

**UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:
CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?**

Deborah Sanders

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FOREWORD

Ukraine is located at a pivotal crossroads in Europe between east and west and has the potential to play an important role in combatting terrorism in two ways. First, by consolidating democracy and democratic control over its armed forces, Ukraine can be a stabilizing force in Eurasia. Second, the country can contribute toward the defeat of terrorism by developing niche capabilities, particularly in its peacekeeping forces.

Dr. Deborah Sanders, the author of this External Research Associates Program (ERAP) monograph, argues that for Ukraine to be an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it must engage in comprehensive military transformation. Such a transformation depends on developing its military professionalism, democratic political control, and democratic professionalism. She also contends that Ukraine must consolidate democracy and develop good relations with its neighbors, beginning with the Russian Federation, to fulfill its potential as an ally.

Dr. Sanders examines Ukraine's progress in these crucial areas and provides recommendations for the U.S. Government, the U.S. military, and the international community to assist that country in accomplishing its military and democratic transformation. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this ERAP monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this strategic issue.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DEBORAH SANDERS is Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King's College London located at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, where she specializes in relations between Russia and Ukraine since their independence. Since 2001 she has widened her research interests to include security sector reform and military transformation in Ukraine and the Newly Independent States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In recognition of her research interest in security sector reform in Ukraine and Russia, Dr. Sanders was awarded a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-EAPC) Fellowship to conduct research into how foreign military assistance programs facilitate mature and stable relations between Russia and Ukraine. She regularly visits Ukraine and is currently working on Ukraine's contribution to stability and security in the Black Sea. Dr. Sanders was awarded her doctorate from Aberystwyth University and subsequently published her thesis entitled *Security Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era* with Palgrave in 2001.

SUMMARY

Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west, Ukraine's pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism. Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping role in frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union—where conflict resolution has yet to take place. Ukraine can make a second contribution to the U.S.-led defeat of international terrorism through the development of niche capabilities—in particular its peacekeeping forces.

The author argues that, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it needs to engage in comprehensive  military transformation. This will necessitate the reform of all security stakeholders—all those organizations responsible for the provision of security in Ukraine. Effective military transformation in Ukraine will be dependent on the development of military professionalism, democratic political control, and democratic professionalism. Professional militaries are efficient, well-equipped, and highly motivated modern forces whose institutions and internal structures reflect democratic civilian control. Democratic control would ensure that all security stakeholders are accountable through the democratic structures in Ukraine; this would include both constitutional limits and accountability to the executive branch, legislative branch, and Ukrainian society. Democratic professionalism is an important benchmark used to determine progress in military transformation and the extent to which Ukraine can contribute to the war on terror. Democratic professionalism is the development of new styles of leadership and promotion in Ukraine so that military commanders have the confidence and flexibility to make timely decisions in a complex battlespace such as stabilization operations in Iraq. The author argues that Ukraine has made considerable

progress in developing military professionalism, democratic political control, and democratic professionalism in the military sphere, but has made far less progress in reforming its security services.

Successful military transformation will allow Ukraine to provide niche capabilities, in particular well-trained and equipped peacekeeping troops able to contribute to the international struggle for peace and stability. Ukraine has made considerable progress in developing effective and professional peacekeeping forces. However, it is clear that, at present, Ukrainian peacekeeping forces lack the training and capability to perform strategic or more complex peacekeeping operations. Stabilization operations in Iraq have demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition members to develop the capability for full-spectrum military activities beyond traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of contemporary conflicts means that members of the international community have to be able to deploy forces that are able to engage simultaneously in all aspects of strategic peacekeeping—peace building, peace enforcement, and traditional tasks related to maintaining the peace. A case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq suggests that these forces currently lack the capability and training for anything more than rigid adherence to traditional as opposed to strategic peacekeeping tasks. The author argues that effective and well-funded military transformation in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the capability to perform more complex tasks in support of the war on terror.

The author argues that Ukraine's ability to perform future military tasks in support of the war on terror also will be contingent on the consolidation of democracy and the development of good relations with neighbors. Ukraine has made some notable progress in the consolidation and building of its democratic and electoral institutions since the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. Ukraine has a flourishing civic society and increasingly a free press. Democratization in Ukraine, which will provide one of the key catalysts for progress in military transformation, may mean, however, that Ukraine lacks the political commitment and domestic support necessary to deploy forces into high-risk environments. Increased democratic political control, accountability, and oversight could limit the

discretion of the Ukrainian Government to deploy its military in support of the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive political control over peacekeeping activities could limit the range of activities and the type of operations Ukraine will commit to in the future.

Ukraine's geo-strategic environment also affects the pace and shape of military transformation and the consolidation of democracy. The author argues that the parameters and possibilities of military change will be affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains good relations with its neighbors—not least of which the Russian Federation. Russian interference in Ukraine's presidential election in 2004 and disagreement over the price of Russian-supplied gas in early 2006 have strained relations between these two states. Russia and Ukraine also have a number of unresolved and contentious legacy issues that hamper the prospects for the normalization of relations in the short to medium term. These include the speed and shape of the Single Economic Space and the conditions under which the Russian fleet remains in Ukraine's Black Sea port, Sevastopol. Ukraine's foreign policy objectives connected with Euro-Atlantic integration will facilitate military transformation, but this ultimately could damage relations further with Russia. Deterioration in relations could lead to the reemphasis of traditional definitions of defense rather than the development of niche capabilities such as peacekeeping forces, thus hampering Ukraine's ability to contribute to the war on terror.

UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?

INTRODUCTION

“Razom nas Bahato! Nas ne podolaty!” The rhythmic chant spread through the crowd of hundreds of thousands that filled Kiev’s Independence Square on the evening of November 22 [2004]. “Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!” Emerging from a sea of orange, the mantra signalled the rise of a powerful civic movement, a skilled political opposition group, and a determined middle class that had come together to stop the ruling elite from falsifying an election and hijacking Ukraine’s presidency.

Over the next 17 days, through harsh cold and sleet, millions of Ukrainians staged nationwide nonviolent protests that came to be known as the “orange revolution.” The entire world watched, riveted by this outpouring of the people’s will in a country whose international image had been warped by its corrupt rulers. By the time victory was announced—in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s electoral triumph—the orange revolution had set a major new landmark in the postcommunist history of eastern Europe.

Adrian Karatnycky¹

Launched almost 5 years ago, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a U.S.-led campaign with the twin aims of ending international terrorism through the defeat of terrorist groups, and ending state sponsorship of terrorism. This protracted struggle has taken many forms, ranging from U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the promotion of democracy in unstable regions. There is a recognition within the U.S. Government that, ultimately, progress in defeating terrorist networks and groups, as well as ending state sponsorship of terrorism, will be dependent upon the “sustained efforts of a global coalition.”²

Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west, Ukraine’s pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism.

Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping role in “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine can make a second contribution to the U.S.-led defeat of international terrorism through the development of its peacekeeping forces. However, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as an effective U.S. ally in the war on terrorism, it needs to make considerable progress in its military transformation. Successful military transformation, which intrinsically is linked to democratization in Ukraine, will allow Ukraine to continue to provide niche capabilities, with well-trained and fully equipped peacekeeping troops able to contribute to the international struggle for peace and stability.

