

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND THE NOT-QUITE WARS OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE**

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Editor

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PREFACE

In September 1995, the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted a symposium surveying the area between the high end of humanitarian intervention and the low end of low-intensity conflict in the not-quite wars that U.S. forces have been engaging in since the end of the Cold War. The following papers on various aspects of civil-military relations resulted from this symposium. Military intervention is nothing new in American history. In their role as commander-in-chief, presidents resorted to this stratagem with some regularity prior to World War II and have done so since 1945 with increasing frequency. But the symposium examined the argument that the pattern of interventions since the end of the Cold War, although sharing some characteristics with traditional patterns, represents a new trend. Participants at the symposium included several distinguished generals and admirals, ambassadors, knowledgeable Pentagon civilian policymakers, scholars from throughout academia, and a number of think-tank strategists. Their papers ranged from case studies of recent interventions in Somalia and Haiti to discussions of issues involving civil-military relations. The Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute were pleased to support the Patterson School's symposium. The following papers are presented to stimulate thought and discussion on the topic of civil-military relations.

FOREWORD

Classic civil-military relations literature, especially at the strategic level, focuses on the relationships between the highest political authorities on the one hand, and the most senior military leaders on the other. But in a broader sense, the topic includes the nature of relationships between society and the military institutions the society supports with the expectation that the military will defend the society's shores and interests from foreign aggressors. The dynamics of civil-military relations also can include the nature of relationships between soldiers and sailors on weekend passes in the local town, whether at home or abroad. In addition, it includes the relationship between the base or post commander and the local mayor of the town or city outside the gate.

With the end of the Cold War, changes in national and international affairs raised civil-military relations questions in new contexts. The front edge of the "baby-boomer" generation who began filling key political offices in the early 1990s often had little or no meaningful prior contact with the military. Some senior military leaders, for their part, remained imbued with resentments based on their perceptions of grossly unfair civilian leadership and "meddling" during the Vietnam War. The stage was set for new concerns about civil-military relations just as a rapid succession of operations got underway in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere.

Three papers presented at the Patterson School-Strategic Studies Institute Symposium focused on civil-military relations at various levels. West Point professor Don M. Snider maintains that continued pressures on the armed forces--especially the Army--to put aside war-fighting missions in favor of other missions will further strain civil-military relations. In the second essay, retired Admiral Stanley R. Arthur examines the broader aspects of civil-military relations where he sees a growing estrangement between all levels of the armed forces on the one hand, and the larger civilian society on the other. Finally, George Washington University professor Deborah D. Avant argues that the post-Vietnam war reluctance of senior military officers to take their forces into low-level threat interventions does not constitute defiance of established civilian political authority. In fact, she holds that this is precisely the way the American system of constitutionally-divided government is supposed to work, and that the real problem is the inability of top civilian politicians to form and achieve a consensus in their vision.

Together these papers address a spectrum of issues attendant to the current debate over civil-military relations. I commend them to your consideration. On behalf of The Patterson School and

the University of Kentucky, I wish to thank the Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute for their support, without which the symposium could not have been held.

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U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Don Snider

To provide context, I begin with three hypotheses about the current state of civil-military relations in the United States. Within that hypothesized context, I will then discuss what I believe to be the principal implications for future civil-military relations stemming from continued U.S. involvement at the low end of the conflict spectrum in "operations other than war" (OOTW).

Three Hypotheses.¹

The recent debate over a potential "crisis" in U.S. civil-military relations, in part a result of Professor Richard Kohn's article in the Spring 1994 issue of *The National Interest*, has been quite productive.² It compelled research and professional introspection into issues that have not been examined in sufficient depth for some time. From those processes, and the real tensions in civil-military relations that have been identified, I offer the following three hypotheses about the underlying systemic causes.³

First, taking the nub of the current tensions to be in the decisionmaking context with focus on who decides and what they get to decide, it is hypothesized that at this interface individual military decisionmakers are better prepared to deal with current and future decisionmaking than are their civilian counterparts. They are better prepared in that they are better educated and trained and have had more relevant experience. To use a sports idiom, the military clearly has "the better team and a deeper bench." Examples range from General Colin Powell reportedly "taking advantage" of President Clinton on the homosexual issue to interagency councils in Washington where flag officers and colonels generally arrive better prepared to outperform their civilian counterparts. Even in the interface between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress, the military staffs at the Pentagon usually outperform the congressional staffs and those of their analytical support agencies. Finally, in the field, the military is taking the lead in the joint mission and political-military analyses that now precede most all operations other than war.

Although the plausible explanations for this phenomena have not been empirically demonstrated, they include short-lived administrations, presidential personnel policies for making political appointments that emphasize criteria other than executive competence, growing piles of "ethics" regulations that

make it increasingly difficult to entice top-quality individuals away from the private sector and into politically-appointed positions, and the thinning quality of career civilians in the federal bureaucracy, in addition to the decreasing familiarity with the military among the civilian leadership. For instance, for the first time in history, the majority of the members of the 104th Congress have had no military experience. Furthermore, this particular administration has appointed far fewer military veterans than any preceding administration. Finally, large numbers of civilians with experience in the Cold War military, intelligence, scientific, and policymaking communities are retiring or seeking employment outside the government.

On the other side of the relationship, within the post-Vietnam military, plausible explanations portray the converse. More officers than ever before are educated in the policy sciences at the best universities. They enter more often and remain longer in policy-type assignments, both in Washington and in various joint commands around the globe. Goldwater-Nichols legislation has produced joint specialists with remarkable professional competence to populate staffs within and without Washington; albeit at the expense of the traditionally powerful service staffs.⁴ Finally, major post-Cold War military operations like DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM have reflected areas of traditional expertise for uniformed officers, such as mid-intensity conventional operations emphasizing informational and technological dominance. Few civilian leaders or their staffs have had experience or training in those areas.

