

**SECURITY COOPERATION:
A KEY TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY**

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November 2007

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ISBN 1-58487-326-4

PREFACE

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ABSTRACT

Peacetime military engagement has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy in the post-Cold War era to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), a concerted Department of Defense effort has transformed engagement activities to a broader concept of security cooperation aimed at creating partnerships and building the capacity of allies and partners to meet the challenges of the uncertain and complex security environment. When it comes to security cooperation, however, there will always be a tension between balancing military readiness with security cooperation. Most argue that readiness is the most important priority. But, if adequately funded and properly executed, security cooperation activities may build partners and prevent conflicts. Investing early in shaping activities may avoid exponentially larger expenditures later. In the strategic environment over the next decade, this tension will continue to exist and manifest itself in challenges to security cooperation in resourcing, assessment, and coordination. This paper examines the role of security cooperation in the emerging security environment and the challenges the United States must overcome to be effective.

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We based our strategies on the principle that it is much more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than it is to stop one once it's started. I cannot overstate the importance of our theater security cooperation programs as the centerpiece to securing our Homeland from the irregular and catastrophic threats of the 21st Century.¹

General James L. Jones, Commander
United States European Command
March 7, 2006

Peacetime military engagement has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy in the post-Cold War era to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), a concerted Department of Defense (DoD) effort has transformed engagement activities to a broader concept of security cooperation aimed at creating partnerships and building the capacity of allies and partners to meet the challenges of the uncertain and complex security environment. When it comes to security cooperation, however, there will always be a tension between balancing military readiness with security cooperation. Most argue that readiness is the most important priority. But, if adequately funded and properly executed, security cooperation activities may build partners and prevent conflicts.² Investing early in shaping activities may avoid exponentially larger expenditures later. In the strategic environment over the next decade, this tension will continue to exist and manifest itself in challenges to security cooperation in resourcing, assessment, and coordination. This paper examines the role of security cooperation in the emerging security environment and the challenges the United States must overcome to be effective.

Security Cooperation: Recent History.

Security cooperation or peacetime military engagement is not a new concept, but one that has evolved significantly over the last decade. During the Cold War, engagement focused primarily on efforts to build relations to counter the Soviet Union and communist expansion. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the military engagement strategy shifted toward integrating new and emerging democracies into the Euro-Atlantic community. Highly successful U.S. military engagement activities during this period were conducted predominately bilaterally by the Services with no formal joint strategy to integrate activities or any linkage to grand strategic objectives.

In 1998, in order to achieve resource efficiencies and more direct strategic relevance, DoD formally institutionalized planning for military engagement by requiring the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) to publish a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP).³ However, TEPs were still developed by GCCs with inadequate policy guidance and only limited strategic direction. DoD Prioritized Regional Objectives, the foundational guidance for

TEP development, lacked stated priorities across theaters or regions making effectiveness difficult to measure.⁴

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld introduced DoD Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003 as part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to unify and focus DoD security cooperation efforts. According to former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to “move beyond the relatively unfocused practice of engagement—which sometimes amounted to little more than showing the flag abroad—and towards a more specific and practical set of goals.”⁵ Thus, this 2003 document directed GCCs to develop and submit for approval annual Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs).⁶ These plans replaced TEPs and were intended to link bilateral and multilateral defense activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying and connecting them to U.S. security interests.⁷ The security cooperation planning process was carried to its current state with the 2005 Security Cooperation Guidance that outlines U.S. interests by themes and objectives in setting priorities for creating new partnerships and building the capacity of existing partnerships.⁸ Additionally, it broadened TSCP submission from GCCs to all Combatant Commands (COCOMs), Services, and DoD Agencies; prescribed formats, and dictated annual assessments.⁹

Security cooperation is also now codified in U.S. joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-0 outlines six phases of a campaign model, all of which incorporate security cooperation. Security cooperation represents a large portion of “Phase 0” or the Shaping Phase. Shaping encompasses activities to assure campaign success by such things as developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; improving information exchange; and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and enroute infrastructure.¹⁰ Most commanders now view shaping and security cooperation as integral parts of the entire campaign continuum, accomplished through a variety of programs:

- Combined/Multinational Education, Exercises, Training, and Experimentation;
- Counternarcotics Assistance;
- Counter/non-Proliferation;
- Defense and Military Contacts;
- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy;
- Humanitarian Assistance;
- Information Sharing/Intelligence Cooperation;
- International Armaments Cooperation;
- Security Assistance which includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Peace Operations Funding, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Excess Defense Articles;
- Others: Partnership for Peace (PfP), Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF).¹¹

The Emerging Security Environment.