The Ukrainian government clearly is interested in realizing this potential to contribute to the war on terrorism. The new Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, has confirmed his government’s commitment to fighting international terrorism. After the bomb attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko stated that terrorism was “a common challenge for every country which requires a common solution.”³ He called on all countries of the world to unite to stop the threat of terrorism. Then in September 2005, Ukraine signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism at the United Nations (UN) Summit.⁴ In a statement after the signing, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk stressed Ukraine’s readiness to cooperate with the international community in developing and implementing effective and practical measures to combat the terrorist threat.⁵

In theory, then, Ukraine has a role to play as a U.S. partner in combatting terrorism. However, declarations of political support do not equate automatically to a substantial capability to act. The author argues that progress in military and democratic transformation will be important factors in determining the extent to which Ukraine will be a reliable partner in the struggle against terrorism. The shape of military transformation also will affect the nature of the military contribution that Ukraine can make, especially in the provision of

niche capabilities such as peace support operations. Ukraine has made considerable progress towards developing effective, well-trained, and professional peacekeeping forces able to contribute to stabilization operations as required by the international community to facilitate peace and stability. However, it is clear that, at present, Ukrainian forces lack the training and capability to perform “strategic peacekeeping” operations.⁶ Stabilization operations in Iraq have demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition members to develop the capability for full-spectrum military activities beyond traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of contemporary conflicts means that there is a need for members of the international community to deploy forces that are able to engage in peace building, peace enforcement, and traditional peacekeeping roles simultaneously. Currently, Ukrainian peacekeepers lack the capability and training for anything more than rigid adherence to traditional peacekeeping tasks. Effective and well-funded defense reform in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the capability to perform more complex tasks and be a more reliable partner in the war on terror. Paradoxically, however, democratization in Ukraine, which will provide one of the key catalysts for greater military effectiveness, may weaken its political commitment to deploy forces into high-risk environments.

WHAT CAN UKRAINE CONTRIBUTE TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM?

This section begins by examining in greater detail what Ukraine can contribute to the war on terrorism. Broadly, the contribution lies in two areas: (1) Ukraine can play an important role as a force for stability in the Eurasian region; and (2) it can provide niche capabilities such as peacekeeping forces. The publication of the U.S. *National Security Strategy* (NSS) in March 2006 provides a useful indication of the important contribution Ukraine can make to U.S. attempts to defeat global terrorism and to prevent future terrorist attacks. Section III of the NSS outlines how, in the long run, winning the war on terror means winning what is referred to as the battle of ideas through promoting and encouraging democracy, freedom,

and human dignity. Ukraine has made some notable progress in building its democracy, suggesting that it is no longer a “state of concern,” but, more importantly, that it can promote freedom, dignity, and democracy in the region by example. In addition to providing peacekeeping troops to regional conflict zones, Ukraine can play a positive diplomatic and military role in “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union, such as those in Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia, and Nagorny Karabakh. These are conflicts in which the use of force has ended and conflict termination has been achieved, but conflict resolution has yet to take place. The NSS outlines how important defusing regional conflicts is in the fight against terrorism. It suggests that, if conflicts are not addressed, they can lead to failed states, which can become safe havens for terrorists. A democratic Ukraine with an effective and reformed military and security sector could play an important diplomatic and military role in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. These regional conflicts provide numerous opportunities for the growth of organized crime and terrorism and a strengthening nexus between the two due to a significant number of ethnic conflicts and the density of criminal and terrorist groups in the region. As the U.S. Department of Justice notes, it is evident that, in the Black Sea region, “instability, as well as growing ties between ethnic minorities engaged in political struggles, have made the region a useful one for terrorists to operate within.”⁷

For example, Trans-Dniester, the tiny separatist enclave that broke away from the Republic of Moldova in 1991, shares a land border with Ukraine and has long been seen as an economic black hole through which all types of contraband move.⁸ The head of the Ukrainian Security Services Ihor Drizhchanyy has noted the threat from Moldova, stating that the “Dniester is a region with a very complex crime and socio-economic situation in which a large number of shadow and criminal structures operate. The law enforcement bodies are waging a fight against them, but in our view, it is not effective enough.”⁹ In March 2006, Ukraine signaled its willingness to deal firmly with the threat from Dniester when it imposed new customs regulations on the enclave. In a further sign that Ukraine is willing to use both diplomatic and military tools to deal with regional threats, Ukraine also has agreed to send peacekeepers to the

disputed enclave of Nagorny Karabakh if international agreement can be reached. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Anatoly Kinakh stressed that “Ukraine will stand for territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and back peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem.”¹⁰ In August 2005, the new government in Kiev again demonstrated its commitment to dealing with regional terrorist challenges when the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council held a meeting with the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The two neighbors met to discuss new forms of cooperation in fighting terrorism, organized crime, and the drug trade.¹¹

Ukraine can make a second contribution to the war on terrorism – through the development of niche capabilities, it can continue to be an active provider of peacekeeping troops to zones of conflict. Niche capabilities can be defined as “high-demand, low-density, and technologically-advanced military assets that are deployable, interoperable, and sustainable.”¹² Capabilities provided by Ukraine could improve the effectiveness of future coalition operations and enhance their legitimacy. Ukraine has been a long and active supporter of peacekeeping operations, with its service personnel having performed peacekeeping missions in Eastern Slovenia, Macedonia, Angola, Abkhazia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Lebanon. Ukraine has played an important role in NATO-led peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. The Ukrainian government demonstrated its commitment to the U.S.-led defeat of international terrorism when it deployed a chemical and biological decontamination unit to Kuwait during the first phase of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Indicating the new government’s support for the provision of niche capabilities, Ukrainian transport aircraft have provided airlift for cargo and peacekeepers in Afghanistan. Former President Leonid Kuchma further signaled Ukraine’s military commitment to defeat terrorism and promote peace and stability when he authorized the deployment of 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeeping troops to the Polish-controlled sector of Iraq. Ukraine also is engaged in cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism. Ukraine has recently pledged its support to Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, NATO’s maritime operations in the Mediterranean

launched on a U.S. initiative after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks.¹³ This operation involves navies from Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, which monitor ships on order to deter criminal and terrorist activity in the region.¹⁴

However, Ukraine's ability to perform future military and diplomatic tasks in support of the war on terrorism will be contingent on building a professional military and security service, consolidating its democracy, and developing good relations with its neighbors. If Ukraine can make significant progress in these areas, it will be better able to participate in the diverse range of security, military, and diplomatic operations required by the international community to enhance peace and stability.

UKRAINE'S MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

This section begins by examining what Ukraine needs to do to achieve a successful military transformation so that it can make a positive contribution to the GWOT, and what internal and external factors might affect this process. It then examines progress made by the new government based on information from interviews conducted in Kiev in April 2006 and the careful analysis of official documents.¹⁵ By means of a case study of the attack by Al Sadr forces on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) compound in Wasit province in Iraq, focusing on the role played by Ukrainian forces, the last part of this section examines just how much real progress Ukraine has made in developing democratic professional forces and democratic political control.

Military transformation can be defined as "a strategy designed purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future."¹⁶ As is well known and frequently remarked, the U.S. military itself is currently undergoing military transformation. The aim of this military transformation is to enable the United States to achieve three key goals: win the GWOT; build efficient fighting forces; and prepare for future wars.¹⁷ It is a process aimed at developing forces capable of defending U.S. security and interests, as well as swiftly defeating an enemy.¹⁸

The Ukrainian government has stated that the two key goals of military transformation in its case are Euro-Atlantic integration and acquiring the ability to provide support to international peacekeeping operations. In order to meet these objectives and be an effective contributor to the defeat of terrorism, Ukraine will need to undertake, first and foremost, the development of professional military forces. Professional militaries are those accepting that “their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the states and are capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and efficient way and whose organization and internal structures reflect these assumptions.”¹⁹ These guidelines are important because military effectiveness is predicated on efficient well-equipped and modern forces that are highly motivated. This definition of professionalism offers an ideal type of military professionalism and a number of important benchmarks for successful military transformation. It suggests that one of the key elements of professionalism is the development of forces that are capable of defending the state and engaging in a range of missions determined by the Ukrainian government. Such capabilities will necessitate a fundamental restructuring and reorganization of its fighting power and, more importantly, the development of an effective, well-equipped, and fully trained peacekeeping contingent.