Second, neither the civilian leadership, regardless of party, nor the military services have a common vision of the future. They have no clear concept of what the military should be able to do, and therefore no common vision of how the services should be organized, trained, and equipped for the 21st century.⁵ In other words, there is not a generally accepted mid-or long-range plan within which, at multiple levels of decisionmaking, civilian and military decision-makers can comfortably agree on who decides and for what. For support of this hypothesis, I need cite no more than the two tortuous processes, as yet inconclusive, attempting since 1992 to resolve the essential issues of strategy and defense policy: those that produced Presidential Decision Document (PDD) 25 on U.S. military interventions, and the ever-changing Pentagon approach to theater missile defenses, the greatest vulnerability of current, power-projection military strategy.

Third, both parties to the relationship, as well as the general public, are changing their ideas of what "correct" or "good" civil-military relations should be in the threat-free environment of today. Simply stated, normative conceptions are changing. In the past it was better understood, and better

accepted, that the supremacy of civilian values lay at the core of American civil-military relations.⁶ But "values" have waned as a focal point, to be replaced by "control" and by various measures of efficiency and effectiveness in the relationship, often defined in terms of a particular political agenda. A policy that produces more gender integration in the military is said to be good or, at the least, a result of "good" civil-military decisionmaking.⁷ Indications of change on both sides of the relationship abound. On the one side, the public had no problem accepting the number of retired senior military officers who endorsed the Clinton presidential bid in 1992 and the rewarding of one with an appointment as ambassador to the Court of St. James. Congressional changes to allow for more political participation by federal employees, including the uniformed military, went virtually unnoticed. On the other hand, there was little in the way of comment when the military took the issue of gays in the military into the public arena. In sum, it is not clear that either the public, the practitioners, or the academics know what "good" civil-military relationships are, or should be, in this new environment.

Implications for Future U.S. Civil-Military Relations of Continued Involvement in Operations Other than War.

The first implication of continued involvement in OOTW is short term in nature and focuses on the character and role of military advice-giving. It results from the highly resource-constrained environment in which these operations will occur. Simply stated, the military leadership will continue to be forced to choose internally between financing OOTW or supporting the traditional "warfighting" roles and their urgently needed modernization. This has been, and remains, a particularly acute problem for the Army, the one service most involved in OOTW, and also the one most without a modernization budget. For the following reasons, the services can be expected, when faced with this choice, to continue their external behavior to resist embracing OOTW missions.

First, such missions do not reflect the essence of the military's *raison de etre*, "to fight and win the nation's wars." Thus the U.S. military should not get involved in quasi-military operations (the Vietnam syndrome). The military's purpose is to "kill people and break things," and other instruments of national power should take on collateral missions such as nation-building and humanitarian relief.

Second, from the services' perspective, the current resource environment has created a zero-sum game when purchasing future military capabilities (OOTW vs. traditional missions) in which the signals from Congress are clear; buy the big items needed for

traditional missions. Further, that game goes well beyond dollar allocations to include recruitment and retention of personnel, as well as organizational energy and focus at a time of critical need for focusing on the future into the 21st century.

Third, under the best of circumstances, OOTW missions are most often "high-risk, no-win" operations, whose complexity in planning and execution is beyond the understanding of most civilian decisionmakers. In this regard, the mission to Bosnia appears to have been unique in the post-Cold War period in that the military was given practically everything it wanted during the political negotiations in Dayton to include a clearly defined, limited mission and open rules of engagement.

Finally, prior to the Dayton negotiations, the military leaders have not trusted their civilian leaders to devise sound political guidance for any initial use of force (thus the 2-year tussle over PDD 25). With Somalia as an example, they do not see their civilian leaders as able to control "mission creep," and they point to the domestication of intervention decisions made on Haiti as placing the military in the service of various domestic constituencies at the expense of others. Taken together, these constitute a disunifying national role that the services always seek to avoid.

Given these existing institutional biases, the hypothesized tensions in civil-military relations over U.S. participation in humanitarian operations will most likely continue. Each mission, as in the case of Bosnia, will require separate political debate, with the military on the sideline awaiting the outcome. The public's unwillingness thus far to support a great involvement in OOTW, and the inability of political leaders to change that fact, will continue to provide support for the services' resistance, and they will act accordingly. That said, however, the military is increasingly aware of the need to be, both in fact and in perception, a good investment of federal resources rather than an expensive institution of little use in the current security environment. This countervailing need, if reinforced by further successful interventions like the very limited operation in Rwanda, could soon erode the current biases of the military and thus lessen civil-military tensions. Bosnia will be the real test of this nascent trend.

These tensions over OOTW do not, however, exist at all levels of the civilian-military interface, particularly at those levels where resource decisions are implemented rather than made. Neither do they exist to the same degree within all military institutions, particularly those entities involved in determining how to do OOTW better than in the past, e.g., the service and joint doctrinal and training communities. I cite three examples: the rich issue of doctrine on OOTW during the past 2 years from

both service and joint doctrinal agencies; the remarkable synergy occurring among civilian and military trainers at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC); and, at a much lower level, the fact that last summer 14 cadets from the U.S. Military Academy, with the assistance of civilian leaders in the Departments of State and Defense, spent part of their summer working overseas with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the purpose of "producing graduates knowledgeable in the NGO-military relationship in peace operations."

The second implication of continued OOTW is long-term and focuses on the issue of building service capabilities for the future, a responsibility of both civilian and military leaders. Basically the issue is dual: whether to build forces for use as "warfighters" or as "peacekeepers," and whether, in the future, technology and organizational adaptation will determine that such a dichotomy is, in fact, false. The services now believe, correctly in my view, that the dichotomy is valid except in the case of a few specialized capabilities, like those of Special Operations Forces. By their own direction to prepare forces at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, prior to rotation into Haiti, it is apparent that they believe even those capabilities now designed for combat at the low end of the spectrum need extensive and expensive retraining, both prior to and following use in OOTW. But in the main, the services would not invest in F-22 air superiority fighters, Comanche stealth helicopters, Aegis destroyers, and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems if they truly believe OOTW will be their focus in the future. Service leaders believe as much in long-term institutional relevance and survival as do other stewards of large organizations supported by the federal treasury.