The U.S. security threats of the 20th century arose from powerful states with aggressive agendas. The key aspects of increased globalization, technology diffusion, and the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power have led to a dramatically different security

environment in the early 21st century. The *2005 National Defense Strategy* characterizes the environment as an era of uncertainty where an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities threaten U.S. interests.¹²

The United States will likely remain the dominant economic and military power for the foreseeable future. However, this dominant power, combined with the growing disparities caused by globalization, will breed unease and resentment. States may align themselves regionally to counter and balance U.S. hegemony. Traditional challenges from peer or near peer competition may surface from major and emerging powers such as China, India, and Russia. The decisions they make when faced with strategic crossroads will determine the international security environment of the future.¹³ Prudence suggests the United States seek friends and allies among these emerging powers and within regions they may seek to dominate.

The most likely challenge the United States will face are the irregular challenges aimed at undermining legitimate governance or eroding U.S. influence. Most dangerous are those associated with the rise of extremist ideologies that advocate the use of violence. In the increasing world of globalization, these challenges are now transnational in nature and compounded by the absence of effective governance in many parts of the world. Either through their inability or their unwillingness to perform traditional governance functions, many states have undergoverned spaces that provide unfettered access to safe havens from which transnational terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations can plan and operate.¹⁴ Unless countered, these spaces will increase.

Compounding these irregular challenges are the threats of catastrophic and disruptive capabilities. The proliferation of low cost, dual-use civilian technologies and easier access to advanced weapons and delivery systems will greatly improve the disruptive and destructive capabilities of both state and nonstate actors.¹⁵ This proliferation, combined with ineffective governance, significantly increases risks the United States faces from transnational terrorists or rogue states employing the catastrophic capabilities of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, in the early 21st century, the United States will face an environment with enormous uncertainty that will challenge the military across the entire spectrum of operations.

The Emerging Role of Security Cooperation.

Current doctrine states: "Security cooperation is the means by which the Department of Defense encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives."¹⁶ The experience in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) makes clear that the transnational nature of the challenges the United States faces precludes achieving our strategic objectives without the cooperation of allies and partners. To achieve unity of effort, the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) proposes that, "Whenever possible, the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity, and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges."¹⁷ No one country can solve GWOT problems; partnerships and cooperation with friendly nations are essential to winning a "Long War" on terror.

Security cooperation with international allies and partners is further outlined in several strategy documents. The *U.S. National Military Defense Strategy* calls for preventive

actions such as security cooperation as a critical component in an active layered defense with the aim of preventing destabilizing conflicts.¹⁸ *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* outlines “ways” in which security cooperation is a strategic approach to fighting terrorism. Helping partners and allies develop their own capacity to better govern, defend, and secure themselves is key to creating an inhospitable terrorist environment.¹⁹ Additionally, through security cooperation efforts, DoD can contribute to conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism by building the security, confidence, and institutional capabilities of moderates who advocate effective governance and peaceful resolution over violent extremism.²⁰ Thus, in today’s uncertain and complex environment, security cooperation, more than ever, has a key role to play in harnessing U.S. alliances and partnerships to deal with terrorism, regional disputes, and other security challenges.

The significant change in strategy from simple engagement to a more focused and operationally relevant program has manifested itself in objectives supporting four overarching themes nested within the *National Defense Strategy*:

- Assure allies and partners;
- Dissuade potential adversaries;
- Deter aggression; and,
- Defeat adversaries.²¹

To achieve these objectives, DoD is focusing efforts along three major avenues: developing common thinking about strategic issues; building partner capacity; and reducing impediments to cooperation.²² Over the last several years, there have been numerous examples of how combatant commands (COCOMs) have begun to successfully implement these approaches in expanding and building international relationships. Through military training, exercises, education, and acquisition projects they have shaped successful programs aimed at building friendly capacity and transforming friendly military establishments to prosecute the GWOT, defend themselves from internal threats, and increase their military capability for future operations in support of U.S. interests. The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) is an example of a military training cooperation effort to increase partner capabilities to deal with transnational terrorist threats in the ungoverned Pankisi Gorge area bordering Chechnya.²³ The 2-year program trained and equipped four battalions and 850 of these soldiers eventually served with coalition forces in Iraq.²⁴ This security cooperation activity not only transformed Georgia’s capacity to increase its governance capability, but helped create a coalition partner.

