

**THE ARMY AND DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION:
THE BRONZE MEDAL AIN'T GOOD ENOUGH IN A THREE-MAN RACE**

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy” Series.



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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the current state of the Army's funding in relation to its needs as well as in relation to its historical proportion of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. DoD has traditionally allocated the Army approximately a quarter of the overall DoD budget, while the Navy and Air Force have received greater than 30 percent. These figures are roughly the same whether looking at the Reagan, Clinton, or either of the Bush Presidencies. Despite the heavy lifting done by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget request had the Army getting about 25 percent while the Navy and Air Force receive slightly less than 30 percent each. The FY2008 request submitted to Congress in February 2007 moved that mark to 27 percent for the Army, 28 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy/Marine Corps, and 16 percent for other DoD programs. These overall percentages do not vary by more than 2 percent of the historical average over the last 30 years.

Advocates for increased Defense spending have pointed out that Defense spending, as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP), is at a historical low of 3-4 percent over the last 10 years, while opponents argue that the end of the Cold War and the limited war we are fighting now justify less of an investment in Defense. This year the Army's leadership is attempting to make a stronger argument for additional dollars, while simultaneously refusing to entertain the question of diverting money from Air Force and Navy funding streams.

How did the Army get to the point where it is the perennial bronze medal winner in a three-man funding race? Are the Army's relations with Congress part of the problem in obtaining sufficient funding? How does DoD determine who gets what and how do they determine how much is enough? After examining the possible Army funding options, this paper concludes with recommendations of actions that the Army leadership should take to procure additional funding for the Army.

THE ARMY AND DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION: THE BRONZE MEDAL AIN'T GOOD ENOUGH IN A THREE-MAN RACE

Five years after our nation was attacked, the terrorist danger remains. We're a nation at war – and America and her allies are fighting this war with relentless determination across the world.¹

Pursuing our enemies is a vital commitment of the war on terror – and I thank the Congress for providing our servicemen and women with the resources they have needed. During this time of war, we must continue to support our military and give them the tools for victory.²

INTRODUCTION

Are we a Nation at War or for that matter a Department of Defense (DoD) at War? Or is the truth that we are really an Army and Marine Corps at War? The Army is currently involved in the greatest sustained combat since Vietnam and yet as a percentage of DoD spending receives the smallest share of the three major services. This paper examines the current state of the Army's funding in relation to its needs as well as in relation to its historical proportion of DoD's budget. DoD has traditionally allocated the Army approximately a quarter of the overall DoD budget, while the Navy and Air Force have received greater than 30 percent. These figures are roughly the same whether looking at the Reagan, Clinton, or either of the Bush presidencies. Despite the heavy lifting done by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Fiscal Year (FY)2007 budget request had the Army getting about 25 percent while the Navy and Air Force receive slightly less than 30 percent. The FY08 request submitted to Congress in February 2007 moved that mark to 27 percent for the Army, 28 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy/Marine Corps, and 16 percent for DoD programs. When looking at the DoD investment budget for the amount spent on weapons purchases, the Air Force receives 36 percent of the budget; the Navy, 33 percent; and the Army is left with just 16 percent, after various defense agencies take 15 percent. These overall percentages do not vary by more than 2 percent of the historical average over the last 30 years. (Supplemental budget submissions were not included in these calculations.)

Our nation last engaged in a serious naval battle over 60 years ago during World War II. In the skies, our Air Force last faced a major threat during the final throes of the Vietnam War. We currently enjoy a 200 to 1 kill ratio in the skies and yet suffer a ground casualty rate of about six to one in close combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, after continuous investment in our sea and air assets, the Navy and Air Force stand alone on the world stage.³ How did the Army get to this point, and how can the Army legitimately make a coherent argument to receive more funds or a bigger piece of the Defense budget?

HISTORY – INITIAL INTENT OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS

The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to:

... raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years;

... provide and maintain a navy;

... provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia . . .⁴

The first logical question we can ask is why has the Army traditionally received the smallest percentage of programmed funding of the services? A possible explanation can be found in the Constitution. Historically, it appears that the Founding Fathers intended the Navy to be a permanent force while the Army would be raised when required. Clearly, this explains the language of the Constitution above. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 11 wrote,

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.⁵

A strong navy is usually not perceived as a threat to the civilian populace or to the government. The Founding Fathers understood and could easily articulate the need for a navy especially since the 13 original colonies had an extensive coast along the Atlantic. After the Revolution, even George Washington, the leader of the Continental Army, believed that any additional government funds would be better directed towards “building and equipping a Navy without which, in case of War we could neither protect our Commerce, nor yield that assistance to each other which, on such an extent of seacoast, our mutual safety would require.”⁶

On the other hand, a strong army was viewed skeptically by a people who had suffered at the hands of an occupying military force. This was a grievance clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence when the Continental Congress attacked King George III “for quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.”⁷ The concern of antifederalists like Samuel Adams about standing armies was reinforced by events such as the Boston Massacre in 1770 when unarmed colonists were gunned down by British troops. Although during the Revolutionary War George Washington had asked the Continental Congress to establish a larger standing army, they refused his requests, instead forcing him to rely on militias that could fight in the spring and summer and not have to be paid while major campaigns were halted because of winter. Historian Russell F. Weigley believes that the Congress was “acutely mindful that the Parliamentary Army of 17th Century England had turned upon its legislative creator and erected the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell.”⁸ Even Alexander Hamilton, a proponent of a strong federal government, acknowledged the concerns of the Anti-Federalists in Federalist Paper No. 8 when he stated, “Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and

it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it. Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain.”⁹

Thus, as the federal government was established, a small standing army was maintained while the bulk of defense needs for the new United States would fall upon state militias. Although this had proven successful during the Revolutionary War, it was a system that had been discarded by Europe in favor of mass conscription, grand scale tactics, and superior logistics as the continent was enveloped by the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁰

HISTORY – 19TH CENTURY TO PRESENT DAY

The United States would continue its philosophy of maintaining a small standing army throughout the 19th century. Militias would be raised when necessary, and the country would resort to conscription during the Civil War and subsequent major conflicts as required. However, after each conflict, the Army would shrink back to a more affordable size. The Regular Army would be maintained to ensure the safety of its citizens with respect to Native Americans as the sweep across the Great Plains continued westward. The importance of the Navy became even more pronounced as the United States reached the Pacific Coast. In the years before the Spanish-American War, the Navy had seen substantial growth due to the efforts of some of its officers and Benjamin Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy in President Benjamin Harrison’s administration. As Richard Stewart pointed out in *American Military History*, Congress was convinced of the utility of committing funds to carry out an “ . . . extensive construction and modernization program. The historical writings of Alfred T. Mahan were particularly influential in establishing the framework of a global, blue – water fleet focused on the dominance of the Navy, the establishment of refueling bases, and the aggressive protection of commerce.”¹¹

As the 20th century dawned and the United States became a major player on the world stage, the Army would once again expand rapidly during the two World Wars and Korea; and then conduct demobilization operations to reduce its size, footprint, and ultimately its cost. The separation of the Air Corps from the Army and the creation of the Air Force as a separate branch of service resulted in the Army’s being relegated to third place in the funding stream as the Cold War began to heat up. The Eisenhower administration determined that the most effective and efficient way to provide the defense of the United States was to rely on its advantage in nuclear weapons and an emphasis on air power. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would state, “The basic decision . . . was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.”¹² The problem with this policy was that once the Soviets achieved parity in nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons was not an option without assuring total destruction of both belligerents. President John F. Kennedy’s administration introduced the strategy of Flexible Response; a strategy that allowed for measures short of total annihilation to deal with threats. Eventually, the size of the Army would have to be increased to counter and react to immediate threats such as the Berlin Blockade and the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹³

The American public’s negative reaction to the conduct of the draft during Vietnam led to the beginning of an all-volunteer Army that was maintained at a much larger level than previous peacetime armies in the United States. This led to higher manpower costs,

but the basic division of DoD dollars has remained constant to the present day. As you can see in Figure 1, the Air Force and Navy each receive about 30 percent, the Army 25 percent, and the DoD keeps the remaining 15 percent for its programs.




Figure 1. Defense Budget Allocation by Service.¹⁴

OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

We have looked at a possible historical explanation for the levels of Army funding, but are there other possible explanations of why the Army has been lagging in the distribution of funds? Since Congress both authorizes and appropriates funding, it may be useful to examine Army relations with the Hill.

Stephen K. Scroggs, in his book, *Army Relations with Congress, Thick Armor, Dull Sword, and Slow Horse*, identified several patterns of Army-congressional relations based on interviews conducted during 1995-96 with Members of Congress, Professional Staff Members, and Military Legislative Assistants. The first pattern identified was actually of a positive nature. Congress sees the Army as the most straightforward, honest, and credible of all the military services. When asked a question, the Army usually responds in a timely fashion whether or not it hurts its image. The Navy and Air Force are not viewed as favorably. It is not just the event itself, but rather the reaction of the service to the problem that is also noted. Examples cited by interviewees were the problems with the C17 cargo plane, the Tailhook scandal, and the Battleship *Iowa* explosion.¹⁵

The second pattern identified is that the Army believes that Congress is more an impediment than a help and that having to deal with Congress is an inconvenience rather than an opportunity to engage. Part of this problem can also be traced to the belief that the Army does not understand the role Congress plays in the process. The Army has traditionally focused on the Executive Branch and has not evolved as the Congress has demanded more say in Defense issues.¹⁶ Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), one of the most ardent supporters of the Army in Congress, noted,

There are those in all services who see Congress as an irritant and obstacle. However, it's the degree to which a service hierarchy and its officer corps carry those sentiments that is significant. Unfortunately the Army holds these sentiments to the greatest degree. It is clearly reflected in the actions of today's senior hierarchy and the officer corps who will replace them.¹⁷

The third pattern identified by Scruggs was the belief that of all the services, the senior military leadership of the Army was the least represented and the least engaged on Capitol Hill. This aspect has two parts: the first being the willingness of three- and four-star generals to make frequent visits to the Hill just to establish a rapport with individual members; and the second being the willingness to engage members of Congress at the three- and four-star level over important Army issues. Navy, Marine, and Air Force leadership have a tendency to work on their relationships with Congress and show up with greater frequency than the Army. Personal relations are important in politics. Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for a short period during the 1990s, visited over 400 Congressional offices during the first couple of months in 1995. This allowed him to engage members of Congress during budget battles over items perceived critical by the Navy. The Army generals traditionally have not been that engaged.¹⁸ Clearly Army leadership recognized these problems and realized that they needed to be addressed. Former Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer once said,

Our success as an institution depends on the degree to which all senior leaders communicate clearly to the American people why we need an Army and why we must remain the best Army in the world. . . . Good congressional relations are good human relations. . . . The return on investment we get is in direct proportion to the quality time and effort we invest in these relationships.¹⁹

Another criticism of the Army is that it is more reactive and less proactive than the other services in representing its institutional interests and concerns to Congress. As stated earlier, the Army is perceived to be the most honest and straightforward service; however, Army leaders carry their adherence to the letter of the law to the extreme. In fear of violating antilobbying laws, the Army has a tendency to wait until an issue becomes a crisis. The perception of many on Capitol Hill is that Army generals only visit when things are desperate. In the Army culture, that is the way things are done. Officers are taught not to bother the boss unless you really need help. This is at odds with the way things are run in politics. The other services are more engaged in "salesmanship" than the Army and on building relationships.²⁰ Former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum explained his take on the problem.