In terms of the civil-military interface, I see the context of this longer-term implication as follows. The services know that their programs are over-structured and badly under-funded. But service leaders cannot find political leaders in either party, or in the Congress and Executive branches, with whom to form a vision of the future so that a political deal can be cut that will last long enough to bring about the changes in force structure and capabilities fostered by that vision. Implicit in this much needed deal would be the acquiescence by military leaders in further cuts in and reshaping of force structure in return for the assurance from political leaders that resources saved would be used over the years for research, development, and investments in future capabilities for the 21st century. Absent this, the service leaders are hedging their bets, tinkering at the margins, but offering no big changes until the political situation clarifies.

For their part, civilian leaders are also accepting future risks by not compelling any dramatic changes in current

capabilities. The Bottom Up Review (BUR) force designed in late 1993 cannot now do what it was designed to do, that is, to fight in two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. It is not likely that anything will change until after the 1996 general elections, except that U.S. military capabilities will continue into obsolescence while consuming virtually all the available resources and, in the process, potentially denying the nation that level of technological sophistication needed to meet future challenges and threats.⁸

In this context, continued involvement in OOTW will fuel the current tensions over whether to build "belligerent" or "peacekeeping" capacities for the future. And well it should, because this issue must be faced squarely and resolved as part of a common vision for the future of DOD. The best way out of this dilemma is by innovative thinking about future military capabilities for OOTW.

The civilian leadership in the Department of Defense, for instance, should accept the currently perceived dichotomy of incapacities and designate a small, joint task force (JTF) dedicated solely to Chapter VI peacekeeping. Such a force would number 10-15 thousand. Logistical support would be "privatized" to multinational companies specializing in global security and logistical operations. The advantages of such a JTF appear large, especially from the perspectives of both sides of the civil-military relationship.

From the perspective of civilian leaders, this would resolve the political debate over how much support the American people are willing to provide for such efforts, whether unilateral or multilateral and, if the latter, whether they would be directed or authorized by the United Nations. If political agreement could be reached between the Executive and Congress, fully supported, that establishes the reasonable limits of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping at any one time, and that all other U.S. military capabilities are exclusively for warfighting roles (including presence, deterrence and defense), then extremely important and clear signals would be sent to several constituencies now in dire need of them.

Congress and the Executive would have a much clearer basis on which to debate and undertake intervention decisions, and would be assisted in coming to closure by the choice between two distinct type of forces with very different capabilities. Foreign governments, NGOs, and multilateral institutions would know that America is willing to do her part in peacekeeping--shedding blood if necessary--but that fact would be conditioned by the expectation that there are clearly defined limits as indicated by the relatively small (smaller than a single division) size of the dedicated JTF. If America's peacekeeping JTF is fully committed,

as most of the time it would be, then it would be clear to all that the United States would undertake no other peacekeeping missions until relieved of the current one by other nations. This would change the terms of the public debate, both at home and abroad, as to the U.S. role in supporting such multilateral endeavors.

Given this kind of structure, it would soon become universally clear that the United States has two types of forces; one for peace and one for more conventional forms of conflict and war. National intentions on the use of force would be clearly signaled by the forces selected for any intervention. Trendy, but utterly confusing euphemisms like the brilliant oxymoron, "peace enforcement," could be eliminated both from civil-military discourse as well as from the national and international debates. Furthermore, the natural synergy between the two distinct levels of military capability would lend credibility to both when advantages taken of U.S. "peacekeepers" compel the deployment and appropriate use of "warfighting" forces. Over time international expectations and behaviors would be conditioned, provided U.S. responses and actions remain congruent and predictable. An additional advantage accruing from this kind of JTF would be the amelioration of the phenomena of "mission creep." The JTF's narrow capabilities would clearly define the range and duration of possible missions. Both civilian and military leaders would know the limits of the possible in advance of any commitment. If warfighting reinforcements needed to be called in later, such a discontinuous and discrete escalation should cause a healthy reexamination of just what the mission ought to be.

From the military leader's perspective, the current stalemate over what capabilities the services should build in the future would be broken. It would be accepted that some forces could be extensively and permanently reorganized, reequipped, and trained specifically and only for peacekeeping tasks. Further, the long-term scope of this "intrusion" in the normal activity of the military departments--force building--could be clearly understood and logically planned for by all involved, as could planning for the remainder of the warfighting forces. Such planning, once the permanence and scope of the endeavor is understood, might even include separate personnel policies for this JTF. Enlisted personnel would have to be specifically screened, tested, and recruited for the purpose of being neutral "peacekeepers." This may, in fact, create a new pool of personnel for military service. Defense industries, to the extent they still exist, and enterprises with dual-use technologies could forecast markets in each capability area allowing at least some industrial base capabilities to focus on the future. The disadvantages of such an approach are clear, particularly from the perspective of the services and their perceived need to defend their Title 10 authorities. But whether the Army

specifically or DOD generally wants to believe it or not, we are in revolutionary times, and viable approaches to the future demand that we do more than merely leverage technologies into existing systems and organizations.

The third implication I see is a continuation of a potentially disturbing trend by the uniformed military to "fill the void" in many civil-military interfaces surrounding the decisionmaking to take on, as well as to implement, OOTW. While such a trend may spring naturally from the services' "can do" approach to mission accomplishment, the unintended consequences, which can be described as the increased politicization of the officer corps, may turn out to be quite deleterious to the services.

Since doctrine has taken an increasingly important role in the shaping of military culture, earlier in the U.S. Army, but more recently in the other services as in the Joint community, it is a logical area in which to observe these consequences. Recent joint publications, as well as Army manuals, contain examples of doctrines that tend to erode traditional roles in civil-military relations, and which come dangerously close to calling into question the dominance of the civilian role, particularly in the sensitive areas of mission analysis and the definition of the end state in OOTW operations.

To quote from the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook*, published in February 1995, paragraphs 5 and 7 read:

5. Mission analysis . . . Throughout the mission analysis, if a mandate or parts of a mandate are unclear, you should take the necessary steps via higher authority to have it explained or redefined . . . A means available to influence a rewrite of the mandate is to develop your own mission statement and coordinate it with higher authorities. This may also provide you with the opportunity to clarify force structure requirements, end state(s) and "commander's intent" with the supported combatant commander.