Successful military transformation in Ukraine, with the aim of achieving Euro-Atlantic integration, also is dependent on creating democratic control of all security stakeholders.²⁰ Thus military transformation requires not just reform of the military, but broader security sector reform. The concept of security sector reform reflects the new security environment in which states find themselves facing external, internal, and asymmetrical threats. The old borders between domestic and external security, and between the different security forces, as well as between public and private security, essentially have been blurred by the changes in the international system.²¹ This complex environment necessitates accepting a wider definition of actors and organizations responsible for the protection of the state and its interests. Such protection would entail reform of regular armed forces, paramilitary and irregular forces, police, and other law enforcement agencies. Effective military transformation

with the aim of facilitating Ukraine's integration into Europe would require as well the reform of relevant nonmilitary structures in Ukraine, which have increased in size quite considerably from the time of their creation in the early 1990s but basically have remained unreformed.²² Reform of the security services would allow Ukraine to play a more significant role in the struggle against international terrorism as it would increase efficiency and facilitate interagency cooperation, thus allowing Ukraine to have full-spectrum visibility of regional and international threats. Such reform would also negate the potential challenges that the security services could pose to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. Ian Leigh argues that the major threat posed by terrorism to democratic states is that of over-reaction, which in turn leads to the erosions of civil liberties and a loss of openness and transparency, all of which undercut the legitimacy of the state.²³ He argues that terrorist challenges necessitate developing constitutional, legislative, and administrative oversight of the security services so that they can protect society effectively without undermining democracy.

Reform of Ukraine's security sector is long overdue. There have been recent allegations that the *Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy*²⁴ (SBU, the Ukrainian security services) was complicit in the illegal export of arms to China, Iran, and Iraq.²⁵ The urgent need for reform of the security sector was recognized by former National Security and Defense Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko in August 2005.²⁶ In an interview, he stated that reform of the law enforcement and special services was one of the key tasks for the new government. He went on to point out that, in their present form, the law enforcement agencies and special services pose a serious threat to national security. Evidence of this was seen during the presidential elections when allegations were made that the Interior Ministry had Yushchenko under surveillance.²⁷ This raised questions about the politicization of the Interior Ministry and the degree to which Ukraine's security sector was impartial and apolitical. The need for reform was recognized by the new government with the appointment in early 2005 of Yuri Lutsenko, a popular opposition politician and a leader of antigovernment protests in 2000, as Interior Minister.²⁸ The Interior Ministry, tasked with fighting endemic corruption in Ukraine and

employing 500,000 people, will now be headed for the first time by a civilian minister. Lutsenko's task is to end corruption among the police and to mobilize them to serve the people. The new head of the SBU, Igor Drizhchanyy, outlined a reform agenda for it. This included the need for a comprehensive review of threats facing Ukraine and responsibilities of the various security agencies in Ukraine to increase efficiency in the fight against terrorism.²⁹ In particular, Drizhchanyy has called for a clear allocation of responsibilities in the fight against corruption and organized crime, a responsibility now currently shared by the SBU, the Interior Ministry, and the Prosecutor General's Office.³⁰ The Ukrainian president also has called for a shakeup of law enforcement agencies, and in July 2005 took the first step by abolishing the traffic police—one of the most corrupt institutions in Ukraine.³¹

Effective military transformation also requires treating all security stakeholders within the larger context of democratization taking place in Ukraine. Democracy cannot succeed without military transformation and vice versa; the two are inseparably linked and interdependent. The creation of effective military and security structures under civilian and democratic control is an important element of effective military transformation, an eventuality intrinsically linked to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. Theodor H. Winkler argues that, if security providers are not accountable through the democratic process, "then democracy cannot flourish; human rights and dignity and security are in jeopardy and the road to good governance, socio-economic development, and the rule of law is blocked."³² The breadth of democratic control required over the security stakeholders, however, is subject to debate. For example, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster take a narrowly straightforward view. They argue that "democratic control should be understood in terms of political control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state."³³ Marybeth Ulrich offers a more detailed taxonomy of the types of democratic political control. She divides these into four key elements: constitutional provisions, executive oversight and control, legislative oversight and control, and societal support.³⁴ Ukraine has made significant progress in all of these areas. It has developed

mechanisms for civilian control; there is a clear chain of command from the executive to military leaders. The Ukrainian Rada, or parliament, has oversight of the defense budget and broad policy issues relating to defense; and within society itself there is broad respect for the military.

Ulrich argues that democratic political control is not enough. She maintains that what is required for effective military transformation is democratic military professionalism, since in her view the process of transformation as treated in the security sector reform literature is insufficiently penetrating and comprehensive. Instead, for Ulrich effective transformation in Ukraine would necessitate the incorporation of key democratic norms into their structures, organizations, mode of thinking, and cultural outlook.³⁵ She outlines a number of key requirements for military professionalism in a democracy. These include a merit-based system of promotion, styles of leadership that reflect society's democratic norms and human rights, high levels of military education and training, military acceptance of its role in society, high public accountability, and operational doctrine reflective of society's values.³⁶ That is, democratic military and security professionals would accept, internalize, and uphold democratic values, while their structures and organization reflect those values.

For the Ukrainian military and security services to contribute effectively to the war on terrorism, they need to do more than just come to terms with operating in a democracy and accept civilian or democratic political control.³⁷ Instead, security stakeholders would need to develop new training courses which promote democratic professionalism, introduce a new promotion system insulated from extrinsic pressures, and adopt new styles of leadership to reflect democratic changes in society. Progress in these three areas would add an important qualitative aspect to military transformation in Ukraine. In particular, the adoption of a more democratic style of leadership and the promotion of Ukrainian military personnel based on merit would go some way toward encouraging and facilitating the development of effective, well-trained, and adequately supported commanders willing and able to assume authority in a complex environment. Military command is the art of decisionmaking,

motivating, and directing forces to accomplish particular missions. Mission command is giving commanders on the ground the scope and authority to make timely and important decisions. It requires the development of a style of command which promotes decentralized command, speed of action, and initiative on the part of the individual commander. The freedom, confidence, and flexibility required to make timely and important decisions, particularly in peacekeeping or stabilization operations, will be facilitated by allowing democratic and liberal values to shape training and education, as well as organizational command in the Ukrainian military. Although there is no automatic link between democracy and effective military command, the former is an important foundation for the latter. Democratic professional forces are less political and better able to make timely and informed decisions. In a democracy, decisions of military operational detail are decoupled from issues of political dogma. This does not mean that an effective military commander is indifferent to politics. Good commanders will think about all of the implications of their actions.³⁸ The adoption of new styles of leadership and command, as well as increased training and education, also are likely to increase the prospects for recruitment and retention of military and security personnel, since their conditions of service would improve considerably.

What is required in Ukraine is a change in the organizational thought process in both the security services and military, and in how they do business. First deputy head of the Ukrainian Security Services Vasyl Krutov has recognized the need for a change in the SBU. He has described how the security services need to change to reflect the democratic changes in Ukraine in the context of the threat from international terrorism.³⁹ He points out that new people have come in, and that the priorities of the service have changed to reflect the values and standards of European integration and the democratization of Ukrainian society after the Orange Revolution. Fundamental and far-reaching reform of Ukraine's security sector is essential and could have a positive spill-over effect in the war on terror. A democratically controlled security sector that is accountable to the government will be better placed to protect Ukraine against regional and international terrorist threats simultaneously, while at the same time upholding and protecting Ukraine's fragile democracy.

The parameters and possibilities of military transformation in Ukraine also will be affected by internal and external factors. The professionalization of armed forces and democratic control in Central and Eastern Europe are affected by both international and domestic factors.⁴⁰ The balance between these factors explains the extent of professionalization as well as the foreign, internal, external, historical, institutional, and cultural determinants of democratic control in this region. This suggests that successful military transformation in Ukraine will be contingent on democratic consolidation and the strategic environment in which relations take place—in particular, relations with neighbors. Military change is affected by three factors: international, domestic, and historical.⁴¹ States have to respond to the security threats and external environment in which they operate, and develop military forces to meet these international pressures. Domestically, a state's military must respond and reflect the values of their society. Lastly, a state's political legacy (e.g., communist or imperial), historical military posture (e.g., aggressive or passive), or means of raising armies (e.g., mass levies, conscription, volunteers) will condition the constraints and opportunities for effective reform.⁴² Therefore, in the next section, we shall consider the impact of both internal and external pressures on the building of professional military forces in Ukraine. Ukraine's progress in military transformation, its capability for membership in the Euro-Atlantic community and for providing peacekeeping troops, and its democratic consolidation are likely to be affected by the strategic environment in which Ukraine operates. For instance, the normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine would allow Ukraine to shake off its communist legacy, both politically and militarily, and redefine its identity as European—and then restructure its military accordingly. Normalizing relations with its largest and most powerful neighbor would ameliorate concerns about Russia's inability to come to terms with an independent Ukraine. In effect, good relations between Russia and Ukraine would allow Kiev to concentrate on the detail of military transformation and the building of closer cooperation with NATO and the European Union (EU). However, Ukraine's membership in NATO is likely to damage relations between these two states. Moreover, deteriorating relations with Ukraine's

neighbors could impact negatively on military transformation. This would likely affect Ukraine's ability to contribute, both generally and specifically, to the war on terrorism.