A common area of criticism for the Army has been an apparent unwillingness of Army leaders to actively court members' support or work with the Congress to gain support for critical initiatives. The Army believes the merit and purity of the Army requirements for modernization will carry the day on Capitol Hill and no further action is required or desirable. Unfortunately, the Army is the only service that holds this view, and the results speak to the validity of this position.²¹

Finally, the Army has been viewed as having a limited and less sophisticated outreach. The Army seems to rely on the same few members of Congress to fight its battles for it. It has not done a good job of cultivating relationships outside those select members of Congress. The view that the Army is less "sexy" than the Navy or Air Force has been

widespread for years throughout the Army. The belief has been that it is tough to compete with the Air Force and Navy on orientation trips.²² Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, both a graduate of West Point and an 8-year veteran of the Army, offered his thoughts on why the Army does not do as well as the Navy and the Air Force.

When visiting members of Congress and their staffs, the Army should market its top programs. Virtually every member of Congress or staffer knows that the Navy needs submarines and aircraft carriers and the Air Force needs new fighter jets. However, even those well versed in military affairs might find it difficult to name the top three Army programs. I think the Army hesitates to arrange orientation trips because there are no alluring aircraft carriers or fighter jets to offer. But the Army has possibly one of the greatest assets of any service—soldiers. In my experience, most members of Congress are not as impressed by hardware as they are by simply talking with dedicated, disciplined soldiers and watching them in action.²³

Scrogg's work is based on his experience working in the Army's Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison and the interviews he conducted in the mid-1990s. The Army seems to have made significant progress establishing better relations with Congress since the publication of his book in 2000, judging by the attitude and willingness of Congress to fund the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan despite their growing concern about the direction of the Iraq conflict.²⁴ One of the more important tools developed by the Army to help hone its message was the development of the Army Game Plan. This resource, although internally focused, is meant to give all soldiers, particularly senior leaders, a common vision of what the Army is trying to accomplish. In itself it contains nothing new, but it is a convenient compilation of material that supports the Army Plan and allows leaders to communicate the Army story, particularly to those in Congress that can provide support and resources.²⁵

Personalities and Key Players.

Do personalities and life experiences play a role in the distribution of defense dollars? Former Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Hans Mark firmly believes they do. Dr. Mark fought passionately for the B1 bomber program late in the Carter administration. Despite his strongest efforts, the best he could do was to convince the President to maintain funding for four airplanes. The Carter decision would later become a huge issue in the 1980 Presidential campaign as Ronald Reagan charged Carter with being soft on defense. Why did President Carter have such strong feelings against the B1? Besides the defense cutting platform which Carter ran on in the 1976 election, Mark believed the issue derived from the fact that President Carter was a former nuclear submariner who felt that the United States could rely on submarine launched missiles.²⁶

An argument against personality playing a role would be that distribution of funds remained unchanged during the 1990s, despite three Army Generals serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in a row. However, it is the Bush administration appointments that may prove particularly interesting to look at. The current Secretary of Defense served in the Air Force during the 1960s, and the former Secretary was a Navy pilot in the 1950s. Undersecretary of Defense Gordon England served as Secretary of the Navy twice but had no military service when he was younger. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy (a position that advises the Secretary of Defense on national security policy, military strategy, and defense policy), served 24 years in the Navy. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a Marine, while his predecessor was Air Force. The current Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is Navy, and his predecessor was a Marine. This in itself proves nothing; however, it should be looked at through the view of what the Rumsfeld Defense Department tried to accomplish.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's transformation initiatives relied on a capabilities-based approach to defense planning versus the traditional threat-based analysis. The traditional threat-based approach had left the services looking like smaller versions of their Cold War selves. The centers of gravity for each of the services centered on the carrier group, the air wing, and the division. The capabilities that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) desired were space-based, precision-guided, rapidly deployable, joint service, modular, and unconventional.²⁷ However, after 6 years as Defense Secretary, the only two Cold War weapons programs cut were Army programs: the *Crusader* artillery piece and the *Comanche* helicopter program. The F/A22 fighter, DDG 1000 destroyer, and the *Virginia* class submarine remain in production, multibillion dollar programs that were initially conceived and designed during the Cold War.²⁸

Despite initial successes in Afghanistan (routing of the Taliban with a coalition of Afghani warlords backed by U.S. airpower and special forces), this transformational effort would get bogged down in Iraq as it became apparent that the only way to truly win a war was to do as historian T. R. Fehrenbach wrote in his seminal history of the Korean War, *This Kind of War*,

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.²⁹

Fehrenbach wrote the original edition of his book before the lessons of Vietnam became apparent and before the Weinberger and Powell doctrines of overwhelming force became dogma in the Army. Even as it became obvious that the Army and the Marine Corps were strained under continuous multiple deployments into combat, Rumsfeld refused to seek permanent authorization of additional end strength. It was only upon his departure after nearly 6 years of combat operations that DoD would change its tune on needing additional troops for the Army.³⁰ Clearly in this case, the presence and departure of one key person resulted in a radical shift in strategy, policy, and ultimately money.

