

**EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND NATO ENLARGEMENT:
A VIEW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE**

**Edited by
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FOREWORD

On August 4-5, 1997, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), together with the Reserve Officers Association, cosponsored a conference in Prague on "Eurasian Security in the Era of NATO Enlargement." In order to clarify fully the emerging security agenda in Europe and hear from member states and other interested parties, SSI invited analysts and officials from all of the Central and East European countries, including those invited to join NATO, those not invited, and those former Soviet states with a vital interest in the outcome, e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The panelists provided assessments of their respective countries' perspectives, of their own governments' policies, and of how they see emerging trends in European security issues.

The success of the Prague conference owes much to the efforts of our Czech hosts. In particular, we wish to acknowledge their unstinting and gracious assistance.

The chapters in this monograph offer a representative selection of the papers presented at the conference. By publishing them, SSI offers our readers a broad spectrum of views, including some not often heard, on the issues connected with NATO enlargement. In this manner, SSI seeks to shed fuller light on what could be the single most important national security issue to appear before Congress and other Alliance legislatures in 1998.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

NATO's enlargement represents a watershed event in European security. It closes the so-called "post-Cold War" epoch that began with the fall of the Soviet empire and opens the way to a new stage in European and American history. The tendencies that are now pushing Europe towards greater integration have received a new injection of energy. NATO has not only proven itself the only truly effective security provider among European institutions, it has also shown itself to be the moving force behind Europe's other security agencies, particularly the European Union (EU). After NATO decided to take in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland at its Madrid Conference in July 1997, the European Union, meeting at Amsterdam, decided to begin accession talks with those three states, Estonia, Cyprus, and Slovenia.

Thus concurrent and coinciding waves of integration throughout the continent are going to transform Europe's security map and agenda beyond recognition. But this does not mean either that past history is now utterly irrelevant or that Europe has attained a kind of security Nirvana. The Bosnian crisis, and to a lesser degree the Albanian crisis of 1997, as well as the recent problems in Kosovo show that many challenges confront Europe, and that Europe is reluctant to confront them.¹ Insofar as out-of-area issues in the Middle East are concerned, the Iraqi crises of 1997-98 demonstrated that Europe remains divided, unable to forge a common security policy for those issues in that region or to assume a leadership position in the resolution of international crises.

Thus, integration does not necessarily produce more security everywhere. Indeed, integration could produce more gridlock, as in Bosnia until 1995. The NATO allies' inability to come to a common understanding of the causes and origins of the wars in the former Yugoslavia was among the most powerful inhibitors of coherent action by NATO before 1995. Furthermore, our allies' fears that we would use our airpower in ill-advised fashion that enhanced the risks to their ground forces there led them to propose the unhappy dual-key arrangement, surrendering control of NATO air operations to the United Nations (U.N.).² In other words, our allies mistrusted our proclivities and policies and sought to restrain us, leading to both U.N. and U.S. refusal to commit fully to the defense of our interests in Bosnia. Allied cohesion in Bosnia was and perhaps remains a fragile thing. And it certainly will not be readily forthcoming as well in future out-of-area crises involving Iraq, for example.³

Accordingly, it is clear that there are contrasting debates as to the future scope of NATO's activities and expansion beyond its members' current frontiers. And such disagreement probably will appear within the EU as well. Given the fact that these organizations' memberships will be only partly overlapping after 1999 and at times driven by discord as to their future direction, e.g. the emerging disagreement on the Baltic states' future membership in NATO, it is by no means certain that the present level of integration in and of itself makes Europe as a whole safe for democracy. What these agencies' decision to expand does mean is something different. It means that the pursuit of national interests and the ability to conduct them unilaterally will once again be subjected to the discipline of alliance and union. It simply is not the case that membership in these organizations means that states have forsworn their past histories of seeking to enhance their position and influence at the expense of their neighbors. Rather, these organizations constrain that approach and

discipline what used to be called “power politics” by means of the overall benefits that integration provides.

Security integration in Europe’s security organizations, first of all, sets limits on efforts at renationalizing security policy or even the U.S. ability to go it alone.⁴ Membership in the EU and NATO allows for Churchill’s “small birds” not only to sing, but actually to have solos for a time until the orchestra hopefully comes together and makes a decision. Therefore, integration also enhances the dialogue of all states in the common quest for European peace and stability.

This volume is fundamentally about giving Europeans and Americans the opportunity to explore how we got to the point of enlargement and where we should be going afterwards. The conference it grows out of was designed to present to a largely American audience views from representatives of all the states most affected by enlargement, the Central European, Balkan, and Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the United States. It also represented an effort to focus our attention on the future challenges, especially *vis-à-vis* Russia, in the Balkans and the Baltic that will not go away. And this focus on how the past merged with the present to shape the future hopefully shook away both the absence of non-American voices in the debate over enlargement and the tendencies of many participants in that debate to conceal their real motives, hopes, and fears about NATO enlargement.

In the United States, we have only heard American voices and approaches to European security, not the outlooks of those most affected by the trend towards enlargement. Furthermore, there is a tendency to focus only on American national interests which, after all, is quite proper, and thereby excludes the broader European perspective that sees European security as being equally tied up with the progress of integration through the EU and other regional organizations or initiatives. If the main challenges of the future are going to be situated in the

Baltic, Balkan, and post-Soviet arenas, then it is necessary to examine local processes in these regions in detail.

To stimulate the debate in a broader context and to raise issues and voices that have not been previously heard were the objectives of the conference organizers. We entertained no illusions that by doing so we would once and for all lay down the truth or the one right way to look at Europe's future. But we did believe that the enlargement of NATO and of the EU provides us with an opportunity and a responsibility to launch that debate along with voices from the region for the benefit of our audience and in accord with the mandate of the Strategic Studies Institute to contribute to the education and informed debate of the public. After all, NATO enlargement may be the most consequential foreign policy issue of our time. If we fail to understand what we have wrought, what our allies think about NATO's future, and what future challenges we face to important and even vital interests, then, to a significant degree, enlargement will prove to be unavailing. If, on the other hand, we further stimulate the existing dialogue on European security, we will then have contributed, however modestly, to the success of the European integration project, for any successful integration begins with dialogue.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Charles Trueheart, "Europe Brought Many Sides to Dispute," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1998, p. 29.

2. Colonel Robert C. Owen, USAF, "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," *Airpower Journal*, Summer 1997, pp. 9-18.

3. *Ibid.*, Trueheart.

4. See Chapter 2 by Stephen J. Blank.

CHAPTER 2

RHETORIC AND REALITY IN NATO ENLARGEMENT

Stephen J. Blank

NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia Founding Act represent a watershed in U.S.-Russian-European relations and open a new chapter in Transatlantic relations. These agreements have created new mechanisms and processes that enable all governments to advance to a new era in European security. But this era could be an unhappy one unless we understand governments' motives and aspirations more clearly. Fortunately, a visible, if unintended, by-product of the debate over NATO enlargement is that every government has had to clarify its perspectives on European security even when each one may try to conceal those perspectives from itself or from other audiences. We need such clarification because the debate has often been as disingenuous as it has been revealing.

Russia, Germany, NATO's Secretary-General Javier Solana, and the United States all openly espouse a lasting pan-European system of collective security. At the very least, they mean a currently cooperative, if not collective, security system. This system allegedly either exists now, or is coming into being, partly due to NATO enlargement. Their leaders, officials, spokesmen, and policy analysts often use the term collective security or ideas associated with it.¹ If collective security is indeed the future of NATO, it would mark a radical departure from NATO's past record which has always been one of collective defense, not collective security. Much current writing on NATO bandies the term collective security about quite promiscuously with little knowledge of NATO's actual operations, conceptual precision, or rigor. Moreover, the numerous authors' and

speakers' definitions all differ from each other's. Current writing on collective security stretches this term like India rubber until it means virtually anything to anyone and perhaps, in reality, nothing at all.² Therefore, we must ask to what extent the main actors (namely the United States, NATO's leader, and Russia) are truly creating that system and to what degree their public rhetoric coincides with reality. To answer that question, we must first define the preconditions for realizing collective security. In 1972, former Czech diplomat and scholar of international relations, Josef Korbel, observed that:

Detente in Europe has lasting significance only as it may be an important step towards a new European system that might one day assure the old Continent of a sense of security, possibly a degree of integration that crosses national boundaries. This ultimately requires a mutuality of fundamental political interests, a complementarity of production and services, and a free exchange of intellectual and cultural accomplishments—and all this, presumably with no expectation of major changes in present and political social systems.³

Since then collective security has been reconceptualized so often that today it means international rules of behavior should be enforced by multilateral coalitions which possess the broadest possible legitimacy based on international agreement.⁴ Practically, this means very little, for even this definition creates a high, often insurmountable, hurdle for states and allies to overcome, as in Yugoslavia, 1991-95. Still, despite tumultuous changes in world politics, a lasting hallmark of collective security is the indefinite preservation of both the territorial *status quo* and of existing peaceful means for changing it.

Collective security systems fundamentally reject major changes in world politics because those changes are generally associated either with war or the threat of war. Rarely does a multinational agreement fundamentally transform the *status quo* exclusively by a negotiated treaty. Therefore the exceptional case of Germany's unification and the end of the Cold War led many to believe that a new age

had dawned. If NATO's enlargement proceeds without crises and conflicts, through multilateral negotiation, to embrace all of Europe, this view could obtain still more validity.

In collective security systems, states place the interests of the entire collective in preserving the *status quo* and rejecting aggression above their own narrow self-interests. As a result, in such a system all states have to act unanimously in the event of a threat to the peace against any of its members. Collective security entails a virtually automatic response on a general, universal scale against any and all threats to peace. Collective security rejects unilateralism, hegemony, selective responses to aggression, and revisionism—world politics' traditional phenomena and repertoire—as legitimate bases for policy and presupposes international consensus on the nature of threats to security and on suitable responses to them. Therefore collective security also fundamentally opposes spheres of interest and neo-imperial policies. For these reasons, the adherents of collective security systems advocate international, multilateral intervention in states' internal affairs to address the problems and crises engendered by the end of the Cold War.⁵ Taken logically, regional or global collective security presumes a regime of unlimited right and disposition to intervene, even in other states' internal affairs, wherever a threat to peace occurs based on this shared assessment of the threat and of the appropriate response to it.

Korbel's first condition, a mutuality of interests, is essential to collective security based on democratic norms. And the spread of that mutuality to ever greater areas through the integration process is a second, equal precondition for success. The third precondition for achieving collective security in Europe is a timely, appropriate, unified, and decisive Western reply to crises in the East or beyond. In a truly collective security system we supposedly can, and should, move from crisis management to a better system of conflict resolution in the early stages of

crises, if not to actual preventive diplomacy. Indeed, many U.S. analysts urge NATO to become more of a global “leading force” that, in principle, should be able to intervene anywhere in the world to avert, not just manage, threats to peace.⁶

Sadly, this advocacy represents a pipe dream. Even in the Gulf War of 1990-91, the zenith of U.N.-sponsored multilateralism and a supposed breakthrough to collective security, the reality was very different.

In true collective security it should make no difference who commits aggression and who the victim is. But the principles of collective security were ignored even during the Gulf War. [Henry] Kissinger, among others, observed that in its finest hour, the Security Council closed its eyes to that principle when Israel was attacked. . . . Tactically the Council’s silence made eminent sense, but the implications of this omission are sobering, for they confirm yet again that the Council is governed less by the commitment to respond to unprovoked aggression than by the politics of the situation.⁷

If allies could not then agree on a response, why should we expect them to do so in future, murkier, and more distant crises? As Inis Claude, Jr., observed, “U.S. policy represents a commitment to a policy of *selective antiaggression*” (italics by Claude). The United Nations or other organizations will condemn some aggressions and counter them by collective measures which are mobilized and led largely by the United States.⁸ Claude’s observation is nearer to reality than the dreams of those who wish NATO to become “an intercontinental policeman” for collective security crusades in and beyond Europe.

This reality includes the Israeli example cited above as well as the subsequent Yugoslav catastrophe. But attentive observers, mindful of the Israeli example, would not have been surprised by the Yugoslav wars’ international course. Anyone reviewing those wars could easily conclude that their main lesson is the enduring vitality of a Hobbesian world where the strong prey on the weak.⁹ NATO’s response

to Yugoslavia's crises and to Russian policy in the CIS raised grave questions concerning NATO's willingness and ability to commit to a new order, let alone collective security in those areas. Arguably neither the U.S.' nor NATO's responses to recent crises displays either party's ability or will to act preemptively and foresee crises even when they are imminent. As the run-up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent crises in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda indicate:

As a superpower with a global array of interests, yet with a limited capacity for comprehending the social, cultural, and political underpinnings of these interests, let alone for attending to them simultaneously, the United States had often failed to identify unfavorable regional developments before their escalation into fully-fledged conflicts; this tendency has not disappeared following the end of the Cold War.¹⁰

Armenian, Russian, Croatian, and Serbian successes in defying international norms and using force to revise borders without international losses since 1991 should tell us that Israel's case is typical, not unique. Rhetoric aside, we still live in a world of Realpolitik. As Ambassador James Goodby ruefully admits:

Collective security is less able to deal with disputes involving the major powers directly, simply because these powers can safely ignore external pressures and resist any attempt to impose sanctions. If collective security is not seen by the major powers to be a sufficient basis for creating conditions of security for themselves, the most acceptable alternative will be the alliance systems that lead to clearly demarcated spheres of influence.¹¹

Russia suffered virtually no external penalties for Chechnya or for destabilizing Moldova and several Transcaucasian and Central Asian states even though its Transcaucasian adventures led it to a posture towards Turkey that reproduces all of Russia's criticisms of NATO's enlargement.¹² In not resisting past Russian encroach-

ments and defining our mission as one of integrating Russia back into Europe, not restraining its imperial impulses, U.S. officials have followed a policy based not on collective security, but on “balance of threat,” a strategy where states balance against real or potential threats, not power *per se*.¹³ Whatever that policy’s merits are, they do not include adherence to collective security. Therefore, without minimizing Europe’s revolutionary changes since Korbelt wrote, can we truly state that his preconditions have been or are being fully realized?

The U.S. Perspective.

NATO’s post-1949 enlargement represents the gradual peaceful spread of the harmony of democratic interests and values that Korbelt and others have invoked. That enlargement also integrated ever wider areas into NATO’s orbit. Therefore, enlargement deeply corresponds to U.S. interests and fulfills the original intention of NATO’s founders.¹⁴ Current U.S. views on European security stem from three deeply held principles that derive from NATO’s history and from contemporary perceptions.

First, Washington believes that without U.S. leadership through NATO, “nothing gets done.” Second, there is the Wilsonian project of leading a crusade for global democratization, first of all in Europe.¹⁵ This project stems from the sound idea that NATO’s current internal structure is one of collective security, (i.e., an attack by any member of the alliance is inconceivable, and this even applies to Greece and Turkey who have been restrained precisely by being NATO members) but also from the unproven idea that this reality does or can soon apply throughout Europe. Because the basis for materializing the principles of collective security in practice supposedly really exist, NATO, and ultimately Europe, can and should be restructured according to these principles as NATO expands.

Third, and last, there is the belief that Russia is already a democratic partner of the United States and either accepts

the *status quo* or can be persuaded to do so by treating it as if it is still a superpower, i.e., by a form of psycho-political therapy.¹⁶ This belief means placing Russian concerns above those of all of its neighbors and maybe even those of U.S. partners, and saying and doing little when Russia does something against our preferences. Indeed, many supporters of a Russia first policy follow its logic and strongly oppose NATO enlargement because Russia opposes it. On the other hand, this vision of Russia as an already existing partner of the United States also breeds a fervent belief that it is our task to integrate Russia into the broader world, “bring Russia into Europe,” and integrate it into the community of nations.¹⁷

However, the attempt to fashion policy conforming to these three principles leads us into a political swamp and a conceptual impasse. One may find this swamp in the total confusion swirling around the concept of collective security. Or, one may find this swamp in the fact that nobody actually makes policy or can behave according to these three principles. These three principles conspicuously eschew any mention of interests or security threats. They speak the language of values rather than interests, and, faithful to Wilsonianism, look askance at interest as a basis for state policy. As did Wilson they confuse values (the ought to be) with interests (what is).¹⁸

Our behavior and that of our partners and interlocutors has not suddenly become more angelic. The United States, since 1990, has not followed the demands of collective security or the new doctrines of international relations theory that deprecate realism and the anarchical “self-help” nature of the international state system. Instead,

And how has the United States responded? Just about the way that realism would predict. Great powers need not go to war against weakened foes in order to seize opportunities to enhance their positions, and U.S. leaders from Reagan to Clinton have clearly seen the Soviet collapse as a golden opportunity to shape the world to their liking. Our leaders may cloak our action in the selfless rhetoric of “world order,” but

narrow self-interest lies behind them. The United States has imposed one-sided arms control agreements on the Russians [this may be debatable but certainly many Russians believe it-SJB], pressured the post-Soviet republics to give up their own nuclear arsenals, fought a war in the Persian Gulf in order to disarm Iraq, sent troops to Haiti to impose a democratic system, bombed the Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table, and proceeded with plans to expand NATO into Russia's backyard, generating a predictably negative response from Moscow.¹⁹

Therefore these three principles misrepresent the true nature of international politics in Europe. If the behavior cited above is taken with the disinclination to act in Yugoslavia before 1995 or to get deeply involved in the CIS, this means we, along with our allies, have inclined towards accepting spheres of influence with Russia. We only desisted from that course when the costs of accepting such spheres based on conquest, as in Bosnia, threatened NATO's cohesion. In fact we have sought, whenever possible, to insulate the West from crises in the East while expanding the West into Central Europe, albeit cheaply.²⁰ These principles and the collective security rhetoric based on them diverge from reality, the policy of selective antiaggression, and insulation of the West from crises in the East. Worse, these principles are mutually contradictory. Using them to rationalize enlargement hides our true motives even from ourselves, making it difficult for us to face reality.

Hence, many prominent Americans believe there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost from expansion, which is a truly bad, mischievous, and potentially catastrophic idea. Few of those in power have been willing or able to give a sufficiently satisfying and/or realistic portrayal of how enlargement serves real U.S. interests. Indeed, talk of real U.S. interests is frowned upon, and we hear instead arguments about democratization and international liberalism. By relying on a Wilsonian rhetoric of values and these principles to justify NATO's enlargement, the administration defends a noble, even

radical goal with bad or weak arguments deriving from unproven theories of international relations or Wilsonian pieties, not the language of U.S. interests. This risks serious dangers, e.g., domestic or foreign opposition to U.S. and NATO policies.

NATO enlargement is the product of an admittedly incomplete and abbreviated, presidential, and personality driven U.S. policy process. It developed outside of, and evidently without, a regular bureaucratic process of strategic review. As James Goldgeier writes, “No formal decision by the President and his top advisers about a timetable or process for expansion occurred until long after Clinton had started saying that NATO would enlarge.”²¹ Enlargement is not being sold on the basis of strategic interests, but rather on the basis of democratization, political stability, collective security, and even trade.²² NATO’s enlargement is a democratization policy that substitutes values for interests or, perhaps fuses values and interests to overcome (or conceal) the Realpolitik implications of a foreign policy that would then be articulated in geostrategic interests.

Worse yet, Wilsonianism’s language of moral crusade invariably fosters an American triumphalism and unilateralism that leads us astray with non-allies and injures ties to our allies. We thus find analysts who are now in the administration calling for a double enlargement of European security institutions to encompass areas beyond Europe and a global security partnership, but threatening Europe that if it does not cooperate with American programs for security beyond NATO’s 1996 frontiers, the United States, when faced with challenges “out of area,” will have to cut its forces and commitment to Europe to face those challenges.²³ Either Europe conforms to U.S. policy or else. Here collective security rhetoric visibly slides into the language of coercive diplomacy.²⁴ A policy that shuns talk of real interests other than free trade and democracy—Wilson’s holy of holies—runs serious risk of repeating his

experiences or of making such grandiose and foolish threats.

The administration argues that NATO's main function is to provide stability and psychological security to Central and Eastern European states in their quest for stable market democracies. Officials rightly and proudly cite improvements in civil-military relations, especially in Poland, and international treaties that dampen ethnic issues, e.g., the Hungarian-Romanian treaty which clearly grew out of both states' awareness that without an accord they would not get into NATO. The Italo-Slovenian, Czech-German, Romanian-Ukrainian, and the Polish-Lithuanian treaties also reflect this process. NATO's functions may have been primarily defensive in the past, but now they are primarily political. Therefore NATO enlargement is being undertaken for purely political reasons and draws no lines in Europe. Rather, the doors are open to all who can qualify with the eventual hope of a general collective security system. Enlargement will continue over time into a second and maybe third or fourth phase, until it might encompass all of Europe in a truly pan-European collective security system.

Accordingly, the administration argues that NATO should do for the East what it and the Marshall Plan did for the West, create stability, security, democratic transformation and facilitate the growth of prosperity.²⁵ Its purposes are purely political, i.e., they comprise facilitating market democracy, stability, military-political integration, and prosperity. Its missions will gradually incline more and more to peace operations in or around Europe, often with Russia's participation. Accordingly, strategic military or geopolitical factors hardly figure at all in this classically Wilsonian approach to European security.

The notion that security collectively managed by international organizations could serve American national security interests was indicative of the community-building objective of the

Wilsonian impulse, and not compatible with realist maxims regarding self-interest.²⁶

The aspiration that lies behind the policy appears in the following remarks by Tony Smith, who ardently advocates a U.S.-led international crusade for democratic governance. If we substitute Europe for Latin America here, the idea becomes starkly clear.

But the critical goal for the United States has little to do with commerce, or borders, or military security. Instead, its major interest should be to seek a greater sense of mutual respect and understanding with Latin nations based on a common hemispheric adherence to democratic institutions and values.²⁷

Here, NATO enlargement looks suspiciously like what Michael Mandelbaum, a stern critic of enlargement and of U.S. policy in general, called foreign policy as social work.²⁸

In fact, a State Department talking paper, presented to an April 1997 conference, stated we are not enlarging NATO for geopolitical reasons.²⁹ No visible compelling strategic interest is at stake. NATO enlargement is a democratization policy which, to go by President Clinton's campaign speeches of 1996 and other major statements, will provide the stability needed for greater economic development in Central and Eastern Europe that will generate new trade and jobs at home.³⁰ NATO is not merely an exercise in preventive diplomacy and deterrence as before.

Rather, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserts that expansion reflects a productive paradox, that the more NATO expands, the less likely we will have to use it.³¹ The more NATO expands, the risk that we will be called upon to use military force in Europe or pay higher costs for defense will decline. Presumably our political involvement in the region will also not be great. We can then have commitment on the cheap or at little or no risk as well as peace and growth. Not only is it a feel good or supposedly no cost policy for Europe, it also is a defense policy that transcends

preventive diplomacy to make America as well feel good that it will never have to resort to force to back up its commitment, because the threat will never materialize. Or, if it does, others will bear the main burden for us.

This line of reasoning appears to have come out of the concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which should be separable from NATO, but not separate, and available should the United States decline to intervene somewhere. Nevertheless, even if the United States does not participate, it will control the operation through NATO since the CJTF cannot function without U.S. support, either politically or materially. This policy line also appears in the recent speech at Ditchley Park by U.N. Ambassador William Richardson.³² Sadly, this line of reasoning also evokes Great Britain's signing of the 1925 Locarno Pact guaranteeing the Franco-German border, believing that it would never be called on to make good its guarantee to France.³³

Hence, U.S. policy is the most officially committed one to a vision of collective security in Europe. But is this a well-conceived policy? Is it really a new dawn for collective security or are we deceiving ourselves? Lest one accuse the U.S. Government of sanctimoniousness, or of being disingenuous while it pursues a hardheaded strategic interest under cover of this lofty rhetoric, the fact is that the Clinton administration truly believes that this is the correct vision for Europe. There is nothing unusually cynical or internally inconsistent about this policy.

Swedish journalists reported in August-September 1996, on the substance of U.S.-Swedish conversations, that Washington wants the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to resemble NATO as much as possible and NATO to appear increasingly as a collective security organization. Then Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which calls for collective self-defense, becomes a last resort. Since PfP and NATO both call for consultations under Article 4 of the treaty, if consultation works, "we will never have to use Article 5."³⁴

The effort to renounce or depreciate Article 5 “was shouted from a megaphone.” Sweden heard U.S. concerns that the European Union (EU) does not want to expand and has little security relevance, while the NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) (now Stabilization Force [SFOR]) in Bosnia was already a regional peacekeeping force and thus a model for future NATO peace operations.³⁵ A Swedish diplomat said that a senior U.S. official told him that NATO was a force for cooperation for collective security rather than collective defense. Article 5 was an asset more for credibility for the political superstructure than something that it actually could be necessary to use.³⁶ Since some former members of the administration as well as several independent scholars have publicly urged that Article 5 be terminated and other articles of the treaty be reformed, this is not a shockingly new current of opinion.³⁷

Washington believes that PfP forces will draw much nearer to NATO, and conduct peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and conflict management within the framework of the Western European Union’s (WEU) 1992 Petersberg Agreement. NATO’s main military operations apparently will then be such operations in or from Europe. Sweden, and presumably other non-NATO states, could participate in those missions and cooperate with NATO while retaining its current defense profile.³⁸ Washington also supports building up a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) only within NATO.³⁹ Sweden and Finland could then be models of civilian control and decisionmaking for the military for future members and cooperate with NATO through the PfP. Their nonalignment calms Russia and shows the Baltics that NATO is not the sole path to security. American aspirations ultimately also point to reciprocal membership for all members of the EU and NATO where an ESDI is in NATO, not in a moribund WEU.⁴⁰

These statements of U.S. policy fully comport with U.S. efforts to portray NATO enlargement as a cooperative or collective security arrangement to foster an enlarged

market democratic community rather than a mutual security alliance for collective defense.⁴¹ Washington apparently believes that the new Europe will not need Article 5 because collective security will reign within NATO, if not Europe. Therefore no threat scenario involving NATO members will arise. The hard cases are finessed away through a response made up in equal parts of hope, ideology, and the unproven beliefs that Russia is a democratic partner of the United States, accepts the *status quo*, will uncomplainingly accept collective security under a U.S.-led NATO alliance system in Europe, and that there are no other real threats that might require an Article 5 response. In the true spirit of collective security, politics, i.e., the struggle of competing interests or states for influence and power, disappears. A permanent peace is presumed to take shape as collective security in Europe assumes a semi-automatic character.

As State Department official and former Rand Corporation analyst Ronald Asmus told a Swedish conference in November 1996:

The goal here is, to refer to something that Secretary of Defense William Perry said when he was in the region several weeks ago, to create a situation where the [difference in the] degree of cooperation between NATO members and non-members is gradually diminished so that, when we get to the point where we get the politics right, moving the Baltic states from the category of non-member to the category of member, this becomes easy, and, at least in theory, a mere technicality.⁴²

However, as stated above, this whole line of reasoning conflicts with NATO's real missions, U.S. and Russian policy.

NATO's Missions.

In 1982 Sir Michael Howard wrote that NATO's twin purposes were deterrence and reassurance. NATO deterred Moscow and reassured Moscow and all of Europe that renationalized and unilateral security policies would not

return.⁴³ NATO, by integrating Germany into European structures, alone legitimated German military power in Europe. That is still true today and accepted in Bonn.⁴⁴ NATO's military force and the danger of nuclear escalation, which was regarded as almost inevitable should war break out, restrained Moscow not only from a conventional offensive in Central Europe but even from threats against neutrals like Sweden. In the 1960s, Swedish leaders deliberately renounced earlier plans to go nuclear because they believed that, despite their neutrality, NATO and U.S. military power defended Sweden.⁴⁵

Despite the end of the Cold War, none of this has changed in Europe. NATO's two missions remain the same, and its development since 1989 illustrates that all concerned understand that fact and the need to adapt to contemporary trends. Therefore, in reality,

Enlarging NATO is not about increasing the family of democratic nations—although that could be a benefit if it is properly conducted. Nor is it about directly increasing the domestic well-being of Americans—increasing exports and creating high-paying jobs. It is first and foremost about completing the settlement of post-Cold War security issues in Europe. And that means it is about establishing the basis for relations among states with vital interests in the region—irrespective of the form of their domestic affairs—so that their competing and in some cases contradictory interests do not give rise to crises and war.⁴⁶

NATO enlargement is really about reconciling varying state interests in an environment where the United States obtains enormous, tangible, material benefits from its leadership position. The United States leads enlargement not mainly or solely out of idealism, but out of interest. NATO enlargement further extends U.S. leadership and security. The expansion of the democratic community of peace based on mutual interests and values remains a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and interests because democracy among NATO's members and its own political-military structure restrains members' and

nonmembers' ability to act unilaterally. NATO membership and NATO's superior power *vis-à-vis* Russia thwarts other states from undertaking unilateral efforts to establish a hegemony in Europe. NATO presents this internal harmony of interests among its members because it has formed a true security community, where war among the members and purely unilateral national security policies are inconceivable.⁴⁷ NATO's integrated military-political structure subjects current and future members to a rigorous international system of civilian democratic control over the use of armed forces at home and abroad.⁴⁸ NATO's 1995 *Study on Enlargement* buttressed this democratic form of control by demanding it as a precondition of membership, and the OSCE's 1994 code of conduct also outlined a politically binding European agenda for such control. NATO staked its claim here to democratize and internationalize controls over governments' defense and security policies.⁴⁹ Everyone undergoes democratization and mutual restraint and becomes more secure.

Given the importance and scope of issues of democratic control over the armed forces, NATO, simply by requiring such control and subjecting all its members to mutual alliance, internal discipline, and shared constitutional restraints that go far in preventing renationalized security policies, justified its enlargement.⁵⁰ This generalized discipline makes NATO a uniquely self-restraining alliance whose inner constitution reassures Europe of peace. Even when Europeans complain about Washington's dictation, they acknowledge that it occurs because Europe cannot overcome its divisions of advocating collective European defense policies while refusing to spend the money or take the necessary action.⁵¹ NATO works only when it acts in unison; when everyone acts unilaterally, or tries to, the result is failure.⁵² When there is European unity, they all say, Washington then does indeed listen to its allies and moderates its position in the interests of allied unity.⁵³ Even at the height of the Cold War, Washington could not simply dictate to its allies, and it remained exquisitely attentive to

their interests and concerns, often being forced to amend its policies to meet those concerns.⁵⁴

NATO thus bridles U.S., German and Russian temptations toward unilateralism in Europe. Those who wish to use NATO assets for global crusades and worldwide intervention on behalf of collective security or democracy may find this condition irksome. But it is the necessary price we pay for leading this kind of multilateral alliance. We are not imposing democracy on Croatia and Serbia or Slovakia as we tried in Haiti and Panama, and we display an unvarying support for anything Boris Yeltsin does at home. And that has much to do with our belonging to a multilateral alliance, where allies have varying interests that must be dealt with through bargaining and adjustment, even if we are its hegemon. Thus NATO is paradoxically a force for democratization within the alliance, even if it restrains partners from intervening too deeply or too unilaterally abroad to democratize other states. It bridles tendencies toward unilateral military-political actions and provides the example for documents like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Code of Conduct.