Before proceeding in the next section to the question of building an effective security sector, let us glance at a number of benchmarks that will be used to evaluate progress in military transformation. For Ukraine to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration and become a provider of peacekeeping troops—i.e., be an effective contributor to the war on terror—it will need to build an effective fighting force that is controlled democratically and has incorporated key democratic norms and values into how it trains and engages in operations. Progress in military transformation will be affected by internal and external factors. Ukraine's consolidation of democracy, the building of democratic electoral institutions, establishment of a free press, and development of a civic society will all impact directly on military transformation and on Ukraine's ability to be a force for stability and security in the region. In addition, economic growth and progress in the development of a market economy also will impact directly on the government's plans to reform, restructure, and modernize the military, as well as affect democratic consolidation. Externally, relations between Ukraine and Russia, as well as U.S. engagement, will shape the possibilities of Ukraine's involvement in the war on terror.

PROGRESS SO FAR IN BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR

This section explores what progress Ukraine has made in transforming its military and security sector, and evaluates how this impacts on its ability to contribute to the defeat of international terrorism. Ukraine's progress in security sector reform will be examined in light of the benchmarks of effective military transformation outlined above. Informed by interviews conducted in Kiev in April 2005 and drawing on key policy documents, we shall consider the extent to which Ukraine is developing professional, well-equipped, and fully funded military and security forces that are controlled democratically and marked by robust democratic professionalism.

Ukraine has made significant progress in consolidating its democracy, a key enabler for military transformation, and has the potential to be an effective military contributor to the war on terrorism.

Military Professionalism – Building a Fighting Force.

Ukraine has made progress in developing its military professionalism. It has a clear plan for modernizing, restructuring, and enhancing interoperability. The *Strategic Defense Bulletin*, a key government document on defense reform, outlines how Ukraine will pursue its national strategic interests and creates a vision of the future organization and configuration of Ukraine's armed forces.⁴³ It deals primarily with the development of Ukraine's manpower and hardware assets—the key ingredients for building a professional military able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way. Between 2001 and 2005, Ukraine had reduced the number of its service personnel from 416,000 to 245,000, divided into 40 percent combat units and 60 percent service support. During this same period, the armed forces discarded over 6,300 pieces of obsolete and inoperable equipment and disposed of 97,800 tons of degraded or useless missiles and ammunition (more on this topic below). At the end of 2005, Ukraine had over 3,000 tanks, 4,290 armored combat vehicles, 3,437 artillery systems, 575 combat aircraft, 182 combat helicopters, and 15 combat ships.⁴⁴ To develop Ukraine's fighting force, the government will introduce a new structure for the military, including better command, control, and logistics. It also has plans for additional significant cuts in personnel and reductions in stockpiles of arms and the upgrading and modernization of hardware—all encompassed in an increasing defense budget.

The key goals of defense reform are to achieve full interoperability with NATO forces and command structures and to establish the means to respond quickly to requests by the UN or other international organizations for peacekeeping troops. In a detailed study of U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation programs, Leonid Polyakov⁴⁵ has argued that full combat interoperability with U.S. forces is not a realistic possibility for the Ukrainian military in the short term.⁴⁶ But he does acknowledge that the extensive program of U.S.-Ukrainian

military cooperation has created at least the necessary foundations for interoperability between these two states at the tactical level in low-intensity operations such as peacekeeping. In other words, the 13 years of military cooperation between the United States and Ukraine have enhanced interoperability between these two states to the extent that they can now conduct successful combined peacekeeping operations.⁴⁷

For the Ukrainian government and military, developing even limited—let alone full—interoperability with U.S. and all other NATO forces will have an implicit positive spillover effect. It will increase the democratic professionalism of the Ukrainian forces, and will allow Ukraine to deploy democratically controlled forces regionally or internally to support the fight against terrorism. To enhance interoperability and develop its peacekeeping potential, as we noted earlier, the Ukrainian government plans to reduce and restructure its personnel, increase sustainability, and modernize its equipment. The new restructured military also will be reduced significantly in size. The total strength of the military by 2011 could be in the vicinity of 100,000 personnel.⁴⁸ In an attempt to professionalize its military, Ukraine also plans to move towards a full standing army by 2010, a year before the final stage of reform in Ukraine as outlined in the State Program of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2006-2011. In the transition period, Ukraine will continue with a mixed system of staffing, assuring that all positions critical to ensuring operational effectiveness are occupied by contracted service personnel.⁴⁹ To facilitate this transition, Ukraine has selected three brigades, one from each service, to be manned fully by volunteers by the end of 2006. The economic and social costs of moving towards a professional, standing, well-equipped, and adequately trained fighting force will be sizeable.

Sustainable progress in military transformation in Ukraine's army is dependent on its successful transition to a market economy. A modern and efficient market economy also is an important enabling condition for democratic consolidation.⁵⁰ This suggests that, for Ukraine to make a military contribution to the war on terrorism and build a stable democratic state as the bulwark against regional terrorism, then economic growth and the rapid development of a

flourishing market economy are vital. Anders Aslund has pointed out that the government's economic policy, under former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was disastrous, with growth plummeting owing to a fall in investment. Aslund argues that the interference of the Prime Minister in pricing and property disputes, compounded by the disruptive effects of widespread nationalization and renewed sales of privatized companies, all acted to undermine property rights and investment in Ukraine.⁵¹ An assessment by the Razumkov Centre of the new government's economic policy also suggests that progress thus far has been slow and patchy.⁵² Yushchenko's government has managed to raise social benefits, pensions, and wages, but its administrative methods have affected business, the investment climate, and economic growth adversely.⁵³ Poor economic progress in Ukraine will constrain the ability of the government to engage in military transformation, which is a costly process. It involves such infrastructural costs as those for the resettlement and housing of military personnel, as well as such operational costs as those incident to buying new equipment, training, and educating security providers.

In recognition of the explicit link between Ukraine's economy and military transformation, the new government has developed a plan which will concentrate financial resources on key priority areas to enable Ukraine to develop modern and combat-capable armed forces within tight budgetary constraints.⁵⁴ During 2005, the imposition of strict fiscal controls on the military and the elimination of inappropriate expenditures has allowed for a more effective use of budget resources.⁵⁵ In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has clear plans to radically change the structure of the defense budget, reduce high personnel costs while shifting the emphasis to spending on force training, weapons, and equipment. The *White Book*, the official evaluation of progress in defense reform in Ukraine in 2005, points out that "the defense budgets for 2000-2004 were not well-balanced and left no headroom for development or investment as most of the money was spent on meeting the fixed costs of personnel."⁵⁶ During 2005, Ukraine spent 81.5 percent of its defense budget on personnel costs, as compared with Germany, which spent 50.7 percent, and Poland at 28 percent. In 2006, Ukraine plans to reduce

its fixed personnel costs to 66.5 percent, which are slated to fall to 57.6 percent by 2011. In February 2006, in a clear sign of democratic support for the defense priorities set by the new government, the Ukrainian parliament approved a significant increase in the defense budget for 2006 amounting to a gross domestic product (GDP) rise from 1.36 to 1.74 percent.⁵⁷ The Ukrainian Defense Ministry's finance director Ivan Marko stated that the new budget would allow the government to move from merely sustaining the military to actually developing the military.⁵⁸ This budgetary increase, combined with efficiency drives, restructuring, and reduction of forces, will allow Ukraine to continue to develop professional, well-equipped, and trained military personnel. Full realization, however, is contingent on continued economic growth in Ukraine.