HOW THE SYSTEM IS SUPPOSED TO WORK

Although PPBS has been continuously criticized over the past four decades, it has been retained as the basic structure for defense strategy, program, and budget development through eight presidential administrations. Despite its flaws and difficulty of execution, no better process has been discovered.³¹

We have taken a look at how we got to this point in distribution of funds to the services, but how is the system supposed to work? This research does not attempt to explain the intricacies of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by DoD

to determine requirements and allocate resources. However, a basic explanation of the process is necessary before proceeding. To begin with, there is very little documentation of the procedures used in this process. Attempting to find outside literature, even in today's era of internet searches, yields remarkably little in terms of substance. Also, DoD does very little to update the sparse documentation that exists when the system is modified.³²

According to Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, two of Secretary McNamara's former "Whiz Kids" who helped developed PPBS in the 1960s,

The fundamental idea behind PPBS was decision making based on explicit criteria of the national interest in defense programs opposed to decision making by compromise among various institutional, parochial, or other vested interests in the Defense Department. The main purpose of PPBS was to develop explicit criteria, openly and thoroughly debated by all interested parties, that could be used by the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress as measures of the need for and adequacy of defense programs.³³

It will be helpful to explain what the acronym PPBS means. In 2003, DoD changed the acronym PPBS to PPBE to include the execution phase of the process. It is not uncommon to see both terms used interchangeably. The definitions that follow are quoted directly from an Executive Primer produced by the Army Management Staff College:

Planning includes the definition and examination of alternative strategies, the analysis of changing conditions and trends, threat, technology, and economic assessments, and efforts to understand both change and the long-term implications of current choices. Basically, it is a process for determining requirements.

Programming includes the definition and analysis of alternative forces, weapon systems, and support systems, together with their multi-year resource implications and the evaluation of various tradeoff options. Basically, it is a process for balancing and integrating resources among the various programs according to certain priorities.

Budgeting includes formulation, justification, execution, and control of the budget. Basically, it is a process for convincing OSD and Congress to provide the necessary resources and then balancing the checkbook to ensure we spend our resources in accordance with the law.³⁴

Figure 2, Events of the Biennial PPBE Process Cycle, although admittedly confusing, is probably the best representation of how the process works. It is essentially how the DoD and ultimately how the Army allocates its resources. It is taken directly from the 2006 executive primer on the PPBE process produced by the Army Management Staff College. As you can see, it is intended to be a 2-year process. The first year is dedicated to strategy and defense planning.³⁵ However, since the budget process is an annual process, the services and DoD frequently update their strategic documents every year much like they are required to do for their Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). The urge to tweak documents results in minor adjustments, often at the cost of tremendous hours of work, since there are many offices and officials requiring a say in the process.³⁶




Figure 2. Events of the Biennial PPBE Process.³⁷

The initiating document for this whole process should be the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) produced by the president and his national security team that is supposed to provide clear and unambiguous guidance on what will be the international role of the United States and what foreign policy goals and aims are to be attempted. The NSS is aimed not only at the DoD, but at all agencies that play a role in U.S. foreign policy. In addition to the State Department, the NSS provides important guidance to the Commerce Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as affected. The NSS usually is released in the December-January time frame; however, a new administration usually does not release theirs until May, after its national security team is formed and gels. The current administration has published only two versions of this strategy during its tenure.³⁸

Using the NSS as their starting point, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) begins a Joint Strategy Review (JSR) which leads to the development of the *National Military Strategy* (NMS). The NMS describes how U.S military assets will be used in support of the NSS. Congress requires it to be released by mid-February of even-numbered years.³⁹ It also provides guidance for the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. This is the document that instructs the Combatant Commanders (the various four-star warfighting commands) to prepare war plans for their areas of operations.⁴⁰

The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) is issued by the Secretary of Defense and usually includes programmatic guidance on the issue he deems most important. The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) is developed using an enhanced planning process (EPP) that began in 2003. Teams are formed that will present the Secretary with alternatives to support joint programs so that he can make decisions early enough in the process to influence the individual services.⁴¹

OSD may choose to take or not take the advice given to it by the OJCS. OSD then gives guidance to all the services and various defense department agencies. The SPG is the method OSD uses to tell the services which specific tasks they must include in their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). The JPG tells each service what it must fund and contains mostly Joint programs. Its directives clearly dictate how the services should prioritize so that they know what risks they can afford to take, ensuring that each service adheres to the Secretary's early decisions. This is essential since each service will be given a target for its share of the DoD budget for each year of the 6-year period of the POM. Unfortunately, this is where the Army's budget problems first surface. If DoD wanted to make changes and address the changing threats that face the United States today, it could do so through the SPG and, more importantly, by reallocating resources to the services. The Army continues to receive approximately the same amount of the DoD budget each year no matter what has changed in the big picture.⁴²

At this point, each service has its own methodology for translating the guidance given to it by OSD and OJCS into its POM. It is a prolonged, complicated, and contentious process that requires tradeoffs to be made among readiness, personnel, construction, procurement, research and development, and force structure. The process is lengthy and requires a special format that is then submitted back to OSD where it is reviewed by the staff. OSD will spend several months reviewing the submissions to ensure that the services adhered to the guidance issued. If expectations were not met and agreement cannot be reached at the staff level, program reviews are held at the most senior level

during the summer to ascertain what course of action should be taken. It is then up to the Secretary of Defense to issue Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs) that direct the services to make changes to their POMs. Once the services have resubmitted their POMs, the OSD comptroller repackages them into the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) which is the 6-year defense plan. The first 2 years of the POM serve as the Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). Near the end of December, OSD submits the finalized plans to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) where they are combined with the rest of the Executive Branch's budget proposals, and offered to Congress by the first Monday in February as the President's budget submission.⁴³

Although the above explanation of the PPBE process in all likelihood appears confusing, it is impossible to convey the *true* complexity of this process. There are huge numbers of military and civilian personnel involved in this process and tremendous amounts of work hours, as well as the tight timelines that exist to make this system work.

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?


PPBE was meant to answer this very question. Tradeoffs are made every day in Washington regarding which programs should be supported and ultimately funded. Rising health care costs, a growing elderly population, education expenses, the war on terrorism, the Iraq War, and a myriad of other needs all compete for federal dollars. Perhaps President Eisenhower best explained the "guns vs butter" quandary:

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.⁴⁴

We can look at the amount spent on defense in several ways. The first would be strictly how many dollars have been spent. Figure 3 shows defense spending since World War II. It includes all supplemental spending requests as well as budgeted funds.