7. End State . . . End state refinement is a continuous process . . . an important step in the mission analysis process is to be sure that there is a clearly defined end state(s) . . . Although an end state may be difficult to define in peace operations, you should strive to refine the mission to ensure one exists . . . being prepared early to develop your own mission statement and coordinate it with higher authority may allow you the opportunity to clearly identify an end state(s) . . . This process also may serve as impetus for all militaries, UN, and other organizations

involved in the operations to agree on what needs to be accomplished or what is acceptable to reach an end state.⁹

A combination of initiative and circumstance may, in some circumstances, place the military leader in a position to determine end states; something normally and rightfully the purview of political leadership. Similar examples can be found in service doctrinal literature; for example, almost identical language is found in Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

Conclusion.

The relations between military and civilian leaders are undergoing a significant transition in this early post-Cold War period, arguably moving those relations out of their tenuous but long-standing equilibrium. It is not yet known how long the transition will take and whether the new relationship will include a new equilibrium similar to the old one. No one knows even what factors are providing the major influences on the transition. There has been much speculation that the factors most responsible include: the loss of the unifying, commonly perceived external security threat; the character of the new baby-boomer civilian leadership; a more assertive post-Vietnam War officer corps expecting--even demanding--more and better guidance from its civilian leaders; and finally, the changing nature of conflict that has added new and unfamiliar demands for the use of military forces. This essay addresses the latter factor, the impact of increasing involvement in OOTW as one form of "new" military operation.

If the hypotheses offered here are valid, and if the implications outlined are real, then it is fair to conclude that American military leaders, during this transition in civil-military relations, are walking a very fine line indeed. They are torn between representing the interests, as they perceive them, of the institutions they lead and the self-abnegating role that the citizenry and the Constitution ultimately requires of them as military servants. I end this essay with two examples to clarify this conclusion.

First, in the recent past military leaders have arguably exacerbated civil-military tensions by their opposition to involvement in OOTW where military capabilities were to be used for limited objectives in support of humanitarian goals (Somalia, Haiti, policy in PDD 25, etc.). Such opposition by military leaders, coupled with their relative expertise (hypothesis one), has led to increased involvement by the military at the political level in determining the appropriate missions for the military, and under what conditions they are to be supported. This was

clearly evident during the Dayton negotiations for U.S. military involvement with NATO in Bosnia. Now, however, having assumed an increasing role in areas that some would consider correctly the purview of civilian leaders, the military could have set themselves up for failure in Bosnia had the operation gone sour, which it has not at this writing in mid-1996.

Over the longer term, military leaders will likely continue to resist accepting the permanence of OOTW missions. They will not soon change their minds on organizing their forces or capabilities to address these missions, preferring instead to consider these requirements as "lesser included capabilities" to those needed for traditional warfighting missions. And while the existing strategic uncertainty may warrant this position, it is also the case that innovative solutions (as outlined in this essay) are available at very low cost (15 thousand manpower spaces that will likely be lost anyway without a political constituency to save them) that could both ameliorate civil-military tensions as well as retain most of the current flexibility to deal with strategic ambiguity.

In both of these examples, I believe it fair to characterize the attitude and actions of the military "knowing best what is good for the military." Assuming the characterization to be valid, the question remains as to whether the military actually does know "what is best," or whether some ideas promoted by civilian leaders, such as continued or increased involvement in OOTW, need to be embraced as in the best interests of the services. This is the thin line military leaders are currently walking because it is not an open question that the American public will eventually hold the military profession accountable for the results of its employments. Thus, from the perspective of future civil-military relations, I believe impacts on intangible factors, such as the public's perception of the profession's ethos, also loom large. These issues additionally deserve our attention. Ultimately, however, the central concern is that continued involvement in OOTW, and the accompanying discord generated, are jeopardizing the military profession's traditional ethical edge.

ENDNOTES

1. The three hypotheses presented here were vetted with a distinguished group of scholars and practitioners at the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, September 22-24, 1995. Little disagreement emerged, and, in fact, several participants greatly experienced in humanitarian operations, such as Ambassador Robert Oakley, strongly agreed with them. Nonetheless, they remain simply hypotheses until empirically supported, which highlights the principal purpose of this think piece--to separate what we

know from what we do not know about the implications of humanitarian operations, and to stimulate research in those areas about which we are as yet uninformed.

2. Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-military Relations," *The National Interest*, No. 35, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17.

3. For an overview of these tensions, see Miranda Carleton-Carew and Don M. Snider, eds., *US Civil-Military Relations: Crisis or Transition?*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995.

4. Garland H. Williams, "Defense Reform and Organizational Change: Have the Services Embraced the New Joint Paradigm?", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1994, pp. 274-287.

5. See Don M. Snider, et.al., "The Coming Defense Train Wreck and What to Do About It," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 89-124.

6. Allan Millet, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective," Mershon Center Position Paper in the Policy Sciences, No. 4, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, April 1977.

7. The classic on the subject of civil-military relations is Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957. See also Michael Desch, "US Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order," in Carlton-Carew and Snider, eds., *US Civil-Military Relations*, pp. 166-170.

8. For a more complete explanation of this scenario, see *Defense in the Late 1990s: Avoiding the Train Wreck*, a report prepared by the Political Military Studies Program, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995.

9. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, February 28, 1995, pp.5-11.

**THE AMERICAN MILITARY:
SOME THOUGHTS ON WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE ARE**

Admiral Stanley R. Arthur

In the United States, some people talk about the subject of civilian control of the military as if the issue is whether or not the military likes or respects civilian control. This is the wrong issue and focus of the discussion. No military institution in the world supports the principle of civilian control more strongly than the American military. Nonetheless, a number of dynamics are cause for concern. These worries are not so much directed at the quality or quantity of senior military advice. Senior military officers are well within the bounds of civilian control, so far. What is of concern is the degree to which the armed forces are growing more and more separate from American society. This separation is even more worrisome because it is built around a feeling of elitism among the military. This is a problem which is reflected in the recruitment and accession policies of our young enlisted and officer candidates. If we do not change them, there is reason to expect this problem to migrate into the senior enlisted leadership and the senior levels of the officer corps. This would be a dangerous thing. We do not want the people who serve in the U.S. military to think of themselves as too distinct from--or much better than--the society they represent.

