

**A 21st CENTURY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
FOR THE AMERICAS: MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION, LIBERAL PEACE,
AND SOFT POWER**

Joseph R. Núñez

August 2002

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The author would like to thank the Institute of National Security Studies (USAF), the Latin American Institute (University of New Mexico), and the U.S. Army War College Foundation for their support of the research for this monograph.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-094-X

FOREWORD

This monograph by Colonel Joseph R. Núñez is a constructive response to the question of “How can the United States best develop security cooperation within the Americas?” In it, he develops the necessary background to make the persuasive argument that it is time for the United States to employ strategic restraint and reassurance of allies to develop a new security architecture that is effective and efficient, not to mention reflecting of our values and interests.

The current security architecture of the Western Hemisphere needs major change. To better address current and future threats, the United States must be able to demonstrate the type of leadership that reflects the “soft power” and liberal peace realities of our hemispheric neighborhood. Of course, this will require the recognition and assistance of other leading states that provide real legitimacy and better representation for this new security structure. The threats and challenges that Colonel Núñez articulates are no longer state versus state on a path to eventual war, but more internal, where weak institutions struggle to deal with terrorism, natural disasters, governmental corruption, insurgency, crime, and narcotrafficking. Many of these problems transcend borders, further complicating matters.

Colonel Núñez argues that the United States is the only country that can provide the new direction for security cooperation, but must rely upon Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to develop the consensus for change and materially contribute to the creation of standing multinational units. He senses that issues such as state sovereignty and the role of the Organization of American States must figure significantly in the overarching security structure, and that these new brigade-sized units must be

able to rapidly deploy to handle missions immediately, not after the fact in an ad hoc and disorganized manner.

This is a most timely monograph. With current concerns about the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the strength of democratic regimes, along with the growing need for homeland—even hemispheric—security, it is most important that we seriously consider new ways to respond to our strategic situation. While the innovative system detailed in this monograph is an ambitious venture, it also reflects great logic, grand strategy, and sound assessments about the Americas. A new security community must be developed to reflect our emerging economic community and uphold shared democratic values.

The mission of the U.S. military, and the Army in particular, is to be prepared to allocate resources for this new security system that complements many transformation themes already embraced, yet in a truly multinational manner that builds trust, respect, cohesion, and results in mission success through competence, interoperability, and rapid deployment. This monograph provides an excellent opportunity for policymakers to consider a new security architecture, complete with details for implementation. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this work as a contribution to the national security debate on hemispheric security cooperation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JOSEPH R. NÚÑEZ, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a Professor in the Department of National Security and Strategy of the U.S. Army War College. With over 25 years of service, Colonel Núñez has commanded at the company and battalion level, taught Political Science in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), and deployed to Haiti in 1994 with the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. His research interests are focused on the Americas and reflected in his dissertation research. Most recently, the Strategic Studies Institute published his monograph, *Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace* (also published as an article in *Aerospace Power Journal* in Spanish). His Op-Ed piece, "Homeland and Hemisphere," was published by the *Christian Science Monitor* on December 20, 2001. Colonel Núñez is regularly cited by major newspapers throughout North America, South America, and Europe for his views on security issues within the Western Hemisphere. A cum laude graduate of St. Lawrence University, he holds an M.A. in Government from the University of Virginia, and is currently completing a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Virginia. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

North and South America



SUMMARY

The main focus of this monograph is on security cooperation within the Americas. Essentially, much emphasis has been placed on economic cooperation (free trade agreements), but little thought has been given to security cooperation. Existing collective defense systems (Rio Treaty of the Organization of American States [OAS]) are a relic of the Cold War and **not** sufficient for the challenges and threats of today.

The Americas are evidence of liberal or democratic peace. States do not war against each other because values and trade discourage major conflicts. The greater challenge to the state is internal, particularly given the problems of natural disasters, insurgency, drugs, violent crime, poverty, and other problems. Because of spillover effects, domestic issues often become transnational, such as with the drugs, weapons, and people that move across borders. Add to these the problems of natural disasters, and one can see that major changes are needed to the security architecture of the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has leadership responsibilities but must exercise them within a soft power framework that reflects strategic restraint and reassurance. Without a win-win strategy (we gain—they gain) for the states that constitute the OAS, the future does not look bright for promotion of U.S. interests and values. Key to successful U.S. leadership is the recognition of certain sub-regional leaders—Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—that can add significant legitimacy to a new security architecture, along with the component forces to create standing multinational units. These units would constitute the reactivation of the First Special Service Force (FSSF), a famous Canadian-American brigade-size unit from World War II. The United States, Canada, and Mexico would form the First Special Service Force—North or FSSF(N) and

Brazil, Argentina, and Chile would form the First Special Service Force—South or FSSF(S).

These units are under the control of the OAS through a newly created security council comprised of the FSSF states. Such forces are organized to be deployable rapidly to handle missions that include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and small-scale contingencies. An FSSF can only be deployed if member countries approve the mission, which works to respect the sovereignty of individual states and increases the scope of input in the decisionmaking process.

This is obviously an ambitious and radical agenda of change. Yet given current opportunities (free trade) and challenges (democratic backsliding), a new security system that promotes better cooperation, coordination, and results is certainly warranted. An incipient economic community (Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA in 2005]) within an existing democratic community requires a new security structure that can support and defend it, now and in the future.

A 21st CENTURY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR THE AMERICAS: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, LIBERAL PEACE, AND SOFT POWER

. . . I think we shortchange ourselves in our own hemisphere from not paying more attention beyond the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which obviously is very important.¹

Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ)

We seek not just neighbors but strong partners. We seek not just progress but shared prosperity. With persistence and courage, we shaped the last century into an American century. With leadership and commitment, this can be the century of the Americas.... Should I become president, I will look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment to my presidency.²

Gov. George W. Bush (R-TX)

Introduction and Significant Trends.

Each century there are few opportunities for a major power—such as the United States—to make a monumental change in grand strategy for an important region of the world. Today, the nation states of the Western Hemisphere possess a fleeting moment to create a new community. Regionalism is on the rise around the world and in the Americas, and with it comes new ways of interacting economically, politically, socially, and militarily. States devote considerable thought and planning to economic issues, particularly trade, but precious little has been devoted to the security cooperation imperative that arises from these other integration areas.

This monograph addresses the task of creating a security cooperation architecture in the Americas. Existing

cooperative defense measures are not in harmony with current security needs, a fact that was echoed throughout the hemisphere in the aftermath of the September 11, 2002, terrorist attacks when words took the place of action. Moreover, security cooperation in the 21st century requires a greater sense of partnership that provides major benefits to all states that participate. Thus, the United States must be willing to be less directive and more willing to listen to the concerns of other states in the region. In return, the hemispheric neighbors of the United States must be prepared to share the security responsibilities that arise from this cooperation.

In attempting to tackle a major strategic challenge, that of devising a security architecture for the Americas, some major trends must be acknowledged as foundational for this new “security edifice.” These trends address economic, political, security, governmental, leadership, and terror issues that affect the prospects for hemispheric cooperation.

The first trend is that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) will be approved by 2005,³ and shall include all nation states in the Western Hemisphere, except Cuba (and possibly Venezuela). Related to this assumption is that domestically, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is enacted by Congress, and internationally, Mercosur (particularly Brazil) maintains a positive view toward participation in the FTAA. Capitalism, despite the criticisms of some regional leaders, is still the only viable economic system. Most of the anticapitalistic rhetoric is directed at the distribution of benefits, not whether it works to produce gains or development.

The second trend is that the Americas remain a “Zone of Peace.” Liberal (or Democratic) Peace prevails. That is, states continue to abhor “total war” as a means of resolving problems. The Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1995 was hardly a war. Fighting occurred, but was limited in scope (fighting restricted to a long disputed and small border zone), severity (few casualties), size (limited forces and logistics),

and time (fighting lasted less than a month, and peacekeepers quickly deployed at the request of Ecuador and Peru). Thus, the last major war in the Americas was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay that began 70 years ago.

The third trend is that the security dilemma from Canada to Chile is largely internal or domestic, and intensified by transnational nonstate actors. Presidents, legislatures, judiciaries, and militaries are more concerned about internal collapse—resulting from domestic pathologies—than a foreign army crossing their border to conquer their homeland. Feeding these fears are monumental problems—narcotrafficking, arms smuggling, violent crime, insurgency, corruption (money laundering to bribery), and terrorism—as well as murky business and political dealings that cross borders, regions, continents, and the world. Essentially, these are strategic criminal enterprises that states find difficult to counter on their own.

The fourth trend is that democracy will endure and strengthen throughout the Western Hemisphere. Even so, backsliding will occur and complicate political analysis of the region. Many countries will take several steps forward in their maturity as democratic states, and then move one step backward. In some cases, backsliding may exceed forward movement, yet that should not distort the overall picture of the region's dedication to democracy. Democracy has been strengthened already in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, to name a few. Others like Venezuela, are moving backward, although the pro-democracy movement against President Hugo Chávez, truly an "elected dictator," grows stronger each day. The challenge is to go beyond democratic elections to achieve democratic and legitimate governance.

The fifth trend is that hemispheric security initiatives require the leadership of the United States, or they will not come to fruition. Like it or not, the United States is the hegemonic force in the Americas because of its economic, political, military, and cultural power. How that power is

used, hard versus soft, determines the level of cooperation that can be achieved. Of course, leaders require followers, so other states must be given incentives to join in and perform certain roles. Unless concerns over matters like sovereignty, distribution of gains, and fulfilling promises are addressed effectively within the hemisphere, security cooperation will not be realized. Further complicating matters is the recognition that the United States can only demonstrate effective leadership in the Americas by relying on sub-regional leaders to assist materially with the creation and operation of a new security architecture. We have interdependent destinies that require cooperation in the protection of values and interests.