In reorganizing and restructuring its military forces, Ukraine plans to create three functional divisions within the armed forces: the Joint Rapid Reaction forces (JRRF), the Main Defense Force, and the Strategic Reserves. The JRRF, which is responsible for peacekeeping operations, will be the most powerful part of the fighting forces, with an operational readiness capability in 30 days. By 2011, the JRRF will be staffed by 29,000 personnel, or 30 percent of the total combat strength of the military.⁵⁹ The JRRF will have two components: the Immediate Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces will be equipped with medium and light equipment and trained for peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and emergency relief operations. Ukraine has made significant progress in training of its JRRF. Prioritizing the development and training of the rapid reaction forces in Ukraine will allow it to continue to be an active participant in peacekeeping operations. In a recent interview, the Defense Minister stated that during 2005 priority was given to training the Joint Rapid Response Forces rather than other forces.⁶⁰ Clearly drawing attention to this priority in defense reform, the *White Book* states that special "attention will be focused on accelerated development of the JRRF." This prioritization also is reflected in the share of defense spending allocated to the JRRF during the second stage of defense reform during 2006-11. The JRRF will receive almost a third more funding than the Main Defense Force, even though the former is half the size of the latter.⁶¹ The Defense Academy in Kiev has trained 1,000

peacekeeping troops since its inception. Ukrainian peacekeepers currently are trained to work in the diverse range of roles required by the international community – from traditional peacekeeping roles to observation missions. Ukraine’s active involvement in peacekeeping operations has a positive side effect in terms of developing skills among service personnel. Writing in 1999, before he became the current Defense Minister, Hrytsenko acknowledged the importance of Ukraine’s involvement in peacekeeping operations in terms of developing key military skills and experience.⁶² A recent survey of Ukrainians participating in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia revealed that almost half of those surveyed identified the desire to improve their level of professionalism as a key motivator in volunteering for peacekeeping.⁶³

The Main Defense Force will operate at a lower state of readiness, its main tasks being to provide national defense, reinforce the JRRF, and serve as a rotational pool for units deployed abroad on peacekeeping missions. Placing too much emphasis on this particular element of defense reform, in terms of funding, training, and equipment, would leave the remainder of Ukraine’s forces weak and could damage morale in the short term. The emphasis placed on the acquisition of the English language, in the absence of comprehensive facilities for all military personnel to acquire this skill, could, in effect, reinforce this two-tier system of elite and non-elite military forces. Unless personnel in the Main Defense Force are offered the same opportunities and training as those in the JRRF, Ukraine might struggle to recruit, let alone retain, a standing professional force of 100,000 personnel by 2011.

There also is a clear recognition by the new government in Ukraine of the need to invest in new equipment if it is to develop a professional military. The *White Book* states that professionalism of the Ukrainian armed forces will necessitate “ensuring the provision of state of the art weapons and equipment.” In emphasizing the importance of the JRRF, the government asserts that these forces are considered to be the top priority for equipping with modern and upgraded weapons and equipment. This will include modern digital communications equipment and a new AN-70 transport aircraft in 2006. The last section of the *Strategic Defense Bulletin* highlights the

challenges facing Ukraine in equipping its JRRF for deployment, noting that “the Ukrainian Armed Forces are equipped with almost all types of [outdated] armament and equipment. The most obsolete equipment can be found in Ukraine’s Naval Forces combat ships, its missile and artillery system, and guided anti-aircraft missiles. First Deputy Minister for Defense Leonid Polyakov has drawn attention to one of the difficult consequences of modernizing Ukraine’s equipment: the disposal of surplus small and light arms.

A report by the Razumkov Centre in 2005 points out that the depots and arsenals belonging to the Ukrainian MoD contain huge stocks of conventional ammunition that is not only obsolete and unfit for combat use, but also exceeds the needs of the military by up to 75 percent.⁶⁴ The continued storage of this ammunition inherited after the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is a costly process detracting from the funding of the Ukrainian military. More significantly, the accidental explosions at the ammunition depots in Artemisvsk in October 2003 and near Melitopol in May 2004 clearly demonstrate that these depots pose a threat to the security of the Ukrainian people. In addition, the existence of large stockpiles of ammunition and small and light arms in Ukraine “offers a deferred supply for terrorist activity or for equipping organized criminals, extremist groups, irregular armed forces, or feeding the criminal ‘black market.’”⁶⁵ The disappearance of 100 decommissioned S-75 missiles from a facility near Zhytomyr in 2004 provided a stark indication that the Defense Ministry had failed to establish a clear system of weaponry accountability and control in Ukraine, making it a potential arms sales provider to terrorist groups.⁶⁶

By the end of 2005, however, Ukraine had made significant progress in reducing its stockpiles of excess ammunition and small arms, and can now claim to have data “on every single weapon and equipment piece” owned by the Ukrainian military.⁶⁷ The new government also has made some limited progress in modernizing, repairing, and upgrading equipment. During 2005, seven *Bulat* T-64 tanks were modernized; 19 *Barsuk* reconnaissance stations were upgraded; and over 550 units of automotive, engineering, navigation, and computer equipment were repaired.⁶⁸

Democratic Control of Ukrainian Forces.

With the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, the new government in Ukraine also has acknowledged the importance of ensuring democratic control of the armed forces and security services. This plan outlines the need for institution-building in Ukraine as well as for the processes by which these institutions exercise democratic control over society in general, and the military specifically, as well as a need for increased transparency and accountability. The first NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, approved in Prague in November 2002, was a result of Ukraine's decision to move towards full membership in the Alliance. The new Ukrainian government agreed to a NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2005 which detailed the activities required of Ukraine to achieve the objectives laid out in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, which takes a comprehensive approach to security sector reform in Ukraine by linking it explicitly with democratic objectives. John Colston, the Assistant Secretary General for Defense policy and Planning at NATO, stated that "defense and security sector reform has been on the NATO-Ukraine agenda for a long time—the Allies are determined to assist Ukraine in strengthening the democratic credentials of its security sector."⁶⁹

Ukraine has made some notable progress in increasing transparency and openness in its defense reform. The publication of the *White Book* in early 2006, which was the first in an annual series of open reports by the MoD on the armed forces in Ukraine, is an important first step. This document provides an open and honest appraisal of the challenges facing the Ukrainian military, as well as a clear statement of priorities over the next 5 years. In an attempt to speed up democratic civilian control of the military, Ukraine has been appointing predominantly civilian employees to the main managerial offices of the MoD.⁷⁰ More importantly, while four out of the five Deputy Ministers of Defense in Ukraine were former military officers, all are now civilians. The appointment of civilian personnel to the Defense Ministry has created the enabling conditions for the building of close and supportive relations between the MoD and the Ukrainian parliament's Defense Committee. This has had a positive side effect in terms of democratic political control of the military and

has allowed the MoD to make its case for a budgetary increase in 2006 to cover the costs of reform.

There also is recognition within the Ukrainian parliament of the need to extend democratic control and oversight to the security services. Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Ukrainian parliament Georgiy Kryuchkov emphasized the need for the new parliament elected in March 2006 to create laws, as well as a new committee, to ensure democratic oversight of the security sector.⁷¹ Until the new government is fully formed in Ukraine, progress in this area will be on hold and is likely to be slow since the security services have yet to come to terms with operating in a democracy. Traditionally, the Ukrainian parliament played a very limited role in defense reform. Its main areas of responsibility are approving the defense budget, adopting laws on defense and security, implementing those laws, determining the broad principles of foreign policy, and warmaking. These powers are more extensive even than those of the UK's House of Commons and are on a par with those of the U.S. Congress. The role of the Ukrainian parliament has been constrained by a lack of access to information and presidential resistance to parliamentary oversight of defense issues. While it has the formal powers to approve the budget, it lacked the capacity to scrutinize detailed legislation. The relevant committees in parliament have had few professional military or defense advisers. It is clear that this situation now has changed quite fundamentally, as the Ukrainian Defense Committee today plays an increasingly important role in shaping military transformation in Ukraine.