By taking a regionally focused approach to Theater Security Cooperation, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has developed programs that provide immediate strategic outcomes while building long-term relationships. Two examples are Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-TRANS SAHARA (OEF-TS) and the Caspian Guard Initiative. By linking a series of military exercises, OEF-TS is designed to build the indigenous capacity of African nations to better govern their territories, thus eliminating terrorist safe havens, while at the same time fostering long-term objectives of building friendly country bonds to assure strategic African access.²⁵ Another successful regional program is the Caspian Guard Initiative. This interagency program is an integrated counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and illegal trafficking effort to help secure the Caspian Basin from

transnational threats. The Initiative includes a wide variety of maritime and border training exercises, and equipment upgrades.²⁶ USEUCOM is beginning to extend this concept to the Gulf of Guinea to address African maritime security challenges.²⁷

Recent success can also be found in DoD's multinational education programs. The five DoD Regional Security Centers for Security Studies have been successful in harmonizing views on common security challenges, educating on the role of security in civil societies, and building long-term relationships with promising foreign military and civilian leaders. Since 9/11, the Centers have made programmatic changes to enhance their role in the GWOT through efforts to build governance capacity and counter ideological support for terrorism. They have shifted programmatic weight from broad topic resident security courses to outreach and network assistance throughout their regions to support GCC's counterterrorism, security sector reform, stability operations, and defense transformation efforts.²⁸

Responsive humanitarian assistance can also play a large role in promoting stability and demonstrating American values. By rapidly responding to a crisis, the United States can minimize disorder and reduce the likelihood of greater instability. Rapid and responsive assistance can also create strategic communication opportunities for countering ideological support for terrorism. Polls following the U.S. tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia in late 2004 showed a major shift in public opinion in favor of the United States in the world's most populous Muslim nation.²⁹ Likewise, the Army-led relief efforts following the October 2005 Pakistani earthquakes served to double U.S. support within Pakistan.³⁰

The Challenges.

Despite successes in execution, as a strategy, security cooperation still faces numerous challenges. Both the international and domestic strategic environments will test our abilities to implement a cooperative strategy framework for the foreseeable future. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, domestic entitlement programs, and outdated legislative authorities will leave DoD struggling to properly resource the activities necessary to meet our objectives. DoD must also address program effectiveness and improve coordination across the U.S. Government and with our allies.

Resource challenges to security cooperation derive from fiscal constraints, Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Global Force Posturing, and outdated authorities. From a fiscal standpoint, the strategic environment will make the task of addressing our security challenges problematic for the foreseeable future. DoD's 2007 budget is projected to be 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As a percentage of GDP, DoD outlays are historically low and have not kept pace with the growth of GDP over the last 40 years.³¹ However, the rising costs of mandatory government entitlement spending associated with Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to account for 11 percent of the U.S. GDP by 2016 and will exert pressures on a budget that economic growth alone is unlikely to alleviate.³² Entitlement obligations will likely result in political pressure to further reduce defense discretionary spending in order to forestall greater budget deficits. Despite the constrained fiscal environment, DoD outlays must continue to grow to meet our global engagement requirements. This should be a continuous strategic

communication message implemented by DoD senior leadership to Congress and the American people to counter a growing view that the federal government already spends too much on national defense.³³