The final trend is that the terrorist attacks of September 11 motivated the United States to address its vulnerability, not only by improving domestic security measures, but also by emphasizing immediate security cooperation within North America, and within the Americas over the longer term. This step is clearly positive for addressing the huge void in hemispheric security. Yet this opportunity must be acted on quickly, lest it fade from public and government attention.

Security Cooperation: The Strategic Challenge.

Hegemony is not a dirty word, but its usage today often elicits negative and visceral responses because it is interpreted as imperialism, when it actually connotes leadership. Thus, the key issue is how leadership is used—for good or bad ends. The realist school of international relations is correct in ascribing anarchy to the international system.⁴ There is no authority above all states. However, that view does not mean that states will not follow the lead of other states. Power does matter, but what is most important is how that power is used, which explains why a leading state, such as the United States, would use institutions to restrict its power—it reduces “fears of domination and abandonment by secondary

states.”⁵ Essentially, G. John Ikenberry is advocating a system reflecting liberal hegemonic stability. If such an approach worked well in Europe after World War II, then surely it can work in the Americas after the Cold War. This is precisely what is needed within the Americas in the 21st century.

Realists overemphasize power and liberals de-emphasize it; both approaches are wrong in this regard. Leadership based on soft power engenders constructive cooperation, as opposed to hard power, the arrogance of might that reinforces negative images of the United States among our hemispheric partners.⁶ The guru of soft power, Joseph Nye, understands well that the key to success is getting other countries not so much to do things they oppose, but rather, to find things we can cooperate on—that is the essence of soft power.⁷ To a large extent, Washington has applied this approach in the realm of democracy and trade, but has done little of this in security cooperation.

The implications of liberal hegemonic stability for security cooperation are several and require important attitudinal changes for U.S. political leaders. From a domestic political—executive and legislative—perspective, humanitarians⁸ must be convinced to relinquish their reluctance to lead. Conversely, jingoists⁹ must be exhorted to refrain from irresponsible leadership. Within the Americas, the role for Washington is to work closely with other states to promote the two main pillars of liberalism, democracy and capitalism. This requires a completely different strategy, an expanded dialogue, and a willingness to cooperate in a truly multinational manner.

A completely new strategy is required that takes a long-term view (short-term views often work against cooperation because they emphasize domestic protectionism over the greater gains of working together openly), recognizes the virtues and value of our regional partners, and reflects the interconnectedness of political, military, and economic issues. The components of this

strategy: democracy, free trade, and security cooperation, are linked through overlapping concerns over human rights, poverty, justice, development, crime, and insurgency. Our neighbors recognize this connection. When asked what was the greatest threat to the national security, Mexico's former—now representative to the United Nations (U.N.)—national security adviser, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, answered: "Poverty."¹⁰ If economic programs fail to bring widespread development, poor people may be willing to risk their lives to bring revolutionary change or engage in criminal activity, thus creating a security dilemma for the state. This nexus is now recognized by the Bush administration. President Bush's aide on international economics reports to the economic adviser and national security adviser.¹¹ Thus, economic and security considerations are discussed concurrently and symbiotically.

Another challenge for strategists is to determine how to reshape the security architecture so that it reflects a cooperative regional approach that addresses the current needs of Western Hemisphere states. The second genesis for security cooperation in the Americas was the defense ministerial process that began in 1995 with Secretary of Defense William Perry inviting hemispheric defense chiefs to Williamsburg, Virginia, for a meeting that is now perpetuated biannually.¹² This was the second genesis because the original hemispheric security cooperation began with the creation of the Inter-American Defense System more than a half century ago in response to World War II.¹³ After the war, it transformed itself into a Cold War organization to counter communism. This system is widely viewed as existing in a state of decline since member states consider it obsolete, even anachronistic. It has not kept up with the security needs of this hemisphere, particularly the relationship between security and economic vitality. This task of change is particularly difficult since very little has been written on the subject, unlike Europe where security

cooperation has evolved steadily along with economic integration.¹⁴

Most who deal with the FTAA are loath to discuss the connection between trade and security, and this is because many reject, even avoid, the argument that security issues have a major impact on free trade. One who goes against this “conventional wisdom” is Robert Zoellick, the Bush administration’s trade representative.

Economic integration, in the Zoellick world-view, is inextricably bound up with democracy and freedom as well as with prosperity. Long before September 11th, he was linking trade and security policy. America, he said, should promote free trade by any means available, across the globe. After that day of horror, he spoke of trade policy as part of the war against terrorism.¹⁵

In the same camp is political scientist Georges Fauriol, who had the strategic vision to see the interdisciplinary nature entailed in the creation of a hemispheric economic community.¹⁶ He recognized that the focus was too narrow. Fauriol notes that the Summit of the Americas process addresses more than economics, but it “is not yet coherent or strategic.”¹⁷ Furthermore, he argues that “what is at stake for the peoples of the Americas goes far beyond a primarily economic agreement.”¹⁸

Some readers may be skeptical of the kinds of inter- American linkages argued here. Critics might question the logic of integrating the evolving South American defense considerations into an already complex FTAA process. The study argues that the achievement cannot be limited only to a simple set of trade negotiations. The institutionalization of democracy in South America in the last decade not only represents the thrust of U.S. foreign policy interests, but also the basis for the transformations sweeping the region. With the end of the Cold War, international security structures are now accompanied by an unequivocal call for the ideals of democratic governance. From the political and security suspicions of the past, the acrimonious foreign policy clashes, and the occasionally anxious economic relations, a new spirit

of partnership has emerged. The Western Hemisphere now entering the 21st century is truly changed—a testimony to the positive results of rebuilding relationships on the basis of cooperation and trust.¹⁹

Also stressing the value of security cooperation is economist Patrice Franko, who has argued for the need of a new regional security framework to complement the FTAA.²⁰ She makes an unfortunate assumption that the new security architecture is needed upon the creation of the FTAA; this is too late. But given political realities at the domestic and international level, the new security community may have to wait for the inception of an economic community. In addition, though Franko cites the need for such a cooperative approach to defense issues, and documents this well, the reader is left without any recommendation as to how this approach is to manifest itself.

Hemispheric security architecture has also been outlined by political scientist Donald Schulz on the basis of his dialogue on the subject with the author.²¹ The basis for Schulz's ideas is a commitment to values, recognition that cooperation can be achieved if structured properly to respect sovereignty and achieve common goals, and analysis that assesses opportunities as exceeding challenges if approached strategically and consistently. The idea of a community of the Western Hemisphere is not new; in fact, it has been around for almost 2 centuries.²²

It is important to note that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States, key members of the OAS wanted to contribute materially to our counterterrorist campaign, but invoking the Rio Treaty, a relic of our Cold War collective defense measures, provided little military support because it has no effective avenue for military cooperation.²³ If the OAS security structure is lacking,²⁴ so is the current strategic approach of the United States toward the Western Hemisphere. There is no single military command that encompasses the Americas. Currently, we

have bilateral military arrangements with Mexico and Canada.²⁵ All military activity with governments from Guatemala to Chile is under the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect since 1995, yet until 2002 there was no security structure to match it. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) provides for a measure of security cooperation with Canada, but there is little or none with Mexico. This security shortcoming is in the process of being resolved, but the level of Canadian and Mexican cooperation is uncertain.

After America²⁶ was attacked, the United States finally recognized that homeland defense was important and required a strategic response. Much of the focus was domestically oriented, but some argued for a broader approach to security.

In the first place . . . we do not live on a remote island, and we know that threats can touch us. We are part of North America, sharing vast borders with Canada and Mexico. There can be no homeland security unless we significantly improve security cooperation with our neighbors. Current arrangements are, at best, incomplete.

Second, an existing economic arrangement requires politico-military support. Canada, Mexico, and the United States are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement. This economic community has the potential to serve as a gateway to improved security cooperation, as long as we remember two imperatives—strategic restraint and reassurance. We must respect the sovereignty of our neighbors by treating them as partners. Also needed is better communication on how to work together to promote mutual benefit.

