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NATO's New Directions

At the Madrid Summit of July 1997 NATO set out or confirmed a number of new directions which it wished to follow into the next century. These included decisions to enlarge its borders to the east, to enhance its relations with states outside the Alliance and to restructure itself to meet the changing pattern of European security. This paper will present an overview of these and other recent initiatives and question whether they will have a fundamental impact on NATO's character.

The House of Commons Defence Committee's Third Report of Session 97/98, *NATO Enlargement*, is available as HC 469.

The additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty allowing for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO were laid before Parliament on 8 April (Cm 3930, Cm 3931 and Cm 3928, respectively).

Tom Dodd

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Summary

The Atlantic Alliance has entered a period of rapid change, accelerated by a number of decisions made at the Madrid Summit in July 1997.

The most important departure was a decision to expand the Alliance in 1999 to admit three new Members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of these new Members will require approval by both their own Parliaments and those of the Sixteen existing Member States, according to their particular constitutional practices. There is a general consensus that this approval will be granted and that ratification of the additional protocols will be completed in time to meet the 1999 deadline.

Enlargement has, however, proved controversial, not least because there is uncertainty as to how much it will cost. Fears have also been expressed about its impact on Russia, although NATO has sought to assuage Russian opposition through a new co-operative mechanism, the *Founding Act*, signed in May 1997. There have also been concerns about the affect of enlargement on the Alliance's cohesion and military effectiveness. Separately, there has been frustration amongst the nine NATO applicants rejected at Madrid, although the door remains open to future accessions. Efforts have been made both to continue to prepare certain states for NATO membership and to offer a framework for pan-European security co-operation via the establishment of a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The EAPC includes European neutrals, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, which have been forced to re-examine their defence policies because of NATO enlargement and wider changes in European security.

Besides NATO, the European Union is also expanding to include central and eastern European Members and some comparisons can be made between the two enlargement processes.

Within NATO, steps are being taken to rationalise the Integrated Command Structure, which will see the number of commands fall from the current 65 to 20. The reorganisation will also accommodate Combined Joint Task Forces, which, by 2000, are intended to offer NATO's European Member States a strengthened operational capability as part of the European Security and Defence Identity. Spain has announced that it will join a reformed command structure, but, defying earlier expectations, France has indicated that it will not.

Outside the Alliance, NATO has formed a new partnership with Ukraine, along the lines of that offered to Russia, and has also sought to stabilise its southern flank through the launch of a Mediterranean Initiative.

NATO is active in many policy areas. However, the combination of continued enlargement and a generally peaceful continent may lead the Alliance to weaken gradually as it enters the new century.

I The Madrid Summit: NATO Enlargement and Other Decisions

The Madrid Summit of July 1997 was one of the most important since the inception of the Alliance in 1949, with a number of momentous decisions being taken on NATO's future. Chief amongst these was agreement on an enlargement of NATO to the east, to encompass three new members. Separately, the Summit discussed: NATO's new relationship with Russia; parallel links with Ukraine; the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and an Enhanced Partnership for Peace; changes to the Alliance's integrated command structure, partly in order to accommodate the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); the participation of France and Spain in that command structure; and new approaches towards NATO's southern neighbours in the Mediterranean. This complex array of policy-making required a new framework and a further decision was taken to begin a review of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. All of the above initiatives interlock and contrive to give NATO a dynamic that many commentators doubted it would have when the Cold War ended.

Of all NATO's new directions, enlargement is the most significant and the most controversial. The Alliance's changing eastern borders stem in part from the decision made at the NATO Summit in London in July 1990 to extend the 'hand of friendship' to eastern Europe. NATO confirmed at the Brussels Summit in January 1994 that it was prepared to accept new democratic members from central and eastern Europe as part of an evolutionary process.¹ A definition of the practicalities and principles of enlargement was published in September 1995 as the *Study on NATO Enlargement*.² Ten countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia submitted discussion papers on membership which formed the basis of bilateral dialogue between them and NATO. Dialogue was subsequently extended to include Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, bringing the total number of potential candidates to 12.

The process of enlargement has not just been dictated by NATO but has also been shaped by appeals for membership from states in central and eastern Europe. Although Russia may pose no immediate threat to their security, several countries, such as Poland, have been invaded or 'liberated' by the forces of the Soviet Union at least twice this century. Russian threats against Latvia over what it regards as the mistreatment of its Russian minority, military ties with Slovakia and the revanchist rhetoric of extreme Russian nationalists, all fuel a sense of eastern European unease. What these countries seek is an insurance policy against Russia's

¹ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 12

² This, in essence, was a checklist of military, political and economic reforms necessary for participation in NATO. There are five basic criteria: an established democracy; respect for human rights; a market-based economy; armed forces under full civilian control; and finally good relations with neighbouring states.

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future intentions, which is what they believe membership of the Alliance will offer them, as well as providing a recognition that they are part of the European mainstream.

At the Madrid Summit NATO membership was offered to three states: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty. Negotiations on the accession agreements of the three accepted candidates proceeded quickly and were finished by the end of October 1997.³ The three invitees submitted Defence Planning Questionnaires in the same month. These are produced annually by Member States and illustrate the forces which they are willing to assign to NATO. The accession protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for all three accepted candidates were signed on 16 December 1997 at the winter NATO Foreign Ministers Council.⁴ The Three are scheduled to agree Target Force Goals, i.e. declarations of what their forces and their state of readiness should be, by June 1998.⁵ In further preparation for their admission, since January 1998 they have participated in meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, although they do not have voting rights and are not present when nuclear and NATO-Russia issues are discussed. Actual accession of the new members is planned to take place at a NATO summit to be held in Washington in April 1999. This is dependent on ratification of the additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty by each new Member and by the existing Members in line with their particular constitutional provisions.

The path to enlargement has not been a smooth one and has shown, once again, the leading, and some would say dominant, role of the USA in the Alliance. The enlargement of NATO to encompass some of its former Warsaw Pact enemies was scarcely considered in the early 1990s. Although the principle of enlargement was conceded in 1994, some NATO members were unenthusiastic about an accelerated expansion process. It was President Clinton who broke Alliance ranks in October 1996 by announcing the prospect of enlargement by 1999 during his re-election campaign. This move effectively short-circuited what had not officially been a predetermined process. Controversy also surrounds the manner in which the USA refused to countenance the admission of Romania and Slovenia to NATO at Madrid.⁶

In the UK, both the Labour Government and its Conservative predecessor have adopted a cautious approach to NATO enlargement. Prior to the Madrid Summit, Britain was not in the vanguard of its proponents and stuck closely to agreed NATO positions. This was in contrast to some other Member States, such as Germany, which was one of the key promoters of expansion. Successive British foreign and defence spokesmen have been keen to stress the importance of

³ *Atlantic News* 31/10/97

⁴ See *Brussels Declaration*, Paras 1 and 4

⁵ HC 469, p. 89

⁶ RP 97/51, *NATO Enlargement*, Section I discusses the issues surrounding enlargement up until May 1997. The candidate debate at the Madrid Summit is examined in Section VI. See also J. Goldgeier, 'NATO Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision', *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1998 on President Clinton's conversion to enlargement and US bureaucratic resistance to it.

preserving NATO's military role and capabilities. The Prime Minister presented Government policy to the House following the conclusion of the Madrid Summit: -

Successful NATO enlargement has been a key objective of both the previous Government and this Government. If we can get this right, it will make a major contribution to security and stability in Europe by bringing in countries of central and eastern Europe to one of our key institutions. Our priority was a manageable and limited enlargement, involving credible candidates with reliable democratic credentials and a real ability to contribute to collective security. As I said in yesterday's discussions, NATO is a military alliance, not a political club, and its collective defence obligations have to be taken with utmost seriousness.⁷

The thrust of British policy was supported both by the Leader of the Opposition and, for the Liberal Democrats, by Paddy Ashdown.⁸

Discussion of the enlargement issue has been muted on the backbenches, with some doubts expressed by individual Labour MPs. Ann Clwyd, for example, has spoken against enlargement on the grounds of cost, the effect it might have on Russia and for being unnecessary, particularly given the financial consequences for the accepted candidates, already struggling with the expenses of economic and social modernisation.⁹ NATO enlargement has been examined in detail by the House of Commons Defence Committee. Apart from this, general debate on the pros and cons of NATO expansion has been more vigorous in the Lords than in the Commons.¹⁰

⁷ HC Deb 9/7/97 c 937 For a wider exposition of Government policy on NATO see 'NATO for a New Generation', speech by the Defence Secretary to the Atlantic Council, 19/11/97 There is also a NATO section of the MOD website (www.mod.uk/nato/index.htm).

⁸ HC Deb 9/7/97 c 938-939 and c 940-941, respectively

⁹ HC Deb 9/7/97 c 944

¹⁰See, for example, HL Deb 21/10/97 c 610-613

II The Ratification of the Accession Protocols

Before the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can formally join NATO, their accession protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty will require ratification by the Sixteen existing Member States after approval by their legislatures, according to their particular constitutional practices. The parliaments of Canada and Denmark became the first two to approve ratification in early February 1998. Those of Norway and Germany followed in March.¹¹ Immediately after the Madrid Summit, the British Government promised that there would be a debate on enlargement on the floor of the House.¹² Although formal Westminster assent for NATO enlargement is not required, the debate will fulfil the requirements of the Ponsonby Rule, the convention whereby Westminster is given the opportunity to consider treaties signed by the executive.¹³ The additional protocols for the three invitees were laid before Parliament on 8 April, together with explanatory memoranda.¹⁴

A. Ratification by the USA

If the debate on enlargement has been fairly muted in the UK Parliament and in the legislatures of most of the remaining Sixteen, it has been more vibrant in the US Senate, which must approve all treaties entered into by the US executive by an absolute two-thirds majority before they may be ratified.

Hearings on NATO enlargement began before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1997. Consideration concluded in early March 1998, when the Committee voted by sixteen votes to two to support a resolution approving the accession protocols for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.¹⁵ Both Senator Helms, the Committee's Republican Chairman, and its senior Democrat, Senator Biden, backed NATO expansion. Although under pressure from the US administration to proceed with a full vote on the floor, this has been delayed. Despite this, the general consensus appears to be that the Senate will endorse NATO enlargement.¹⁶ Senator Roth, the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and a

¹¹ *The International Herald Tribune* 4/3/98 and 27/3/98

¹² HC Deb 9/7/97 c 937

¹³ Under the Ponsonby Rule treaties requiring ratification are laid (in the form of command papers) before both Houses of Parliament for a period of 21 sitting days to allow the opportunity for questions to be tabled on them or for debate. A treaty does not require the positive approval of Parliament as a whole or of any particular committee convened for this purpose. If Parliament has not expressed an opinion against a measure, then after the 21-day period, the Government may proceed to deposit its instrument of ratification. However, if a treaty requires British legislation then this must be approved by Parliament in the normal way.

¹⁴ Cm 3929 (Poland, EM24), Cm 3930 (Czech Republic, EM25) and Cm 3931 (Hungary, EM26)

¹⁵ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly (CQW)* 7/3/98

¹⁶ See Cambone, 'Debate in the US Senate on NATO Enlargement', *RUSI Journal*, December 1997

leading supporter of expansion, has spoken of gaining up to 80 Senate votes in favour out of the total of 100.¹⁷

Although opposition to enlargement in the Senate is limited, this can not disguise minority disquiet either on the principle of enlargement or on certain of its aspects, of which cost has been the key question. Firstly, what is a realistic figure for enlargement, which will not see expansion under-funded and therefore leave the Alliance militarily weakened? Secondly, there has been a widespread sentiment that the European allies and the new NATO Members, rather than the USA, should bear the bulk of the financial burden of enlargement.¹⁸ The latter view marks a revival of the historic and wider issue of military and financial burden-sharing in the Alliance, which has periodically gnawed at the transatlantic link since NATO's inception.

