signed, although key members of the ethnic Albanian leadership have signalled a commitment to abide by the obligations agreed at Rambouillet. At a meeting on 8 June US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright secured a commitment to honour the accords from three of the main Kosovar leaders: Hashim Thaci, the head of the KLA-backed provisional government; Ibrahim Rugova, the pacifist head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK); and Rexhep Qosja of the United Democratic Movement of Kosovo.

It seems likely the KLA leadership recognises that co-operation with the West will prove vital if the movement is to continue to play a major political role in the province. Nonetheless, the fragmented nature of the command structure within the KLA and the lack of unity in the Kosovar Albanian political and military leadership may still pose serious obstacles. Some regional commanders within the KLA have declared their opposition to disarmament in the belief that the organisation should be eventually transformed into the army of an independent Kosovar state.¹⁹

Talks between KLA (UÇK) and KFOR commanders began in Tirana on 15 June on a demilitarisation plan and, despite press reports on 16 June that agreement had been reached, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said on 17 June that

...no formal agreement has yet been concluded between NATO and the UCK, although contacts are ongoing, and we hope that a formal agreement will be concluded in the next few days and we are continuing to work at that. We have put to the UCK political leaders a clear timetable running upwards out to 30 days for their initial demilitarisation and which would assure that naturally the heavy weapons and so on would be placed under the control of Kfor in secure storage sites.²⁰

¹⁸ Chapter 7 Article V Paragraph 1. The full text of the Rambouillet Accords is available on the web at <http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/interim.htm>

¹⁹ *Financial Times*, 15 June 1999

²⁰ NATO press briefing, 17 June 1999

It remains to be seen whether NATO will concentrate primarily on the hand-over and destruction of heavy weapons, considering the full disarmament of the KLA, including the hand-over of small arms, to be too problematic. Nonetheless, a credible demilitarisation programme will be vital, if NATO is to convince ethnic Serb civilians in Kosovo that it can guarantee their security.

E. The Refugee Situation

The conflict in Kosovo has provoked a major humanitarian crisis in the region. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians were forced to flee their homes by an apparently orchestrated policy of mass expulsion by Yugoslav forces. One of the main tasks facing the international community in the coming weeks and months will be to ensure the safe return of these refugees and internally displaced people to Kosovo. To this end the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has drawn up a Return Plan, which is included as Appendix 4.

As of 17 June the UNHCR reported that an estimated 234,400 people were in FYR Macedonia, 424,600 in Albania, 69,700 in Montenegro, and 21,700 in Bosnia.²¹ A total of 87,156 were reported to have been evacuated to other countries, including 14,726 to Germany, 8,142 to Turkey, and 4,056 to the United Kingdom.²²

The UNHCR is anxious to prevent large-scale returns of refugees from the camps in FYR Macedonia and Albania due to concerns over their safety. Many ethnic Albanian settlements and much of the infrastructure have been destroyed either during the fighting or by retreating Yugoslav forces. Booby traps and minefields pose additional dangers, and the UNHCR has commenced an education programme in the camps to heighten awareness of the risks of premature return. Nonetheless, the UNHCR reported on 17 June that during the previous 48 hours over 26,000 refugees had re-entered the province from Albania and FYR Macedonia, apparently anxious to repair their homes and to restart the planting of crops during the summer months.²³ Many are men returning to their homes to assess the damage before they return later with their families. Few ethnic Albanians were reported to have returned from Montenegro, probably due to the continued presence of Yugoslav units along the provincial border.²⁴

Other obstacles to the return of refugees include the destruction of passports, birth certificates and other documents by Serbian and Yugoslav forces. In the aftermath of the

²¹ *UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update* of 17 June 1999 from the UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm>

²² *ibid.*

²³ NATO press briefing, 17 June 1999

²⁴ *UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update* of 17 June 1999 from the UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm>

peace agreement Belgrade declared that the FRY forces permitted to remain in the province should retain control over the return of refugees, but this was disputed by the international community, including the head of the UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, who wrote in the *International Herald Tribune*:

The international administrators in Kosovo must ensure that those who were responsible for the mass expulsions are not allowed to reap the harvest of the inhumane policy of expulsion by being able to block “undesirable” refugees from returning.²⁵

Mrs Ogata insisted that FRY forces “must not be vested with the authority to control the return movement” of refugees.²⁶

The initial aim for humanitarian agencies in Kosovo is to deliver humanitarian relief to the estimated half a million civilians believed to be internally displaced within the province.²⁷ The majority of the internally displaced people are concentrated in and around Glogovac, Klina, Obilic, Orahovac, Podujevo, Srbica, Suva Reka and Vucitrn, as well as in Stimlje and Mitrovica.²⁸ The priority is to locate and provide assistance to these people, many of whom have been living rough without access to regular supplies of food and medical equipment.

A fresh refugee crisis is in danger of developing as ethnic Serb civilians flee the province, fearful that NATO will be unable to guarantee their safety from possible KLA reprisals once FRY forces have departed. On 17 June the UNHCR reported that more than 17,000 Serbian civilians had fled the province to Montenegro since 9 June, a development that could provoke further instability in the region and upset the already tense and fragile relationship between the Montenegrin Government in Podgorica and the authorities in Belgrade.

On 15 June General Jackson called on ethnic Serbs to remain in the province and insisted that KFOR would be “even-handed” in its treatment of all Kosovo’s ethnic communities:

I appeal to the Serb population of Kosovo to accept what I say in good faith and to stay in their homes and not think they have to leave.²⁹

In spite of fears that the departure of Serb civilians might continue, as the Belgrade-appointed governor of Kosovo warned on 15 June when he said the departure of Serbs

²⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, 14 June 1999

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ Figure from *UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update* of 14 June 1999 from the UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm>

²⁸ See map of Kosovo in Appendix 5

²⁹ *Financial Times*, 16 June 1999

was “growing into a stampede”,³⁰ there were signs that some Serbs were considering returning to their homes after talking to KFOR troops.³¹

F. The Establishment of the Interim Administration

Under the terms of the peace agreement, the international community is to establish an interim administration for Kosovo. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said on 17 June that, in the short-term,

...the task of civil government in Kosovo will be in the hands of the United Nations, with the assistance of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank and the UNHCR. However, I hope that in a year or more one of the urgent priorities of that civil government, drawn from the interim international administration, will be to transfer its powers to elected representatives of the Kosovar Albanians and to ensure that we maintain the spirit of the Rambouillet peace accord, which provided for maximum decentralisation to the local regions of Kosovo so that communities would have maximum room to settle their own security matters and the future of their own public services.³²

The UN has appointed Vieira de Mello to the post of interim special representative for Kosovo with responsibility for overseeing the civil administration of the province prior to the appointment of a permanent representative. Mr de Mello, the UN Under-Secretary General in charge of co-ordinating emergency humanitarian operations, headed the UN assessment team that travelled to Kosovo while the NATO air campaign was underway.