Third, our true strategic destiny is as part of the Americas, a community of states from Canada to Chile that have largely embraced democracy and capitalism. President Bush is committed to making this vision a reality, as the Free Trade Area of the Americas moves ahead. Such an agreement

requires better security arrangements than we have within our command structure or exists within the framework of the Organization of American States.²⁷

Presently, the United States is working to construct a Northern Command that will—no big surprise—include our NAFTA partners. What started out as a push for a Homeland Defense Command evolved into a command structure that encompasses North America; this change appears to have come from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top aides, who were apparently more influenced by views outside than inside the Pentagon. Rumsfeld was critical of the existing Unified Command Plan (UCP), which approaches the world according to regions. As Thomas Ricks noted based on conversations with Rumsfeld, “Transnational concerns, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation, have not received adequate attention from senior commanders, who don’t have the capabilities to coordinate with law enforcement or to track a threat from one continent to another.”²⁸ Ricks also brought to public attention that the Pentagon was considering formation of an Americas Command. It would be tasked with the defense of the Western Hemisphere, with homeland defense being part of the mission.²⁹

An Americas Command is not a new idea. The National Defense Panel (NDP) in 1997 recommended creating such a security organization. The NDP envisioned a command that included the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and all of South America. It retained SOUTHCOM as a subordinate (or sub-unified) command, and created a Homeland Defense Command as another subordinate command.³⁰ While the NDP concept of an Americas Command is sound, strategic, and needed, the panel’s rationale for a Homeland Defense Command (HDC) is flawed. The panel argued that the HDC “would be created for such missions as augmenting border security operations, defending North America from information warfare attacks and air and missile attacks, and augmenting consequence management of natural disasters

and terrorists attacks.”³¹ Such responsibilities are important, but not sufficient in scope to warrant a single command, particularly since the military has a supporting role—civilian law enforcement agencies have the leading role. Secondly, a command with such a moniker would be appropriate if it only involved the United States. Since Canada and Mexico will be included in the command, the command name is an affront to our NAFTA partners.³² Thus, a Northern Command makes much greater sense.³³

Canada and Mexico as Security Partners of the United States

Since September 11, both Canada and Mexico have expressed great interest and concern about a new security architecture for North America. It should be of surprise to no one that the Canadians are more favorably oriented toward increased security cooperation. NORAD provides a working framework for security cooperation. Historically, the United States and Canada worked closely during World War I and II; this cooperation produced a strong defense partnership. Ottawa and Washington are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Most Canadians see the U.S. initiative to create a Northern Command through the dilemma that journalist Jim Travers describes as the choice to “share defence or be tossed aside.”³⁴ Borrowing an analogy from classical literature, Travers describes Canada’s security challenge:

Shocked awake by Sept. 11, Washington, or Gulliver, is not about to be constrained by the petty concerns of the Lilliputians. Canada is the most exposed of the Lilliputians. Perched precariously along the great undefended cliché and historically committed to securing America’s back door, this country faces an unambiguous imperative: It can share responsibility for continental defence or it can be tossed aside as Gulliver stirs.³⁵

Reflected in these choices are concerns about the adequacy of Ottawa’s military, the uneasiness of living next

to a superpower, and concern that Canada might be abandoned if it does not act to pull its share of continental security mission. But worse scenarios are seen by other Canadians.

Dr. Douglas Bland believes that the recent terror attacks significantly have changed the important relationship between the two countries. Critical to this change is the huge impact that would result from Canada not doing its part to cooperate in preventing terrorism from penetrating the United States from the north.

Thus, Canada's most important coalition may be headed for radical transformation, from one based since about 1950 on a threat of over-the-pole air attacks and from 1989 on no threat at all, to an overwhelming, all-encompassing concern for the security of the homeland. In this circumstance, the United States will undoubtedly look to Canada to share the burden of homeland security in hitherto unimagined ways, which will impose considerable tangible and intangible costs on Canadians. Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new obligations, it seems likely that the United States will blockade its northern border, and undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada whenever the president deems it necessary. Canada faces no greater foreign and defence policy challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to reassure the United States that Canada can live up to the 1938 Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement that no attack on the United States could come through Canadian territory.³⁶

While Bland's concerns are not to be taken lightly, the good news is that Ottawa is moving more toward Washington on security matters, while still raising concerns about sovereignty and consultation. Canada has taken significant steps to improve border security in recognition of the need "to safeguard the Canadian and the American homeland," notes Michael Kergin, the Ambassador of Canada to the United States.³⁷ Perhaps recognizing that the costs are too unbearable should Ottawa not improve its security posture, it is strengthening bilateral relations with Washington. Ambassador Kergin

puts it bluntly, “Like many countries in the world today, the United States is Canada’s primary foreign policy concern . . . without the United States, Canada is pretty isolated.”³⁸ He argues that Canadian interests and U.S. interests have much more in common—citing trade, rule of law, and democracy—than any differences that exist, so it is wise to join as partners in the war against terrorism.³⁹

Essentially, John Manley, the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada—now Finance Minister—argues along the same lines. A complex set of intersecting issues—border reform, transportation, law enforcement, financial and immigration issues, and security cooperation—challenge Canadians to make what Manley calls “clear and conscious choices as a nation . . . what we value, what we will seek, what we must defend—and, ultimately, what we are willing to do in order to achieve these.”⁴⁰ Acknowledging that sovereignty is an important concern of Canada, he argues that it “is fundamentally about making choices, and about acting responsibly in the national interest so that we are able to preserve that field of choice for ourselves... sovereignty must be dynamic—or else our country cannot be.”⁴¹ Thus, if Canada wants to preserve its favorable situation—the number one trading partner of the United States—it must get beyond the shrill rhetoric about “American imperialism,” something that is present in academic circles and the media.⁴² Manley recognizes that Canada can better preserve its sovereignty by constructively engaging with the United States to address bilateral responsibilities as well as benefits—there is no free lunch. He addresses the interdependent relationship:

Canada and the U.S. are fully cognizant that the bulk of our massive two-way trade derives from companies operating near, around and across the border. This remains a key driver for jobs and prosperity in both Canada and the USA, and lies at the core of our economic security. But we know that without a foundation of confidence—meaning consistent, comprehensive and effective security measures—this will falter. . . . Much of the almost 135-year history of our nation

has been about how we establish and exercise our sovereignty within a shared North American space—almost always accompanied by ritual fear and anxiety over how a greater North America might mean a diminished Canada (this has always struck me as absurd, since we occupy the bulk of North American territory!).⁴³

Until recently, Canada was known for its peacekeeping and little else in the military realm, at least since the end of World War II. That has changed significantly in 2002. Now Canadian military forces are engaging in combined combat operations with the United States in Afghanistan against al-Qaida fighters, and are performing very well. Even before Canadian troops entered the fray, they were well-regarded by American commanders. Referring to the soldiers of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Colonel Frank Wiercinski told reporters that because the soldiers were well-trained and equipped, they would be integrated fully in his task force. Wiercinski stated, "We want to bring capability that we both can put together, and by doing that make ourselves stronger by using the best of each. And I think we've done that. They bring capability, not liability, to this fight. . . . I know (the Patricias) are a great battalion."⁴⁴

Canadian military forces' ability was verified on March 14, 2002, when they engaged in a fierce battle near Shah-e-Kot as part of Operation ANACONDA. The Canadian-American offensive demonstrated the resolve and abilities of both countries. It was also a historic event, since it was almost 50 years—dating back to the Korean War—that a Canadian military force had participated in a ground offensive.⁴⁵ Canadian performance obviously impressed U.S. military commanders because the Princess Patricia unit was placed in charge of Operation HARPOON, a mission to flush out enemy fighters that remained in mountainous caves.⁴⁶

If Canada is moving deliberately to improve its security cooperation with the United States, the same cannot be said for Mexico. Military actions do not match the political rhetoric—even if President Vicente Fox's election in 2000

foreshadowed many democratic gains for Mexico, along with the decline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Of all the major militaries in the hemisphere—these include the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—Mexico is in need of the greatest reform and improvement. Though large in size, a force of 240,000 members, it is neither well-trained nor well-equipped, and is not well-regarded by other militaries within the Americas. It still operates as a feudal bureaucracy, a vestige of the corporatism found under the old one-party-dominated political system.

The Mexican military is almost completely focused on domestic security and is a virtual neophyte in the international system. Constitutionally, it is prohibited from most forms of deployment outside the borders of Mexico. This institutionalized policy of nonintervention was a rational response for a nonaligned state that did not want to get involved in the Cold War duel between the United States and the Soviet Union. It no longer makes sense in this new century. But the military in Mexico extremely resists change, save for an occasional episode of humanitarian assistance in Central America. Even so, the hermetically-sealed glass bubble in which the military has thrived is cracking, exposing it to greater scrutiny, accountability, and potentially new missions.

Even before Fox was elected as the first non-PRI president in modern times, the military's luster was somewhat tarnished in the mid-to-late 1990s by two major problems. The first was the public criticism that arose—President Raúl Salinas de Gortari did little to protect the military—over their brutal handling of counterinsurgency operations in Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and other areas in the south. The second was the exposure and sacking of senior military officers for drug corruption, as the military assumed a greater role in fighting drug trafficking.⁴⁷ By the time the National Action Party (PAN) succeeded in the national election that brought Fox to power, the military was beginning to make small

changes to blunt criticism, a reactive coping mechanism more than a vision for future reform. Ginger Thompson perceptively explains this difficult transition:

Since the 1940's when military generals gave up control of the Mexican government and promised to stay out of politics, civilian sectors of the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party abided by promises to stay out of military affairs, including scrutiny of the military's multibillion-dollar budget and investigations of military conduct. Those quid pro quo agreements are gradually being challenged by an activist civil society and Mexico's first democratically elected president. . . . For the first time, Mexico's secretary of defense, Gen. Clemente Vega Garcia, broke the military's tradition of official silence and appeared before Congress to discuss military operations over the last year.⁴⁸

Concerning security cooperation, the Mexican Armed Forces are now challenged to consider new missions beyond the national territory by a powerful force, the internationalist agenda of the Fox Administration. The transition to executive electoral democracy and the success of NAFTA provides the fuel for the new president's engine of change. Mexico is no longer a subregional big fish in a small pond. It is now a regional or hemispheric power with global aspirations. As Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan point out, "Fox has brought new confidence to a nation that historically has been defensive and inward-looking. Armed with assurance, Fox has vowed to forge a more equal relationship with the United States . . ." ⁴⁹ In many areas, he has succeeded in placing Mexico on a better footing with the United States, but security cooperation is not one of those areas yet.

Providing strategic international focus to President Fox is the duty of Jorge Castañeda, his Foreign Minister, a man who is most difficult to describe as a political thinker, mainly because he has moved from being a reactive nationalist to an energetic internationalist. Castañeda consistently amazes politicians and journalists with his quickly devised statements. In early 2001, he astounded

listeners during a radio interview when he presaged a new turn in foreign policy for Mexico.