The difficulties I see in the military grew out of solutions to the problems we had at the end of the Vietnam War when low morale was the norm among all the armed forces. The controversies of the war were only part of the problem. They were exacerbated by the fact that those who could afford to found ways to avoid the draft. In fact, one of those who did escape the draft, James Fallows, has referred to Vietnam as "the class war."¹ The exemptions, however, did not stop with class. The draft was also skewed along racial lines. From among the many myths emerging from the Vietnam War is the notion that blacks were drafted in greater numbers than their corresponding proportion to the population, and that black Americans bore a disproportionate number of the casualties.² While the statistics do not support those widely-held beliefs, what is important is that the perceived unfairness of the draft, along with the unpopularity of the war, led to a number of problems in the field, to include drug abuse, alcoholism, and a general sense of malaise. In any event, by 1975 the core values in the American military were at an all time low. At the same time, there was tremendous political pressure to end the draft. The combination of the legacy of Vietnam problems and the downsizing after the war led many to worry that the United States would not be able to meet serious security threats.

The creation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was one solution to these difficulties. The idea behind the AVF was to let the market solve the problem. If, under the draft, the United States had poor military recruits, the idea was to take in those who really wanted to serve and to offer them pay and benefits that would reward their service. The AVF was not without its critics. Many worried that the military would not be able to attract enough high-quality recruits. Some also worried that the armed forces might be an even worse representation of society without the draft. In the end, the AVF was a good solution to past problems, but it has created a set of challenges of its own.

There was tremendous debate over the benefits and costs of the AVF. At the beginning, it was tough to attract better-educated recruits, especially in the wake of Vietnam. But over time, the quality of recruits rose. The United States now fields a force of higher quality than it has at any time in its history. The military sets its sights on high school graduates and dedicates the funds necessary for pay, health benefits, college tuition supplements, comfortable living accommodations, and a plethora of facilities to make service in the military an attractive option for many young people.

The AVF and the mechanisms we have used to make it work, however, have increased the cost for maintaining the armed forces. People are an expensive part of all modern armed forces, but the inducements to serve in the U.S. military have increased the cost to the point that pay is, all by itself, the largest single item in the defense budget. But pay is only the beginning of personnel costs. Add to basic compensation the cost of providing housing, health benefits, schools, day care facilities, and a host of other benefits evident on military installations at home and abroad, and we are in danger of pricing ourselves out of the market. In the days of the draft, open-bay barracks were thrown up to house soldiers in large groups. Today, many service members have their own rooms and a host of amenities such as televisions and VCRs.

Another hidden cost is that of recruiting. Part of the concern over the AVF was whether it would truly reflect American society. We have done a great deal to make sure that the military does represent American society in some ways. We can chart and control where and whom we recruit by age, aptitude, gender, and race. But every time we want to change the mix, every time we want to increase the admission standards, every time we decide on a new parameter, it costs us more. There must be new recruiting advertisements, and we need to monitor the success of recruiting in each of our services. But advertising is extremely expensive, especially during programming focused on young people, i.e., collegiate and professional sports shows and prime time television serials and movies.

The armed forces are where they are because of the AVF. If they want to retain high quality recruits, they have to treat them well with pay and benefits for service. If the goal is to make the military representative of the diversity in American society, then the price must be paid for advertising, recruiting, and monitoring the quality and progress of the recruits as they become soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Unfortunately, this has become very expensive, and no end is in sight. There is an ever-increasing desire to do more for those who serve--"to put people first." Senior officer after senior officer begin their speeches and addresses by assuring their various audiences that they are, indeed, "people persons." But there is tradeoff between providing a high quality style of life and comfortable living conditions for troops, and developing and procuring modern military equipment. We are in danger of caring more for the quality of living conditions than we are the quality of the rifles, and, in that, we may be losing sight of what is most important for any military service.

So, were our concerns about the ability to field a top quality AVF real? No. We have been very successful in recruiting top quality people. We had little trouble accessing an appropriate mix of race and gender within the services. Within a few years of the introduction of the AVF, we had both a diverse and a talented force. But then we became worried about upsetting this trend.

First, we wanted to keep the quality of our people high. The expense of inducing high quality recruits, however, meant that we had to make do with fewer personnel. That forced us to select only the best of a pool of good recruits, thus increasing the quality of our recruits even more, especially among women. This helped the services deal with the demographic trends between baby boomers and their children. As the number of available people in the population decreased, so did the number of people we recruited. Now, however, the demographic trend is going in the other direction, and the number of people available from the general population is increasing. A larger pool of potential recruits available to enter a downsizing military means quality and selectivity will be high.

Second, the military has the tools to meet racial and gender diversity goals. In many ways the armed forces have been more successful than most other institutions in dealing with this issue. The military is the one place where minorities in leadership positions are not an anomaly. It is too early to declare success in all issues involving women in the armed forces, but great progress has been made by any objective evaluation.

But representing society does not mean having the same balance between race, ethnicity, and gender. There has been a cost to the success of the AVF. It no longer recruits as many "normal" folks, nor does it touch a large cross section of people's lives. Consequently, the military is no longer an institution with which most--even many--people can identify. And because of this, I am worried that our armed forces will not produce as many Al Gores, Bob Doles, Harry Trumans, or Dwight Eisenhowers.³ To be sure, today's all volunteer force is a good one. But to keep this quality up, each service is putting more and more resources into providing better benefits. We also do a great deal to make our people feel special through advertising and training. But there is a price. When we go for only the highest quality recruits, people who could benefit from military service sometimes are left out. Ultimately we risk making our armed forces less representative of American society.

Today, the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. More and more, enlisted as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy.