Despite having the authority to plan and conduct security cooperation within their area of responsibility (AOR), GCCs currently lack sufficient dedicated resources to support their security cooperation strategy. In addition, existing resources are limited by multiple and conflicting policy and legislation. Up to 30 sources of funding regulated by various authorities and guidelines are required to implement GCC security cooperation strategies.³⁴ Security Assistance programs like international military education and training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), and financial management service (FMS) are State Department funded, and COCOMs have limited ability through the interagency process to influence where and how this money is spent.³⁵ Other sources like Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding support military exercises and capacity building efforts but continue to come under increased program management scrutiny. In the past, security cooperation funding by Service Components has contributed significantly to COCOM plan execution. However, Service Chiefs face growing fiscal obligations. As an example, the Army delayed submitting its 2008-13 Program Objective Memorandum in an effort to avoid a QDR strategy and resource mismatch.³⁶ A mismatch still exists, and the Army faces a growing problem in funding current equipment wartime reset requirements and its modernization efforts. In recent congressional testimony, the Army Chief of Staff outlined the Army equipment reset bill at \$17.01 billion for FY 2007, with expected requirements beyond 2007 to be \$12 to \$13 billion per year through the conflict and a minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond.³⁷ Additionally, the Army will need nearly \$200 billion for the Future Combat System and its associated spin-off technologies to meet modernization requirements.³⁸ These fiscal realities suggest Service components will have fewer resources to dedicate to security cooperation, as Service Chiefs, who already have less interest in engagement programs, struggle to meet their Title 10 responsibilities to train, organize, and equip their forces.³⁹ To overcome these hurdles, funding streams must be consolidated and reforms initiated that provide GCCs more influence in the allocation of funding resources for security cooperation.

COCOMs will also likely face continued challenges in finding sufficient resources in the form of military personnel to conduct security cooperation programs. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security cooperation, and they must come from forces assigned to a COCOM's AOR or that temporarily deploy for engagement activities.⁴⁰ For the foreseeable future, the deployment requirements to support the GWOT will continue to leave few opportunities for active and reserve component units to participate in coalition and multinational exercises. In struggling to meet its surge requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is falling short in its ability to resource the steady-state deterrence and partner enabling missions called for in the QDR strategy.⁴¹ To address this shortcoming, President George W. Bush's 2008 budget contains proposed funding for an additional end-strength increase of 92,000 troops for the Army and Marine Corps by 2013.⁴² This increase is not only necessary now, but also is required post-Iraq/Afghanistan. The Army must be forthright and convincing with the nation's civilian defense leadership about the future force structure required

to meet the myriad of “Boots on the Ground” tasks necessitated by an uncertain and complex environment.⁴³

In the long term, the Realigned Global Force Posture aimed at creating a CONUS based expeditionary force could have negative consequences for future shaping activities. The Army has typically provided over 60 percent of the support to the GCC engagement efforts through its forward stationed forces.⁴⁴ In Europe alone, Army restationing will reduce the forward presence in Europe to only two permanent Brigade Combat Teams. Potential GWOT commitments aside, this reduction in forward based forces will either reduce USEUCOM’s military exercise and training programs or significantly increase transportation costs for CONUS based force participation. Alleviating some of these issues will be the decision to rotate forces to Bulgaria and Romania. General John Craddock, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), views this as an opportunity to “focus on mil-to-mil activities that continue to build the military capacities of new NATO Alliance and perspective Alliance countries along with strategic partners in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.”⁴⁵ However, to truly allow GCCs the predictable manning resources, TSCPs must be integrated into the Global Force Management construct. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model provides a great opportunity to make forces available for GCC security cooperation requirements.

Resource challenges are also found in the numerous policy, regulatory, and legislative constraints governing the execution of programs. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, SACEUR General James L. Jones said:

Although the threats we face have changed dramatically, resources available for security cooperation, one of our key enablers in dealing with present day challenges, are still used as they have been since the Cold War. They are applied for deliberate, long-lead-time system built to address a single, enduring and predictable enemy.⁴⁶

An example of outdated resourcing can be found in the authorities enabling the military to train and equip partner nations. The GTEP, while eventually successful, required funding from seven different agencies and allied contributions delaying the program start by seven months.⁴⁷ Most State Department funded security assistance programs like FMS require multiple years to be put in place. To overcome this, the Bush administration sought and received limited authority to train or equip other countries’ militaries to respond to critical needs and meet emergent threats and opportunities. Under a 2-year pilot program, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2006 provided \$200 million in authority for GCCs to build the capability of military forces of a foreign country to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support stability operations.⁴⁸ While a vast improvement, the amendment still lacks elements the DoD requested, and others desired. Key among these is the limitation on training only national military forces vice border security and other security forces engaged in counterterrorism and stability operations.⁴⁹ In its Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007, DoD submitted legislation for congressional consideration to expand the type of forces that may be trained and increase the funding ceiling to \$750 million while making the 1206 authority permanent.⁵⁰ The Act also seeks legislative provisions to streamline the authorities to increase our partners’ capacities through logistical and material support. It contains requests for permanent authorities to loan significant military equipment to

coalition partners participating in combined operations and to allow GCCs to make grants of nonlethal excess defense articles.⁵¹ These legislative proposals to increase authorities are critical to increasing our partners' effectiveness and must be enacted, streamlined, and fully funded.