Mexico said yesterday that it is open to the possibility of joining United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, signaling a foreign policy shift in Latin America's second-most-populous nation. 'Yes, there will be more active participation,' Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda said. 'If we were asked to participate and we had the capacity to do so, and we felt it would be useful and agreed with the cause, then we would consider the possibility,' Castañeda said. . . . He said Mexico's more active international role could come 'through the armed forces, or other types (of participation) with civil components, engineers, medical doctors, nurses, etc.'⁵⁰

President Fox picked up on independent-minded Castañeda's remarks and endorsed them. This was an important signal to observers. The president found merit in his foreign minister's bold assertions on Mexico's new international direction for security. Fox's words were full of reflection and projection:

'I believe that we have matured enough to go in the world and take part in what is happening there, regardless of whether we like it or not, or whether or not it suits our interests,' he said. Fox urged the diplomats to think of themselves as the heralds of an 'extremely dynamic' foreign policy that defends national interests 'in an intelligent way.' In the past, he noted, 'perhaps we were a bit isolated because we were ashamed about not having reached full democracy and this possibly led us to paint ourselves into a corner with certain political attitudes that we defended.' Now, however, Mexico was in a position to assume its place in the world as 'proactive defender of human rights' and let the international community know about far-reaching changes it has experienced in its social and political orientation. For that reason, Fox said, his administration would consider any invitation for Mexican troops to take part in international peacekeeping missions.⁵¹

Despite the executive pronouncements on Mexico's interest in participating in international peacekeeping operations, it was soon clear that the military was not

prepared for nor interested in this new mission. When a very senior ranking military officer was asked if the Mexican Armed Forces were going to take on international peacekeeping duties, his quick and emphatic reply was “impossible!”⁵² This was not surprising because the military has several significant obstacles to hurdle in order to participate effectively in the international arena. The first challenge is obviously attitude. The senior military leaders did not grow up with peacekeeping, so they resist adopting this mission change, a natural organizational reaction. Second, the military is deficient in logistical and deployment capabilities. Third, Mexican troops are not trained for such missions.

Nevertheless, the Mexican Armed Forces are being forced to change by the other two members of the Clausewitzian Trinity—the government and the people.⁵³ The government has pressed the military to change, bolstered by the people who are exposing the military for human rights abuses and corruption. This process of change will continue.

If it was just up to the Fox administration, security cooperation would advance without much trouble, for administration members understand how interdependent the North American states have become. The challenge to bringing Mexico into a security partnership with Canada and the United States is the resistance of the Mexican Senate, particularly the opposition parties (PRI and PRD). Countering Fox, they employed a constitutional provision to restrict him from traveling to the United States and Canada. Furthermore, opposition senators criticized the president for bringing Mexico closer to the United States in trade and security matters.⁵⁴ In particular, there was great concern expressed over Mexico’s signing a new border agreement with the United States, which PRI representatives said would “jeopardize territorial rights.”⁵⁵ They also complained about joint military exercises with the United States that occurred without legislative approval. Finally, they railed against the president for working with

the United States to create a “unified North American military command that could subject our armed forces to foreign command.”⁵⁶

Therein lies the problem. The legislature is dominated by nationalistic representatives who are poorly informed about international affairs. The opposition takes a bit of truth and weaves it into a mysterious web of international intrigue. While the United States is deeply interested in having Canada and Mexico as security partners and integrated within the emerging Northern Command, there is nothing threatening to the sovereignty of Canada or Mexico through this cooperation. But most Mexican politicians see evil intent in anything Mexico City might do with Washington.

Moreover, long-term strategic security visions⁵⁷ have been confused with current initiatives. The United States is not interested in subjecting Mexican military units to U.S. command. But this will not stop Mexican opposition politicians from making up bizarre stories. Part of the reason for this is that a prominent journalist for *El Financiero*, Dolia Estevez, the leading financial newspaper in Mexico (or Latin America for that matter), periodically has written since 1999 about new ideas in security cooperation within North America. Recently, she wrote about how Mexico might play a role in the Northern Command proposed by Washington.⁵⁸ Obviously she was on to something. Two days before her article was published, an Associated Press article by Will Weissert confirmed that Mexico was interested in security cooperation:

Mexico’s defense secretary, Gen. Clemente Vega, was flying to Washington on Thursday [April 11, 2002] to discuss military cooperation that might link U.S., Mexican and Canadian forces against terrorism in a way that NAFTA has linked North America’s economies. The plan apparently is based on a U.S. Army War College report in 1999 that suggested a North American peacekeeping force that would be headquartered in the United States. . . . ‘One of the programs the general will discuss in the United States is a continental command that

would use the North American Free Trade Agreement as a basis,' a [Mexican] Defense Department spokesman said. . . . The newspaper *El Sol* reported on Tuesday that such talks were part of Vega's agenda and quoted U.S. officials as saying discussion of the idea was 'a positive step.'⁵⁹

Once the Mexican Senate got hold of these articles, it added security cooperation as another reason to deny President Fox travel to the United States. The legislative accusations elicited a response from the Jorge Castañeda. He denied that the Northern Command had anything to do with Mexico; that this was just an internal initiative of the United States to revise its Unified Command Plan.⁶⁰ Following that, the U.S. ambassador offered another explanation to refute the wild claims of the opposition parties.⁶¹ The upshot of all this is that security cooperation will grow, but very slowly, due to the incredible level of distrust within the opposition parties.⁶²

Building Security Cooperation Through Brazil and the Southern Cone Connection.⁶³

Brazil looms large as a political, economic, and military force with South America, making it a pivotal state.⁶⁴ It is arguably the leading force—not in charge but certainly a strong leadership example that is respected—of the subregion for several reasons. First, it geographically dominates South America as the largest country; it is more than twice as large as the second largest country—Argentina. Second, Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world, far outpacing Argentina (ranked 17th), and larger than NAFTA member Mexico (ranked 12th).⁶⁵ Third, it also leads South America demographically, with over 156 million people, thus making it the second most populated country in the Americas.⁶⁶ Fourth, it has substantial cultural influence within South America and beyond. From soccer to music, Brazil is admired and emulated.

Fifth, Brazil possesses the largest active duty military force in South America—second within the Americas

behind the United States—with 287,600 personnel in uniform.⁶⁷ Brazil’s military has transformed from a strictly conventional force into a versatile force that has garnered much peacekeeping experience over the last decade, thus gaining even more respect from other militaries in the region.⁶⁸ That said, most of its peacekeeping experience has been concentrated in the former Portuguese colonies of Africa. Closer to home, Brazil was instrumental—along with Argentina, Chile, and the United States—in the very successful peacekeeping operation that took place between Peru and Ecuador in 1995.⁶⁹ Currently, the greatest portion of the Brazilian military is deployed in the western part of the country, protecting the Amazon region, and deterring guerrilla incursions from Colombia. Of all Colombia’s geographic neighbors, the one that the guerrillas most fear as a military force is Brazil.

Lastly, Brazil is the leading force within Mercosur—or Common Market of the South. It sees itself as a subregional hegemon in pursuit of continental hegemony through an expanded Mercosur.⁷⁰ However, the likelihood of an expanded Mercosur grows dimmer over time, as the FTAA movement threatens to engulf or ignore it, largely because Mercosur has not produced economic results—particularly from Argentina’s current view. Given all of these factors, it is easy to see why Brazil is a key piece of the current (and future) hemispheric puzzle.

If one is wondering why so many facts were detailed above, it is because most people in the United States know little about Brazil, and that is most unfortunate and problematic for resolution of trade and security challenges. Another outcome of this ignorance about Brazil is what might best be called the “Aretha Franklin factor.” Brazilians yearn for R-E-S-P-E-C-T, and rightly complain when they do not get it. From being overlooked for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council to the ignorance of the “soft power” leadership Brazil has demonstrated in South America, it is now even more determined to achieve greater international standing for

what it has done and will continue to strive for politically, economically, and militarily. Truly Brazil is an enigma in the international state system, for it is neither a great power nor a lesser power. Contrary to the assertions of political scientist Joseph Tulchin, it is neither a rule-maker nor a rule-taker.⁷¹ Brazil's actions regarding the FTAA process are proof of this—it does not control the process nor is at the mercy of the process.

If Mexico is the gateway to a hemispheric community of nations, then Brazil is the gatekeeper. More than any other country in South America, Brazil holds the most influence as to whether cooperation will occur. Concurrently, this country confounds the critics by its Janus-faced nature. Its president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, now a devoted free market disciple, was once a leading critic of capitalism.⁷² Cardoso's politics has also changed, from devout socialism to a blend of democracy, capitalism, and socialism.⁷³ Cardoso's abiding concern for the poor in his country is understandable, as it is at once one of the richest and poorest countries in the Americas—just visit Rio de Janeiro to understand this bizarre economic paradox.⁷⁴

Finally, in the security realm, as Brazil portrays to the international community a strong interest in asserting itself as a leader, it is also concerned about its inability to stem the growing violence erupting in the *favelas* (urban slums)—call this internal insecurity. While Mexico may share similar concerns, its domestic difficulties pale in scope and size when compared to Brazil. Nevertheless, revolutionary change is not found in Brazil's past—unlike Mexico—and it does not appear to be part of its future, despite concerns over who succeeds Cardoso as president. As Maria D'Alva Kinzo points out, “political rupture has never been a feature of the process of change, and Brazil's current democratization has not diverged from this historical pattern.”⁷⁵ Instead of revolution, Brazilians are more concerned that lawless urban protectorates will continue to grow, forcing the country to become more like a police state and less like a democracy.