In this connection, NATO enlargement became linked in US minds with the NATO and US military presence in Bosnia and the recent Iraq crisis. Many in Congress have supported a US Army withdrawal from Bosnia, suggesting that now that the Bosnian conflict has ceased, European NATO and other states should assume more of the military and financial burden of peacekeeping there. Some US politicians have also compared the US willingness to lead in pacifying Bosnia, which they saw as an essentially European security problem, with the lack of support from some European allies for US military and political steps to contain Iraq.¹⁹

It now seems that the low official NATO estimate of the common cost of enlargement, produced in December 1997 and subsequently endorsed by the US Department of Defense, has helped to temper some Senate opposition to enlargement.²⁰ The burden-sharing argument, now revived, may not pass away so easily.

Other attitudes to enlargement in the Senate are displayed in conditions attached by the Foreign Relations Committee to its resolution of approval and in attempts by individual Senators to add 'riders' to the ratification resolution. The Committee has demanded that it be consulted on the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept and also that Russia not be allowed to gain a veto over NATO actions via its *Founding Act* with the Alliance. Another condition requires that the President report regularly to the Senate on what NATO Members are paying towards Alliance costs. An amendment tabled by the Democrat Senator Moynihan would delay NATO membership for the three accepted candidates until they have all joined the EU, while another would prevent a further round of enlargement until after 2002. The need for a

¹⁷ *Atlantic News (AN)* 30/1/98

¹⁸ *The International Herald Tribune* 7/10/97

¹⁹ The three accepted NATO candidates, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all demonstrated their support for the US position by promising to dispatch small contingents of medical or support personnel to the Gulf. On the crisis in general, see RP 98/28, *The Iraq Crisis*, February 1998

²⁰ See reports on hearings from *CQW*, 4/10/97, 11/10/97 and 25/10/97.

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delay in any renewed NATO expansion is felt by a number of other Senators, but the administration is keen to avoid any such legally binding restriction on future enlargement.²¹

B. Ratification by Turkey

The only existing Member State where enlargement may face significant difficulties is Turkey. Under the coalition government of Turkey's first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey indicated that it might veto enlargement unless progress was made on its application to join the EU and Western European Union (WEU).²² In June 1997, the Erbakan government collapsed after pressure from the Army, which was concerned about the preservation of the country's secular traditions. The new government, led by Mesut Yilmaz, is secular and pro-American, although it has recently been incensed by the EU's decision to put off any prospect of Turkish EU membership for the foreseeable future. The Yilmaz Government has expressed its support for NATO expansion, although, particularly after the EU decision, some in the Turkish Parliament may vote against ratification of the necessary additional protocols. One deputy was recently quoted as saying that "Turkey would be foolish to say "yes" to the membership of these three countries and contribute to the credits and aid they would receive as members while the gates of the EU remain open to them at the same time."²³

C. Ratification by the New Member States

Approval of the accession protocols will also be required by the parliaments of the three new Members. It is perhaps surprising, given the amount of lobbying that their governments have undertaken in favour of their admission, that only the lower house of the Czech Parliament has so far done so. The vote, on 15 April, was 154 in favour to 38 against, with only the deputies from the Communist Party and right-wing Republican Party opposing. The Czech Senate is expected to approve NATO accession by a large majority.²⁴

²¹ *CQW* 7/3/98

²² *AN* 7/2/97

²³ *Asia Intelligence Wire*, 7/3/98

²⁴ *The International Herald Tribune* 16/4/98

Of the three invitees, only Hungary has put the question of NATO membership to a referendum, which was held in November 1997. Turnout was low at just under 50 per cent, but of this figure 85 per cent voted in the affirmative.²⁵ Support for NATO membership has always been stronger in Poland than in the other two accepted NATO candidates. In polls 90 per cent of respondents have backed NATO accession. Pro-membership sentiment has been less solid in the Czech Republic, where it has hovered in polls at between 40 and 60 per cent.²⁶

²⁵ *International Herald Tribune* 20/11/97

²⁶ RP 97/51, p.24, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* 29/11/97 and 4/12/97 and *The International Herald Tribune* 16/4/98

III The Cost of Enlargement

Since the Madrid Summit, the biggest single issue in the enlargement debate has been the question of the financial cost of NATO expansion. A number of cost studies were drawn up before the Summit against a background of uncertainty as to the exact number of new members, the demands that NATO would make of their armed forces, varying assessments of the threats posed to an expanded NATO and requirements to meet them. The post-Madrid studies have been informed by more fixed guidelines.²⁷

A. The Main Cost Studies

In a report published in April 1995, the US RAND Corporation estimated that expansion to include the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) would cost as little as \$10bn over a ten-year period at the minimum level of requirement. The provision of more vigorous security measures could cost up to \$100bn over the same timeframe. A study in autumn 1996, also by RAND but using a different approach, produced similar minimum and maximum figures.

In March 1996 the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a more wide-ranging report which examined a range of options involving the Visegrad Four, ranging from potentially assisting the new members in a border skirmish to stationing forces of the western members permanently on their territory. The studies assumed that costs would be spread over a 15-year period. Assessment of the least cost Option 1, which included substantial re-equipment of new member armed forces, produced a figure of \$61bn. The maximum cost Option 5 indicated a figure of \$125bn.

In February 1997 US Department of Defense (DoD) published its own enlargement cost estimates, which were reported to Congress. These expected a first wave enlargement to cost \$27-35bn over a thirteen-year period. The administration was keen to stress that under this estimate the new NATO and other existing NATO members would pay the vast bulk of the costs of enlargement. The US share of the notional 13-year \$35bn bill would come to 5 per cent or around \$150m per annum.²⁸ The US General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report commenting on the DoD study in August 1997. The GAO questioned the accuracy of the DoD estimate, owing to the many uncertainties involved in assessing the exact costs of enlargement prior to a decision on exactly how many new states would be accepted.²⁹

²⁷ The various costs studies are discussed extensively in HC 469

²⁸ AN 7/3/97

²⁹ HC 469, Para 66

NATO itself commissioned an official study into the costs of enlargement in December 1996. This was concluded in autumn 1997 and presented to NATO ministers in December 1997. The study, drafted by the Military Committee, found that enlargement costs would be far lower than had been expected. New communications, radar and other infrastructure and measures required to integrate the new Members into the Alliance would only cost about \$1.5bn or £850m over ten years. \$1.3bn of this sum would come from the NATO Security Investment Programme (the infrastructure budget), \$200m would fall to the Military Budget to cover the running costs of new infrastructure, and the remainder would come from other NATO budgets.³⁰ The full NATO cost study is NATO classified and has not been released, although it was shown in confidence to the Defence Committee in evidence during its NATO enquiry.³¹ In February 1998 the US DoD published a report endorsing the NATO figure and methodology and repudiating its earlier study of February 1997.³²

B. Explaining the NATO Estimate

The MOD has produced a short document giving some reasons for the huge discrepancy between the NATO estimate of \$1.5bn and the much higher sums suggested by the earlier cost studies. This represents the only detailed UK Government commentary on enlargement costs.³³ The fact that NATO itself has not been prepared to release the details of its cost study may have fuelled suspicions that either NATO is attempting to deceive Member Parliaments, where there are concerns about expansion costs, or that it is somehow seeking enlargement 'on the cheap'.

The MOD analysis, and a separate study produced for the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) by Harry Cohen MP, suggest a number of methodological errors to explain the high cost forecasts. Firstly, the new Members would spend additional sums to restructure and modernise their armed forces, regardless of whether they joined NATO or not, and that these steps, current and planned, would be sufficient to meet their Alliance commitments. Indeed, if they were not entering NATO these national bills could be even higher. Secondly, the existing and already planned improvements to the rapid reaction forces of NATO countries are sufficient to fulfil NATO's collective security commitments to the new Members. The defence infrastructure in the new Members, which might be needed to house reinforcements sent from the other Members in a crisis, is adequate and is in far better condition than had at first been expected. It already enables the British Army to undertake annual brigade

³⁰ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 5

³¹ HC Deb 28/11/97 c 678-9w and HC 469, Para 67

³² See DoD, *Report to Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement*, February 1998

³³ *Studies of the Cost of NATO Enlargement: Note by the Ministry of Defence*, March 1998. Some very brief financial detail is given in explanatory memoranda laid with the additional protocol Command papers.

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exercises in Poland, for example. Separately, the threat assessments used by the CBO and RAND studies, predicated on resisting a possible Russian attack, were also seen as highly unrealistic, given the state of the Russian forces alone and regardless of any consideration of the current nature of Russian security policy. It has been made clear that no forces of the existing Members are to be permanently stationed on the soil of new Member States. The MOD and NAA studies also pointed out that only three states, rather than the four assumed by many cost studies, were to be admitted to the Alliance.³⁴ In essence, this means that no additional spending other than that already planned is needed to pay for enlargement either in the new or existing NATO Member States. All that is required is for the small direct costs of enlargement to be borne by the Alliance collectively via its various common budgets.³⁵ This is the \$1.5bn estimate, \$150m per year for ten years, which includes the costs of additional communications, headquarters and other central changes necessary to integrate the new Members into the Alliance's political and military structures.

C. Paying for Enlargement

The total current annual NATO budget stands at some \$1.8bn of which \$188m is in the civil, \$826m in the military and \$800m in the infrastructure budget.³⁶ It is intended that the costs identified by the NATO study will be fully met from within this budget. There is some room for optimism on this score. Firstly, NATO is engaged on a major rationalisation of its command structure, which may generate some savings.³⁷ Secondly, the NATO budget may grow on enlargement. As part of their membership, the three new Members will make small contributions to the annual NATO budget: Poland will pay 2.48 per cent, the Czech Republic 0.9 per cent and Hungary 0.65 per cent.³⁸ This amounts to \$44.6m, \$16.2m and \$11.7m, respectively.³⁹ It has yet to be decided whether these contributions will be additional to the existing budget ceilings or not.⁴⁰ Finally, Spain, as a participant in the integrated military structure, will also contribute to its costs from 1999. In this light, in December 1997, the Foreign Ministers Council felt sufficiently confident to state that:

Overall, the analysis of the resource implications of the accession of the three new members has justified the confidence of our Heads of State and Government that, in the present and foreseeable security environment in Europe, Alliance costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided.⁴¹

³⁴ *Ibid* and *The Costs of NATO Enlargement*, Draft Special Report, NAA, February 1998

³⁵ For a contrary view see Perlmutter and Carpenter, 'NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1998

³⁶ AN 7/3/97

³⁷ See Section XIII

³⁸ *Atlantic News* 13/11/97

³⁹ *International Herald Tribune* 21/12/97

⁴⁰ HC 469, p. 103

⁴¹ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 5

Despite this statement, it is unclear whether all the shared costs of enlargement identified by the NATO study will in fact be met from within the existing NATO budget, and whether additional contributions from the Member States will not be required. The Defence Committee, in its analysis, held that \$1.5bn figure was the *minimum* assessment of these costs and could well double.⁴² The UK may therefore find itself paying more than the current MOD estimate of £11m per annum for enlargement over the next decade, a fact acknowledged in explanatory memoranda laid with the additional protocol command papers.⁴³

One expense, which does not appear to have been included, is that of rebuilding the NATO HQ outside Brussels. This was erected hurriedly in the late 1960s when NATO was required to leave France. Although it could be argued that some of this replacement cost was inevitable, new building may be needed to house the missions of the new Members, those of any future Members and those from Partnership for Peace countries; some are currently housed in temporary accommodation.⁴⁴ The Permanent Council has been considering a number of options for reconstruction/refurbishment of NATO HQ, including one involving moving to an entirely new site. The cheaper options are estimated to cost some BF12bn or £200m over a period of up to 10 years.⁴⁵ Separately, the NATO estimate also appears to assume that from 1999 a large proportion of the infrastructure budget will be directed to projects either in the territories of the new Members or connected to their defence requirements. As a consequence, NATO infrastructure spending on defence projects in the existing Member States will decline and this shortfall may need to be covered by increased national expenditure.