Another example of legislative constraints exists with the DoD Regional Centers. Legislatively, the centers are now able to fund only military and civilian defense officials. Expanding the participant pool would strengthen their ability to educate and network with those necessary to counter ideological support for terrorism. In Middle East societies, where religion is so deeply integrated, Imams with greater understanding of democratic principles and common security challenges could be influential with Muslim populations, thereby countering extremism. Strategic communications could be further enhanced if influential moderates with access to al-Jazeera were educated at the centers. Lacking authority to waive costs for a broader pool of participants, Regional Centers are unable to reach the influential audiences most critical to U.S. interests. In the uncertain and rapidly changing security environment we now face, we must not continue to embrace outdated models and antiquated mindsets in dealing with allies and partners. The flexibility offered by initiatives like partner capability and capacity building legislation in the Building Global Partnerships Act is a necessary start. To truly be effective, however, the United States must completely reexamine the Foreign Assistance Act and undertake broad reform of the ways in which we provide security assistance.

Another growing challenge to security cooperation lies in the necessity to properly assess and evaluate program effectiveness. In the domestic strategic environment of scarce and competing defense resources, it will be critical for COCOMs to evaluate their security cooperation programs to establish priorities, defend funding, and apply their resources where most needed. To date, the submission of engagement plans has simply served as a venue to capture and inform the Joint Staff of *what* the COCOMs are doing but fail to demonstrate their effectiveness.⁵² The 2005 Security Cooperation Guidance outlining the requirement to conduct an annual assessment of security cooperation activities in their AORs is a beginning. No assessment guidance has been published by DoD, however.

Historically, the subjective nature of security cooperation has made it very difficult to measure. Assessment has consisted mainly of capturing and reporting outputs, including details such as the number of exercises, students trained, and port calls have served as the measure of program success. Assessment templates should require addressing measures of performance, or how well a plan was executed and also how well programs are aligned with priorities for creating and building partnerships outlined in the Security Cooperation Guidance. To truly transform security cooperation effectiveness, however, one must address the difficult task of measuring effectiveness. Assessment plans should evaluate programs against broader cooperation efforts.⁵³ COCOMs must begin to measure in terms of strategic outcomes, measuring the effectiveness of how well their plans build partners and capacity. The Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Roadmap, signed in May 2006 by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England to provide a plan of action for implementing partnership capacity related QDR decisions, may prove constructive if it improves DoD's ability to assess security cooperation investments.⁵⁴

While properly measuring effectiveness is vitally important to prioritizing resources, caution must be taken to avoid a short-term focus. The emerging security environment

may lead to a significant resource struggle to achieve a proper balance between short- and long-term programs with respect to measuring the effectiveness of attaining security cooperation objectives. A steady shift to more immediate, tangible, and measurable outcomes from theater security programs is likely. However, a business mindset towards assessments should not force policy practices to favor short term, metric oriented programs that have quick and measurable tactical effects. The difficulty of measuring security cooperation success creates problems when evaluating progress over time. Many long-term benefits in engagement programs that build partner *will* through trust and mutual understanding exceed the scope of any single program and progress more often comes from multiple programs conducted over many years.⁵⁵ Ongoing multifaceted cooperation in the GWOT is an example where long-term U.S. military cooperation efforts have achieved valuable outcomes. In congressional testimony, USEUCOM Commander General Jones said:

Since September 11, 2001, nearly every nation in the USEUCOM AOR has offered or provided intelligence, basing access, and over-flight rights, forces, and equipment as well as other forms of key support in our efforts to combat terrorism. The degree of support we have received is directly related to the effort and attention we have given to the security cooperation program that was in place well in advance of the current conflict.⁵⁶

In the security environment of uncertainty the United States faces, long-term efforts to build and maintain a foundational base of security partners through exercises, military education, and exchanges are wise investments to hedge against future security challenges. Assessment constructs must capture both short- and long-term returns.