G. The Indictment of President Milosevic

On 27 May the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Louise Arbour, announced the joint indictment of five members of the Belgrade leadership, including Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, on three counts of crimes against humanity and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war. The other men indicted were the President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, Nikola Sainovic, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the FRY, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Vljako Stojiljkovic.³³ According to ICTY:

³⁰ *Financial Times*, 16 June 1999

³¹ *UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update* of 17 June 1999 from the UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm>

³² HC Deb 17 June 1999, c587-8

³³ The full text of the indictments is available on the web at <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/24-05-99milo.htm>

The indictment alleges that, between 1 January and late May 1999, forces under the control of the five accused persecuted the Kosovo Albanian civilian population on political, racial or religious grounds. By the date of the indictment, approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, about one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, had been expelled from Kosovo. Thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovo Albanians have been killed in the operations by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Specifically, the five indictees are charged with the murder of over 340 persons identified by name in an annex to the indictment.³⁴

The indictment was submitted by Justice Arbour on 22 May and confirmed by Judge David Hunt on 24 May, although the announcement and the issuing of arrest warrants was delayed until 27 May to avoid jeopardising a UN humanitarian mission, which had been visiting the FRY and Kosovo. Further indictments will probably be issued once the Tribunal's teams have completed their investigations in the province.

During the NATO campaign NATO leaders consistently ruled out the option of an amnesty for President Milosevic or for any of the other members of the Yugoslav and Serbian leadership indicted by the Tribunal. Mr Cook said in April, prior to the issuing of the indictment:

I don't believe that the major powers would offer an amnesty to anyone they indict and indeed that would not be the policy of Britain.³⁵

However, he also acknowledged that the need for a peace agreement to resolve the conflict could mean NATO would have to deal with Mr Milosevic:

I will deal with anybody who enables us to return the refugees to Kosovo under international protection. If that involves dealing with those who have effective power in Belgrade, then we owe it to the refugees to do that.³⁶

During the subsequent talks with Belgrade in May and June, some commentators believe that NATO gave Mr Milosevic an indication that the indictment would not prove an obstacle to reaching a peace agreement. According to the *Financial Times*, NATO communicated through its secret envoy to Belgrade, the Swedish businessman Peter Castenfelt, that the indictment was "completely separate" from the issue of an agreement. An advisor to Mr Castenfelt told the *Financial Times*: "We could not change or soften the judgement, but we could say that it was a quite different matter."³⁷

³⁴ ICTY Press Release, 27 May 1999 from ICTY web site at <http://www.un.org/icty/special/index-p3.html>

³⁵ BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *Financial Times*, 14 June 1999

In any event, the Tribunal has no means of enforcing its writ without the co-operation of the states involved, and there is apparently little chance that Mr Milosevic will be handed over to the Tribunal in the immediate future. Even if Mr Milosevic were removed from power in the coming months, it seems unlikely that any new administration in Belgrade would be willing or able to hand him over for trial, for fear of provoking a political crisis. In Bosnia the two main figures indicted by the Tribunal, the commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, General Ratko Mladic, and the former Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic have both yet to be brought to The Hague.

H. The Situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

In the aftermath of the peace agreement that brought an end to the NATO campaign President Milosevic is facing a major challenge to his political position. Yugoslavia's economy and military have been badly damaged by the air strikes and there are increasing signs of domestic discontent, yet few commentators are willing to predict his imminent departure from power. Mr Milosevic is regarded as a skilful, if ruthless, politician, able to adapt to the prevailing political mood. There are already signs that he is seeking to present himself as the solution to the crisis, notwithstanding that many observers would claim he himself initiated it. He has been assisted by the tightly controlled state media, which has covered the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, but made little mention of the exodus of Serb civilians.

In a rare television address on 10 June Mr Milosevic attempted to play on the Serb national mythology of defiance in the face of overwhelming odds by insisting that the peace deal had ensured Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and that "we never gave up Kosovo." He also congratulated the Yugoslav armed forces for "heroically" defending the country against foreign "aggression".³⁸ Four days later, in his first public appearance since the end of the conflict, he gave a speech at one of the bombed bridges over the Danube at Novi Sad in which he called on his countrymen to begin the task of reconstruction.³⁹

However, the decision to agree to the peace deal has already had an impact on the political situation in Belgrade. On 14 June the leader of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Vojislav Seselj, announced the resignation of his party from the Serbian Government in protest at what he called "capitulation" to NATO's demands. Mr Seselj, who held the post of Deputy Prime Minister, had warned earlier that his party would resign if NATO forces were allowed into the province as part of a peace plan. The SRS held 15 of the 35 ministries in the Serbian Government as part of a coalition with Mr Milosevic's Socialist Party.

³⁸ *Washington Post*, 11 June 1999

³⁹ BBC News web site at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 14 June 1999

The withdrawal of the SRS may not pose an immediate threat to Mr Milosevic's position, as the former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, Vuk Draskovic, who was dismissed in late April for advocating compromise with NATO, has indicated a willingness to return to the Government.

Opposition to Mr Milosevic is also emerging from other quarters. On 15 June the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a statement demanding that President Milosevic stand down in the interest of the people and their salvation, so that

new people acceptable to the domestic and international public, as well as a government of national salvation, can take responsibility for the people and their future. It is quite clear to any reasonable person that the numerous internal problems and contradictions, as well as the isolation of our state on the international scene, cannot be resolved and overcome by a government such as this one and under such conditions.⁴⁰

The mood of the general population is harder to judge. Some have expressed support for Mr Milosevic for standing up to what they see as foreign aggression, while others are questioning why they were forced to endure eleven weeks of bombing before concluding a peace agreement, which has much in common with the Rambouillet Accords. In the short-term Mr Milosevic's position may be secure, but the longer-term prospects are far from clear, especially if popular discontent increases as the full economic and social impact of the conflict becomes apparent.

⁴⁰ Bosnian Serb news agency *SRNA*, 15 June 1999

II Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis

A. Costs of the Military Campaign (PB)

It is not clear as yet what the costs of the military operation have been. On 15 April 1999 Mr Robertson said that ‘our assessment of costs incurred as of 8 April is some £17 million; this does not include the costs of replenishing stock of ordnance expended.’⁴¹ On 17 May 1999 Mr Corbyn asked what estimate had been made of the cost of the deployment of British forces in the Balkans since 18 April 1999. Mr Robertson gave the following reply:

As at the end of April, £37 million of additional expenditure has fallen to my Department as a direct consequence of the UK’s military response to the Kosovo crisis. This figure does not include the costs of replenishing stocks of expended ordnance or the costs of the UK’s ongoing contribution to SFOR in Bosnia.⁴²

An article in the *Independent* on 11 June 1999 argued that the total costs of the military operation and the reconstruction of the Balkans could reach £3.5bn. According to this article the military operation itself is estimated by the Ministry of Defence to have cost between £400m and £500m. Other costs would derive from the contribution to KFOR and from reconstruction efforts. On 7 June 1999 the *Independent* gave a total of ‘more than £200m’ as the total cost to the MoD, including ordnance expended. The same article also claimed that a dispute had arisen between the MoD and the Treasury over the funding of the military operation. It claimed that the MoD sought a contribution from the Treasury’s contingency reserve, but that the Treasury was unwilling to provide this on the basis that not all the costs incurred were additional (the troops would have been paid in any case and would have incurred costs on training missions and the like). A substantial claim on the contingency reserve might have an impact on the resources available for other Departments.