Obviously, defense spending has been on the rise since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and especially since the invasion of Iraq. However, a large part of that spending has been through supplementals and is expected not to continue at those levels when operations in Iraq are scaled back. With the election results of 2006 firmly in both Democrat and Republican minds, there is no indication that there is the will in this country to maintain this level of commitment in Iraq.


A second way to look at defense spending is in terms of percentage of the total federal budget. During the Cold War, the percentage of spending on defense was much greater than it has been since. In 1962, the DoD budget was approximately 47 percent of the federal budget. The numbers would never go higher than 45 percent throughout the entire Vietnam War and would fall to 22 percent by the end of the 1970s. At the height of President Reagan's buildup of the armed forces in the 1980s, the percentage would never exceed 27 percent. During the 1990s, defense expenditures would fall to a low of



Source: CSBA, April 2006, Based on CMB, DoD and CBO data.
 *Excludes funding for the 1991 Gulf War and related allied cash contributions.
 Includes \$70 billion FY 2006 supplemental appropriations request and \$50 billion the administration has indicated it will request as a downpayment on FY 2007 war costs.

Figure 3. National Defense Budget Authority FY 1946-2011.⁴⁵

15 percent before being increased in the aftermath of 9/11.⁴⁶ In the 2007 Federal Budget Request, as shown in Figure 4, defense spending was requested to be 19 percent of the entire budget.



Source: CSBA, March 2006, Based on OMB and CBO data.

Figure 4. FY 2007 Federal Budget Request.⁴⁷

Critics of defense spending often cite the amount of spending on defense in terms of percentage of the discretionary budget. This figure is derived by taking the total federal budget and subtracting the dollars spent on entitlements or mandatory spending. These expenses include Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, interest on the debt, and veteran’s services. Mandatory expenses account for nearly two-thirds of the federal budget. Figure 5 indicates that defense spending is nearly 54 percent of the discretionary federal budget for FY2005.




Figure 5. Federal Discretionary Budget FY2005.⁴⁸

Yet another approach to analyze whether we spend enough for defense is the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP of a country is the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country during a specific time frame. This is often the most cited method by those individuals or organizations suggesting that more needs to be spent on our national security. As can be seen in Figure 6, the spikes in spending are clearly linked to the significant conflicts the United States has been involved with over the last century.

There was a tremendous increase during World War II as the country moved to an almost totally war centered economy, as well as significant jumps during Korea and Vietnam. As a whole, though, defense spending as a percentage of GDP has been on the decline. At the tail end of the 20th century, the defense spending as a percentage of GDP had dropped to 3 percent. Even with the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, that percentage has only increased to roughly 4 percent. As Figure 7 shows, the percentage of GDP is projected to drop back to 3 percent in the final years of the FYDP. In recent congressional testimony, the Chief of Staff of the Army testified that he thought 5 percent of GDP is a more realistic number to provide adequately for defense needs.⁴⁹




Figure 6. National Defense Outlays as a Share of GDP.⁵⁰

Fiscal Year	National Defense Outlays (050)	Federal Outlays	O50 as % of Federal Outlays	GDP	O50 as % of GDP
1980	134.0	500.0	22.7%	2,728.6	4.0%
1981	157.5	678.2	23.2%	3,054.7	5.2%
1982	185.3	745.7	24.8%	3,227.6	5.7%
1983	209.9	808.4	26.0%	3,440.7	6.1%
1984	227.4	851.9	26.7%	3,840.2	5.9%
1985	252.7	946.4	26.7%	4,141.5	6.1%
1986	273.4	990.4	27.6%	4,412.4	6.2%
1987	282.0	1,004.1	28.1%	4,647.1	6.1%
1988	290.4	1,064.5	27.3%	5,008.8	5.8%
1989	303.6	1,143.8	26.5%	5,400.5	5.6%
1990	299.3	1,253.1	23.9%	5,735.4	5.2%
1991	273.3	1,324.3	20.6%	5,935.1	4.6%
1992	298.4	1,381.6	21.6%	6,239.9	4.8%
1993	291.1	1,409.5	20.7%	6,575.5	4.4%
1994	281.8	1,461.9	19.3%	6,961.3	4.0%
1995	272.1	1,515.8	17.9%	7,325.8	3.7%
1996	265.8	1,580.5	17.0%	7,694.1	3.5%
1997	270.5	1,601.2	16.9%	8,182.4	3.3%
1998	268.5	1,652.6	16.2%	8,627.9	3.1%
1999	274.9	1,701.9	16.2%	9,125.3	3.0%
2000	294.5	1,789.1	16.5%	9,710.0	3.0%
2001	304.9	1,863.0	16.4%	10,058.0	3.0%
2002	348.8	2,011.0	17.3%	10,377.0	3.4%
2003	404.9	2,180.1	18.7%	10,806.0	3.7%
2004	455.9	2,293.0	19.9%	11,546.0	3.9%
2005	495.3	2,472.2	20.0%	12,260.0	4.0%
2006	535.9	2,709.7	19.8%	13,030.0	4.1%
2007	527.4	2,770.1	19.0%	13,761.0	3.8%
2008	494.4	2,813.6	17.6%	14,521.0	3.4%
2009	494.3	2,821.8	16.9%	15,296.0	3.2%
2010	507.4	3,060.9	16.6%	16,102.0	3.2%
2011	522.7	3,239.8	16.1%	16,955.0	3.1%

Source: CSBA, March 2006. Based on OMB, CBO and DoD data.
 * National defense estimates include outlays for the 1991 Gulf War and allied cash contributions.

Figure 7. National Defense, Federal Spending, and the Gross Domestic Product, FY1980-FY2011 (Outlays in Billions of Current Dollars).⁵¹

Percentage of GDP is the statistic that most proponents of increased defense spending use to make the case that a country as rich as the United States can afford to spend more on its national defense. However, it does not take into account the massive increases in GDP due to the increasing productivity of Americans. In the past, some have made the claim that as we approach spending just 3 percent of GDP on defense, we are hitting the same levels of expenditures that existed just prior to World War II. However, there are relatively few people with the audacity to compare today's military with the military of 1940. At that time, the United States had a military that was less than 10 percent of Germany's, half as large as Japan's, and ranked 16th in the entire world.⁵² It also leaves open the question that, if GDP declined, would we see a call for lower spending on defense?

The Army Posture Statement, Association of the United States Army (AUSA), and numerous defense analysts have all cited the lower GDP figure as a reason to boost defense spending. As the world's lone superpower, there are certain inherent responsibilities that accompany that title. The world's sea lanes depend on a U.S. naval presence to keep them open. With the emphasis on free trade and the role that the United States plays as both an exporter and importer, one could argue that a global market requires a global strategy. This naturally comes with a price. The question naturally comes back to that asked earlier – how much is enough?

FY 2008 Army Funding.

By summer 2006, it became rapidly apparent to the Army leadership that they would not be able to submit their 2008 budget to DoD in August as required. Money during the year had become increasingly tight since the Army could not begin troop drawdown in Iraq as originally planned, due to increasing sectarian violence. Army leadership had decided to freeze all civilian hiring, cut back further on travel, and put a hold on all new contracts.⁵³ In June, OSD informed the Army that its base line budget would be \$114 billion. This was a \$2 billion cut from the scheduled FY07 budget.⁵⁴

The Army staff laid out their best arguments for increased funding. Rather than build a budget submission that was based on a number given to them by OSD, they started with the guidance given in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) and factored in the current operating environment. The total was a staggering \$138 billion just for the base budget. Supplementals would have to be added to pay for Iraq and Afghanistan war costs. Lieutenant General Jerry Sinn, the Army's top budget official, likened the challenge faced by the Army to that of a cattle rancher by saying "I'm going to size the herd to the amount of hay that I have; Schoomaker can't size the herd to the amount of hay that he has because he's got to maintain the herd to meet the current operating environment."⁵⁵

Figure 8 is a simplified representation of the Army's argument and was used frequently to explain the Army's dilemma. The operational demand on Army forces is larger than the QDR strategy, which is greater than the resources provided. The fix to get to the minimal level required by the QDR requires programming changes in the POM. The solution to meet the current operational demand would require assistance by Congress with supplemental funding.




Figure 8. Operational Demand Greater than QDR Strategy or Resources.⁵⁶

After the Army completed its internal estimates, Secretary Rumsfeld agreed to establish joint teams with OSD and Army personnel to agree on what the true cost of the Army was. As General Schoomaker said, “We have opened the books . . . the cost of the Army is higher than they thought.”⁵⁷ Once OSD agreed with the Army’s figure, Rumsfeld allowed the Army to take its case directly to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This decision was “a shocker,” according to an unnamed senior Pentagon official. It was either a calculated move by Rumsfeld to force OMB to shift the spending cap or an abandonment of duty. “If the SecDef isn’t setting those spending priorities, then what the heck is going on?” added the official.⁵⁸ By the end of October 2006, OMB would give DoD an additional \$11 billion, of which DoD would allocate \$7 billion more to the Army; nearly \$17 billion short of what DoD and the Army agreed was needed. As mentioned earlier, those numbers would become larger as the FY08 Presidential budget submission was released in February 2007.

Army Options for Increasing Funding.

Whichever method you use to measure and evaluate the level of financial commitment to spending on U.S. national defense, the basic decision required after reviewing that information is the same question articulated by President Eisenhower, “How much is enough?” The tradeoffs that President Eisenhower discussed allow three possible outcomes with regard to defense spending. The United States will spend the same, more, or less money. Given the political realities of today, neither party seems willing to cut defense spending. In fact, the Defense budget for FY08, submitted by the administration to Congress in February 2007, increased spending by 11.3 percent over projected spending for FY07. Figure 9 breaks out the dollars each service is expected to garner. The Army gained less than a 2 percent additional share of the defense pie. The new percentage breakout of proposed defense spending is 27 percent for the Army, 28 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy Department, and 16 percent for DoD programs.⁵⁹ In the FY08 case, the Bush Administration opted to increase funding for all services but with a greater percentage given to the Army. Hence, there were no losers. Each service received more than the previous year and is also expected to receive additional dollars in supplemental budget requests to Congress.

Discretionary Budget Authority, Dollars in Billions

	FY07	FY08	Increase
Army	109.7	130.1	20.4
Navy	110.3	119.3	9.0
Marine Corps	16.2	20.5	4.3
Air Force	128.4	136.5	8.2
Defense Wide	70.9	74.9	4.0
BRAC	—3.1	N/A	3.1
Total	432.4	481.3	49.0

Figure 9. FY2008 Budget by Service.⁶⁰

There is a gentlemen’s agreement that the services do not attack each other’s programs or each other’s budget. This uneasy truce has kept the Army’s percentage of funding at roughly the same percentage of defense spending for the last 30 years.⁶¹ Traditionally, Army leaders not have publicly argued for additional funding, concerned that this would cause funding wars between the services.⁶² General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, expressed his frustration at Army funding levels in an interview in September of 2006:

Historically the Army’s been a Cinderella service. We paid the lion’s share of the so-called peace dividend in the 1990s. We had a \$100 billion shortfall in investment in the 1990s. We cut the Army by 500,000 soldiers – active, Guard and Reserve. Defense Department investment was \$1.89 trillion between 1990 and 2005. And the Army’s share of the pie was 16 percent. One thing, I’m careful to say, I do not look at the Navy or the Air Force [to correct the imbalance]. We need strong navies and air forces and armies.⁶³

General Schoomaker clearly expressed the Army’s need for additional dollars without attacking the Air Force or Navy for their funding. With an administration that has doubled defense spending since taking office (including supplementals), it was probably the astute political move at the time since there was nothing to be gained from attacking the Air Force or Navy. Figure 10 is from the 2007 Army Posture Statement and shows a graphical representation of the disparity in the funding of DoD investment accounts.