Although isolated incidents, the medic who refused to serve under United Nations command and the two Marines who declined to provide DNA samples indicate the kinds of attitudes that are more and more prevalent. Increasingly, members are trying to dictate the terms of their service. They feel entitled to know what they will be doing before they sign up. Service members demand to know the what and why of the requirements put upon them by those in command. It is almost as if the services are becoming unionized. While paying more for the AVF and getting the quality people we want, the services are paying a price in that the total "commitment to serve" has devolved into service within specified parameters. The debate over the proper use of force is a debate that belongs in Congress and not in the barracks, enlisted and officer clubs, nor even around the table in the briefing rooms at higher headquarters. When one signs up for service in the armed forces, he or she must be prepared to do whatever the government decides is appropriate. Unfortunately, today too many people throughout the armed forces believe they have both the *right to remain* in the force and the *right to specify* where and how they will serve.

There is reason to believe that this trend will continue. This has not only to do with the quality of people we are taking into the military, but also has to do with what we do with them once they are a part of the force. The whole focus on quality of life issues is important not just because it is expensive, but because it is aimed at individuals, and because it is increasingly dealt out in ways that reinforce the separation of

the military from society.

The external perception that the Clinton administration is loaded with draft dodgers and people who are, at best, unfamiliar with military service or, at worst, hostile towards it, has led the administration to bend over backward to demonstrate its support for the armed forces. To some extent, this effort is misguided. Support for the troops has centered on initiatives that increase the quality of life for military members--better quarters, more pay, and additional services like day care centers and more and better recreational facilities. But there is a trade off. With increasingly limited resources, every dollar spent on quality of life is not being spent on purchasing better weapons and equipment. Dead in battle because one's weapon is obsolete results in a very low quality of life.

Even more important, the tendency has been to direct quality of life improvements toward bases and posts. This is understandable since any politician who gets new houses built on a military installation can claim he has provided a service to his district. Along with better housing comes better schools and, now, better child care facilities.

One of the unfortunate results of this trend is that military people spend more and more time with other military people. Consequently, they have less interaction with society. Their children go to special schools which, in many cases, may be better than those in the immediate area. Even if this is so, it is not a healthy thing for the military to be distinct from its society. It would be better to increase the stipends for these service members so they can live in the outside community. Otherwise, the risk is that our armed forces will become increasingly isolated from the nation they serve. That separation the military feels from society holds the potential for fostering a sense of superiority.

So, beginning with the general effects of the AVF recruiting something other than a cross-section of society, and adding in the effects of housing and educating military families separately, a problematic level of separation and distinction arises. Military families mix well with each other, but not as well with the general population. While it might be convenient to have housing, child day care, education, and health care facilities all in one place, especially when both adult members of a family are in the military, there is the danger of creating a totally separate society. Our inclination to hold our people to higher ethical standards creates the dilemma of having them believe that they do, in fact, embody a superior ethical and moral code which makes them better than those outside the gate.

As we shrink the size of the armed forces while maintaining

the high quality of our forces, and at the same time encourage them to turn inward, how can we ensure that they will not see themselves as superior to the American people they serve? We need to think hard about this because the more those in the ranks think of themselves as elite, the less likely they are to be concerned with the attitudes, needs, and demands of the nation. There is a real problem when the armed forces do not respect the values of the society at large. The recent troubles with hate groups and skinheads could be, in part, attributable to this dynamic. Superficial remedies, like banning Nazi flags or watching for certain kinds of tatoos, address symptoms more than causes.

The problem occurs more at the lower levels of the service hierarchy than with the leadership. But if allowed to develop, it will inevitably migrate upward. People are aware of the culture of promotions and education in the military and what will and will not be tolerated. If these attitudes develop among the privates and lieutenants, they will inevitably develop among sergeants and majors, and then among sergeants major and colonels. When they reach the flag officer levels, there is potentially a threat to civilian control.

So, how do we address and hopefully solve this problem? We cannot and do not want to lower the quality of recruits because this will lead to a lower quality military. While resurrecting the draft is unrealistic, the fact is that when we had the draft, it routinely brought in people who initially had little interest in the military but who learned from their experiences.⁴

The first solution involves civilian attitudes toward the military. Both the legislative and executive branches need to be careful about their well-intentioned, though perhaps misguided, tendencies to focus on the quality of life of the forces versus everything else. Instead, they should focus on military capabilities, their abilities to support national objectives, and the military's commitment to serving the nation. In this sense, supporting the military services by making sure they have the best possible equipment and weapons would be more effective than making sure they have luxurious quarters.

Decisions as to the quality of life in and on military installations need to be made with a sensitivity toward the long-range attitudes of the force. The convenience of having homes, schools, and child day care centers on post and on base have to be balanced with the costs of reducing the interaction with society. Instead of building newer and better facilities on base, Congress and the civilian leadership of the armed forces should work on providing adequate stipends for military families to live outside the base, send their children to public schools, and patronize community day care centers. Politicians ought not to

shy away from this issue. They might still benefit from infusing the local economy because these service members will be buying homes, paying property taxes to support education, using civilian rather than government facilities, even theaters, bowling alleys, and clubs.

Finally, the armed forces could benefit from a two-tiered entry program at the enlisted level. The first tier would operate the way it does now. But the second tier would provide a chance for those who might not make the initial cut to improve themselves. Perhaps they could enter into a special 2-year trial enlistment in which they might be paid less and have fewer guaranteed benefits, but successful completion would allow these people to enter the first tier. In a sense, the services already do this with the prep schools for the various academies. Instituting a similar program for the enlisted ranks might provide some solutions by increasing the chance that the services will attain a cross-section of society and return people to society who have benefitted from their military experiences.

Regardless, we need to focus sustained attention on this issue. In policy terms, one challenge is to remedy the increasing separation of the military from the society it serves. Within each of our individual services, the challenge is to work on attitudes to reinforce an understanding of who we are and what we are. From private or airman to general, from apprentice seaman to admiral, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have pride in themselves and their services. But they must also be proud of their service to the country and proud of the country that they serve.

ENDNOTES

1. James Fallows, "What Did You Do In the Class War, Daddy?," *Washington Monthly*, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1975, pp. 5-19.