In May 1999 the *Financial Times* cited an economist who estimated that the cost of one month’s air campaign over Kosovo was at most about £1.8bn.⁴³ It is not easy to produce an accurate monthly or weekly figure, since the nature of operations varied over time, so this should be taken as a very rough estimate. According to a *Reuter’s* report at the end of the campaign the total cost to NATO countries was between \$3bn and \$5bn.⁴⁴

On the apportionment of these costs, the Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Gilbert, gave the following answer:

⁴¹ HC Deb 15 April 1999, cc323-4w.

⁴² HC Deb 17 May 1999, c257w.

⁴³ *Financial Times*, 12 May 1999.

⁴⁴ *Reuter Textline*, 11 June 1999.

The total cost of NATO's military operations against Yugoslavia has yet to be determined. Individual nations will, however, be expected to bear the costs associated with their own military activity in support of Kosovo-related operations. NATO common costs, covering the activities of NATO bodies and formations, will be apportioned in accordance with established cost share arrangements.⁴⁵

The costs of KFOR and the reconstruction of the region are the subject of speculation, with estimates varying very widely. There seems to be a consensus that the total cost will be many billions of pounds phased over a number of years.

B. Economic and Other Costs (MH)

Assistance in the form of emergency/humanitarian aid will continue to be required in Kosovo and its neighbouring countries for some time, especially if the plight of Serbian refugees is now to be alleviated.⁴⁶ However, international efforts in response to the Kosovo crisis are starting to shift more towards establishing a co-ordinated response to the economic and financial needs of the region, including the establishment of a programme of reconstruction for Kosovo and countries neighbouring the FRY.

This section draws heavily upon an IMF study, which sets out some preliminary estimates of the economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis in terms of the external financing gap and budgetary gap of the six most affected countries for 1999. The figures are subject to a large margin of error and do not include the costs of reconstruction, especially the cost of re-housing returning refugees.⁴⁷ It is too early to provide any meaningful assessment of the cost of repairing or replacing physical, economic and social assets. The cost of such a rebuilding programme will depend clearly upon a number of factors, which are presently unknown, such as the extent of the damage and the pace and quality of the rebuilding programme.

This section merely seeks to set out some general points on the short term economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis.

C. Estimated costs

- The cost of repairing the war damage in Kosovo and the neighbouring countries will not be known until assessors have full access throughout the region. More reliable figures are likely to be available in the autumn in time for a possible donors' conference.

⁴⁵ HL Deb 19 May 1999, c37w

⁴⁶ Latest details on the humanitarian response are available from the Department for International Development.

⁴⁷ *The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment*, IMF/World Bank, May 25 1999 from web site <http://www.seerecon.org/>

- Despite the uncertainty about the true economic cost, the region's economy, especially its transport, business and trade links, is severely disrupted.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania are also experiencing the effects of the crisis since their leading export markets and transit routes are disrupted.
- According to the IMF, of the countries neighbouring Kosovo (excluding Serbia), Albania and FYR Macedonia are the most affected. The large number of refugees in these countries has put a huge strain on the social and economic infrastructure in these countries.

D. Balance of payments gaps

- The region is unlikely to have adequate external financing to deal with the adverse macroeconomic consequences of the crisis. Some of these countries will face sizeable budgetary and balance of payments gaps at least through to the end of 1999.
- As a result of lost export earnings, trade diversions, and potentially higher debt service costs, the balance of payments gaps in most countries are likely to widen. The aggregate incremental balance of payments gap for the six most affected countries are projected to range from \$1.1 billion to \$1.7 billion in 1999. Inclusive of the refugee cost, the total financing need for the region is in the order of between \$1.3 billion and \$2.2 billion. This excludes rebuilding costs.⁴⁸
- Even assuming that external financing is available in adequate amounts to cover the incremental balance of payment gaps, the crisis is projected to cut the average rate of economic growth in the six countries by 3-4 percentage points in 1999, with much larger declines in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, and significant declines in Bulgaria and Croatia.
- The attractiveness of the region as a destination of foreign direct investment and tourism has been blighted. International borrowing costs are likely to rise in order to reflect the higher country risk premium on capital markets borrowings.
- The total amount pledged so far by donors to the six most affected countries for covering the balance of payments gaps is about \$620 million, of which well under half is concessional financing. This leaves an unfilled incremental balance of payments gap of between \$500 million and \$1 billion for 1999.

⁴⁸ See table in Appendix 6

E. Budgetary gaps

- Governments in the region are also likely to face increasing budgetary gaps as tax revenue falls (through lower incomes and collection rates) at a time of higher expenditures related to refugees. In the face of such budgetary pressures the governments may be forced to make offsetting cut backs in spending in other key social areas.
- The total direct refugee costs in 1999 would range from \$400 million to \$760 million depending upon whether the crisis is resolved quickly or not.

F. Future Response

- As noted above, the international community has already started to assess the current and projected implications of the crisis on the countries of the region with a view to providing additional assistance over and above their regular aid programs.
- It is possible that an international conference, such as the G-24 donors and including the World Bank and the EU, could take place sometime around mid-July. This could focus on what the international community can do to help the people in the region return to normality. A second donors' conference for the reconstruction efforts is planned for the autumn, as soon as initial damage assessments have been carried out.

A report by the UN Secretary-General of 12 June 1999 included the following reference to reconstruction:

14. The tasks of reconstruction would be led by the European Union, and should be aimed at rebuilding the physical, economic and social infrastructure and systems of Kosovo and supporting the reactivation of public services and utilities. The range of tasks would be decided in consultation with the European Union. These could include near-term projects in the area of agriculture and markets, and activities relating to commerce; activities to re-establish essential public services and develop programmes for economic recovery; and longer-term capital projects in the areas of housing, utilities, transportation and communications. Every effort should be made to avoid the creation of a gap between humanitarian relief and rehabilitation and longer-term reconstruction. The overall plan for Kosovo should take into account the reconstruction and stabilization plans for the wider region.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), S/1999/672, 12 June 1999

G. The updated IMF/World Bank study into the estimated costs of the Kosovo crisis and possible sources of finance

On 25 May 1999 the IMF and World Bank published an updated assessment of the economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis. This study looked at 2 scenarios differentiated by the assumed length of the crisis: prolonged disruption (Scenario A) and a more quickly resolved crisis (Scenario B). This updated version was more pessimistic than the earlier study published in April:

20. Donor assistance for non-budgetary humanitarian costs comes in many forms, both cash and kind, and is difficult to quantify. However, the humanitarian support being provided appears to be both timely and broadly sufficient to cover the basic needs of refugees. In contrast, the total amount pledged so far by donors to the six most affected countries for covering the balance of payments gaps is about \$620 million, of which well under half is concessional financing. This leaves an unfilled incremental balance of payments gap of over \$1 billion for 1999 under Scenario A, and about \$500 million under Scenario B. The sizable unfilled gap indicates the urgency of securing external financing commitments. Given the already heavy external debt burden in many of the affected countries, it will be important for the additional financing to be on appropriately concessional terms. The planned donor meetings are therefore critical for mobilizing such assistance.