What is now motivating Brasilia to give more favorable consideration to security cooperation, particularly as it relates to the Colombian security conundrum, is an evolving realization that it must play a role in countering the spillover effects. Initially, Brazil balked at Plan Colombia, just like other neighboring countries. One complaint was that the United States failed to consult Brazil, preferring to focus on a major bilateral deal with Colombia, with lesser deals for Bolivia and Peru. This was a valid objection as it is clear that regional approaches are required to the problems in and spreading from Colombia.⁷⁶ On the other hand, part of the problem was Brazil's initial resistance to cooperate on an approach to quelling the contagion that crosses borders. Brazil saw this as someone else's problem. Over the last year, this has changed. Brazilians now recognize two important strategic challenges that must be handled, one domestic and the other international.

While the Brazilian military does not fear Colombian guerrillas as a threat to the country's territorial sovereignty, the military is becoming increasingly concerned about the negative effects of drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and logistics—such as the trade in precursor chemicals for cocaine production—upon the stability of Brazil. Privately, there is acknowledgement that the drug trade has fueled a huge increase in criminal activity, so much so that many *favelas* are now classified as “off limits” to government authority—unless they employ military or quasi-military operations—because of the well-armed and violent gangs that find sanctuary there. Senior officials, military and civilian, admit that something must be done to stem this tide, and pursuing partnerships with other states is a necessary endeavor within South America.⁷⁷

If Brasilia does not come up with a significant role in aiding regional security, there will be major negative consequences. Internationally, Brazil is compelled to act or lose any leadership momentum it may have built; it will be viewed as a soft power state that is devoid of hard power.

This is not to say that Brazil—or the international community—should intervene directly in Colombia,⁷⁸ rather it has many options to consider that can facilitate the sharing of information to track and intercept transborder challenges to state authority and stability. This is a most difficult mission for Brasilia to take on, particularly since there are internal and external criticisms to overcome.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, there is a growing instability along the Andean Ridge and beyond; this is a clarion call for Brazilian leadership in security cooperation. Without it, there will be greater instability throughout the region, no matter what the United States might do.

Argentina.

The land of silver is another paradox. As Argentina has contracted economically, its military has become a more professional, though smaller, force. Proof of this was demonstrated during the recent Argentine political, economic, and social crisis, where the military stayed in the barracks. As Professor Andres Fontana of Belgrano University recently stated, “There has definitely been a change of values and mentality.”⁸⁰ This is not the military of Juan Peron or even Leopoldo Galtieri. Today the military is not a threat to the state. Civil-military relations are strong, largely because the military does not see itself as a primary actor in the resolution of political disputes, nor does it want to control the state. When interviewed about the turmoil in Argentina, Lieutenant General Ricardo Brinzoni, commander of the Argentine Army, said that “resorting to ‘the military option’ was no longer possible because both civilians and the military preferred it that way.”⁸¹ The extensive and unpleasant experience with military rule caused an important change in how the military should relate to the government and society.

With a total of 41,400 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the military is significantly smaller than what it was just 2 decades ago. Nonetheless, with this major force

reduction, Argentina can still claim to be one of the most progressive peacekeeping forces in the world. However, this distinction has come at a high price according to analysts for *Jane's Defence Weekly*:

In a world where nearly all armed forces have seen great changes in recent years, Argentina's armed forces are in a class of their own. Until the disaster of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, the armed forces boasted great political sway in addition to military significance. However, the past 15 years have seen the armed forces slashed in size, lose political power and face massive budget cuts . . . They have also totally changed their strategic perceptions of their neighbours and former rivals . . . Peacekeeping and peace enforcement have become major roles for the Argentine forces. This decade alone, they have deployed to Africa, Cambodia, the Caribbean, Central America, Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. But those operations have been conducted on a shoestring budget and the resource benefits to the forces, in many ways, have not been recouped. Despite President Carlos Menem's use of the armed forces in his determined policy of bringing international respectability to Argentina, they have not received much priority on matters outside that role.⁸²

Diplomatically, Argentina enjoys good relations with Brazil and Chile through Mercosur and numerous combined military exercises. These exercises or confidence-building measures (CBMs) are designed to promote transparency, understanding, trust, and shared democratic values. They have been an important initial step in building security cooperation.⁸³ Even so, without increased funding, Argentina will be hard-pressed to maintain a modern, well-trained, and significant—in size—military force. Its further decline would challenge its ability to remain a neutral actor in the domestic political realm.

During the 1990s, Argentina became one the United States' closest allies in the Americas. It enjoys a special status as a non-NATO ally, and for all intents and purposes, functions as a quasi-member of NATO. It may be

geographically separated from Europe, but enjoys a convergence of interests with the NATO that ranges from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. In the realm of cooperative security, Argentina is determined to become NATO's South Atlantic partner.⁸⁴ It is also an advocate of a regional security system, and recognizes that transnational security issues require better cooperation within South America, and the Americas as a larger entity.

Argentina's peacekeeping initiatives are very farsighted. Though geographically placed in the Southern Cone of South America, it has soldiers (and police) deployed all over the world on peacekeeping missions. At last count, the U.N. had 612 Argentinean soldiers and police deployed on various missions on several continents.⁸⁵ Argentina consistently ranks in the top 20 to 25 countries among contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It ranks second in South America behind Uruguay. Perhaps its greatest international military achievement to date is its membership in the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) designed expressly for U.N. peacekeeping. Led by Denmark, this unit consists of soldiers from Argentina, Austria, Canada, Finland, Italy, Jordan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. SHIRBRIG has evolved since its inception in 1995, when it was little more than an idea, to today, where if activated by the U.N., it would consist of four to five thousand soldiers. It is the rapid reaction force that many have long called for to deal with emergencies that develop quickly and with little notice.⁸⁶

Within Argentina, the military can proudly claim ownership of Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para de Paz (CAECOPAZ), an Argentine joint peacekeeping operations center. CAECOPAZ was inaugurated by President Carlos Menem on June 27, 1995. Located in the garrison of Campo de Mayo, not far from the capital city of Buenos Aires, it provides instruction in Spanish. Particularly significant is that the school is multinational—open to all countries—and sanctioned by the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the U.N.⁸⁷ This school and Argentina's membership in SHIRBRIG represent a commitment by the military to transformation, from an archaic territorial force to a modern, intelligent, well-trained, international force that serves the needs of democracy and advances the country's standing internationally.⁸⁸

Chile.

Though small in population, with just over 15 million people, Chile stands out in a major way on the regional and world stage. It is without question the strongest democracy in South America, low in corruption and high in opportunity. It is an economic powerhouse, largely due to careful planning and difficult choices. More than a decade ago, Chile developed a long-term free trade strategy and paid the short-term cost of economic dislocation, losing thousands of jobs in the textile industry, but eventually developed even more positions for workers in a vibrant export economy that is the envy of the world. President Ricardo Lagos explains:

It seems to me that what we have been able to accomplish in Chile is important from the point of view of a small country that decided that in this century, the 21st, we are going to be living in a global economy. So, when we are talking about trade, we are talking about the kind of development that we have in our own country today. It's true that during the last decade we were able to double our gross domestic product. It's true that during the last decade only two countries were able to have a bigger rate of growth than Chile, China and Singapore . . . the kind of opening of the Chilean economy requires us to have a very strong commitment to this kind of free trade. Of course we belong to Latin America, and in Mercosur countries we are associate members of Mercosur, and the reason we are not full members of Mercosur is the difference in tariffs.⁸⁹

Chile has excellent relations with its neighbors in South America except with Bolivia, mainly due to past conflicts

that resulted in a territorially reduced Bolivia and a greater Chile. Yet, while it seeks comity, Chile is known for its tendency to set its own course in political, economic, and military matters. Having never lost a war, and possessing a model economy and a political system that is arguably more progressive than the United States, it is understandable how Chile is able to carry itself proudly in international affairs (post-Pinochet era). More importantly, it is a global player—with impeccable credentials—that sees its future depending upon the vitality of its hemispheric and international partners. Its relations with the United States are very close, yet Chile has not lost its independent streak, carefully but firmly chiding Washington when it moved too slowly on formal recognition of Chile as a vital trade partner.

The Chilean military reflects the progressive norms of the country. Its active duty force of 87,500 makes it the largest military on a per capita basis within South America.⁹⁰ It is well-trained, highly educated, well-equipped, and well-respected within the Americas. The military's funding is bolstered by a major infusion of money annually from the "copper law," in addition to its regular military budget.⁹¹ Chile's military has a strong partnership with the United States. Evidence of this can be found in numerous cooperative training missions and the willingness of Chile to purchase our military hardware.⁹² Internally, the Chilean military has improving civil-military relations.⁹³ The military leadership is committed to respecting civilian authority, even if it means adjusting to further scrutiny and transparency, and this is aided by the fact that as an institution it is highly respected by society.

Chile is a relative novice at peacekeeping, having been focused more on conventional military doctrine, training, and operations. While it has experience in conflict resolution that dates back to the 1930s, it has only become a significant contributor to U.N. operations within the last decade. Its most significant U.N. operation so far was in East Timor, where Chile provided an aviation brigade,

along with some ground forces.⁹⁴ The interest in peacekeeping is growing. Currently, Chile has a total of 44 military and police deployed on U.N. peacekeeping operations.⁹⁵ No doubt this commitment will increase in the future.