The NATO budget represents less than 0.38 per cent of total Alliance defence expenditure, the remainder being national defence spending.⁴⁶ The official study has assumed that no additional expenditure is required by the existing Members to support enlargement, other than that which would be undertaken in any case. Whether this view is plausible or not, in the context of declining defence budgets and for some NATO Members, preparations for EMU, the Sixteen were perhaps never prepared to pay the billions envisaged by the earlier cost studies. European NATO members certainly balked at earlier US suggestions that they should bear a disproportionate burden of enlargement costs for what some might regard as an enterprise forced along by the USA.⁴⁷

⁴² HC 469, Para 79

⁴³ HC 469, Para 88 The explanatory memoranda refer to “a possible increase in contributions to NATO’s commonly funded budgets”.

⁴⁴ AN 1/4/98

⁴⁵ AN 30/1/98

⁴⁶ IISS, *MB 1997/98*, p. 268

⁴⁷ Philip Gordon, ‘Will Anyone Really Pay to Enlarge NATO - and If So, Who?’, *International Herald Tribune*, 30/4/97

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It would thus appear that the bulk of the costs arising from enlargement will fall to the three new Members. Although NATO maintains that they would increase their defence budgets regardless of whether they had decided to join the Alliance or not, this may not be the case. If NATO faces a benign strategic environment, so does Hungary, for example. Of the three invitees only one, Poland, shares a common border with the Russian Federation, and this only with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. However, to join the Alliance, it has been made clear that all are required to increase their defence spending in both the short and long terms to pay for the equipment and training necessary to raise their armed forces towards NATO standards. The Council has reportedly been presented with assessments of the additional spending sought from the new Members. The press has suggested that reorganisation and re-equipment costs in the three new Member States have been estimated by NATO to total some \$3.5bn over 2 years.⁴⁸ Given that in 1997, the combined defence spending of the three new Members was \$4.3bn, this may mean that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will need to spend around 40 per cent of their defence spending between 1997 and 1999 on NATO enlargement-related costs.⁴⁹

In the longer run, far greater sums may need to be spent, particularly on combat aircraft and air defence systems. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish armed forces are far behind NATO standards in such simple matters as organisation, efficiency and tactics. An officer who resigned from the Czech Army in protest at its condition stated that it "was unfit for NATO", it lacked a career structure, was disorganised and in financial disarray. His airborne unit lacked sufficient parachutes and could only afford to train for two mornings a week.⁵⁰ Critics would suggest that the costs of NATO membership could be seen as a heavy and, in the current European security situation, an unnecessary burden on countries still facing the economic and social consequences of conversion from command economies and the additional pressures of preparation for EU membership. However, a recent IISS analysis was relatively optimistic on both their potential military contributions to the Alliance and on their ability to pay for the modernisation of their armed forces. Economic growth in the three invitees has been rapid. In the years 1993-96, their economies achieved an average growth rate at or above the EU average of 1.7 per cent. The annual Polish growth rate over the period was 5.5 per cent.⁵¹ It is in this context that all the invitees have promised to increase their defence spending: Poland from 2.3 per cent of GDP to 3 per cent; the Czech Republic from a 1997 figure of 1.7 per cent to 2 per cent in 2000; and Hungary from 1.8 per cent in 1997 to 2.3 per cent by 2002.⁵² However, these increases are small in nominal terms and may mean that there will be no arms bonanza for western defence contractors in central and eastern Europe, at least in the short and medium terms.⁵³

⁴⁸ *The Financial Times* 20/11/97

⁴⁹ IISS, *MB* 1997/98

⁵⁰ *The Independent* 14/11/97

⁵¹ See 'NATO new members: ready for accession?', *IISS Strategic Comments*, December 1997

⁵² HC 469, Para 46

⁵³ American arms manufacturer have invested heavily in supporting enlargement (see 'Arms Lobby Investing Heavily in NATO Growth', *International Herald Tribune* 2/4/98).

Central European electorates, having faced the austerity demanded for conversion from command to capitalist economies, may also prove unwilling to support additional defence expenditure. This may be particularly true in the Czech Republic and Hungary where the armed forces command little public affection. Moreover, in comparison with NATO members of similar population, the defence budgets of the leading NATO applicants are still small.⁵⁴ Although local defence costs are considerably below those within NATO, the aspirants appear to have few spare resources with which to fund their integration into the Alliance. Once in the Alliance, the new Members may face rather less of an incentive to increase their defence budgets, given that the majority of the existing Members continue to plan to reduce their expenditure.⁵⁵ Ultimately, as the IISS has suggested, for new and existing Members "funding NATO enlargement is more likely to be driven by what is affordable than by what is required".⁵⁶

⁵⁴ In 1997 the Czech Republic's defence budget was \$826m, that of Hungary only \$511m, and of Poland \$3.0bn. IISS *The Military Balance 1997/98*

⁵⁵ During the Cold War, on several occasions NATO Members made commitments to increase their defence spending by fixed amounts in response to a perception of a growing threat from the USSR. These commitments were seldom fulfilled.

⁵⁶ IISS, *MB 1997/98*, p. 273

IV NATO, Russia and the Baltic States

A. Russia and NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement has generated opposition from Russia and also from those within NATO who believe that it will alienate and isolate Russia unnecessarily.⁵⁷ The main proponents of this position have often been veterans or students of the Cold War and have tended to view policy towards Russia in balance of power terms. One stream of this argument, as outlined by the leading Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, is to make comparisons between the treatment of defeated enemies after previous grand European conflicts, such as the Napoleonic War and the First and Second World Wars, with the treatment of Russia after its 'loss' of the Cold War. Whereas in the case of France after 1815, and Germany and Japan after 1945, successful efforts were made to integrate the defeated enemy back into the international system, this contrasted with the vindictive handling of Germany at Versailles in 1919 and the revanchist sentiment that this encouraged. This analogy is extended to post-Soviet Russia. Comparisons are made between the fragile and flawed democracy of Weimar Germany, which ultimately collapsed into dictatorship, and current Russian internal politics.⁵⁸

The thrust of the argument is, then, that enlargement will prove counterproductive. It will undermine reformers in Russia and support the rise to power of reactionaries, whether of the Communist left or authoritarian right (which are now often the same thing). Even in the short term, the alienation felt by Russia may remove its incentive to co-operate with the West in other areas of international affairs, such as non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. The START II agreement on nuclear arms reductions, signed in 1993, has not come into force due to the refusal of the Duma to approve it.⁵⁹ Until this occurs, there will be no movement on further START negotiations. Indeed, Russia has revealed that, until funds are found to modernise its armed forces, its defence strategy will place a greater onus on its nuclear arsenal.⁶⁰ In February 1998 the Duma passed a motion calling NATO enlargement the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II. Elsewhere, Russia has followed policies dissonant with those of the USA and Britain towards the treatment of Serbia, particularly with regard to the latter's actions in Kosovo, and also towards the handling of Saddam Hussein.⁶¹

⁵⁷ For example, see Susan Eisenhower, 'NATO Expansion: The Senate Risks Taking a Dangerous Step into the Dark', *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 1998

⁵⁸ J.L. Gaddis, 'History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement', *Survival*, March 1998

⁵⁹ Although it should be pointed out that the Russian Government continues to implement the Treaty's provisions regardless.

⁶⁰ 'NATO growth increases Russian nuclear threat', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 17/12/97

⁶¹ D. Broder, 'A Momentous Blunder on NATO', *The International Herald Tribune* 18/3/98

The counter-argument to this position is that the North Atlantic Alliance threatens no one and that NATO, through various initiatives, is seeking to foster a new policy of co-operation and partnership, rather than enmity, in Europe. Even if this liberal view of security policy is accepted, it might perhaps be naive to imagine that Russia would not pursue its own interests in the Middle East and non-proliferation policy, for example, even if NATO had not embarked on enlargement. Fears persist, though, that enlargement will generate a new fault line in Europe with the potential to revive the confrontation of the Cold War. A major element, therefore, of NATO's enlargement strategy has been to temper Russian opposition to enlargement and to integrate Russia more closely into the Euro-Atlantic security community.

B. NATO's Russia Policy

NATO's policy towards Russia contains two major strands. Firstly, NATO has agreed to a reorganisation of the so-called 'flank zones' in the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement to satisfy Russian concerns about security along its southern border.⁶² Secondly, NATO negotiated a bilateral agreement on co-operation and consultation with Russia, the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation*. This was signed in Paris in May 1997 in advance of membership invitations being extended to new Member States in July 1997. The *Founding Act* offers an array of co-operation measures and mechanisms. In essence it provides Russia with an entry to NATO discussions on all non-Article 5 tasks, such as non-proliferation, peacekeeping, disaster relief, etc. The main forum for this co-operation is the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which is intended to meet twice annually at the level of foreign and defence ministers and also monthly at the ambassadorial level in conformity with the usual cycle of NATO Council and Permanent Council meetings. It may also meet at head of state level. The PJC is chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO (or one of his officers), a representative of one Member State and a Russian representative. To foster liaison Russia was also to open an office at NATO HQ.⁶³

Although the *Founding Act* is less than a year old, it could be regarded as a tentative success. The first meeting of the Permanent Joint Council was held in September 1997. Perhaps more importantly, as envisaged in the *Act*, joint NATO-Russian working parties have been established on nuclear and non-proliferation issues and also on peacekeeping. Exchanges of officers between Russian military headquarters and the Russian Ministry of Defence and NATO military and civilian HQs are being organised.⁶⁴ A senior Russian military

⁶² See FCO Background Brief, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: An Implementation Update*, September 1997. The Agreement, signed in 1991, places ceilings on national holdings of various types of military equipment. These have also applied to regions of Russia. Moscow believed that the ceilings have caused Russia difficulties in responding to new security threats along its southern border.

⁶³ This was not a major step. As a result of Russian participation in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia, Moscow has maintained a military liaison office at SHAPE since 1996.

⁶⁴ See 'NATO-Russia Warming to Joint Working Groups', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 5/11/97

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representative to NATO assumed his post at the end of 1997. A much delayed Russian Partnership for Peace Individual Partnership Programme, setting out its particular menu of co-operation initiatives, is expected to be submitted shortly.⁶⁵

Clearly, it is NATO's hope that co-operation under the *Founding Act*, particularly joint operational experience of peacekeeping, will help to dispel Russian mistrust of NATO and of its enlargement. However, the existing Member States should not be deluded as to the extent of the psychological trauma suffered by the Russian political elite as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire.⁶⁶ To many Russians it seems illogical that, in the post-Cold War world, whilst the Warsaw Pact has been disbanded and Moscow has abandoned its traditional defensive barrier against the West, NATO not only still exists but advances onto the territory of Moscow's former satellites. Consistent with certain Soviet and even Tsarist concepts of European security, Russia favours a stronger role for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), possibly with a security council of the great European powers, as the organisation to secure European collective security, perhaps subordinating collective defence organisations, such as NATO.