2. According to Thomas C. Thayer, *War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 114, whites accounted for 87 percent of the American combat deaths and blacks accounted for 12 percent. By comparison, the national population of males of military age in 1973 was 13.5 percent black. The percentage of blacks in the U.S. armed forces at the end of 1972 were 13.5 percent enlisted and 2.3 percent officer.

3. Let me provide an example. A high school friend of mine was a frequent visitor to misdemeanor court. After another late night appearance, the judge (my father, a 23-year career Navy man who enlisted at the age of 17) gave my buddy a choice: join the Navy or go to jail. He opted for the Navy and served honorably

for 20 years, retiring as a warrant officer. When he returned to our hometown, he bought a farm and forged a second career as a productive and respected member of the community. In today's environment, this man probably would not have been recruited into the Navy because of his court record.

4. Each of the military services has, since the Vietnam War, achieved a level of excellence unparalleled in the history of the armed forces of the United States. Some have suggested that it might be beneficial to direct some of their accomplishments to the society at large. See Robert Hahn, "Soldier-Citizens: New Roles for Military Officers in American Society," paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1995.

**MILITARY RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE IN LOW-LEVEL CONFLICTS:
A "CRISIS"?**

Deborah D. Avant

When people write of the "crisis" in American civil-military relations, they are referring to many different issues. One of the most important is that advice by the military leadership increasingly hinders civilian decisions to use force, particularly in low-level conflicts. I think this argument is misguided. While agreeing with the crisis literature that the military's advice tends to be reticent, I think this is a problem that reflects a lack of consensus among *civilians* rather than military intransigence. Furthermore, I propose that the reluctance can be ameliorated only in the event of civilian agreement about the importance of low-level conflicts to national security goals. Finally, absent that agreement, there may be some policy benefits to military hesitation. Extending American military force when the consensus for action is not high has presented the United States with security disasters in the past. While we do not want the military to determine security goals, if military hesitancy makes civilian leaders think twice about difficult commitments for which there is not domestic support before the United States is involved, it may be a good thing.

In the ideal situation, the military acts as an agent of the civilian leadership, and ultimately the electorate. In agency relationships, there is always the potential that the agent's interests may be different than his superiors. For example, in the simplest terms, we can imagine a president, because he has to balance many objectives, preferring to get the most bang for the buck from the military; an individual military leader, however, may prefer instead to get the most bucks for the organization. Also, because the agent knows more about how he behaves when his superiors are not looking and often knows more about the issue he works on, he can often use his position to further his own interests. Thus superiors must think hard about how to select appropriate agents and monitor them to insure that they act as intended.

The choices made by various superiors concerning how to setup and monitor military organizations affect what kind of agency problems are most likely to occur. Because civilian leaders are also agents of their voters, political institutions are an important factor in deciding how civilians will decide to structure and monitor their militaries.¹ When civilian institutions unify power over the control of the military in one branch of government, civilians can exercise after the fact, or *ex post*, checks to punish military indiscretions relatively free from electoral costs.² This often biases organizations to anticipate civilian goals. When civilian institutions divide

power over the control of the military between a president and a legislature--as in the United States--oversight becomes more complicated.³ There are two reasons why this is true.

First, the different electoral structures for the president and the Congress encourage disagreement between the institutions over policy goals.⁴ When Congress wants the military to do one thing and the president another, the military is likely to align with the civilian preferences closest to its own. For example, after the Civil War, military leaders sided with Congress because both wanted a more activist reconstruction policy in the South.⁵

Second, and more often, disagreement between civilians can take the form of distrust between the different branches of government over the mechanisms by which to control the military. So, even though the president and Congress may agree on what they are telling the military to do, they may disagree about how to best monitor and oversee the organizations. Mechanisms that work well for the president may frustrate Congress. For example, despite the general agreement with goals of John F. Kennedy's "flexible response" doctrine, many members of Congress disapproved of Robert McNamara's methods of oversight.⁶ This disagreement allowed the Army greater discretion in interpreting Kennedy's call for more preparation in counterinsurgency.

Aside from these broad outlines, theories about delegation tell us to expect several patterns to emerge when multiple civilians compete for control over the military. First, the compromise that results often makes policy less efficient. So, while civilians may get what they want in general, they may have to pay too much, have to withstand delays, etc., and policy is likely to contain more slack.

Second, when civilians disagree, the military has an incentive to act strategically and play civilians off one another in order to gain support for its own preferences.⁸ All things being equal, military opinions are more influential when civilians disagree on policy.

Finally, even regardless of the military's preferences, policy will tend to be conservative when civilians disagree. When civilians give military leaders competing signals about what is acceptable and require specific procedures to ensure that their preferences are reflected in policy, military leaders have reasons to take small, but well-fortified steps.⁹ For example, in the post-Cold War period, American military organizations have been asked to formulate plans for action in high risk areas, plans for action that do not risk casualties, and plans that can be undertaken in an era of reduced budgets. In specific instances, there may be no plans that satisfy all these criteria. But violating any one of them will bring the wrath of some

portion of Congress or the administration to the organization. In these cases, we should expect military organizations to draw conservative plans that specify their awareness of the various civilian concerns in order to avoid blame after the fact.

In instances of divided civilian control, it is likely that policy outcomes will reflect civilian preferences most closely when civilians agree on policy goals. When they disagree on objectives, military advice will be couched in such a way as to reinforce the preferences of the civilians closest to the military position. In this case, military advice will have relatively more influence on outcomes. The tendency for civilian leaders to rely on more confining procedures when they disagree should lead the military to be more cautious about spelling out the costs and benefits of policy options and having clear criteria for success.¹⁰

Though space prevents an examination here, the cases to which the crisis literature has pointed support this logic. In Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, we tended to see military advice becoming public only when Congress took a publicly different stance from the president (the advice sometimes represented presidential opinion and sometimes congressional). Congressional articulation of conditions for intervention also prompted the military to push for clear and achievable goals that took heed of congressional conditions. Most importantly, in none of these crises did military advice drive policy. Initial civilian decisions against using force in Bosnia had more to do with alliance concerns and domestic political concerns than military reluctance. In the end, civilians decided to use force in Bosnia and Haiti *despite* military reservations and concerns.¹¹

The Costs and Benefits of Military Hesitancy.