Putting It All Together: The New Hemispheric Security Architecture.

Before explaining how this new system should operate, it is important to establish what the ends are. The principal result sought is to transform our security architecture from an archaic collective defense framework to one that reinforces our incipient hemispheric community. It must be able to capitalize on the synergy resulting from shared values and interests. It must strengthen our democratic ties and improve opportunity by addressing the current security needs of the Americas. This raises many questions. What should this new system be able to do? What controls are needed? Who are the key players? What international organization is best suited to managing and directing this security system?

An important principle that should guide security cooperation is that to be effective, it must be organized, professional, and able to quickly respond to problems. We no longer need a body of bureaucrats that is adept at discussion but empowered to do little. This new security architecture must be empowered to act decisively and competently. After all, if we—the states of the region—are going to construct a hemispheric economic community, there had better be a security community that can protect it, and without delay. In essence, the new security architecture must have standing multinational forces (SMFs) that can handle humanitarian assistance missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other small scale contingencies (SSCs).⁹⁶ Agreements, structures, and organizations are meaningless unless they can perform. Thus, only standing multinational units can truly execute this requirement. Anyone who has

served in the initiation phase of an operation such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement understands just how important this new standard (of SMFs) is, since the level of chaos is often under-reported in official channels. Thus, the primary end of this security structure is that it must be able to deploy expeditiously—regionally and globally—to deal with natural disasters, border disputes, failed states,⁹⁷ and other challenges that rapidly emerge.

To safeguard the sovereignty of states, effective controls are needed to prevent any one state from dominating the agenda and controlling the missions. If we are truly to uphold liberal values, each state must be respected and given an important say as to whether its soldiers can be employed on a mission considered by the security structure. Without broad agreement of member states, the security architecture loses the legitimacy that is the foundation for security cooperation.

International organizations, once created, are difficult to replace, and almost impossible to dismember once they have decades of experience. The OAS certainly is an example of this, albeit on a regional basis. Yet, even though its security structure—the Rio Treaty—is largely obsolete, there is potential for major reform and revitalization. Moreover, having seen positive changes in other OAS areas—such as the Democratic Charter⁹⁸—it is no longer good form to impugn the ability of this venerable organization to embrace change and become more relevant to the Americas. The fact is only one body speaks for the Americas, and it is the OAS.

If the security architecture relies most upon standing multinational units, are there any examples to follow in form or function? A current “almost-standing” multinational unit is, of course, SHIRBRIG. It is, however, more standby than standing. Reaching back to World War II there was a standing multinational unit that is an excellent model to consider.

The First Special Service Force (FSSF) was a collaborative effort between Canada and the United States. Colonel Robert T. Frederick of the U.S. Army was given command of this multinational brigade, formed in 1942, to conduct cold weather operations.⁹⁹ Originally configured as a commando unit that could conduct diversionary attacks through airborne delivery of personnel and special transport vehicles, the unit was converted into a versatile assault group.¹⁰⁰ The Canadian and American soldiers worked well together, and took great pride in their elite status, having been recruited from lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers.¹⁰¹ They trained on skis and developed proficiency on a host of weapons.

Through the generation of day-to-day habits in the training program the Force had become, in itself, an individuality, a separate entity that was neither Canadian nor U.S., but just plain Special Service Force. The initial selection of rugged individualists to man this force, and of highly aggressive, capable officers to lead it had produced a singular unit made up of what has been described as 'the leaders of gangs.' The individual soldier, almost to a man, had resourcefulness, mental and physical toughness, and an initiative that surmounted all obstacles.¹⁰²

From the Aleutians to European campaign in Italy and France, members of the Devil's Brigade (as the enemy called them) fought with great valor and success, often sustaining significant casualties. Their incredible esprit de corps made them very aggressive in battle, much to the chagrin of the other side. The Canadian journalist Sholto Watt, of the Montreal *Standard*, summarized the accomplishments of the unit:

But the importance of the First Special Service Force in world history, and their influence on the future, are much greater than even their outstanding military merit would deserve. The significance of this Force is that it was the first joint [multinational] force of its kind, drawn from two neighbor democracies, and that it was a brilliant success throughout. It

is by no means fanciful to see it in the prototype of the world police of that world community which has for so long been the dream of goodwill. . . .¹⁰³

It is time to bring back the First Special Service Force, making it the cornerstone for hemispheric security cooperation in the 21st century. Certainly there is no need to wait for another Great War to operate in a truly multinational manner. Through the descriptions of selected states in North and South America it should be clear that they form the building blocks for regeneration of the FSSF. Canada, the United States, and Mexico could cooperate in providing military forces to create the First Special Service Force (North) or FSSF(N). Brazil, Argentina, and Chile could cooperate in providing the force structure to build the First Special Service Force (South) or FSSF(S).

These units represent the beginning phase of the new security cooperation architecture, which is to say that more forces can be added to the security structure or even to each force. For example, shortly after the FSSF(S) is formed, other states may desire to join. Uruguay and Paraguay might very well be interested in joining with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. They should be encouraged to become involved and expand the partnership. If states within Central America, the Andean Ridge of South America, and the Caribbean want to form an FSSF, they should be encouraged to do so. A long-term goal is to have all states within the Americas represented.

What should comprise an FSSF? To execute competently a wide range of missions, it should have combat arms, combat service, and combat service support units.¹⁰⁴ It will also need rotary and fixed wing aviation units to ensure that these brigades are rapidly deployable.¹⁰⁵ To be a fully capable and self-contained brigade task force, it must have between five and six thousand soldiers and airmen (though it might also have marine and navy liaison detachments). Since they will be multinational, interoperability challenges must be addressed. Each force must have a

primary and secondary language—some might even speak three languages. Equipping the force has to be sorted out in a manner that uses the best equipment from member countries and encourages cooperative ventures among defense industries. Only the best soldiers should be permitted to join this elite force, because they will need great intelligence, dedication, and understanding to succeed as members. Those that join the FSSF should expect to sign on for a minimum of 3 years to facilitate using all their talents and maintain the highest level of unit readiness. Each FSSF will provide liaison sections to other FSSF units to improve training, deployment, and mission coordination.

Perhaps the most important benefit from recreating the FSSF is the true understanding, respect, friendship, and trust that is realized when soldiers train together, live together, and socialize together. Anyone who has served in an elite military unit understands the bonding that occurs when troops join with a common purpose and build teamwork to bring out the best in individuals and succeed as a collective entity. The only problem with combined training exercises is that they end just as soldiers from various countries are beginning to get acquainted. That is an important reason for developing standing multinational units. The synergy realized in international military relations from an FSSF will be immense and positive because FSSF members will return to their countries with different ideas about cooperation and will have an impact on the views of other soldiers, officers, family members, and neighbors.

No matter how command and control is accomplished, there will be complaints. Putting that aside, control of the force for deployment can only rest with the OAS, in a new security council that will oversee the FSSF units. To respect the sovereignty of states that have military forces within an FSSF, each state must provide express consent for each mission chosen by the OAS. Unless all states agree, the force cannot be deployed. Using this rule supports two important

requirements noted earlier: strategic restraint and reassurance. Large states cannot manipulate smaller states into executing an agenda that is contrary to their values and/or interests. Making consultation with all states a requirement alleviates the concerns that smaller states might have. An important by-product of this rule is that it engenders consultation, consideration, fairness, transparency, and more deliberate and diverse decisionmaking.

As to day-to-day command of the proposed FSSF(N) and FSSF(S), another issue for the gnashing of teeth, only so much can be shared. Ultimately, there can only be one commander of a military organization. FSSF(N) should be commanded by a brigadier general from the United States, with deputy commanders from Canada and Mexico. FSSF(N) should be operationally under the Northern Command, even though it is ultimately accountable to the OAS. FSSF(S) should be commanded by a brigadier general from Brazil, with deputy commanders from Argentina and Chile. Operationally, FSSF(S) should be under a regional command based in Brazil. Both the United States and Brazil should serve as leaders for the reasons already outlined. With leadership comes responsibility, meaning that these countries will have to provide significant physical, human, and financial resources for these units which will be based in their countries, although training missions must be executed in all member countries.

The OAS Security Council responsible for the deployment of each FSSF is also responsible for organizing higher level headquarters and additional forces depending on mission requirements. The Security Council should be composed of Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile as a starting point. The OAS Security Council can have as many as 10 members, with some designated on a rotating basis. Any recommendation for action by this council must first receive a two-thirds majority vote of support from the OAS General Assembly.

The primary role of FSSF units is to serve on missions within the Western Hemisphere. The secondary role is to be available for offer by the OAS to the U.N. for peacekeeping missions. Even so, individual states may be the catalyst for generating the support of such a mission. Given the high probability of deployment, no more than one FSSF should be deployed outside of the Americas until such time as there are at least three such separate brigades in the OAS inventory. The logic is that too many U.N. commitments could deprive the hemisphere of a force to respond to its own emergency situations. The OAS would do well to have a security liaison section assigned to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, in order to improve mission planning, coordination, and response.

Recommendations.

It is crucial that the United States take the lead in expanding security cooperation within the Western Hemisphere. The next 5-10 years are critical to achieving a greater sense of community within the Americas. If opportunities are not met with action, undoubtedly this would result in the loss of standing of the United States in the eyes of its hemispheric neighbors, not to mention the damage done to advancement of interests and values. Given this, the following recommendations are made:

Conduct a hemispheric security conference with the support of the OAS by October 1, 2003. The conference should focus on the creation of a new security structure. The United States should enlist the support of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile as cosponsors of the conference. A new OAS security structure should be created and staffed by January 1, 2004.