Democratic Professionalism in Ukraine's Forces.

Hardest to evaluate is how much progress Ukraine has made in developing democratic professionalism among its military and security personnel. Democratic professionalism is the acceptance and internalization of key norms and values through changes in education, training, promotion, career advancement, recruitment, and retention. The Ukrainian military, compared with the security services, has made the most significant progress. Ukraine has increased the level of training across all branches of the armed forces.

In addition to increasing the number of tactical military training exercises, the Ukrainian military also plans to delegate responsibility for the delivery and evaluation of training to individual commanders. This would suggest the adoption of a merit-based approach to promotion—at least at command level. It also hints at the adoption by the Ukrainian military of a more positive approach to “mission command,” i.e., decentralization of authority to commanders in the tactical/operational realms. The *White Book* foreshadows these changes in stating that the “promotion of command personnel will directly depend on the training levels of their subordinate elements.”⁷²

Movement toward the development of a centralized system of personnel management in 2005, aiming eventually to comply with NATO standards, further suggests that the Ukrainian military is setting up the institutional framework necessary for a move to a merit-based approach to promotion.⁷³ Moreover, it signifies recognition of the need to manage the career development of individual service personnel, which is likely to enhance recruitment and retention and build morale. The dramatic reduction in military personnel also has necessitated the streamlining and reevaluation of the role and function of military education in Ukraine. The MoD has signified its readiness to increase the level of military education of all military officers so that they can perform their role adequately as leaders. The *White Book* states that “for brigade commanders, the standards of education will be raised to the operational and strategic level, and for battalion commander they will be raised to the operational and tactical level.”⁷⁴ Indicating that Ukraine is keen to embrace a merit-based approach to promotion, it also has adopted a new system of officer training to provide officers with the skills and knowledge they need prior to promotion to higher ranks. In a further sign of qualitative improvements in military education, the Ministry also has accepted the concept of sponsoring university students before they join the military. Currently, Ukraine has over 1,000 university students who, on completion of their degrees, will complete a year of military training and become military officers, somewhat on the model of the U.S. ROTC programs.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

As was discussed earlier, the U.S. National Security Strategy draws an explicit link between democratization and defeating terrorism. The consolidation of democracy in Ukraine is, therefore, a means to achieve greater stability. Democratization also is a force enabler in facilitating military transformation in this state. If Ukraine continues along the democratic path, it will be a force for stability in the region and at the same time also will be better placed to contribute militarily and diplomatically to the war on terrorism.

Ukraine has made some notable progress in the consolidation and building of its democratic and electoral institutions since the Orange Revolution, thus boding well for military transformation. In December 2004, in an attempt to break the political impasse between the two contending presidential camps growing out of the Orange Revolution, the parliament adopted far-reaching constitutional changes in which Ukraine would become a parliamentary-presidential system. After the elections and the formation of a new government in Ukraine in March 2005, the Cabinet, rather than the President, became the supreme executive decisionmaking body. The President retains the right to appoint the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. The move in Ukraine towards a parliamentary system, where members are elected on a purely proportional basis from the national party lists, theoretically encourages democratic institution-building and increases parliamentary oversight of military transformation. The introduction of a parliamentary system with a Prime Minister accountable to parliament heading a Cabinet will ensure a better balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in all areas of government. It also will encourage cross-party cooperation and has the potential to increase transparency in decisionmaking—including defense and security policy.⁷⁵ However, despite the need to widen access to decisions in the defense sphere, there is no guarantee that a new parliament necessarily will facilitate military transformation in Ukraine. The current parliament has acted as a spoiler in terms of defense reform, and consistently has thwarted attempts by the

Defense Minister to implement desirable aspects of reform. For instance, the parliament has turned down a number of bills needed for cooperation with NATO, including the use of Ukraine's transport aviation in NATO airlift operations and the admittance of foreign militaries onto Ukrainian territory for multinational exercises.⁷⁶

Ukraine has a flourishing civic society and increasingly a free press—two of the key components for successful military transformation as laid out in the NATO Action Plan. A free press encourages governmental accountability in the security sphere, and provides people information about defense and security issues. A developed civic culture ensures that all security stakeholders in society have access to the decisionmaking process and can influence policy. The Orange Revolution created the enabling conditions and motivation for the uniting of the many opposition groups in Ukraine—nongovernment organizations (NGOs), youth, church groups, and all sectors of society—to overthrow the old regime. Ukraine had benefited from more than a decade of civil society engagement and support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and NGOs, the rise of a significant middle class, and a new and critical news media on the Internet.⁷⁷ Public response to the massive election fraud on November 21, 2004, as embodied in the Orange Revolution, resulted in the highest level of civil engagement in the political process in Ukraine since independence in 1991.⁷⁸ A further sign of the mature civic culture in Ukraine was the peaceful nature of the protests and the compromises that were struck by the opposition to ensure the peaceful transfer of power. A key element for successful military transformation is a free and open press, an area in which Ukraine has made considerable progress. The news media began to operate more freely in Ukraine after the revolution. With the previous regime, intimidation, pro-government ownership, favoritism in granting broadcasting rights, and government guidance on what to publish and how to publish were the order of the day. Some concerns have been expressed, however, about the actual level of governmental support for a free press when a reporter was heavily criticized for revealing damaging information about the finances and lifestyle of Yushchenko's son.⁷⁹

Although Ukraine has made considerable progress in the consolidation of its democracy, a key barrier to democratization,

and hence military transformation, is the high level of corruption. Alexander Motyl recently has described Ukraine as an “excessively corrupt country.”⁸⁰ Corruption, in the sense of the misuse of public power for private gain or the misuse of entrusted power, is a major cultural and structural impediment to military transformation in Ukraine. The absence of the rule of law, inefficient bureaucracies, over-regulation of the economy, alternative systems for organizing society, and the lack of accountability and transparency in government have formed a breeding ground for corruption. One of the most damaging effects of corruption is its undermining of the consolidation of democracy.⁸¹ Distrust in elected officials breeds cynicism, apathy, and eventually alienation from the democratic process.⁸² The collapse of the ruling coalition in Ukraine in September 2005 amid allegations and counter-allegations of corruption has delayed much needed economic, social, and political reforms. Even more importantly, the poor showing of Yushchenko’s party in the parliamentary elections indicates that his reputation has been damaged significantly.

EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Ukraine’s geo-strategic environment also has affected the pace and shape of its military transformation and consolidation of democracy. In particular, the parameters and possibilities of change will be affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains good relations with its neighbors—not least of which is the Russian Federation—and by its level of engagement with the United States and Europe, in the process of transformation more generally.

In a pragmatic recognition of the importance of maintaining good relations with its larger neighbor, President Yushchenko’s first formal state visit after his inauguration was to Russia in early 2005. During that year, relations between these two states went through a long overdue, at times painful, process of reevaluation, including particularly the nature of the relationship. Some limited progress in changing the nature of relations was evident during 2005 when the two states agreed to begin demarcating a land border between the two; they also finalized an agreement on simplifying border-crossing

regimes for their citizens. Signifying a recognition of the mutual benefits of continued pragmatic relations, economic ties between these two countries during 2005 also continued to develop.⁸³

The attempt to build pragmatic relations between these two states has been hampered by Russia's interference in the Ukrainian presidential elections and Russia's decision to force Ukraine to pay world prices for Russian gas. Russian interference in the democratic process in Ukraine before and during the presidential elections in 2004 was both covert and overt. In an attempt to secure the victory of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich, the Russian government sent what are referred to in Russia as "political technologists" to advise and shape the candidate's presidential election campaign. President Putin all but publicly endorsed Yanukovich with his strategically timed visits to Kiev just prior to the first and second round of voting in the Ukrainian presidential elections. Interfering overtly in the Ukrainian elections, President Putin telephoned Yanukovich to congratulate him on his victory when the controversy over his supposed victory had caused mass protests in the streets in Ukraine. President Putin's attempt to influence the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections damaged relations in the short term between these two states. Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov stated that the president's meddling in the Ukrainian election had harmed Russia's long-term interests in Ukraine by alienating millions of Ukrainians.⁸⁴

In a sign of strains in the relationship, in early 2006 the Russian natural gas company, Gazprom, announced that it had cut off supplies of gas to Ukraine. This unilateral action was in response to Ukraine's rejection of a proposed gas price increase. Under pressure from Europe, Russia and Ukraine worked out a compromise deal whereby Ukraine pays more for gas, but the higher price is offset by supplementing Russian supplies with cheaper Central Asian gas.⁸⁵ The deal has been criticized heavily in the Ukrainian parliament and press, not least because the intermediary through which Ukraine will buy this cheaper gas, RosUkrEnergo, was investigated for criminal activity in 2005.⁸⁶ Although Russia has been condemned for what was termed economic pressure and blackmail by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new agreement has facilitated the

normalization of relations with its neighbor.⁸⁷ By paying what are in essence world prices for gas, Ukraine will no longer be a petitioner for Russian good will and instead can build relations with its neighbor as an equal partner. Since Ukraine's accession of independence in 1991, Russia had subsidized the Ukrainian economy with cheap gas, in effect allowing Ukraine to postpone hard economic decisions about restructuring its own industries.⁸⁸ The compromise deal worked out with Russia now halts the resulting waste of energy and encourages Ukrainian enterprises to introduce energy-saving technologies. Most important of all, it will facilitate Ukraine's ultimate acquisition of economic and political independence from Moscow.⁸⁹

Russia and Ukraine do have a number of unresolved and contentious legacy issues that are likely to hamper the prospects for normalization of relations in the short to medium term. The first of these is the disagreement over the speed and shape of the Single Economic Space (SES). During the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Yalta in September 2003, a treaty creating the SES between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine was signed. It was ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments in April 2004. The SES would entail the establishment of a Free Trade Area followed by a customs union and eventually the formation of an economic union among the member states. However, there is some concern in Kiev that the SES will jeopardize Ukraine's efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU, that Ukraine could lose its economic sovereignty, and that Russia, as the state among the four with the largest GDP, will dominate key decisions in any SES.⁹⁰ The new government in Ukraine has been keen to advance a new modified model of the SES—one that aims to preserve amicable relations with its neighbor but does not preclude Ukrainian membership in the WTO and the EU.⁹¹ Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk explained Kiev's approach to the SES with his assurance that Ukraine would not withdraw but merely would seek a free trade zone with its four neighbors.⁹² However, this watered-down model of the SES is unlikely to satisfy the other three states, all of which are resolved to move towards full economic integration.

A second key issue that will affect the possibility of normalizing relations with Russia is Ukraine's success in resolving the status of

the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) based in Sevastopol in bilateral negotiations with Russia. There was a clear sign just months into the new government's tenure that Kiev was prepared to advance Ukraine's legitimate interests in the region by arranging the eventual removal of the Russian naval base located on its territory. Specifically, in April 2005, President Yushchenko announced that the status of the Russian BSF in Sevastopol needed to be reconsidered.⁹³ A few days earlier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk had stated that the 1997 agreement according to which Russia could use the base of Sevastopol until 2017 would not be extended.⁹⁴ This statement was made in response to a number of highly publicized incidents in the Crimea which have threatened Ukraine's territorial integrity and Ukrainian law. At the end of March 2005, for example, a Russian landing craft carried out an unauthorized practice landing near Feodosia in Ukraine. A few weeks later in mid-April, a group of Ukrainian observers were denied access to the Russian base in Sevastopol to check on allegations that the Russians were subletting Black Sea Fleet facilities. Ukraine's response to these incidents suggests that the new government is prepared to assert its full sovereignty in the region, which is likely to damage relations with the Russian Federation.

Normalization of relations between these two states is affected not only by the legacy issues outlined above, but also by Ukraine's relationship with Europe and the West. Since his inauguration, President Yushchenko has declared that Ukraine's main foreign objective will be securing EU and NATO membership. Ukraine's strategic reorientation towards Europe will affect the prospects for military transformation in two ways. It will shape Ukraine's perception of threats in the external environment, and also will affect Ukraine's democratic transformation, which in turn will have a bearing on military transformation. In a recent lecture, Francis Fukuyama draws attention to the importance of what he terms national "neighborhoods" in determining the prospects for democratization.⁹⁵ Fukuyama argues that, as societies fall under the influence of what goes on around them in a globalized world, it is inevitable that people begin to copy the norms and political movements of other societies and polities. This suggests that EU and

NATO engagement with Ukraine serves two vital purposes. First, it enhances Ukraine's long-term security; and second, it promotes and encourages democracy through proximity and the consequent spread and institutionalization of democratic norms and values.

Relations between Ukraine and the United States have improved significantly since the election of President Yushchenko. In a successful visit to the United States, Yushchenko succeeded in normalizing Ukrainian relations with its most important ally after many years in the wilderness. During this visit, Yushchenko secured a pledge of support for lifting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that restricts U.S. trade with Ukraine, a U.S. commitment to support Ukraine's entry into the WTO, endorsement of Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations, easing of the visa restrictions, and an aid package to facilitate Ukraine's domestic transformation. Moreover, the decision by the new government of Ukraine to withdraw its forces from Iraq apparently has not damaged U.S.-Ukraine relations. However, those relations could be damaged if Yushchenko is unable to implement the far-reaching reforms in the economic and political spheres that are required to transform Ukraine into a stable and secure democracy. Progress in reform is dependent on good relations with the United States, Europe, and Russia. However, good relations with the United States and Europe also ultimately depend on Ukraine's democratization and military transformation.

CASE STUDY OF UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPERS IN IRAQ

Through a case study, this section critically evaluates the performance of the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq during a particularly difficult operation, the defense of the Coalition Provisional Authority compound in Wasit province. Such a study of the effectiveness and capability of Ukrainian peacekeepers has been chosen because peacekeeping is a key niche capability that the Ukrainians are keen to develop and to which they have assigned a high priority. An evaluation of the Ukrainian peacekeepers' performance will allow for a determination of just how much progress Ukraine really has made on the ground in developing a democratic

professional force able to be deployed in behalf of the international community to promote peace and stability in conflict zones. In addition, the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq are of interest because they provide an important test case of the ability of the Ukrainian units to be reliable coalition performers as *stabilization* peacekeepers in contrast to more traditional peacekeepers who focus narrowly on preventing violence between opposing camps. As discussed earlier, these stabilization operations are more complex tasks in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment in which the parties have not reached a formal agreement on peace. Finally, this case study has been chosen to highlight the paradoxical effects of military transformation in Ukraine from an American perspective. On the one hand, effective reform allows Ukraine to develop the capability to be an effective contributor to the war on terrorism. On the other, however, this case study suggests that democratic consolidation is likely to weaken the commitment of the Ukrainian government to become involved in stabilization or strategic peacekeeping. The new government in Ukraine is unlikely, in the future, to have the domestic support it needs to send peacekeepers on complex national stabilization operations. Instead, a restructured, reformed, more efficient and effective Ukrainian JRRF might find itself deployed only in traditional peacekeeping operations designed to keep warring parties apart.

Ukraine clearly has demonstrated its commitment to peacekeeping through its active involvement in various operations since 1992. Recently Ukraine has cooperated with NATO in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the Balkans, Ukraine has contributed an infantry battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion, and a helicopter squadron to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has deployed peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, and 300 Ukrainian peacekeepers still serve there as part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The final contingent of Ukrainian peacekeepers in the Wasit province of Iraq performed a number of significant duties. The 7th Detached Mechanized Brigade detained suspected or known terrorists, confiscated weapons and ammunition, and, with the cooperation of the Kazakhstan field engineering detachment, defused and destroyed ammunition and

unexploded ordnance.⁹⁶ In addition, the brigade completed civil support projects such as repairing and refurbishing schools and hospitals, restored water supply lines and sewer systems, and supplied the local population with potable drinking water.