Figure 10. Defense Investment (FY90-06).⁶⁴

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is not bound by the same political considerations as the Army. General (Ret) Gordan Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the

Army and the current President of AUSA, has been vocal about the need to expand Army funding. In the February 2005 issue of *Army Magazine*, he called for the “Army share of the DoD budget to be reapportioned above the traditional 24 percent that DoD allocates in its budget formulation . . . In 2005 and out, the administration and Congress should reapportion the DoD budget to reflect the reality of ‘boots on the ground’ and fund the Army at a 28 percent budget share. . . .”⁶⁵

However, if and when the political climate changes and either defense spending stalls or even decreases, then the Army will be faced with a more difficult situation. Of course that situation in a perfect world would be answered by the PPBE process. However, since DoD has not been open to significantly redistributing the wealth among the services over the last 30 years, that is not a likely option unless the Army can overwhelmingly make its case. The submission of the FY08 Presidential Budget in February 2007, with its slight percentage increase in funding the Army’s share, was greeted by commentary from several sources that a new period of interservice rivalry was at hand.⁶⁶ The Air Force announced last year that it was cutting 40,000 airmen from its ranks, retiring scores of aircraft, and attempting to improve efficiency in order to pay for new programs such as a replacement for the KC-135 tanker, the new F22, and the *Joint Strike Fighter*.⁶⁷ In an effort to support their call to procure these systems, the Air Force is trying to focus attention on China, Iran, and Venezuela. Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley, declared at an Air Force Association conference in February 2007 that “Our enemies are not sitting idly by. Instead our adversaries [are developing] newer and better means to threaten our nation, our population, our interests, our way of life. . . . [T]omorrow’s military threats span all three of our warfighting domains [air, space, and cyberspace]”.⁶⁸ General Moseley would go on to claim in the same speech that the air fleet is “at a point of obsolescence vis-à-vis these emerging threats.”⁶⁹

The Navy is under much the same strain as it has cut thousands of sailor billets over the last 4 years and has ended up with a fleet of only 276 ships, the lowest in nearly a century.⁷⁰ The idea that either of these services will roll over and let the Army garner additional resources at their expense is highly unlikely.

“The Question.”

As resources in DoD become tighter at some point in the future, the services will be faced with a dilemma that none of them want to confront. It is entirely possible that during congressional testimony a Member of Congress will ask the service chiefs to make an argument for increasing their funding at the expense of their sister services. The party line answer will be that they could use additional funds, but that they support the President’s Budget Submission. If, at that point, the Member of Congress asks for their personal opinion, then the answer may change. This is similar to what happened when former Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki testified to Congress on the eve of the Iraq War and was asked about troop strength needed for the occupation of Iraq. Shinseki made clear that the need for several hundred thousands of troops was his “personal assessment of postwar needs” and that General Tommy Franks as the commander of American Forces would be the final decisionmaker.⁷¹ This was in contradiction to the Pentagon’s earlier pronouncement of the size required to conduct operations.

To date, the Army has refused to demand a greater share of the DoD budget. However, it has consistently continued to ask for additional funds. With each service getting additional funding over the last several years, the question of percentage of the DoD budget has had little impact. However, if budget cuts take place as happened after the Cold War, then the question will most likely be asked and the answers may get interesting.

HOW TO PROCEED—INFLUENCING THE PROCESS

As we have discussed earlier in the PPBE process, there are several ways that the process can be influenced to result in additional dollars for the Army. Early in the process, we have the NSS that originates in the Executive branch. Then there is the NMS that is written within the Pentagon and the guidance that comes from that by OSD to the services. Finally, there is the influence that Congress wields as both the authorizer and appropriator of funds. Basically, you can influence the process before it starts by getting the President and OMB on your side and having them provide guidance to DoD, or working the off-cycle time to ensure that OSD and the Joint Staff give the guidance that favors the Army. After the President submits his budget plan to Capitol Hill in February, Congress has a minimum of 7 months to kick it around before it even think about passing the appropriation bills. This is another opportunity for the Army to tell its story and highlight its needs.

Although we have talked about a PPBE “cycle” or when certain things happen, the reality is that things are constantly being changed and shaped. Therefore, the Army must be engaging all of these influencers all the time in order to maximize the possibility of obtaining adequate resources.

Using the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Although not discussed earlier in this paper, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has the potential to be a tremendous influence on the funding process. The QDR is scheduled every 4 years and was mandated by Congress in the late 1990s. The intent is for the Pentagon to produce a product that defines a 20-year road map which addresses DoD’s strategy toward force structure, force modernization, infrastructure, and budget. It was first conducted in 1997 and unfortunately was poorly received because it ended up being a budget-driven process that did not rationally connect the Pentagon’s objectives with the means available. The 2001 QDR was seen as a more valuable product since it provided the rationale for the Pentagon’s transformation agenda.⁷² The QDR released in 2006 had the potential to make serious changes in the Pentagon’s strategy since it was the first one conducted entirely after 9/11 and the Iraq War. While a strong argument can be made that this latest QDR necessitates a turn toward strategy that requires greater involvement of ground forces for implementation, the administration did not make radical changes in the distribution of funds in the 2007 budget submission. Looking at the chart in Figure 11, from the 2006 QDR, threats are classified as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive along with the charting of the likelihood and America’s vulnerability of an event.

The Security Environment	
<p>IRREGULAR</p> <p>Irregular challenges from the adoption or employment of unconventional methods by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents - terrorism, insurgency, civil war, etc.</p> <p>Seeking to erode U.S. power</p> <p>Ethnic War; Guerrilla; Insurgency; Terror</p>	<p>CATASTROPHIC</p> <p>Catastrophic challenges involving the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.</p> <p>Seeking to paralyze U.S. power</p> <p>WMD: Rogue, Terrorist; Homeland Missile Attacks</p>
<p>TRADITIONAL</p> <p>Traditional challenges posed by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.</p> <p>Seeking to challenge U.S. power</p> <p>Legacy Nuclear Forces; Uniformed Militaries</p>	<p>DISRUPTIVE</p> <p>Disruptive future challenges emanating from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains.</p> <p>Seeking to marginalize U.S. power</p> <p>Cyber-War; Directed Energy; Genetic Weapons; Nano Weapons</p>

Source: 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

Figure 11. The Security Environment.⁷³

Throughout the Cold War, the United States was oriented towards handling traditional threats and as a consequence, our capabilities have been built to handle that traditional threat. The threat today is different. The case the Army must make is that different threats require different capabilities. When asked which service can provide the means to address these threats, the Army can make the strongest argument for handling irregular or catastrophic threats. Figure 12 shows where DoD's capabilities now exist and where they must shift.



Figure 12. Shifting Our Weight.⁷⁴

As the United States shifts its capabilities out of the domain of strictly addressing traditional threats, it is clear that the Army is the service that will provide the biggest part in the next fight, just as it is doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is not to say that the Navy and Air Force do not have major roles to play. What DoD must acknowledge is that the Army will continue to play a larger role. With a larger role, the Army will need a greater share of the defense budget. After World War II when the country was building its nuclear capabilities, it shifted a disproportional share of its defense budget to the Air Force, as high as 55 percent of all defense expenditures, as it built missiles and bombers to deliver a nuclear payload. DoD needs to be convinced, using its own methodology, that a paradigm shift in defense spending must now take place.

AN EVEN NEWER TRIAD

The traditional Strategic Triad during the Cold War referred to nuclear weapons delivered via intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long range bombers, and submarines. It was devised to keep the Soviets off balance. Hence if they delivered a first strike, it would be almost impossible to destroy all three methods of nuclear delivery, thus ensuring that the United States would have the ability to mount a retaliatory response, thereby guaranteeing mutual destruction.⁷⁵

In December 2001, DoD submitted a *Nuclear Posture Review* at the direction of Congress. This report outlined a new triad that replaced the strategic triad of the Cold War. This new triad was intended to integrate conventional and nuclear offensive strategic strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure to provide a more diverse portfolio of capabilities against existing and emerging threats.⁷⁶ This strategy followed in the footsteps of the QDR that changed focusing on specific threats to focusing on emerging capabilities that would take advantage of U.S. weaknesses or allow possible foes to exploit their advantages.⁷⁷




Figure 13. Transition from Existing Triad to New Triad.⁷⁸

From a theoretical standpoint, the new triad made sense. The world had changed, and yet U.S. strategic policy had changed very little. Foreshadowing this change in policy that was to come, Secretary Rumsfeld unequivocally stated, "the U.S. will no longer plan, size, or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union."⁷⁹

Since the new triad has been established, another triad of sorts has developed. Despite the desire to have a small footprint in Iraq, U.S. forces have recently begun a surge to add 20,000 or more troops to Baghdad. The vast majority of this increase in troops will fall on those forces that have been doing the bulk of the fighting since the invasion in 2003. This “muddy boot” triad consisting of Soldiers, Marines, and Special Operators has taken the brunt of this fight. Of the over 3000 deaths in Iraq, more than 96 percent have been either a Marine or a Soldier.




Figure 14. U.S. Fatalities by Branch of Service as of March 25, 2007.⁸⁰

Whether we look at the need for defending the United States from a threat or capability based scenario, it has become abundantly clear that this “muddy boots” triad is the force we must use to counter the threats that exist now.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army base budget has been stuck at relatively the same share of DoD funding for the last 30 years. The FY08 budget submission has shifted that percentage somewhat in the Army’s favor. However, this shift still places Army’s proposed base line funding behind that of the Navy and the Air Force. It remains to be seen if FY08/09 is the start of a trend or an anomaly. For the Army to maintain its success, it must:

- Continue to tell its story to the American people. Senior leaders must continue to use the Army Game Plan to show the great things our soldiers are doing and stay on message.
- Maintain the improvement in relations with Congress. Lately the Army has successfully communicated its needs to members of Congress and has garnered additional resources because of it.
- Convince DoD that the current fight and potential fights will continue to be Army centric. When faced with the possibility of constrained defense resources, ensure that DoD understands that the Army needs a large enough share of funds to adequately address real, defined, and probable threats . . . not just enhanced capabilities to cover possible threats.
- Ensure that OMB understands that Congress and the American people will not be content with an Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Community (comprised of its sons and daughters) that is underfunded, particularly when they are doing the lion’s share of the work in Afghanistan, Iraq, and wherever else terrorism threatens America.

The Army consistently has been the bronze medal winner in a three-man race. For the sake of our nation, it is time to go for the gold. Despite the lack of proper funding, its Soldiers have been Bronze Star winners with Valor devices for their heroism in leading the charge in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. America must shift its resources in order to successfully confront its enemies – present and future. The new “muddy boot triad” needs those resources in the post-9/11 world to combat those threats in a world in which the words of T. R. Fehrenbach still hold true, “If you desire to defend . . . protect . . . and keep [a land] for civilization, you must do this on the ground . . . by putting your young men into the mud.”⁸¹

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