Reactivate the First Special Service Force (FSSF), with a northern unit consisting of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. This unit will be known as

FSSF(N). A second southern unit consisting of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile will be known as FSSF(S). These units are to be operable by October 1, 2004.

Ensure that the FSSF (N + S) is properly filled, provisioned, and trained, so that it is fully prepared to deploy within the Americas on a potential mission by October 1, 2005.

Encourage other member states of the OAS to create additional FSSFs by October 1, 2005, so that sufficient units are available by October 1, 2006, to handle missions within and outside the Americas simultaneously.

Conclusion.

A new security architecture is needed in the Americas that reflects the movement toward economic community and commitment to democratic—more accurately liberal—values. It should also reflect a new type of leadership that employs strategic restraint and reassurance of allies.¹⁰⁶ One of the great ironies in life is that the harder one tries to lead, the less likely that others will follow. Good leadership, defined as having loyal followers, occurs when the focus is not so much being in charge, as it is developing a sense of teamwork that shows respect for the opinions and ideas of the team. Essentially, this is what soft power is all about—getting others to do things they see as being consistent with their own values and interests. The “sovereignty clause” contained in this new security architecture reflects soft power. No state is compelled to join in a mission that it does not support. This builds trust and confidence.

A subtle but important distinction is that the focus is on security cooperation, not defense integration. Defense integration raises a host of sovereignty issues that argue against such a program. Security cooperation provides opportunities to improve the way we collectively respond to

challenges within and without the Western Hemisphere, yet under a process that does not upset existing state defense structures or diminish the authority of the state in the security realm. It is also important to note that this is an indirect approach to fighting scourges such as drug trafficking and guerrilla insurgencies. Cooperation provides the sharing of information, ideas, and concerns. This by itself assists states in their duty to protect the safety and rights of their citizens. This is not the primary duty of standing multinational units. They can assist, but only when there is consensus of all member states, which is most unlikely.

While confidence-building measures were a positive step in hemispheric security cooperation, it is clearly time to move on to the next phase, a security system that reflects the realities of the 21st century and is attuned to regional security virtues and challenges. Today the Americas need competent standing multinational units that can uphold peace and fight natural disasters immediately, not a bureaucratic machinery that is slow to respond and usually disorganized when assembled and initially deployed. We can and must do better. A revised OAS security framework and First Special Service Force component units are the best ways to address the challenges of the future, promote cooperation, strengthen democracy, expand opportunity, and build lasting trust and respect. Let us get to work to build a better community of states within the Americas.

ENDNOTES

1. House Committee on International Relations, "Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2003 Budget Request for Foreign Affairs, *Federal Document Clearing House*, February 6, 2002.
2. Glen Johnson, "Bush Stresses Latin America as US Priority Pushes 'Special Relationship' with Mexico," *Boston Globe*, August 26, 2000, p. A1.

3. If the FTAA is not passed by 2005, there is still good reason to believe that it will continue to be pursued and eventually realized within the first decade of the 21st century.

4. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002, pp. 29-54.

5. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 15.

6. Kenneth Maxwell, "Avoiding the Imperial Temptation: The United States and Latin America," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, Fall 1999, pp. 57-67.

7. Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead*, New York: Basic Books, 1990. See also Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

8. I use this term to describe those who often echo the criticisms furnished by human rights organizations. Their policy positions on Colombia have not led to peace, but rather have indirectly contributed to the escalation of violence or abuse of human rights, an ironic twist indeed. That is not to say that human rights organizations do not play a constructive role in identifying crucial problems, but rather the difficulty lies in their inherent biases and inability to articulate effective strategies to end insurgencies or improve human rights. See, for example, Robert L. Pollock, "Peace Doesn't Come From a Process," *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 2002, p. A18. See also Editorial, "Help for Colombia," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2002, p. B6; and Peter F. Romero, "Save Colombia," *Washington Post*, February 20, 2002, p. A15. Perhaps the best article on this subject is Mary Anastasia O'Grady, "Colombia's Anti-Terrorist Efforts Deserve US Help," *Wall Street Journal*, March 29, 2002, p. A13.

9. I use this term to describe those who have been the unrelenting advocates for a counterdrug strategy that has largely failed. See for example General Accounting Office, *Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles*, Washington: GAO Reports, 2002. See also Reuters, "Colombia's Coca Crop Up, U.S. Says," *New York Times*, March 9, 2002, p. 5; and Associated Press, "Thriving Peru Coca Hampers Drug War," *Associated Press*, March 13, 2002.

10. Philip Bennett, "Fox's Cutting Edge; For Mexico's New President, the Future Begins at the Border," *Washington Post*, January 14, 2001, p. B1.

11. Tom Raum, "Bush Creating New White House Post," *Associated Press*, January 16, 2001.

12. Official Report, *Defense Ministerial of the Americas*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. The second Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) was held in 1996 in Bariloche, Argentina. The third DMA was held in 1998 in Cartagena, Colombia. The fourth DMA was held in 2001 in Manaus, Brazil.

13. J. Fred Rippy, *South America and Hemisphere Defense*, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1941. On a broader basis, the idea of a hemispheric community dates back to the early 1800s, but was opposed by the Federalists in the United States and Simon Bolivar in South America. Another wave of hemispheric solidarity developed in the 1880s but did not engender much support.

14. Francois Heisbourg, "European Defence: Making it Work," *Chaillot Papers* 42 (September 2000). The European Union (EU) has a multinational unit—Franco-German Corps—to protect the interests of member states, and more states are now furnishing units to the EU.

15. Lexington, "Bob Zoellick's Grand Strategy," *Economist*, March 2, 2002, p. 35.

16. Georges A. Fauriol and William Perry, *Thinking Strategically About 2005: The United States and South America*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999.

17. *Ibid*, Foreword.

18. *Ibid*.

19. *Ibid*.

20. Patrice M. Franko, *Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas: The Strategic Implications of the FTAA*, Washington: CSIS Press, 2000.

21. Donald E. Schulz, *The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 41-46.

22. Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954.

23. For elaboration on this, see Joseph R. Núñez, "Homeland and Hemisphere," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 20, 2001, p. 9.

24. Ginger Thompson, "Fox Urges Scrapping of 54-Year Treaty Between U.S. and Mexico," *New York Times*, September 8, 2001, p. A6.

President Vicente Fox of Mexico called today for the dismantling of a 54-year-old treaty between the United States and Latin American nations that was aimed at protecting the hemisphere against Communism and replacing it with pacts that would combat widespread social ills and organized crime. . . . And he urged the organization [OAS] to begin work on the development of new regional strategies that would take on 'the real threats that stalk us,' including extreme poverty, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and natural disaster.

25. This will be true until October 1, 2002, when Northern Command is formally created. Northern Command, according to the new Unified Command Plan, will include Canada, the United States, Mexico, and a portion the Caribbean.

26. The term America is used in recognition of the fact that victims of the World Trade Center were not just from the United States; they also included a significant number from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and others from the Americas. Of course, victims were also from many other countries.

27. Núñez, "Homeland and Hemisphere," p. 9.

28. Thomas E. Ricks, "Military Overhaul Considered," *Washington Post*, October 11, 2001, p. A1.

29. *Ibid.*

30. National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, 1997, p. 72.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Fiscal Year 2003 Department of Defense Budget," *Federal News Service*, February 5, 2002, p. 38. In testifying before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified that the new Northern Command “would focus primarily on the defense of the continental United States and our neighbors. . . .”

33. Núñez, “Homeland and Hemisphere.”

34. Jim Travers, “Share Defence or be Tossed Aside,” *Toronto Star*, February 26, 2002, A23.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Douglas Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?” *Policy Matters*, Vol. 3, February 2002, pp. 26-27.

37. Michael Kergin, “Canada and the United States: Facing a New World Reality—Together,” speech presented to the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, February 6, 2002.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. John Manley, “Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada and Minister of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations, to the Canadian Club,” February 11, 2002.

41. *Ibid.*

42. For a critical assessment of the Canadian-American relationship see Stephen Clarkson, “Lockstep in the Continental Ranks: Redrawing the American Perimeter After September 11th,” Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, February 2002. See also James Laxer, “Surviving American Imperialism,” *Toronto Star*, February 17, 2002, A13; and Paul Hellyer, “The Americans Will Dictate Our Military Roles,” *Globe and Mail*, February 7, 2002, p. A11. For a more balanced analysis, finding fault with Ottawa and Washington, see Jim Travers, “Future Bleak if Canada in Lockstep with the U.S.,” *Toronto Star*, February 7, 2002, p. A27.

43. Manley.

44. Mitch Potter, “Canadian, U.S. Troops ‘a Team’ in Kandahar: It’s ‘One for All, All for One,’ says top U.S. Commander,” *Toronto Star*, February 6, 2002, p. A1.

45. Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "U.S., Allied Forces Patrol Battle Zone, Pursue Survivors; Canadian Troops Join in Brief Firefight," *Washington Post*, March 15, 2002, p. A14.

46. Bryan Bender, "Canadians Search for Al Qaeda Fighters," *Boston Globe*, March 14, 2002, p. 1. See also *Newsweek*, "US, Canadian Troops Battle al-Qaida," Associated Press, March 14, 2002; and Steve Thorne, "Canadians Kill 3 Al Qaeda Fighters," *Toronto Star*, March 15, 2002, A10.

47. For more on this, see Joseph R. Núñez, "A New United States Strategy for Mexico," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1999.