C. Russia's NATO Policy

Russia had various aims in its negotiations with NATO over what was originally to be called the NATO-Russia Charter. These included: the prevention of the stationing of forces and nuclear weapons from the existing Member States on the territory of the new Member States; a veto on any new round of enlargement beyond that of 1999; and to penetrate NATO decision-making in so far as it was possible. Although receiving no guarantee, Russia gained indirect assurances on the first point. NATO stated that it had "no intention, no plan and no reason" to base nuclear or other forces in the accepted candidate states. As it perhaps expected, Russia was unsuccessful on the second point. Privately, Russia is now resigned to the current round of NATO expansion and would perhaps accept a further round, but only if it did not include states which were part of the Former Soviet Union. It is in the area of decision-making that Russia may now seek advantage. Even though the Permanent Joint Council is intended as a forum of consultation, its terms of reference are wide. It may discuss "issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area". Eyal and other commentators have suggested that Russia may attempt to manipulate the PJC and to play great power politics with NATO over the heads of non-NATO eastern European states. A key Russian aim here is to prevent NATO from enlarging to include the Baltic States.⁶⁷ Indeed, Russia has, perhaps mischievously, offered security guarantees to them,

⁶⁵ AN 27/3/98

⁶⁶ See article by Marshal I. Sergeev, the Russian Minister of Defence, 'We are not adversaries, we are partners', *NATO Review*, Spring 1998

⁶⁷ J.Eyal, 'NATO's enlargement: anatomy of a decision', *International Affairs*, October 1997, p. 716-717

which have been rejected, on several occasions. The Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff recently commented: -

We could hardly understand why these nations should enslave their security aspects only to NATO. In our St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad military districts facing them, we have reduced to brigade level. If – contrary to common sense – NATO expands further towards Russia's borders, our armed forces will be faced with the need to take adequate measures to protect our security ... but if we respect each other's opinions, there might be a large chance of long-term peace into the next century.⁶⁸

D. NATO and the Baltic States

If the Baltic States, which in the case of Estonia and Latvia have large Russian minorities, are perceived as being of vital security interest to Moscow, they also pose a problem for NATO decision-makers. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could all be said to meet the criteria for NATO membership, as set out in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* of 1995, although in the case of Estonia and Latvia there may remain doubts about the treatment of their ethnic Russian populations. Despite Denmark leading the support for the Baltics to be included in the first round of enlargement, it was reaction to staunch Russian opposition, which prevented their candidature ever proceeding far. In particular, Baltic NATO membership would isolate the heavily armed Russian province of Kaliningrad, already geographically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation.⁶⁹ It must also be said that any realistic NATO defence of the thinly populated and very lightly armed Baltic States, which share long borders with Russia, would probably require the basing of standing forces from other NATO countries on their soil.⁷⁰

It has been left to the USA to launch an initiative to reconcile the conflicting demands of democracy and security in the Baltic region via the Baltic Charter, formally known as the *Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania*. Signed in January 1998, this represents a US political commitment to the independence, sovereignty and self-determination of the three Baltic states. It includes a series of statements on economic and political co-operation, reaffirms that NATO remains open to further enlargement and also pledges US help to the Baltics to prepare for NATO membership. However, it does not guarantee that the latter will ever be secured. Russian reactions to the Charter have been muted, but this may be because it lacks two things that the Baltics want: a firm western security guarantee and a clear commitment to future NATO membership.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Interview with Lt. Gen. Vladislav Putilin, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8/4/98

⁶⁹ Kaliningrad is the former East Prussian city of Königsberg, which was given to Russia, along with its hinterland, in 1945.

⁷⁰ T. Kuzio, 'The Baltics, Ukraine and the path to NATO', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1997

⁷¹ *The Times* 13/1/98

V The Implications of Enlargement for the Existing NATO Members

There has been much discussion of what enlargement will mean for NATO itself. By absorbing some of its former adversaries, this NATO enlargement is much more of an experiment than those of the past, which included first Greece and Turkey, second Germany and then Spain.⁷²

A. The Impact on Alliance Cohesion

One of the chief criticisms of enlargement is that any expansion in numbers may both weaken Alliance cohesion and further change its character away from being a military organisation intended for collective defence. The enlargement to Nineteen may make reaching consensus more difficult, particularly if the new Members bring with them some of their latent tensions with states outside the Alliance, such as Hungary with Slovakia and Romania, for example. However, it has also been argued that the three new Members have much to gain from behaving as exemplary NATO participants. Firstly, any weakening of NATO's commitment to collective defence might only threaten their own security. Secondly, good behaviour is one way to help secure military and economic aid from Germany, the USA and other Alliance Members.⁷³ Separately, the addition of new European Members may assist the re-balancing of the Alliance towards a more equal relationship between its Atlantic and European pillars. Britain, in particular, may face a loss of influence as a result. Although the professionalism of its armed forces is widely admired in central and eastern Europe, the closest military and diplomatic relationships of the three new Members may be to Germany and the USA, and not to Britain.

The process of enlargement may already have had an impact on the cohesion of the existing Alliance Members. Although there was collective agreement in January 1994 that the Alliance should expand into eastern Europe as part of an evolutionary process, there is a perception amongst many NATO Members that the USA has dictated the course of enlargement, without exercising sufficient consultation with its allies. When President Clinton announced that enlargement would take place by 1999, this was a date earlier than many Alliance Members had wanted. The USA may also have behaved dictatorially on the question of which NATO candidates should be admitted. Although a clear majority of NATO Members was in favour of accepting more than three new Members (Britain was

⁷² In 1952, 1955 and 1982, respectively.

⁷³ Eyal, *op cit.*

initially sympathetic to the claims of Slovenia), Washington rigidly refused to countenance more than this number, to the annoyance not only of France but also of other Members.⁷⁴

B. The Impact on Military Effectiveness

Rather less has been said about the possible impact of enlargement on the Alliance's military effectiveness. The bedrock of NATO is the mutual security guarantee of Article 5. In this respect, such is the state of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, that they may be able to offer very little to the defence of other Member States for many years to come. In advance of signing their accession protocols, the three accepted candidates were required to fill in force questionnaires, which set out their military assets and their preparedness.⁷⁵ A leaked NATO report on the state of the Polish armed forces reported, *inter alia*, that only 22 Mig-29s of the Polish Air Force would have any realistic NATO role; only a third of the Polish Navy was operational; ammunition stocks were negligible; and, more importantly, Polish army brigades would not have NATO-compatible communications until 2002 at the earliest.⁷⁶ If anything, the armed forces of the Czech Republic and Hungary are in a worse state. Collectively, the forces of three new Members may be just about capable of contributing small contingents to non-Article 5 missions, such as small peacekeeping operations, as they do in Bosnia, but of little else. In short, whatever its political advantages, enlargement will reduce NATO overall military effectiveness for at the least the time that it takes for the three new Members to restructure and upgrade their forces to NATO standards. The first US DoD report stated that this would not be reached before 2009.⁷⁷

Thus, NATO may be guilty of some over optimism when it noted at the last Defence Council that:

[the cost study] report concludes that the available and planned military forces and their capabilities of the current Allies and the three invitees are sufficient to ensure fully the collective defence of all members of the enlarged Alliance in the present and foreseeable security environment and that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will also make valuable contributions to the Alliance's ability to perform the full range of its missions.⁷⁸

However, the biggest problem faced by the new Members may not be one of money, but one of personnel and organisation. All have made efforts to restructure their armed forces along western lines, particularly in terms of a reduction of their relatively high proportions of

⁷⁴ Stan Sloan, 'Transatlantic relations: Stormy Weather on the way to enlargement?' *NATO Review*, September 1997

⁷⁵ This is part of the annual NATO planning cycle.

⁷⁶ *The Guardian* 24/1/98

⁷⁷ HC 469, Para 81

⁷⁸ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 8

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officers and in the establishment of civilian-controlled ministries of defence, designed to exercise political control over their services. However, many of these new structures are both new and relatively fragile and there is some debate as to whether they will be able to absorb the huge information flows demanded by NATO membership. There is, for example, a critical shortage of English-speaking officers able to engage in NATO liaison or to serve in NATO headquarters. NATO and the existing Member States have sought to remedy this problem of expertise through various aid and training programmes. However, as is common in central and eastern Europe, many servicemen and officials depart to more lucrative positions in the private sector once trained.

A comparison might be made between the current problems faced by the new Members with those experienced during the last and often forgotten enlargement, the unification of Germany in 1990, which took NATO's eastern border from the Elbe to the Oder. In what effectively amounted to a takeover, the *Bundeswehr* acquired a vast array of Soviet-style equipment and the 140,000 men of the East German *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA), widely regarded as the best army in the Warsaw Pact. The vast bulk of East German equipment was declared incompatible with the NATO-standard armoury of the *Bundeswehr* and surplus to requirements. More significantly, few of the NVA regulars were retained. Of 24,000 former NVA officers it was decided that as few as 6,000 would be needed in the longer-term. All generals and the majority of middle-ranking officers and senior NCOs were to be made redundant, either because they were considered politically suspect or too old to learn the (NATO) skills of the *Bundeswehr*.⁷⁹ Subsequently, the German defence budget has been stretched by the large costs associated with upgrading former NVA barracks and facilities to western standards. The German approach to the modernisation of armed forces in its eastern half was in effect to disband the NVA and start from scratch. This option is simply unavailable to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Although all three have restructured their armed forces and cut numbers by a third since 1990, they have been forced to make the best of the manpower and material that they have available.

⁷⁹ G. Van Orden, 'The *Bundeswehr* in transition', *Survival*, July 1991

VI The Candidates Rejected at Madrid

Both Slovenia and Romania may have had particular reason to feel aggrieved at their rejection at the Madrid Summit as they had enjoyed the support of many of NATO's Members, particularly those from the southern tier. Slovenia could have been said to have met all the criteria for membership. It also offered the prospect of a 'bridge' to land-locked Hungary, which will have no common border with any other NATO state. Despite the acknowledged febleness of its armed forces, the main reason for Slovenia's rejection would seem to be that it was deemed a new Member too many by the US administration, fearful of the difficulties of selling an 'excessively large' NATO expansion to Congress. Romania had also asserted its claim strongly, particularly given the active role its soldiers have played in NATO-led peace-keeping operations in Bosnia and the wider reform of its armed forces since the collapse of communism. However, Romania's position may have been somewhat weaker in meeting NATO's democratic and economic criteria. Although the communist dictator Ceaucescu was overthrown in 1989, subsequent governments were dominated by figures connected with the *ancien regime*. Only in November 1996 did a genuinely post-communist politician, Emil Constantinescu, assume the Presidency and since then Romania has faced great difficulties in carrying out many of the basic economic reforms already accomplished in many of its contemporaries.⁸⁰

Of the remaining candidates, the membership ambitions of the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) were never likely to be successful for the reasons discussed above. Bulgaria, in terms of its candidature, suffers from problems similar to those of Romania in the immaturity of its political and economic reforms.⁸¹ Any possible claims by the Albanian government to have met any of the enlargement criteria were refuted by the anarchy that gripped the country in 1997. Although some stability has returned, the new Socialist government in Tirana scarcely exercises any control over the country's northern half. Macedonia perhaps never had any real prospect of NATO membership on geopolitical grounds alone. It suffers from inter-ethnic tensions, which partly involve an Albanian minority. It also shares a border with the troubled ethnic Albanian-inhabited Serbian province of Kosovo and has had a difficult, although recently improved, relationship with Greece. Finally, away from the Balkans, the prospects for Slovakia, once one of the leading candidates for NATO membership, have waned even further since the Madrid Summit. The Slovakian government has become increasingly authoritarian. In March 1998 the prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, assumed many additional Presidential powers when the term of his rival, President Mihal Kovac, ended, without parliament being able to choose a successor.⁸²

⁸⁰ *The Economist* 4/4/98

⁸¹ *The Financial Times* 12/2/98

⁸² *The Economist* 13/3/98

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Whatever the current position of the rejected candidates, NATO has been keen to stress that the door remains open to future accessions. The Madrid Declaration stated that: -

We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership. The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.⁸³

Although specific mention was made at Madrid to Slovenia, Romania and the Baltic states as countries to be considered in any future NATO enlargement, their individual chances may be poor, despite the hopes of some candidates of receiving invitations at the 1999 NATO Summit for accession in, say, 2002.⁸⁴ It appears to be the British view that NATO expansion should stop at Nineteen for some time, to allow the Alliance time to digest the three new Members and also to assess how much enlargement has affected the Alliance as a whole. Answering a PQ on Slovenia's hopes of admission, the Defence Secretary replied:

NATO has undertaken to review the process of its enlargement in 1999; considerations set forth in NATO's 1995 Enlargement Study will continue to apply with regard to all aspirants. The UK views Slovenia as a strong candidate for any future enlargement of NATO. The priority for now is to ensure the successful military and political integration of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into NATO.⁸⁵

However, if the chances of accession for the Baltic States, Romania and Slovenia soon after 2000 are limited, then the position is even less encouraging for other NATO aspirants.