The crisis literature claims that military reluctance has constituted undue military influence on civilian decisions about the use of force. I have argued that when civilian control is divided and civilians disagree, we should *expect* the military to have more influence (particularly if its advice is conservative), and we should *expect* policy outcomes to be less efficient for any particular civilian preference; thus the "crisis" claims are overstated. It is nonetheless clear that military advice in recent crises has generally reflected a reluctance to intervene in low-level conflicts, and this reluctance has often frustrated at least a portion of the civilian leadership. Is this military reluctance a good thing?

Congressional scholars make competing arguments about the benefits and costs of presidential (divided) vs. parliamentary (united) governments. Presidential systems are held to create

unwieldy arrangements that do not allow countries to respond effectively to the international system. Parliamentary systems allow governments to respond quickly and efficiently. At the same time, however, proponents of divided systems argue that they guard against civilian indiscretion. Parliamentary systems purchase efficiency at a cost--they increase the risk of civilian errors.¹²

The crisis literature asserts that civilians have a right to be wrong.¹³ With this claim, they may be reasoning in a similar way to proponents of parliamentary systems. The framers of the American Constitution, though, had significantly different worries. Their concern in structuring American institutions was to guard against civilian indiscretion--to make it harder for mistaken policy to go forward.

Just because the American system is working the way the framers intended does not make it right or best. The framers' concerns, however, have shaped American institutions and should be the starting point for realistic expectations about what we can expect from civilian and military leaders in the United States. Divided systems instill a set of behaviors and enforce them with electoral risks. Indeed, the impact of the recent conservative military advice is enhanced by its reflection of public and congressional concerns about limited wars.¹⁴

Encouraging leaders to ignore electoral risks may lead the country into policies that are unlikely to be sustained. Certainly, one of the most important lessons of the Vietnam War is that there are high costs to embarking on a policy that cannot be continued in the long term. In other words, it may be a good thing that the military is giving prudent advice before there is broad agreement between the president and Congress (or even between different Congress members or the public at large) about what are U.S. national security goals. Until there is a general consensus that the United States should be intervening in Bosnia, or Haiti, or Cuba, or any one of a number of similar contingencies that may arise, American interests (and the interests of our allies) may be served well by military wariness. Inaction may be frustrating, but action which only makes matters worse by its failure or lack of completion can lead to wasted resources, squandered lives, and institutional crises.

Barring constitutional reforms, there will always be more slack in the American polity than in a more unified system. If we want less slack, we need to focus our attention on the root cause--lack of consensus among civilian leaders. Trying to remedy an intermediary result--conservative advice from military leaders--is unlikely to work and could lead to even worse policy outcomes.

Conclusion.

Are the reluctant warriors out of control? Not quite.¹⁵ Their conservatism makes sense as a response to the lack of consensus among the civilian leadership in the United States about the importance of low-level threats. The lack of consensus has been affected by both the uncertainty of the international environment and political institutions in the United States which encourage disagreement. When civilians disagree, the United States' institutional structure was designed to slow change. The system is working as intended, and the way we should expect it to, short of constitutional reform. Regardless, to the extent that there is a problem with the nation's willingness to use force, it is not a problem that will be solved by discouraging conservative military advice. The solution to the problem is to generate civilian consensus. Until the consensus about the conditions under which responding to low-level threats is important to American security, the military will not abandon its cautionary role.

ENDNOTES

1. Deborah D. GAvant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994; Terry Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 150, No. 1, 1994, pp. 171-195; Terry Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in Oliver Williamson, ed., *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

2. This is because military leaders cannot appeal to another institutional branch, and there are thus fewer mechanisms by which civilian choices are likely to be questioned, and fewer electoral incentives to question leaders' incentives.

3. This logic can be extended to expect differences within the legislative branch (between the Senate and the House), and, at times, the judicial branch may be involved as well. The War Powers Act has prompted much legal attention of late. Representative Lowery sued President Reagan in 1983, Ron Dellums sued President Bush in 1990. See David Locke Hall, *The Reagan Years: A Constitutional Perspective on War Powers and the Presidency*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991; Harold Koh, "Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Professor's Memorandum in *Dellums v. Bush*," *Stanford Journal Law*, Vol. 27, Spring 1991, pp. 247-264.

4. See Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice." Congressional interest in defense policy depends on the

importance of defense policy for congressional electoral prospects. See also, Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, Chap. 2.

5. See Harold Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 65, 1960; Benjamin Thomas and Harold Hyman, *Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War*, New York: Knopf, 1962, pp. 85-100; Russell F. Weigley, *A History of the United States Army*, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, Chap. 12.

6. Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991 edition, p. 44.

7. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*.

8. Terry Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4, November 1987, pp. 475-520.

9. See Mathew McCubbins and Benjamin Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., *Congress: Structure and Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; and McNollgast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations*, Vol. 6, 1987.

10. By conservatism, I mean prudence and not ideological tendencies. Charles Cochran and Eloise Malone, "A Comparison of Naval Academy Plebes and College Freshmen Over 20 Years: 1974-1994," paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, October 20-22, 1995.

11. There were those in the military that supported the use of military force in Bosnia, most prominently, USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak.

12. See Maurice Durverger, "Which is the Best Electoral System?" in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System*, New York: Praeger, 1984; Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, New York: Agathon, 1986; Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. Matthew Shugart and John Carey demonstrate that there are many intermediary systems and that number of parties, length of terms, electoral systems, and many other variables mediate these issues of basic constitutional design. This is argued in Matthew Shugart and John Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

13. Peter Feaver, "Civilian Control of the Military: American Civil-Military Relations in Theory and Practice," paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 18-20, 1996, Chicago, IL.

14. Russell Weigley has long argued that it is difficult for the American military to pursue limited wars. This phenomenon has less to do with whether civilian leaders are in control and more to do with the electoral context within which leaders operate.

15. Even Richard Kohn agrees that "out of control" did not accurately characterize his argument. See "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Summer, 1994, pp. 21-31.

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