21. A lack of adequate and timely balance of payments financing would result in further severe damage to the economies in the region. In FYRM [FYR Macedonia], shortfalls in external financing would in the first instance cause import compression and further output losses, but given the limited room for expenditure cuts, the authorities might also have to resort to inflationary domestic financing, threatening macroeconomic stability. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, the currency board arrangements would force a further sharp contraction of output, adding to budgetary pressures and undermining support for reform. In Albania, Croatia, and Romania, unfilled balance of payments gaps could to some extent be met by reducing official reserves, but at some loss of confidence and with an increased threat to exchange rate stability.

VI. Conclusions

24. The following main conclusions emerge from the staff's updated assessment of the consequences of the Kosovo crisis for the six most affected neighboring countries:

- The economic costs are likely to be significantly higher than estimated earlier. Even if the conflict were quickly resolved, the damage already done to trade routes and the time it will take to repatriate refugees implies that costs (including direct humanitarian) will exceed \$1¼ billion in 1999. This excludes the costs of making Kosovo habitable to the returning refugees. The cost estimates climb to about \$2¼ billion if the disruption is prolonged, the refugees do not return home, and trade with FRY is not resumed in any form. Future refugee repatriation costs would presumably also be substantially higher. It should be stressed that

Scenario A should not be seen as the upper bound to the costs of the Kosovo crisis for the six most affected countries.

- Even with adequate external financing, the Kosovo crisis will have a major negative impact on growth in most of the six affected countries. Growth will be reduced on average in the six countries by 3–4 percentage points, with the impact sufficiently large in some countries to cause output to contract. The estimates assume adequate and timely external assistance, but they do not fully take into account the less quantifiable impact of potential setbacks to structural reforms and deterioration in governance. Such setbacks could lead to broader instability in the short run in some countries, and to lower growth in the medium term.

- Concrete pledges of external financing so far fall well short of what is required to fill balance of payments gaps in the six affected countries, even under the more optimistic assumption of a quick resolution to the crisis. If the financing is not forthcoming, several of the countries would be forced to implement additional painful adjustment, with a further negative impact on growth. The risk of a further setback to structural reforms would also increase markedly.

III Opinion in the British Parliament

A. The British Government

The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in both the military and diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Kosovo crisis. However, the British Government recognises that the suspension of the air campaign and the deployment of KFOR do not signal the end of the international involvement in Kosovo. In the debate on Kosovo on 17 June the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, declared:

There is much still to be done. We will continue vigilantly to monitor the withdrawal of all Serb forces until the last vehicle has rolled over the border. That moment will not mark the end of our engagement in Kosovo, but the start of a new stage in which we must face the civilian challenge of rebuilding its shattered economy and its fractured society.⁵⁰

In addition to praising the work of the “many people across the Alliance and in the wider international community who have contributed to the successful outcome” of the crisis,⁵¹ he went on to express the hope that the crisis might mark a turning point for the Balkans, saying:

We have opened a new chapter in the relations between western Europe and the Balkan region. We now have the opportunity to close the chapters of Balkan history that are written in blood and to make the region’s countries our partners in trade and our equals in freedom.⁵²

B. The Opposition

For the Conservatives, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, John Maples, said:

The Foreign Secretary is right to say that NATO and the Government have been very successful in the first phase, and they deserve our congratulations.⁵³

However, with regard to the unilateral deployment of Russian forces to Pristina, he accused the Russians of behaving in “extraordinarily bad faith” and questioned why NATO had not foreseen that such a move was possible.⁵⁴ He also repeated his party’s call for an inquiry to take a “close and objective look after the event at the circumstances leading up to the military action”, saying it should

⁵⁰ HC Deb 17 June 1999, c582

⁵¹ *ibid.*, c589

⁵² *ibid.*, c589

⁵³ *ibid.*, c590

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, c593

...consider the diplomatic background, the military advice and the political direction of the military, which has been one of the difficult aspects of NATO's control and has made the military operations more difficult than they would otherwise have been.⁵⁵

The Foreign Affairs Spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, Menzies Campbell, said that "much had been achieved", but warned against drawing "invalid conclusions" from the military campaign based on contemporary evidence. In particular, he raised the point that

...if air operations had begun at the right tempo and intensity, if diplomatic efforts had been sufficiently strenuous initially, and if the threat of ground action had been credible from the beginning, the Milosevic regime might have capitulated earlier.⁵⁶

C. Other Views in Parliament

Sir John Stanley stated his support for the NATO action, but questioned whether NATO could have done more in March to impress on Belgrade its determination to take military action, thereby perhaps averting "this appalling humanitarian disaster in Kosovo."⁵⁷

Alice Mahon warned that an ethnically pure Kosovo was in the process of being created as ethnic Serbs flee the province, and claimed Western governments and the media had "demonised the Serbs as a people in an increasingly racist way."⁵⁸ The Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, said she regretted the departure of large numbers of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo, adding "we should try...to ensure that the Kosovar Serbs are made to feel safe" and "reassured that they are full citizens and are to be protected absolutely."⁵⁹

⁵⁵ HC Deb 17 June 1999, c594

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, c604

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, c617

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, c609

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, c651

Appendix 1: Text of Plan approved by Serbian Parliament

In order to move forward toward solving the Kosovo crisis, an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

1. Imminent and verifiable end to violence and repression of Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a quick timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo, under U.N. auspices, of efficient international civilian and security presences which would act as can be decided according to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter and be capable of guaranteeing fulfillment of joint goals.
4. International security presence, with an essential NATO participation, must be deployed under a unified control and command and authorized to secure safe environment for all the residents in Kosovo and enable the safe return of the displaced persons and refugees to their homes.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo which the U.N. Security Council will decide and under which the people of Kosovo will enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The interim administration [will] secure transitional authority during the time [for the] interim democratic and self-governing institutions, [establish] conditions for peaceful and normal life of all citizens of Kosovo.
6. After the withdrawal, an agreed number of Serbian personnel will be allowed to return to perform the following duties: liaison with the international civilian mission and international security presence, marking minefields, maintaining a presence at places of Serbian heritage, maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and the displaced under the supervision of UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] and undisturbed access for humanitarian organizations to Kosovo.
8. Political process directed at reaching interim political agreement which would secure essential autonomy for Kosovo, with full taking into consideration of the Rambouillet agreement, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other states in the region as well as demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The talks between the sides about the solution should not delay or disrupt establishment of the democratic self-governing institutions.
9. General approach to the economic development of the crisis region. That would include carrying out a pact of stability for southeastern Europe, wide international

participation in order to advance democracy and economic prosperity, and stability and regional cooperation.

10. The end of military activities will depend on acceptance of the listed principles and simultaneous agreement with other previously identified elements which are identified in the footnote below. Then a military-technical agreement will be agreed which will among other things specify additional modalities, including the role and function of the Yugoslav, i.e. Serbian, personnel in Kosovo.

11. The process of withdrawal includes a phased, detailed timetable and the marking of a buffer zone in Serbia behind which the troops will withdraw.

12. The returning personnel: The equipment of the returning personnel, the range of their functional responsibilities, the timetable for their return, determination of the geographic zones of their activity, the rules guiding their relations with the international security presence and the international civilian mission.

Footnote. Other required elements: Fast and precise timetable for the withdrawal which means for instance: seven days to end the withdrawal; pulling out of weapons of air defense from the zone of the mutual security of 25 kilometers [16 miles] within 48 hours; return of the personnel to fulfill the four duties will be carried out under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number – hundreds, not thousands.

Suspension of military actions will happen after the beginning of the withdrawal which can be verified. Discussion about the military-technical agreement and its reaching will not prolong the agreed period for the withdrawal.

Source: *Washington Post* web site at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/accord060499.htm>

Note: The text, originally in Serbian, was translated by the *Associated Press*.

Appendix 2: UN Security Council Resolution 1244

United Nations
S/RES/1244 (1999)
10 June 1999

RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

- (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
 - (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
 - (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
 - (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
 - (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
 - (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
 - (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
 - (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
 - (j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
 - (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by

the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;

- Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.¹ A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;

- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;

- Timetable for their return;

- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;

- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

1 Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

Appendix 3: Military Technical Agreement

Military Technical Agreement

Full text of the Military Technical Agreement signed by the International Security Force (K-For) and the military representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on 9 June 1999.

Article I: General Obligations

1. The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari [of Finland] to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb parliament and the Federal Government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences.

The Parties further note that the UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences.

2. The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (K-For) will deploy following the adoption of the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution referred to in Paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.

They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this Agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.

3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below:

a. "The Parties" are those signatories to the Agreement.

b. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organisation of the Parties.

c. "FRY Forces" includes all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia personnel and organisations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the international security force (K-For) commander.

d. The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone.

e. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone.

f. Entry into Force Day (EIF Day) is defined as the day this Agreement is signed.

4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) described in paragraph 3. Article 1 without the prior express consent of the international security force (K-For) commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.

The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and Serbian personnel which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.

b. To provide for the support and authorisation of the international security force (K-For) and in particular to authorise the international security force (K-For) to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the international security force (K-For), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations (details in Appendix B).

Article II: Cessation of Hostilities

1. The FRY Forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities.

They shall not encourage, organise or support hostile or provocative demonstrations.

2. Phased Withdrawal of FRY Forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased withdrawal of all FRY Forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo.

FRY Forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, FRY Forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges.

They will also mark all sides of all minefields. International security forces' (K-For) entry and deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized.

The phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:

a. By EIF + 1 day, FRY Forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that Zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).

Once it is verified that FRY forces have complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this Article, NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and provided that the UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force (K-For) so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided.

b. By EIF + 6 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Establish liaison teams with the K-For commander in Pristina.

c. By EIF + 9 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).

d. By EIF + 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).

e. By EIF +11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to the Agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 km GSZ.

At the end of the sequence (EIF + 11), the senior FRY Forces commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force (K-For) commander that the FRY Forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal.

The international security force (K-For) commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal.

The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY Forces as provided under Article II.

The international security force (K-For) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this Agreement.

f. The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will co-operate fully with international security force (K-For) in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ.

g. FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack.

h. The international security force (K-For) will provide appropriate control of the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN.

3. Phased Withdrawal of Yugoslavia Air and Air Defence Forces (YAADF)

a. At EIF + 1 day, no FRY aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, will fly in Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force (K-For) commander.

All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missile and aircraft of the Parties will refrain from acquisition, target tracking or otherwise illuminating international security (K-For) air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ.

b. By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometre ASZ.

c. The international security force (K-For) commander will control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF.

Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international security force (K-For) commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as unauthorised flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defence (IADS) within the ASZ, are subject to military action by the international security force (K-For), including the use of necessary force.

The international security force (K-For) commander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY institutions to monitor operations, deconflict international security force (K-For) air traffic movements, and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system.

It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian authorities as soon as practicable.

Article III: Notifications

1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately communicated to all FRY forces.

2. By EIF +2 days, the State governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all FRY Forces:

a. Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglement, physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY Forces.

b. Any further information of a military or security nature about FRY Forces in the territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international security force (K-For) commander.

Article IV: Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)

A JIC shall be established with the deployment of the international security force (K-For) to Kosovo as directed by the international security force (K-For) commander.

Article V: Final Authority to Interpret

The international security force (K-For) commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports.

His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.

Article VI: Entry Into Force

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Appendices:

A. Phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo

[This Appendix contains map(s) of designated routes for Serb withdrawal.]

B. International security force (K-For) operations

1. Consistent with the general obligations of the Military Technical Agreement, the State Governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (K-For) will deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.

2. The international security force (K-For) commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all he judges necessary and proper, including the use of

military force, to protect the international security force (K-For), the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities inherent in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace Settlement which it supports.

3. The international security force (K-For) nor any of its personnel or staff shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this Agreement.

The parties will agree a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as soon as possible.

4. The international security force (K-For) shall have the right:

a. To monitor and ensure compliance with this Agreement and to respond promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required.

This includes necessary actions to:

(1) Enforce withdrawals of FRY forces. (2) Enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY personnel to Kosovo. (3) Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or otherwise authorised by the UNSC.

b. To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, and with FRY/Serbian civil and military authorities.

c. To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo that the international security force (K-For) commander believes has or may have military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Agreement.

5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Parties understand and agree that the international security force (K-For) commander has the right and is authorised to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international security force (K-For) commander determines a potential threat to either the international security force (K-For) or its mission, or to another Party.

Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the international security force (K-For) shall be subject to military action by the international security force (K-For), including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance.

Appendix 4: UNHCR Kosovo Return Plan

UNHCR Kosovo Return Plan

Update as at 11 June 1999

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I. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

This note provides an update on return planning outlined in the "Concept Paper on a Proposed Framework for Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons to Kosovo" of 12 May 1999, and the "Next Steps for Return" note of 7 June 1999. Given the fast-moving pace of developments, UNHCR's plans are a work in progress, and will be constantly updated to keep pace with events.