⁸³ *Madrid Declaration*, Para 8

⁸⁴ *ibid*

⁸⁵ HC Deb 9/2198 c 67w

VII The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: New Co-operative Mechanism or Consolation Prize?

The question of how to treat the rejected candidates, and also of how to continue to induce them to remain on the path of reform, led to a decision both to rationalise and to improve NATO's bodies for external co-operation at the NATO Council at Sintra in May 1997. The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was merged with Partnership for Peace (PFP) to form the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It was also agreed that the PFP should be enhanced.

NACC had been established in 1991 as the body intended to offer regular political dialogue between East and West. Initially comprising 25 NATO and former Warsaw Pact states, by 1996 NACC membership had expanded to 40 members with the inclusion of Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, the successor states of the Soviet Union and the two components of Czechoslovakia. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland all became NACC observers. In a further attempt to respond to eastern Europe's demands for NATO membership, the US government drew up a new proposal for a 'Partnership for Peace' in 1993, which was formally endorsed at the NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994. PFP would be open to all European states, inclusive of Russia. It offers a series of levels of NATO co-operation to the states of central and eastern Europe if they accept certain principles, including, *inter alia*, democracy, democratic control of their armed forces and transparency of their force structures and budgets. PFP Partners are given the opportunity to participate in exercises with NATO forces. In particular, training concentrates on the possibility of Partner involvement in NATO-led humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.⁸⁶ Although many NATO applicants were initially sceptical about PFP, seeing it as another tactic to delay their accession to NATO, the experience gained from PFP is now generally welcomed by all Partners, regardless of whether they seek to join the Alliance or not.

The newly created EAPC is open to all OSCE states "able and willing to accept its principle and to contribute to its goals".⁸⁷ It meets twice a year at both Foreign and Defence Ministerial level and, usually, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels on a monthly basis. It may also convene at the level of Heads of State or Government.

The establishment of the EAPC may have a number of benefits. It will provide the political framework for an Enhanced PFP, but, at the same time, has removed some of the duplication between the activities of NACC and PFP. EAPC also includes the four European neutral NACC observers, thus bringing them into a closer relationship with NATO. It treats its 44 members

⁸⁶ *Brussels Declaration and the Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, January 1994

⁸⁷ *EAPC Basic Document*, Para 12

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(including the Sixteen), on an equal basis, but is also selective “by allowing Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in small groups with the Alliance”. The Council “will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to the activities in which they participate”.⁸⁸ To this end, Partners have been encouraged to open missions at NATO HQ in Brussels. In an aspect of the Enhanced PFP programme, Partners will potentially enjoy a greater operational role in NATO actions, and may participate, for example, in planning for Combined Joint Taskforces.⁸⁹ Sweden has recently decided to attach liaison officers to certain NATO commands to further bilateral co-operation.⁹⁰

In effect, the EAPC establishes a form of Associate NATO membership by opening all non-Article 5 Alliance operations and activities to Partners wishing to participate in them.⁹¹ It also provides one means of taking forward NATO’s programme of ‘intensified dialogue’ with aspiring Alliance candidates deemed not yet ready for membership. The dialogue covers a full range of political, military, financial and security issues, and includes extra meetings within the EAPC. Periodic meetings are also held with the North Atlantic Council in permanent session, the NATO International Staff and other NATO bodies, all, it is stated, “without prejudicing any eventual Alliance decision”.⁹²

Still, the EAPC is a new and untested organisation and the OSCE already offers a more inclusive body for pan-European security co-operation. Although the EAPC may provide a framework for co-ordinating peacekeeping operations or orchestrating an international political consensus in response to a particular crisis, it is unclear whether it will prove an effective co-operation mechanism or whether it is merely another consolation prize for the rejected NATO candidates.

⁸⁸See *EAPC Basic Document* and *The Europe-Atlantic Partnership Council*, NATO Factsheet No. 19, July 1997

⁸⁹*The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP)*, NATO Factsheet No. 9, July 1997

⁹⁰AN 1/4/98

⁹¹On this point, the Brussels Summit declaration stated that NATO would “consult with any active participant in the Partnership [for Peace] if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security” *Brussels Summit Declaration*, Para 14. In March 1998 Albania became the first Partner to request emergency consultations under this mechanism in connection with the crisis in the neighbouring Serbian province of Kosovo (*Jane’s Defence Weekly* 25/3/98).

⁹²Von Moltke, ‘Accession of New Members to the Alliance: What are the next steps’, *NATO Review*, July 1997

VIII The Implications of Enlargement for Austria, Finland and Sweden

NATO enlargement and wider changes in European security have prompted further rethinking on defence and security policy in three of the four EU neutrals: Austria, Finland and Sweden.⁹³ There have been suggestions that all three states, active in Partnership for Peace and also in international peacekeeping, could enter the Alliance, where they could be integrated with some ease.

In Austria the debate on NATO and WEU membership is polarised on party-political lines, with the two parties in the governing coalition divided between the conservative People's Party in favour and the Social Democrats against. In an attempt to resolve these differences, the government commissioned a report on the subject to be presented to Parliament by the end of March 1998.⁹⁴ Its completion was, however, pre-empted by the announcement by the Austrian Chancellor, the Social Democrat Viktor Klima, that he opposed joining the Alliance. This rules out any decision to join NATO before the 1998 general elections and probably beyond. In any case, the Austrian constitution would need to be changed in order to allow the country to join a military alliance. This requires a two-thirds majority in parliament or a simple majority in a referendum. The Government may prove reluctant to put NATO accession to a vote when Austrians have already faced extensive changes to their external relations in recent years, firstly by joining the EU in 1995 and, secondly, by the decision to participate in EMU.⁹⁵ Moreover, in a recent poll, 54 per cent of the sample opposed NATO membership and only 24 per cent were in favour.⁹⁶

In both Finland and Sweden NATO membership is the subject of debate, although mainly in military and foreign policy circles. The ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party is opposed to joining NATO, although the opposition Moderate (conservative) and Liberal Parties have supported the move in principle.⁹⁷ Elections are due in Sweden later this year and Carl Bildt, the Moderate Party leader and a former OSCE High Representative in Bosnia, is widely expected to be successful.⁹⁸ However, Swedish defence policy is usually drawn up by consensus between the major parties, and a future Bildt government might prove reluctant to pursue NATO accession without SDP support. Political leaders in Finland have been less willing to countenance NATO membership in public, partly for fear of antagonising Russia,

⁹³Despite the advantages of joining PFP being suggested by the opposition Fine Gael and Progressive Democrat parties, the current Fianna Fail Government has remained at arms length from NATO (*The Irish Times* 24/1/98).

⁹⁴*AFM* 17/3/98

⁹⁵E. Foster, 'Austria: Central European and All at Sea', *RUSI Newsbrief*, October 1997

⁹⁶*AFM*, 17/3/98

⁹⁷*The Financial Times* 14/7/97

⁹⁸*AP* 3/12/97

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although privately they feel threatened by the claims of extreme Russian nationalists to their country.⁹⁹ Hopes in the Baltic States that early Finnish NATO accession might help their own cause may therefore be premature.

It could be said that the three neutrals do not have any particular incentive to join NATO. Certainly, facing no particular threat and able to participate in non-Article 5 operations, they have no particular need to do so. They can co-operate with NATO and, as during the Cold War, can benefit indirectly from NATO's collective security guarantee, without necessarily needing to gain the access to NATO decision-making that full membership would bring. They may also enjoy an implicit security guarantee through EU membership. Despite this, for all three it is a case of postponing NATO membership, rather than putting it off altogether.

⁹⁹ *The Financial Times* 9/12/97 and P. Jarvenapaa, 'What Comes After Madrid? A View from Helsinki', *NATO Review*, September 1997

IX NATO and Ukraine

Ukraine occupies an important position in European security, being the most populous of the successor states of the Soviet Union after Russia and lying between the new NATO members of central Europe and the Russian Federation. It also possesses a large ethnic Russian component who inhabit much of the industrial east of the country and the Crimean peninsula. Some Russian nationalists have never recognised the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state and particularly Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea, which only became part of the notionally autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine in 1954.

Ukraine has tried hard to follow a policy of non-alignment in European security, attempting to develop cordial relations with its neighbours, including NATO invitees such as Poland and Hungary, with Russia, and with the USA and NATO. Ukraine joined Partnership for Peace in 1994 and, like many Partners, has participated in NATO-led operations in Bosnia. It has, however, made clear on repeated occasions that it has no desire to accede to NATO. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennadi Udovenko, recently declared that “Ukraine is a non-aligned country and does not want to join the North Atlantic Alliance”.¹⁰⁰

Ukraine’s relations with Russia have improved significantly in recent years. Ukraine ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 and the last formerly Soviet nuclear weapons left its soil in 1996. The issue of the status and division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was finally resolved in May 1997 after a lengthy dispute. Under the agreement signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma, the naval port of Sebastopol will be operated jointly for a period of 20 years. Ukraine will receive a substantial annual rent and some of its energy debts will be written off by Russia. In a further symbol of better relations, the two countries signed an important bilateral economic agreement in February 1998.¹⁰¹

In parallel with its warmer policy towards Russia, Ukraine has sought to develop a co-operative relationship with NATO and NATO has recognised Ukraine’s importance through the *Charter on Distinctive Partnership*, which was signed at the Madrid Summit.¹⁰² The *Charter* is similar to the *Founding Act* agreed with Russia, offering a range of political consultations and military co-operation. It stipulates, for example, that a Ukraine-NATO Commission would meet twice a year at the North Atlantic Council level.

¹⁰⁰ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* 13/3/98 Ukraine will, however, eventually seek membership of the EU

¹⁰¹ *SWB* 6/3/98

¹⁰² See *Madrid Declaration*, Para 12

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The *Charter* declares that: -

NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.¹⁰³

Relations with NATO are not the biggest challenge that Ukraine faces. The country remains mired in economic decline and is paralysed by internal political instability. Recent general elections proved inconclusive and there may be little prospect of the strong government required to pursue urgently needed economic reforms.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, Para 14 and see also I. Kharchenko, 'The New Ukraine-NATO Partnership', *NATO Review*, September 1997

¹⁰⁴ 'Ukraine: Election makes progress more difficult', *RFE/RL* 2/4/98

X EU and NATO Enlargement Compared

NATO is of course not the only organisation which is in the process of expanding its membership. An enlargement of the European Union to encompass the new or restored democracies in central and eastern Europe has also been under discussion since the democratic revolutions of 1989.

The most obvious comparison between the first rounds of NATO and EU enlargement is that they are asymmetrical. NATO will expand in 1999 to include three states: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Following the decisions of the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, the EU began accession negotiations in March 1998 with the above three and also with Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia.¹⁰⁵ There are various assessments of when the negotiations might end, but the EU may be unlikely to accept its sixteenth Member State until 2004. There are interesting comparisons to be made between the list of accepted candidates for the two organisations, particularly given that the qualifying accession criteria are very similar. Slovenia was rejected from this round of NATO membership largely, it seems, because of US opposition. NATO rejected Estonia because of its geographical location. Cyprus is a special case. Indeed, the EU's decision to leave Turkey out of the enlargement process has created problems for NATO. It may have exacerbated Turkish tensions with Greece within the Alliance and may also hamper efforts to resolve tensions in a divided Cyprus.

Future Estonian EU accession could also pose difficulties for NATO, since EU Member States are entitled to become full members of the Western European Union. Given that WEU membership is a sub-set of NATO membership, it is difficult to see how a state could be a full member of the former and not also of the latter.¹⁰⁶ Estonian membership of the EU may therefore offer it a backdoor to the Alliance. This could force NATO to confront the wider issue of Alliance membership for all three Baltic States earlier than many existing Members might wish.

It has been argued that it would be better if the two enlargements were better co-ordinated. The current situation would appear to leave room for future disagreement between the EU and NATO over the division of their political authority in eastern Europe. Prior to the NATO Summit, Wallace, for example, suggested a dual enlargement to include the same three or four central European states.¹⁰⁷ The division in approach between the EU and NATO may

¹⁰⁵ HC Deb 13/1/98 c129-131

¹⁰⁶ According to the WEU Maastricht Declaration No. 2, "States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to the WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish" (Cm 1934, p. 133).

¹⁰⁷ W. Wallace, 'On the move destination unknown', *World Today*, April 1997

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hide underlying tensions over whether NATO, as a means of expression of US interests, or the EU, in its external policy role, has the leadership role in Europe. It has been easier for NATO to enlarge more rapidly because the preparations for NATO membership are not on the same scale as the enormous economic, legal and political reforms required of EU candidates. Certainly, there has been some irritation in Brussels at the perceived attempts by the USA to manipulate EU enlargement. Washington is strongly in favour of early EU enlargement to include the Baltic States and to other parts of eastern Europe deemed either currently incapable or never able to join NATO. Again, with reference to the burden-sharing debate within NATO, the European Members might argue that the EU, collectively and via its Member States, is already a far greater provider of aid and foreign investment to eastern Europe than the USA.¹⁰⁸ Conversely, a number of US commentators, who have opposed NATO enlargement, are supporters of EU enlargement to the east as an alternative or as a precursor to Alliance expansion.¹⁰⁹ They would maintain that it is only the economic security offered by EU membership which will truly underwrite democracy in eastern Europe. Such a suggestion would be preferable to Russia which still conceives of the EU as an economic organisation and which seems to have little awareness of its political, defence and security dimensions.¹¹⁰

Whatever their views, both NATO and the EU may face similar problems in dealing with the problems of feelings of exclusion amongst their rejected eastern European applicants. Both have set up membership 'waiting rooms' for those not accepted in their initial waves of expansion. To this end, the EU decided to establish the European Conference, which met for the first time in March 1998, to which all ten eastern European candidates, Cyprus and Turkey were invited. There will also be accession partnerships to prepare the ten eastern European applicants for eventual membership. NATO has its programme of 'intensified dialogue' with candidates deemed not yet ready for membership.¹¹¹

A number of western foreign policy spokesmen have urged that the Iron Curtain should not be replaced by a 'Velvet' one. The difficulty may be that while prospective NATO and EU membership has acted as an important inducement to the central and eastern Europeans to continue with reform and to maintain good relations with their neighbours, the economic and military restructuring required of candidates is costly.¹¹² For example, opening formerly closed markets to EU competition could lead to increased unemployment in the short term and to possible social unrest. Similarly, restructuring armed forces along NATO lines may

¹⁰⁸ In 1996 financial flows into eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union amounted to about \$20bn of which the EU supplied \$12bn and the USA \$3bn (Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients OECD/DAC 1992-96).

¹⁰⁹ Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye, 'Enlarge the European Union Before NATO', *International Herald Tribune* 6/2/98

¹¹⁰ Eggert and Goltz 'From the Atlantic to the Urals?', *World Today*, October 1997

¹¹¹ Von Moltke, op cit

¹¹² Friendship treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic are seen as examples of the stabilising effect created by the prospect of NATO (and EU) membership.

also prove painful, in terms of sacked officers and delayed bureaucracies, and may also require increased defence spending in times of tight limits on public spending.

Both the EU and NATO need to keep the rejected candidates on the path to reform, but this may prove difficult as their prospects of membership of both these clubs recedes further into the twenty-first century. The EU enlargement process may be even more protracted and may face even greater problems of digestion and incorporation than NATO, particularly in relation to Poland. 'B' list countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, may therefore have little chance of gaining entry to the EU before 2010. The danger, then, is that the 'double outs', excluded both from the EU and NATO, could be tempted to postpone economic reform and perhaps slide into authoritarianism and nationalism, as has perhaps already occurred in the case of Slovakia. Romania, since 1996 under a liberal government, but with similar problems of political stability and potential tensions with Hungary over a large Magyar minority, also has potential to reject reform. The mere prospect that Hungary would be admitted to NATO and Romania would not, provoked some brief mutual animosity before the Madrid Summit.¹¹³ That said, the Stability Pacts between Hungary and Slovakia and Hungary and Romania, respectively, have maintained generally reasonable relations between the parties, notwithstanding some harassment of Magyars in Slovakia. Poland is another example of a state which has made attempts to secure friendly relations with its eastern neighbours, perhaps in reaction to problems of a 'Velvet Curtain'. It has bilateral co-operation agreements with Lithuania and Ukraine, both states with small Polish ethnic minorities.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ M. Rogers, 'Challenges Loom Beyond Enlargement for NATO', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2/7/98

¹¹⁴ For example, there is a joint Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion.

XI The New NATO Command Structure

At the December 1997 Defence Council, ministers accepted a plan, drawn up by the Military Committee, to rationalise the Alliance's Integrated Military Structure (IMS). Planning for a transition to a new structure was also authorised.¹¹⁵ After final approval at the December 1998 Defence Council, the new IMS is due to come into effect in April 1999.

A. The Origins of the New Command Structure

The origins of the new system of commands, which will be reduced in number from the current 65 to 20, stem from the launch of a Long Term Study (LTS) in September 1994. The aims of the LTS were not merely to cut costs but also to make the IMS more flexible and to accommodate Combined Joint Task Forces. The new command structure would also be designed to make room for French and Spanish participation, thus allowing them to become fully fledged NATO Members.

It is perhaps a sign both of the changes in the European security environment and of the slow pace of some NATO politico-military decision-making, that work on the new IMS was authorised only three months after the first revision of NATO's Commands had come into effect. This had stemmed from a review begun in 1991. The launch of the LTS was recognition that the 1994 structure was really a stopgap, pending a further, more penetrating attempt at redefinition. NATO's Command structure currently functions at four complex and acronym-laden levels: Major Command (theatre), Major Subordinate Command (region), Principal-Subordinate Command (sub-regional) and Sub-Principal Subordinate Command (multinational or national force). It is also the focus of much national egotism, in which national claims to a certain number of starred posts and proportions of personnel in HQs are vigorously asserted.¹¹⁶

The major focus of the 1994 reform was a reorganisation and partial rationalisation of the command structure north of the Alps. Partly due to the sensitivities of the countries involved, the PSC of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) was left largely untouched, although a new Sub-PSC, Allied Land Forces South Central Europe, was created in Greece. As far as Britain was concerned, the major impact of the 1994 changes was the loss of the Major Command, Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), which had been led by a RN Admiral, based at Northwood, and the extension of Allied Command Europe (ACE), one of the

¹¹⁵ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 17

¹¹⁶ M. Codner, 'NATO Facing Reforms: Hanging Together in NATO: The Ongoing Review of Command Structures', *RUSI Newsbrief*, November 1996

remaining Major Commands, the other being Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), to cover the UK mainland for the first time. Although ACCHAN had arguably long been an anachronism, in partial compensation, Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), a British-held command based in Oslo, was moved to High Wycombe and became Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST). Britain also acquired the command of AIRNORTHWEST.

The results of the LTS are more radical, although the two Major Commands, ACE and ACLANT, will remain. Below this level there will be Regional Commands and under them either functional Component Commands (air or sea) or Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRCs). The lowest tier of command, the Sub-PSC, will be deleted. The structure also has some additional features: Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQs are to be embedded into certain commands; the boundaries of the JSRCs are not fixed to ensure greater flexibility, specific missions and areas of responsibility will be allocated as required; and there will be greater multinationality at all levels of command. At least 50 per cent of the staff of a JSRC HQ are intended to be of a nationality other than that of the host country.¹¹⁷

Within ACE, there will be two regional headquarters, Allied Forces North and South. AFNORTH will contain three sub-regional HQs in Denmark, Germany and Norway, respectively, and air and naval component HQs. Poland suggested that a sub-regional command should be based on its soil after it acceded to NATO in 1999, but this was rejected, partly out of fears of offending Russia.¹¹⁸ Likewise AFSOUTH will also contain two functional commands (air and sea) and four sub-regional HQs in Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain. The revised Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) structure will be more simple, with three regional commands West (US), East (UK) and South East (Portugal), a joint submarine and strike fleet commands.¹¹⁹

Again from Britain's point of view, the new structure represents both losses and gains. AFNORTHWEST is to be abolished and merged with AFCENT to form a new AFNORTH, headquartered at Brunsum in the Netherlands. AIRNORTHWEST is also to be disbanded and its responsibilities transferred to AIRNORTH in Germany. However, the position of Northwood, currently the site of both the headquarters of EASTLANT and NAVNORTHWEST and 'doublehatted' under a British Admiral is to remain. Under the new structure it will keep both roles, but the latter will be named NAVNORTH. This will retain the influence of a British naval commander from the Western Approaches to the Baltic. This reform will also remove one of the main illogicalities of the 1994 structure, the fact that the

¹¹⁷ K. Naumann, 'NATO's New Military Structure', *NATO Review*, Spring 1998 and AN 3/12/97

¹¹⁸ *AFM* 14/12/97 A Danish-German-Polish Corps HQ will, however, be established at Szczecin (Stettin) in north-western Poland from 1999. In what could be viewed as a minor breach of assurances to Moscow, this will mean that some military personnel from the existing Members will be placed permanently on the territory of the Invitees (*AP* 29/1/98).

¹¹⁹ Naumann, *op cit.*

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NATO Baltic Approaches Command (BALTAP) had been subordinate to AFNORTHWEST for naval operations and AFCENT for land operations. The gestation of the new structure has not been without its pains. Indeed, the retention of quasi-national headquarters, in the form of the Joint Sub-Regional Commands, is evidence of the powerful forces of national identity within a collective military security organisation.

B. The Difficulties of Change: AFSOUTH and the Iberian Peninsula

The difficulties of reconciling national military aspirations have been most recognisable in AFSOUTH. The refusal of NATO to agree to award the leadership of AFSOUTH to a European commander was an essential element in France's eventual decision not to rejoin the Integrated Military Command Structure. Ironically, France's decision has probably 'saved' a number of British and German star and staff posts, since both countries would have lost posts to accommodate French officers in the new structure if France had joined.¹²⁰

The problems of designing the new command structure were also evident in the Iberian peninsula. A condition of Spain's entry into the IMS was that it obtain leadership of a NATO command covering Iberia and the western Mediterranean i.e. that Spain would retain effective military control over its national territory. This raised problems with Portugal, an original Alliance member and holder of the NATO Iberian–Atlantic (IBERLANT) command, which did not wish to place its territory under the command of its old rival, Spain. Under compromise proposals, adopted in October 1997, Portugal will remain as a subordinate regional command under ACLANT, while most of the remainder of the Iberian landmass is run from a new Joint Sub-Regional Command in Madrid under ACE. Both countries' Atlantic islands will report to their respective nationally based-HQs. Thus, the Canaries will ultimately fall under ACE and not ACLANT.¹²¹

Spanish and Portuguese disagreements pale in comparison to the Anglo-Spanish dispute over the status of the British colony of Gibraltar, currently host to a low-level NATO command, GIBMED. Madrid has sought the recovery of the 'Rock' ever since it passed to British sovereignty under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. Spain operates a policy of exclusion towards Gibraltar. Spanish military headquarters will accept no signal coming from the colony, nor is any ship either bound for or from Gibraltar allowed entry to any Spanish port, nor is any military or civil aircraft taking off or landing at Gibraltar allowed to enter Spanish airspace. The British Government has made it clear that such restrictions are unacceptable between allies and has threatened to veto Spanish entry into the IMS. Spain, for its part, is keen to exert some control over Gibraltar, in NATO guise, by incorporating it into the

¹²⁰ See Section XIV

¹²¹ E. Foster, 'NATO's Iberian Challenges', *RUSI Newsbrief*, November 1997

Madrid-based JSRC. Military command is of particular significance to the airport, RAF Gibraltar, which is central to the colony's continued viability.¹²²

Bilateral negotiations over this issue are still deadlocked, despite the suggestion of a Spanish concession over warship access and Britain pointing out that the airport could be open for Spanish military use.¹²³ Although NATO's agreement in principle to the new IMS in December 1997 was presented by Spain as a victory, the British Government has been at pains to point out that the new command structure will still need to be formally approved at the December 1998 Defence Council.¹²⁴ This leaves Britain and Spain at least a further eight months to argue over Gibraltar's NATO status. For its part, NATO has been keen to avoid involvement in this issue, perhaps fearful that it will partly disable NATO in the western Mediterranean, much as mutual Greek and Turkish antagonisms have weakened the Alliance in the Aegean.¹²⁵

On the Spanish attitude to NATO/Gibraltar, the Defence Secretary has stated: -

Mr. George Robertson: The UK, together with other Allies, has welcomed Spain's announcement of its intention to join the Alliance's integrated military structure. The detailed arrangements have still to be established. We are addressing military air access to Gibraltar and naval movements bilaterally and in the context of Spain's entry into NATO's future Command Structure. We will deal separately with the question of civilian air access to Gibraltar.¹²⁶

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces has commented on the future military status of Gibraltar: -

Dr. Reid: As part of the implementation of NATO's new command structure GIBMED, the NATO headquarters based in Gibraltar will close.

The UK national headquarters in Gibraltar will continue to be available for NATO use when required, and NATO facilities will also remain based on Gibraltar. The defence and security of Gibraltar will of course remain the direct responsibility of the UK.¹²⁷

Work is continuing on an Implementation Plan for the new command structure, which will have to contend with the modalities of personnel, infrastructure, communications and

¹²² *ibid*

¹²³ *ibid*

¹²⁴ *El Pais* and *The Times* 3/12/97

¹²⁵ Greece and Turkey have accepted the new, draft IMS, which should allow the NATO Command at Larissa in Greece, stalled since 1994 by their disputes, to be activated.

¹²⁶ HC Deb 27/1/98 c 181w

¹²⁷ HC Deb 12/2/98 c 298w

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funding. More importantly, it will need to be able to accommodate the forces of the three new Members. It has already been made clear that no NATO HQ will be sited in the Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary, but room will have to be made both for their generals and staff in the IMS. Details of this particular aspect of restructuring appear unclear, but it does seem likely that the Czech Republic and Poland will become part of AFNORTH, while Hungary will fall under AFSOUTH. In the eastern Mediterranean, it remains to be seen whether both Greece and Turkey will temper their territorial and other disagreements sufficiently to allow implementation of the revised command structure in this region.

XII The European Security and Defence Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces

A. Background

At the Madrid Summit, NATO leaders also re-affirmed two important concepts: the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).¹²⁸ ESDI is an attempt to build up a stronger European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, consistent with parallel attempts in the EU to strengthen European defence co-operation. The key institution in both respects is the Western European Union (WEU). Since first being identified as the expression of the EU defence identity at Maastricht in 1991, and encouraged by further steps taken in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the WEU has sought to develop an operational capability to undertake limited peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the so-called Petersberg tasks. The difficulty for the WEU Member States is that they lack or face shortages in many areas of the defence equipment or capabilities necessary to mount such operations. These facilities include intelligence, communications, logistics and heavy air and sealift, which, although mainly American, are all available to NATO. Under the CJTF concept, the WEU will be able to 'borrow' such assets from NATO. In the words of one commentator, CJTFs are "a sort of defence Lego that can be built up at short notice to send to the world's hot-spots".¹²⁹ From a military and cost perspective, the attractiveness of this approach is that it allows the EU to strengthen its military instruments, without embarking on the expensive replication of NATO assets. Perhaps more importantly, in the jargon, the CJTFs will be 'separable but not separate' from NATO. In other words they are intended to enhance European defence co-operation in a practical manner, without establishing a defence organisation parallel to or competitive with NATO. This will avoid what some NATO Members, including Britain, have feared, that is a greater assertiveness in purely European defence eroding the transatlantic link.

The CJTF concept was first proposed by the US administration in autumn 1993 and subsequently adopted by NATO at the Brussels Summit of January 1994. From a military perspective, the CJTF idea draws from US military experience in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and also from that of Britain in the Falklands in 1982. Although simple in theory, CJTFs have been difficult to translate into reality and will not be operational until the year 2000. For example, the military modalities of 'loaning' forces from NATO to the WEU, and then returning them; the plans for drawing forces and assets of disparate countries swiftly together; and the establishment of flexible command and control arrangement are all inherently complex. However, although time-consuming in terms of analysis and preparation, these hurdles are not insuperable. Work began on the military side of CJTFs in 1994 but had halted by the end of the year. The reason for

¹²⁸ *Madrid Declaration*, Paras 14-20

¹²⁹ *The Financial Times* 6/6/96

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this impasse was a political one, and saw France, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, divided over the central question of command and control of the Task Forces. The French government was keen to avoid the Major NATO Commands (MNCs), responsible to SACEUR, an American general, dominating the control of CJTFs in non-Article 5 operations without additional (i.e. French) political input. This was a rerun of an earlier French complaint against NATO; the power of an allegedly politically unaccountable US general in charge of Allied forces was one reason why France left the command structure in the 1960s. For its part, the USA, supported by most NATO allies, maintained that the North Atlantic Council exercised sufficient political control over the IMS and was opposed to any political interference in the running of the MNCs. Washington also feared the establishment of competing staff structures for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations, which could undermine one of NATO's great strengths, its united chain of command.¹³⁰ It was also reluctant to see US military equipment and personnel operating under something other than US military command.

This dispute was eventually overcome at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996. Here, the US administration conceded that the WEU, i.e. the Europeans, would have "political control and strategic direction" of CJTF missions, although these would be based on criteria and plans drawn up between NATO and WEU, i.e. with US involvement. On a second point, it was agreed that CJTF command structures would be embedded within the NATO structure, with appropriate European officers doublehatted in both a NATO and WEU role. These CJTF cells would then detach when required. In other words, there would be no separate European military command structure. Significantly, a decision to launch a CJTF would require the approval of the North Atlantic Council.¹³¹ Separately, it was agreed that, in the event of a grave security crisis, NATO could remove its forces from a CJTF before the mission had been completed i.e. that the USA could withdraw its assets if they were needed for pressing operations elsewhere.¹³² The Berlin decisions were taken in the light of France's move back towards the military command structure.¹³³

Further progress on CJTFs was made at the Madrid Summit, where it was agreed that a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe would have overall responsibility for the military development of ESDI and CJTFs, although his exact duties were to be decided.¹³⁴ Again, this marked a compromise between France and the USA. France had proposed a Deputy SACEUR, who would effectively be in charge of the detachable CJTF cells, while the USA had opposed what it saw as another attempt to weaken the overall integrity of the command structure. The first full NATO CJTF exercise was held by AFCENT in Germany in November 1997.¹³⁵ The latest NATO defence ministers meeting, held in Brussels in December 1997, recounted progress:

¹³⁰ C. Barry, 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice', *Survival*, Spring 1996 and M. O'Hanlon, 'Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces', *Survival*, Autumn 1997

¹³¹ *Berlin Declaration*, Para 7

¹³² *The Financial Times* 26/4/96

¹³³ *The European* 6/6/96

¹³⁴ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 18

¹³⁵ *AN* 26/11/97

At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996 NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers resolved to build ESDI within the Alliance, based on the concept of separable but not separate capabilities. We noted with satisfaction the further progress achieved towards defining practical arrangements for WEU-led operations making use of Alliance assets and capabilities. This has included the detailed development of mechanisms for the identification, release, monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities; arrangements designed to ensure close consultation between NATO and WEU on, inter alia, the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations involving the use of such assets and capabilities, including measures for intensified sharing of information and intelligence in the context of such operations; the provision from NATO's command structure of headquarters elements and command positions to command and conduct WEU-led operations; the development of an exercise programme designed to test procedures for NATO support of a WEU-led operation, leading to a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise planned for 2000, to be followed by a CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operation, taking into account decisions on European command arrangements and the provision of NATO assets and capabilities to the WEU; and the incorporation of requirements for WEU-led operations into NATO's defence planning based, inter alia, on the WEU's illustrative mission profiles.¹³⁶

B. Combined Joint Task Forces Evaluated

The Combined Joint Task Force is a common factor in many of NATO's attempts to adapt itself to the new century. It not only provides a practical means of bringing European defence aspirations and US military power together, but also, through the potential co-option of NATO Partners, a wider way of uniting the Euro-Atlantic military community. Operationally, the CJTF may offer a flexible framework for coalitions of willing and able states, including Russia, to respond to sudden developments that affect their common security.

For all the optimism of supporters of the CJTF concept, doubts remain as to whether CJTFs will ever be used operationally. Through its active role in Bosnia from 1995, its support for NATO enlargement and the continuing presence of US military forces in Europe in significant numbers, the USA has underlined its current position as a European military power. Some would question whether there would be any major, even quasi-military, operation in the wider North Atlantic area in which the USA would not wish to have a direct role. Traditionally, European NATO allies have often privately preferred US leadership to squabbling amongst themselves over the direction of a particular European security policy. This US leadership is exercised via NATO.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ *Brussels Declaration*, Para 21

¹³⁷ P. Gordon, 'Recasting the Atlantic Alliance', *Survival*, Spring 1996

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While a purely European humanitarian operation was conducted successfully in Albania in 1997, some WEU Members, including Britain, were unwilling for the organisation to provide the framework for the mission, which instead was led by Italy and involved a number of states acting in an *ad hoc* coalition. There is also the question as to whether, in practice, a US President, let alone the US Congress, would allow US service personnel to be placed in potential danger outside US military command. There may be a place for CJTFs, but this may only be in very low-level peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, where the USA provides air or sealift and then effectively ceases involvement in the operation. In such a manner, US military transport aircraft have regularly flown French and Belgian troops to intervene in African trouble spots. In another example, US air and sealift was used to transport British reinforcements to UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1995. NATO's planning and exercising for CJTFs may assist the work of NATO itself, potentially with its Partners, in responding to crises.¹³⁸ However, it remains to be seen whether it will make a material difference to autonomous European military operations.

¹³⁸ The SFOR Strategic Reserve Force, involving troops from Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, the USA and the UK, may be a case in point (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 8/4/98)

XIII France and NATO

Another item on the Madrid Summit agenda was France's reintegration into NATO military structures. In the event this move, which had been in prospect, was postponed and subsequently abandoned.

A. Background

Under the second Mitterrand Presidency and more speedily under President Chirac, France steadily moved away from its policy of semi-autonomy in defence, propounded by De Gaulle. Despite leaving NATO's military structures in 1966 and thereafter often adopting a singular approach to European security, France always maintained pragmatic defence links with NATO and had remained part of the Atlantic Alliance.¹³⁹ The new policy towards NATO was the product of a number of factors. These included, *inter alia*, the end of the Cold War, which removed some of France's room to manoeuvre between the superpower blocs; and the experience of the Gulf War, where French armed forces found it difficult to operate together with the NATO-trained US and British forces. More important was French involvement in peacekeeping in Bosnia, which drew France's armed forces into practical co-operation with those of full NATO members, such as Britain, and also into staff discussions about the conduct of NATO operations in the Adriatic theatre. On the political front, the failure of France to launch an independent European defence at Maastricht, pressure from Germany, which wanted France to become more closely linked to NATO, and, more importantly, the desire of states in central and eastern Europe to become full Members of the organisation that Paris had rejected, all encouraged a redefinition of France's security policy. The Brussels Summit decision on ESDI and CJTFs also offered evidence that, from a French perspective, NATO was changing and would become less American-dominated.

France's move back towards NATO was incremental. In 1993 Paris agreed that the Franco-German Eurocorps, the kernel of France's plans for a Common European defence, would serve under NATO's operational command in the event of a crisis. In 1994, a French defence minister attended a NATO defence ministers council for the first time since the 1960s. It was confirmed that France would attend such meetings on a case-by-case basis thereafter. France's return to NATO's military structures became more concrete in December 1995, when it was announced that France would attend NATO Defence Councils and meetings of the Military Committee on a regular basis, although it would still not attend the Defence

¹³⁹ Such links included a French military mission to the Military Committee, practical co-operation in areas such as logistics and communications, and secret agreements on the participation of French forces in NATO operations in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion.

Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group. The new relationship formed the platform on which France approached the Madrid Summit.¹⁴⁰

B. The Madrid Summit and France's New NATO Consensus

The French government had a firm condition for reassuming full NATO membership at Madrid, this being a greater Europeanisation of the NATO command structure. As discussed above, a key French aim was the transfer of the AFSOUTH command to a European officer, to be held on rotation between France, Italy and Spain. In this it did not succeed. The leader of AFSOUTH is an American, who is also the Admiral of the US Sixth Fleet currently holds the AFSOUTH command. The Fleet is regarded as central to US military power in the Mediterranean. Although Washington was willing to pass over a number of posts in the Command structure to Europeans, it was never likely to cede control of the Sixth Fleet to a foreign commander, even one from another NATO Member State, and refused to do so. After the Summit, Paris gave another reason for its decision not to rejoin the NATO command structure as disappointment at the decision not to admit Slovenia and Romania to the Alliance. The candidature of both countries had been firmly supported by Paris.¹⁴¹

In October 1997, the French Socialist Government confirmed that, while it would continue to participate in NATO's politico-military structures, it would not be rejoining the IMS. The major French political parties, the Socialists, the centre-right *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) and the neo-Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR), all now share in this new defence consensus.¹⁴² France's decision was perhaps inevitable. The move back to NATO never represented a conversion to Atlanticism but arose from the realisation that French national interests could best be pursued through a closer relationship with NATO. Thus, France should co-operate with NATO's military structures, but, at the same time, continue to work for a stronger European defence identity. Reintegration into the military command structure was possibly never in prospect as it would subordinate France to US leadership, conflict with its own self-image as a leading world power, and also possibly terminate France's aspirations for an EU Common Defence. Even if Jospin wished to rejoin the IMS, he would face opposition from within the ranks of his own party and also from the Greens and Communists in his government coalition. In a poll taken in June 1996, only 17 per cent of respondents favoured full integration into NATO.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ See R. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', *Survival*, March 1996 and A. Le Gloannec, 'Europe by Other Means?', *International Affairs*, January 1997.

¹⁴¹ *Le Monde* 29/6/97

¹⁴² P. Boniface, 'The NATO Debate in France', Conference on NATO Enlargement, October 1997

¹⁴³ *ibid*

Unlike Spain, which indicated at Madrid that it would join the IMS, France may remain in a semi-detached relationship with NATO for some time.¹⁴⁴ Whatever its domestic underpinnings, this can only have negative consequences for NATO's future development. It may, in particular, continue to undermine the implementation of the CJTF concept and reduce Europe's wider military effectiveness, at a time of continued reductions in national defence budgets and armed forces.

¹⁴⁴ The Aznar Government, elected in Spain in 1996, indicated its intention to join the IMS if a number of conditions, including the establishment of a Spanish-led regional command, were met. Spain's decision was eased by the fact that unlike France it has always participated in meetings of the Defence Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Military Committee. Spain will presumably join the IMS in 1999 or whenever the revised command structure comes into effect.

XIV The Mediterranean Initiative

Also discussed at Madrid was the Alliance's policy towards its southern flank. NATO first specifically identified the southern littoral of the Mediterranean as an area of potential crises and direct threats to European security in the 1991 Strategic Concept. In particular, the Concept referred to the "build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance".¹⁴⁵ Other potential threats identified were the potential for the 'spillover' effects of local conflicts, such as the migration of refugees and the interruption of international communications and energy supplies. Energy is a major factor in relations between states on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean; 74 per cent of Spain's natural gas needs, 50 per cent of Italy's and 29 per cent of France's are obtained from the countries of the Maghreb. Regardless of any local conflict, migration may prove an inevitable product of rapid population growth in the region. The population of North Africa is expected to more than double by 2025, and 30 per cent of the region's population will then be under the age of 15. Algeria, in particular, has seen the consequences of high population growth and the inability of its economy to keep pace. Both factors have played a part in the country's descent into civil war.¹⁴⁶

At the Brussels Summit of 1994 the Sixteen recognised that the Alliance's security was closely linked to that of the wider Mediterranean region by deciding to "consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries of the region" with a view to achieving better mutual understanding and underpinning regional security and stability. Later that year, NATO decided to establish bilateral dialogues with individual states in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. In 1995 Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia were invited to participate and were subsequently joined by Jordan. At Madrid, the Mediterranean dialogue was raised to a new level with the establishment of a new Mediterranean Co-operation Group, that is 16 + 6, which would have overall responsibility for co-ordinating individual dialogues (16 + 1) and other co-operation measures.¹⁴⁷ The latter might include military co-operation along the lines of Partnership for Peace, such as attendance at NATO courses, seminars on crisis management, etc.¹⁴⁸

It remains to be seen what exactly the Mediterranean Initiative can achieve. Tensions exist between some of the southern Mediterranean states involved in the dialogue. Previous efforts

¹⁴⁵ *Strategic Concept*, November 1991, Paras 7-11

¹⁴⁶ 75,000 Algerians have been killed in fighting between or by the Algerian security forces and various Islamist and criminal factions since 1992 (*The Financial Times* 24/1/98).

¹⁴⁷ *Madrid Declaration*, Para 13

¹⁴⁸ J. Nordam, 'The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling misconceptions and building confidence', *NATO Review*, July 1997 and N. de Santis, 'The future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative', *NATO Review*, Spring 1998. Forces from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco participate in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia.

at regional co-operative security, such as the proposal in the early 1990s for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, have been frustrated by such animosities. Moreover, the dialogue does not involve Algeria in whose complex and bloody affairs all international organisations are reluctant to become embroiled. It also fails to include Libya, seen by many as a pariah and whose unpredictable policies may pose a particular threat to NATO interests. The complexities of the Middle East Peace Process dominate relations between Egypt, Israel and Jordan. It is also questionable whether the North African states wish to enter into any form of extended military co-operation with NATO. Many Arabs would regard the Alliance as a cover for general neo-colonial (France) or neo-imperialist (USA) activities in the region. The states of the area may wish for greater security but they may not be willing to be, or to be seen to be, beholden to Euro-American security interests.

XV NATO in the 21st Century

NATO is to review the process of enlargement at its 1999 Summit in Washington. It remains to be seen whether fresh invitations will be issued or whether the Alliance will pause for a period of reflection to allow for integration of the three new Members, whilst at the same time again reassuring the excluded candidates of their future chances of admittance. Russia, whatever its public protestations, appears privately resigned to this and further rounds of enlargement as long as they do not include states which were formally part of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, NATO may continue to evolve further away from its purely military rationale of the past into an even more political role, a trend assisted by a strategy review due to be concluded by 1999. In practical terms, the Alliance's continued high credibility may relate partly to the progress of its peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and to its continued success in containing the strains between Greece and Turkey.

The question of how much NATO enlargement will or should cost may remain opaque. NATO is not to begin spending money on infrastructure, etc. in the territories of the new Member States, until after they have actually joined in 1999. In addition, perhaps one of the most important issues, the true state of readiness and equipment of the new Members' armed forces, may never be made fully public. This may make objective non-NATO assessments of any requirement for remedial spending difficult. In conclusion, in the context of the perception of a fairly benign threat environment in Europe, it would seem that the Sixteen, and then the Nineteen, will spend what they are willing and able to on their collective defence, rather than fulfilling any abstractly derived or even official NATO plan.

The key question to be faced by NATO at what is likely to be a triumphal summit in 1999 may be to decide what NATO is in fact for. This question may partly be answered by the current strategy review. The 1991 Strategic Concept, with its references to the Soviet Union, is clearly outdated. The residual threat identified in 1991 has now evaporated and planning may concentrate on maintaining and projecting Alliance capabilities, rather than responding to any specific enemy. This may lead to lower states of readiness for the bulk of NATO forces, but greater emphasis on the readiness and support of certain rapid deployment units.¹⁴⁹

Politically, two advantages of NATO have often been stated. Beyond the political link of the North Atlantic Alliance, it preserves a tangible transatlantic bond between Europe and the USA. It also provides a multilateral context for the defence and security policies of European states, which might either feel uncomfortable or be tempted into mutual competition without

¹⁴⁹ P. Cornish, 'NATO at the Millenium: New missions, new members ... new strategy?', *NATO Review*, September 1997

one. Germany falls into the former category and Greece and Turkey into the latter. Although, in the post-war period, membership of the EC might have made conflict in western Europe unthinkable, it was perhaps membership of NATO which made it impossible. The prevention of the nationalisation of defence policies in eastern Europe may be one of the persuasive arguments in favour of progressive NATO enlargement.

The fact remains that alliances have not historically been mere products of shared values but have been formed by states drawing together in response to a perceived common threat. The impetus for NATO was the fear of Soviet aggression. Some commentators would maintain that, in order for the collective glue of a military alliance to remain, NATO will require a threat, and that threat emanates from North Africa and the Near East. According to Binnendijk, through enlargement and other initiatives NATO has 'solved' the strategic problem of northern Europe by bringing stability to the strategic space between Germany and Russia, but it now needs a southern strategy to stabilise the southern and eastern Mediterranean.¹⁵⁰ The 1991 Strategic Concept already includes references to "instabilities" in this region as a potential threat to Alliance security. The revised Concept may greatly expand them.

A 'southern' strategy would fit in with some American perspectives of NATO being the institution for a 'Grand Bargain' between the USA and Europe. In essence, this entails the USA maintaining a defence presence in Europe in exchange for European assistance with American security policy elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Middle East. The strategy might, however, have a number of pitfalls for the Alliance. Although many European NATO members are fully cognisant of potential threats to their security on their southern flank, there must be distinct doubts as to whether they will be prepared for NATO to become directly involved in regions well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Disparate European reactions to the latest Iraq crisis reveal yet again the many distinctions in US and European views of international security. Any US efforts to use NATO well outside its traditional area of operation may only weaken both it and the transatlantic link.

Suggestions that NATO should become more involved in non-military activities, such as promoting democracy, countering international terrorism, environmental protection and non-proliferation may also have a mixed impact. It could be argued that NATO is above all a military organisation; the strength of its command structure and common operating procedures has been revealed by its largely successful peace-enforcement and then peace-keeping mission in Bosnia since 1995. It does not have the expertise to become involved in entirely non-military areas of security, which should perhaps best be left to international organisations with the relevant experience. For example, the prevention of international crime or terrorism should be undertaken by Europol or Interpol. NATO is perhaps not the best body

¹⁵⁰ H. Binnendijk 'Next NATO Needs To Give Itself a Southern Strategy', *The International Herald Tribune* 17/3/98

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for promoting democracy, with this role better exercised by the Council of Europe and OSCE. In the Mediterranean the EU's Barcelona Process may offer a more effective means of reducing insecurity in the region, by tackling some of its underlying socio-economic causes, than politico-military action by NATO.¹⁵¹

Whatever its political advantages, NATO enlargement will degrade the Alliance's military effectiveness, at least in the short-term. The new Members, and any additional candidates admitted after 1999, have weak armed forces and it will take many years to raise them to standards of the existing membership. A weakening of the political bonds of the Alliance may also prove an inevitable product of the enlargement from sixteen to perhaps nearly thirty members in the next century and of the broader ethnic and economic divergences between Europe and North America.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ The Euro-Mediterranean Initiative or Barcelona Process was launched at the city of the same name in November 1995. It offers a range of economic, political and social links to 12 Mediterranean partners. It focuses, in particular, on the promotion of economic development in the region.

¹⁵² Factors in this divergence might include the decline of European-Americans as a proportion of the overall US population, unilateralist sentiment in Congress, and the economic rivalry between rival trading blocks, perhaps to be enhanced by competition between the Dollar and the Euro. See Cornish, *op cit* for a brief discussion of NATO's future