A final challenge for COCOMs in planning TSCPs is coordinating the disparate security cooperation activities being conducted within their areas of responsibility. Adjacent and Functional COCOMs, Services, combat support agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and U.S. agencies representing other instruments of national power are continuously conducting engagement activities. While COCOMs are charged with the authority to plan and conduct security cooperation activities within their AOR, "there are a number of programs or activities over which the GCC has no influence."⁵⁷ To avoid duplication and leverage other existing activities, GCCs must have more visibility of programs within their AOR.

Progress is being made within DoD. The 2005 Security Cooperation Guidance clearly identifies COCOMs as the supported entity and mandates coordination of Services and Defense Agency cooperation strategies with the COCOMs.⁵⁸ This is a step forward. Interagency planning and coordination has and will continue to be more problematic, however. The U.S. Government has no integrated process for comprehensively coordinating security cooperation strategies and plans. The 2005 Security Cooperation Guidance specifies "it is essential that we coordinate our efforts across the U.S. Government, especially the Department of State."⁵⁹ There is, however, no government process to effectively coordinate security cooperation within an AOR. Four years ago, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) were established at each GCC to serve as an advisory element on the COCOM staff to improve coordination and synchronization. Presumably, the JIACG was to identify and integrate other Washington agencies',

multinational and international organizations', and nongovernmental organizations' efforts with the GCC's Theater Security Cooperation Plans.⁶⁰ While achieving some success, the JIACG's "efficacy has been limited due to a shortage of appropriate personnel and limited authorities."⁶¹ To be an effective tool for planning and coordination, JIACG assigned personnel must be more than simply advisory subject matter experts. JIACGs should be staffed with personnel who are able to take active authoritative and resourcing decisionmaking roles. The BPC Roadmap is tasked with developing plans of action for integrating interagency participation in DoD planning and improving interagency planning at the COCOM level.⁶² These efforts are necessary and should be expedited. Creating effective processes to affect successful planning and collaboration so as not to duplicate government efforts in security cooperation is challenging and important.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

Since 9/11, improved strategic planning guidance and innovative program approaches to security cooperation have done much to build partner capacity and transform others' militaries to prosecute the GWOT and deal with regional instability. Despite our successes, the United States must overcome several challenges. First, GCCs must receive more dedicated and predictable resources and authorities. Funding streams must be consolidated and reforms initiated that provide GCCs more influence in the allocation of fiscal resources for security cooperation. TSCPs must be integrated into the Global Force Management construct to provide GCCs with the predictable manning resources necessary for shaping their AORs. In the long term, the civilian defense leadership must address the necessary military end-strengths GCCs will need to accomplish the myriad of steady-state and surge "Boots on the Ground" tasks required of our QDR strategy. Improved resourcing must also include a reexamination of the existing Cold War legislative authorities under which the U.S. Government conducts its security cooperation efforts. Legislative initiatives to streamline the authorities in which GCCs are able to build the capabilities and capacity of partner nations must be articulated and fully funded. In the long term, the United States must completely reexamine the Foreign Assistance Act and conduct broad reform of the framework with which we provide security assistance, and it is imperative that COCOMs have flexible resource authorities to meet current challenges.

Second, the United States must be able to measure the effectiveness of our security cooperation efforts to ensure we are prioritizing programs and properly applying resources to achieve the desired strategic outcomes. Appropriate assessment constructs are needed to gauge the return on security cooperation investments. Any accountability construct must address the requirement for a balanced approach to security cooperation. Programs consisting of both short-term partner capacity development and long-term objectives aimed at building trust, will, and regional access are necessary.

Finally, the GCC's ability to coordinate the disparate security cooperation programs conducted within their AORs must be improved. Improved processes to leverage regional and global partners in security cooperation must be implemented. JIACGs must be fully staffed and assigned the personnel necessary to make authoritative resourcing decisions regarding security cooperation and to strengthen interagency planning at the

COCOM level. In the long term, integrating interagency participation into DoD planning must be addressed. Improved processes to integrate and coordinate security cooperation strategies across the U.S. Government and with allied partners are necessary to both improve synergy and avoid duplication of efforts in the fiscally constrained environment the United States is likely to face. With improvements in resourcing, assessment, and coordination, security cooperation may well prove to be the decisive strategy for dealing with the challenges of the 21st century.

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