Events in Kut in Iraq in April 2004 suggest that more robust strategic peacekeeping by the Ukrainian forces lacks sufficient domestic political support. Followers of rebel Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr launched a well-coordinated uprising across southern Iraq. It included attacks on the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) headquarters in the city of Kut in Wasit province where the Ukrainian peacekeepers were based. Allegations have been made that the Ukrainian forces failed to defend the compound when it was attacked and pulled out of Kut, thus abandoning the Iraqi city to Shia insurgents.⁹⁷ The most damning criticisms of the Ukrainian peacekeepers' resolve have come from CPA governance coordinator Mark Etherington, a former member of the British parachute regiment. Etherington claims that the Ukrainian forces in Kut abandoned the city without a word of warning to CPA headquarters, and the province then simply collapsed.⁹⁸ In explaining this unauthorized withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, brigade commander Sergey Ostrovskiy told Etherington that, because of disturbances in other cities, Sadr followers informed him that the safety of Ukrainian forces in Kut could not be guaranteed and that they had thus withdrawn to avoid bloodshed, leaving CPA to wonder who was supposed to be guaranteeing safety to whom.⁹⁹ Etherington is even more critical of the performance of Ukrainian soldiers inside the compound during the attack by Sadr's forces, stating that he detected "limited enthusiasm for the fight among our Ukrainian soldiers. Some were in firing positions, but many were not; and a few had quietly absented themselves."¹⁰⁰ Etherington further questions the commitment of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that, despite being told by coalition superiors that U.S. General Ricardo Sanchez had ordered the Ukrainians to stay and defend the compound, the Ukrainians disobeyed orders and evacuated to Camp Delta two and a half miles away, leaving the compound and its personnel undefended.¹⁰¹

These criticisms of Ukrainian peacekeepers raise two important interrelated questions. First is whether or not events in Kut indicate that Ukrainian peacekeepers in general are willing to stand and

fight if the mission so requires in strategic peacekeeping. Second is whether or not these alleged failings in Kut indicate a lack of commitment by the political masters of the Ukrainian troops to more robust peacekeeping. David Stokes suggests that the explanation might indeed be the lack of political commitment from above. Stokes, a coalition security contractor and site supervisor of the CPA compound in Kut, avers that the Ukrainian soldiers stationed at the CPA compound fought valiantly and tirelessly during the attack.¹⁰² In his unclassified report on the attack against the CPA compound, Stokes goes on to draw attention to the limited military capability of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that they “were never prepared to fight a ground offensive. Towards the end of night on the 6th of April, the Ukrainians began to run low on ammunition. Additionally, they had no night vision equipment nor did they have any heavy weapons which could be set up in defensive positions.”¹⁰³

Admitting a degree of mismatch between what the Ukrainian peacekeepers were trained for and what was expected by CPA in this more complex and hostile environment, Etherington draws attention to the key difficulties of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He asserts that what was needed in Wasit province was a more aggressive program of foot patrols in the streets and alleys, but that this was beyond the capabilities and experience of the Ukrainians.¹⁰⁴ Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk had made clear that the Ukrainians in Iraq were expected to be involved in *traditional* peacekeeping, not *strategic* peacekeeping. More explicitly, he stated that “our peacekeepers were not to engage in hostilities in Kut because this was not their mission.”¹⁰⁵ He went on to explain that the mission for his forces was not to guard or defend the city of Kut, but rather to guard local Iraqi officials who had fled government offices at the start of the uprising. Major General Leonid Holopatiuk, head of the Ukrainian military’s Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department, felt that the Ukrainian mission became dramatically more challenging during April and that “the majority of our contingent in Iraq was ready for a more classic peacekeeping mission,” even if not for the heavy attack actually received¹⁰⁶ Thus legitimate questions do remain as to the capability and commitment of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground and

politicians back in Kiev to move from light peacekeeping tasks to strategic peacekeeping in a complex and potentially hostile theater of operations.

This case study also raises questions about the degree to which Ukrainian forces generally, and the peacekeepers in particular, accept and reflect the democratic and liberal values of Ukrainian society – that is, the level of democratic professionalism. On their return from Iraq, security forces detained the Ukrainian peacekeepers at the Boryspil airport in Kiev. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry confirmed that over \$300,000 were confiscated from the troops.¹⁰⁷ The Ukrainian news media reported allegations that money intended for operations in Iraq had been diverted illegally and smuggled back into Ukraine by the Ukrainian peacekeepers.¹⁰⁸ In June 2005, former commander of Ukraine's troops in Iraq Major General Serhiy Savchenko was arrested on money smuggling charges.¹⁰⁹

The question of Ukrainian peacekeepers' commitment, capability, and democratic professionalism ultimately cannot be separated from the issue of increased democratic political control in Ukraine in light of its consolidation of democracy. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was unpopular in Ukraine, with little support in parliament or among the Ukrainian people for the deployment of Ukrainian peacekeepers. The death of eight Ukrainian soldiers in Iraq in an explosion at an ammunition dump led to calls by the Ukrainian parliament for immediate withdrawal of forces.¹¹⁰ In January 2005, the Ukrainian parliament again called on the President to withdraw the Ukrainian peacekeepers.¹¹¹ During his presidential campaign, Yushchenko felt the need to declare that he would withdraw Ukrainian forces from Iraq.¹¹² There was increasing domestic concern that Ukraine itself would become a future target for terrorist attacks.¹¹³ In light of terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko was under increased domestic pressure to speed up the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces. The Communist Party issued a statement demanding that the president go ahead and act in line with the parliament's decision to withdraw the Ukrainian military contingent from Iraq.¹¹⁴ It would thus seem that increased democratic political control in Ukraine could limit Ukraine's willingness to deploy its military in support of the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive political control

over peacekeeping activities is therefore very likely to limit the range of activities and the types of operations Ukraine will commit to in the future.

SUMMARY

- The author has argued that Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led war on terrorism in two key ways: through the consolidation of democracy, which allows Ukraine to be a force for stability and peace in the region, and through the development of peacekeeping forces.
- In Ukraine, the goals of military transformation are Euro-Atlantic integration and the development of deployable peacekeeping forces, both of which will promote democracy and allow Ukraine to be a net contributor to the war on terror.
- To meet these goals, Ukraine needs to engage in military transformation, which is the development of a professional military, obtaining democratic control over all security stakeholders, and bringing about democratic professionalism.
- Ukraine has made considerable progress in all three areas of military reformation, but has made less progress in reforming its security services. Progress in achieving these goals and contributing to the defeat of terrorism depends on normalizing relations with its larger and more powerful neighbor, the Russian Federation.
- An evaluation of progress in defense reform suggests, however, that, while the JRRF has the capability and training for stabilization operations, the Ukrainian military is not yet ready for more robust peacekeeping tasks.
- Ukraine's goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, if not well-managed, risks damaging further relations with Russia. This could hamper effective military transformation in Ukraine and the development of niche capabilities such as peacekeeping forces.

- Democratic consolidation and increased democratic oversight of the military might limit Ukraine's ability to perform more strategic peacekeeping roles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The U.S. Government and military must recognize the unique nature of Ukraine's military transformation and the complex relationship between the internal and external challenges, and then tailor programs that encourage military and democratic transformation and promote good relations with the Russian Federation.
- The United States and the international community need to recognize the inherent contradictions in Ukraine's attempt to consolidate its democracy. There is a trade-off—a democratically stable Ukraine, which would be a force for stability in the region, might be less willing to deploy peacekeeping troops in nontraditional peacekeeping operations, even those with a UN mandate.
- The United States in particular must work with Ukrainian forces to develop key leadership skills required by future commanders in peacekeeping roles. This would include tailoring courses that deal with the broader challenges of peace support operations such as effective and decentralized command. The Defense Academy in Kiev presents courses for peacekeeper commanders prior to deployment. The operative assumption here is that commanders undertaking these courses already have developed key command skills. However, the case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq presented earlier suggests that this assumption may be ill-founded, and that these skills need to be learned earlier in an officer's career.

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