As soon as the international military force which will be deployed to Kosovo under the Security Council resolution implementing the peace plan confirms that the necessary conditions are in place, UNHCR will re-enter Kosovo. This is likely to happen within 24 - 48 hours of the international forces' deployment.

UNHCR's priorities will include:

- immediate provision of emergency assistance to the estimated 600,000 displaced persons in Kosovo, as well as other civilians in need;
- re-establishment of UNHCR's offices in seven locations around the province, and creation of "humanitarian distribution points";
- establishment of a program to assist displaced persons and refugees to voluntarily return to Kosovo in safety and dignity and to fully reintegrate;
- re-establishment of the international framework for protection monitoring and intervention on behalf of displaced persons and returnees.

2. Operational Assumptions

Approximately 600,000 displaced persons are inside Kosovo who will require urgent assistance; The population remaining in Kosovo is in worse physical condition than the refugees; Refugees will start to return in large numbers within three weeks of the international military force entering Kosovo: some will also return spontaneously before that time; Up to 500,000 refugees may return to Kosovo from Albania and FYR of Macedonia within three to four months after return has become possible; Average family size is 6 people; Humanitarian access will be limited in the first month for security reasons (e.g. landmines); Up to 50% of returnees will need transport assistance, with the other 50% repatriating spontaneously; Up to 50% of housing in Kosovo is damaged or destroyed; A certain number of refugees may choose not to return to Kosovo at this time.

In the first wave of return, returnees will be from:

Within Kosovo

Displaced persons in the open (near Glogovac, Klina, Obilic, Orahovac, Podujevo, Srbica, Suva Reka, Vucitrn). All will require immediate food and non-food aid, as well as transport assistance.

Albania

Refugees in border areas in Northern Albania (100,000). Many have tractors, although transport assistance may be necessary for some. Many do not have documents and will require documentation assistance. Refugees from elsewhere in Albania (150,000). Many will require transport and documentation assistance.

FYR of Macedonia

Refugees in camps in FYR of Macedonia. (100,000) This group is from the larger cities and arrived by trains and buses. Nearly all will require transport assistance. Many do not have Kosovo identity documents and will require documentation assistance (e.g. refugee registration cards, ration cards). Refugees in host families in FYR of Macedonia. (100,000) Many have documents and vehicles, while a smaller number will require assistance with both.

Montenegro

IDPs in border collective centres and host families in Montenegro. (50,000). Many have cars, many will also require transport assistance. Many have documents, although others will require assistance on this front.

3. Strategy

Protection: It is imperative that adequate security conditions are established within Kosovo in order for refugees to voluntarily return and reintegrate. In the first phases of return, it is expected that there may be a vacuum of authority in the maintenance of civil law and order, and that security/protection problems are likely to arise. The establishment of adequate protection monitoring and intervention arrangements will be a key priority of UNHCR, in coordination with ICRC, OHCHR, UNICEF and other agencies with protection mandates. UNHCR will also seek to ensure that displaced persons and refugees are able to make a free and well-informed decision regarding return, and will resist organised, politicised efforts to take people back to Kosovo against their will.

Border issues: Refugees must be given freedom of movement to cross the border into Kosovo. Given the destruction of many Kosovar's identity documents, returnees need to be admitted irrespective of whether or not they possess identity documents. Prior residence should be assumed and any verification for the purpose of identity and other personal documents should be done only after return and by the simplest of measures. Other documents to establish identity, such as refugee registration or ration cards, should be also be recognised as legitimate for return. If necessary, UNHCR will establish mechanisms to provide ad hoc documents prior to border crossing for those in need. UNHCR will also organise "go and see visits" for refugees where required to assess conditions of return and to return to neighbouring countries/provinces, which will require freedom of movement across border crossing points.

Presence: Some 20 UNHCR staff will be in the first humanitarian convoy into Kosovo. UNHCR will establish a presence first in Pristina, which will be the main logistics hub. Within the first 30 days, UNHCR will establish seven field offices around Kosovo, each with a humanitarian distribution point and warehouse under the management of an NGO. After Pristina, offices will be opened in Prizren, Gnjilane and Urosevac, as these will be the major return towns and on major supply routes. Offices will follow in Djakovica, Pec and Mitrovica, bringing the total of seven offices and distribution centres within 30 kilometres of each other. Once these offices are functioning, it is estimated that some 350 staff will be in place. This extensive coverage should give the Office proper coverage and access to all returnees and displaced persons.

Target areas of activities: UNHCR will target its activities in Kosovo in the first weeks in areas where displaced persons are believed to be concentrated, and in areas where refugees will be returning first. A first priority for humanitarian assistance convoys will be the areas where there are believed to be large concentrations of displaced persons near Glogovac, Klina, Obilic, Orahovac, Podujevo, Srbica, Suva Reka, and Vucitrn. Once security is established inside Kosovo, these groups are expected to return to major cities such as Pec, Pristina and Mitrovica.

Refugees from FYR of Macedonia are expected to return in the first wave to municipalities bordering FYR of Macedonia, Podujevo, Pristina and Urosevac. Most returnees will travel through the Blace/General Jankovic border crossing and will use the

main road from Skopje via Urosevac to Pristina. Refugees from Albania will return in the first movements to the areas surrounding Prizren and Djakovica. Displaced persons from Montenegro will return to border municipalities in Western Kosovo, as well as through Pec and further on to Mitrovica in the north east, and Djakovica in the south. Accordingly, UNHCR will target its activities in the initial stages of return in these areas. All UNHCR offices will have warehousing from which aid will be distributed.

Information: Given the realities on the ground, it is extremely important that a proper information flow to refugees and displaced persons on conditions in Kosovo be urgently established, so that they may make a well-informed decision about return. A priority for UNHCR field staff in Kosovo in the crucial first days and weeks will be to gather information on conditions in Kosovo which will be channeled to displaced persons and refugees through a mass information program. A mass information focal point will be located in UNHCR's offices in Pristina, as well as those already in Skopje and Tirana.

Refugee Program: While it is envisaged that there will be a sizable return movement within the first three to four months, all displaced persons and refugee programs and structures in Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro will continue. The maintenance of adequate security arrangements, registration procedures and winterisation activities will remain key priorities.

II. DEPLOYMENT PLANS

1. Initial Preparations

A humanitarian assistance strategy is being developed by UNHCR, together with UN agencies, UNHCR implementing partners and NGOs providing sectoral emergency assistance, including health, water/sanitation, and shelter.

2. Activities Underway

UNHCR Ad Hoc Return Task Force: Given the rapid pace of developments in Kosovo, a senior level task force, which incorporates the Regional Return Unit (previously established in May) was also established in Skopje this week to step-up planning efforts already commenced with counterparts in FYR of Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNHCR Inter-Agency Return Task Force: The Task Force was initiated in Skopje in early-May to share plans with humanitarian assistance actors, and to coordinate with sectoral NGOs to develop a "best practice" and standardized framework. It has been agreed by the Task Force that UNHCR, in coordination with other donors, selected implementing partners and operational NGOs will provide an initial emergency response through the designated seven humanitarian assistance distribution points.

Military Liaison: UNHCR has appointed two liaison officers in Skopje to maintain close liaison with NATO/KFOR, on behalf of UNHCR, UN agencies and NGOs, to prioritize access of humanitarian assistance to Kosovo.

UNHCR personnel: International and national staff for initial deployment to Kosovo have been identified and are being pre-positioned in Skopje. Those for the first convoy are already in place or en route.

Supply Chain: To ensure that a supply chain is ensured, and to maintain liaison with WFP on food supply chain, UNHCR is enhancing existing capacity by establishing a Kosovo Support Unit in Skopje which will be functional 12 June 1999. The Unit will also provide general administrative, logistical and coordination support for UNHCR's operations in Kosovo.

Mine Action: To address the threat posed by mines to humanitarian organisations, UNHCR in coordination with UNMAS, has requested mine action agency HELP to prepare for the immediate deployment of teams to Kosovo. Further discussion with other agencies such as Halo Trust and NPA are also planned. A HELP representative will join the first humanitarian convoy into Kosovo.

3. Deployment to Kosovo

First Humanitarian Team: UNHCR will lead the first UN and NGO humanitarian team into Kosovo. The inter-agency convoy will bring 250 tonnes of food and non-food assistance within 24 - 48 hours of deployment of the first international military forces into Kosovo. UNHCR will be supplying over 50 tonnes of bottled water, tents, hygienic kits, blankets and plastic sheeting within the first hours of arrival in Kosovo. UNHCR will also take in office containers, office equipment and telecoms to reestablish its office in Pristina. As part of the coordinated humanitarian effort, WFP will supplement UNHCR's non-food aid by providing five trucks of humanitarian daily rations and wheat flour. UNICEF will also be bringing in vital supplies such as water purification kits, mine awareness items, hygienic kits and tents. Teams from UNMAS and NGOs involved in mine action will also be in the convoy to assist in the mine awareness and demining aspect of the mission.

First weeks: During the first week when UNHCR returns to Kosovo, its objectives will be to deliver immediate life-saving assistance to displaced persons and others through the establishment of humanitarian assistance points in Gnjilane, Pristina, Urosevac and Prizren; to reestablish its operational base in Pristina, including premises, staff, equipment and telecoms; to deploy key staff for all field offices to Pristina; and to conduct an initial needs and resource assessment of displaced persons and the remaining population, targeting areas where the displaced are believed to be concentrated.

Relief centres: UNHCR will plan to set up a number of relief centres along major routes where return is anticipated, and in areas near where the displaced are concentrated, for

returnees and the displaced to stop and receive immediate assistance (water, food, plastic, etc.).

4. Operational Plans for FYR of Macedonia/Albania/Montenegro

Preparation for return movements to Kosovo is underway in Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro. UNHCR's priority activities in the first weeks, which are already underway, are to conduct mass information campaigns on conditions of return, the repatriation process and specific repatriation procedures; to establish appropriate mechanisms in collaboration with concerned parties to ensure that returning refugees possess the necessary documentation to enable return; to set up arrangements for transportation of returnees; to establish way-stations along major routes of return to provide assistance with documentation and humanitarian relief; and to arrange modalities for return with government authorities.

5. Sectoral Responsibilities in Kosovo

Protection: UNHCR will immediately establish protection monitoring frameworks to assess the security/human rights conditions in the municipalities, and to provide information to UNHCR offices in FYR of Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro to feed the mass information campaign. To ensure that returnees and displaced persons are adequately protected, UNHCR in collaboration with agencies such as ICRC and OHCHR, will liaise with the international forces established in Kosovo on security and public law and order issues. Special attention will be paid to monitoring and assisting communities at risk, including the remaining Serb minority.

Transport and Logistics: In the first phase of the return, warehousing and transportation of all non-food items will be conducted from a "logistics hub" located in FYR of Macedonia. Warehousing capacity in Kosovo will be immediately identified or established (rubhalls) in the seven locations of UNHCR Field Offices. A principal NGO in each of these locations is currently being identified by UNHCR and will be responsible for secondary distribution, identifying and staffing secondary distribution points and commodity tracking (ration cards). In the second phase, ECHO has identified an NGO for each municipality. While there is a preference to rely upon local transportation capacities, UNHCR will also have to establish a fleet of international trucking teams in order to ensure immediate cross-border delivery of items from FYR of Macedonia and pending re-establishment of local capacities in Kosovo. Some of the DFID-seconded trucking teams of Albania are already being redeployed to Skopje. DRC will provide transport/logistics and warehousing under an existing arrangement with UNHCR. In agreement with UNHCR, transportation of returnees and their personal belongings will be conducted by IOM while WFP will be responsible for the transportation of food items to EDPs in accordance with the existing MOU with UNHCR.

Food: WFP will be responsible for the procurement of basic food items. In accordance with the existing Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, WFP will organise the delivery of basic food items to a number of Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) in Kosovo,

the location of which will be determined in cooperation with UNHCR and implementing partners to be identified. During the initial phase, WFP will mobilise a rapid response team by helicopters to deliver food commodities to pockets of needy communities which are difficult to access. WFP will set-up field offices and warehouses in the same seven locations as UNHCR. While UNHCR will be responsible for distribution, WFP will provide, when appropriate, logistical assistance in transporting food to final distribution points. UNHCR will establish, in consultation with WFP, an effective monitoring and reporting system. Wherever appropriate, WFP will provide baked bread for distribution utilising local bakeries and by setting-up mobile and movable bakery facilities. Returnees and displaced person will be provided with travel rations and food packages being prepared by a number of NGOS to cover needs until regular food deliveries are established at the community level.

Non-Food Items: Distribution of returnee assistance will be conducted inside Kosovo. UNHCR will ensure a basic returnee assistance package composed of seven core items while OFDA and ECHO will provide complimentary items, including some kitchen sets, baby kits, shoes, clothes, underwear, and basic tools not included in the shelter kit. UNHCR's package will, inter alia, consist of blankets, mattresses, hygienic kits, soap, jerrycans and candles.

Shelter: It is estimated that roughly 50% of the houses in Kosovo are damaged or destroyed (subject to on-the-ground assessment). UNHCR will provide basic shelter materials for approximately 35,000 housing units. Basic shelter kits will include plastic sheeting (roof and windows), some timber, a tool kit and possibly window/door frames. Procurement has already been initiated to cover the needs for 15,000 to 20,000 houses and some 15,000 "winterised" tents are already in the pipeline. Tents will essentially be used to complement existing housing capacity for badly-destroyed housing units and provisions are also made to rehabilitate some collective centres which could accommodate especially vulnerable returnees if needed. Wherever possible, preference will be given to local procurement for comparable prices, quality and delivery time. The coordination of shelter rehabilitation efforts by a wide variety of actors will be a major and difficult task, and will be conducted in the initial stages by UNHCR. Various discussions are already ongoing in FYR of Macedonia and Albania between shelter technical experts of UNHCR, major donors and NGOs/implementing partners. Plans for this key sector will be finalised on a priority basis. It is expected that this sector will eventually be led by the recovery agencies.

Health, Education and Community Services: Coordination in the health sector to ensure that displaced persons, returnees and others in need have access to essential health and education services will involve UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, ICRC, as well as major international NGOs. Health sector objectives, strategies and activities will be implemented in a phased sequence. Emphasis during the first phase of two to three months will be placed on meeting the basic health and nutritional needs of populations who remained in Kosovo, and on further identification of additional needs and resources. This will be achieved by the rehabilitation and revitalisation of pre-existing health structures. Services will be based on a primary health care strategy, with particular

emphasis on absorption of qualified medical staff and setting up services which are likely to be sustainable in medium to long terms. UNICEF will coordinate the deployment of mobile medical clinics in cooperation with UNHCR and international and local NGOs. Other assistance to be provided should include rehabilitation and recovery of village health stations, rapid delivery of essential drugs and basic medical materials and immunisation campaigns targeting children. As coordinating agency for the education sector, UNICEF will also, inter alia, provide school kits and establish guidelines on minimum standards for primary school rehabilitation. UNHCR's emergency standby arrangement with Radda Barnen will be activated immediately upon initiation of the return. This will enable the deployment of Community Services Officers within the seven UNHCR Field Offices in Kosovo. Partnerships with various implementing agencies will be established as soon as needs have been assessed in situ.

Water and Sanitation: Pending additional procurement, UNHCR will be redeploying some of the emergency water equipment and part of the water/sanitation fleet from Albania to Kosovo. Discussions are underway between UNHCR water/sanitation technical experts, donor technical experts and planned implementing partners in order to ensure full coordination and common approaches.

Humanitarian-Military Liaison: UNHCR will have a Liaison Officer responsible for liaison with the international security force at the HQS level in Pristina, and a Liaison Officer from the military will be seconded to UNHCR. Field Offices will also establish mechanisms for regular coordination with military counterparts. UNHCR military liaison officers already posted in Skopje and Pristina will maintain close contact and coordination with their counterparts in Kosovo.

InterAgency Coordination: UNHCR will work closely in Kosovo with WFP, UNICEF, UNHCHR, UNMAS and other UN agencies, international organisations such as the ICRC and IOM, the local Red Cross movement, international and local NGOs in all sectors, as well as government partners such as DIFD and FOCUS. To ensure proper coordination, a senior coordinator for inter-agency coordination will be seconded from OCHA to the Office of the Special Envoy to establish a coordination cell in Pristina. It is expected that staff from other UN agencies will also be seconded to this unit. At the local level, coordination mechanisms with agencies and NGOs will be set up by UNHCR in each municipality.

Geographic Information System: UNHCR has a geographic information system unit based in Skopje which will collaborate with partner agencies to provide a coordinated approach to humanitarian information collection and analysis relating to Kosovo. As part of this process, a multi-sectoral Rapid Village Assessment, developed in consultation with technical experts and key NGOs and compatible with the existing UNHCR geographic information system, will be undertaken by UNHCR and partner agencies immediately upon return to Kosovo. The assessment will collect information on population, shelter damage, infrastructure, mines, health, water supply, protection and assistance and provide important baseline information until detailed sectoral assessments

can be undertaken. This information will be fed into UNHCR's mass information campaign on return conditions.

Information campaign: Given the realities on the ground, it is extremely important that a proper information flow to refugees and displaced persons on conditions in Kosovo be urgently established. Together with NGO partner Media Action International, UNHCR is in the process of implementing a mass information campaign for refugees and IDPs to provide accurate and objective information regarding conditions in Kosovo, the repatriation process and specific procedures for return, as well as humanitarian assistance which is available. UNHCR has appointed mass information coordinators in Skopje and Tirana to work with the 15 staff of Media Action International in the region to provide information on television, radio and through information brochures in the camps. The first information brochure on the implications of the initial peace plan and repatriation planning was issued this week. This will be updated on a regular basis. A mass information focal point will also be appointed in Pristina as soon as UNHCR resumes operations there.

Source: UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosret2.htm>

Appendix 5: Map of Kosovo

KOSOVO



General Staff Map Branch, GSGS 12381, Edition 5-GSGS, August 1998. 672/98
 Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Produced by Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 1998
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Appendix 6: The Financial Impact of the Kosovo Conflict

Six Most Affected Countries: Incremental Effect Arising from the Kosovo Conflict 1999

	Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria	Croatia	FYR Macedonia	Romania	Total (1)
Number of refugees (in thousands)²							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	446	53	4	6	203	6	718
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	294	35	3	4	134	4	474
Refugee cost (US\$ millions)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	324	46	3	5	151	4	534
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	144	19	1	2	67	2	236
Balance of payment gap (US\$ millions)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	161	89	345	454	392	246	1,687
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	133	44	209	205	337	176	1,104
<i>Of which: Current account gap</i>							
<i>(US\$ millions)</i>							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	113	-60	174	203	259	197	886
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	84	-13	87	137	226	147	668
Total financing need (US\$ millions)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	485	135	348	459	543	250	2,221
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	277	63	210	207	404	178	1,340
(In percent of GDP)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	12.9	3.0	2.7	2.3	15.8	0.9	3.0
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	7.4	1.3	1.6	1.0	11.6	0.6	1.8
Budgetary gap (US\$ millions)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	154	110	123	117	193	52	749
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	111	58	77	77	167	42	532
(In percent of GDP)							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	14.0	2.4	0.9	1.7	5.5	0.2	1
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	12.9	1.2	0.6	0.4	4.7	0.1	1
GDP growth (in per cent)²							
Scenario A (a prolonged conflict)	0.0	-8.0	-2.5	-3.0	-9.0	-0.5	-2
Scenario B (more quickly resolved)	0.0	-5.0	-1.5	-2.0	-8.0	-0.4	-2
Memorandum items:							
GDP (1998 current prices, US\$ billions)	3.0	4.1	12.3	21.3	3.5	38.1	824.0
Population (in millions)	3.3	4.2	8.2	4.6	2.0	22.6	44.9
Per capita GDP (US\$)	923	972	1,487	4,662	1,773	1,687	1,834
Literacy rate (in percent)	98	98
Physicians (per one hundred thousand)	345	204	225	181	...
Enrollment in higher education institutions (per thousand)	27	89	31	51	...

Sources: Taken from "Economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis", IMF (May 1999) and based on UNHCR; and IMF staff estimates.

1 Sums of the individual country estimates, except for per capita GDP, GDP growth, and items expressed in percent of GDR For these, the totals are averages weighted by projected 1999 GDPs (in US dollars).

2 Average for Q2-Q4 1999.

3 Further details on the different scenarios are set out in "The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis" IMF, May 1999