



[UN-PROGRAMME and TRAINING FOR PEACE]

New partners, new possibilities

The evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations

Kristin M. Haugevik



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Kristin M. Haugevik

[Executive Summary] This report discusses the emergent trend of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations. It takes a closer look at bilateral collaboration among the ‘big four’ security organizations of today – the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU – identifying evolutionary phases and underlying motives for such cooperation as well as lessons learned from the field thus far. Three general observations can be made. First, it seems clear that, once initiated, inter-organizational security partnerships are rarely reversed. A tentative conclusion may therefore be that the evolution of inter-organizational cooperation involves a certain degree of path-dependency. Secondly, the motives for inter-organizational security cooperation can be of both a materialist and an ideational nature. Materialist motives like organizational survival, neutralizing competition and resource dependence are all important rationales for international security organizations to enter into collaboration with one another. In addition, ideational motives such as legitimization, shared values and organizational learning seem to help in justifying and validating such relationships. Thirdly, lessons learned from inter-organizational security cooperation in the field so far include the need to clarify the content and duration of mission mandates; establish better practices for communication and information-sharing; ensure respect for one another’s organizational identities, values and working procedures; and increase the willingness to adjust to one another prior to, during, and in the aftermath of cooperation in the field.

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1. Introduction

The nature of international peacekeeping is changing. One indication is that in the last ten to fifteen years, international conflicts and crises have increasingly been met with multilateral and multidimensional responses from the international society. Today, the number of UN personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations has reached a historic height.¹ At the same time, regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) are increasingly being asked – and are increasingly accepting – to take on responsibility for peacekeeping in locations that include Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Recent years have seen a growing academic as well as political interest in concepts like ‘civil–military cooperation’, ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘integrated missions’, ‘whole-of-government approach’ and ‘effects-based operations’.² This report discusses the emergence of a related phenomenon: *inter-organizational security cooperation* in international peace operations. While a central recognition of the past decade was that ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’,³ the same now appears to be increasingly true of international security organizations. International and regional security organizations have entered into partnership with one another in peacekeeping, either on the basis of formalized frameworks for cooperation or on a more *ad hoc* basis. Yet, despite extensive discussions in the practitioner literature, few efforts have been made to analyse these developments systematically in the context of international security politics. With that as a point of departure, this report addresses the following three questions:

1. *What generic phases characterize the evolution of inter-organizational security relationships?*

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¹ Center on International Cooperation (2007: 2).

² See for example Pugh and Sidhu (2003); Eide et al (2005); de Coning (2007); Haugevik and de Carvalho (2007); Yost (2007).

³ A much-quoted phrase from the European Security Strategy (2003).


2. *What underlying motives for inter-organizational security cooperation can be identified?*
3. *What lessons can be learned from security cooperation between the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU in the field?*

The following section identifies the typical evolutionary stages of an inter-organizational security relationship, and discusses which of the six bilateral relationships examined here have evolved the furthest. Furthermore, common motives for inter-organizational security cooperation are presented and discussed with reference to collaboration between the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU, before some key lessons learned from inter-organizational security cooperation in the field are identified. Finally, the conclusion links the three aspects *phases*, *motives* and *lessons learned*, and offers some remarks regarding the current challenges to and future prospects of inter-organizational security cooperation.

2. The evolutionary phases of inter-organizational cooperation

It has been argued that the life-cycle of an inter-organizational partnership typically consists of five phases: the *courtship* phase, the *negotiation* phase, the *start-up* phase, the *maintenance* phase and finally the *ending* phase.⁴ This is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The evolution of inter-organizational relationships



⁴ Murray and Mahon (1993: 109-110), see also Child (2005: 403-404).

In the first two phases of the life-cycle, the potential partners check each other out and negotiate in order to find out what they can offer one another in a partnership. If the answers from these preparatory stages are satisfactory, a new relationship is usually founded. Following these initial achievements, if the cooperation proves successful, the relationship will typically progress into a phase of maintenance, during which it is likely to become more structured and formalized. This phase is usually decisive insofar as the future of the relationship is concerned, as the lessons learned that are identified here will largely determine whether the partnership will continue or be dissolved.

2.1 The evolution of security cooperation within the UN–NATO–EU–AU quadrangle

The two inter-organizational security relationships that currently have developed the furthest are undoubtedly the UN–EU and NATO–EU partnerships. The courtship and negotiation phases of *UN–EU cooperation* started to bear fruit at the turn of the millennium, when the EU began to realize its aspirations of becoming a global security actor. Since then, both organizations have revealed a strong will to formalize and extend the relationship. This is evident from the many official documents on UN–EU collaboration – including a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management⁵ – as well as EU representation in most UN bodies, agencies and programmes, and in weekly coordination meetings between EU member states on UNSC issues.⁶ In addition, the two organizations have, since 2003, worked together on the ground in locations that include Bosnia and Herzegovina, the DRC and Chad.

The preparatory phases for *EU–NATO cooperation* began in the early 1990s, but due to national and institutional disagreements, the relationship was not properly formalized until the Berlin Plus agreement was signed in 2002.⁷ Currently, the agreement consists of some fifteen sub-agreements, which in essence set out arrangements for NATO support to EU operations when NATO as a whole does not wish to be engaged.⁸ The EU and NATO have also agreed upon a range of additional institutional agreements and mechanisms, including formal meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Council’s Political and Security Committee, and

⁵ UN (2003).

⁶ EU(2004), see also Wouters (2007: 7-8).

⁷ See Yost (2007: 74-75); Yost (2007: 111).

⁸ EU(2002).

between EU and NATO foreign ministers.⁹ Since 2003, the two organizations has worked together on the ground in military operations in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and are currently preparing for what many believe will be the first real test of their operational relationship: Kosovo.

In contrast, *UN–NATO cooperation* has made little progress as regards formalization since the first efforts to cooperate on the ground in the Balkans in the early 1990s. At present, there exist no official documents or joint declarations on UN–NATO cooperation, despite repeated efforts to establish a comprehensive and structured framework for co-working. A joint UN–NATO declaration was in fact drafted in September 2005, but has reportedly stranded somewhere in the UN system.¹⁰ Yet, despite the apparent lack of political will to establish formal structures for UN–NATO cooperation, the two organizations have worked together on the ground in complex operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo and Afghanistan.

As the AU is the youngest security organization of the four examined here, it is not surprising that its respective relationships with the other three organizations are as yet relatively rudimentary and informal. Of the relationships involving the AU, it is undoubtedly *UN–AU cooperation* that has evolved the furthest. In 2006, UN and AU leaders signed the hitherto most extensive formal agreement for collaboration between the two organizations, stating their commitment to ‘expanding and strengthening consultations and cooperation’.¹¹ The UN and the AU have also tested their co-working skills on the ground in Burundi and in the Sudan.

The first steps to initiate formal *EU–AU cooperation* have also been taken, even though both are comparatively young as security organizations.¹² In 2005, the EU declared its willingness to ‘work with the AU, sub-regional organizations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace on their own continent’.¹³ Furthermore, a major EU–AU summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 resulted in the adoption of a joint Africa–EU strategy, of which security constituted an important part.¹⁴ In

⁹ Yost (2007: 16, 90-91).

¹⁰ Koenders (2006); Yost (2007).

¹¹ UN (2006).

¹² The ESDP was formally activated in 2001 and the first operation took place in 2003. The AU was founded in 2002, and its peace and security role has been in place since 2004.

¹³ Council of the EU (2005).

¹⁴ AU (2007).

fact, field cooperation between the two began earlier. The EU contributed financially to the AU's mission in Burundi back in 2004,¹⁵ and has provided the AU with financial, logistical and technical support, as well as contributed with military, police and civilian observers and advisors to the mission in the Sudan.¹⁶

At present, the least developed of the six relationships is *NATO–AU cooperation*. However, while NATO and the AU have not yet adapted any formal agreements for collaboration, NATO has, upon the AU's request, contributed logistical and technical support to the AU missions in the Sudan and Somalia. Recently, the AU signalled that it is hoping for more long-term and more comprehensive cooperation with NATO.¹⁷

It is worth noting that none of the inter-organizational security relationships examined here have been reversed or dissolved following their initiation. A tentative conclusion may therefore be that the evolution of inter-organizational security partnerships involves a certain degree of *path-dependency*: once the choice to cooperate has been made, it is difficult to turn back, due to the time, resources and prestige already invested.¹⁸

Summary

- *The evolution of inter-organizational cooperation typically proceeds in five stages: courtship, negotiation, start-up, maintenance and endings.*
- *Out of the six constellations examined here, it is the UN-EU and NATO-EU relationships that have evolved the furthest.*
- *In contrast, UN-NATO cooperation remains informal and in the initial stage.*
- *The AU's relationships with the UN and the EU are evolving rapidly, whereas the evolution of NATO-AU relations until recently has been lagging somewhat behind.*
- *None of the six relationships, once initiated, has been reversed, which may suggest that the evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation tends to be path-dependent.*

¹⁵ de Coning (2006: 36).

¹⁶ International Crisis Group (2005); de Coning (2006).

¹⁷ NATO (2007).

¹⁸ The idea of path-dependency is often associated with 'institutionalist' approaches to international cooperation.

3. Motives for inter-organizational security cooperation

Inter-organizational security cooperation can be seen as driven by both holistic and individual factors – i.e. by changes in the external environment of the security organizations as well as internal needs within the security organizations themselves. External changes will often contribute to provoking or making visible internal needs. In the context of this report, important changes in the structural environment include the changing character of international conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the increasing demand for multinational and multidimensional responses to these conflicts as well as the ‘internationalization’ of both states’ and regional organizations’ security policies. It is also likely that the broad endorsement of an extended definition of security in both academic and political circles has been important in this context: Security is no longer seen as being about territorial and military security only; implying that international crisis management requires a more complex approach too. Last but not least, the experiences from the first international peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, where one of the most important lessons learned was the need to coordinate the international efforts, has been of importance in this context.

Why do international security organizations increasingly choose to enter into partnership with one another? What is the added value of joint efforts, as against acting alone? The following overview indicates six general motives that may generate inter-organizational security partnerships. These are grouped in two overall categories: materialist motives, and ideational ones. With the first category, the idea is that international security organizations choose to collaborate on the basis of the materialist gains they expect they can obtain. At least three such materialist motives or expectations can be identified in this context: organizational survival, neutralizing competition and resource dependence. The other overall category is, as the name ‘ideational’ motives implies, based on the notion that social factors such as norms, values, ideas, discourses and knowledge may influence materialist policy choices.¹⁹ In other words, international security organizations may cooperate not only because they see a materialist interest in doing so, but also because they consider it the right, good, or enlightening thing to do in a given context. Three such ideational motives are presented below: legitimization, shared values and organizational learning.

¹⁹ Adler (2002: 102-103).

These six motives are not mutually exclusive categories: on the contrary, they seem to have a mutually synergetic effect. Materialist motives can be identified as a driving force in each of the altogether six bilateral relationships examined here, perhaps strengthening the claim that ‘a purely ideological alliance, unrelated to material interests, cannot but be stillborn’.²⁰ Yet, it is also noteworthy that ideational motives are clearly evident in all of the cases, suggesting that such factors strengthen the prospects for successfully initiating and effectuating inter-organizational security cooperation. The six different motives are discussed in further detail below.

3.1 Organizational survival

A security organization’s motive for entering into cooperation with another organization can be seen simply as a matter of *organizational survival* – a way of maintaining its own relevance and basis for existence on the international arena.²¹ Such a rationale is anchored in the view that international society is structured as a self-help system where all actors seek to ensure their own survival, and to that end will sometimes decide to enter into temporary ‘marriages of convenience’ with other actors.²² A similar approach explains such cooperation with reference to a ‘natural selection model’, which argues that all organizations have a natural instinct for survival, and will therefore, ‘like any other species in an ecosystem’, do whatever it takes to avoid certain death.²³

NATO’s increasing receptivity to working together with other security actors in recent years is an apt example in this regard. Following the end of the Cold War, many scholars predicted that NATO ‘must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe’, since NATO’s entire existence was founded on the Cold War order and the security threat from the Soviet Union.²⁴ In short, NATO was faced with the choice between going ‘out of area or out of business’.²⁵ More than fifteen years later, we see that the organization has evolved from being primarily a territorial defence alliance, to increasingly becoming a ‘fo-

²⁰ Morgenthau (1948: 184).

²¹ Lang (2002: 162), see also Murray (1993: 104).

²² Mearsheimer (1995: 11).

²³ Lang (2002: 162).

²⁴ Most notably Mearsheimer, (1995: 14). For an overview of this debate see Howorth (2003: 236-237).

²⁵ As famously stated by US Senator Richard Lugar in 1993.

rum in which the [member states] can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them'.²⁶ NATO has also extended its geographical working radius from the territories of its member states and their immediate neighbourhoods to less 'obvious' areas such as Afghanistan and the Sudan.

It can be argued that NATO's survival plan would not have been feasible had it not been for the organization's partnerships, first with the UN and more recently with the EU and the AU. When the UN was faced with challenges in the Balkans the 1990s, NATO seized the opportunity to play a role by stating its willingness to support peacekeeping operations under the authorization of the UNSC.²⁷ With its key role in the implementation and stabilization of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia, and later in the air campaign and peacekeeping force in Kosovo, NATO presented itself as an organization that was not afraid of taking on new tasks. Today, the NATO operation in Afghanistan, which takes place under a UN mandate and alongside UN civilian efforts, serves as another example of on-the-ground collaboration between the two organizations. In similar ways, NATO's military cooperation with the EU in the Balkans and logistical support to the AU in the Sudan has also contributed to making the organization more relevant in contemporary crisis management.

3.2. *Neutralizing competition*

A second materialist motive for inter-organizational security cooperation is that it can be an efficient way of *neutralizing competition* when two security organizations have overlapping, and hence potentially competing, functions and competences.²⁸ The military collaboration between the EU and NATO may serve as an example here. In the late 1990s, prominent US officials were among the many who expressed fear that the EU, with its rapidly evolving plans to become an international security actor, would end up duplicating and competing with NATO, and preventing non-EU NATO members from taking part in operations.²⁹ In light of this scepticism, the establishment of the Berlin Plus agreement in 2003, which provides the EU with access to NATO

²⁶ The quote is taken from NATO's official homepage, www.nato.int. In practice, this is a reformulation of Article IV in the North Atlantic Treaty, which emphasized that the member states would 'consult together whenever [...] the territorial integrity, political independence and security of any of the Parties is threatened' (NATO, 1949).

²⁷ NATO (2001: 340).

²⁸ Stokke (2001: 29).

²⁹ Most notably Albright (1998); Talbott (1999).

assets and capabilities in EU-led operations when NATO decides not to act, can be seen as a way to ensure for NATO greater control of the development of the EU's military role. Indeed, a commonly held interpretation of the Berlin Plus agreement has been that NATO implicitly possesses the right to a 'first refusal' on the launching of military operations in Europe before the EU can take on the mission.³⁰

Yet, the neutralizing-competition argument can also be turned the other way around. With access to NATO's military assets when necessary, the EU has arguably become a more complete security actor, capable of carrying out a wider range of peacekeeping tasks. This, in turn, gives the EU competitive powers vis-à-vis NATO, as the Berlin Plus agreement has not as yet been 'reversed' in the sense that NATO has been granted access to EU civilian capabilities.³¹ It has also been claimed that the EU's dependence upon NATO's military assets is somewhat overrated, as NATO's military forces actually belong to its member states (which by and large also are EU members).

3.3. *Resource dependence*

The third and perhaps most important materialist motive for inter-organizational security cooperation is that of *resource dependence* – which occurs either because a security organization is not capable of meeting existing demands and needs on its own, or because two organizations have complementary competences and realize they can benefit from gaining access to one another's capacities and resources (cf. 'comparative advantage').³² In other words, 'where adequate resources – whether financial, physical, or human – are available, inter-institutional cooperation presumably would not be undertaken'.³³

Such a rationale is applicable to all the inter-organizational security relationships examined here. First, the overstretching of the UN's peacekeeping capabilities in recent years has made contributions by regional organizations a welcome supplement to the organization's activities.³⁴ Both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, the UN has benefited from NATO's military ca-

³⁰ See Haine (2007: 1). However, according to Daniel Keohane, NATO was not accorded such a right in the case of Operation *Artemis* (Keohane, 2003: 74).

³¹ Clément-Noguier (2006); Flournoy (2005); Yost (2007: 88-89).

³² Stokke (2001: 29); Lang (2002: 154-163).

³³ Lang (2002: 154).

³⁴ Pugh (2003); Tardy (2005: 49).

pabilities. Equally, NATO remains highly dependent upon the civilian capabilities of the UN and other actors in operations where military efforts constitute only one part of a larger mission, as is the case in Afghanistan. Similarly, upon the request of the UN, the EU has provided rapid military assistance to the UN mission in the DRC, MONUC, on two occasions (Operation *Artemis* and Operation EUFOR RD Congo). The EU also took over the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, establishing the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM).³⁵

For its own part, the EU has benefited from NATO military resources in two operations thus far, *Concordia* in Macedonia (2003) and *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004– present), both conducted under the Berlin Plus umbrella. On a general level, the EU has also benefited from NATO’s institutional achievements in the past, in the sense of being able to simply adopt or build on procedural compromises reached within NATO. At the same time, the EU is in possession of unique civilian capabilities, and is therefore, like the UN, an attractive partner for NATO in operations that involve more than military security.

It is, however, undoubtedly the AU which today is most dependent upon the resources and expertise of the three other security organizations. The AU itself has acknowledged that it currently lacks the ‘expertise and experience, as well as considerable and foreseeable logistical and financial resources and a management capacity for carrying out a long-term peace support operation’.³⁶ This has rendered close cooperation between the AU and UN missions in the Sudan necessary, and is a main rationale behind the two organizations’ recently established hybrid mission in Darfur.³⁷ The AU has also received financial and technical support from the EU in Burundi and in the Sudan, and logistical support from NATO in the Sudan and Somalia.

3.4. Legitimization

An ideational motive for cooperation can emerge when norms held or promoted by one security organization have a *legitimizing* effect on the actions of another security organization, thus mak-

³⁵ Council of the EU (2002: 16-17).

³⁶ AU Peace and Security Council (2006).

³⁷ The plans for a UN-AU mission in Sudan became reality in late July 2007, when the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1769, stating the establishment of a common mission, the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and to protect personnel and civilians in the area.

ing the former an appropriate and attractive partner. Collaboration on such grounds has also been referred to as ‘normative interplay’, implying that one party contributes to strengthening the normative credibility of another.³⁸

NATO and EU cooperation with the UN may here serve as examples. While the actual impact of the UN’s judicial role has been disputed in the aftermath of cases such as the non-authorized interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, the organization undoubtedly remains unique in its normative ability to ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to ‘make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’.³⁹

The primary responsibility of the UN for upholding international peace and security is acknowledged in the very first sentence of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document. The treaty makes it clear that NATO is to desist from ‘the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN’, and reaffirms the NATO members’ trust in ‘the purposes and principles’ of the UN Charter.⁴⁰ While NATO reportedly has ‘always rejected the idea of a Chapter VIII-style dependence on the UN Security Council’,⁴¹ most of NATO’s non-Article 5 operations since 1992 have, with the notable exception of the 1999 Kosovo air campaign, had their basis in a mandate from the UNSC.⁴² NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999 confirms that the organization is ready to ‘support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council’.⁴³

Similarly, and even to a larger extent than NATO, the EU recognizes the UN’s supreme role in maintaining international peace and security. Following the rapid development of the ESDP in the late 1990s, it made sense for the EU ‘to revisit its relationship with the UN; both as a legitimizing body, and as the main peacekeeping implementer’.⁴⁴ In the EU’s 2003 Security Strategy, the member countries reaffirm their commitment to ‘upholding and developing Interna-

³⁸ Stokke (2001: 16-20), see also Gehring (2006: 13).

³⁹ UN (1945).

⁴⁰ NATO (1949).

⁴¹ I.e. that NATO operations cannot take place without a UNSC mandate.

⁴² Yost (2007: 35).

⁴³ NATO (1999).

⁴⁴ Tardy (2005: 49).

tional Law’, and in the same paragraph bind themselves to ‘strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively’.⁴⁵ Although a UN mandate does not seem to be required for EU operations carried out ‘in Europe, with the consent of the host state, and [which] are of a non-coercive or civilian nature’, the EU member states are overall key contributors to UN-mandated (albeit not UN-led) operations.⁴⁶

For somewhat different reasons, it can be argued that the AU’s participation in the newly established UNAMID mission in Darfur adds to the operation’s overall legitimacy towards the Khartoum government and among the Sudanese people. Indeed, given the Sudanese government’s refusal to allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur in the past, it seems clear that the AU serves as a legitimizing force for the UN’s presence in Darfur.

3.5 *Shared values*

Shared values represent another ideational motive for cooperation between international security organizations. Such motives often represent a driving force for collaboration when the prospects for materialist gains are not obvious. Put differently, the security organizations ‘promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms’.⁴⁷ It could, of course, be added that since values typically are seen as representing a more marketable or just motivation than self-interest, interests will often be disguised as values in official discourses.⁴⁸ However, it could also be argued that value-based rhetoric often influences practices, simply because it limits the range of policy options.⁴⁹ Values can also strengthen the grounds for cooperation by ‘marshalling moral convictions and emotional preferences to its support’.⁵⁰

The UN’s partnerships with the EU and the AU are good examples here. A 2006 report on UN–EU cooperation stresses that the two organizations are ‘united by the core values’ enumerated in the UN Charter and the Human Rights Declaration.⁵¹ Furthermore, a value-based ground for cooperation between the two is frequently emphasized by UN and EU officials, for instance

⁴⁵ European Council (2003).

⁴⁶ Tardy (2005: 51-53).

⁴⁷ Finnemore (1998: 898).

⁴⁸ Cf. “strategic discourse”, see Fairclough (2001: 164).

⁴⁹ See Adler (2002: 103).

⁵⁰ Morgenthau (1948: 184)

⁵¹ UN (2006).

when UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon recently made it clear that the EU's support to UN activities 'is not only for the United Nations but for all the common good of the international community'.⁵² In a similar way, the UN and the AU noted in their joint 2006 declaration that they share a 'commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security [...] on the African continent'. The two organizations also emphasized that they would work together to improve collaboration 'of the international community's response to the challenges on the African continent'.⁵³

3.6 Organizational learning

A final motive for inter-organizational security cooperation is that of *organizational learning*, in the sense that one security organization functions as a role model for another security organization, and thus provides it with opportunities for improvement and growth. Such collaboration has been described 'a vehicle by which organizational knowledge is exchanged and imitated'.⁵⁴ A related explanation is that of modelling theory: 'social learning, or imitation and modelling, in the emergence of cooperation'. In practice, this means that one organization observes another, and chooses to imitate or model that organization's structures, procedures or values.⁵⁵ This, in turn, may contribute to establishing a basis for further cooperation.

Organizational learning would appear to constitute an important part of the co-working relationships between the four security organizations examined here. In their key security documents,⁵⁶ NATO, the EU and the AU all make reference to the international norms and values established by the UN: indeed, the language and form of AU resolutions even resemble those of the UN. Moreover, the EU's military operations are, due to the Berlin Plus agreement and the many shared members, to a large extent modelled on NATO's experience and procedures in such operations. Another illustrative example is the AU's relationship with the EU. Reportedly, the founders of the AU largely 'relied on the EU template' when establishing the new organization in 2002, in particular with regard to institutional structures and basic goals.⁵⁷ In fact, many of the

⁵² ki-Moon (2007).

⁵³ UN (2006).

⁵⁴ Kogut (1998, cited in Child et al., 2005: 76-77).

⁵⁵ Smith (1995: 18).

⁵⁶ AU (2000); European Council (2003); NATO (1999).

⁵⁷ Babarinde (2007: 8).

existing AU institutions even share the same names as well-known EU institutions – including the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. Furthermore, like the EU, the AU aims at using ‘regional integration to promote peace, stimulate economic growth, achieve solidarity for their peoples, and strengthen their international profile/stature’.⁵⁸ In all these cases, one organization’s imitation or modelling of another has been succeeded by cooperation both at headquarters level and in the field, suggesting that organizational learning may not only be a noteworthy side-motive for inter-organizational security cooperation, but can also create a platform for further collaboration.

Summary

- *At least six different motives for inter-organizational security cooperation can be identified: Organizational survival, neutralizing competition, resource dependence, legitimization, shared values, and organizational learning.*
- *The former three can be categorized as ‘materialist motives’, whereas the latter three can be seen as ‘ideational’.*
- *In the six bilateral relationships examined here, resource-dependence seems to be a particularly recurrent motive, but organizational survival and neutralizing competition also appear to be important.*
- *Ideational motives such as legitimization, shared values, and organizational learning are highly present in all of the cases, possibly indicating that such factors strengthen the prospects for initiating and effectuating inter-organizational security cooperation.*

4. Lessons learned from inter-organizational security cooperation in the field

How extensive and how efficient has cooperation between the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU been in practice? What lessons can be learned from their co-working so far and, on that basis, what challenges can be identified regarding future cooperation? The following section is based on lessons learned and assessment reports from peace operations involving collaboration between the four international security organizations.

⁵⁸ Babarinde (2007: 9).

4.1 UN–EU cooperation: Lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the DRC

The first test of UN–EU cooperation on the ground took place in 2003, when the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replaced the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF). As the EU’s very first mission under the ESDP framework, the EUPM represented ‘both a milestone and a crucial test for the civilian crisis mechanism of the EU’.⁵⁹ The mission was intended to ‘ensure a successful follow-up’ to the IPTF, and a key aim was that the transition between the two missions should be as seamless as possible.⁶⁰ Specific measures taken to promote a smooth transition included information-sharing between the two organizations in the planning phase of EUPM as well as co-location of the EU and UN teams in Sarajevo. Moreover, the fact that the head of the IPTF continued in the position as the EU’s police commissioner was seen as a way to ensure that lessons learned from the UN mission were passed on to the EU mission.⁶¹

While an assessment report released by the UN in 2002 concluded that the handover from IPTF to EUPM had been ‘an excellent example of cooperation and smooth transition between the UN and a regional organization’,⁶² some important lessons learned have also been identified. First, the ‘double-hatting’ of the IPTF head/EU police commissioner was not entirely unproblematic, as it created confusion about the mandate of the EUPM vis-à-vis the IPTF.⁶³ For the EU, this was particularly troublesome, since the EUPM represented the organization’s first opportunity to demonstrate its potential as an independent security actor. This was made more complicated since many third parties had difficulties distinguishing between the UN and the EU mission.⁶⁴ In addition, the EUPM did not have a formal UN mandate, despite its being welcomed by UN resolution 1396. This gave rise to some questions regarding the actual legitimacy and international support of the mission.⁶⁵

Half a year after the initiation of the EUPM, the EU military operation *Artemis* was launched in support of the UN mission in the DRC, MONUC.⁶⁶ Operation *Artemis* was, in contrast to the EUPM, provided with a clear UN mandate, authorizing it to ‘contribute to the stabili-

⁵⁹ Osland (2004: 544).

⁶⁰ Council of the EU (2002: 16-17).

⁶¹ Tardy (2005: 55).

⁶² UNSC (2002: 8).

⁶³ Osland (2004).

⁶⁴ Hansen (2006: 45).

⁶⁵ Tardy (2005: 49); Tardy (2003).

⁶⁶ *Artemis* comprised a total force of 1800 military troops, mostly of French nationality, and lasted for three months.

zation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia’ and to ‘contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town’.⁶⁷ France was the lead nation of the operation, and the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and the French *Artemis* Force Commander were tasked with maintaining contact with MONUC ‘as appropriate’.⁶⁸

An assessment report released by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2003 concludes that cooperation between the EU and the UN in the DRC was generally satisfactory once the EU troops had been deployed.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the report also points out some important lessons learned from the operation. First, when EU personnel who served in *Artemis* were asked by the UN to continue their work under MONUC, they all declined. This, combined with the EU’s refusal to pay occasional visits to MONUC following *Artemis*, was seen as unfortunate by UN officials, as it made it more difficult for the UN to benefit from the EU’s resources and experience from the operation. In addition, the short duration of *Artemis*’ mission mandate – only three months – finally forced the EU to ‘accelerate its withdrawal’ from the area, out of fear that the EU troops would be left without a legal cover should anything occur.⁷⁰ In 2006, the EU once again supported MONUC in a short-term operation, assisting with upholding peace and security during the elections in the country (EUFOR RD Congo). Currently, the EU is starting up another interim military operation, this time in Chad, to support the UN presence in the area.⁷¹

Summary

- *The UN and the EU have collaborated in the field in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the DRC, and are currently cooperating in Chad.*
- *Lessons learned from these operations include the need to clarify the content and duration of mission mandates, to improve general information-sharing, and find better ways of drawing on one another’s resources in and experiences from the field.*

⁶⁷ UNSC (2003).

⁶⁸ Council of the EU (2003).

⁶⁹ UNDPKO (2003: 14).

⁷⁰ UNDPKO (2003: 15).

⁷¹ Council of the EU (2007).

4.2 NATO–EU cooperation: Lessons learned from the Balkans and the Sudan

Shortly after the Berlin Plus agreement was agreed upon in 2003, NATO and the EU worked together in their very first mission on the ground, operation *Concordia* in Macedonia. *Concordia* was a follow-up to the NATO operation *Allied Harmony*, and its overall aim was to contribute to the further stabilization of the country as well as overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement between the Macedonian government and Albanian representatives.⁷² Slightly more than one year later, operation *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched, also within the framework of the Berlin Plus agreement, to ‘contribute to a safe and secure environment’ in the country and to follow up on the work of NATO’s IFOR and SFOR missions. This operation is still going on.

Both *Concordia* and *Althea* were accomplished ‘with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities’, and have been referred to as Berlin Plus ‘success stories’ as far as political coordination at the headquarters level is concerned.⁷³ On the other hand, assessment reports have nuanced this picture somewhat, pointing out that during the transition from the NATO to the EU operation, mission mandates were at times unclear and overlapping. Furthermore, disagreements between the two organizations at the institutional level also caused delays on the operational side.⁷⁴ In fact, it has been claimed that current NATO–EU meetings on *Althea* ‘involve no genuine dialogue: only formal statements of policy by the representatives of each organization, with no follow-up discussion’⁷⁵ Such observations have led some analysts to opine that the Berlin Plus agreement actually delimits NATO–EU cooperation more than it promotes it, mainly because the debate concerning the exchange of information with non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members gets in the way of political dialogue.⁷⁶

A similar concern was raised in the case of the Sudan, where both the EU and NATO contributed technical and logistical support to the AU mission. While both organizations expressed a strong willingness to collaborate on this issue, and were in fact working side-by-side in

⁷² Council of the EU (2003).

⁷³ Shimkus (2007).

⁷⁴ Shimkus (2007)

⁷⁵ Yost (2007: 94).

⁷⁶ Yost (2007: 94).

the field, coordination and cooperation proved very difficult.⁷⁷ No agreements were reached on either a joint NATO–EU chain of command or a common planning centre, despite efforts on both sides. This, in turn, resulted in duplication in the field and confusion on both sides.⁷⁸ Yet, the biggest test of the two organizations’ collaborative skills in the field is likely to be the upcoming military operation in Kosovo.

Summary

- *NATO and the EU have cooperated in the field in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and were both assisting the AU mission in the Sudan. Currently they are preparing for the first real test of their collaborative capabilities: Kosovo.*
- *Lessons learned from operations thus far include the need to improve the dialogue between the headquarters of the two organizations, overcome institutional and national differences, ensure that the division of labour is clear in the field, and, where indicated, find a way to establish joint chains of command and planning centres.*

4.3 UN–NATO cooperation: Lessons learned from the Balkans and Afghanistan

The UN and NATO entered into cooperation on the ground in the Balkans already in the early 1990s, with NATO’s surveillance of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina as authorized by the UNSC. NATO also provided air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and carried out air strikes to protect the UN-designated safe areas. Moreover, following NATO’s bombings of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the UNSC mandated the alliance to ‘take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with’ the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement.⁷⁹ This was the very first time NATO operated under the authority of the UNSC, and alongside UN forces on the ground.⁸⁰ NATO’s multinational implementation force (IFOR) replaced UNPROFOR, but was meant to work closely together with UN agencies on the ground. Then, when IFOR’s mandate expired, the UNSC authorized the establishment of a NATO stabilization force (SFOR) to ‘deter hostilities and stabilise the peace’.

⁷⁷ Miranda-Calha (2006).

⁷⁸ Miranda-Calha (2006).

⁷⁹ UNSC (1995).

⁸⁰ Eekelen (1998).

A 1996 assessment report from the UN Secretary-General concluded that the cooperation between the UN and IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ‘extensive and constructive at all levels’⁸¹. It has also been commended that both IFOR and SFOR seemed to have learned from the experience of UNPROFOR, as ‘a tight linkage between mission, mandate and capabilities’ was ensured.⁸² However, several key challenges for UN–NATO cooperation were also identified on the basis of the experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One such challenge was coordinating the military activities of NATO with the civilian tasks of the UN. Another challenge was that the existence of two parallel chains of command made it difficult for the two organizations to agree on and work towards a shared, overall end-goal for the mission.⁸³

In 1999, in the aftermath of the much disputed NATO air campaign against Kosovo, the UNSC mandated NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to ‘deter renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforce a ceasefire, and ensure the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces’.⁸⁴ The operation is still going on. The central objective of KFOR is to assist the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In 2003, the then UNMIK chief concluded that ‘UNMIK can’t do without KFOR, and KFOR can’t do without UNMIK’.⁸⁵ While an assessment report carried out for the NATO parliamentary assembly in 1999 concluded that the collaboration between KFOR and UNMIK was working out very well,⁸⁶ other reports have noted that lack of coordination between KFOR and UNMIK remains a considerable challenge. As in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is first and foremost blamed on the separation of UNMIK and KFOR decision-making structures, which has made communication between the two unnecessarily complex. Moreover, since the KFOR forces report directly to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, whereas the UNMIK Police and the Kosovo Police Service report to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, information-sharing has not always been optimally efficient.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Boutros-Ghali (1996).

⁸² Eekelen (1998).

⁸³ Greco (1997: not paginated).

⁸⁴ UNSC (1999).

⁸⁵ Steiner (2003).

⁸⁶ Chaveau (1999).

⁸⁷ CASIN (2003); Meckel (2000).

The most recent example of UN–NATO cooperation in the field is Afghanistan. In 2003, NATO took over the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s tasks include providing security, extending the authority of the Kabul government, and facilitating development and reconstruction. In doing so, it works in close collaboration with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN development programme (UNDP), among others.

A recent report from the UN Secretary-General concludes that UNAMA has ‘increased high-level dialogue with the ISAF senior leadership, laying the groundwork for the development of an integrated political-military approach in Afghanistan’.⁸⁸ Yet, at the same time, there are undoubtedly many challenges when it comes to the cooperation between ISAF and the UN agencies in Afghanistan. One such challenge is the difference in the military and civilian identities of NATO and the UN, which has raised debate about NATO’s air bombings with regard to ISAF’s UN mandate. Insufficient information-sharing between NATO and UN officials represents another recurrent challenge, and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently emphasized the need for ‘greater coordination among the international community’ in Afghanistan.⁸⁹ NATO’s difficulties in securing the peace and stability in Afghanistan have led many to call for a strengthening of the UN’s role in the country. And yet, UN and NATO efforts in Afghanistan seem inextricably linked together. While NATO does not possess the tools to engage in state- and nation-building, the UN has so far been dependent upon NATO’s military resources to uphold security. Both factors seem necessary if the peace in Afghanistan is to be secured and the country rebuilt.

Summary

- *The UN and NATO have cooperated in operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.*
- *Lessons-learned reports indicate that obstacles to efficient UN–NATO cooperation are often connected to the different nature of the two organizations (civilian–military). Key challenges include the lack of a forum for coordination and information-sharing, too separate decision-making structures, and difficulties in understanding and respecting one another’s operational values and working procedures.*

⁸⁸ UNGA/UNSC (2007).

⁸⁹ NATO (2007).

4.4 UN–AU cooperation: Lessons learned from Burundi and the Sudan

The first test of UN–AU cooperation on the ground came with the UN’s takeover of the AU mission in Burundi in June 2004. Although the AU was still a newly established security actor at that point, the organization nevertheless agreed to take on responsibility for ‘over[seeing] the implementation of the ceasefire agreements’ in Burundi, as well as for ‘striv[ing] towards ensuring that conditions were created for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission’.⁹⁰ The operation, the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB), lasted for a little more than a year, before it was succeeded by the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB). The AU was later commended for its efforts in Burundi, especially in view of its scarce resources and lack of experience. Nonetheless, a lessons-learned report concluded that AMIB’s contribution to the political and economic stability in Burundi had been relatively limited. Above all, the financial and logistical support to the mission, from other African countries as well as from the UN and other parts of the international community, was deemed unsatisfactory. The UN was also criticized for consulting directly with the African troop-contributing countries in Burundi rather than with the AU at the institutional level. This was by some seen as undermining the AU’s credibility as a security actor.⁹¹

Shortly after the mission in Burundi, the two organizations initiated cooperation between their missions in the Sudan; the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS). On a regular basis, and as a consequence of the Sudanese government’s refusal to allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur, the AU coordinated its efforts in the area with the UN. This collaboration was intended not only to strengthen AMIS, but also to prepare for a possible transition to a UN mission.⁹² When the Sudanese government finally accepted the deployment of UN troops in Darfur in late 2007, the two organizations’ plans for a joint United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) became reality.⁹³ While it is still too early to assess the achievements of UNAMID, two possible challenges regarding UN–AU cooperation should be noted. First, while both organizations have acknowledged that efficient coordination of UN and AU troops will require the establishment of one single effective chain of command and control mechanism, it remains unclear how this will work in practice. Secondly, the coordination of ci-

⁹⁰ Agoagye (2004: 10).

⁹¹ Agoagye (2004).

⁹² Bah (2007: 8-9).

⁹³ UNSC (2007).

villian and military activities in Darfur could become an even more complex task than usual in such operations, as one will have to deal not only with civilian–military divergences, but also with the organizational differences between the UN and the AU.⁹⁴

Summary

- *The UN and the AU have so far cooperated on the ground in Burundi (2004) and in the Sudan (2004-present).*
- *In Burundi, the UN was criticized for not offering sufficient economic support and for communicating with individual AU countries rather than with AU officials at the institutional level. While it is still too early to assess the achievements of UN–AU cooperation in the Sudan, possible challenges include establishing an effective joint chain of command and overcoming both civilian–military and organizational divergences at the same time.*

4.5 EU–AU cooperation: Lessons learned from Burundi and the Sudan

EU–AU cooperation in the field started in 2003, when the EU provided funding and support for the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB). More recently, the EU has supported the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) ‘through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers and strategic transportation’,⁹⁵ and has also signalled its willingness to provide similar support to the newly established UNAMID. A 2005 assessment report concluded that the EU–AU cooperation in the Sudan had been ‘generally successful from a technical point of view’, and that the partnership had involved ‘a mutually steep learning curve’. Yet, in general terms, it was also noted that coordination within and between the two organizations could be much improved.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Bah (2007: 9-10).

⁹⁵ European Union Factsheet: EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070507-factsheet6-AMIS_II.pdf

⁹⁶ International Crisis Group (2005).

Summary

- *EU–AU cooperation has so far centred on financial and technical support to the AU missions in Burundi and the Sudan.*
- *The need to further improve coordination between the two organizations is acknowledged.*

4.6 NATO–AU cooperation: Lessons learned from the Sudan

While NATO in the past has shown itself somewhat reluctant to become involved in operations on the African continent, this disinclination seems to have been modified in recent years with NATO's technical and logistical assistance to the AU in the Sudan and Somalia. In the Sudan, NATO's involvement began in July 2005, following a direct request from the AU. Two years later, NATO responded positively to another AU request, to provide similar support to the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This also appears to be NATO's preferred model for when and how NATO–AU cooperation should occur: NATO's operational support 'must be driven by the requests of the AU' rather than the other way around'.⁹⁷ In addition, both NATO and the AU are concerned with the primacy of AU local ownership, meaning that NATO's role in African security should be limited to assisting the AU upon its request. It is also crucial for any further NATO involvement in Africa that the division of labour between NATO and the EU be sorted out.⁹⁸

Summary

- *Upon the request of the AU, NATO has offered logistical and technical support to the AU operations in Darfur and Somalia.*
- *So far, the main concerns have related to securing AU ownership of the process as well as sorting out the division of labour between the EU and NATO.*

Figure 3 sums up the status of the evolutionary phases in the bilateral relationships between the six security organizations examined here, as well as their motives for cooperation and examples of operations where they have worked together.

⁹⁷ Miranda-Calha (2006); Scheffer (2005).

⁹⁸ Miranda-Calha (2006).

Figure 2: UN–NATO–EU–AU cooperation

| Relationship | Evolutionary phase | Motives for cooperation | Examples of cooperation on the ground |
|---------------------|---------------------------|---|---|
| UN–EU | Maintenance | Resource dependence Legitimization Shared values Organizational learning | Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004– present) DRC (2003, 2006) Chad (2008-present) |
| NATO–EU | Maintenance | Organizational survival Neutralizing competition Resource dependence Organizational learning | Macedonia (2003) Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004– present) Kosovo (planned) |
| UN–NATO | Start-up/ maintenance | Organizational survival Resource dependence Legitimization Organizational learning | Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–2004) Kosovo (1999– present) Afghanistan (2003– present) |
| UN–AU | Start-up/ maintenance | Resource dependence Legitimization Shared values Organizational learning | Burundi (2004) Sudan (2004– present) |
| EU–AU | Start-up | Resource dependence Organizational learning | Burundi (2004) Sudan (2004–2007) |
| NATO–AU | Start-up | Resource dependence Organizational learning | Sudan (2004–2007) Somalia (2007– present) |

5. Concluding remarks

Cooperation between international security organizations seems to be the new tendency. In recent years, the ‘big four’ security organizations – the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU – have all started the process of establishing formal relationships with one another. There are also several examples of co-working between the four organizations in the field, from UN–NATO cooperation in the Balkans in the early 1990s to UN–AU collaboration in Darfur today.

This report has sought to identify and systematize the patterns of inter-organizational security cooperation, by studying the phases of, motives for and lessons learned from cooperation involving the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU, both at the headquarters level and in the field. The first section of the report presented a typical life-cycle of an inter-organizational partnership, consisting of five phases: courtship, negotiation, start-up, maintenance and endings. Of all the six

partnerships examined here, it is clearly the UN–EU and NATO–EU partnerships that have come the furthest when it comes to the degree of formalization. In contrast, UN–NATO cooperation has, despite being effectuated on the ground already in the early 1990s, not yet been formalized, and seems to be facing difficulties in evolving beyond the status quo. The AU’s relationships with the UN and the EU have been developing rapidly in recent years, not least due to collaboration in Burundi and the Sudan. The NATO–AU relationship has been lagging somewhat behind until recently, but NATO’s assistance to the AU in the Sudan and Somalia suggests that this partnership may also have found its form. Interestingly, not one of the inter-organizational security partnerships in question has been either reversed or dissolved after first having been initiated. This could indicate that such relationships are somewhat path-dependent.

The second part of the report examined why international security organizations increasingly work together, identifying altogether six possible motives. These were grouped in two overall categories: materialist motives and ideational motives. Materialist motives include organizational survival, neutralizing competition and resource dependence – all of which appear to have been highly relevant for the initiation of the partnerships examined here. Ideational motives include legitimization, shared values and organizational learning. These motives also appear to have been significant in all of the cases, suggesting that the presence of such factors plays an important role in justifying and validating inter-organizational security partnerships.

The third and final section discussed lessons learned from inter-organizational security cooperation on the ground. In most of the cases examined here, inter-organizational security collaboration was evaluated as generally satisfactory and promising, but the need for better efficiency, transparency and overall coordination has also been pointed out. Key challenges identified include the need to clarify the content and duration of mission mandates, to ensure better practices for communication and information-sharing, to promote respect for one another’s organizational identities, values and working procedures, and to establish more integrated decision-making structures. Yet, despite the need for improvements, inter-organizational security cooperation is increasingly becoming a favoured operational design in international peace operations today.

Abbreviations

| | |
|----------------|--|
| AMIB | African Union Mission in Burundi |
| AMIS | African Union Mission in Sudan |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| AU | African Union |
| DRC | The Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EUFOR RD CONGO | European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EUPM | European Union Police Mission |
| IFOR | Implementation Force |
| IPTF | International Police Task Force |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| SFOR | Stabilization Force |
| MONUC | United Nations Mission in Congo |
| NAC | North Atlantic Council |
| ONUB | United Nations Mission in Burundi |
| PSC | EU Council's Political and Security Committee |
| PRTs | Provincial Reconstruction Teams |
| UNAMA | United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan |
| UNAMID | United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur |
| UN DPKO | United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNMIK | United Nations Mission in Kosovo |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |

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