By uniquely combining U.S. leadership with a functioning and institutionalized system of voluntarily accepted restraint on all members, NATO attracts newcomers and satisfies everyone. This is because their fears of other states' renationalized security policies in Europe outweigh any temptation they now have to follow that course themselves. But NATO exacts a price; namely, that it can intervene in other states' vital issues only by consensus, i.e., by rejecting the presumptive global right of intervention inhering in collective security systems. While NATO itself remains an area of collective security and is now enlarging it, NATO does so by restraining its abilities to act on behalf of worldwide democratization and collective security. NATO remains an alliance led by a hegemon, not a classical manifestation of collective security. To the extent that NATO proclaims collective security and tries to

implement it, we will see defections from NATO when such intervention contravenes a member's vital interests, or a reversion to big power hegemony and intervention abroad.

Russia and the West.

Therefore it is not surprising, if not necessarily commendable, that the West has shunned extensive intervention in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) issues or when Russia violated European conventions and treaties in Chechnya. The West's failure in Yugoslavia also seriously weakened any desire to intervene in the CIS. That enabled Russia to pursue a sphere of influence there using ethnic conflicts and peace operations as a screen for old-fashioned imperialism. The failures of collective security *vis-à-vis* Israel and Yugoslavia demonstrated that there would be no military effort to restrain Russian imperialism as long as it did not reach Ukraine or/and the Baltic states, and, more recently, involve vital energy interests.

At the same time, it is hardly insignificant that Russia lacks almost all of the civil-military controls specified in the OSCE Code of Conduct and has violated over half its precepts, often deliberately, e.g., invading Chechnya 5 days after signing the Code.⁵⁵ Accordingly, it remains unclear whether Russia will democratize its civil-military relations and conduct a European security policy that conforms to international treaty standards of conduct and is not wholly unilateral in content. To judge from the latest "military reforms" since July 1997, Moscow is going backward, not forward, on these issues.⁵⁶

Russia's policies also clash with efforts to renounce war or forcible border changes, ethnic cleansing, etc., as a legitimate aspect of European policy. In stark contrast to Hungary, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine who have acted purposefully and peacefully to prevent ethnic conflict, Russia has fomented and incited ethnic wars, *coups*, and civil wars on its peripheries,

truncated territories of Moldova by force, and blundered into war inside Russia, i.e., Chechnya. In all of these foregoing ways, Russian military and security policy is neither democratic, *status quo* oriented nor in tune with European standards. Russia remains inherently prone to the incitement of or participation in wars. Worse yet, Russia remains an openly and unabashedly revisionist power. In September 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov told the OSCE that,

Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War certain countries in Europe—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—have disintegrated. A number of new states were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new system of security.⁵⁷

(emphasis author)

Such revisionism suffices to alarm every Russian neighbor, justify their searches for NATO membership, and validate NATO's own decision for enlargement.

Revisionism and dreams of unilateral spheres of influence are incompatible with collective security. But Moscow still seeks to reconcile the irreconcilable. Since 1954 Moscow has advocated a Pan-European collective security system that would subordinate NATO to an outside agency where Russia would have both a veto and a free hand. This aspiration still animates Russian thinking about Europe as does the long-standing effort to try and split the allies from Washington and among themselves.⁵⁸ Russian spokesmen still advocate collective security in Europe and the subordination of NATO's operations, especially those out of area, to the U.N. or OSCE where Moscow has a veto, and insist on a Russian veto in Europe.⁵⁹

Russian defense policy, and much of its foreign policy, remains erratic, uninformed by any coherent sense of military or strategic reality. Russian policy is evidently inherently prone to strategic overreaching, i.e., aspirations that cannot be realized or even attempted without risking Russia's own stability, not to mention its main partners' and neighbors' security.⁶⁰ For example, Russia also has shunned a security dialogue with Poland and made it clear that it will use its new seat in the NATO-Russian Council to obstruct Poland's membership in NATO and to interpret the Founding Act selectively and unilaterally.⁶¹ In February 1997, Russia demanded for itself the right to intervene in Baltic domestic legislation and tie up their borders so that the Baltic states remain outside NATO.⁶² Russia openly demands an extraordinary role in Europe that is greater than anyone else's and insists that it will not accept defeat in contemporary Europe. Sergei Rogov, the director of the Institute for the United States and Canada (ISKAN) and a prominent advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, bitterly decried NATO's pre-Madrid tendency to disregard Russian interests and consign Russia to an unacceptable role as a defeated, second or third rate power in Europe. Instead,

The aims of Russian diplomacy should be as follows: First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the special character of Russian-American relations. Washington should recognize the exceptional status of the Russian Federation in the formation of a new system of international relations, a role different from that which Germany, Japan, China, or any other center of power plays in the global arena.⁶³

Russia's 1993 military doctrine and ensuing efforts to prevent NATO's enlargement and obtain a relationship whereby no NATO troops are deployed "to countries bordering on the Russian Federation without Russian consent" signified its pursuit not just of an exceptional status, but also of a *droit de regard* (right of supervision) over Central and Eastern European security. Yeltsin confirmed this when he stated that "It is essential for us

that we take part in all NATO's decision making."⁶⁴ This military doctrine also sanctions Russia's forceful intervention abroad to protect Russian speakers. And since 1992, Russia has steadfastly refused to formalize the new borders between it and the other post-Soviet republics and states, a refusal that can only signify hopes either of overturning that settlement or of diminishing their security. Hence, it is not surprising that both Western and Russian observers consider Moscow's border policy to be duplicitous.⁶⁵

Democratization and reform in these domains, as both Western and Russian analysts know, remain legitimate preconditions for Russian integration into Europe and for collective security. Their absence, instead, justifies NATO's enlargement.⁶⁶ As a result, Russian analysts have had to admit that Russia cannot exclusively lead the resolution of nationality issues in the CIS or the Baltic because its history and motives are rightly suspect.⁶⁷ And the foregoing issues remain legitimate standards by which to measure Russia's progress even if that measurement yields negative results.

Given present conditions, Russia remains *a priori* a danger, if not a threat, to all its neighbors, interlocutors, and former satellites, notwithstanding the dramatic decline of its military capability. Precisely because Russia cannot control itself, nor be subjected to the effective external constraint that NATO imposes on its members, it constitutes an inherent risk factor and a source of instability in Eurasia. As Robert Legvold has incisively observed, Russia wants status, not responsibility, in Europe.⁶⁸ As long as this view dominates Russian policy, Russia will continue to be isolated in Europe.⁶⁹

But this existential fact of life does not warrant Russia's exclusion from Europe lest that then aggravate all the negative trends in Russia and drown the positive efforts that have been made. NATO and the West have ample means to put pressure on Russia to alter its course in its own best interest. Rather, Russia's ambivalent status requires

us first to rethink our own policy. If we are to frame a compelling case for NATO, we have to jettison bad arguments that contradict the facts and mask our own concept of our and our allies' true interests.

U.S. Policy and Russia.

U.S. policy since 1991 has been to “bring Russia into the European community.” This policy reflects the elite consensus that Russia is the most important player in Europe whose opinions and demands must be heeded first. The image most elites have is Weimar Russia that replicates the failure of Versailles which we now have to overcome. But this policy and this belief have led us into an impasse. Thus we find strong advocates of NATO as security provider writing that,

Western security interests call only for rather narrow security guarantees that are designed to deter Russian expansion into Central Europe, but not to prevent all wars between the smaller countries of central Europe. Furthermore, if making these security commitments would appear threatening to Russia [note not if they were threatening but are merely so perceived-SJB], NATO should consider forgoing them entirely, since such a policy could be self-defeating.⁷⁰

In other words, we only have an interest in securing Central Europe against Russia if Russia is not threatened or deterred thereby. If Russia merely perceives or announces that it perceives enlargement as a threat, NATO should renounce acting according to its interests lest Russia feel injured! This is the tortuous logic of the Russia first argument. Thus even though the extension of democracy under the umbrella of U.S. leadership has stabilized Western and now Central Europe, many argue that NATO enlargement is against our interests because it antagonizes Russia.

The attempt by the administration to combine two principles of Wilsonian idealism—enlarging a democratic community of states sharing similar values, and the

rehabilitation of Russia first—inevitably leads to such conceptual and policy impasses. Sadly, the only way out of those impasses seems to be making large “side payments” to Russia, e.g., soft-peddalling charges of what its policies are and making concessions like those in the Founding Act which water down NATO’s ability to act cohesively.

The Founding Act’s text and the contending “battle of interpretations” that has broken out since its signing demonstrate that this act significantly dilutes NATO’s collective power while demanding no concessions in return from Moscow. There is no reciprocity here whatsoever.⁷¹ The NATO-Russian Council provides a new, structured, and institutionalized mechanism for mutual discussion of any issue of interest to the parties. However, despite administration claims to the contrary, the Founding Act does not merely institutionalize an already existing relationship. Prior to this Act there was no such mechanism for discussing European issues on a regular basis mainly because Russia refused to create one. Nevertheless, Russian spokesmen constantly complained that nobody wanted such a mechanism or to listen to Russia.⁷² Now Moscow is directly inserted into the U.S. dialogue with its allies at all levels of NATO and with total freedom to raise any issue.⁷³ The 1997 Denver summit of the eight codified this outcome and replaces the habit of unfettered inter-allied discussion with a much more cumbersome mechanism unless we propose to use it strictly as a decoy. Claims that the NAC (North American Council) remains the principal venue for inter-allied communication, as stated in the Madrid meeting Communique, directly contradict the language of the Founding Act and will invariably lead to more recriminations.⁷⁴ If this contradiction is merely sloppy drafting, it still has real implications, and if this contradiction is more than that, those implications become still more meaningful.

While no state or party has a veto over the other side’s internal operations in the NATO-Russia Council, in matters brought to the Council, in the absence of consensus, no

action can be taken. Therefore out of area operations in the CIS are ruled out *a priori*. Spheres of influence peace operations remain the order of the day. Moscow will also undoubtedly seek to extend this to the Balkans unless it is first compensated or invited in by NATO, although it cannot meaningfully contribute to a solution and is the largest foreign provider of arms to both Serbia and Croatia. Moreover, Moscow still evidently believes that, if it wages a determined propaganda campaign and conducts spectacular foreign policy decisions, it can shake the resolution of Western and U.S. policymakers and influence the forthcoming debate on ratifying NATO enlargement.⁷⁵ Russian commentators assert that the negotiations that preceded enlargement and the Founding Act negotiations confirmed that Europe will not let Russia be estranged even if Washington wanted to do so. They are certainly right about Germany. Nor is Washington liable to do so since Russia is the key country to Europe and the CIS and its democratic partner. No crisis or question that arises where Russia has an interest will escape discussion in the Council, nor is the West likely to press towards a unilateral conclusion, and a Western consensus will be hard to obtain. Therefore they argue that Russia has obtained a *de facto* veto in the Council and more flexibility in the CIS.⁷⁶

Indeed, Russia has already started to blackmail the allies saying that, if there is a second round, especially to former Soviet republics, relations will collapse.⁷⁷ Together with this approach, Moscow has also proposed a bilateral joint guarantee of Central Europe and the Baltic states with the United States and/or NATO, or a five-power conference with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany to form a kind of great power European security directorate and exclude the small states, which Russia considers of little consequence and which it has basically shunned since 1989.⁷⁸ Yet as it offers the Baltic states guarantees, Russia also tells Latvia and Estonia that unless Riga treats its Russians as Moscow wants, relations will remain bad and tells Lithuania that it will not get into

NATO. Or else it calls for the Baltic states neutrality *a la* Sweden. Moscow could have had this outcome 5 years ago, but its own policies helped destroy that option.⁷⁹ Such pressure has already alarmed Latvia's President Gintis Ulmanis sufficiently for him to call for his government to make concessions to Latvia's Russians, implicitly confirming Russia's ability and intention to use its new position *vis-à-vis* the West to curtail Latvia's domestic sovereignty and foreign policy options.⁸⁰

Yet despite Russia's record, the United States remains the primary author of the case for integrating Russia into Europe.

The case could be made that the logic of courting Russia now resembles that employed in the courtship of West Germany during the early 1950s—to coopt former adversaries into the West by offering them favorable terms as members of the liberal community. If American leaders are to be as sensitive to the domestic vulnerabilities of Russian reformers as they were of Adenauer's in the immediate postwar years, then enlarging NATO short of Russia is a rather self-defeating proposition, just as pursuing East-West relations contrary to West German unification sensibilities would have been.⁸¹

Nevertheless, it is precisely these U.S. policies, that Russia comes first and that we and our allies must integrate it into the West, that are seriously flawed and contradict U.S. interests in NATO's enlargement and in Europe's ultimate pacification. First, the Weimar or Adenauer analogies are faulty. Nobody compares Yeltsin to Adenauer with good reason. Yeltsin is no Adenauer or convinced democrat, and shows little aspiration towards democracy and the rule of law. He certainly has no coherent military policy or design for integrating Russia into Europe and has been allowed to get away with a revisionist policy that has only exacerbated regional security crises in the CIS. Nor does Russia fully resemble Weimar Germany, a country at the leading edge of the world economy and technology, for all of its serious troubles. And Yeltsin's military policies are

utterly unlike those of the Weimar governments. While useful, this analogy falls when pushed too far.

Second, this policy absolves Russia of the responsibility to conform to European standards. It relieves the pressure inside Russia and on it from outside to reform and integrate itself into Europe. The results became clear by the end of 1992. Third, as seen above, it gives Russia an inherent veto on plans for Central and East European security and encourages it to “throw tantrums” to achieve that veto.⁸² Fourth, this policy removes constraints on Moscow to accept the *status quo* and its own reduced ability to play its past role in Europe even though its real security from external threats is guaranteed by the post-1989 spread of democracy and the real demilitarization of NATO.

As Robert Hutchings, the National Security Council Director for European Security Affairs in the Bush administration rightly concludes, an enduring lesson of the end of the Cold War is that Central and Eastern Europe are the keys to European security. The Bush administration triumphed in 1989-91 because it tied U.S.-Soviet relations to Moscow’s acceptance of democratic change in the region.⁸³ Afterwards, however,

Yet, by the end the Bush administration had forgotten some of its own lessons, vastly exaggerating our ability to influence the Russian internal dynamic and embarking on a self-defeating strategy that had us intruding too deeply into Russia’s domestic affairs. Worse, in our zeal to avert Russia’s exclusion from the emerging international order, we allowed the Russian agenda to dictate our own and put ourselves in the position of trying to compensate Russia for lost influence. In the end, we inadvertently lent strength to the extremist forces we meant to oppose. We seemed to be legitimizing and accommodating ultra-nationalist demands that sprang from an obsolete definition of security based on spheres of influence and territorial control.

The Clinton administration accentuated these mistakes by elevating Russia’s internal transformation to first place in our global agenda. . . . [This] happy state of affairs [Washington]

described was the proper goal of *Russian* policy, not American.⁸⁴

While we should invite Russia to join a renovated Europe, only Russia can choose to integrate with Europe and accept the terms of the invitation. We cannot pretend to make Russian policy for it or intervene across the spectrum of Russian politics unless we are then prepared to defend Russian and U.S. national interests at one and the same time, a trick beyond all dialectics. For European collective security to emerge, Russia must choose freely to integrate into alliance structures, adopt a truly European policy, and become a satisfied, *status quo* power. That policy must meet European political and civil standards and renounce efforts to redivide Europe.

Because of the multiplicity of lines in Europe that history has left behind, it is fallacious to assume that NATO enlargement is about drawing new lines. Actually, enlargement erases many lines and forces the EU to do so, too.⁸⁵ Enlargement goes far toward ending Europe's historic bifurcation into two economic-political-cultural poles and generates the process and standards by which Europe's future unification may occur. It overcomes lines dating back to the Renaissance and Reformation and generates the process by which others, including those dividing Russia from Europe, can be eliminated over time. Thus enlargement both represents and should be seen as a radical transformation of the European landscape with all its attendant consequences, e.g., our deeper and further involvement in all manner of Central and Eastern European security agendas.⁸⁶

Enlargement is neither a *status quo* policy nor a way for Washington to minimize its involvement and commitments in Europe. Enlargement must be recognized as the price necessary for a continuing, even deeper, U.S. leadership role in Europe. That, and deterrence of Russian revisionism, are enlargement's second justification after the democratization of military policies. While this radical

transformation obviously frightens Russian elites, it does so only because enlargement also forecloses their imperial option. Therefore enlargement is a boost for security and democracy in both Russia and Europe. That is the third major justification for NATO enlargement. Then it is not surprising that Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's former Foreign Minister, acknowledged that resisting enlargement only benefits those who support Russian unilateralism and imperialism in Eurasia. Kozyrev also commented that Primakov's policies seem more like peaceful coexistence than anything else.⁸⁷

However, our current perspective on Russia's importance directly contradicts our NATO policy and its goals as well as our own actual behavior. First, we must acknowledge the correctness of Russians' view that NATO enlargement is a massive, resounding, and unfortunately, justified vote of no confidence in Russian democracy.⁸⁸ Whatever allied governments may say, practically the fact of NATO enlargement means that NATO does not trust Russia's policies and interests (though we will never say so openly). Sad to say, however, this vote of no confidence is probably richly deserved, due to Russia's own failures in economic, political, and military reform and its neo-imperial policies in the CIS.

The U.S. attempt to conduct this Russia first policy along with enlargement represents a fundamental contradiction that confirms what Ambassador-Designate to the CIS Stephen Sestanovich recently wrote. Sestanovich confirmed observations about the lack of realist maxims in our policy by writing that, "On balance, there have been few signs that U.S. policy is shaped by calculations of any kind about Russian power—present or future, global or regional, nuclear or conventional."⁸⁹ Furthermore, with regard to NATO enlargement, he correctly observes that,

Poles and Russians may disagree whether such "neo-containment" is a good idea, but they have no trouble interpreting what is going on. Seen from Washington, however, the story looks

very different. It would be a gross misreading of events to think that the United States embroiled itself in a major dispute with Moscow so as to check the resurgence of Russian power over Eastern Europe. In fact, American policymakers were swayed by a mix of motives, both analytical and practical, that had little to do with Russia. Analytically, U.S. interest in an enlarged NATO was set in motion by, inter alia, anxiety about how to tie the alliance together in the future, the desire to head off any rethinking in Germany about its Western orientation, the hope to prevent “future Bosnias” in the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe; and the nervous recollection that twice in the twentieth century this region was the “seedbed” of wider wars.⁹⁰

To this list we may also add Bonn, Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw’s appeals to Washington that Central Europe not be left in a limbo as that could provoke all sorts of negative phenomena. We must also then accept Stanley Hoffmann’s assessment that current U.S. policy in Europe is marked by a constant, vacillating, and unresolved tension between a desire to preserve U.S. primacy as much as the *status quo* permits, and “a conspicuous strategic vacuum insofar as policy is concerned.”⁹¹

Why NATO Should Enlarge.

In such a vacuum, U.S. leadership in Europe is untenable. Erratic U.S. policies diminish our reputation and capacity for wise leadership on Europe’s behalf and remove the security blanket from Europe that has fostered internationalized security policies there. Then under cover of a dying NATO, renationalized security policies, often at odds with U.S. interests, will then ensue. And the most dangerous of those possibilities involves both Germany and Russia. Hence the lands between them, none of which wants to repeat any of the previous phases of the Prusso-Russian or Russo-German relationship, must not be left adrift.⁹² Unquestionably they would be left adrift without NATO, for it has been convincingly demonstrated that the magnet and power of NATO and of the EU, added to the internal divisions among Central and East European states, have

effectively precluded all efforts at regional security cooperation since 1989. The Visegrad four long ago abandoned any pretense of effective security cooperation, Baltic security cooperation is open to question, and neither Sweden nor Finland alone or together can make up the entire slack despite their best efforts or those of other powers, especially Germany, to pass the buck on to them.⁹³ Finally, the Partnership for Peace ended any hope for bilateral or regional defense collaboration by making cooperation exclusively through Brussels the price of membership.⁹⁴

Enlargement, then, is necessary for a fourth reason, namely preventing a return to nationalized policies and competition in Europe. Absent enlargement we are left with the following alternatives: a general renationalization of security agendas everywhere in Europe, but particularly in Germany and all states to its East, and spheres of influence as the inevitable result of such an abandonment of those areas. If the only proven effective European security organization refuses to act as an organization in the areas of crisis within Europe, then its cohesion and purpose will surely be questioned and other major powers will either act on their own or abdicate, leaving and leading those most endangered to act on their own. Then prospects for mutual security and for consolidating the victory of 1989 will evaporate. Renationalized security policies will then predominate across Europe.

As it is, we already have seen notable examples of such nationalized policymaking in Europe, e.g., Germany's efforts to subvert the tottering Yugoslavia in 1990-91 by running arms to Croatia and Slovenia through Hungary in the name of self-determination and its ensuing preemptive recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as states. We also have seen Russian intervention and war in Chechnya, Moldova, and Georgia, gun running in Armenia, and Russia's fomenting of *coups* in Azerbaijan. In the former Yugoslavia we find the destructive Serbian and Croatian policies, and Italian efforts to exclude Slovenia from the EU in 1994-95.

Elsewhere there are Greece's blockade of Macedonia, Hungarian and Russian efforts to obtain a *droit de regard* (right of supervision) over their neighbors' domestic nationality policies, and the Bundesbank's coercion of the entire European economy in 1992 to bear the costs of German unification, even at the price of massive devaluations of their currencies.

Many of these events occurred precisely because NATO was not leading or interested in the areas involved. Instead, we tried collective security, which failed because the allies could not agree and thus tried to insulate the problem from their vital interests. We failed to expect that Russia would use the opportunity to reverse the *status quo* and demand for itself an exceptional place in Europe. Furthermore, we have refused to accept the consequences of the fact that absent countervailing power, Russia cannot be restrained by its membership in a so-called collective security system, i.e., the CIS. For the CIS and neighboring areas in Europe not to be an arena of constant strife and tension, Russia must be restrained by some force outside the CIS and bigger than it, i.e., NATO.⁹⁵ Because this strategy of insulation, neglect of Russian realities, and collective security failed, NATO cohesion almost fell apart and the fiction that we could somehow insulate the Balkans from Europe also should have disappeared for good.

Our past strategy left small states in trouble on their own to face risks of having to rely exclusively on other, larger states' consultations. Yet the large states could not and still cannot agree about the nature of crises or on an appropriate response, as Albania's current crisis showed us.⁹⁶ We should also note that this fumbling response was not due to lack of knowledge. Once again preventive diplomacy failed for the usual reasons. Such failures push small states and then larger states toward unilateral security policies. Such security policies explicitly contradict and threaten enlargement's purposes and the collective security concept that allegedly supports it. Renational-

ization also undoes Korbels insistence on shared political interests and effective responses to crises.

Conclusion.

And this outcome provides us with the best arguments as to why NATO enlargement is a positive trend that should continue, despite our hitherto faulty conception of it. Specifically, NATO must enlarge because there is nobody else who can or will perform the task of security in Europe. French President Jacques Chiracs foreign policy advisor, Pierre Lellouche, stated it bluntly,

Once again Europe is characterized by a pivotal and strong Germany, a backward and unstable Russia, and a large number of small, weak states. And again, France and Great Britain are incapable by themselves of balancing German power or of checking Russian instability, let alone resurrecting the entire European order around a Franco-British axis.⁹⁷

Without U.S. relatively benevolent hegemony and leadership, there is no possibility for equilibrium or security in Europe, let alone justice. While it is hegemonic leadership, of all the available alternatives it is the best precisely because that hegemony exists within freely chosen institutional restraints. The integrated military-political structure of NATO exercises a consistent gravitational pull towards unity. The utter incapacity of the WEU and the EU to create security, to overcome their home governments' economic gridlock, and move the EU eastward, which would not occur without NATOs pressure to do so, tells us that Trans-Atlanticism is still as necessary as before. Without it, states would have to fend for themselves, leading to the futile and violent renationalized security policies we have already seen. And the new members know that, without U.S. restraint on European governments, they would be caught between two fires.

NATO enlargement greatly conforms to our interests and those of our allies, but it requires the courage to state

that defense and foreign affairs matter for their own sake, that we have real interests, that our work is not yet done, and that the price of our leadership in Europe is self-willed, self-imposed, and voluntary restraint.⁹⁸ We must acknowledge that, while inside NATO there is a security community, outside of it there are many dangers, not least among them a revisionist and potentially unbridled Russia. Were we rhetorically or actually to withdraw into unilateralism, as we tried in Bosnia in 1994, we would imperil our greater interests in a democratic security community and encourage others to do so as well. To the extent that we voluntarily circumscribe our ability to act unilaterally, we not only achieve more security, we make it possible for every other government in Europe to do so as well, including Russia. Until now Russia has been, to say the least, ambivalent about this message. But the superiority and magnetic attractiveness of the EU and NATO are such that empire is already prohibitive for Moscow, and NATO already projects its shadow to Ukraine and the Baltic states, even without a formal guarantee. Indeed, NATO's ongoing attractiveness and ability to project security for nonmembers assures the vitality of the EU through its enlargement, leading the Russian government to hint at Russia's desire for future membership in the EU.⁹⁹

If and when Russia ultimately accepts and conforms to the EU's and NATO's common membership requirements, we will have truly attained Korbel's goal and collective security. Until then, idealism divorced from reality leads to a blind alley or at least to difficult impasses. But when the force of an abstract, dry idea is joined by a tested, experienced force and reality, it becomes a living, breathing, vital, and nourishing reality.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Hamburg, *Welt am Sonntag*, in German, June 8, 1997, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Western Europe* (henceforth *FBIS-WEU*)-97-159, June 8, 1997; Stockholm, *Svenska Dagbladet*, in

Swedish, August 28, 1996, *FBIS-WEU-96-170*, September 5, 1996, Klaus Kinkel, "Priceless Alliance, *The Washington Post*, November 4, 1997, p. 17.

2. Inis Claude Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," Gary Guertner, ed., *Collective Security in Europe and Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992, pp. 7-28; James Goodby, "Can Collective Security Work: Reflections on the European Case," Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 237-253; and George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994, offers the latest systematic discussion of this concept. And for concrete examples, the following quote is illustrative:

The long-term goal Austria is officially aiming at is a European system of collective security. Usually this term remains un- or ill-defined in the respective statements by Austrian politicians. According to the traditional meaning, such a system goes beyond an alliance in that it calls for joint sanctions against breaches of the peace committed by members (and not only against aggressors who do not belong to it); however, participation in it is deemed compatible with neutrality. This Austrian opinion is based on the qualification of enforcement measures not as war in the technical legal sense but as international police action. Advocates of this view also point to the absence of objections to neutral Austria's taking part in sanctions voted by the UN Security Council. . . . However, it should be clear that participation by Austria in forcible action against an aggressor is likely to lead the latter to include Austria among the targets of his retaliatory strikes.

Hanspeter Neuhold, "Austria and European Security: The Question of Neutrality," Franco Algeri, Josef Janning, Dirk Rumberg, eds., *Managing Security in Europe: The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement*, Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996, pp. 31-32.

3. Josef Korbel, *Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 6.

4. Goodby, pp. 239-242.

5. *Ibid.*, and for examples, see Secretary of State's Albright's statement that the United States plays a more important role in the post-Cold War world as a "Pathfinder" that shapes history and as helper in the construction of "a global network of purpose and law." Robin Wright, "Albright Pledges to Flex Muscle in Cambodia," *Los Angeles Times, Washington Edition*, July 24, 1997, pp. 1-2; and Secretary-General Javier Solana's call for an international police force for peace operations in failed states, Madrid, *EFE*, September 8, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-251*, September 8, 1997.

6. See the essays in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. As the authors and editors are all associated with the Rand Corporation, it would appear that these essays, taken together, represent something of the corporate view of RAND.

7. Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 101.

8. Claude, p. 23.

9. Raju G.C. Thomas, "Self-Determination and International Recognition Policy: An Alternative Interpretation of Yugoslavia's Disintegration," *World Affairs*, Vol. CLX, No. 1, Summer 1997, p. 20.

10. Ephraim Karsh, "Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does it Make a Difference for the Middle East?," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, September 1997, p. 281. On p. 283, he noted that Saddam Hussein's buildup prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was "treated in Washington with the disbelief that commonly accompanies a warning that another government is about to break a basic international rule," exactly as occurred in Chechnya in 1994. See also, Stephen J. Blank, "Yugoslavia's Wars and European Security," Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, pp. 123-159.

11. Goodby, p. 242.

12. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus," *European Security*, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 317-320.

13. Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, Spring 1997, pp. 69-70.

14. Mary N. Hampton, "NATO At the Creation: U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany, and the Wilsonian Impulse," *Security Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 610-656.

15. James M. Goldgeier, "U.S. Security Policy Toward the New Europe: How the Decision to Expand NATO Was Made," paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28-31, 1997.

16. Stephen Sestanovich, "Giving Russia Its Due," *The National Interest*, No. 36, Summer 1994, pp. 3-13.

17. U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Spokesman*, "Remarks by Secretary Madeleine K. Albright to Students at Vilnius University and Question and Answer Session," July 13, 1997, Vilnius, Lithuania; USIA, "The End of the Beginning: The Emergence of a New Russia," an address by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, September 19, 1997, from *Johnson's Russia List*, *djohnson@cdi.org*, No. 1220, September 23, 1997 (henceforth Talbott).

18. Jeffrey Record with Julia Woodbury, "The Perils of Strategic Slumming in Europe," *NATO Enlargement: Two Views*, Atlanta, GA: Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1997, p. 50; Hampton, pp. 613-624.

19. Stephen M. Walt, "The Gorbachev Interlude and International Relations Theory," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, Summer 1997, p. 478.

20. Paul D'Anieri and Brian Schmiedeler, "European Security After the Cold War: The Policy of Insulationism," *European Security*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 341-364; Blank, "Yugoslavia's Wars and European Security," pp. 134-159.

21. Goldgeier, *passim*; R.W. Apple Jr., "Road to Approval Is Rocky, And the Gamble Is Perilous," *New York Times*, May 15, 1997, p. 1.

22. *Ibid.*; Stephen A. Cambone, "The Strategic Implications of NATO Enlargement," Stephen J. Blank, ed., *From Madrid to Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997, pp. 4-8.

23. Gompert and Larrabee, *passim*.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Cambone, pp. 4-8.

26. Hampton, p. 622.
27. Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXII, No. 6, November/December 1994, p. 38.
28. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy As Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXV, No. 1, January-February 1996, pp. 16-31.
29. U.S. Department of State, "How to Deal With the Arguments Against NATO and its Enlargement," mimeo presented to the III Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, NY, April 25, 1997, p. 5.
30. Cambone, pp. 4-8.
31. Apple, p. 1.
32. Edward Mortimer, "Clinton Doctrine," *Financial Times*, July 16, 1997, p. 12.
33. Paul Kennedy, "Is NATO Expansion a Policy of False Pretense?," *Boston Globe*, May 17, 1997, from Johnson's Russia List, *djohnson@cdi.org*, May 17, 1997.
34. *FBIS-WEU-96-170*, September 5, 1996.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Cambone, pp. 4-8.
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43. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980's," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXI, No. 2, Winter 1982-83, pp. 309-324.

44. Stephen J. Blank, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do?," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 18, 1997.

45. Paul M. Cole, *Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994, *passim*.

46. Cambone, p. 8.

47. Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *et. al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, is the canonical statement of this thesis; for a recent restatement of it, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995.

48. General Klaus Naumann, "NATO Is Changing," *Central European Issues: Romanian Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1997, pp. 18-28; General George A. Joulwan, "The New SHAPE of the Atlantic Alliance," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 15, Spring 1997, pp. 57-61.

49. *NATO Study on Enlargement*, NATO Internet, Brussels, September 28, 1995.

50. *Ibid.*; "The Enlargement of the Alliance," Draft Special Report of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, November 1994, NATO Internet; David Carment, "NATO and the International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: Perspectives on Theory and Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, December 1995, pp. 364-365.

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52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.* Vienna, *Die Presse*, in German, July 16, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-197*, July 16, 1997.

54. *Ibid.*, Risse-Kappen, *passim*.

55. Stephen J. Blank, "The Code and Civil-Military Relations: The Russian Case," Gert de Nooy, ed., *Cooperative Security, the OSCE and Its Code of Conduct*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 93-112.

56. Stephen J. Blank, "Russia's Armed Forces: Issues and Trends," forthcoming in *Post-Soviet Prospects*.

57. Address by Y.M. Primakov to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, September 20, 1996, p. 2, transcript made available by the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States.

58. Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Peter van Ham, "Integrating Russia in Europe: Mission Impossible?," *TKI Working Papers on European Integration and Regime Formation*, Denmark: South Jutland University Press, 1997, pp. 24-31.

59. Statement by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V.S. Chernomyrdin At the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE Participating States, Lisbon, December 2, 1996; "Can Russia Ever Be Secured?," *The Economist*, December 7, 1996, pp. 45-46; but in calling for the leadership of the OSCE, Russian spokesmen are careful to make sure that it will have no real military or other power to compel Russia to act according to its unilateral conception of its interests, N. Afanasevskii, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, "The OSCE Summit in Lisbon," *International Affairs*, Moscow, Russia, No. 1, 1997, pp. 33-36.

60. As Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA-Canada Institute told the AUM-CATO Conference on U.S.-Russian Relations, Washington, DC, September 19, 1996, "My government is responsible for nothing."

61. Warsaw, *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, in Polish, June 4, 1997, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Military Affairs* (henceforth *FBIS-UMA*)-97-155, June 4, 1997; Warsaw, *Rzeczpospolita*, in Polish, June 5, 1997, *FBIS-EEU*-97-157, June 6, 1997; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, June 5, 1997, *FBIS-SOV*-97-156, June 5, 1997; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, June 6, 1997, *FBIS-SOV*-97-157, June 6, 1997; Florence, *La Nazione*, in Italian, June 8, 1997, *FBIS-WEU*-97-159, June 8, 1997.

62. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, February 11, 1997; *The Monitor*, February 12, 1997; Paul Goble, "Analysis From Washington—Putting Pressure On Baltics," *RFE/RL*, February 14, 1997.

63. Sergey M. Rogov, "Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit," Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, CIM 513/May 1997, p. 10.

64. *Open Media Research Institute, Daily Report*, March 28, 1997; Moscow, *Associated Press*, May 8, 1997; Lothar Ruehl, "The Historical Background of Russian Security Concepts and Requirements," Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda*, Oxford; Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1997, p. 34.

65. Marie Mendras, "Towards a Post-Imperial Identity," *Ibid.*, p. 103; and Aleksei Arbatov in Moscow, *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, in Russian, July-September 1994, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Central Eurasia, FBIS Report*, (henceforth *FBIS-USR*)-94-129, November 29, 1994, p. 48.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-60; Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, March 14, 1995, *FBIS-SOV-95-053*, March 20, 1995, pp. 5-7, "Old Rivals Must Advance Carefully, Despite Accord," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 4, 1997, p. 16.

67. Alexander A. Konovalov and Dmitri Evstafiev, "The Problem of Ethnic Minority Rights Protection in the Newly Independent States," Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz, eds., *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue*, Joseph S. Nye Jr. Foreword, New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1993, p. 160.

68. Robert Legvold, "The 'Russian Question'," in Baranovsky, p. 67; Sergei Medvedev, "European Security After the Cold War: A Rejoinder," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 319-320 writes:

In the years to come Russia will stay a suspended, yet constant security threat on the edge of Europe; a nuclear power and still a major military force with unclear intentions, complicated domestic policies, with multiple interest groups influencing foreign and security policy, producing scores of refugees and migrants, raising security concerns of the CIS states and Eastern Europe, and finally unable to cooperate with the West on security issues.

69. For examples of how Russia's demand for an exceptional place in Europe and a special sphere provokes this isolation from other states, see Project on Ethnic Relations, *Enhancing Regional Security: Russian and Central European Perspectives*, Warsaw, Poland, May 16-18, 1997, Princeton, NJ: Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997.

70. Charles Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe: Why NATO Is Still Best," in Downs, ed., p. 219.

71. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, Between NATO and the Russian Federation," Paris, May 27, 1997, *NATO Internet*; "Russia, NATO Agree on Act Formalizing Relations," *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 20, June 18, 1997, where a Foreign Ministry official said, "We got everything we wanted." Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," *Washington Post*, March 30, 1997, p. C7; Henry Kissinger, "The Dilution of NATO," *Washington Post*, June 8, 1997, p. C9; Friedbert Pfluger, "NATO's Bad Bargain," *New York Times*, May 16, 1997, p. A33.

72. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS World Service*, in Russian, March 26, 1997, *FBIS-UMA-97-085*, March 26, 1997; Rogov, *passim*; "Russia and NATO's Enlargement," *passim*; and interviews with a former NSC official, Washington, DC, November 6-7, 1996.

73. *The Founding Act*.

74. *Ibid.*; *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, July 8, 1997, *NATO Internet*.

75. "Expert Outlines Russian NATO Counterstep Scenarios," translated in *Johnson's Russia List*, djohnson@erols.com, No. 1284, October 15, 1997 from Budapest *Nepszava*, in Hungarian, October 9, 1997.

76. Moscow, *RIA*, in English, May 17, 1997, *FBIS-UMA-97-137*, May 17, 1997; "Rogov on Founding Act's Benefits, Problems," *Johnson's Russia List*, djohnson@cdi.org, May 28-29, 1997, from *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 28, 1997; Moscow, *Itogi*, in Russian, May 27, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-109*, May 27, 1997.

77. The most recent example is "Primakov on Peace: I Do Not Envy Madeleine," *Newsweek*, September 29, 1997, p. 43.

78. *Enhancing Regional Security: Russian and Central European Perspectives*, pp. 23, 43-44.

79. Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the Baltic: Is There a Threat to European Security?," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 13-16; revealingly, Chernomyrdin now calls for the Baltic states to assume a status corresponding to that of Sweden and Finland, *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Newslines*, (henceforth *RFE/RL Newslines*), September 5, 1997.

80. *RFE/RL Newslines*, July 11, 1997.

81. Hampton, pp. 654-655; for proof of the resort to this analogy, see the following speeches by Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, and Secretary of Defense William Cohen: U.S. Information Agency, Hunter Speech, "NATO Expansion: Reckless or Requisite?," speech at the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, September 16, 1997 and U.S. Department of Defense, "Remarks Prepared for Delivery by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen," Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, CA, September 21, 1997.

82. Leon Goure, "NATO Expansion and Russia: How Will their Relations Change," in Blank, ed., *From Madrid to Brussels*, pp. 49-72.

83. Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992*, Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 1-173, 350-351.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 351.

85. In the summer of 1997, the EU announced accession negotiations would begin for five states, including Estonia and Slovenia, two states that pointedly did not succeed in getting into the first round of NATO enlargement.

86. Cambone, pp. 10-11.

87. Andrei V. Kozyrev, "NATO Is Not Our Enemy," *Newsweek*, February 10, 1997, p. 31.

88. Record and Woodbury, p. 36.

89. Stephen Sestanovich, "Why the United States Has No Russia Policy," Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century*, New York: Longman, 1997, p. 166.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

91. Stanley Hoffmann, "The United States and Western Europe"; *Ibid.*, p. 191.

92. Author's interviews with Czech officials, Prague, December 1994.

93. Asmus, p. 13; Berlin, *Die Tageszeitung*, in German, July 14, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-197*, July 16, 1997. This is also precisely the point

of the German commissioned study by Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick, "NATO Expansion and the Baltic States," Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996, a study which seems to ignore the fundamental precepts of Finnish and Swedish policies in the Baltic.

94. Jeffrey D. Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing the East," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 5, Summer 1994, pp. 42-44.

95. Paul D'Anieri, "International Cooperation Among Unequal Partners: The Emergence of Bilateralism in the Former Soviet Union," forthcoming, *International Politics*.

96. When the Albanian state fell apart in early 1997, the initial response of the EU was to do nothing until Italy took the lead in organizing a humanitarian intervention to help restore order. For the paralysis and insulationist tendencies of the West when confronting challenges from the East and South, observe the following two citations from a working group on improving East-West relations from September, 1996:

1. In the new paradigm the international system is seen as consisting of a center or a core, "the West," and a periphery. In the European context this periphery runs from regions around the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, back to the Balkans, from there through the Mediterranean to the Strait of Gibraltar. "Security" in this context means preserving the quality of society and life itself in the "center." The challenges are coming both from the center itself and from the periphery, and covering a wide spectrum of possible "negative" developments.

2. Despite all attempts to convince the three nations that no secret agreement between Washington and Moscow exists, there is fruitful soil for allegations about the possible creation of interest spheres in the Baltics.

"Improvement of the Relationship Between East and West in the Field of Security, European Meeting on Security Studies, Rome, September 16-27, 1996," *Europe and Its Neighbors: Reflections for a Common Security Policy*, Rome: September 16-27, 1996; Centro Alti Studi Difesa and the WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1996, pp. 102-103, and 106, respectively.

97. Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXI, No. 1, Spring, 1993, p. 30.

98. As President Clinton told an interviewer, “What we’ve done is to construct a balance of power that both restrains and empowers all the people who come within the framework of the agreement.” Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “The New Balance of Power,” *Washington Post*, May 30, 1997, p. 25.

99. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, July 22, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-203*, July 22, 1997.

CHAPTER 3

“FROM PRAGUE” . . . AFTER PARIS AND MADRID

Jacob W. Kipp

Introduction.

It was a great pleasure to speak to this Conference on Eurasian Security. The timing could not have been better or the theme more appropriate. The topic of our session, in fact, provided the Eurasian component of this conference’s theme since Russia, much more than NATO, has an explicit Asian security cast. Among the six strategic axes enumerated in Russia’s military reform, three have a distinctly Asian cast—the Caucasian, Central Asian, and Far Eastern. Yet the capital issues for Russia are about the management of risk and stability in Europe. Russia is, as General John Reppert reminded me earlier in the conference, “a very, very big place.” Thus, NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian relations take on this Eurasian tenor. As one involved in the practical opening of NATO contacts with the Central European states via the Soviet Army Studies Office, and later the Foreign Military Studies Office, and in the intellectual discussions of European security in a post-Cold War world, as well as editor of the journal of that name, I am a committed supporter of NATO enlargement and the successful management of the NATO-Russian relationship. As I noted several years ago, a new Europe is giving birth to a new security system; given the security challenges faced by Europe, the best answer remains one that provides a bridge rather than a buffer or a barrier.¹ This concept of a bridge was a critical feature of the vision of European security found in the *Poland-NATO*

Report, published by the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw in 1995.²

George Kennan and Challenge of Change.

The title for my remarks is taken from a slim book by Ambassador George F. Kennan, the respected dean of American commentators on international affairs. That book, a collection of papers from Kennan's tenure as the Secretary to the American legation in Prague covering the eventual period from August 1938 to October 1940, is an analytical gem for its powers of foresight and empathy. Rereading it, I was struck by the author's timely insights just one month after Munich. Kennan had already grasped the destructive consequences of the imperial ambitions and militarism that Munich had let loose upon the world.

These days, so tragic for the Czechs themselves, have been anything but pleasant for their friends. It is easy to point out the mistakes of the past, but it is not so easy to comfort people for what they regard as twenty years of misplaced endeavor, betrayal by their friends and the loss of the dream of centuries—a dream that seemed, only a short time ago, so tantalizingly close to realization.³

Munich was for Kennan never an empty metaphor to be filled with a new content. Likewise, he understood the basic and monumental tragedy that was about to unfold for the Czechoslovak peoples and for a humane Europe. Today, Ambassador Kennan is once again an important voice on the fate of Europe. He has spoken forcefully against NATO expansion and declared it the gravest error of the post-Cold War era, calling into question the very gains that a humane Europe has achieved over the last decade. This paper, in the spirit of Kennan's remarks in 1938, will seek to identify what is at stake in NATO enlargement and its most salient consequences for Russia's relationship with the new Europe. His point is well taken. The new Europe will not know peace and stability if the experiment with democracy and an open society fails in Russia. But it is quite uncertain

whether a NATO grounded upon the collective defense of Atlantic Europe would be any more capable of dealing with that challenge, so distant from its own borders.

Whereas Kennan looked at the tragic end of an era, we stand in the midst of another. Yet the subject is the same: the security of Europe and prospects for survival of a humane and whole Europe. After Paris and Madrid, it is absolutely clear that NATO will go forward in its evolution towards a regional peacekeeping and conflict management institution for this new Europe. Three states that were at the hinge of fate during the late 1930s and confined to national subjugation in the aftermath of World War II have been invited to join the Alliance. Other candidates have been identified. The Partnership for Peace program continues its good work, and NATO, through its IFOR/SFOR missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, continues its contribution to European peace and stability. Russia is playing an important role in that mission. Moreover, NATO and Russia have found grounds for cooperation. Evaluating his experience working with General George Joulwan as his Deputy Commander for the Russian contingent, Colonel-General L. P. Shevtsov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, has spoken of the unique achievements during IFOR and in 1996 advocated the maintenance of the position of Russian military representative at SHAPE.⁴ The Founding Act provides both the principles and mechanisms by which NATO and Russia can, given the will and shared interests, find the winding road to deeper cooperation. We cannot really see the outcome of these processes, but the complex system that is European security demands the effort to manage change over time. One of the great challenges will be the management of the relationship with Russia in its bilateral and multilateral forms. Paris is an important step in that process. The first meeting of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in July represents another key step. Now it is a matter of giving content to form.

Paris and the Founding Act.

Put bluntly, the issue is whether Paris has given Europe a basis upon which NATO enlargement can go forward and Russia continue to play a positive role in building a new and inclusive Europe. The Founding Act provides as the basis for NATO-Russian cooperation in post-Cold War Europe:

Russia and NATO do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of Russia and NATO to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between Russia and NATO. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.⁵

The mechanisms of such cooperation include the following areas: “consultation, cooperation, joint decisionmaking, and joint action.” The act depicts both NATO and Russia in states of change. NATO is moving from the consensual defense military alliance of the Washington Treaty towards a regional peacekeeping and crisis management organization. Russia is on its path to democracy. Russia is a state undergoing democratic transformation towards a market economy and an open society. Where one sees Russia very much defines the prospects for the type of NATO-Russian cooperation and objectively depends on developments in Russia itself. The Founding Act suggests that cooperation between NATO and Russia is the interest of each in accomplishing its transition. It emphasizes the role of other institutions, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in fostering a stable security environment for the next century.

Moreover, the act defines the risks and challenges which both NATO and Russia see before them, to include:

aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, and persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.⁶

That these are risks and challenges and not threats speaks much to the point of the new arrangement as being one of conflict management and prevention and not collective defense. Collective defense is now frankly an insurance treaty against an indefinite and ambiguous future threat. Only the utter failure of NATO's efforts in crisis management and conflict resolution will bring Article V into play. In that context, the guarantees would be operating under very ambiguous circumstances. Moreover, the principles contained in the Founding Act are about a different order of relations. Transparency, the critical importance of a civil society to democratic peace and stability, refraining from the use of force, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual transparency in the areas of defense and security doctrines, and, finally, cooperation, on a case-by-case basis, in peacekeeping operations are the vocabulary of the new Europe just being born. How the principles and mechanisms work in practice will depend on the progress of transformation within NATO and its members (old and new) and within Russia.

The key venue for cooperation will be the newly created Russia-NATO PJC. It will be there that the question of mutual trust and interest will be resolved. Its charter calls for seeking opportunities for joint action in as many areas as possible. And the list is, indeed, impressive. Moreover, the charter provides for a wide range of levels of interactions. And here there is a danger that bureaucratic inertia will overcome a prudent set of priorities with appropriate institutional support and sustained effort. Quantity is no substitute for quality in this regard. Recently Deputy

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott addressed the role of the PJC in developing NATO-Russian relations. The keystone is pragmatic and mutually-beneficial cooperation. Russian distrust of NATO expansion will go down in proportion to the success of the Alliance's efforts to promote effective, mutually-beneficial cooperation. Talbott observed:

And the reason that the disagreement, I think, will diminish is because the Russians will become convinced that we mean what we say—we, NATO—when we say NATO is not directed against Russia, in fact quite the contrary, NATO is prepared to work ever more with Russia....⁷

Ambassador Kennan has warned against NATO expansion because it could be the sort of misstep that, over time, leads to the tragedy of Prague after Munich. The point is that we are entering upon a new stage in the evolution of the emerging security system for Europe, and NATO-Russian relations will be of capital importance to the utility, stability, and consequences of this system. Only time will tell whether we have the will and patience to turn these initiatives into instruments that contribute to the peace and stability of the entire European-Atlantic community. This depends very much on the internal politics of Russia and is, at heart, a matter of what parties and programs will direct Russia's foreign and security policy. As Alexander A. Segounin has suggested, NATO expansion has been opposed by much of the political elite in Russia. The dividing line now, however, has moved from NATO-phobia to damage limitation and pits those who have sought to protect and reduce the threat to Russian interests in such developments against those who would only be satisfied if the Atlantic Community ceased to exist.⁸

Richard Pipes and the Weimar Metaphor.

Recently, another dean of American historians of Russia, Professor Emeritus Richard Pipes of Harvard, warned that military developments in Russia called into question the very processes at the foundation of the Paris

and Madrid agreements. Pipes, who served in the Reagan administration as National Security Advisor on the Soviet Union, warned against a Russian military revival, imperial ambitions, and commitment to overturn the existing order in Eastern Europe. For Pipes, this potential threat is sufficient to oppose NATO enlargement on the grounds that the Alliance's guarantees of collective defense need to be maintained and any "unmerited concessions" be avoided.⁹ I would like to take this opportunity to focus on this military problem because Professor Pipes on another occasion invoked a powerful metaphor from the very period upon which Ambassador Kennan commented: Weimar Germany and the Reichswehr.¹⁰ Does such a metaphor capture the current situation in Russia and does its logic undermine the rationale for NATO-Russian cooperation, NATO enlargement, and NATO's transformation into an instrument of mutual security, as opposed to collective defense? Are there Russian military-technical capabilities now, or in the near future, that constitute such a threat to the general peace of Europe to justify a system of collective defense directed against Russia?

Having studied Russian and Soviet military foresight and forecasting for the last three decades and having just completed the editing of the English translation of Army General Makhmut A. Gareev's book, *Esli zavtra voyna? . . .* (If War Comes Tomorrow? . . .),¹¹ I would like to comment on the issues raised by Professor Richard Pipes' "Russian Generals Plan for the Future." Soviet thinking about the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) began well before the Gulf War. General Gareev, then the head of the Directorate of Military Science of the General Staff, observed:

Now we can speak about a turning point in the development of military science and military art. In general, a new qualitative leap in the development of military affairs, connected with the modernization of nuclear weapons and especially the appearance of new types of conventional weapons, is ripening. In connection with this (process) there has arisen the need to

rethink the basic military-political and operational-strategic problems of the defense of the socialist Fatherland.¹²

The focus of Soviet military forecasting was distinctly narrow and encompassed military-technical issues of future war. The military-political issues defining the threat, probable opponent, and political goals were left in the hands of the Communist Party. The context was of an ideologically-shaped, militarized, bipolar competition in which Europe was the chief prize and potentially the most dangerous theater of military actions, involving the risk of both horizontal and vertical escalation.

The core problem for Russian military forecasters today is that they must deal with four revolutionary events simultaneously. The first is the internal transformation of their own society, beginning with the abandonment of the militarized society that was the Soviet Union. This involves significant transformations of the polity, the economy, and the state. Each of these shapes what the military can expect to defend and what resources it can expect to receive. The second is the transformation of statehood and sovereignty from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to the Russian Federation, creating new boundaries, new neighbors, and recasting security requirements. The third is the transformation of the international system, based upon a bipolar, militarized competition between the superpowers into a multipolar order, in which the United States remains a global power and Russia assumed the role of a regional power with interests in multiple regional security orders. The fourth, and the one which Pipes emphasized, is the revolution in military affairs and the associated requirement for Russian military reform to adapt to its requirements. Under even the best of circumstances, military foresight is a matter of a "labor of Sisyphus," an unending, always incomplete, often contradictory process, in which the military must engage.¹³ But this revolution is taking place in a post-war environment of general military reductions and restructurings to fit a very different and less intense threat milieu. The risks of nuclear

and global war have been radically reduced. Local wars are still a possibility, but they are more likely to arise out of regional conflicts with their ethno-national and transnational sources.

Pipes' thesis seems to be that some Russian generals are planning for the future. This insight should hardly be surprising. General staffs have been doing that for the last 100-plus years since war became mass and industrial. There are two key issues. The first issue is for which war, with whom, and when are they planning. The second issue is who is listening and acting on their forecasts. Are the Russian forecasters Oracles of Delphi or Cassandras in Yeltsin's Russia? The answers to these two issues are critical and not so clear as Pipes suggests. Pipes portrays them as Oracles who have the ear of the power-that-be. I have assumed, on the bases of the instability within the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff and the continued deterioration of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of morale, training, combat effectiveness, and acquisitions over the last 6 years that they were more Cassandras.¹⁴

Minister Rodionov was fired in 1997 because he would not accept the idea that cutting funding and carrying out military reform were compatible. In 1997 the Duma finally voted a defense budget of 104 trillion rubles, 56 trillion rubles less than the Minister's bottom-line request of 160 trillion rubles. Of the 104 trillion rubles that were appropriated, 20 trillion rubles were never transferred to the Ministry. This year's Duma defense authorization bill stipulates a budget of 81.7 trillion rubles (or 81.7 billion in redonomiated rubles) for 1998.¹⁵ Minister of Defense Sergeev has been forced to go back to the President and Duma to ask for additional funds.

On the military-technical issue of the revolution in military affairs, Pipes oversimplifies the issue. The Russian General Staff was not stunned by the Gulf War. They certainly missed the casualty ratios for the two sides, but so

did many other militaries. But the advanced technology, especially precision fire, advanced automated systems of troop control, and electronic warfare, was no surprise. Rear Admiral V. S. Pirumov and his colleague, R. A. Chervinsky, published a study of the Falklands conflict in 1988 and foresaw the role of information warfare and radio electronic warfare very clearly.¹⁶ In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Pirumov pointed out that the truly revolutionary aspect of the war was the fact that the struggle for “command of the ether” had replaced “command of the air” as the precursor of modern deep operations.¹⁷ Pirumov served on the Main Naval Staff and then the Academy of the General Staff. From 1994 to early 1997, he served as Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Russian Security Council. Marshals Ogarkov and Akhromeev had been talking about the revolution in military affairs from the late 1970s. The Gulf War did not convince Russian generals that “they must abandon traditional Russian strategy and tactics of relying primarily on offensive by hordes of foot soldiers regardless of casualties.” The infantry army of the Great Patriotic War was dead by that war’s third phase. In the post-war era, tanks and APCs replaced foot soldiers. The issue in the Gulf War was the survival of masses of mechanized and tank forces on the post-modern battlefield. The Soviets had been trying to address this issue by looking at concentration of deep fire and strike effects without massing means—tanks, APCs, artillery and rocket systems—which could be hit by precision strikes, the reconnaissance fire and strike complexes of the 1980s.¹⁸

The cohort of 1923, which led the Soviet Army almost to the very end, never could give up the idea of massed mechanized warfare. Reform-minded officers and analysts grasped the problem and the inherent revolution in military affairs associated with the new systems.

Regarding Russia’s pool of manpower, Pipes makes critical points and then fails to carry the analysis forward. Russia has had a mass army since the Miliutin reforms of the 1870s, but mass conscription does not provide the sort of

soldier necessary to man modern weapons systems. Moreover, a declining population and reduced life expectancy for males undercut the logic of relying on mass armies, even as advanced technology places more emphasis on the quality of troops and not sheer quantity. These long-term demographic problems and current hostility towards the draft intensify the manpower problem. But Russia is a continental state with potential threats on multiple strategic directions, and requires some sort of mobilization (economy and personnel) system. Right now, as Russian military reformers have asserted, Russia has too many men under arms in all the various power ministries and must reduce those numbers in such a fashion as to enhance the prospects for economic development, fiscal stability, and social peace. The sad truth is that former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov was right when he said that downsizing the military will cost substantially more than maintaining the force, if the state is to honor its legislative/contractual obligations to its professional officers. Alexei Arbatov, a member of the Yabloko Faction in the State Duma and Deputy Chairman of its Defense Committee, has argued for a much smaller, professional army of 800,000 with a very limited mobilization base for manpower and the economy.¹⁹

Regarding the Russian decision to reduce current procurement of weapons and concentrate on research and development (R&D), this is prudent policy in a time when the risk of general war seems unlikely, and when a Revolution in Military Affairs is under way. Many states are following that policy. Pipes, however, focuses on technology in the abstract. The Russian generals are seeking

to draw on Russia's impressive scientific talent to blueprint military technology that in the not too distant future will give them fighting capabilities unmatched by any potential rival. Emphasis is laid on directed energy, electronic data equipment, lasers and other futuristic weapons that are being designed with the help of U.S. super computers.

It would seem that the key event in this R&D offensive is “the help of U. S. super computers.” What Pipes does not seem to understand is that a military revolution has two critical components and is not a matter of weapons production. First, the state needs science, technology, and economic capacity that can be mobilized in a timely fashion for military purposes. Second, a military revolution is not a matter of wonder weapons and strategic technological surprise but a struggle for the technological initiative, where concepts and organizational innovations, requiring exercises and study, are absolutely critical. What an army spends on training and education of its officer corps matters more than actual weapons R&D. The Reichswehr had no tanks. The Wehrmacht learned in Spain that it had procured the wrong tanks in the Mark I and Mark II and went to war with a hodgepodge of obsolete and foreign tanks in its parks. But the concept at the heart of the panzer division of mechanized war involving combined arms coordination with effective troop control proved effective.

DESERT STORM did not show that one post-modern army equipped with advanced C⁴I and precision-strike weapons is “now capable of neutralizing an army before serious combat operations even get underway.” It demonstrated the vulnerability of a modern, tank-heavy force with weak C⁴I to such capabilities. We do not know—have no experience with—combat between two post-modern forces. Negation of “mass” may be overstated, since “mass” could take on a very different character in post-modern combat and operations. Military theorists speak of massing fire and not forces. But in this case, precision fire negates the requirement for an overwhelming superiority in numbers expressed as a correlation of forces ratio. Russian military studies on military systemology, i.e., a conflict of one system of systems against another system of systems, seems to put a premium of redundancy, force protection, and robustness in its theory of combat systems.

Pipes is correct in noting a shift in Russian nuclear policy, which now renounces the no first use pledge. But it is

hardly like NATO's flexible response. Coming from one of the great hawks of the Committee on the Present Danger, this characterization of Russian current strategy as deterrence sounds a bit strange. Russia has a weak conventional military, unstable neighbors, a nuclear arsenal of questionable stability, and a government that has suffered military defeat on its own territory. That does not sound much like the context of NATO's Flexible Response or a sound deterrence posture. The same generals whom Pipes once accused of just waiting for the right correlation of forces under the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to launch a war-winning nuclear strike are now going to be prudent in a military-political crisis affecting their immediate state, territory, and population. Good relations with the United States have reduced the risk of nuclear war on a global scale and can lead to further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both powers. But Professor Pipes does not seem to have such actions in mind. Yet, this is just the point made by Russian analysts who favor START II ratification and propose new negotiations to bring even further cuts. These authors are even willing to consider a strategic partnership with the United States in a shift from postures based on mutually-assured destruction to mutually-assured protection, including limited anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems capable of dealing with nuclear attacks from rogue states.²⁰

Opposing NATO expansion, Pipes emphasizes the threat Russia poses to the other successor states from the Soviet Union. He specifically cites Russian requirements for additional population, Ukrainian food, and Caspian oil. But these are hardly war aims. Even Pipes suggests that: "Military weakness along with fear of foreign sanctions precludes simple reconquest. But they do not inhibit gradual military penetration of the sovereign states of what has become known as 'the near abroad'." Does public support for such adventures enter into this matter in any way? Pipes seems to assume that Russians are imperialists by definition. Yet, one of the major topics of political debate

in Russia today is precisely the question of whether Russia will be a normal great power with regional interests or an empire.

That thought is the most troubling aspect of the essay because it raises questions of the Reichswehr analogy. The Reichswehr-von Seeckt analogy is inappropriate precisely because the cases do not fit. First, Pipes does not understand the military transformation of the Reichswehr under von Seeckt, the topic of James Corum's two excellent books.²¹ This transformation involved mastering the lessons learned from World War I, especially a revolution in infantry-combined arms tactics and troop control, which set new requirements for troop training and equipment. The covert mobilization capacity was significant but limited. Germany was forbidden to produce or acquire certain weapons, including combat aircraft, tanks, chemical weapons, submarines, and capital ships of above 10,000 tons. A small, professional force of 100,000 men with the advantage of peace could master the training for specific missions—war in the west and east—France and Poland. The Reichswehr did circumvent Versailles through foreign covert arrangements with the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Finland in the production and testing of prototypes. but it is unclear how much Germany gained by this process. At the same time the Reichswehr sought to retain its professionalism by staying out of German politics, to be a state within the state.

The Russian situation today is different in key details. In Russia there are arms limitations, but they were mutually negotiated and not imposed on the defeated by the winners. Russia retains a nuclear arsenal that alone assures its status as a great power. The arms transfer arrangements in the Russian case are overt, and involve current sales of advanced systems for cash to retain Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDTE) capacity. In at least the Chinese case, the sales are to a major potential opponent. Domestically, Russian militaries are completely politicized and involved in intense rivalries for state

support. Only the regular forces of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) seem to have any institutional interest in technological development or a professional orientation towards future high-tech threats. Sustaining three million-plus, non-MOD troops must be a break on state investment in R&D. But the current government sees the chief threat as internal and counts on the loyalty of its various Internal Troops, Border Guards, Federal Security Service (FSB) special forces, Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) and Ministry of Extraordinary Situations (MChS) units to sustain internal order and leverage the borderlands and near abroad. Russian intervention in these areas since 1991 has been problematic and costly. Unlike the Reichswehr, the Russian Armed Forces have not been allowed to focus on their own reform but have been used by the state in an unsuccessful attempt to put down secession in Chechnya. There is a risk of an anti-Western backlash in the military. Aleksandr Yanov has argued that Yeltsin's Russia is in a "Weimar stage" from which forces of revanche may gain the upper hand in the form of some "Red-Brown" alliance. But that is primarily a question tied to Russian internal stability, statehood, and a politicized military, very different from von Seeckt's professional autonomy.

Andrei Kokoshin, then First Deputy Minister of Defense and now Secretary to the Defense Council and Head of the State Military Inspectorate, in his recent book, *Armiya i politika* (The Army and Politics) did, indeed, look back to the 1920s for an inspiration for military reform. But Kokoshin did not emphasize von Seeckt and the Reichswehr, but rather Svechin, Frunze, and the Red Army.²² In his conclusion, he stressed three relevant points: adapting the concept of deep operations to system of systems vs. system of systems warfare involving information superiority, determining the level and imminence of the threat of war on specific geopolitical directions, and the capital problem of effective civilian control of the military. These are all real issues which will have much to say about Russia's military

power, its place in the international security system, and the level of stability in Eurasia. The need to address both military-political and military-technical issues has been a major theme of Kokoshin's recent discussion of the need for a unified military doctrine for Russia.²³ Only recently, Russia's Security Council issued a document covering in broad outline these political questions in the form of Russia's National Security Concept. As regards Russia-NATO relations and the expansion of NATO, that document lays out its capital concern: expansion means a renewed division of Europe at Russia's expense.²⁴ Expansion is considered a political danger and a potential military threat, given the dynamics of the RMA, especially the appearance of a new generation of weapons and a renewed arms race.

Over the last several months, the Russian government has once again sought to move forward on military reform, beginning with the pressing need to reduce the overall size of the armed forces under the Ministry of Defense by 500,000 over the next 2 years, to an end-state of 1.2 million. The central element of the reforms is to reduce the burden of defense on the national economy and to provide the bases for the creation of a smaller, post-modern military. The other announced reorganizations—concentration of strategic assets in a single branch, the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the unification of the air and air defense forces, the reduction of the number of military districts from eight to six and their transformation into strategic directions, and the abolition of the Main Command for Ground Forces and strengthening of the command authority of strategic direction commanders—do much to define the sort of conflicts that the Russian government foresees in the future, local wars with the risk of regional and strategic escalation. But the core assumption involved in these reforms is that the threat to Russia on any axis is not immediate or high. The real threat is Russia's own internal stability, and this, most of all, depends upon peace and successful internal reform. Aleksei Arbatov has argued that the key element to

successful military reform is the establishment of strong, effective civilian control of the military, including legislative oversight of the budget process.

It is here that the issue of “Weimar Russia” does raise its head. But the threat is political and not military-technical. Yanov’s “Weimar Russia” begins with the victory of revanchist elements in alliance with disaffected army officers. The threat to Russian stability does not come from rogue generals plotting future war but from what Arbatov has called weak and ineffective civilian control of Russia’s multiple militaries. The Yeltsin government’s greatest error has been in combining the ill-considered use of military power within Russia with a subjective military control, based on fear and misunderstanding of what professional armed forces require in an open, democratic society. This situation, when combined with the cast of Russian domestic politics, could lead to military intervention in the Russian polity.

The current Russian government, while in no way endorsing NATO enlargement, has sought to make the best deal that it could and keep Russia engaged in Europe. This government wants Russia to play the role of a great power, to have a directing hand in the evolution of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and to act as a Eurasian great power, having its own relations in the East and South. It is very likely that the United States and other Western powers will have disputes with this Russia, but it is a Russia anchored in the new Europe. On the other hand, many opposition parties, including Gennadiy Zyuganov’s Communists and Vladimir Zhirinovksy’s Liberal Democratic Party, are opposed to the very existence of NATO and are determined to overturn the territorial and political settlement that emerged between 1989 and 1992. For them, the West is the eternal enemy, and Russia’s reformers are traitors and agents of influence. General-Colonel Lev Rokhlin, hero of Grozny and Chairman of the State Duma’s Defense Committee, heads the newly-founded Movement for Support of the Army, Defense

Industry, and Military Science, which aims at nothing less than the removal of the elected president. He recently declared:

Thus, the domestic, military and foreign policies pursued by the country's leadership are not in line with our national interests and are aimed at destroying our defense might—which will inevitably lead to Russia losing its sovereignty and independence.²⁵

Others associated with the unreconciled nationalist-communist opposition have been even more explicit about an inevitable conflict with the West. Aleksandr Dugin, an author with close ties to Aleksandr Prokhanov's *Zavtra*, has written a primer on geopolitics in which he asserts that Russia, as the great continental power of Eurasia, is fated to an inevitable conflict with the maritime West's Atlanticism and globalism (*mondializm*).²⁶ Dugin, a self-styled "conservative revolutionary," rejects both liberal democracy and communism in favor of a third path. Russia's current reformers are no more than "agents of Western influence."²⁷ He has called for a Russian military that will be an army of empire and not that of a great regional power. Thus, nuclear weapons, strategic defense, space assets, naval, missile, and strategic aviation forces get top priority. Ground forces are treated as internal forces, and only airborne forces are given serious attention.²⁸ While some points in this military program sound very much like those of Russia's current reformers, the context of a renewed global military competition is quite different. For Dugin, geopolitics defines the constants for Russian foreign and defense policy, and, for its military doctrine, the core reality is that "the main 'potential enemy' is namely the Atlantic Bloc."²⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, an active supporter of a NATO enlargement that would include Ukraine and the Baltic states, seems to mirror this analysis. In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, he called upon the United States, "as the world's premier power," to play a decisive role in redefining the "geostrategy" of Eurasia and advocated the emergence of a "Greater China" and a weak, confederated Russia.³⁰ His

views and the map of redrawn spheres of influence in Eurasia have strengthened the case of those in Moscow who see such a geopolitical conflict between Russia and the United States as inevitable.³¹

Conclusion.

Russia's transition to a democratic and open society is the key to peace and stability in the new Europe. No one in the midst of this great transformation can guarantee that it will be successful. But treating Russia as a pariah or object in the international system can only aid those committed to overthrowing the existing international system. Moreover, for all its faults and failures, the Russian experiment still deserves the support of those seeking to give Europe an era of peace and stability. Cooperation between U.S.-NATO and Russia, as exemplified by the Russian military presence with Task Force Eagle in IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia, represents the best hope for a new security system for Europe. It assumes the possibility of joint efforts towards the establishment of peace and security in Europe. It is based on a willingness to take into account the mutual interests of both sides. In 20 years others will look back on these accomplishments. May they see that we were farsighted enough to grasp the opportunity before us and prudent enough to build an international order that reduced the risk of war. Powerful metaphors, unconnected to the complex system that is now undergoing fundamental change, can blind us to the details of managing change. And our challenge, as Kennan suggested in 1938, is to avoid tragic mistakes even as we endeavor to shape a better future for Europe in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

AFTER MADRID AND AMSTERDAM: POLAND AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Przemyslaw Grudzinski

It is fairly obvious that, in light of the decision taken at the Madrid Summit and at the Amsterdam European Union (EU) Summit (plus the subsequent European Commission proposal to start accession negotiations with five Central European states in January 1998), Polish foreign and security policy must be revisited. The basic tenets of that policy, its Western orientation, and its general nature will and should remain the same. But Poland will have to consider several new issues resulting from its improved institutional perspective. Among those issues is whether to support in the next decade a gradual, but at the same time unlimited, expansion of the Euro-atlantic and European institutions, or to favor a more modest but realistic model of enlargement (without harboring any illusions that Poland will be an influential decisionmaker in fundamental NATO decisions). My own view is that greater Europe can best be balanced within a framework of multifaceted, multi-dimensional, and multilateral structures in which both an open and exclusive grouping of states can and will coexist with each other. I agree with Norman Davies' view, recently expressed in his history of Europe, that "somewhere between the depths of Russia and the heart of Europe a new dividing line will have to be established—hopefully along a border of peace."¹ Not abandoning the idea of building a Europe "free and undivided" as a long-term aim, Poland will concentrate on less ambitious but more concrete short- and medium-term goals that will directly lead to enhancing European security and stability, particularly in Central

Europe. That, in practice, means supporting NATO and European Union (EU) membership for those countries that have proven themselves to be consistent in their reform process in all areas and have been able to consolidate these achievements.

It is equally obvious that, in mapping out a more secure Europe at the turn of the century, three fundamental issues should be taken into account: democratization, living standards, and economic development and security. It is now also clear that the calls of Central European states (at this point, certainly three of them) for security have been answered by the West, despite the strategic and political hesitations and ambiguities involved in the process of providing and sharing security. Security first (as a shield enabling both democratization and economic reforms) was, to my mind, a rational way of prioritizing the foreign and security strategies of Poland and its neighbors, given the patterns of the past and the historic necessity of overcoming their geopolitical predicament. It is now also clear that the core security of an enlarged Europe will be built around NATO, an institution led by the United States and at the same time anchoring it to Europe. In an almost miraculous way, a workable structure of European security has been emerging out of post-Cold War fluidity and chaos; a structure that responds to the security perceptions and the deepest concerns of Poles allowing us to concentrate on the gigantic task of EU integration and necessary preparations for NATO membership.

As far as European security is concerned, its security structures should obviously be related to the security threats and risks that European nations feel themselves exposed to. For those who still think of NATO as a shield designed to protect against the massive invasion from the East, the expansion of NATO may seem irrelevant. A British critic of NATO enlargement, Ian Davidson, recently noted that there is no need to move the line of Western defenses to the east “since the countries of Eastern Europe do not need this defense since they face no present or

probable threat from Russia,” but at the same time, “the enlargement of NATO cannot fail to be seen as aimed at Russia because that is precisely why the east Europeans want to join; and in any case, it is unavoidably a shift in the strategic balance of power against Russia.”² Poland certainly did not aspire to join NATO as a measure against anybody, and the strategic shift in Europe has been both the cause and the result of the end of the Cold War.³

Still others make the point “that formal NATO membership for Eastern European nations is less important for that region’s security than their spokesmen now suppose and less disadvantageous for Russia than its spokesmen now suppose.”⁴ I would argue that, from a Polish perspective, the first of these arguments is wrong but the latter absolutely correct. Madrid’s NATO decision addressed two persisting existential and fundamental problems looming over the Poland’s future. For the first time in Polish modern history its own internal effort at reforming itself has been matched by the external support she has received. This time Poland has been accepted as a full member of a prosperous and secure community of Western nations and not left out in the cold as a second class citizen residing in the other Europe.

That doubts in the West on the score of Poland’s belonging to this community (in terms of values, possible contributions and Western self-interest) have been strong and persistent is quite clear. For example, British author Tony Judt recently argued that setting aside

the issue of cultural affinity—whether, that is, western Europe is lacking a vital part of itself if it is in any way separated from central and eastern Europe. . . . The perceived self-interest of western Europe today lies in securing itself against demographic and economic threats to its east and south. As for threats of a more conventional sort, it is an unspoken assumption of all European defense planners that Russia remains the only significant military threat to the rest of Europe. That may or may not be so. What is even less clear is whether Russia will be more or less threatening if the borders

of a non-Russian European Union are pushed nearer to its present frontier. That the major states of western and central Europe have the same interest they always had in maintaining buffer states to separate them from Russia is clear. But whether these perform their geo-strategic role better in or out of a formal Union remains an open question for many western diplomats.⁵

Now, by NATO's decision on enlargement, the compelling logic of building a larger and more secure Europe has been inevitably and irrevocably put in motion. Central European countries, not only the three invited but others as well, may become—due to the same logic—a part of institutional Europe and thus not remain condemned to float in the “other Europe” forever, provided they earn their position by determined domestic reconstruction. The first wave of enlargement is therefore crucial to the future of the whole region. This also has serious implications for Europe as a whole. In a few years Central Europeans will themselves participate in shaping the future of Europe and not simply accept whatever terms the West proposes. In modern history, opening the door to the full participation of Poland in the political, economic, and social development of Europe is a watershed. This has not been the case in regard to Poland for the past 300 years. A dynamic, prosperous Poland contributing to Transatlantic and European stability and prosperity will be the best proof of the correctness of the NATO enlargement decision and not the prolonged absence of threats from the East. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

As far as the Russia factor is concerned, George F. Kennan, who may now be called the father of both the containment and the self-containment doctrine, recently wrote that:

Leaving aside these 18th and 19th century incursions of Russia into Eastern and Central Europe, which were really parts of what Gibbon referred to as “the contagion of the times,” and also leaving aside the wholly abnormal situations of what we might call the terrible Hitlerian-Stalinist period, the worst that can be said about earlier Russian foreign policies is that they reflected

an undue sensitivity to the proximity or threatened proximity to the Russian borders of any other strong power and a tendency either to push these borders farther from the Russian heartland or to create protective zones just beyond them.⁶

Similarly, in the words of a contemporary Russian foreign policy analyst, such

Russian expansion was beneficial to pan-European interests, but it did create some problems. Some of these were external in nature, since this expansion led to (the) destruction of some powerful neighbors: Poland, Sweden, and Turkey.⁷

And, in the words of Sergey Kortunov written just before the Madrid Summit,

. . . it would be possible to structure such (Euro-Atlantic) security without the Central and East European countries, Baltic countries, and Ukraine—but not without Russia.⁸

The current ongoing rearrangement of Central Europe as an integral part of the West makes my own response to these claims superfluous since the facts remove the whole strata of historic legacies accumulated over hundreds of years. This new situation may help to gradually but successfully overcome the whole culture of bad feelings, mutual distrust, jealousies, and a mutual lack of respect for one another, as well as Russian over-reliance on force and intimidation, and Polish feelings of insecurity coming from the East. The new situation will create much better conditions for developing a new political culture and habits of cooperation in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO enlargement thus achieves Poland's twin goals of removing persisting fear of another Yalta and constituting a starting point for a historic rapprochement with Russia. This is provided that the Russian Federation will not react aggressively against Poland's membership in NATO and toward Poland's support for the continued process of enlargement. This time the West was able to deliver on its

promise; NATO's dual-track approach towards Russia and Central Europe was able to attain its objective, or so it seems at the moment. Both objectives were pursued as important, and inevitable trade-offs have not been made at the expense of Poland's fundamental goals. Poland's determined, non-nationalistic and clear-cut foreign and security policy bore fruits. At the same time, it is only the starting point for further developments which will most importantly lead to the organic integration of Europe, although the road ahead will certainly be long and difficult. But the bottom line is that Poland is now in a much better position to reach its European aspirations.

The tradition of sympathy for others at the expense of Central Europe and its problems is still ascribed to those politicians and analysts who criticize Polish policy as prejudiced in favor of the West and who insist that Poland should act as a major bridge between East and West. Like Sherman Garnett, they maintain that, contrary to Poland's pro-Western orientation, Poland's Russian policy lacks dynamism and effectiveness. As a result, there is a certain imbalance in Poland's foreign policy, although "for Poland, an *Ostpolitik* is no luxury, nor can it be postponed until the NATO question or other aspects of Poland's Western agenda are resolved." Participants in the debate on NATO expansion "appear to be pushing Poland toward the role of a bulwark, not a bridge." Poles themselves are not without blame.

A start for both Poland and NATO would include the following steps: First, the West, including NATO and the EU, as well as the states of Central Europe, must emphasize the significance of an Eastern policy. Poland's steps to the East ought to be seen as more important to EU or NATO membership than needless professions of its readiness to host nuclear weapons or conventional forces. Poland should view itself as a force for redefining Western Europe's own eastern policy and for changing attitudes toward Ukraine. It should also work to encourage a sustained Russian-Central European format for cooperation and consultation. Existing Central European fora, such as the Central European Initiative, should be expanded to

include the Baltic states, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Such a stance would open new avenues of cooperation with the United States and Germany and would be a long-term service to the Alliance as a whole.⁹

The dilemma of Poland as a bulwark or a bridge along Europe's axis is utterly wrong; it is a remnant of the Cold War division of Europe into East and West. This will only be a dilemma if plans for an expanded NATO and a more secure Europe come to nothing. If these plans become reality, Poland will not conduct a separate and independent policy towards Russia, but one that will meet Poland's institutional obligations to NATO and the EU. In the current communication, technological, and commercial age, Poland will not act as a bridge but as one of the elements of a distinct and relatively open NATO and EU border. Proponents of the bridge theory are not aware of the irritation of the Russians themselves when states of Central Europe offer them their "bridge" services. "It is up to Russia itself to arrange its relations with Western Europe, avoiding the dubious advantages of [East Central Europe] ECE mediation." ("All East European countries, even Estonia, Lithuania, and Albania, have billed themselves as a 'bridge' for economic partnership between East and West," wrote Russian economist Y. Monich.¹⁰) Some Western politicians delight in prompting Bulgaria to assume the role of bridge to Russia. Bulgaria, British Secretary of State Portillo said, "must utilize its special relations with Moscow in order to become a bridge between Russia and NATO." "Friendly bridge" seems to have become a new formula for neutrality. This is precisely the trap which Central Europeans should be careful to avoid.

The essential questions Polish and Western critics of Poland's Eastern policy ask are:

- Is current policy conducive to Poland's integration into and significant role within Europe?

- Isn't Poland wasting an opportunity to devise an effective Eastern policy of its own which might help it succeed in its aspirations of joining NATO and the European Union?
- Shouldn't Poland insist that the conditions of her joining these institutions not jeopardize Poland's interests in the East?

These questions are suspended in a political and strategic vacuum. This proposes that Poland participate in a very risky game, promising that Poland will play a special role in East and Central Europe. Such a game would provoke another nation-wide discussion concerning Poland's orientation and would exacerbate the geopolitical split between East and West.

Poland has charted her path towards a normalization of her European status. This path leads through the historic reconciliation with Germany and takes into account the positive geopolitical changes in the East. Poland's strategy does not, however, boil down to perceiving the end of her history in her integration in Europe. On the contrary, only Poland's full integration into the main current of European policy and civilization will open up new and real possibilities in the region. Today, for our neighbors to the east, the success or frustration of our European endeavors (Finland, another neighbor of Russia's, understands this very well) is a criterion of Poland's standing and attractiveness as a partner.

From the Polish point of view, there are three main determinants for the further reorganization of the European state system in the era of integration and globalization:

1. Poland's policy towards the West. The orientation toward Euro-Atlantic ties and European integration. Its most important futures are, on the one hand, priority given to relations with the United States (NATO framework), and on the other, maintaining the momentum in relations with

Germany and France (bilateral and trilateral cooperation both within the NATO and EU frameworks and outside of them—Weimar triangle).

2. Polish policy toward Central Europe. Supporting the further institutionalization of security in the region based on NATO and the EU/Western European Union (WEU) and not allowing the current but temporary division of Central European states into haves and have nots (the essential requirement is that they earn their membership by internal progress) to assume a permanent character.

3. The stabilization of our own region in the spirit of good-neighborly relations (also with the East):

(a) A policy of supporting Ukraine as an expression of Poland's aspiration to intensify the positive effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union by genuinely breaking down barriers. (Hardly anyone remembers that Central Europe was isolated not only by the "iron curtain" on the River Elbe from the West, but also by the barbed wire on the River Bug from the East). This "Ukrainian strategy" realizes Poland's potential and makes it more attractive to key Western partners. Poland will support the development of Ukraine's close cooperation with NATO.

(b) A good-neighborly policy towards Russia should consist of a strategy of patient building of mutually advantageous relations in an evolving fashion without resorting to immediate, eye-catching initiatives which could jeopardize our European orientation.

Poland's Eastern policy must be in consonance with the program for the institutionalization of European security which Poland belongs to and supports. We want to construct this program around NATO and the EU and want it to contribute to good and friendly relations between these institutions and states remaining outside their institutional limits.

Poland will oppose the reemergence of a Concert of Powers outside the existing institutional framework which

could function as an exclusive grouping of powers and, conceivably, also as a narrow interest group of NATO countries and Russia, and would aspire to coordinate European politics within the framework of the NATO-Russia agreement or—as Russia wishes—as a superstructure within the framework of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the eyes of Poles, a Concert of Powers would be an openly discriminatory mechanism which would diminish the future benefits stemming from the institutionalization of the European security system. It would reduce our influence on our own security and European security in general. But readdressing OSCE capabilities and functions would be useful and would not have to run counter to the basic role of NATO (and the WEU/EU) as the core element of European security.

In the wake of the Madrid Summit and having a clear perspective of joining the EU in 5 years, Poland should ask itself what its role in Europe will be after 1999-2002, and what strategic options it has within the framework of the emerging European system.

Below I discuss a range of strategic possibilities, starting from the most favorable from the point of view of Poland's security in the European state system. I make the assumption that the process of ratifying an enlarged NATO, as difficult as it may be, will lead to membership of the three Visegrad countries in the spring of 1999. I make here also the assumption that Poland and four other Central European states will join the EU by 2002.

Central Europe within the Security System Based on NATO and the EU. This is the best possible system from the point of view of Poland. Membership in NATO, combined with full participation in the EU/WEU system, OSCE, and the Council of Europe would allow Poland and other Central European states to achieve their main political and economic aspirations. This model ensures the balance of power within the European system and Russia's

participation within it through the maintenance of an American presence in Europe. It offers the possibility of achieving a compromise between the central Western coalition and Russia as the Euro-Asiatic power. It would enable Poland to set up an efficient network of ties with Russia, as Poland's Western orientation does not result from its aspiration to shut out and isolate Russia from the West. "On the contrary," said Krzysztof Skubiszewski, former foreign minister of Poland:

by joining Western organizations and by building up good relations with the East, Poland draws the West closer to Russia, thus becoming a bridge between east and west of the European continent. Here, the word "bridge," so often senselessly repeated, has real meaning (potentially at least).¹¹

As a corollary to its own intensive preparation for enlargement in 1999, Polish strategy will try to help offset the negative consequences of Central Europe being divided into haves and have nots: by supporting the next wave of enlargement, by offering programs devised to improve the chances of the next candidate countries, by creating a dense network of political and security cooperation, and by engaging in defense cooperation. This strategy will not be based on unique Polish considerations, but will be conceived of as part of an overall NATO effort to further enhance stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

In a less favorable variant, if the process of NATO enlargement is derailed, Poland would first become a member of the EU and, possibly, of the WEU (assuming, against all odds, that this would be possible before Poland becomes an Alliance member), and only then, a member of NATO. The adequate level of international security for Poland would be deferred for several years, making our position in this respect temporarily dependent on the solution to the difficult complex of economic and political issues. If everything goes according to the plan, Poland will join the EU in 5 years and will actively support European

defense projects in Central and Eastern Europe complementary to NATO enlargement.¹²

Central Europe as Junior Partner to the Western Coalition. According to this model, Poland would be included in the Western security system but with considerable restrictions. Poland would be subjected to a number of special predetermined limitations that, in the end, would undermine its ability to receive defense assistance and undermine its ability to contribute to European security. Although Poland supports further CFE reductions, the revised Treaty should not lead to the establishment of a special Central European zone of any kind. This would simply be the introduction of the buffer zone idea through the CFE back door. Europe will not be able to achieve real stability as long as Central Europe's uncertainties about the compromise negotiated with Russia loom over Europe. There shouldn't be any second-class security areas within the space of the Alliance. NATO must remain a uniform security space for sovereign nations. As Herbert Kramp stated in *Die Welt*:

The principle of military integration permits exceptions; the principle of equal security permits differentiated decisions with respect to troop strength, armament, deployment, and infrastructures, as well as the permanent or temporary presence of allied military forces. These restrictions depend on what the affected countries want, however. They cannot be decreed by others or without agreement (of the affected states).¹³

In the long run, such a system would deteriorate due to the growing frustration of Central Europe and the vague, undetermined influence of Russia in regard to Central European security. Poland must, as an indispensable corollary to its NATO membership, do everything possible to become a member of the EU and WEU; it would not be wise to rely totally on one pillar only.

Central Europe in a Eurocentric System (without NATO). Poland does not see, and rightly so, this conception

as an alternative to the Atlantic solution for a majority of the Central European states. There are, however, some Western politicians and analysts who treat it as an alternative model. If such a system were to emerge as a result of U.S. withdrawal from Europe, and not as a result of a long rational evolution of the EU and the WEU, it would seriously disturb European equilibrium. The United States is the necessary element of European security, although Europe has limited influence over whether or not the United States remains in Europe. Once the United States withdraws from Europe, the role of Russia, which has not opposed the expansion of the European Union into former Warsaw Pact countries, in ensuring European security may increase beyond measure. For Poland, such a system would necessitate constant maneuvering which would, in turn, make it difficult to develop truly good relations with Russia. Such a system could awaken various temptations in relation to Central Europe, for example, a rebirth of the idea of *Mittleuropa*, and certainly it would make it more difficult to coordinate Warsaw's and Bonn's eastern policies in a wider European context.

Variant of a Deferred (for a Long Time into the Future) Institutionalization of Central Europe's Security for the Majority of the Central European States. This scenario would be the result of a ceaseless process of deferring and watering down decisions on the further enlargement of NATO and the EU because of serious setbacks and a lack of internal progress in these states, the absence of political will in the West, and a disinclination to incur Russia's displeasure. This would be tantamount to deferring *ad calendas Graecas* the now realistic prospect of building a more secure order in Central Europe based on unique institutions. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (plus Slovenia and Estonia in regards to the EU) would remain on the frontier of an institutionalized Europe that would be perceived as an inflexible dividing line instead of part of a moving frontier of stability. They would be exposed to security risks and political instability as a result of an

imbalanced and divided neighborhood. Poland's strategy would also try to offset the negative consequences of Central Europe's being thus divided. (Here I do not mean the evolutionary process of NATO enlargement leading to a much larger NATO by, say, the year 2005, but a situation where the process of enlargement will be stopped after 1999). The resulting initiatives towards various parts of Central and Eastern Europe could involve EU activities and different coalitions of the willing, e.g., Germany, Poland, and Denmark; the three Visegrad countries, and Italy and other multilateral combinations designed to increase and export stability into Central and Eastern Europe. This strategy should prevent the emerging parts of Central Europe from becoming an autonomous system of subregional security, with parts of Central Europe serving as a buffer zone and parts of Central Europe subjected to division into spheres of influence and Balkanization. One should not forget that the most important factor preventing these variants from taking place is the ability of candidate countries to make convincing cases to both NATO and EU paralleled by the sustained momentum of security and economic integration in Europe.

It is clear that Poland will in the future try to influence NATO's and the EU's *Ostpolitik* in a way which will help prevent the above-described variant from emerging. It is clear that the expansion of NATO and the EU over the next 10 years will delineate the contours of political Europe. New NATO members from the East will certainly be willing to actively participate in this process. President Havel expressed the hope that NATO will be required to shape its "Eastern edge" with the participation of the countries concerned. The Alliance shouldn't remain some sort of club of the veterans of the Cold War.¹⁴ Poland, along with her allies, will search for answers to a number of difficult questions: how political and institutional Europe can relate to its nonintegrated parts; how NATO enlargement should coincide with EU enlargement; how Europe's foreign and security identity should evolve; and how to anchor Russia in

Europe. Poland will certainly be interested in enhancing European institutional stability without sacrificing the values and effectiveness which characterize the existing institutional system.

With the prospect of NATO enlargement in less than 2 years and the EU absorbing five or more new members in 5 years, the security orientation of not just the Central European future member states but also of Europe as a whole will be changing. The admittance of three Central European countries into NATO will create new NATO interests and increased interaction with the neighboring states, particularly with Ukraine and the Baltic states. As Sherman Garnett recently wrote, although this fact is little understood in the West,

Poland's security, and thus that of its allies, will be in large measure determined by the stability of its eastern neighbors. NATO and the most powerful Western states will gradually become more active in Eurasia as the Alliance's new frontiers demand their attention. . . . While increased Western activity in Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltics need not conflict with Russian interests, it will certainly be another sign of how the outside world has begun to shape lands that Russia has traditionally regarded as its exclusive domain.¹⁵

NATO's *Ostpolitik* goal, which will be fully supported by Poland, is to prevent dividing Europe into new spheres of influence, and to avoid dividing the other parts of Central Europe not invited to join NATO and the EU into narrower spheres of influence acquired by Russia and the West. Europe will not achieve lasting peace and stability based on agreement with this outdated concept. It is also possible that alternative security and defense coalitions (voluntary and involuntary) will form in the East, for the most part as a result of Moscow's aspirations to go its own way. The effect of such coalitions on European security will depend on the nature, stability, and goals of the potential new coalitions.

Finally, let me enumerate the factors which will determine the political vigor and geographical scope of a

secure Europe based on NATO and the EU entering the 21st century:

- The difficulty or ease with which NATO will be able to integrate its first new members from Central Europe. What will be the time of their political, military, cultural, and geopolitical integration into NATO? What will their actual contribution and role be? When and how will EU enlargement complement NATO's opening to the East?
- The evolution of Transatlantic security, and NATO's ability to respond to real security threats and challenges in Europe. How will NATO "*ad hoc* responses" influence its strategic and military ability to respond to security challenges? How many more members will NATO absorb? What are the limits of NATO's future growth? How will NATO enlargement influence its internal mechanisms and cohesion?
- The differentiation of potential new members from Central and Eastern Europe. How uniform will be the economic reform process and progress toward democratization in the area? How will rapid progress or the failure of reforms in parts of Central and Eastern Europe affect the NATO relationship and EU enlargement process?
- How, when, and in what fashion will NATO be able to create a new equilibrium within the enlarged institution and maintain its ability to absorb new members? One of NATO's important internal challenges will be to try to resolve the inherent tension between its traditional defense function of NATO (Article V) and its functions in the cooperative security domain which may, in daily practice, tend to dominate NATO activities in the beginning of the 21st century.

- The ability of an integrated Europe to integrate new members and to develop more self-dependent foreign and security policy (within and outside NATO mechanisms). The other side of the coin is American willingness to remain actively engaged in Europe. It now seems that NATO will be able to play the crucial role of shielding the process of building a more secure Europe, even if the process of EU integration is slowed down. At the same time, the United States, by endorsing a limited enlargement of NATO, sends a signal to Europe that it is willing to help to solve some, but not all, European security concerns.
- Last, but not least, the Russian factor, the internal evolution of the situation in Russia, the relationship between an enlarged NATO and Russia, and the nature of any Moscow-inspired Commonwealth of Independent States integration will largely determine the evolution of NATO into the 21st century. To remain effective, NATO must develop the ability to act in close consultation and cooperation with Moscow and other powers but also retain its ability to develop policies and react to crises solely bound on its own internal values, interests and strategic assessments.

Poland would like, in a modest way and commensurate with her newcomer status and obvious weakness, to participate in decisions which will shape Europe's political, economic, and security dimensions. For us, NATO membership means we have reached a crucial threshold among the many steps taken since 1989. We are not interested in pursuing a zero-sum game in Central and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the relative improvement in our international standing will best be used to the advantage of our Central European neighbors and in the broader interest of Europe as a whole. But it will not be easy. The era of Polish strategic certainty corresponding to Poland's strong national desire to join NATO is coming to an

end. With an equal determination, we approach the vital goal of EU membership. Membership in the EU must be considered as a vital element of Poland's independence and security.¹⁶

The period of living with an external threat has happily come to an end, for which I have no regrets whatsoever. But after 1999, there is the real possibility that Poland, along with the other new and old members of NATO, will also succumb to the laws of ambiguity. The unprecedented era of intense concentration of national energies on achieving the most fundamental national aim—security—may soon be over. The country may be much more divided about reaching yet another crucial threshold, that of membership in the EU. The requirements for building regional and European stability and security may not be as simple, and policy formulation may require more sophistication and better instruments, which are still hardly available. We may have to cope with more temptations and less obvious traps, and we may have to learn to be content with less spectacular gains. A successful adaptation of Poland's foreign policy in the last decade of the 20th century would mean that Poland has found its unique role as a member of an integrated Europe. Roughly, that role would be one of a loyal Atlanticist, a committed European, and a good neighbor.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

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11. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Kwestia partnerstwa," *Rzeczpospolita*, May 30, 1996, p. 8.

12. See an interesting proposal by Karl Lamers to form a second Eurocorps in Central Europe, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 10, 1997, and developed further in his subsequent article. Karl Lamers, "Myslec w kategoriach Europy," *Rzeczpospolita*, June 25, 1997, p. 5.

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CHAPTER 5

HUNGARY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Laszlo Valki

Following the NATO Council meeting in Madrid in July 1997, there was relief among the Hungarian political elite. The country had come to the end of a long process and had at last found its historical equilibrium. Eight years after the fundamental political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO had finally decided to start negotiations concerning accession with Budapest (as well as with Warsaw and Prague), virtually declaring that it considered Hungary a part of the West and showing that it was prepared to integrate the country into its political and military organization. Naturally, the elite was aware of the fact that negotiations had to be successful, that the Hungarian referendum had to have a positive outcome, and that NATO parliaments—including the U.S. Senate¹—must ratify the enlargement before the process could really be considered as concluded. Nevertheless, the general view in Hungary was that the decisive step had already been taken. This was reinforced by the European Commission's decision passed a few days later, recommending to the Council of Ministers that Brussels also start negotiations with Hungary and the other two Central European countries on the enlargement of the Union.

Before the Madrid meeting, a rather odd psychosis seemed to have overcome Hungary. The politicians in Budapest were looking dreamily toward NATO, plucking flower petals, and murmuring—loves me, loves me not. Every political act, every event had been assessed according to whether it furthered the accession of the country to NATO or hindered it. Hungary had been making enormous

efforts to prove that it was fully fit to be admitted. The politicians started from the assumption that, in each and every case, the destiny, the historical future of the country, was ultimately at stake. It was far from certain that the “well-behaved” countries would be admitted to the Euro-Atlantic integration, but it was quite certain that the “badly behaved” ones would not.

The issue of NATO accession had become so predominant in foreign policy that it was practically becoming all consuming. Bosnia aside, in international negotiations during the past few years, Hungarian participants and their partners hardly spoke of anything else but who would be admitted and when, in what order of succession and under what conditions; who would be the ones to be left out, and, first and foremost, what would be the attitude of Moscow. Why did Hungary want so badly to become a member of NATO?

Lessons of History.

The primary motive can certainly be seen in the lessons drawn from history. There is a general sense of insecurity which characterizes the Hungarian way of thinking. The consciousness of the Hungarian political elite is, of course, most powerfully influenced by their own personal experiences in the recent past. The generation of the late Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and his successor, Gyula Horn, still had or has memories of World War II—even if they were very young at the time—while the consciousness of the next generation, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs or Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and their contemporaries, was shaped—also at a young age—by the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and later, when they were young adults, by the Prague Spring of 1968 and by Polish martial law in the 1980s.

But no matter how the life of the individual political figures developed and what personal convictions they concluded from the events they had witnessed, they all

shared the historical memory of the nation. There is a general belief in Hungary that its history developed in a rather unfortunate way during the last 500 years. The historical experiences show that geography is, indeed, destiny.² The Hungarian kingdom became a buffer zone between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires in the 16th century. Most of its territory was occupied by the Turks, the rest by the Habsburgs. The 150 years of Ottoman rule was ended and replaced by the Habsburgs in the 18th century. The wars of independence of Rakoczi³ and Kossuth⁴ were suppressed, the latter with the participation of Russian troops. Hungary entered World War I as a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. The country became independent only at the end of the war, after the fall and split of the monarchy. In fact, no independent Hungarian state existed between 1526 and 1918.

After 1918, following a relatively short period of independence, the political leadership took the worst path: it joined the Axis powers which led to its participation in World War II, to German occupation, to a *coup* of the fascist party, to the holocaust, to the death of a great number of Hungarian soldiers and civilians, and to the major destruction of cities and industry. Soviet troops liberated the country at the end of the war—and remained there for the next 45 years. In short, for the recent political elite the country was characterized by an “anything-can-happen-at-any-time” syndrome, and at times by a complete lack of predictability.

At the same time, the elite realized that after World War II, while Hungary was preoccupied with living its own tumultuous life, the advanced industrial countries of North America and Western Europe also became stabilized in historical terms, probably for good. Although this does not really mean “the end of history” for them, they will certainly not resort to violence against each other ever again. Using a term of Karl Deutsch, the states of the Euro-Atlantic region have created a kind of “security community” in the past 4 decades, which is characterized by a high degree of social,

political and economic stability unknown before.⁵ In the development of this state of affairs, a major role was played by the institutionalization of cooperation, by the foundation of a whole system of international organizations, especially NATO and the European Union. These organizations have given rise to extremely intensive interaction among not only the economic actors of various nationalities but also among the government bureaucracies, including those serving in the command and control systems of the armed forces.

That is why the Central European countries wanted to avoid becoming stuck on the periphery of this region of stability. Since 1989, they have become politically stable and have, to a greater or lesser extent, entered a phase of economic growth after having hit rock bottom in 1991. The political, academic, and media elite treats the historically developed dividing lines between the East and the West as evident. According to a Hungarian columnist, for instance, "This is the first time in history that there is a chance for Hungary and the Central European region to cross the great line between civilizations dividing Europe within the next 5-10 years."⁶ For understandable reasons, Samuel P. Huntington's article on the clash of civilizations is frequently quoted in Hungary. He wrote that, after the end of the Cold War, the same dividing lines between civilizations reappeared which once had separated Western Christianity from Orthodox Eastern Christianity after the split of the Catholic Church in 1054 and, somewhat later, from Islam.⁷

The late Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs is also quoted in that respect. He set the emergence of the dividing line to an even earlier time, and drew two parallel lines, with Central and Eastern Europe being situated between the two. As Szűcs explained, the Western line emerged in the 9th century by the Elbe and the Leitha Rivers, along the Eastern borders of the Carolingian Empire, and was then redrawn time and again by history.⁸ Szűcs called it fearful that "the sharp economic and social structural demarcation line which virtually divided Europe after 1500, . . . retraced

with stunning precision the border line between the Elbe and Leitha drawn around the year 800.”⁹ The other, oriental dividing line described by Szucs more or less concurs with Huntington’s line. “After the great schism (1054),” Szucs says, “a more or less parallel, but no less sharp, line was seen to appear starting from the Lower Danube region up through the Eastern Carpathian mountains, then North along the forests dividing the Eastern and Western Slavs, Poland and Russia, reaching the Baltic region in the 13th century.” The region between the two dividing lines, already around 1100-1200, began to be referred to comprehensively as *Europa Occidens* (Occidentalis) by contemporaries. “History swept across the two lines with significant overlaps,” Szucs observed.¹⁰ Indeed, history did sweep across *Europa Occidens*, often with a great deal of brutality, which is one of the sources of the feelings of insecurity mentioned above. It is no accident, wrote another Hungarian historian, that the peoples of the region are treated as a part of the zone of small nations stretching from Finland to Greece, the so-called *Zwischen-Europa* (In-Between Europe) characterized by “ethnic colorfulness, fusion and fractiousness,” by a continuous struggle of nation-states against the empires. “The struggle for nation-statehood is well-nigh a form of action for these small nations,” he added.¹¹

It is easy to understand the desire of the Hungarian political elite to be integrated as much as possible into the more advanced region west of the dividing line. The elite was fully aware that this would not be achieved by Partnership for Peace or association agreements, only by full accession. On top of that, it committed itself to this objective to an extent rarely seen in international relations. Most parliamentary parties built their foreign policy programs upon accession; moreover, a positive attitude to accession became a part of their legitimacy. The parties saw no other possibility, and neither did the government work out any alternative program.¹²

Thus the answer to the question as to why Hungary wants so badly to join NATO is simple: it would put an end to the perception of insecurity of the political elite as regards the historical fate of the country. It would increase the self-confidence of the elite, a rare commodity here but indispensable for development. It would also allow it to focus on the social and economic progress of the society. The official statements do not refer to any fear of neighbors in the region, even of Russia. Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said, for example, that:

Hungary wants to join NATO not because it perceives an external threat, nor because it seeks protection from its neighbors, but because it regards integration into the European community, that is, membership in NATO, the European Union, and Western European Union, an indispensable condition of its security, stability, and economic development.¹³

Former Deputy State Secretary for Defense Tibor Toth put it in the following way: "Hungary's bid for membership of NATO and the EU is not driven just by security perceptions, it is a part of a modernization policy based on shared values with western democracies."¹⁴

Although no one perceives an immediate threat in Hungary, it would be too early to exclude it from a historical perspective. The peoples of the successor states of the former Soviet Union are living in a state of lasting instability. For them, the year 1991 meant not the promise of stability but the beginning of another period of upheaval. Russian industrial production fell rapidly. Statistics have shown a long decline in production in Russia, Ukraine, and most of the other former Soviet republics.¹⁵ Neither was the political sphere very stable. In 1993, Moscow witnessed a severe crisis, in the course of which the newly elected parliament was bombarded by troops loyal to the president. There followed an amendment to the constitution which meant a concentration of power in the hands of the president which was far greater than that enjoyed by the

tsars, “making legislative wrangles inconsequential.”¹⁶ At the Duma elections in December 1995, the relative majority of votes were won by the Communist Party, the leader of which openly declared that his aim was the restoration of the Soviet Union. In mid-1996 an ailing president won the election. According to some sources, writes Stephen Blank, the Federal Security Forces organized a plan to cancel that election’s second round, if Yeltsin lost the first round, by introducing martial law. Yeltsin’s victory obviated the need for this plan, but it was followed later by other *coups* against Barsukov, Korzhakov and Lebed. The Russian army is “privatized.” According to some estimates, there are 15-24 separate armed forces with different loyalties.¹⁷ Blank concludes that

the entire security system and state is in total disarray as rival clans slug it out for power. . . . [T]he many armed forces are out of control and are available to political leaders who are ready to launch pre-emptive coups for their own personal benefit. . . . That has brought about Russia’s ‘de-institutionalization’ and a pervasive executive irresponsibility.¹⁸

Under these circumstances no one can be sure whether the various political forces of the region will not try to solve some of their internal or external conflicts again by force, as they did in Chechnya. It is unlikely that Russia will be an island of peace and prosperity in the coming decades. Its environment could easily become destabilized.

Western politicians and observers seem to share these worries, although, for obvious reasons, they make rare or no references to Russia itself. Arguing in favor of enlargement, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used rather general terminology: “[the enlargement] lessens the chance American soldiers will ever again have to fight in Europe. . . . Throughout the Cold War, NATO gave evidence that we were prepared to fight if necessary; by so doing, the alliance made it unnecessary to fight.”¹⁹ The Cold War enemy of NATO was, of course, the expansionist Russian empire, thus the Alliance was prepared to fight against this

particular enemy. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake were more explicit on this issue. “Developing a relationship with a democratizing Russia”, they wrote, “an expanded alliance provides a hedge against the unlikely but real possibility that Russia will revert to past behavior.”²⁰ Thus the possibility still exists, though in all probability it will not happen. Ironically, the most explicit reference to a possible Russian threat was mentioned by someone who argued against enlargement. Describing geostrategic consequences of enlargement, Martin Sieff stated that the Czech Republic and Poland “are historically defenseless against a massed tank invasion from Russia. . . . Even with equipment that is technically obsolete compared with the best American weapons, Russian forces could sweep across them in a matter of hours.”²¹ He concluded that, due to this geostrategic situation, NATO should not take the risk to extend Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to Central Europe. This is, of course, complete nonsense. Russian troops, except for Kaliningrad, are not stationed any longer along the borders of the Czech Republic or Poland, thus they would have to first cross Belarus and Ukraine, thereby providing ample warning time for NATO to prepare against such a “massed tank invasion.” Nevertheless, the statement is characteristic of the perceptions of threat that still exist *vis-à-vis* Russia in various circles of western society. It would be misleading to assume that these perceptions do not prevail in Central Europe, including Hungary. No politicians or diplomats would talk about them openly. It would be counterproductive to refer to an abstract threat which might reemerge in historical terms. Open talk could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In fact, during the last 6 years, Russian foreign policymakers contributed to the distrust that prevailed around them. First, they never attempted to convince the Central Europeans that their aims were completely different from the past, and to convey the impression that all that Moscow wanted to do was to cooperate both with them and the western countries. Since the split of the Soviet

Union, Moscow has never formulated or carried out a comprehensive foreign policy toward Central Europe. Moscow simply paid no attention to its former “allies.” This nonpolicy option would not cause any harm to the region and would not lead to any worries there if it had, after all, no foreign policy objective of halting NATO enlargement which seemed to be very important for the countries concerned. Second, the Central Europeans observed that Moscow—after the first years or months of its “honeymoon” with the West—returned in many respects to an old-fashioned adversarial rhetoric and foreign policy. As Leon Goure rightly concluded, “Russian foreign policy in recent years appears to have been, to a considerable extent, an imitation, if a pale one, of Soviet foreign policy.”²² Goure referred to closer Russian ties with China and Serbia, the “special relations” in the Middle East with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the sale of advanced weapon systems to some troubled parts of the world, etc.²³ Neither the old-new rhetoric, nor the old-new policy was reassuring for the Central Europeans and made them even more determined to seek membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Political Participation.

Enlargement would bring about another positive consequence: the Hungarian administration would join in the work of the staff of NATO and its political and military decisionmaking bodies. This would facilitate even closer and more regular contact with the leading political circles of the Euro-Atlantic region than exist today. Participating in short, often purely formal North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) sessions or bilateral meetings cannot be compared with taking part in decisionmaking as a member of an organization. The latter also concerns interaction among bureaucracies. It is a general experience that officials who work at the headquarters of some international organizations or are involved in maintaining relations between international and national bureaucracies

have a greater capacity to understand and accept the interests and values of the international community.

It would, of course, also mean that the Hungarian government would have a say in major foreign policy decisions, especially in those involving its region. The public is not really mindful of the fact that NATO is far from being a military organization only. The wide range of consultation systems set up within the Alliance ensures the continuous exchange of foreign policy information both on member and nonmember states. Attention is focused today on peace-making operations in Bosnia, which are by nature of a military character. It is important, however, that the NATO member states shape the foreign policy of the West largely within the framework of the Alliance. It is of utmost importance that this policy is being shaped with the participation of Central European countries, including Hungary and not without. In addition, accession to NATO would also mean, besides military integration, the beginning of a limited political integration. This process would not lead to the creation of a supranational structure as the one aimed at by the European Union (EU) but would play a major role in the life of society.

Security Considerations.

Accession would naturally increase the external security of Hungary. The organization would guarantee its defense, a fact that any third state which might in the future, for whatever unforeseeable reason, threaten its security would be aware. Many say that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not provide for perfect defense because it does not stipulate the obligation of automatic assistance by member states.²⁴ Indeed, the article states that in the event of an armed attack against any member state(s) the others would take actions "individually and in concert" to restore and maintain security. In other words, the Alliance shall, by consensus, select the nations and decide on the means and contingency plans to defend the state(s) under armed

attack. Theoretically, it is possible that no consensus is reached on joint actions; fortunately, the need to test this procedure never arose during the Cold War.²⁵

Article 5 has also been discussed in a different context. Some experts say that, all in all, during the Cold War years stipulations concerning collective defense would have been taken seriously. Accordingly, in the event of external aggression, every member state—even France—would have been ready to provide assistance to a state under attack. However, the situation has changed since the end of the Cold War. “The substance and range of Article 5, as the old geometry and the old mechanism are part of the past, will have to be conceptualized once again and not only under fair weather conditions but also *in extremis*,” stated Michael Sturmer who concluded that Article 5 should be reinterpreted.²⁶ In other words, he maintains that the very article on which the Washington Treaty is based should be reformulated. It would be difficult to find a version which does not say less than the old one but corresponds more to the recent strategic environment. It is reassuring that the NATO *Study on Enlargement* did not question the meaning of Article 5, but stated unambiguously that “new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of members under the Washington Treaty.”²⁷

Deliberations concerning the interpretation of the article also suggest concrete apprehensions. Specifically, would the Alliance be willing to guarantee the security of newly admitted member states by every available means? Previously, during the time of Mutual Assured Destruction, the question was phrased as follows: “Would the Americans be willing to sacrifice Chicago for Frankfurt?” After enlargement, Frankfurt will be substituted by Budapest. Observers are not convinced that the parliaments of present member states would willingly ratify a treaty which contains a clause to defend remote, often unknown regions. “Never go into a global thermo-nuclear war to protect a country you can’t find on the map,” advised an American journalist.²⁸

However, the key word here is prevention. In past decades, the allied states created an integrated military structure which was capable of protecting the security of any member state, and could also consequently prevent any act of aggression. NATO's Strategic Concept is correct in stating that in the new system of international relations "[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territories of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties" in Central and Eastern Europe. The latter might trigger unpredictable social and political processes which could "lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers . . ." ²⁹ After enlargement it would hardly be conceivable that the new member states should become involved in an armed conflict, since they would be backed by a force which would deter any armed actions against them. (Deterrence in Bosnia remained ineffective for a long time, since the conflict there began as a civil war, and the country to be protected was not a member of NATO. Later, following the deployment of NATO-based IFOR and SFOR troops deterrence worked.)

The Hungarian political elite believes that accession would, even if indirectly, also increase the internal security of a member state. Since 1989, Hungary has enjoyed full stability: it was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe where both freely elected governments served or will serve their full terms, and where no constitutional crisis has taken place. However, in historical perspective, one has to take into account that the political integration taking place within the framework of NATO, and the intensive contacts among political parties and government administrations, would have a beneficial effect on further smooth democratic evolution. Internal security would also be enhanced by participation in military integration. Owing to their close integration, the member states have very accurate information on the armaments, role, and operation

of each other's armies, of their military development programs, the views of leading military circles, etc. This means that measures could be taken in time to prevent any national armed force from achieving too much independence or influence in a member state.

In principle, it is not one of NATO's tasks to deal with internal political issues. But in the mid-1970s, the Alliance coordinated its efforts to prevent an extreme leftist *coup* in Portugal following Salazar's regime, and to promote democratic development in Spain after Franco's death.³⁰ Learning from experiences in Greece, the Alliance came to the conclusion that it cannot view with indifference the rise of a dictatorship of extremist forces in any one of the member states. The first fact recognized was that a nondemocratic regime in a member state indirectly endangers the defense capability of the Alliance. Later, the recognition that the interrelationship of external and internal security came to acquire increasing importance besides purely military considerations. This is, indeed, reassuring for a new member state.

Economic Considerations.

Admission to NATO would also have favorable economic consequences in a new member state, thus contributing to its internal security. Above all, the inflow of foreign capital could be expected to grow. Investors prefer to invest their money in countries which they regard as stable and safe. According to Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, "as a result of admission, security of the country would improve considerably which is most important for a foreign investor. After all, capital is invested where it is safe. This will, no doubt, help our integration [also] into the European Union."³¹ As a result of accession to NATO, a large part of the costs of the unavoidable modernization of the Hungarian Army could be saved. In the past 10-15 years, there was no development made except for some Russian fighter planes, tanks, and other military devices acquired

by Hungary. A NATO member state does not have to develop an all-encompassing defense system all its own. That is, indeed, one of the major advantages of military integration.

More generally, one has to also take into account that the years of drawn out debate on enlargement directed international attention on Central European countries more so than any other event or fact (such as, for instance, the planned Expo '96 in Hungary which had to be cancelled for financial reasons). Not since 1956 and 1968 have the heads and staffs of western foreign ministries or the international press paid so much attention to the Central European countries. Wearisome as it was to follow the discussions of the issue of "Should we enlarge?" and "Who should be admitted?", it also meant that the observers had to acquire an increasing amount of information about the aspiring countries. All in all, the three countries which finally came under consideration in the first round of admissions and the two others mentioned in the communique of the Madrid summit received good ratings all over the world. For these countries, publicity and a good image are now of vital importance. Although it cannot be expected that the enlargement of NATO—and subsequently of the EU—will have similar effects as the Marshall Plan, its consequences are already clearly beneficial.³²

A "New Dividing Line."

Opponents of enlargement say that it would lead to the creation of a new dividing line between the enlarged NATO and its neighbors, revitalizing the division characterizing the period of the Cold War.³³ The enlargement of NATO would minimize the chances for obliterating the borders between East and West as well as for harmonious relations between former enemies. In Charles A. Kupchan's words: "The chance to build a European security community that included Russia would be lost. The West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile

halves.”³⁴ According to Michael Brown, “[a] new line would be drawn in Europe, a new Cold War could ensue, and the West would have itself to blame for bringing this about.”³⁵ This argument was most recently repeated by 46 former policymakers and experts in their open letter to President Clinton.³⁶ In another letter—also addressed to the President—20 senators stated that the new members will have a “distinct advantage over their neighbors in the competition to attract new business and foreign investment.”³⁷

However, these statements do not explain why the new NATO borders would reestablish the same dividing line between East and West that characterized the Cold War. The two are hardly comparable. Cold War enmity was founded on (Leninist) ideology and was, therefore, rightly called antagonistic. The predicted future enmity—should it evolve—would have nothing to do with ideology, thus would not be as antagonistic. Whatever we may think of the developments in Russia, they cannot be compared to those characterizing the Stalin or the Brezhnev eras. Granting the possibility of an East-West conflict, it would in no way be a reproduction of the period between 1945-90. NATO exists with its eastern borders, which fact itself clearly does not exert any negative influence whatsoever on the relationship between the Alliance and Moscow. The differences between the West and Russia have nothing to do with the “dividing lines”; therefore, a slight change in terms of geostrategy would not revive the Cold War. NATO would be able to maintain and develop its partnership with the nonmember states; any conclusion to the opposite effect recalls the old-fashioned philosophy of “zero-sum-game.”³⁸

A frequently raised argument is that relations would deteriorate between Hungary and those states which would not be admitted to the Alliance, thus creating new security risks in the region.³⁹ It is not clear why disappointment over nonadmission would evoke an adverse political reaction to those admitted, rather than to the decisionmakers in Brussels. Why would Hungarian minorities be made to suffer the consequences of Hungary’s accession to NATO?

Indeed, President Iliescu had actually stated that, "It would become a source of conflict between the two countries if one were admitted into the organization but not the other."⁴⁰ If Hungary were to join the organization before Romania, he said on another occasion, it would lead to rivalry and diminish trust between the two countries.⁴¹ They must join at the same time or both should remain outside, he declared several times. However, the situation has changed considerably since the election in December 1996. Although the Constantinescu-Ciorbea administration continued to regard accession to the Alliance as its primary goal, it was also aware of the reality. Soon after the election, President Constantinescu said that "[f]or both Romania and Hungary, simultaneous integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures would sanctify and stabilize harmonious bilateral relations. For this very reason, I would like us to be partners, not rivals, at the current stage of the integration process." Should admission not occur simultaneously, he added, "I would like to state clearly that Romanian foreign policy will not depart from its basic principles, which include the development of neighborly relations and active participation in all diplomatic actions which contribute to ensuring stability in the region."⁴² As far as Hungary was concerned, its government stressed repeatedly that both countries should become members of the organization. "The admission of as many of its neighbors as possible lies in Hungary's interest," Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs stated, "because we believe that NATO membership would contribute to the improvement of relations between Hungary and its neighbors."⁴³

Interestingly enough, some representatives of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania also expressed worries, though mainly with regard to Hungary's EU membership. They were less afraid of the adverse reactions of the Slovak or Romanian authorities than of some indirect consequences of a possible Hungarian accession. They identified a danger arising out of the fact

that Hungary would be integrated in the West while they would continue sharing the destiny of their own states—bogged down in slow economic and social development. Some of them also maintained that Hungary should wait for the others and join NATO together. This position was not accepted by the Hungarian government. If there were a chance to join NATO, Hungary should not miss the opportunity. A refusal would mean wasting time also from a historical perspective, and the quality of life of the ethnic minorities would not improve at all. A meeting between the representatives of the Hungarian government and the ethnic minorities in July 1996 apparently has settled the dispute. In their joint declaration the participants have agreed that

joining, as soon as possible, the Euro-Atlantic integration is of crucial importance for the future of Hungary and the Hungarian nation. This is the interest of all Hungarians living in different countries of the Carpathian Basin. . . . These efforts [however] should not prevail over the fundamental interests of the Hungarian ethnic communities abroad.⁴⁴

After the elections, the quality of life of the Hungarian minority in Romania changed significantly. The Hungarian ethnic party became a member of the government coalition, and a number of decisions by the new administration created a favorable situation for the Hungarian minority. The wish of Bucharest to join NATO also contributed to these favorable changes. The condition of accession was clearly defined by the Alliance: admission was contingent on the settlement of all essential conflicts between the countries concerned. For this reason, the new Romanian government signed the appropriate treaties not only with Hungary, but also with Moldavia and Ukraine.

After Madrid, when Romania had learned that it would not be included into the first round of accession to NATO, Bucharest continued its constructive policy both towards the Hungarian ethnic minority and Hungary itself. It was more than a symbolic action that, only a few days after

Madrid, the Hungarian General Consulate was reopened in Cluj, the “capital” of the Hungarian-populated Transylvania.⁴⁵ This was a major event in the process of reconciliation between the two countries, and demonstrated clearly that the current Romanian government is determined to continue its new policy. The Consulate was closed down in 1988 by Ceausescu and could not renew its activity even under the Iliescu administration. Now thousands of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians greeted the two foreign ministers at the opening ceremony, thus approving the policy of reconciliation.⁴⁶

At the same time, the situation did not change in Slovakia, neither before nor after Madrid. On the contrary, some decisions of the Bratislava government led to further deprivation of the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority. Hungarian schools were either closed down or the language of tuition became Slovak; certificates, which have always been bilingual, are issued now only in Slovak. Hungarian school directors have been removed. The Meciar government, contrary to the recommendations of the European Communities and the Council of Europe, did not prepare a law on using minority languages. The government is also not ready to jointly rebuild an important bridge over the Danube River border at Esztergom, probably because it would connect areas populated by Hungarians.⁴⁷ Many provisions of the Basic Treaty of 1995 are not observed by the Slovak government. Hungary has tried to settle these disputes at all possible levels. In August 1997 Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn handed over a list of minimal requirements to Vladimir Meciar who refused to accept any of them.⁴⁸

All this allows for the conclusion that the observation of the rights of ethnic minorities depends on the development of a domestic political environment more than on the fact of whether Central and East European neighboring countries are “divided” by the frontiers of an alliance or not. However, it has to be emphasized that neither the earlier disputes over ethnic minorities with the previous Romanian

administration, nor the recent ones with the Meciar government, have any security dimension whatsoever. Even when a 1977 inter-state treaty on the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Danube was terminated by Hungary and the main flow of the river itself unilaterally diverted by Czechoslovakia to Slovak territory in 1992, not even the slightest military maneuver was made on either side. This dispute was brought before The Hague Court of Justice, and judgement was expected in September 1997.

Nevertheless, the aspiration of Central and East European countries to join the Alliance had some favorable “side effects,” first of all, the conclusion of basic treaties. Even if the disputes between Hungary and its neighbors did not pose an imminent threat to the peace in the region, even if one of them does not yet observe the obligations arising out of the treaty, it certainly eased the conflicts in the region. It is of utmost importance since, by the conclusion of the treaties, Hungary may invoke the provisions on minority rights while it would be difficult for either of them to assert that Hungary has any territorial claims against its neighbors.

Hungarian Public Opinion.

One of the planks in the Socialist Party’s 1994 election platform was in favor of Hungary joining NATO. However, it included a rather unfortunate commitment to holding a referendum on the issue. The socialists won the elections and formed the government in coalition with another party; Prime Minister Gyula Horn kept repeating that the referendum would be held.

In the fall of 1995 Parliament also voted in favor of holding a referendum.⁴⁹ This was unavoidable given that in the summer of that year the small extra-parliamentary communist party—which had opposed NATO membership from the beginning—collected more than enough signatures on a petition calling for a referendum. This initiative was obviously premature since at the time there was no talk of

Hungary being invited to join the organization, nor of commencing negotiations on accession; furthermore, no one knew what the conditions of possible accession to the organization would be. There was justified concern that for this reason a referendum would be doomed to failure (as was the case later in Slovakia). Furthermore, according to the law, another referendum could not be held within the following 2 years, virtually undermining the outcome of the exploratory talks with NATO due to start in 1996, and thus accession itself. It looked as if legally Parliament had no choice but to order the referendum, when a closer examination of the relevant provisions showed that the law does not make this an unalterable condition.⁵⁰ Parliament adopted the legal arguments on the basis of which it dismissed the initiative, but at the same time agreed to hold a referendum after a study of the relevant conditions. Accordingly, in July 1997, the coalition and opposition parties agreed to hold the referendum with the stipulation that it be a consultative act only. The parties did not fear rejection of accession but a low turnout (in the case of a consultative referendum, there is no lower limit). However, due to the demand of the opposition parties to hold another referendum on the foreign ownership of agricultural lands, the government decided in August 1997 to connect the timing of the two and to declare both of them binding (this requires at least a 50 percent turnout). The government probably concluded that the dual referendum would attract both the urban and the village population, though for different reasons.

The peculiarity of the situation is that, although it was Hungary—along with other countries—who was desirous of joining the Alliance, and not NATO wishing to expand eastward, Hungarian public opinion is not completely united on the question of accession. Public opinion polls show that accession received over 50 percent support in the period immediately before the summit in Madrid. Previously, the highest ratio—exactly 50 percent—was reached in July 1994 when, in the wake of NATO's January

1994 resolution, the chances for accession did not yet seem very close. Thereafter the average values fluctuated between 44-47 percent up until June 1997, when the ratio of supporters rose to 61 percent. The ratio of opponents alternated between 24-35 percent, and even in June 1997, it was only 27 percent. The declining number of “don’t know” respondents from 26-12 percent between March and June 1997 explains the rise in the number of supporters.⁵¹ After the Madrid summit, the proportion of supporters rose to 69 percent, while the opponents fell to 22 percent; 9 percent remained undecided.⁵²

Thus when the respondents perceived the chances of accession as uncertain, they also expressed an uncertainty of opinion. In June 1997, the near certainty that a positive decision would be reached in Madrid probably changed the opinion of many, and the invitation issued by NATO to negotiate with Hungary on membership led to a further rise of supporters. Pollsters did not expect further significant changes in these ratios before the actual referendum (which took place on November 16, 1997). The ratio of opponents has remained more or less constant, while in June 1997 the ratio of “don’t know” respondents dropped to the level of previous polls. Unfortunately, this might also be the reason for a low key government campaign concerning this issue; according to some in the administration, more intensive activity at this point would not change the ratios considerably. They disregard the dangers involved in a low turnout, for instance, the reaction of the U.S. Senate. In the spring of 1998, senators might ask whether it is worth guaranteeing the security of a country where people are not really interested in the issue.

As regards the opponents to accession, they are made up of the communists who have been joined—and not for the first time in history—by the similarly small extreme rightist party.⁵³ Aside from them, there are also a few pacifists who argue against accession. Their arguments are almost exactly the same as those used in debates in the West, especially with regard to the costs of accession.⁵⁴

What the members of these three groups add to these arguments is at the most that accession endangers Hungary's sovereignty and independence, and also that it gives the "capitalist military-industrial complex" an increasing say in determining the country's internal and foreign policy. Several people think nostalgically about the idea of neutrality which arose both in 1956 and 1989 in Hungary. Austria was set as the example, but what those who cited Austria actually wanted to achieve was Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The pacifists believe that, with the end of the Cold War, there is no sense in maintaining a military alliance; furthermore, by joining NATO, Hungary may easily find itself involved in a military conflict it has no interests in whatsoever, and lastly, the military commitments concomitant to membership could have a damaging effect on the environment. Meanwhile, NATO herself has eliminated the earlier, most effective arguments of the opponents of accession, namely, the potential deployment of nuclear weapons and permanent stationing of foreign troops.

Politicians and experts in favor of accession have appropriate answers to these arguments. Nevertheless, the ratio of opponents (or of those who would not participate in the referendum⁵⁵) is relatively high despite the fact that all seven parties represented in Parliament are in favor of accession and the constituency of the two extremist parties does not exceed 3-4 percent. The explanation lies primarily in the fact that the standpoint of Hungarian parties does not necessarily serve as a guideline for voters. Second, there is no perception of threat among Hungarians since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Even during the war in Yugoslavia when military actions posed an immediate threat to regions along the border, only in these particular regions did people communicate a feeling of anxiety in public opinion polls. After Dayton, this threat perception also disappeared. Third, the conflicts involving the Hungarian ethnic minorities in the neighboring countries have not given rise

to any perception of threat either—due to the above-mentioned fact that these conflicts have no national security dimension. It has to be noted that the overwhelming majority of the people in Hungary are somewhat self-concerned: they are much less concerned with the situation of those minorities across the border than the previous Antall administration assumed. The ill-famed statement of Antall that “I am in spirit the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians” alarmed foreign as well as Hungarian public opinion.⁵⁶ Historical and other arguments in favor of joining the organization, which were mentioned at the beginning of this study, are only tangible for and understood by the political elite. The man in the street is concerned primarily with questions such as the growth of crime and difficulties in social security. Political interest in every area, including international relations, is low. Taking into consideration the historical experiences of a Central European country, it is not necessarily a discouraging phenomenon.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. About the difficulties, see, for example, Michael Dobbs, “Americans Yet to Be Sold on Need for Larger NATO,” *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1997, p. A1.

2. Jim Hoagland, “Reaching Out for NATO,” *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1995, p. C7.

3. Between 1703 and 1711.

4. Between 1848 and 1849.

5. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5.

6. *Nepszabadsag*, December 16, 1995, p. 3.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 29 ff. Incidentally, I do not share the author’s view that the conflict between civilizations is again intensifying.

8. Jeno Szucs, "Vazlat Europa három történelmi régiójáról" ("A Sketch on the Three Historical Regions of Europe"), *Történelmi Szemle*, No. 3, 1981, p. 314.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-316.

11. Lajos Pandi, ed., *Köztes-Europa* (Europe In-Between), Budapest: Osiris-Szazadveg, 1995, p. 31.

12. As far as the recent leading coalition party on government is concerned, its head, Gyula Horn, declared as early as February 1990 that Hungary has to join the **political** organs of NATO. He did not refer to a full membership yet: the Warsaw Pact still existed.

13. *Magyar Hírlap*, May 27, 1995, p. 3.

14. Interview with Tibor Toth, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 7, 1996.

15. *Oroszország 1994-ben* (Russia in 1994), Budapest: Institute of World Economy, 1995 (mimeo); György Nanovszky, *Oroszország - tények és adatok* (Russia: Facts and Figures), Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1995, pp. 96-108. It may well be that Russia has already reached the bottom and will show some development in 1997.

16. László Csaba, "Magyarország az átalakuló poszt-szocialista világban" ("Hungary in the changing Post-Socialist World"), *Kulpolitika*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 35.

17. Stephen J. Blank, *Towards the Failing State: The Structure of Russian Security Policy*, Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Center, November 1996 (mimeo), p. 2.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

19. Madeleine Albright, "Bringing New Democracies Into the NATO Fold," *International Herald Tribune*, July 8, 1997, p. 8.

20. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake, "The Moral and Strategic Imperatives of NATO Enlargement," *International Herald Tribune*, July 1, 1997, p. 10.

21. Martin Sieff, "Expansion Cuts Effectiveness of Military Alliance," *The Washington Times*, July 9, 1997, p. 1.

22. Leon Goure, "NATO Expansion and Russia: How Will Their Relations Change?," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *From Madrid to Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 15, 1997, p. 65.

23. *Ibid.*

24. See Uwe Nerlich, *NATO at the Crossroads, Once Again*, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1997, p. 23.

25. "NATO works by consensus and will continue to do so even after expansion," said William Perry at the Hungarian Senior Military Academy in a speech on September 20, 1995. *U.S. Information and Texts*, No. 078, Bonn: September 21, 1995.

26. Michael Sturmer, *The Transatlantic Security Agenda: Co-opt Eastern Europe But Don't Overstretch the Western Systems and Don't Lose Russia*, paper prepared for the Aspen Meeting at Istanbul, Summer 1995 (mimeo).

27. *Study on NATO Enlargement*, September 1995 (mimeo), para 4.

28. Thomas L. Friedman, "Are They Ready, Then, to Fight for Bratislava?," *International Herald Tribune*, April 10, 1995, p. 8.

29. The Alliance's new strategic concept, agreed by the Heads of State Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, para 10, *NATO Press Communiqué*.

30. Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September/October 1993, p. 29.

31. *Magyar Hirlap*, May 19, 1995, p. 4.

32. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, many references were made in that respect. See, among others, Madeleine K. Albright, "Time to Finish the Job for All Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, May 28, 1997, p. 7; "Az EU-bovites feler egy Marshall tervvel" ("The Enlargement of the EU Matches a Marshall Plan"), *Magyar Hirlap*, July 17, 1997, p. 3, quoting the words of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer.

33. Fred C. Ikle, "Why Expanding NATO Eastward Is a Deplorable Idea," *International Herald Tribune*, January 12, 1995, p. 6.

34. Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO Now - And Split Europe," *The New York Times*, November 27, 1994, p. 311.

35. Michael Brown, "NATO Expansion, Wait and See," *The Washington Post*, December 26, 1994, p. A29.

36. "In Europe, NATO expansion will draw a new line of division between the 'ins' and the 'outs,'" Open Letter to President Clinton, Washington, DC: Press Release, June 26, 1997.

37. "Ten Questions About NATO Expansion," *The Washington Times*, July 7, 1997, p. 7.

38. Giorgio Napolitano, Karsten Voigt, Tamas Wachsler, *The Enlargement of the Alliance*, Draft Special Report of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, North Atlantic Assembly, October 1995, para 10/c.

39. James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignment*, McNair Paper 40, Washington: National Defense University, April 1995, p. 37.

40. *Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 1995, as quoted by *Magyar Hirlap*, January 2, 1996, p. 3.

41. *Die Presse*, July 19, 1996, p. 3.

42. *Magyar Hirlap*, December 21, 1996, pp. 1-3.

43. *Magyar Nemzet*, March 14, 1996, p. 7.

44. Joint Declaration, Conference on "Hungary and the Hungarians Abroad," Budapest, July 5, 1995.

45. "Megnyilt a magyar fokonkulatus" ("Hungarian General Consulate Opened"), *Nepszabadsag*, July 24, 1997, p. 3.

46. The Hungarian Foreign Minister said to journalists that this day was his happiest one since he took office in 1994. *Ibid.*

47. This was the only bridge between Budapest and Kararom/Komarno, i.e., within 100 kilometers. The European Union offered, in vain, substantial financial support for the reconstruction.

48. *Nepszabadsag, Magyar Hirlap*, August 16, 1997.

49. Resolution No. 120-1995 of the Hungarian Parliament, December 19, 1995.

50. The author of this study provided the interpretation of the law on referendum in his article, "Felvegyük-e a kesztyűt?" ("Should We Take the Glove?"), *Nepszabadság*, November 17, 1996, p. 7.

51. "Egyre Nepszerűbb a NATO" ("NATO Is Getting More and More Popular"). The poll was made by Gallup, Hungary. *Magyar Hírlap*, June 26, 1997, p. 1.

52. "Két ügyszakos nepszavazás lesz" ("There Will Be Two Binding Referenda"), *Nepszava*, August 29, 1997, pp. 1-2. The poll was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made by Sonda Ipsos.

53. MIEP (Hungarian Party of Justice and Life).

54. See Pal Dunay, "Hitvitak Magyarországon" (Theological Disputes in Hungary), in Pal Dunay, Ferenc Gazdag, eds., *Az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete, Tanulmányok és dokumentumok* (The Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, Studies and Documents), Budapest: Stratégiai és Védelmi Kutatóintézet, 1997, pp. 293-334.

55. Before the August 1997 government decision on combined referendum, 43 percent of the voters would "definitely" participate in the referendum, 28 percent "probably." *Magyar Hírlap*, August 29, 1997.

56. People still remember this statement Richard Cohen wrote just recently:

After all, it was [the late] Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, who ominously referred to 15 million Hungarians—about 4 million more than live in Hungary. . . . It was precisely this maddening obsession with ethnic minorities that helped ignite World War II and, much more recently the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.

Richard Cohen, "NATO: Make It Larger," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1997, p. A15.

CHAPTER 6

LATVIA AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Daina Bleiere

The Internal and External Conditions for Latvia's Security.

Latvia, just like other Central and Eastern European countries, is seeking to find its place in the European security architecture which is still under construction at this time, although it seems that its basic features are already in place. The architecture consists of three major elements: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the American military presence in Europe. It is already evident that plans to build a European defense identity outside NATO, and to build up an Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-based European security architecture, are not going anywhere. A strong security core which is capable of assuming responsibility and utilizing force when necessary is an indispensable element of European security. Events in Bosnia have proved this clearly.

There are many circumstances which influence one's understanding of the country's external and internal security policy priorities and strategy. The most important of these are the following factors:

- Domestic policy conditions;
- The perception of external threats;
- Existing pressures from the international system;
and,

- Understanding of the logic of the international system.

Domestic Factors. Latvia is a small and presently weak country which has only recently regained its independence. Limited material resources, domestic policy difficulties which must be overcome while simultaneously resolving problems in the area of establishing a market economy and a democratic society, and strengthening the sovereignty of the state—these factors specify the choice of a security policy strategy, as well as the effectiveness thereof. In addition, the domestic political situation in Latvia is made all the more complicated by the ethnic makeup of the country which was left behind by Soviet policies, and the problems which arise in integrating nonindigenous ethnic groups into Latvian society.

Domestic policies are not all equally significant in all directions of the state's foreign policy, but in issues such as the relationship with Russia and Latvia's integration with the EU, their influence is quite fundamental.

Security Threats. To a great extent, any country's choice of security policies is dictated by the state's understanding of external threats. It is frequently emphasized that "it is the fear of Russia that drives Baltic foreign policy."¹

This is rather an overly simplistic claim, but it does contain a good share of the truth, especially if we review the security policies of Latvia and the other Baltic states before 1994, when the Russian armed forces were withdrawn from Latvia. The presence of the Russian military in Latvia, a lack of clarity about developments in Russia's political situation (e.g., the popularity of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Communist politicians in Russia), as well as the tendency of Russia's political leadership to speak with the Baltic states from a position of strength, and a postponing of troop withdrawal several times linking it with the matter of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states and the financial issues—all of these helped to preserve the idea

that Russia was not prepared to recognize the complete sovereignty of the Baltic states and that it wanted to preserve a special status in the former Soviet Union and in the Baltic states as well. In the Baltic states, this led to calls for efforts to distance from Russia and the ex-Soviet Union as much as possible and to achieve a situation where the Baltic states are recognized by Russia and the rest of the world as completely sovereign countries. These nations are prepared to join the economic, political, and security structures of Europe on the same terms as are applied to the so-called Visegrad countries. The only true alternative which was offered by the international community was integration with the EU and NATO, as well as regional cooperation among the Baltic states and establishment of the Baltic-Nordic security region.

At the same time, however, it is clear that, in the foreseeable future, there is no possibility of direct military threats against the Baltic states from Russia or that the scenario of 1940 might be repeated. Even though it is happening with great complications and difficulty, Russia is becoming an “ordinary” capitalistic country, and as such, it is interested in respecting the rules of the game which currently prevail in Europe. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said some time ago² that Russia eventually hopes to join the EU, and this provides spectacular proof of the attractive force of European integration (even if it is just a declaration). Given the existing international system, it is difficult to imagine any developments which might lead to a violent redistribution of power in Europe. Furthermore, even if politicians were to come to power in Russia who want to restore the Russian or Soviet empire, Moscow is currently entirely unable to implement aggressive or even particularly active foreign policies. This is evidenced not only by the unsuccessful war in Chechnya, but also by the failure of the Russian president and government to force the president of Belarus, which is bound to Russia by treaty, to release imprisoned Russian television journalists and to

cease unprecedented persecution of the Russian mass media in Belarus.

Russian policies will always be perceived with heightened sensitivity in the Baltic states, and the establishment of normal neighbor-country relations with Russia is still a major problem for Latvia's foreign and security policy.

This is specified first and foremost by historical experience. Russia has sought to obtain control over the territories that are now Latvia and Estonia since the 16th century, and, in the 18th century, the Baltic region did become part of the Russian Empire. The Baltic territory was Russia's "window to Europe," and thus it was important from an economic, as well as a geostrategic perspective. "Land space and resources were for centuries the measure of Russian development."³ The independence of the Baltic states creates not only practical problems for Russia, but also is an important matter in the area of establishing a post-imperial and post-Soviet identity for the country.

Russian politicians and foreign policy experts have very contradictory views of the position which the Baltic states play in Russian security policies and in possible integration processes in the post-Soviet space,⁴ and the latter issue helps to preserve fears that Russia wants to keep the Baltic states within its sphere of influence or, given more favorable conditions, to reintegrate the three countries altogether, using political or economic levers. As Russian analyst Alexander Sergounin has written with full justification:

The Baltic states perceive Moscow's current policy as a continuation of Russian (or Soviet) imperial policy. They do not believe that the new Russian foreign policy is truly democratic in character.⁵

Considerations that the Baltic states may remain in the Russian sphere of influence politically have, until now, dominated the views of Russia's foreign policy leaders and experts. Their views are rooted in geopolitical thinking and

in a realist-based perception of the international system: “Russia seems unable to break free of its view of the world as a sort of zero-sum game in which countries become strong only by making other countries weak.”⁶ The Baltic states, in accordance with these concepts, will inevitably remain part of the Russian economic and security space, despite their efforts to “flee into Europe.”⁷

Of course, this is quite possible if Latvian attempts to integrate into European economic and security structures prove unsuccessful. Given that there can be no comparison between Russia’s and Latvia’s potential, the gravitational pull of the Russian political and economic space will always be palpable, even if Russia remains only a European-level great power. If Latvia were to choose neutrality as a security policy bedrock, or if it were to develop a “special relationship” which would copy the Finno-Soviet post-war model, Latvia would inevitably become a member of the Russian “near abroad” and would lose some of its sovereignty. Moreover, this choice would do nothing to provide the economic, political, and social stability which Latvia requires so urgently. Russia’s economic trump card lies in energy resources and raw materials, as well as a vast consumer market. Still, Russia is unable to become a locomotive of economic reform and economic growth.

The relationship with Russia is not being established easily or simply, but the perception of threats in Latvia has become more complicated. Russia is not Latvia’s only security problem, and it only partly explains Riga’s desire to join the EU and NATO. Although the possibility of a direct military threat should always be taken into account, it seems that the main threat for Latvia at this time is the possibility that it may be eliminated from mainstream Western integration processes. This is an important problem for all Central and Eastern European countries, and for Latvia in particular. As a small country engaged in a process of economic and political transition, Latvia is depending very much on a stable and predictable external environment. Inclusion of Latvia in a stable economic and

political system is seen as the main factor in lessening internal and external vulnerability and would have a stabilizing effect on the country. Logically, therefore, Latvia seeks to integrate with the EU and NATO. In the first instance, it would join one of the world's three economic superpowers (the United States, Japan, and the EU), obtaining much-needed material support for the modernization of the country's economy and society. Membership in NATO, for its part, would mean Latvia's participation in the world's most powerful and effective security organization, something that would give it the best available security guarantees. At the same time, the Alliance is shown to be based both on elements of *realpolitik* and on elements of institutionalism. Even though it is a classical military alliance, we must take into account the fact that the goal of NATO membership is broader than mere military guarantees; it also means admission to a European system of values. Even though collective defense remains the main mission of NATO, crisis management and a projection of stability are becoming increasingly important tasks for the Alliance.

The process of globalization brings with it an increase in environmental and social threats. Threats against security are becoming more difficult to define and identify, but the potential for catastrophe (e.g., in the area of possible nuclear reactor accidents) is no less than in the case of military aggression. This is another reason why institutional aspects and regional cooperation are becoming increasingly important in international policy.

External Environment. The existing international system specifies the security solutions which are available to Latvia. In the inter-war period, Latvia, like the other Baltic states, could choose among neutrality, alliance with any of the major powers, or balancing among the various powers of Europe. The Baltic states tried out all of the strategies, but that did not help them to preserve their independence. The present-day European international system is much more favorable for small countries because

it provides true security guarantees under the auspices of multilateral structures.

The discussion about the new European security architecture revolves around a fundamental problem: is the current international system operating on the basis of the laws of realism, maintaining the balance-of-power system, or has dominance been achieved by a system of mutually interrelated security institutions which offer an opportunity to correlate all possible views? The way in which we perceive this international system leads to conclusions about the strategies that are made available to small countries.

Obviously, it would be most precise to define the system as one which merges both balance-of-power and institutional elements. For Latvia, as well as other Central and Eastern European countries, the search for security is based not so much on theoretical considerations as on historical experience, the balance of forces in domestic policy, and pressures from the foreign environment, and all of this serves to prove the aforementioned hypothesis quite convincingly.

The Baltic states see the international system as one in which the laws of realism have not been repealed, but the international system provides an opportunity for a certain extent of fair play, creating mechanisms which reduce the influence of major-power *realpolitik* on small countries and allow smaller states to protect their own interests more successfully. Understanding the significance of *realpolitik*, the Baltic states are very sensitive in their attitude toward the policies which the United States, Germany, and other major powers have developed *vis-à-vis* Russia. Frequently there are fears that the destiny of the Baltic states may be decided without their own participation (“Yalta-2”). This was seen most vividly before the NATO Madrid summit.

These considerations lead to a mixed bag of strategies. On the one hand, there are efforts to increase security by joining such international institutions as the EU and by

increasing regional cooperation, especially in the Council of Baltic Sea States and under the auspices of Baltic-Nordic cooperation. On the other hand, the Baltic states seek to obtain strict security guarantees within NATO.

At the same time, Latvia, like the other Baltic states, remains interested in preserving an American presence in Europe. It is understood very well that, without the support of a superpower, European institutions alone cannot guarantee security.

The Heavy Door to NATO.

The meeting of leaders of the NATO member countries in Madrid on July 7-8, 1997, ended with a decision to begin expansion of the NATO Alliance. Meanwhile, the European Commission on July 16, 1997, published recommendations to begin membership negotiations with six Eastern European nations. Both events were an important turning point for the Central and Eastern European countries and for the EU and NATO. The decisions mark an end of discussions about the desirability of undertaking the Eastern enlargement of process. However, there are still questions about how extensive the enlargement will be, and the successive stages of expansion that will be required. Even more important is the question of what consequences there will be after the first stage of EU and NATO enlargement. Will the process contribute to “improving the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area” and ensuring “the consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent,” as was claimed in the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation of July 8, 1997,⁸ or will it result in an increasing economic burden for Western countries and a subsequent widening of political disagreements?

The way in which it will happen has not been much of a surprise to those who have been following the ongoing discussion. Both organizations have chosen the group principle, which allows them to merge expansion with

internal reforms more successfully, and to avert the negative consequences which expansion might have for the internal stability of NATO and the EU.

This resolution of the problem does not satisfy those Central and Eastern European countries which were not included in the first wave of expansion, including Latvia. Latvia sought to be included in the first wave, and it hoped that the EU would begin negotiations with all candidate countries simultaneously. In the case of NATO, this was a very difficult goal to reach, first and foremost because of Russia's consistent objections to the idea. In the case of the EU, the developmental level of the candidate countries was of greater importance. If Latvia had unquestionably met the criteria which were set up, the European Commission would have had a difficult time in rejecting the country for membership negotiations, despite the fact that the EU is not really interested in admitting an excessive number of new members.

If, in previous years, the discussion about NATO and EU enlargement centered mostly on the Central European countries, now Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are once again a front-page issue in European politics. To some extent, the Baltic states are becoming something of a proving ground for the emerging European security architecture. The process of enlarging NATO and the EU, as well as the success of Baltic integration in these structures and the development of relations with Russia in this context—all this will prove whether there is a possibility to build a comprehensive security system that can ensure security for all nations, big or small, notwithstanding their geopolitical location, and to create a European system in which legitimate Russian security interests could be in conformity with the Baltic states' bid for their security.

The results of the Madrid meeting may seem to have been a disappointment for Latvia and the other Baltic states, but it was very clear even a year ago that the Baltic states would not be admitted to NATO in the first wave of

enlargement. Prior to the Madrid summit, there were justified fears that the Alliance's doors would be closed to the Baltic states forever. In this context, the mention of the Baltic states in the Madrid declaration on security and cooperation was highly appreciated by Latvian politicians. It was the best that could be hoped for under the circumstances.

On the whole, the first wave of NATO expansion, despite uncertainties about the Alliance's internal development, will probably bring more positive than negative consequences to Latvia. NATO's geographical and political proximity to Latvia is increasing. There is hope that the new member states, especially Poland, will be more closely involved in Baltic matters. Even more, defense cooperation between the Central European countries and the Baltic states will become an internal NATO matter and, perhaps, will be intensified. As has been admitted by a Latvian defense ministry official, defense cooperation with these countries is at a much lower level than is the case with Western and Nordic countries.⁹

Although the door to the Alliance remains open "independently of geographic location," Latvia has not yet reached the point where future membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is a sure thing. It is worth remembering a commentary on the Madrid summit that was published in *The International Herald Tribune* on July 9, 1997:

No one in the Alliance organization—although expressing admiration for the Baltic states' democratization—has said they should join the Alliance at any foreseeable date.¹⁰

In all likelihood, membership in NATO is a very distant goal. As the French analyst Pierre Hassner has remarked, "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are beginning to understand that they will have to wait longer than Romania for NATO membership, and almost as long as Ukraine."¹¹

Although Latvian officials have expressed the hope that Latvia will be invited to join NATO during a second wave of

expansion in 1999, there is no certainty that this will happen. Latvia's ability to become a NATO member in the foreseeable future depends on several factors.

First, it must be remembered that the process of adjustment in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland once they become members of the Alliance will take some time, expense, and effort. The inevitable complexity of this process may also increase the influence of those forces in NATO which are opposed to further enlargement. Also, the various preferences of different NATO member countries, especially the French preference to strengthen the south-eastern flank of NATO, could play an important role.

However, the main obstacle remains the opposition of Russia. There are no signs that Russian opposition to NATO membership for the Baltic states will diminish in the near future. Statements by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov after the Madrid summit left no room for doubt about this. There is a broad consensus in the Russian foreign policy establishment against the enlargement as a whole, and especially where the Baltic states are concerned.

The NATO-Russian agreement, if it proves effective, may serve as a basis for a closer integration of Russia with the European security system and for a change in the thinking of Russia's political elite. (As has been pointed out by many observers, this is mostly the concern of Russia's elite, and not of public opinion at large.) It is certain, however, that this will not be a rapid or easy process. The Russian government cannot step back from its anti-NATO rhetoric, if only because it is loath to give the political opposition any opportunity to accuse the government of abandoning the country's interests. Russia's military circles, moreover, are having trouble in forgetting the "enemy image" that was cultivated for many decades. Indeed, it is quite possible that the fear which the Russian political elite has displayed with respect to Baltic membership in NATO is promoted not so much by concern

that the three countries may escape the Russian sphere of influence as by the idea that Baltic membership could provide a boost for other ex-Soviet republics, especially Ukraine, which are drifting in NATO's direction. Not accidentally, military exercises in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework in the former Soviet republics (e.g., Ukraine and Uzbekistan) are looked upon by Russian mass media as an enlargement of American sphere of influence.

It can be expected that Russia's diplomats will seek to take advantage of differences among Alliance members and use Moscow's political weight to prevent Baltic admission to the Alliance. In practical terms, this means that Russia will probably have to deepen its relationship with NATO within the framework of the NATO-Russian Founding Act, thus integrating itself more closely into the European security system. An optimistic view of this possibility would posit that it will contribute to a change in the perceptions which Russia's political elite hold *vis-à-vis* the Alliance. The pessimistic view would hold that Russia will then be able to block Baltic membership in NATO all the more effectively.

Speaking to students at Vilnius University on July 13, 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said:

We must continue to make clear that NATO enlargement is not directed at Russia—and you must help us. This process is not about escaping West, it is about gaining the confidence to look to the East in a spirit of cooperation.¹²

Undoubtedly it is very important in this respect for Latvia to improve its relations with Russia and to participate in confidence-building measures. It must be repeated, however, that the success of this process depends upon two basic issues:

- Russia's preparedness to recognize that the Baltic states have full rights to resolve their security issues in the way which they consider to be best. (This preparedness depends on the balance of forces in Russia's domestic politics, as well as on the level of

understanding in Russian society and political elite with respect to Russia's role in the contemporary world.)

- Russia's understanding of the nature of the present-day international order, i.e., whether it is a system which to some extent is replicating the bipolar world structure where the deciding characteristic was the contrast between American and Russian interests, and which leads to fears that NATO's eastward expansion in fact means an expansion of the American sphere of influence.

Regarding bilateral relations with Latvia, Russia has a choice between two tactics—to increase pressure, or to put more weight on confidence-building measures. The first option has been used more willingly so far. Linking citizenship issues with unresolved border problems and economic relations, as well as threats to implement economic sanctions (e.g., to divert oil transit from Latvian ports to St. Petersburg or Finland) in order to gain political concessions—these have been the main levers which Russia has used until this time. These tactics are counter-productive, however, as they inevitably strengthen Latvia's desire to seek security guarantees through integration with NATO. Recently there has been some hope that those experts in Russia who are proposing a normalization of relations with the Baltic states might come to the fore to a greater extent.

It may seem true, as after Madrid, Russian leaders have made different statements indicating some change in their Baltic policies. On September 5-6, 1997, there was a conference in Vilnius called "Co-Existence of Nations and Good Neighborly Relations—the Guarantee of Security and Stability in Europe." At the conference, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin submitted a series of proposals on the improvement of Russo-Baltic relations. Among them were the conclusion of bilateral agreements on political and government cooperation, confidence-building

measures (establishment of a “hot line” between the Russian military command in Kaliningrad and the Baltic states), specification of areas banned for military training in the Baltic Sea, exchange visits of military training ships, organization only of defensive military games in the Kaliningrad region), as well as Russian security guarantees for the Baltic states. At the same time, Russian foreign policy leaders have said several times that Moscow does not object to Baltic membership in the EU. They have also indicated a willingness to conclude border agreements with Latvia and Estonia without making any links to humanitarian issues, as has been done until now.

These initiatives are unquestionably a new breeze in Russia’s Baltic policy, but there is no reason to think that there has been a fundamental shift in foreign policy. Russia’s initiatives remain linked to a very basic condition: the Baltic states must remain outside any military or political alliances, i.e., they must renounce the goal of joining NATO. A certain amount of skepticism is also raised by the fact that Chernomyrdin’s proposals made no mention of reducing Russia’s military presence in Kaliningrad and other regions which border the Baltic states. Even more, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev has said that Russia will bolster its defenses in Kaliningrad, mainly because of military activity in the Baltic states and the bid by the three countries to join NATO.¹³

Latvia rejected any notion of security guarantees even before the Vilnius conference, as did the other Baltic states. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said that “under no conditions, even at the level of discussion, will we speak about Russian guarantees.”¹⁴ It is rather obvious why this proposal was rejected by Latvian policymakers. There is no Russian military threat against Latvia at the present time,¹⁵ but security guarantees would offer no assurance that Russian policies might not change in the future. The most threatening idea to Latvia is the possibility of internal political instability in Russia and the coming to power of unpredictable political forces in Moscow. In that case,

security guarantees would make very little sense, and there would be no reason to believe that Russia would honor them. The most important thing, however, is that Russian security guarantees would be some kind of legal confirmation that the Baltic states have a special status in Russian thinking—as a Russian zone of influence or some kind of buffer zone. As has been pointed out, security guarantees would mean abandonment of part of Latvia's sovereignty and a significant reduction in Latvia's ability to influence the situation in a way desirable for Latvia in case of changes in the international system.¹⁶

Taking into account the fact that Latvia's chances of joining NATO primarily depend on external factors such as the success of NATO in achieving internal and external adaptation, the outcome of the first wave of enlargement, and the development of NATO's relationships with Russia, it remains important for Latvia to decide what it can do to ensure that the NATO door remains open to it for the foreseeable future. One answer is self-evident for anyone who has followed the internal debate on Latvia's defense capabilities. The most important thing is to build up an efficient and capable defense force which meets NATO standards. It would be difficult to expect that Latvia could adjust its military capabilities in accordance with NATO standards without internal political stability and economic growth in the country. At present, Latvia's economic development is not such that the country can even begin to assume the obligations which are connected to participation in the Alliance. Even taking into account economic constraints, however, Latvia's defense budget is simply too small. Even though funding has increased from 11.9 million lats in 1993 to 25.5 million lats in 1997,¹⁷ we must take into account that the increase was tempered considerably by inflation. In 1995 Latvia's defense budget was larger than Estonia's and almost equal to Lithuania's, but this year it is only about one-half the size of the budgets of the two neighboring countries. In 1993 defense spending in Latvia constituted 0.8 percent of gross national product (GNP),

while in 1997 the figure was only 0.67 percent—compared to 1.2 percent in Estonia and 1 percent in Lithuania. Although it is evident that Latvia's level of economic development, as well as the government's commitment to a deficit-free national budget, does not allow for any huge allocation for defense purposes, this level of defense spending is simply inadequate. It should be boosted to 2 percent of GNP in 5 years' time, but in the proposed 1998 budget, the plan is to devote only 0.76 percent of GNP to defense purposes.

The government understands that defense assignments are currently insufficient, but there are many other areas which are suffering equally from the lack of money: health care, social welfare, education, science, etc. This puts Parliament and the government in a very difficult dilemma. In the words of Prime Minister Guntars Krasts,

without adequate investments in the social welfare of the individual, it would be short-sighted to increase the investment in the nation's long-term insurance policy—national defense—at an incommensurate rate. At the same time, however, it would not be proper to contrast the individual's welfare with the defense of the state—without one, the other is not possible.¹⁸

Insufficient funding of defense can arouse suspicions that Latvia in reality is not very serious about joining NATO and does not pay much attention to security problems. It can jeopardize chances to be admitted to the next wave of NATO enlargement. It also can hamper further development of military cooperation among the three Baltic states within the framework of the Baltic Battalion or *BaltBat*, as well as *Baltron* (a Baltic coastal minesweeper squadron under formation) and *Baltnet* (a Baltic regional air-surveillance system), as well as other common projects. However, a positive aspect is that defense policy now has become a focal point of debate in Latvia. The strategic priority of joining NATO is not questioned by major political forces (although a small group of mainly Socialist parliamentarians has been formed to oppose Latvian NATO membership—very much

in line with formation of similar groups in Russian and Ukrainian parliaments). The debate is about domestic policy priorities and about the organization of defense forces.

Budget shortages in the armed forces lead to insufficient logistical planning, a lack of effective officers, a group of conscripts who have a relatively low level of education, and a decline in the prestige of the military. At the same time, as the Latvian minister of defense has admitted, part of the defense system's already small budget is being used for activities that are not directly linked to the national defense.¹⁹ There are also other shortcomings which are the result of a certain amount of neglect by the country's leadership. And although there are no problems with the overall process of civilian control over the armed forces, the internal structure of the Ministry of Defense remains militarized to a significant degree.

Taking into account all of these difficulties, the support which Latvia's armed forces has received from NATO and the Nordic countries is of key significance. Latvia has military agreements with 11 countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, and the United States). Latvia also receives considerable support from Sweden and Finland, two neutral countries with which Latvia has no military agreements. Foreign support has been directed mainly at the training of personnel and at material and technical aid. Among the assistance programs are logistical planning for the *BaltBat*, as well as military exercises within the framework of the PfP program.

The current Defense Minister, Talavs Jundzis, has proposed a reorganization of the defense forces that is aimed at drawing closer to NATO. The basic principles of the National Security Concept that was adopted in 1995 are being preserved. That document states:

Latvia will not be able to ensure durable resistance against a large, superior military force, and its defense must be based on

the principle of repulsion and on military-political solutions. The national armed force must be small, mobile, well-equipped, well-trained and subject to civilian control.

Latvia's armed forces are made up of a number of units: the frontier guard (now it has been transferred to the Ministry of Interior Affairs) and the naval force and the air force which control and protect the state's land borders, maritime economic area, and air space, working in cooperation with the various civil service controls in the state. The Latvian Home Guard ensures defense of the entire territory of the state. Regular army ground troops are trained for quick reaction missions; soldiers receive basic training and participate in the operations of the aforementioned *Baltic Battalion*, which works under the auspices of the United Nations.²⁰

The reorganization plans envision a ground force that is built up on the basis of the Home Guard and acts as a territorial army. This would mean a closer integration of the 16,000-man Home Guard with the national armed forces (about 1,000 men in the ground force).²¹ The Home Guard is trained according to the standards of the British Ground Force, and it has proven itself as a good foundation for the army, especially as it provides the best opportunity, given Latvian circumstances, to create a reliable mobilization reserve according to the concept of total defense that emerges from the so-called Scandinavian model. At present there are separate training centers for the army and the Home Guard. The two institutions also have separate intelligence facilities and similar entities, and that is a waste of money. Under the reorganization plan, the National Armed Forces Staff would be responsible for defense policy and strategy, and the staffs of the naval and air force would be under its subordination. A new Territorial Forces Staff would be created.

Although Latvia receives much more from other countries than it is able to contribute, participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the PfP Program, as

well as participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, helps the country to adjust to NATO standards and to receive assurance that, despite its low level of military strength, Latvia can nevertheless contribute to European security.

Reform of the armed forces and efforts at military cooperation must be underpinned with diplomatic activity. The support of Denmark, Norway, and Germany was crucial in ascertaining that the Baltic states were mentioned in the Madrid declaration. Given NATO's overall consensus principle, however, much wider support must be ensured.

The Road to the European Union.

Future membership in NATO is an important element of Latvian security policy, but it must be backed up with the "soft" security guarantees that would be provided by membership in the EU. Integration with the EU provides both direct and indirect security guarantees, although the security aspect of EU integration is often undervalued. There is no serious alternative to European integration when it comes to Latvia's security and economic interests. As it was mentioned previously, membership in the EU will be an important factor stabilizing country's internal as well as external situation. Membership in the EU to some extent is a precondition for success of modernization processes. Of course, there are security risks attached to the Baltic states' integration with the EU. A small state that is integrating with a multilateral organization must inevitably face the dilemma of autonomy versus interdependence. However, it should be pointed out that the political impact of small states in the system is greater than it has been in various balance of power situations where small states have virtually no influence on the power games of the great powers.

The external environment (integration processes in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as with the

Scandinavian countries) also leaves no room for other options. Perhaps of note here is Morten Kelstrup's "integration dilemma," which assumes that, in the context of integration, a state must either give up a substantial part of its sovereignty (which involves a threat of becoming "entrapped" in the integration system and of losing the country's ability to pursue its own interests independently), or it must insist upon its own independence, thus facing the danger of being abandoned in the wake of the integration process which moves ahead without it.²² Put more plainly, "the fundamental attraction of EU membership is that nonmembership is a worse option."²³

As was stated previously, the indirect security guarantees have to do with the stabilizing effect which membership in the organization can have. Direct guarantees may emerge from the Union's future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although the details of the CFSP have not been worked, some elements are already becoming clear. One of the most important issues is the way in which the EU will be linked with other elements of European security, including the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Developments in the WEU and its relationship with NATO are decisively important.

The first major development is the fact that the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996 took several decisions that were aimed at the development of a European security and defense identity within NATO. The creation of a proposed Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) would allow NATO to transfer to the WEU capabilities, assets, and support assets, as well as command arrangements needed for WEU-led operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations). Meeting in Ostend on November 19, 1996, WEU ministers agreed that it would be valuable for the WEU to become actively involved in the Alliance's defense planning process, and they expressed their readiness to do so. The WEU is thus being transformed into a capable and potent organization, which it has not been previously. Although it does not seem that the WEU

will end up directly subordinated to the EU, the WEU is bound to accept any request that comes from the Union.

The EU Commission's recommendation to start accession negotiations with only six associated countries was perhaps a more painful blow to the Latvian foreign policy establishment than was refusal of NATO membership negotiations. In the case of NATO, the decision depended on Latvia itself only to an extremely limited extent. In the case of the EU, however, the decisive factor for all aspiring members was the level of political and economic development in each country and the ability of each state to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. Geopolitical considerations could not have been more important than indisputable political and economic achievements of the aspirant countries.

There are constant discussions and arguments why the European Commission chose Estonia out of the three Baltic states. It may be assumed that Estonia's selection was compensation for the fact that the Baltic states were spurned by NATO, as well as an indication that the Baltic states will be accepted into the EU.

Even taking into account that numerous EU officials have acknowledged that Latvia and Lithuania are not far behind, the fact is that Estonia was not chosen accidentally. It has had the most consistent economic development policies of all three Baltic states, not least in the respect of being first to implement privatization, trade liberalization, etc. Estonia's politicians managed to adopt the unpopular measures that were necessary for further economic and political development more quickly than did their Latvian colleagues. Much depends on diplomatic strategies and skills, and Estonia has been able to create an image of a regional "tiger."

The European Commission Opinion on Latvia's application for membership in the EU concludes that Latvia presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions, guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights,

and respect for and protection of minorities, and has made considerable progress in the creation of a market economy. However, in the Commission's opinion, Latvia would face serious difficulties to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term. It was also urged to accelerate the rate of naturalization of Russian-speaking noncitizens to enable them to become better integrated into Latvian society and improve the administrative system.

The Latvian government has undertaken fairly active work to convince the EU that it meets the organization's criteria and that the European Commission's conclusions were not precise—especially, that Latvia's rapid social and economic progress in 1996-97 was not entirely taken into consideration. The Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a memorandum addressing the ways in which it will overcome the deficiencies which the European Commission pointed out with respect to adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. There is also a 51-point action plan to intensify the country's integration with the EU. Government officials undertook a serious effort to change the EU opinion before the summit on December 13, 1997, in Luxembourg.

Even if it would be acknowledged by the EU officials that there are not striking differences between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, there was, however, very little hope that the European Commission would change its mind until December. Perhaps it is more realistic to try to achieve Latvia's admission to membership negotiations in December 1998.²⁴ Latvia's demand that membership negotiations be started simultaneously with all aspirant countries has so far been supported only by Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Sweden. A lot depends on Germany's standpoint on the matter that has not been announced yet. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that the EU decision will depend more on internal considerations—ability to carry out negotiations effectively, necessity to carry out internal structural reforms, problems with common currency, etc.

Needless to say, a simultaneous opening of negotiations with all of the aspirant countries would be the best possible course of events for Latvia. Application of the selective group principle means that there will be at least a two-track Central and Eastern Europe. Even if Latvia were able to improve its performance significantly and the EU will decide in 1998 to start negotiations, it would still be very difficult to catch up with the first group. Even more alarming are possible consequences of the differentiation process on Baltic cooperation.

EU and NATO Enlargement and Baltic Cooperation.

As NATO and EU enlargement draw closer, a certain gap has appeared in the process of cooperation among the three Baltic states. On the one hand, Lithuania's new conservative government has devoted much effort to improving links with Poland in the hope that Lithuania might be admitted to NATO together with that country. Lithuania's politicians were active in propagandizing the view that NATO should consider each Baltic country separately, not as a geopolitical unit. As Vytautas Landsbergis put it: "Lithuania wants to be considered as an individual country, not as a mushroom in a common basket that is known as the 'Baltic states'."²⁵ Estonian politicians have also objected to the idea of seeing the Baltic states as a unified whole, believing instead that in terms of EU membership, each country must be considered individually and in light of its own accomplishments. The position taken by these Lithuanian and Estonian politicians is understandable. They believed that their countries had realistic possibilities of joining NATO (in the case of Lithuania) and the EU (in the case of Estonia) in the first round of enlargement, and they feared that if the Baltic states were seen as a unified region, these opportunities might be lost. The culmination of these differences, apparently, occurred at the meeting of Baltic prime ministers in June 1997. At the conclusion there was no joint declaration by the three men.

As the three Baltic states were not admitted to NATO, they are in the same position now, and there are no serious obstacles to their security cooperation. Even more, it is likely to be increased in a framework of different programs envisaged to compensate for exclusion from the first wave of enlargement.

The matter is much more complicated with the EU membership. After the publication of the European Commission's report, then Prime Minister Andris Skele announced that, "The decision to begin negotiations only with Estonia damages the unity of the Baltic states. The Baltic region is once again being divided."²⁶ Present Prime Minister Guntars Krasts said in an interview with the German business newspaper, *Handelsblatt*, that Estonia's admission to the EU without Latvia and Lithuania could jeopardize cooperation among the three republics.²⁷ He suggested that Estonian membership in the EU could put an end to several pan-Baltic projects such as a customs union and common border controls. In addition, he said, Estonian membership could result in increased pressure from Russia against Latvia and Lithuania. Krasts' statement led to a fairly sharp reaction from Estonian politicians, who sought to eliminate fears that Estonia might become more oriented toward cooperation with those EU member countries with which Tallinn has especially close links (especially Finland and Sweden), sacrificing for this purpose its interest in cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania. However, Latvian reaction is understandable, as Latvia would suffer most from a weakening of Baltic cooperation, as Estonia can move closer to Finland and Sweden, while Lithuania is interested in closer cooperation with Poland and other Central European countries.

Be that as it may, the fact is that if Estonia becomes an EU member country first, there will be purely technical difficulties in terms of a customs union, the Baltic free trade agreement, visa-free travel, etc. These problems, generally speaking, will not be insurmountable, however, especially given that the Baltic states would be able to avail

themselves of the experience of Sweden and Norway after the former country joined the EU but the latter did not.

Looking at the influence which EU expansion may have on cooperation among the Baltic states, it should be noted that the best scenario, of course, would be simultaneous membership for all three, or at least a minimal time interval between the first accession and the others. Still, membership of just one Baltic country in the EU is not an unrealistic proposal, and this would have negative, as well as positive consequences.

The main negative effect is that the Baltic states, justly or unjustly, will be divided in two groups. This will have an impact on flow of foreign capital investments, and thus influence an economic performance.

The main positive consequence is that precedent will be created, and the membership of the other two Baltic states would be unstoppable. It should be taken into account that Estonia has, to a very great extent, set an example for Latvia in the area of domestic policy reform. Two examples will suffice: negotiations over the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, and the search for a solution to border problems between Estonia and Russia. In the area of economic transformations, too, Estonia has often set an example for Latvian politicians to follow when it comes to making necessary changes that are hard to stomach politically. Estonia's successful integration with the EU will help to reduce the skepticism and lack of faith in European integration which currently prevail among a fairly sizable share of the Latvian population. In addition, Estonian membership could help to spotlight the problems which Latvia will have to encounter when its turn for accession arrives. And, finally, there is no doubt that trans-frontier cooperation issues will be easier to resolve within the framework of the EU.

Conclusion.

In any and all scenarios, it must be taken into account that Latvia's full integration with NATO and the EU will be a very lengthy process. Furthermore, it is true that the European security system will be built not only on the basis of those two organizations, but also on the foundation of various institutional and regional elements. We must rather speak of a comprehensive security system in which all of the different elements are important. The "hard" guarantees which NATO could provide are just as important as the "soft" guarantees which come from the EU, the upcoming U.S.-Baltic charter, the Pfp program, and the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council, as well as various security structures, regional cooperation programs, and confidence-building measures. Latvia's security depends to a very large extent on the effectiveness of this system,²⁸ as well as on Latvia's own ability to exploit all of the possibilities inherent in the system to the fullest extent.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

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3. Marie Mendras, "Towards a Post-Imperial Identity," in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Merging Security Agenda*, Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 91.

4. See Aivars Stranga, "Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995-Beginning of 1997," in Atis Lejins and Zaneta Ozolina, eds., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective*, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997, pp. 184-237.

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6. "Russia Eyes the World," *The Economist*, November 23-29, 1996, p. 36.

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8. "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," July 8, 1997.

9. Gunita Nagle, "Ko dod militarie ligumi Latvijai?" ("What Do Military Agreements Provide for Latvia?"), *Diena*, July 28, 1997.

10. John Vinokur, "Historic Expansion is Approved With Some Discord at Summit," *The International Herald Tribune*, July 9, 1997.

11. Pierre Hasner, "Madride atstumtie sarezgita situacija" ("The Rejectees at Madrid are in a Complicated Situation"), *Diena*, July 11, 1997.

12. *Reuters*, July 13, 1997.

13. "Against the Baltics' NATO Bid," *The Baltic Times*, September 11-17, 1997.

14. *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 17, 1997.

15. Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of the Parliament of Lithuania, has pointed out that:

We do not think that there exists an aggressor who would attack us. However, we may be subjected to pressure, "satellitization," or forceful Finlandization. Instead of tanks, banks may be used to deliver a blow.

See Vytautas Landsbergis, "A Secure Future for All," *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. L., No. 2, 1997, p. 47.

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17. Zaneta Ozolina, "Latvian Security Policy," in Atis Lejins and Zaneta Ozolina, eds., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective*, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 52. See also the Latvian law on the national budget for 1997, *Latvijas Vestnesis*, No. 228/230, 1996.

18. Guntars Krasts, "Latvijas solis Eiropas ceļa" ("Latvia's Step Along Europe's Road"), *Diena*, September 23, 1997.

19. Interview with Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis, “Zinu, ar ko sis amats sakas, un ar ko beidzas” (“I Know With What This Job Begins and With What It Will End”), *Diena*, July 7, 1997.

20. National Security Concept approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, June 12, 1995.

21. Gunita Nagle, “Jundzis grib veidot teritorialo karaspeku” (“Jundzis Wants to Establish a Territorial Force”), *Diena*, July 15, 1997. The Home Guard was created in the fall of 1991 and initially was supervised by Parliament, while the national armed forces were under the control of the Ministry of Defense. In 1994 the Home Guard was also put under the commander of the national armed forces.

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26. Anda Kozukalne, “Premjers: EK lemums grauj Baltijas vienotību” (“Prime Minister: The EU Decision is Destroying Baltic Unity”), *Diena*, July 19, 1997.

27. “Collapse of Baltic Cooperation?,” *The Baltic Times*, September 11-17, 1997.

28. “If this very heterogeneous system manages to become effective, that will minimize the negative consequences that would emerge from the limited expansion of NATO and the EU.” See Aivars Stranga, “The Baltic States in the European Security Architecture,” in Atis Lejins and Zaneta Ozolina, eds., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective*, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 49.

CHAPTER 7

POST-MADRID ESTONIAN SECURITY POLICY

Mart Laanemae

Introduction.

The following story describes the basic issue in the security of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Once upon a time there was a miller who had a son. The son was afraid of the ducks on the millpond because he thought he was a grain of wheat and therefore thought that the ducks wanted to eat him. The miller sent his son to the best psychiatrists of the land. Eventually, the doctors said he was completely cured and sent him home. But as soon as he saw his first duck, he ran into the forest to hide. The miller found his son and asked, "I thought you were cured. Why do you still run away from the ducks?" The son replied, "Father, I know that I am not a grain of wheat. But do the ducks know that?" Many seem to think the Baltic States are like the miller's son. But that is a misconception. The Baltic States are the ducks.

We are just like ducks swimming around on the millpond, trying to get along. We have no desire to attack anybody. We know that sometimes poachers might trespass on the miller's land and come to the millpond to shoot us; in other words, that instability in neighboring countries may endanger our security. But we have no desire to attack our neighbors. That is part of the common European values that we share. We just want to go about our business.

Really we want to be like Singapore, which, as you will recall, was a British fortress. Like Tallinn, it was designed to defend against pirates and its guns pointed out to sea. In the Second World War the Japanese forces conquered

Singapore from the backside, from the land. This military Achilles' heel remained when Singapore attained independence, which was initially very fragile. Yet, Singapore survived and is now so important for the economy of the region that it can feel very secure. We would ultimately like our security to be like Singapore's; but because we are in Europe, our situation and thus our security policy are a bit different.

Estonian security policy has two basic components: good relations with our neighbors, and integration with Europe. The desire to have good relations with our neighbors is natural for us, especially considering that we have not attacked anyone for eight centuries. We must, of course, remember that joining any number of organizations does not replace good-neighborly relations. We must have both.

Integration into Today's Europe.

Integrating into Europe is, for us, based on the common values which are the essence of the new post-Cold War reunion of Europe. European organizations, especially the European Union (EU), can prosper only if there is security and stability in Europe. Peace in Europe is not and never will be a matter of course; it needs to be preserved diplomatically, stabilized politically, and secured militarily. The major challenge to internal security in today's Europe is economic and developmental failure, as well as problems with the environment, terrorism, migration, and international crime. We must work hard to prevent these through the conscientious development of soft security in all of Eastern Europe. These challenges are complex, multifaceted, difficult to predict, and hard to assess. If not contained, they will jeopardize the stability and strategic interests of Europe as a whole. Regional and continent-wide stability are interdependent. Of all the European organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has the greatest capability to ensure stability and

security. The EU can contribute in the area of soft or domestic security.

In the process of accession to the EU, each applicant goes through the process of analyzing existing legislation, harmonizing legislation with that of the EU, and taking on the requirements of the EU membership. All of these acts reinforce the rule of law and support the development of robust democratic structures. In this integration process, the EU provides help as a “democratic advisor” through assessing a country’s readiness to join the EU. In addition, the EU can offer “democratic building blocks” in the form of time-tested legislation and proven methods of peacefully reconciling competing interests. These laws and institutions have been modified over time and have demonstrated their worth in the workings of the EU.

The EU also has an important role to play in dealing with continent-wide threats to internal security. Estonia has made serious efforts in this regard which are closely coordinated with the authorities of neighboring countries, including Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, and the Russian Federation. Estonian frontiers are now controlled in a highly effective and professional manner. In the fight against drug trafficking, close cooperation between the police and border guard authorities of Estonia, Finland, and Sweden has led to a significant increase in the number of arrests.

In this manner, Estonia views the integration of Eastern European nations into the EU as an important element in the overall strategy to bring stability and democratic practices to the entire region. Simply said, the EU is an integral soft security provider. The EU—through the obligation of membership, and even potential membership—has the capacity to influence all of these levels of stability. But hard security is still the realm of NATO.

Estonia's Position on NATO Accession.

Joining NATO is the ultimate step of integration into Europe, because NATO is the organization that truly safeguards European common values. Most importantly, NATO is an organization for collective defense, where every member gives and takes his share. Estonia not only wants to be a consumer, but also a contributor to security. Europe deserves lasting peace and security. After all, the history of Europe is the history of war. It took the war that followed the "war to end all wars," it took the *shoah* (the Hebrew word for the holocaust and the title of a famous French documentary on it), the total destruction of Europe's heartland, and the death and displacement of millions of its inhabitants for us Europeans to realize that this was not the way to proceed. The eastern half of Europe attained peace as a result of repression, the Western half of Europe attained peace through international cooperation. The enlargement of NATO really is the eastward propagation of the second, democratic approach to lasting peace, into countries which desire the same.

Europe came to realize that as long as each nation developed its army by itself, with the capability to lay waste to all of its neighbors, there would always be a reason to start yet another war. For example, the small war that started with a shot in Sarajevo escalated into a regional conflict only because there were so many armies ready for action. The historic role of NATO was to make war irrelevant for nations which had fought each other for a thousand years. NATO showed that armies whose soldiers and officers train together every day shoulder-to-shoulder do not fight each other.

In addition, Estonia, as a member of the United Nations, is bound to contribute to ensuring stability and security everywhere. We were not in a position to simultaneously develop our military both as a defense force and as a peacekeeping unit, so we are very happy that with the help of NATO countries an Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian joint

peacekeeping unit was established, which has been very successful.

Of course, a military that can defend us is the priority. As we develop it, it can make domestic contributions, especially in the field of peacetime civil defense, such as catastrophe relief. In July, Estonia hosted the second largest military exercise in Europe last year, BALTIC CHALLENGE 97. The purpose of this exercise, which was carried out in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP), was to practice providing disaster relief after an earthquake in a politically unstable area, and it helped our military gain experience in humanitarian operations.

As we develop our military capability and our interoperability with NATO, we must be sure that the process of NATO enlargement continues. NATO's Madrid summit affirmed that we are part of this process, which will eventually lead to full NATO membership. In Article 5 of the Madrid Declaration, the 16 members welcomed the aspirations and efforts of the 12 European countries that have so far requested to join the Alliance.

Article 5 of the Madrid Declaration makes the important statement that the time has come to start a new phase of this process. Estonia's wish was that Madrid would be a beginning, not an end, and NATO has agreed. In addition, NATO made progress beyond the well-known concept of an open door: Article 8 of the Madrid declaration says that the Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and would enhance overall European security and stability.

We must work to be ready to contribute to NATO and take on the Article 5 responsibilities of membership. After Madrid, we have an added incentive. Whereas NATO enlargement was previously based only on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty—which says that the members may invite others to join—the Madrid Declaration makes a much stronger commitment, based on common values and on the need to reinforce security and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area.

But we see this as a bilateral process: it is good that NATO is contributing to help us, but we must also contribute to NATO, even before we join. It is logical that we seize any opportunity to practice the requirements of being NATO members as soon as possible. In the months leading up to the Madrid Summit, we participated as much as possible in NATO's decisionmaking process. There were two theoretically possible outcomes: being invited to join or not. Even if we were asked to join, some countries would be left out, and by helping them, we would be helping ourselves, too, if we were not invited.

Our efforts leading up to the Summit were directed towards ensuring that PfP is continually strengthened, and that, in parallel, a reliable and clear enlargement mechanism is created. In both areas we are pleased with the results.

Contributing to PfP and Working Toward Article 5.

Estonia considers it important to enhance military and operational cooperation within PfP and especially to institutionalize cooperation on a regional basis. NATO would still have the last word, but the partners would be involved. The NATO-Russian cooperation has many conceptual similarities, but, in addition to having cooperation with central NATO structures, we wish to promote regional operational centers and have full access to them to further develop interoperability.

Moreover, Estonia strongly advocated the idea of replacing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). We viewed this as becoming a decisionmaking body on political-military matters, which would concentrate on priority security issues like CFE, CSBMs, emerging crises or possible conflicts, civil emergencies, chemical weapons disposal, and so forth. As the EAPC gets underway, we hope to see a deepening of the consultation associated with PfP and also to discuss possible new regional NATO substructures, depending on how NATO decides to develop them. The PfP and EAPC should also deal with involvement in Common Joint Task Forces for PfP partners.

But early on, Estonia realized that PfP alone is not a road to NATO enlargement. There are now five kinds of PfP partners: present NATO members, future NATO members, countries that have applied to join NATO, countries that could probably join NATO but are not interested, and countries that NATO would probably not invite to join. Each PfP partner has slightly different aims and different abilities to contribute.

This means that there is already a differentiation between PfP partners based on their individual actions and aspirations, and much of it is a result of each partner's individual situation and history. By setting appropriate priorities and carrying out appropriate changes, each partner can change its profile. We call this self-differentiation. Each partner may still have a slightly different profile, but accession will be possible in each particular case. The approach to self-differentiation should be flexible, because it must also be prepared to deal at an appropriate speed with countries like Austria and Sweden, should they decide to join NATO.

Estonia was very concerned about ideas to discontinue individual dialogues with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It was important for us to ensure that there would still be a 16+1 mechanism for consultation about

membership, because PfP and EAPC are not about membership. By maintaining a 16+1 type mechanism, NATO would in effect recognize that self-differentiation is taking place.

The justification for why we can promote self-differentiation in this way is found in the NATO handbook, in which the structures created within NATO are described as providing for continuous consultation and cooperation in political, economic, and other nonmilitary fields, as well as for the formulation of joint plans for the common defense; the establishment of the infrastructure needed to enable military forces to operate; and arrangements for joint training programs and exercises. If we want to join NATO, we must be able to consult and cooperate in all these areas. That is our goal: to be so comprehensively involved in NATO activities that when we do become full members, we will be able to make a full contribution to NATO.

The Madrid Declaration has completely justified and supported these aims. Article 8 states that NATO members also intend to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership and that these will cover the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, both within the EAPC and in a 16+1 format.

Estonia had always pointed out that these talks are the *second* stage of self-differentiation. The first stage is to apply to join in the first place. Estonia agrees that these would not be considered accession negotiations. They will be preparatory talks about enlargement, which will focus on the readiness or the nonreadiness of applicant partners and discuss their practical preparation for membership.

Last spring, NATO members were not keen to present aspiring countries a list of what they still had to do in order to join NATO. Their message was to keep working until we were ready. This is perfectly understandable, as NATO is too serious an organization to join just by fulfilling a one-time checklist. Since Central and Eastern European

countries have to use their limited resources wisely to continue their reforms, it would be foolish to allow a situation where a country could divert all available resources toward NATO membership and perhaps lose elsewhere.

An idea which NATO members were more willing to support was to help the aspiring countries review their progress; that is, to recognize what had been accomplished, not to say what still had to be done. The Madrid Declaration has left this question open, but provides for high-level reviews of the 16+1 consultations. Given good will on both sides, this concept is so flexible that it may be better than our initial proposal.

What Estonia clearly did not expect was the decision to review this process in 1999. Mentioning the two countries left out of the first round, Romania and Slovenia, as well as clearly noting the Baltic States was also unexpected. These statements ensure that, for now, NATO enlargement is clearly seen as a process that will continue, and that no countries which are ready, regardless of geographic location, will be excluded from consideration. These two aspects, which Estonia had not expected to see in the Madrid declaration, show that NATO is serious about its aims and serious about us, and we welcome them.

Concluding Remarks.

To conclude, I must emphasize that NATO enlargement should by no means be considered as targeted against anybody. Rather, it is all part of a larger integration process in a new post-Cold War era. NATO is also a new NATO. The success of a strong common effort to establish peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina with IFOR and now SFOR is the best proof of that. We should not hide our heads in the sand and pretend that there are no new lines in Europe. Seeing and recognizing them, we can make them lines of cooperation rather than division. There are countries that still need to be fully convinced of that, for not even all NATO countries

have a complete consensus for enlargement. Therefore, we do value intense cooperation between NATO and Russia as well as NATO and Ukraine. We are pleased that this cooperation has been fixed in writing and expect it to benefit security and stability in Europe.

So what do we do now? Well, we must work hard. We must continue the NATO enlargement process, we must ensure that it takes place individually and outside the EAPC and PfP, which will however help us prepare to take on the responsibilities of NATO membership. The prospects are generally positive.

After all, just 5 short years ago we were ugly ducklings, swimming in the millpond watching life go by. We are becoming grownups and are preparing to participate in the life around us. Unfortunately, our lives can move in one of two directions. We do not want to grow up to be sitting ducks, our lives at the mercy of an unpredictable hunter. We rather hope to be accepted as grownups, able to protect common values with our neighbors. We know that the miller's son is a not grain of wheat. And we remember that some European ducklings have grown up to be swans.

CHAPTER 8

BULGARIA AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Valeri Ratchev

INTRODUCTION

For any observer in Sofia, the last years of the second millennium are exceptionally dramatic and full of challenges. They are dramatic because, for those living in a period when the tectonic slabs of history are shaking under the people's feet, nothing is "like before," and few are those who know what the future will be.

We, the Bulgarians, are confronted with an avalanche of rhetorical questions: Are we Europeans or Orientals? Do we participate in the European processes, or are we just watching them from a short distance? What is more important for us—to stick to the cumulated historic complexes or to get rid of the heavy burden of "Balkanization" and to adopt the values of Western civilization? To be happy with the recovered national sovereignty or to rush to a new binding with an alliance? If we are following the path to Europe, through where does this path pass—through Bonn or Washington, through Moscow or Istanbul, or maybe through Brussels or Strasbourg?

The challenges stem from the necessity that the answers to these questions—which touch upon the foundations of the Bulgarian people and statehood—must be found in a very short time frame, and the decisions which we inevitably must take have to be realized with political, financial, and moral resources which measure practically to zero.

The Republic of Bulgaria is passing through a complicated stage of political and economic transition from totalitarianism to democracy and market economy. The deep economic crisis forces the government to concentrate its attention and efforts on the immediate solution of the economic and social problems. The political will, demonstrated by the President of the Republic and the Government, the broad public support of the decisive restructuring of the national economy, and the attention of friendly nations and international institutions are guarantees for rapidly overcoming the crisis and entering into the “rhythm” of the European integration process.

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The European security model which would correspond to the greatest extent to the national interests of Bulgaria has to solve five fundamental questions:

- that security is really collective, and all have equal responsibilities and rights in its provision;
- that the specter of institutions, responsible for the different aspects of security, be preserved, guaranteeing the role and the mission of each one of them by real instruments;
- that the United States, Russia, and the European nuclear powers be subject of a unified security framework and have equal responsibility for the collective security;
- that an overall system of crisis monitoring and a mechanism for sure and effective conflict prevention and crisis management be established; and,
- that the existing security architecture be used to a full extent modernizing its elements and optimizing its interaction mechanisms, avoiding drawing the

countries into a new negotiation process—a sort of repetition of the historic process passed by the nations “to Helsinki.”

SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

There is something paradoxical in the attitude of Europe to the Balkans. On one side, the situation in the region is evaluated as complicated, and efforts are being made for its political and military isolation. On the other side, however, when there is a question of stopping the invasion of forces and influences from outside the Continent, the Balkan nations are being considered as an integral part of the European family.

Actually, the division in the Balkans is not an exceptional phenomenon in Europe. Three of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) are members of the European Union, and two of them are neutral while three are NATO members (Denmark, Iceland, and Norway). In Central Europe a geopolitical periphery is being shaped around Germany. It is charged with potential ethnic conflicts and, at the same time, demonstrates an affection to Germany which the Germans themselves do not reciprocate.

What is really different in the Balkans is that the peninsula is a center of three civilizations—Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim. For this reason, the wars in the region had most often civilizational characteristics. This has to be understood and remembered by all who try to “make history” in Europe.

Some of the more general and stable characteristics of today’s regional security situation are as follows:

- The mosaic of security in South-Eastern Europe comprises states ranging from such which are covered by the whole spectrum of international guarantees (like Greece) to such which are not even internationally recognized.

- The Western European and Euro-Atlantic security and defense organizations do not have an immediate interest in the region although they are involved in the process of its stabilization. Even if such an interest could be stimulated, it would be based on specific preferences of some of the European powers—e.g., France to Romania, Italy to Slovenia, Germany to Croatia.
- The great powers—the United States and Russia—have interests in certain countries of South-Eastern Europe but in fact those interests can be explained by their traditional interest in geo-strategic regions adjoining the Balkans—the Mediterranean, the Near and the Middle East, Central and Western Asia, and the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles).
- The deep economic crisis and stagnation in practically all countries of the region, the lack of traditional inner regional markets, the total deficiency of new investments, and the excess of manpower strongly limits the possibilities of alternative forms of integration. In fact, the region as a whole is in the era of the mechanical agrarian economy. Computerized production and services are an exception, and information technologies are in an initial phase.
- No active all-regional system exists in South-Eastern Europe even for political consultations, not to mention any semblance of a regional security system. The meetings of the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries before 1989, in July 1996, and June 1997 did not lead to significant results in this field.
- One of the main sources of conflict in the region is the deficiency of an alternative to military force for solving interstate disputes. At the same time, none of the countries disposes with sufficient outside political

support and necessary financial resources, nor with economic and technological know-how to consider military force as a “last argument.”

- The risk factors for regional security present a complicated picture, the main elements of which are listed next.

Military Aspects.

- The internal conflict in former Yugoslavia escalated to a war in the central part of the Continent, and its solution required the largest military operation in Europe after World War II. The reasons for the emergence of the conflict and the consequences of it will no doubt leave behind a lasting imprint on the relations inside the region and on international political and economic attitudes toward the states there.
- The region includes the CFE flanks where the heritage of bloc confrontation in the arms field is felt in the strongest way. In certain circumstances, the enormous imbalances between neighboring countries may provoke use of military force for reaching limited political goals.
- The ethnic problems in the region are considered as the most serious on the Continent and may serve as a potential cause for a new regional military conflict.
- The dangerous tendency exists that the region may be purposefully divided on a civilizational principle which will not only cause internal confrontation, but will open space for intervention from external factors such as Islamic.
- Disputes and conflicts of regional significance are indicated below.

- A number of unsolved problems exist between Greece and Turkey that obstruct the development of their bilateral relations: the delimitation of the continental shelf, the limits of the air space, and the right of Greece to enlarge its military waters to 12 miles in accordance with the International Convention of Law of the Sea which was declared by Turkey as a possible *casus belli*. Turkey also accuses Greece of violating the rights of the Muslim minority in its territory and of supporting the activities of the Kurdish Working Party (PKK).
- The Cyprus problem remains unsolved after more than two decades and creates serious difficulties for relations between Greece and Turkey. It also has a negative impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The efforts of the United Nations, NATO, and member-states of the Alliance do not create great hopes for a lasting negotiated solution. It is difficult to foresee whether the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as a special representative of the U.S. President for Cyprus will lead to better results, especially having in mind the difficulties in applying the Dayton agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first meeting in 3 years between the leaders of the Cypriot Greeks and Turks Glafkos Klerides and Rauf Denktash (July 9-12) did not much advance the cause of peace on the island. There is little hope for greater progress at their next meeting in Switzerland, especially given the tension provoked by the EU decision to start negotiations with Cyprus for future membership and the intention for “partial integration” of the so-called Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic with Turkey.
- Greece and Albania are in a dispute about the rights of the Greek minority in Southern Albania,

and Athens makes development of bilateral relations dependent on the solution of this problem.

- Despite the progress in the relations between Greece and Macedonia, which led to the opening of diplomatic liaison offices in the two capitals and to the lifting of the Greek economic embargo, the question of the name of Macedonia remains open, and there are no signs of softening in their positions on the matter.
- The Kosovo problem remains explosive. The compact masses of the Albanian population on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and in Macedonia, and the separatist feelings stimulated also from outside these countries, create a potential danger of escalation to a conflict which could have serious consequences for FRY, Macedonia, and Albania, and for the Balkans as a whole. The Kosovo problem is an internal one for the FRY and has to be solved in accordance with the OSCE principles through a dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. The reestablishment of the OSCE Mission in FRY is therefore obviously necessary. It is too early to say what will be the impact of the events in Albania on the situation in Kosovo. Some observers express the opinion that the turmoil in Albania might cool the desire of the Kosovo population to adhere to the “Motherland.”

Non-military Aspects.

- Organized crime in South-Eastern Europe is growing due to the transition processes in some of the countries, and to the existence of sources of tension and military conflicts in the Balkans and in the adjoining geo-strategic regions. One of the main “traditional” (the so-called Balkan) roads for narcotics traffic to Western Europe passes through South-

Eastern Europe from the “Golden Crescent” (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) as well as from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. (It is estimated that 75-80 percent of the heroin in Western Europe passes through this road.) “The Balkan Road” is used in the opposite direction as well—for the transportation to the Near and the Middle East of chemicals produced in Western Europe needed for drugs production. In the last few years, growing efforts are being observed of the creation of new channels for drug traffic. In addition, the crime organizations are seeking possibilities for lasting implantation in the countries of South-Eastern Europe, including the building of factories for drugs production.

- There is a tendency for the illegal traffic of arms, ammunition, and explosives to increase. Several channels pass through the Balkans—from Western Europe to Turkey and the Middle East, from Russia to former Yugoslavia (through Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), to Turkey and the Middle East, from Serbia to neighboring countries. A real danger for a massive increase of this kind of traffic is the present situation in Albania, where millions of weapons are in the hands of the population.

The increase in the quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives on the illegal markets in the Balkans is an objective factor for the expansion of political and criminal terrorism. It is also a prerequisite for the escalation of existing ethnic tensions in the states of the region to local armed conflicts. These conflicts lead to the destabilization of established political and economic relations, and to armed confrontation of the crime groups on a national and regional scale.

- The traffic of strategic goods and raw materials is a relatively new phenomenon in the region. It is a consequence of the great political and economic changes in South-Eastern Europe after the end of the

Cold War, mainly the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Besides the usual criminal results, this traffic creates a real danger of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological terrorism on a regional, European, and worldwide scale.

- South-Eastern Europe is also used as a transit point and intermediate base for illegal traffic of humans. The Turkish, Kurdish, Iranian, Syrian, Palestinian, and Albanian groups operating in the region are linked to the international crime organizations which control illegal emigration streams on a worldwide scale.
- The region is very vulnerable to money laundering. The liberalization of internal and external economic relations and the great increase in the number of financial and credit institutions (banks, insurance companies, etc.) in the new democracies of the region create favorable conditions for money laundering, especially considering that the new institutions are not sufficiently controlled by the central banks, and there is a lack of legislation adequate to the new conditions. Moreover, this is a destabilizing factor for the economies of the region and for regional economic cooperation, which is an additional prerequisite for the expansion of organized crime.
- The acts of terrorism in South-Eastern Europe show that the nature of terrorists varies in the different countries of the region. Terrorist activities have mainly an internal character. At the same time, the differing terrorist pressure on the states leads to differences in their reactions. The different degree of preparedness of the defense systems of the individual countries creates a field of maneuver for terrorist organizations and conditions for the “transfer” of terrorism. This converts internal terrorism into a regional threat. The lack of sufficient political

confidence and readiness for interaction of these states may lead to preventive operations outside the national borders by those countries which are most seriously affected by terrorist activities.

- A risk factor for regional security is the possibility of using terrorist organizations for attainment of narrow national goals. South-Eastern Europe is still considered a base and transit point of radical Islam organizations. A favorable condition is the existence in the region of compact Muslim populations and tension between the ethnic and religious groups.
- Due to its geographic situation, South-Eastern Europe is one of the migration “highways” from Asia and Africa to the developed countries of Western Europe and the United States. One of the transit lines between the Christian and the Muslim worlds passes precisely here. The balance of security of the South-Eastern European countries is particularly sensitive to these processes. In defending their national interests, the countries of the region, including Bulgaria, are a buffer on the way of the migration waves. They assume the original pressure and, to a certain extent, soften the negative consequences for the Western countries. One way to limit illegal migration on a continental scale is for the countries in the region to receive financial assistance from the Western states for building an efficient system for border, customs, and immigration control and for extradition of illegal immigrants.

Influence of NATO Enlargement on Security in South-Eastern Europe.

The consequences of NATO enlargement in South-Eastern Europe may be evaluated, first of all, by understanding what is positive and what is negative for the nation and the state, and to what extent their interests are

compatible to the interests of the other countries of the region. I will therefore deal with the possible consequences of NATO enlargement which, in my opinion, are of lasting importance and will no doubt have either a positive or a negative influence in the region.

The main consequences which may have a **positive** effect for the region are as follows:

- As a result of the general (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia excluded) desire for membership and the related implementation of common criteria and conditions, the Balkans will become a homogeneous political space in which the nations rapidly adopt West European rules and regulations for international and internal political, economic, and military-strategic behavior. The adherence of the Balkan nations to one of the symbols of the democratic world will make them participants in a process which has absolutely clear rules, parameters, and perspectives, and in which the improvisations in the field of collective security are also extremely clear.
- The new conditions will create objective conditions for fully respecting national sovereignty—a problem to which the Balkan nations are particularly sensitive. It is a myth that NATO membership restrains sovereignty. At the end of this century, sovereignty has completely different dimensions compared to those from the times of ideological hostility. Outside NATO the sovereignty of a state might be recognized but might also be completely ignored. The NATO mechanism of political decisionmaking guarantees to each member-state not only the right to its own position, but also obliges the allies (and not only them) to conform to it. Therefore, by joining NATO the Balkan nations will enter an environment where they may develop a regional security strategy and not worry about their national sovereignty.

- The Balkan nations will join a political and military system with great potential and international prestige. The zone of security and stability that NATO extends over the territory of its members cannot be compared to any other not only today, but in the foreseeable future as well. The future role of NATO is motivated by the understanding of almost all European states that, even without the existence of a direct military threat, it is simpler and much more reasonable and profitable that national security be guaranteed in the framework of a multinational organization than to organize a “defense on all azimuths.”
- Preconditions are being created for establishing new political, economic, and military relations with the leading countries of the world. By joining NATO, the Balkan countries will enter a zone with a higher security level which automatically will change positively the political and economic attractiveness of the region. Foreign investors’ complaints of the unstable conditions for capital investment will be neutralized to a great extent. Six of the seven most developed countries in the world are NATO members. It is politically inadmissible to miss the possibility of joining these powers in a unified organism, especially when each country in the region has such enormous need of support in practically all fields. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that precisely these six countries control the international financial institutions which obviously will be the leading factor in the economic transition of the Balkan countries. The adherence to NATO will strengthen the positions of the counties in the region for full membership in the European Union.
- The basis for a stabilization process with new characteristics and scope will be created in South-Eastern Europe. Becoming members of the Alliance

will enable the Balkan countries to prevent in the most efficient way the establishment of any hostile regional configurations. With adherence to NATO, there will be more states in the region with common strategic interests than with strategic contradictions.

- The external guarantees received by the countries of the region will have a predominantly preventive character which, in the case of the Balkans, is much more valuable than the ability for immediate defense.
- The adaptation process of the countries in the region to the substantial body of NATO standards, regulations, and agreements will result in the simultaneous solution of legal problems of an internal and international character, such as consolidation of the separation of powers, establishment of democratic civil-military relations, etc. This will also create a new internal and external environment favorable for the execution of international economic projects of strategic importance.
- The problem of the military imbalance in the region, while not fully solved, will be sharply mitigated.

At the same time, some consequences may prove to be **problematic** at a given stage and to a certain extent. These consequences are related mainly to the continued negative attitude of Russia to NATO enlargement despite the signing of the Founding Act between the Alliance and the Russian Federation in Paris in May 1997, and the fact that, at the Madrid Summit in July, no Balkan state was offered the possibility to join NATO with the first wave. Moscow has repeatedly declared that the strong desire to join NATO expressed by the countries in the region, including Bulgaria, will not influence bilateral relations. But there is no doubt that this desire irritates Russia and may lead—at least for a certain period—to difficulties in export and import of strategic raw materials such as petroleum

products. The armed forces in particular may have problems with spare parts and repairs.

Concerning the Approach of NATO Enlargement.

It was naturally not reasonable to expect that all nations in the region could simultaneously join NATO. It is normal that each country “publicizes” its arguments and leads a policy conforming to its national interests. What is important is that this is being done in a spirit of cooperation and not of competition.

NATO enlargement is a problem of geopolitical and military-strategic nature. It is important that the Balkans or parts of them do not become bargaining counters aimed at the compact integration of the Central European countries only. It has to be clear to all that tearing the Balkans away from Europe and the European integration process is a much bigger threat to common security than the isolation of Russia from European matters. Space does not permit lengthy geopolitical, demographic, ethnic, religious, and military-strategic analyses, but it is important to lay out several troubling problems that would likely result from NATO’s permanently excluding the Balkans from the enlargement process:

- The Balkan countries would begin forming all sorts of hostile political “axes” and “triangles.”
- All countries, and the region as a whole, would be considered unattractive political and economic partners. The political will of the international financial institutions to assist the structural reforms in the region would strongly diminish. Only projects of importance to the European Union and of a transitional importance for the Balkan countries would be supported.
- The feeling of insecurity and isolation from the rest of Europe would take deeper root in the Balkan peoples

and their governments, economies, and security institutions.

In addition:

- How would the process of the secondary split of the Balkans develop, and what would the result be of the possible confrontation between external forces aiming at redistributing the zones of influence in the region?
- What would happen to the Southern Flank of NATO? In particular, what would be the future of the conflict between Greece and Turkey with their Balkan neighbors left out of NATO's political and security regime?
- What mechanism would solve the potential tensions between the states of the region which would inevitably emerge in the process of its next restructuring?
- How would Western Europe cope with a possible intrusion of aggressive Islamic forces? In broader terms, how would a clash of civilizations be avoided (which in Europe is possible only in the Balkans)?

PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF BULGARIAN SECURITY POLICY

Starting Position.

Bulgaria was left out of the first wave of the enlargement both of NATO and the European Union. For the time being, it is not clear whether it will be included among the potential candidates in the near future. The reasons for this are complex—internal and external.

The internal reasons are mainly related to the political character of the post-Cold War transition period in which the theme of “social transition from socialism to market

economy” prevailed in Bulgaria. This theme enabled the former Communist Party (Bulgarian Socialist Party—BSP) to have a leading role in the political life of the country. The BSP position on NATO membership (in contrast to the position of the socialists in Hungary and Poland) remains negative, mainly because of the unchanged attitude of its electorate. Another internal reason is the historical heritage of the last 50 years. Bulgaria does not have to its credit anything like the “events in Hungary” of 1956, the “Prague Spring” of 1968, or the strikes in Gdansk of 1981. The lack of such anti-Soviet or anti-communist resistance proved to play an extremely important role not only within Bulgaria but also for the ideological approach of the West to the first wave of NATO and EC enlargement. It determined the unequal start in 1992-1994, including the purposeful investment of enormous funds for the preliminary preparation for membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The main external reason for Bulgaria’s ineligibility for NATO accession is the West’s interpretation of Bulgaria’s relations with the former Soviet Union. The assessment of Bulgaria as the closest ally of the former USSR continues to be one of the many obstacles for the country in the context of East-West relations. Sober voices among Western experts are too few to change this assessment for the short period after 1991. The heroic conduct of Bulgaria in respecting the embargoes on Iraq, Libya, and former Yugoslavia does not seem to have had any practical value. The full involvement in the efforts of the international community in defending democracy (the economic results of which are close to a Bulgarian national disaster) seems to be far less important than a labor strike in the times of collapsing communism.

Such considerations would be marginal if countries such as the United States decided to act in accordance with their strategic interest. The most serious problem of Bulgaria, in the context of joining the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, is the existence of a misunderstanding by the United States, NATO, and the European Union of their real

interests in the Balkans. The evidence for this is apparent, starting with the specific conduct of Germany in the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, passing through the period of multiple policies of the Western European countries and the United States, and ending in the way in which the Dayton agreements were concluded. There is no shortage of other examples: the purposeful limitation of the notion of “Balkans” to the geographical “Balkan peninsula,” excluding Slovenia, Romania, Croatia, and Cyprus, and its division into Southern and Northern Balkans; the American “Shifter” initiative and its fierce rejection by the European Union; the debate about the future of SFOR; the confidence in the Dayton peace process; the problem of Turkey’s membership in EU, etc.

The conclusion is that, in a period of 10-15 years, the international status of Bulgaria will probably not change. If the negative outlook on Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and EU continues, the country will remain in a “special zone,” and for a long time will stay outside the European integration processes, with the following likely results:

- the realization of the strategic goal—full integration with the European political, economic and defense structures—will be considerably delayed;
- the logic will be applied to Bulgaria that, if a country is not attractive from the strategic, military and political point of view, it is not suitable for economic expansion as well;
- Bulgaria will gradually fall into regional isolation or will be forced to join (directly or indirectly) a regional configuration which does not correspond to its national interests;
- the question of external guarantees against sources of risks and danger for national security will remain unsolved;

- the restructuring and modernization of the Armed Forces will become a constant problem. The technological backwardness of all defense elements will significantly increase the negative arms imbalance with the neighboring countries.

This will inevitably have a specific impact on the Bulgarian policy in the sphere of national and international security. During a period of 10-15 years, the main particularity of Bulgaria's political strategy will be the necessity to distribute the extremely limited political, financial, and personnel resources for the parallel solution of several strategic survival goals. The internal political, social, and economic stabilization will be a prerequisite for consolidation of the international positions of the country and, at the same time, external factors will be decisive for the success of the economic and political reforms. Any internal political and economic step will have to conform with the requirements of all external factors and will have an important impact on the internal processes.

The main goal of the Bulgarian national security strategy is to overcome the economic and social lag and simultaneously compensate for the shortage of external security guarantees by combining efforts for internal restructuring of the political and economic system with a policy of close cooperation, interaction, and gradual binding with NATO and EU until obtaining full membership in these institutions.

The New Course of the National Security Policy.

The Bulgarian government decision of February 17, 1997, to seek accession to NATO put an end to the inconclusive and deformed debate about the country's position on this matter. Bulgaria is no longer the "particular (special) case" in Europe.

President Petar Stoyanov's appeals to NATO, WEU, and EU, the Visegrad countries, Greece, Turkey, and Romania

show that the leadership of the country has moved from the unclear and noncommittal statements of the last government to a period of intensive conceptual, organizational and practical work for Bulgaria's integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In a very short time, the active work of the President and the government led to an official recognition of those efforts by the United States and—to a certain extent—Germany. As a result, the procedure was initiated by which Bulgaria would be included on the list of countries with which a dialogue about membership will be conducted in the future. Regrettably, the U.S. proposal that Bulgaria be mentioned in the Madrid Declaration among the potential candidates of the next wave was rejected because of particular interests of some European countries.

At the same time, a process of thorough reconsideration of the national security policy started in Bulgaria. The priority of joining NATO and EU is unconditional, irreversible, and based on firm political will.

Bulgaria's desire to become a NATO member is based on the following:

- the fact that Bulgaria belongs to the European democratic system of values and is ready to contribute to the common security and to share the risks involved, to defend and protect the common Western political, spiritual, and cultural values.
- the conviction that (in the foreseeable future) an adapting NATO will become the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and the main carrier of collective (and cooperative) guarantees for the security of its members (and partners).
- the readiness of Bulgaria to share the responsibility for Euro-Atlantic security by participating on the basis of equal rights and engagements, without conditions or restrictions, in all aspects of construc-

ting and functioning of the Trans-Atlantic security system.

- the desire of Bulgaria not to have borders with NATO. Relations with Greece and Turkey are relations of openness and confidence. If today we are partners with these nations, sharing the same visions of the future, tomorrow we can be allies in the full sense of the word.
- the understanding that Bulgaria's membership in NATO cannot be considered as a threat by the main opponent of enlargement—Russia.

Bulgaria and NATO—The Formula of the Common Interest.

Bulgaria shares the opinion that the three main motives for NATO to accept new members are:

- that collective defense remains the unconditional necessity for Trans-Atlantic security;
- that pursuing prospects for NATO membership will encourage the candidates to rapidly solve their regional problems by peaceful means; and,
- that it will stimulate them to make a rapid and decisive transition to democracy and a market economy.

In accordance with this, Bulgaria has decided to embark on the road to join NATO without laying down preconditions and restrictions. Our resolution is based on the objective evaluation of the situation in the zone of Bulgaria's national interests.

Although Bulgaria is situated in one of the conflict regions of Europe, *none of its vital national interests is immediately threatened by external factors*. There is no immediate military threat to the country. Bulgaria has now

many more partners than in the time of the Cold War. The nations with which we have common interests and goals in the security sphere are much more numerous than those with which we have serious contradictions.

The national security strategy is being realized in full conformity with the principles and provisions of the U.N. Charter, the founding documents of OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as with the rights and obligations assumed in accordance with other multilateral and bilateral treaties, agreements, and other international documents.

Bulgaria has no territorial claims to any of its neighboring countries, does not recognize such claims from other countries, and does not construct its national security on dependence on other countries. Bulgaria will not allow threats to the security of the neighboring countries from its territory and is acting to build up an atmosphere of confidence in their mutual relations.

Under these circumstances, the strategic goal of Bulgaria is to develop attachments with the international security system that will make it an equal carrier and beneficiary of guarantees in case of crisis. Bulgaria's integration in the common Euro-Atlantic space is a way to avoid a possible negative challenge to its defense possibilities, to the reliability of its partners and friends, and to the European security system in general. We are convinced that in this context our interests fully coincide with those of NATO, and, from a strategic point of view, no barriers exist to the full integration of Bulgaria in the Alliance.

At the same time (in my opinion), Bulgaria is important for NATO:

- as a factor of stability in the region which is assessed by the Alliance as a potential source of future conflicts,

- as a country situated in the NATO southern flank which needs to be consolidated,
- as an exceptionally well-balanced military-strategic entity, considering the correlation of *national territory, peaceful frontiers, population, size of the Armed Forces*;
- as a country which is traditionally positively oriented towards Russia and Ukraine and can make an important contribution for realizing the future formulation of NATO's relations with these countries.

The geostrategic factor in the Bulgarian argument for NATO membership cannot be considered as absolute. Bulgaria may count on occupying a place of merit in the new European home only if it rapidly realizes the political and economic transformation to democracy and a market economy, if it continues to optimize the inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the country, and if it introduces democratic control of the security sphere.

The national strategy is in a process of reorientation. The Bulgarian government now clearly understands the situation, has concrete ideas for achieving speedy and irreversible progress, has the political will (and resolution) to assume responsibility for a rapid completion of the political transition, has friends and partners ready to support its efforts, and, most important, has the political and moral support of a great part of the population.

What we offer to NATO is not an economically rich Bulgaria but a stable nation in an unstable region. We count on NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic community supporting Bulgaria in carrying out the radical change of its society, having in mind the readiness of the country to adhere unconditionally to collective defense and the coordinated policy of international security.

The formula of the possible participation of Bulgaria in NATO collective security will be a result of the coincidence

of the Bulgarian national interest with the interests and the goals of the Alliance.

Recent statements of NATO officials reassure us that, in the process of enlarging, the Alliance will follow a very balanced and nonconfrontational policy toward its new members, toward the candidates for membership, and toward its main opponents. The NATO members from Southern Europe already have expressed their support to Bulgaria. We are convinced that NATO will realize the great advantage of Bulgarian membership for the collective defense of its southern flank. Besides, it should be emphasized that such a membership does not lead to restoration of the Alliance's common border, neither with Russia, nor with countries of CIS.

Bulgaria's national interest dictates that the country obtains guarantees for its security at the highest possible level, including from a military point of view. We are in a position to carry full responsibility for the defense of the national territory in case of aggression. But in being a candidate for NATO membership, Bulgaria faces the challenge to reform its national defense system in the interest of collective defense. There is no requirement in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* which Bulgaria is not in a position to fulfill.

The National Program for Joining NATO (which is being prepared by the government) is oriented towards intensive preparation for a successful negotiation process in all fields leading to rapid and full joining of the Alliance. Its principal aim is to prepare the country for NATO membership through the formula "full rights, full responsibilities."

The program concentrates on reaching the following goals:

- radical change of civil-military relations in accordance with the new role of the military factor in the political system and the civil society;

- establishment on a legal basis of the principles of democratic control of the security and defense establishments;
- reform of the Armed Forces and reconsideration of the Strategic Concept of National Defense; and,
- full guarantees in the sphere of external security.

Bulgaria will join NATO only as a full member with all related rights and obligations. This means that, if admitted as a member, Bulgaria is ready:

- to prepare and put at the disposal of the Alliance all its operative forces for the needs of integrated defense;
- to participate in the work of all political and command bodies and committees; and,
- to take part in common actions, realistically considering the national possibilities and the international context.

We are convinced that the participation of Bulgaria in the whole spectrum of NATO missions will create a new situation in the security sphere of South-Eastern Europe. The establishment of a future regional “sub-coalition” by the member-states of the Alliance will radically change the situation in a positive direction. Our readiness for full participation in coalition defense and in the activities for conflict prevention will probably inspire the formation of regional multilateral forces.

Bulgaria’s joining NATO will create new and much larger possibilities for cooperation with the states which will remain outside the organization. The exceptional advantages of Bulgaria are its key geographical position, the fact that it borders two NATO member-states, the positive potential accumulated by its policy during the crisis in former Yugoslavia, its active and constructive regional

policy, and what was done so far in accordance with Confidence and Security Building Measures.

The main change in the military aspect of Bulgaria's security policy has to be directed to the obligatory participation of Bulgarian forces in international peacekeeping operations. The security policy of Bulgaria must have two main characteristics—political engagement and military involvement.

In my opinion, the synthesis of Bulgaria's security policy in the coming years has to be concentrated in a strategy for Euro-Atlantic integration. Its basic parameters would be:

- Pressing ahead with economic reforms.
- Development and enlargement of the national consensus for Euro-Atlantic integration—consensus in the political elite, with the political opposition, and among the public.
- Institutionalization of the integration policy as a priority of vital importance.
- Increasing interoperability with NATO especially in the spheres of defense policy, planning and management, command and control procedures, common field exercises, and English language training.
- Continuing progress toward democratic control of the military.
- Full participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced “Partnership for Peace” Program.
- Exploiting the “special relationship” with Russia to provide reassurances to that country.

- Shifting from bilateral to multilateral regional cooperation in the Black Sea and Inner-Balkan zones, intensifying the exchanges of military staff officers and enhancing military planning transparency, and establishing a system of regional interaction and cooperation and mutual assistance in the framework of PfP, including a program for enhancing interoperability in the interest of joint (common) participation in peacekeeping operations.

CONCLUSION

The perspective of European security is based on the political and economic predominance of these principles: the regulated free market, the trans-nationalism of politics and economy, the global approach to human rights, and the powerful institutions of democratic civil societies.

Trans-national corporations will be the pioneers in assimilating the new economies in Eastern Europe and will integrate the new European economic and political order. Their activities will be supplemented by expansion of democratic civil societies.

Global information networks will form in Europe an integral space of well-informed—which means free—people. The information and cultural mastery will facilitate the political and economic transformation.

Threats to European security will increasingly pass through the social plane—unemployment and traffic of humans, slowdown of the economic development rates and social tensions, huge corruption, and international organized crime. Having in mind this perspective, the place of defense and armies of a classic type is temporary—prevention will soon play a dominant role.

There is no place for nationalism and chauvinism in Bulgaria and the other Eastern European nations. There is no place, either, for improvisations in the sphere of internal and foreign policy, of national and international security.

There is just one possible line of conduct, and it begins with the attachment to common democratic values, and passes through the cooperation and interaction in all fields of economy, politics, and culture, in order to develop into an all embracing cooperation and full integration.

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