48. Ginger Thompson, "Rights Group Says Mexico Ignores Abuses by Military," *New York Times*, December 6, 2001, p. A18.

49. Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, "Mexico Steps Into Spotlight; New President Sets a Bold Course in U.S., Regional Relations," *Washington Post*, January 31, 2001, p. A14.

50. Reuters, "Mexico Could Join U.N. Peacekeeping Efforts Worldwide; Fox Initiates Shift in Foreign Policy," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, January 5, 2001, A18.

51. Global News Wire, "Fox Announces 'More Dynamic' International Role for Mexico," *EFE News Service*, January 6, 2001.

52. Conversation related to the author by a colleague who posed the question to this general officer on August 7, 2001, in the United States during an official visit.

53. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89.

54. Susan Ferriss, "Mexico Chief Says Politics Behind Travel Curb, Fox Ties to U.S. Bring Backlash," *Atlanta Journal—Constitution*, April 11, 2002, p. A10. See also Ginger Thompson, "Mexico Bars Its President From Trips Next Week," *New York Times*, April 10, 2002, p. 7; and Kevin Sullivan, "Travel Ban Reflects Frustration in Mexico With Fox; President's Trip Was to Promote Trade; Critics in Congress See Few Benefits From Close U.S. Ties," *Washington Post*, April 11, 2002, p. A18.

55. Ferriss, p. A10.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Such as those presented by the author.

58. Dolia Estevez, "Busca Incorporar a México en Comando Norteamericano," *El Financiero*, April 12, 2002, p. 7.

59. Will Weissert, "Mexican Defense Minister to Discuss Possible Joint North American Force," *Associated Press*, April 10, 2002. The report cited was written by Colonel Joseph R. Núñez. See also Joseph R. Núñez, "A New U.S. Strategy for Mexico," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1999.

60. José Luis Ruiz, "No Compete a México Informar Lo Que Hace EU," *El Universal*, April 13, 2002, p. 1.

61. Jeffrey Davidow, "EU No Busca Subordinación De Las Fuerzas Armadas de México," *El Universal*, April 15, 2002, p. 5.

62. Aside from the support by the Fox administration for security cooperation, there is growing evidence that the Mexican people do not agree with the international positions of the PRI and PRD. See Gretchen Peters, "In Mexico, War Between Fox and Congress Escalates; President Fox Was Supposed to be in the US This Week, But Congress Said No," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 2002, p. 7. "So far, most Mexicans have sided with Fox. A telephone poll by the daily newspaper, *Reforma*, found that 67 percent of respondents believed the legislators acted wrongly; 71 percent saw insufficient reason to block Fox's trip; and 35 percent gave Congress low marks in general. More than half said legislators were putting party interests ahead of the national good."

63. For an excellent overview on security cooperation on Brazil and the Southern Cone, see David Pion-Berlin, "Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern Cone," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 42, Spring 2000, pp. 43-69. A key point made by Pion-Berlin is that Mercosur has had a very positive effect on security cooperation between Brazil and the Southern Cone countries. Pion-Berlin also perceptively notes that the militaries in these countries have become attuned to the economic reality that it is in their own best interest to cooperate with other militaries in the region—one could call this the nexus of economic and security interdependence.

64. Jean Krasno, "Brazil," in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., *The Pivotal States*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999, pp. 165-168.

65. World Bank, *World Development Report: 2000-2001*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 274-275.

66. Regional Surveys of the World, *South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 2000*, London, UK: Europa Publications, 2000, p. 149.

67. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 2001-2002*, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 223-224.

68. Max Manwaring, "Brazilian Security in the New World Disorder: Implications for Civil-Military Relations," in Richard Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition*, Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1996, pp. 223-240.

69. For the best source on this conflict see Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes, eds., *Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador Peru Conflict*, Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1999. It should be noted that the senior ranking officer during the entire peacekeeping mission was a Brazilian general.

70. Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 335-336.

71. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, "Latin America in the International System: A Call for Strategic Thinking," in Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, eds., *Latin America in the International System*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 16-31.

72. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1979.

73. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Reinventing Democracy in Brazil*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

74. Alan Gilbert, *The Latin American City*, London: Russell Press, 1998, pp. 14-17, 42. According to the World Bank (1990), 56 percent of urban Brazilians were either poor or extremely poor and 87 percent of the rural population was either poor or extremely poor. No other Latin American country had more poverty than Brazil.

75. Maria D'Alva G. Kinzo, "Transitions: Brazil," in Manuel Antonio Garretón M. and Edward Newman, eds., *Democracy in Latin America:*

(Re)constructing Political Society, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001, p. 41.

76. I address this in Joseph R. Núñez, *Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 27-28, 32-33.

77. Author interviews with senior Brazilian officials, military and civilian, in the Ministry of Defense, Brasilia, Brazil, June 4-8, 2001. Author discussions with senior Brazilian military officers in the United States between March 1 and April 12, 2002.

78. Núñez, *Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity*, pp. 13-16.

79. For an excellent discussion of Brazil's challenges in asserting leadership, see Thomaz Guedes da Costa, "Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits at a Crossroads in US-Brazil Relations," a chapter in a book on hemispheric security cooperation to be published by National Defense University Press in 2002.

80. Larry Rohter, "In Argentine Crisis, Military Stays in Step," *New York Times*, February 24, 2002, p. 16.

81. *Ibid.*

82. James Bain, Marcela Donadio, Ian Kemp, Hal Klepak, and Luis Tibiletti, "Commitment To New Order," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 29, 1999, p. 1.

83. For more on confidence-building measures, see Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Confidence Building Measures and Strategic Balance: A Step Toward Expansion and Stability," in Joseph S. Tulchin and Francisco Rojas Aravena, with Ralph H. Espach, eds., *Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998.

84. Jorge Dominguez, Minister of Defence of the Argentine Republic, "Argentina, NATO's South Atlantic Partner," *NATO Review*, Vol. 47, Spring 1999, pp. 7-10.

85. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly Summary of Contributors," *United Nations*, March 31, 2002, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/mar02.htm>.

86. H. Peter Langille, "SHIRBRIG: A Promising Step Towards a United Nations That Can Prevent Deadly Conflict," *Global Policy Forum*, Spring 2000, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/>

reform/canada.htm. See also Backgrounder, "The Origins and Status of SHIRBRIG," Department of National Defence (Canada), September 20, 2000, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2000/sept00/21shirbrig_b_e.htm, and News Release, "Canadian Forces Deploy Peacekeepers to the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Department of National Defence (Canada), November 21, 2000, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2000/nov00/21eclipse1_n_e.htm.

87. This information was derived from the official CAECOPAZ Internet site at <http://www.un.int/argentina/english/caecopaz/caeco.htm>.

88. For an excellent analysis of this military transformation, see Herbert C. Huser, "Democratic Argentina's 'Global Reach:' The Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 51, Summer 1998, pp. 55-69.

89. Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile, "U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement and the FTAA," speech before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, *Federal News Service*, April 16, 2001.

90. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2001-2002*, London: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 226-227.

91. Guillermo Pattillo, "El Presupuesto de Defensa en Chile: Procesos Decisionales y Propuesta de Indicadores de Evolución," *Security and Defense Studies Review: The Interdisciplinary Journal of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*, Vol. 1, Winter 2001. See also CESIM, "Ley Reservada del Cobre: Fuente y Mecanismo de Recursos para la Defensa de Chile," <http://www.cesim.cl/pags/investigacion/pags/20000606175132.html>.

92. Anonymous, "Chile Signs for F-16s, Postpones Frigates; US Now Focuses on Brazilian F-X," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Vol. 30, February 2002, p. 3.

93. It is important to note that the memories of the Pinochet military dictatorship have not completely faded away. Even so, the military appears to be adjusting well to greater civilian control.

94. This information was derived from the Chilean Army, <http://www.ejercito.cl/internacional/timor.htm>.

95. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly Summary of Contributors," *United Nations*, March 31, 2002, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/mar02.htm>.

96. These operations encompass the full range of military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities but short of major theater warfare. Beyond missions already noted, these include show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, counterterrorism operations, and disaster relief. Frankly, it is conceivable that over time and with the support of member states, these standing multinational forces could be employed in major theater warfare operations, although such a mission would be a secondary priority.

97. A good example where such forces might be needed in the future is Haiti, where the government is experiencing incredible difficulty in providing basic public services (such as human security) and seems unwilling to reconcile with opposition parties in any meaningful way.

98. General Assembly of the Organization of American States, *Inter-American Democratic Charter*, Lima, Peru: Organization of American States, September 11, 2001.

99. Robert D. Burhans, *The First Special Service Force: A War History of the North American, 1942-1944*, Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947, p. 10. See also Joseph A. Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade: The True Story of the First Special Service Force*, Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History, 2002.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-300.

104. For many missions, there is a much greater need for combat support and combat service support units than combat units. For example, during humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, military police, engineers, transportation, and medical units are often more necessary than infantry units. Ideally, such units must be able quickly to tailor their organization to meet mission requirements, which includes leaving some elements behind, using elements for other purposes, or adding units from outside the organization. Also, there is a need to integrate special operations forces as part of the FSSF.

105. The standard for rapid deployment is that a battalion task force (up to 1,200 personnel) must be able to deploy within 24 hours of

notification. The entire FSSF must be able to be deployed within 72 hours of notification.

106. The reassurance of allies is a new theme in Washington that replaces the vague notion of “engagement.” For more on it, see Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001, pp. 11-16.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General Robert R. Ivany
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz**

**Author
Colonel Joseph R. Núñez**

**Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell**