



NATO School

POLARIS

Quarterly

Yevgueni Aliyev

**Arms Control:
The Beginning of the Process**

Thomas Kabs

EU's Mission to Congo

László Póti

**The Contours of a New Russian Security
Policy**

Marcel de Haas

Russian Airpower Thinking

Russell Myers

Forum: A Good Time to Reflect

Spring 2004
Volume 1
Issue 1

NATO School

Research and Publication Department
Am Rainenbichl 54
82487 Oberammergau
GERMANY

URL: www.natoschool.nato.int
Email: RPD@natoschool.nato.int

Subscription is free of charge. Please provide us with your contact information. Contributors are also invited to submit their papers.

POLARIS Staff

Commandant:
COL Mark Sullivan, US AF
Dean of Academics
COL Thomas Klincar, US AF

Executive Editor:
COL Andras Ujj PhD, HU AF

Editors:
MAJ Marcel de Haas, PhD, NL AF
Heiko Bubholz, MA, GE Civ

Disclaimer: The NATO School (NS) is not responsible for the factual validity of the articles covered in POLARIS. The opinions and analyses expressed in POLARIS are those of the individual authors. Publication of articles does not constitute approval or endorsement by NS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Partnership for Peace Program or by member- or partner governments. The NATO School respects individual opinions and protects academic freedom.

POLARIS Quarterly

The NATO School has the honour to present to you its first Quarterly issue of POLARIS.

The NATO School focuses on operational military issues. Examples of this emphasis are its courses dealing with military cooperation with Partners for Peace, Russia, Ukraine, and other international organizations; arms control; and aspects of military operations such as operational planning, resources, public information, CIMIC, and environmental, medical and legal affairs.

These topics are also discussed in the NATO School's periodicals. Whereas the POLARIS WEEKLY magazine is an open source news round-up, the POLARIS QUARTERLY journal provides analytical operational-level articles, in order to connect NATO's strategic documents with experience at the operational level.

The articles in the POLARIS QUARTERLY journal will be acquired from the Research & Publication Department, from other staff members of the NATO School, and from military and academic institutions from NATO and PfP member states.

The quarterly magazine contains analytical articles, a forum for discussion and an overview of current developments in international security. Readers are invited to contribute to POLARIS QUARTERLY by submitting articles or comments on articles published in this journal.

POLARIS Contents

- 1 Editor's foreword**
- 3 International arms control: the beginning of the process**
Lieutenant-Colonel
Yevgueni Aliyev,
MoD Azerbaijan
- 13 European Union's Congo Mission**
Lieutenant-Colonel
Tom Kabs, NATO
School
- 17 The Contours of a New Russian Security Policy**
Dr. László Póti,
Senior Research
Fellow, Center for
Strategic and De-
fence Studies, Hun-
gary
- 21 The Contours of New Russian Air-power Thinking**
Major Marcel de
Haas, NATO School
- 31 Forum**
Lieutenant-Colonel
Russell Myers,
NATO School

Editor's foreword

Arms control has been the cornerstone of improving relations between East and West since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the era of confronting blocks has vanished, arms control is still an important issue for NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, certainly when it comes to confidence building steps. Yevgueni Aliyev in his article "International Arms Control: The Beginning of the Process" provides us with an excellent description of arms control and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in particular. Coming from Azerbaijan, one of the former Soviet republics, Aliyev's views are especially interesting because they provide a perspective of how Moscow's activities were viewed from the periphery of the former Soviet Union.

After concentrating for decades on economic cooperation, in the beginning of the 1990s the European community decided to establish a common foreign policy. Soon after starting this process, security policy was also put on the EU's agenda. For a few years now, the EU and NATO have been on a path of increasing cooperation in the field of security. For instance the Berlin Plus Arrangements of Spring 2003 allow for EU access to NATO assets. Therefore it makes sense to keep a close watch on how the EU is implementing its security policy, especially in the

operational area. Tom Kabs presents an article on "European Union's Congo Mission". He stresses that the EU's Congo Mission had a great political importance, since it was its first military mission without any support from NATO. However, according to Kabs we should understand that the EU is developing its own military wing, independent from NATO, but not in competition with the Alliance.

NATO-Russia relations are getting stronger, especially since "9/11". To understand the present relationship between the Russian Federation and the Alliance it is essential to know the basics of Russian security policy. In the year 2000, under President Putin, the development of a balanced Russian security policy was completed with the announcement of a new grand strategy (national security concept) and concepts derived from this leading document in the fields of military doctrine and foreign policy. In his article "The Contours of a New Russian Security Policy" László Póti shares his opinion on the policy document "The Primary Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces", which was presented by the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, on 2 October 2003. Both Russian and foreign observers regarded this document as a draft for the new military doctrine.

The Russian security document “The Primary Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces” covers not only political-strategic issues but also deals with operational matters. After explaining the development of Russian airpower over the last decade, the editor concentrates on the airpower aspects of the document. Since many of the provisions on airpower also account for other services, these entries can be regarded as an example of current Russian military thinking as a whole. In our

discussion section *Forum*, Russell Myers, a US-AF pilot and former instructor at the Fighter Weapons School, provides us with his view on current Russian airpower thinking.

We invite our readers to forward their comments on these articles. They will be included in the *Forum* of the next issue of this journal.

Marcel de Haas, Major NL AF
Editor

International Arms Control: the Beginning of the Process

Lieutenant-Colonel Yevgueni Aliyev, PhD, MoD, Republic of Azerbaijan

This article focuses on issues concerning the implementation of the international arms control process. Among other aspects the initial stage of preparation and coming into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will be analysed.

The end of the second millennium was marked by essential changes in the world which have caused a fundamental transformation of the military-political situation. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of superpower USSR, expansion of the NATO, formation of a unipolar world order, globalization in the political and economical systems, are the events which will define the course of history in the first decade of the twenty first century. These radical changes in the world have caused a number of negative developments, such as territorial disputes and conflicts, economic and interethnic problems. However, all these processes have taken place at local or regional level. The fact that the transition period has passed without worldwide and European upheavals was defined, in many respects, by the presence of international military-political arms control treaties.

The countries of "eastern" and "western" blocks have confronted each other for more than forty years. They have been armed to the teeth and were

drawn into a never-ending arms race, but nevertheless were able to realise the hopelessness and fatality of this approach. This understanding resulted in a number of international military-political agreements in the field of arms control, which included a verification regime. The following were the most important agreements for Europe:

- The ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty signed by the USSR and the USA in 1972.
- The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty signed by the USSR and the USA, which came into force on June 1, 1988;
- The START-I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-I) signed by the USSR and USA in July, 1991, which came into force in December 1994. On December 1995 START-II was signed, which has considerably contributed to the process of reduction of strategic arms. However, recently the USA an-

nounced the annulment of the ABM Treaty. At present in this field of armament processes are taking place, which can lead to significant changes, encompassing far-reaching consequences for the whole mankind.

- The Vienna Document 1990, which was related to the negotiations on confidence and security building measures. This agreement was politically binding and contained significant measures in transparency, which were accompanied by corresponding forms of verification. In the Vienna Documents of 1992, 1994 and 1999 these provisions were further developed.

We have to be aware if the fact that during the same period others agreements (Open Skies Treaty; the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of specific Conventional Weapons; Protocols on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines; Non-Proliferation Treaty, Test Ban Treaty; the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, etc.) were also signed and have come into force.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Force in Europe (CFE Treaty) is the most important agreement in the field of dis-






armament and arms control and forms the corner stone of European security. The starting point of the CFE Treaty, which has an unlimited period of implementation, is limitation and, if necessary, reduction by all State Parties of conventional arms in five categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces of 100 mm calibre and above, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990. The area of application of the CFE Treaty covers a significant part of European territory, from the Atlantic Ocean up to the Ural Mountains. The area of application of the CFE Treaty was divided into four zones. The quantitative limitations on arms were established for every zone (See Section III, IV, V, VI of the CFE Treaty). It should be noted that combat aircraft and attack helicopters are not subjected to zone limitations. The Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the Trans-Caucasian region as a whole, is situated in the so-called "flank" zone, which has an additional set of restrictive factors (Section V of the Treaty).

The State Parties of the Treaty have the obligation to provide annually detailed information on the national armed forces in the area of application. The CFE Treaty also requires accepting inspections, organized by other State Parties to check military objects on-site. The specific aim of these inspections consists of enabling a state to verify compli-

ance by other contracting parties with all provisions of the CFE Treaty. At the same time it contributes to a higher level of transparency in Europe. Initially, the limitation of conventional arms and equipment was anticipated for each group of State Parties:

seven States of the Warsaw Pact and sixteen States of NATO. The following maximum collective levels of holdings of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) for each of the two groups of State Parties were established:

Table 1: Maximum levels of holdings of TLE defined by the CFE Treaty¹

Treaty limited equipment (TLE)	Maximal levels of TLE in the area of application	Maximal levels of TLE in each group of State Parties	Maximal levels of TLE for one country
 Battle Tanks (BT)	40,000	20,000 (of which no more than 16500 in active units)	13,300
 Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACV)	60,000	30,000 (of which no more than 27300 in active units)	20,000
 Artillery of calibre 100 mm and above (Arty)	40,000	20,000 (of which no more than 17000 in active units)	13,700
 Combat Aircraft (CA)	13,600	6,800	5,150
 Attack Helicopters (AH)	4,000	2,000	1,500






As a result of negotiations between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies on ceilings of arms, the following maximum levels for the USSR were determined:

- BT 13,150 pieces (of which 2,650 in designated permanent storage sites, DPSS);
- ACV 20,000 pieces (of which 2,080 in DPSS);
- Arty 13,175 pieces (of which 2350 in DPSS);
- CA 5,150 pieces;
- AH 1,500 pieces.

In order to fulfil the obligations of the Treaty the State Parties had to carry out reductions to reach the defined numbers of TLE.

¹ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990, Preamble, Articles IV, VI.






Table 2: NATO and Warsaw Pact declared levels of holdings and reduction liabilities²

TLE	Maximum levels of TLE in each group of State Parties	NATO		Warsaw Pact	
		Declared holdings on 19 Nov 1990	Declared reduction liability*	Declared holdings on 19 Nov 1990	Declared reduction liability
 BT	20,000	2,5091	5,949	3,3191	13,191
 AC V	30,000	3,4453	4,631	4,2949	12,949
 Arty	20,000	2,0620	2,334	2,6953	6,533
 CA	6,800	5,939	0	8,372	1,572
 AH	2,000	1,736	0	1,701	0

* NATO countries decided to set their TLE limits below the levels permitted by the Treaty.






The quantitative data on the Treaty limited arms and equipment for each State Party made it possible to evaluate the level of confrontation between the leading states of the world and between the two military blocks of that era.

Table 3: Declared national levels of TLE holdings as of 19 November 1990³

State	 BT	 ACV	 Arty	 AC	 AH
Maximal levels of TLE in each group of State Parties	20,000	30,000	20,000	6,800	2,000
Maximal levels of TLE for each state	13,300	20,000	13,700	5,150	1,500
<i>Warsaw Pact</i>					
USSR	20,694	29,348	13,828	6,445	1,330
Bulgaria	2,416	2,010	2,474	387	44
Czechoslovakia	3,035	4,359	3,485	369	56
Hungary	1,345	1,720	1,047	110	39
Poland	2,850	2,337	2,300	654	128
Romania	2,851	3,135	3,819	407	104
Total:	33,191	42,949	26,953	8,373	1,701

² Initial CFE Treaty data exchange of military information, 19 November 1990.

³ Source: see note 2.

State	 BT	 ACV	 Arty	 AC	 AH
NATO					
USA	5,904	5,747	2,601	704	279
Belgium	359	1,282	376	191	0
Canada	77	277	38	45	12
Denmark	419	318	553	106	3
France	1,358	4,125	1,330	700	429
Germany	7,133	9,598	4,644	1,064	357
Greece	1,725	1,639	1,941	480	0
Italy	1,912	3,591	2,222	584	169
Netherlands	913	1,467	838	196	91
Norway	205	146	532	90	0
Portugal	146	259	334	96	0
Spain	854	1,259	1,373	252	28
Turkey	2,888	1,554	3,202	589	0
UK	1,198	3,193	636	842	368
Total:	25,091	34,453	20,620	5,939	1,736

After the above mentioned quantitative data were submitted by all State Parties of the CFE treaty, serious problems arose concerning the data of the USSR. US military experts claimed that after analysing this information they observed fundamental discrepancies between the data provided by the USSR on 19 November 1990 and the numbers which the USSR presented during negotiations in 1988. For example, the difference in numbers on battle tanks reached up to 11,000 pieces, for armoured combat vehicles - up to 12,000 pieces, artillery pieces- 12,000 pieces and combat aircraft – 3,000 pieces. The divergences were substantial. This dispute led to a slowdown of the CFE Treaty ratification process. Numerous bilateral consultations followed. USSR officials explained the discrepancies by stating that from 1989-




1990 the Soviet Supreme Military Command had carried out a large-scale operation in withdrawing a significant number of military units and military equipment from Central and East Europe. Allegedly, from 1989-1990 focusing only on the arms category of battle tanks, more than 4,000 pieces of equipment had been destroyed, exported and converted, and some 8,000 tanks were moved to military units in Central Asia and storage sites beyond the Ural Mountains. A similar approach was conducted with regard to thousands of ACVs, pieces of artillery, as well as attack helicopters. All these transfers were based on that fact, that arms and military equipment located beyond the Urals (i.e. outside the area of application of the CFE Treaty), were not subject to any limitations.

Similar actions, undertaken by the Military Command of the USSR, have also affected military units located on the territory of Azerbaijan. For instance, all battle tanks of a motor rifle division deployed in Nakhchivan, a separately located enclave of Azerbaijan, were withdrawn, and the division itself was reassigned to the Border Troops which did not belong to the jurisdiction of the CFE Treaty.

During this period of reorganizing the order of battle on the European territory of the USSR three motor rifle divisions (consisting of 120 BTs, 753 ACVs and 234 pieces of artillery) were reas-

signed to Naval Infantry; Coastal Defence Forces were created (813 BTs; 972 ACVs and 846 pieces of artillery); and a significant number of TLE was transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces (1,791 ACVs). Furthermore, there were problems concerning the equipment of the Civil Defence Forces. As a result of these actions, the USSR was able to reduce the number of the military objects subjected to inspections from 1,500 to less than 1,000. In addition to this the USSR also reduced the number of TLE subject to reduction. These actions caused considerable dissatisfaction among the partners of the CFE Treaty.

Table 4: Development of the number of TLE declared by the USSR from 1988-1990

TLE	On 1 July 1988	On 1 August 1990	On 19 November 1990	Total number TLE withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the CFE Treaty
 BT	41,580	24,898	20,694	20,886
 ACV	57,800	32,320	29,348	27,452
 Art	42,400	18,300	13,828	28,572

In February, 1991, in the Persian Gulf the large-scale US military operation “Desert Storm” crushed the war machine of Iraq, a former ally of the USSR. Subsequently, the process of disintegration of the USSR became more apparent. In January and February 1991 Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia declared themselves sovereign. Gorbachev lost authority day by day. In this period, under incessant pressure from the USA,

final agreement on all disputed issues was reached. Nevertheless, the USSR was able to retain many of its stances. TLE transferred to Naval Infantry and to Coastal Defence Forces, remained in these military units, which did not become objects of verification in the framework of the CFE Treaty. However, all this military equipment was accounted in the maximum TLE ceilings of the USSR. At the

same time the military equipment transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces, 1,701 ACVs, was not taken into account in the Soviet permitted TLE totals. US experts accepted this proposal of the USSR, bearing in mind the necessity to provide appropriate security of nuclear weaponry at a time of obvious instability in the USSR. Some countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, were dissatisfied by the fact that all of the negotiations on the above mentioned issues were dealt with at a bilateral level between the USSR and the USA. However, this was the political reality of those days.

In addition to the topics agreed, the USSR committed itself to destroy or convert (for use in civil purpose) a significant number of arms and equipment, which had been transferred beyond the Ural. No less than 6,000 BT, 1,500 ACVs as well as 7,000 pieces of artillery were subject to this procedure. After reaching achievement on the above-mentioned issues, many of the State Parties could start the ratification procedure of the CFE Treaty. Czechoslovakia was the very first state to ratify the treaty. By the end of 1991 14 states had already ratified this military-political document in the sphere of arms control. The ratification process was suspended as a result of the collapse and disintegration of the USSR. On 25 December 1991 the USSR officially ceased to exist. Fifteen newly independent states were formed.






Eight of these states - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, fell within the area of application of the CFE Treaty. The European countries tried to develop a mechanism of involving these new states in the proceedings of the CFE Treaty.

On 10 January 1992 representatives of the newly independent states – Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers - were invited to Brussels, Belgium, to attend a session of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). It was for the very first time that high level representatives of the newly independent states met their colleagues from the NATO countries as well as from the former Warsaw Pact countries. In their statements the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the newly states confirmed that they considered the CFE Treaty to be the “corner stone of European security”. The representative of the Russian Federation claimed in his statement that only Russia needed to ratify the CFE Treaty and subsequently Russia would settle all CFE Treaty implementation issues with the other former Soviet republics. However, the countries which participated in NACC implied that all the newly states should be considered as equal-in-right successors to the former USSR, and consequently all these states should sign and ratify the CFE Treaty. It was decided that the states of the former USSR, located in the area of application of the Treaty, should di-

vide amongst themselves the TLE reduction obligations of the former USSR. On January 16, 1992 at a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Minsk, Russia stated that it should receive two-thirds of the conventional arms and equipment of the former USSR and should be entitled to coordinate all inspections, escort activities, and reduction of TLE on the territory of all newly independent states. However, the other countries of the CIS rejected this proposal. Subsequently, complicated negotiations were started on the division of the maximum TLE ceilings of the former USSR amongst its successor-states. From February until March 1992 a dedicated working group tried to draft a dividing formula, which would be

acceptable for all newly independent states. All countries of the former USSR were under constant pressure of the NATO countries, which demanded to achieve an adequate division of the maximum ceilings of TLE. US CFE Treaty negotiators met representatives of all countries of the former USSR and supported the search for compromises. After numerous intermediate meetings of the representatives of the new states in Moscow, Minsk and Kiev, on 15 May 1992 the leaders of the successor-states gathered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. At this meeting consensus was reached on the division of the maximum TLE ceilings of the former USSR. For the Western partners this agreement came rather unexpectedly.

Table 5: The results of the 1992 Tashkent Agreement on the division of maximum permitted TLE levels⁴

State	 BT		 ACV				 CA	 AH
	Total	DPSS*	Total	DPSS*	Total	DPSS*		
Azerbaijan	220	0	220	0	285	0	100	50
Armenia	220	0	220	0	285	0	100	50
Georgia	220	0	220	0	285	0	100	50
Russia	6,400	1,425	11,480	955	6,415	1,310	3,450	890
Belarus	1,800	275	2,600	425	1,615	240	260	80
Moldova	210	0	210	0	250	0	50	50
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	4,080	950	5,050	700	4,040	800	1,090	330
Total	13,150	2,650	20,000	2,080	13,175	2,350	5,150	1,500

* DPSS-Designated Permanent Storage Sites. TLE located within DPSS shall be counted in the maximum national levels of TLE holdings but do not belong to those of active units.

⁴ 4. Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992; Protocol “On the maximum levels of holdings of conventional armaments and equipment.”

It should be noted that the maximum permitted TLE holdings for the Azerbaijani Republic, as indicated in the Tashkent Agreement, were accepted by the Azerbaijan delegation under Russian pressure. The same situation applied to some other countries. The Russian Federation wanted to create an impression of military parity between the Trans-Caucasian states, but at the same time desired to maximise the TLE levels for its own North-Caucasian "flank" region. When a comparative analysis of the maximum TLE ceilings for the other states is made, it is obvious that the limitative parameters established for Azerbaijan did not reflect demographic nor geopolitical facts. In defining the TLE quota for Azerbaijan the following parameters should have been taken into account: the size of the population of the country, the significant mass of the territory, the presence of a separately located enclave (Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic), as well as the considerable length of the border with a state which is not a CFE Treaty participant and is not a member of the OSCE; the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, the Iranian Armed Forces have 1,565 BT; 1,375 ACVs, 3,285 pieces of artillery; 307 CA as well as 85 AH at their disposal.



Nevertheless, the Tashkent Agreement opened the way to completion of the CFE Treaty signing and ratification process for all State Parties. At the Extraordinary Conference in Oslo,

Norway, of 5 June 1992, the accession of new states to the CFE Treaty was officially accomplished and the results of the Tashkent Agreement were accepted. As a consequence of the unification of the two German states (GDR and FRG) and the disintegration of the USSR, 29 states became participant of the international-legal document, the CFE Treaty. After the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states – the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the number of participating states was increased to 30 State Parties. After the Extraordinary Conference in Oslo, all efforts were concentrated on completion of the CFE Treaty ratification process by all States Parties prior to the opening of the CSCE (OSCE) Summit in Helsinki, of 9-10 July 1992. The Republic of Azerbaijan ratified this military-political agreement on 31 May 31 1992, Turkey on 8 June, Russia on 8 July, etc. There were only three states, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which did not ratify the CFE Treaty in time. This prevented declaring the CFE Treaty coming into force at the Summit in Helsinki. There was a threat that a favourable political opportunity would be lost. However, the USA offered a way out of this situation. The USA suggested signing an agreement on a provisional (120 days) coming into force of certain provisions of the CFE Treaty. This document was signed by the State Parties of the CFE Treaty on 10 July 1992 in Helsinki. Thus, on 17 July 1992 the CFE Treaty

came into force. In addition to this at the Helsinki Summit the State Parties also agreed upon a connection between the CFE Treaty and the Agreement CFE-1A: the Concluding Act of negotiations on personnel strength of Conventional Armed

tional Armed Forces (CAF) in Europe. By accepting this Agreement, the State Parties acknowledged political commitment to observe limits on national levels of personnel strength.

Table 6: National limits of Conventional Armed Forces personnel strength (CFE-1A)⁵

Country	 Personnel strength of CAF	Country	 Personnel strength of CAF
Azerbaijan	70,000	Luxembourg	900
Armenia	60,000	Moldova	20,000
Georgia	40,000	Netherlands	80,000
Belarus	100,000	Norway	32,000
Belgium	70,000	Poland	234,000
Bulgaria	104,000	Portuguese	75,000
Hungary	100,000	Russia	1,450,000
Germany	345,000	Romania	230,000
Greece	158,621	UK	260,000
Denmark	39,000	USA	250,000
Iceland	0	Ukraine	450,000
Spain	300,000	Turkey	530,000
Italy	315,000	France	325,000
Kazakhstan	0	Slovakia	46,667
Canada	10,660	Czech	93,333

⁵ Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A).

European Union's "Congo" – Mission

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Kabs, Director Policy Department, NATO School

"Europe tests its military wings..... The European Union could not have picked up a worse conflict to test its peace-keeping skills..."

"The EU Force in Congo is making history by deploying for the first time far beyond the continent."

"In mounting Operation ARTEMIS at the UN's request the EU is seeking to prove itself a global player and, crucially, able to operate without NATO..."

Introduction

The statements mentioned above are a summary of the sometimes not very positive international press, before the European Union started its very first so called *autonomous* military mission. It is true, that this military mission was described as a very difficult, risky operation. But we should also see *ARTEMIS* as the very first and welcome opportunity for the European Union to demonstrate that the EU has "...added some modest military muscles to its economic weight...". The EU's "High Representative", Mr Solana, really wanted to see if the Europeans would be able to make the difference. So apart from EU's military mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - which I see from a different perspective – for the very first time Solana "...was taking the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the ground to

make Europeans stop talking about theory and capabilities and instead carry out a mission....".⁶

Background

In the Democratic Republic of Congo more than 3 million people have been killed over the past few years; the poor country has been plagued by political instability, misrule, economic disaster and interference by its neighbours Rwanda and Uganda as well as by the misuse of child soldiers to replenish local official militaries. In May 2003, after the EU defense ministers had declared that the EU-Rapid Reaction Forces (EU-RRF – or otherwise called "*Helsinki Headline Goal Forces*")⁷, would be ready, the UN Security Council mandated the deployment of an *In-*

⁶ Steven Everts, British political analyst.

⁷ A pool of 60,000 troops available for peacekeeping, humanitarian operations as well as regional crises (see also annex).

terim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) and requested support of its member nations.⁸ The European Union's Political & Security Committee (EU-PSC) approved the plan to send peacekeeping troops to the Congo under the name of *ARTEMIS* and ratified the decision in Luxembourg on 5 June 2003.



Mandate, Mission & Contribution

Officially Operation *ARTEMIS* was intended to stabilize the security in the Congo, to improve the humanitarian situation, to provide security at the airport and at the refugee camps in Bunia as well as for the civilian population and the humanitarian relief workers.

The operation was carried out in close cooperation

⁸ UNSC Resolution 1484, 30 May 2003.

with *MONUC*, the UN Observation Mission in the Congo. The United Nations strengthened the *MONUC* force contingent by mid of August and EU peacekeepers formally handed over authority to a UN force with a broadened mandate on 1 September of this year.⁹ Due to its extended experiences, France served as the Framework nation for this EU operation. Under the command of the French General, Jean Paul Thonier, who reported to his MoD in Paris and to the EU-PSC in Brussels, which provided the strategic direction, about 1,400 soldiers served in the Bunia region.¹⁰ All troops were relatively heavily armed and had robust rules of engagement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.¹¹

Officially the *ARTEMIS* force left the Congo on 15 September 2003. But the EU's role in the country did not end in September. The European Union is still providing assistance to strengthen UN's *MONUC* mission, including support to local Congolese police forces.

⁹ About 2,500 soldiers from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Uruguay

¹⁰ 850 French, 350 Germans, some British, supported by South Africans.

¹¹ Chapter 7 mentions [Enforcing] Action by the UN with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

Comments

Of course EU's Congo mission was a small one, a timely limited one; but no doubt about that – it was a successful one. Solana has stated, that the French-led force had “.... given a positive boost to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo....”

The very first autonomous military mission of the EU, the very first military mission without any NATO support, was a political sign. I think we have to perceive this mission as a far bigger test of European Union's effort to develop a military wing independent of NATO, but **not in competition** to NATO. Therefore it was the right decision from several EU NATO countries to run this mission alone without NATO (US) influence and to remove “*Berlin Plus*” rules, which would allow special NATO countries certain control over any EU-led peacekeeping in return for NATO planning and assets. So the European Union is becoming more and more active, showing more and more confidence to extend its peacekeeping responsibilities. As is well-known the EU is still running its peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however in this case by using NATO capabilities, and is increasing its engagement in the Balkans.¹²

¹² At the moment 80 % of the 25,000 NATO led-forces in Kosovo and of the 12,000 troops in Bosnia belong to the EU. In Bosnia the EU set up a civilian/policing mission in January 2003.

It is likely that the European Union may have other operations on its agenda, perhaps in Moldova (Trans Dnestr conflict) or maybe somewhere else. The right way ahead; but again – the EU should gain experience, perhaps on its own but not in competition with NATO. According to an EU ambassador ...“It's about the EU learning on the ground and moving ahead with capabilities to carry out a range of missions. ...It's also about our long term strategy”. This strategy is based upon the desire to prevent conflicts. If prevention has failed, then the EU wants to move quickly with strong civilian back-up, such as police and a judicial apparatus, to restore civilian institutions. I think this is one of the very important perhaps even fundamental elements which is lacking in the US' strategy towards Iraq. Indeed, the civilian role dimension was very much part of the Congo mission as it is part of Solana's new security doctrine. It calls for a greater capacity to bring civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations. The statement: “In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by a civilian chaos...” - and Iraq is a very good example for it - , is well-known. The EU wanted this strategy of civilian back-up to be applied in some way to the Congo. It was always and still is the European Union's very first intension to restore political and civilian institutions or to set up

transitional institutions by backing the training and integration of police forces and judges. As a EU diplomat stated:”.... And if we do not do it, the military operation’s success would be a short term one...”

European Security and Defence Policy is not dead, the European Union is on the right track. All of us should accept EU as a military equivalent to NATO; not to weaken NATO, but to strengthen the European part of NATO!

The Contours of a New Russian Security Policy

Dr. László Póti, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and Defence Studies, Hungary

Shortly after Putin's coming to power, first as Prime Minister, then as President, Russia adopted three new strategic documents: National Security Strategy (January 2000), Military Doctrine (April 2000), and Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000). More recently, on 2nd October 2003 the Russian defence leadership held an 'enlarged meeting' with the participation of President Putin. With unprecedented openness and detail, this meeting made public a document that presented the current Russian security perception. While reaffirming much of the content of the preceding documents, it also introduced some significant new information. The document was presented by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov in a 45 minute presentation under the title "The Topical Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation". An analysis of the 73 page document follows.

The document consists of six chapters and numerous illustrations was presented – according to the reports of those who were present – in a very much Western business-like style, covered the following items:

- The new phase of the development of the Russian Armed Forces,
- The role of Russia in the world's military-political system of relations
- The evaluation of the threats affecting Russia
- The character of contemporary wars and military conflicts
- The tasks of the Russian Armed Forces
- The priorities of development of the Russian Armed Forces

The main elements of the Defence Minister's report can be summed up, as follows:

First, the authors of the document see current world politics characterized by the following trends:

- Globalization tendencies (e.g. the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, drug-trafficking);
- Military force is used more frequently outside traditional military-political alliances in the form of ad hoc coalitions;
- Military force is more frequently used for achieving economic aims;
- The role of non state actors has grown in formulating world politics and the

foreign policies of individual countries.

Second, the document identifies the regions that are considered within the “natural interests” of Russia from the national security perspective. These are: Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Pacific. In this regard, what is of most interest, when taken at face value, is the pragmatic perspective that - **Russia does not identify itself as global power, but rather as an actor interested in regions of lesser importance**, such as Africa or South America. This self-definition places Russia in a much more realistic dimension, as far as her international role is concerned, and makes her somewhat similar to the self-perception of the EU.

Third, in addition to the usual classification of threats as external and internal, the Defence Minister’s report introduces a new category, the so called “trans-border” threat. This latter category of threat – the significance of which is considered ever expanding - is defined by its form and appearance as internal, but by its substance (sources, instigators, executors) as external e.g. external support of dissident groups with the aim of preparing for later actions within Russia, support of groups whose aim is to overthrow Russia’s constitutional order, as well as hostile information activities, organized crime, international drug trafficking etc. What is worth noting is that although this

new category of trans-border issues are primarily found among external threats, this distinction is very important from the Russian perspective, reflecting a very specific Russian problem area, and as such it is not mere rhetoric.

Fourth, probably the main message of the report – formulated in a variety of consistent statements – is that **the role of military power in safeguarding security not only remains, but is expanding**, and that to safeguard “the security of the Russian Federation by only political means (membership in international organisations, partnership ties, and political influence) is virtually impossible.” In comparison to the strategic documents of 2000, this demonstrates the most significant change.

Fifth, as to the use of nuclear weapons, the document does not say anything new, ‘first use’ remaining under well defined conditions. Of note are new arguments in favour of the role of these weapons as a means of deterrence. According to the authors of the Report the use of military force without a UN Security Council mandate has given impetus to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Report goes on to suggest that nuclear weapons are considered by more and more states as usable weapons, and thus the threshold for their use has been lowered of late. The conclusion is that in this newly evolving situa-

tion Russia should rely considerably on its nuclear capability, which means **Moscow declaring an explicit comeback to nuclear deterrence.**

Sixth, as to NATO, - despite the Media's best efforts to dramatise - the Report does not offer any new policy changes, but certainly uses remarkable wording. While briefly describing the existing framework of cooperation between NATO and Russia, it goes on to state that there are differences of opinion between the two sides concerning two issues: the enlargement of the Alliance eastwards and NATO's participation in military conflicts. The most controversial statement sees Moscow asserting that the Alliance "removes the direct or indirect anti-Russian components of its military planning", and that should NATO remain "a military alliance with offensive doctrine" then Russia needs to carry out "radical changes in its military planning ... including Russian nuclear strategy". This appears to be a blunt way of expressing how the lessons of the NATO air campaign against Former Yugoslavia have made their way into Russian security thinking. The unusual wording is not a return to the rhetoric or the practice of the Cold War era, rather a **crystal clear expression of the difference of opinion and perception on major developments in international security.**

Finally, as to reform of the Armed Forces, the Report's main

message is that the **reduction of the Army has reached the level where further significant reductions are not expected.** This means that after reducing from 2.75 Million (1992) to 1.6 Million (1996), the current Army of 1.16 Million will reach the final bottom line of One Million by 2005.

The real importance of the Report will obviously be measured in the longer term, but certain significant features can already be seen now. First of all, any suggestion that this is just an ad hoc political signal from the Russian leadership can be discounted. It is known from several sources that the document had been under preparation for at least a year, with the involvement of a range of expert stakeholders (General Staff, Ministry of Defence, academic institutions, Presidential office, and other Parliamentary groups). For the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the Report serves the political ambitions of Defence Minister Ivanov, or in a wider sense the interests of the military-industrial lobby, or indeed the hard-line military. Nor can the Report be interpreted as a kind of PR-activity timed for the elections that were to follow it i.e. the Parliamentary elections of December 2003 and the Presidential elections of March 2004. President Putin's presence at the meeting (contributing with introductory and closing remarks) is also an indication that the document reflects a considered approach by the

whole of the Russian political-defence leadership.

Although, the authors intended the Report as material for further thought, commentary to date has dealt critically with only minor elements of it, and not questioned the principal message. It is most noteworthy how widely the document's content is accepted. The influential informal Council on Foreign and Defence Policy led by Sergei Karaganov, while issuing its own version entitled "Russia's Defence Policy", basically reaffirmed the Ivanov paper.

In summary, while not re-writing the extant series of strate-

gic documents of 2000 the current Report contains one fundamental message: if the world is evolving in the way it is perceived – there is an increased likelihood of the use of military force, an increased role for nuclear weapons, a decreased role for the main security institutions, and the legitimization of preventive strikes. The inference is that Russia cannot stop these trends, but rather must accept the new rules of the game and act accordingly. What we are witnessing is not a Russian return to Cold War, or the beginning of a new assertive Russia, but rather **the adoption by Moscow of a pragmatic approach to a changing post-bipolar security environment.**

The Contours of New Russian Airpower Thinking

Major Marcel de Haas, Head Research Branch, Research & Publication Department, NATO School.

In his article "The Contours of a New Russian Security Policy" Dr. László Póti discusses political-strategic aspects of the Russian security document "Current tasks of the development of the Russian armed forces". In addition to political-strategic views, this document, which was made public by the Russian Federation (RF) Minister of Defence on 2 October 2003, also comprised present Russian thinking on warfare, in particular regarding the fight against terrorism. Since studying military thinking on the operational level is a primary goal of NATO School, it makes sense to unfold these thoughts in this journal. I will concentrate on provisions in this document related to the use of airpower. Airpower thinking can be regarded as an example of current Russian thoughts on warfare in general. Before dealing with the airpower entries of this document I will describe the development of Russian airpower over the last decade.

Russian airpower thinking since 1992

The development of Russian airpower has been influenced by *internal* as well as *external* factors. A vital *internal* factor was the consequences for the build-up, tasks and status of military aviation as a result of RF security policy at the political-strategic level. Another crucial *internal* factor has been the Chechen conflict. Warfare in both Chechen wars (1994-1996 and 1999 until today) as well as in the Dagestani conflict (autumn 1999) proved that Russian military concepts, including that of airpower, had to be changed from stress on large-scale conventional to internal, irregular warfare. The primary ex-

ternal factor has been Western experience in using airpower. The leadership of the RF Air Forces has attached a lot of value to Western airpower experiences in the Gulf War (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) and endeavours to implement these lessons in procurement and doctrinal concepts of its own organisation. Below I will go into detail on the influence of RF security policy on priorities of airpower, on the effort of the Air Forces' leadership in centralizing command and control over airpower, on large-scale versus irregular warfare thinking and on the interaction between doctrinal thought and the actual use of airpower in Chechnya.

Consequences of RF security policy for airpower priorities

Russia's security policy from 1992 to the end of the 1990s, which demanded annual cuts in the defence budget, affected the operational capabilities of military aviation, of materiel (aircraft) as well as of personnel. The Chechen conflicts proved that military aviation was not capable of operating either in bad weather or during the night, which the guerrilla type of warfare especially demanded. The shortage or absence of expensive precision guided munitions, high-tech communications, navigation and targeting systems, as well as all weather and day/night capabilities, reduced the combat readiness of military aviation. Another negative consequence of decreased defence budgets was the lack of fuel, spare parts and maintenance. As a result of the low funding levels pilot training and combat experience were insufficient as well. In 1999 average annual flying hours for attack aviation were around 23 and for bombers around 25, whereas Western (NATO) air force standards require 180 flying hours as a minimum for a skilled pilot. The lack of flying hours resulted not only in a higher rate of aircraft losses but also in less effective fulfilment of missions, for instance by dropping bombs too early. Although reorganisations such as the amalgamation of Air Defence and Air Forces produced cuts in

personnel as well as in materiel, they did not bring about a structural improvement in combat readiness.¹³

Another aspect of security policy was the preferential status of the strategic bomber force of the RF Air Forces. The desire of the political-military leadership to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrence force led to a special status for the strategic bomber force, because of its nuclear and long-distance capabilities. As a result of this privileged position the combat readiness level of this element became much higher than the other parts of the Air Forces. Since the end of the 1990s Russia's military-political leadership has increased the use of the strategic bomber force in exercises. For instance in June 1999 strategic bombers participated in the command-staff exercise *Zapad-99*. However, the increased attention to the capabilities of the strategic bomber force negatively affected the budget of the other elements of the RF Air Forces.

Centralised control over airpower

In the 1990s, just as the other services of the RF Armed Forces and the troops of other ministries, the Air Forces had to face struc-

¹³ M. de Haas, "Russian airpower over Chechnya: lessons learned applied", *The Officer magazine*, Volume 15, Issue 6, September/October 2003, pp. 17-18.

tural cuts in their budget. Every force tried to make the best of these bad times. The Navy did so by introducing a naval doctrine, including a powerful position for the Navy. The Ground Forces managed to create a situation in which all forces and troops within the Military Districts would be under their operational command, instead of being subordinated to the staffs of the different services. The Air Forces pursued a different course to strengthen their position. They did so by emphasizing the generally accepted principle of centralised command and control and decentralised execution of airpower. Naturally this centralised command of airpower would have to be placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces. At the beginning of that decade Russian military aviation was divided in Air Forces, Air Defence Forces, Ground Forces (army aviation), Navy (naval aviation), Border Troops (aviation section) and Internal Troops (aviation section). Having promoted this reorganisation since 1994, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces saw the merger of Air Defence and Air Forces implemented in 1998. In August 2002 the shooting-down in Chechnya of an overloaded helicopter made the RF Ministry of Defence (MoD) decide to reassign army aviation from the Ground Forces to the Air Forces by the end of that year.¹⁴ Follow-

ing this, in January 2003 the MoD announced that it would examine the pros and cons of transferring all other elements of military aviation to the Air Forces. With the prospect of acquiring all military aviation, the position of the Air Forces among the other services and troops would be substantially consolidated. Consequently, the principle of centralised command and control of airpower did not only serve the effectiveness of air warfare but was also beneficial for the position of the Air Forces.

Military thinking: large-scale versus irregular warfare

On the military-strategic level a part of the Russian military leadership has concluded that as a result of the end of the Cold War and the rise of internal conflicts, the armed forces should change their concepts accordingly, from large-scale to local, irregular warfare. However, conservative policy makers on the other side retained their focus on large-scale, conventional conflicts, which was translated into emphasis on nuclear capabilities and in maintaining massive ground forces. They considered local, irregular conflicts and modern warfare with a leading role for airpower as of minor importance. This 'double focus' was also reflected in the status and tasks of the Air Forces. On the one hand the convictions of the generals of the Air Forces, derived from Chechen and Western experiences, con-

¹⁴ M. de Haas, *The use of Russian Air Power in the Second Chechen War*, B59, Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, January 2003, p. 18.

cerning the dominant position of airpower in internal, irregular conflicts were adopted in the Military Doctrine of 2000. For dealing with these kinds of conflicts this security document demanded the formation a unified air component subordinated to a joint military staff, which would be in command of the aviation units of all services and troops. Other entries covered intensified cooperation among the RF Armed Forces and other troops, as well as a clear description of the dominating role of airpower, in the form of air campaigns, air operations and air support for ground forces.¹⁵ On the other hand at the same time concentration on large-scale warfare and nuclear capabilities was also continued by pressure of conservative representatives of the security establishment. Consequently, except for the strategic bomber force, which benefited from this policy, the rest of the Air Forces suffered from structural cuts in manpower and materiel causing a diminishing combat readiness. Irregular warfare in Chechnya showed that the shortage or absence of sophisticated weaponry and avionic instruments limited the effectiveness of airpower.

Looking back at a decade of Russian airpower thinking it is evident that the most important structural problem for Russian airpower has been funding, due to the economic situation as well

¹⁵ De Haas, "Russian airpower over Chechnya: lessons learned applied", p. 18.

as to other priorities of the political-military leadership. But in spite of the financial problems, the RF Air Forces demonstrated that they were capable of enhancing effectiveness even without additional financial support.¹⁶ However, at the end of the 1990s as a result of priorities of the military-political leadership other than reinforcing airpower, the combat readiness of the Air Forces was increasingly declining.

Interaction between doctrine and the use of airpower in Chechnya

In analysing the interaction between doctrinal thinking and airpower experiences again the factors of command and control, cooperation among armed forces (MoD) and troops of other ministries, as well as employing military force in internal conflicts come to the fore.

The Military Doctrine of 1993 made a clear distinction between command of the armed forces and that of the other troops. This was put in practise in the first Chechen conflict when forces and troops, including the different air assets of the MoD and of the Internal Troops, acted on their own. The result was a disaster and frustrated an effective course of the operation. Keeping this experience in mind the Military Doctrine of 2000 took a different ap-

¹⁶ De Haas, *The use of Russian Air Power in the Second Chechen War*, p. 20.

proach. Now the General Staff of the MoD apart from commanding its own forces was also in charge of the joint (MoD and other departmental troops) employment of the military force as a whole. By creating a joint air component this doctrinal demand was implemented in the second conflict.

As a result of the minimal attention for cooperation among forces and troops in the Military Doctrine of 1993, the first Chechen conflict showed shortcomings in cooperation in air operations among Air Forces, army aviation and aviation of the Internal Troops, as well as by Forward Air Controllers (FACs), who formed the link between air and ground operations. As stated above the 2000 Doctrine, by demanding the formation of joint forces in resolving internal conflicts, incorporated these lessons learned. In the second Chechen war apart from the formation of a unified joint air component, cooperation between military aviation and ground forces was also improved. By conducting air barrages prior to the advance of troops, airpower created favourable conditions for ground forces and diminished the possibility of friendly fire. Because FACs were deployed in more units and at lower tactical levels of the ground forces, they proved to be more effective than in the first conflict.

The Military Doctrine of 1993 failed in providing entries on solving internal conflicts. Therefore the use of airpower in the first conflict was not based upon

doctrinal guidelines. With these lessons included, the 2000 Doctrine not only extensively mentioned warfare in internal conflicts, but for the first time also dealt with levels lower than those of grand strategy and military strategy. Regarding airpower, entries on air campaigns, air operations as well as joint operations by (special) forces were stated in this doctrine. In the second conflict these doctrinal guidelines were implemented by commencing with an intensive air campaign, fulfilling air support for ground forces in the form of close air support, air interdiction and transporting special units in anti-terror operations, as well as by providing air support for psychological warfare. Thus airpower was employed in line with the Doctrine. The doctrinal guidance of forces and troops clearly improved between the first and second Chechen conflict as a result of lessons learned. The grown emphasis on internal irregular conflicts as well as the increased doctrinal attention for warfare at the lower levels of strategy was evidence of a realistic approach of the General Staff towards current security threats.

Airpower aspects in “Current tasks of the development of the Russian armed forces”

Characteristics of current wars and armed conflicts

Analysis of conflicts from the 1970s until 2003, leads the Russian military-political establishment to the following conclusions in the security document of 2 October 2003:¹⁷

- A significant part of all the conflicts has an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrate fierce fighting and in a number of cases result in a total destruction of a state system;
 - The outcome of conflicts is more and more determined in its initial phase. The party which takes the initiative has the advantage;
 - Not only military forces but also political and military command and control systems, (economic) infrastructure as well as the population have become primary targets;
 - Information and electronic warfare nowadays have a great impact in conflicts;
 - The use of airborne, air mobile and special forces has increased.
- Unified command and control, joint warfare and a thorough cooperation between ground and air forces in particular has become essential;
 - A prominent role in modern warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), is taken by long-range precision guided munitions (PGMs) in combination with airpower, after air superiority has been established;
 - Massive use of tanks and infantry has to a large extent been replaced by long-range guided weapon systems and massive air raids, although the role of these conventional forces is still important after the initial stages of a conflict;
 - The dominating role of airpower in modern warfare requires a well-equipped and electronic warfare resistant anti-aircraft defence system;

Key priorities in the build-up of the RF Armed Forces

The Russian military-political leadership underlines two main concerns: first, to maintain a potential of strategic deterrent forces, and secondly, to strengthen conventional forces and to organize them in joint

¹⁷ “Aktual'nyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, RF MoD, 2 October 2003 (Current tasks of the development of the Russian armed forces) www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?doc_id=261, pp. 34-38.

groupings of forces.¹⁸ In addition to the Strategic Missile Forces the strategic deterrent forces also consist of nuclear air forces. In order to guarantee the capacities of the airpower element of the strategic deterrent forces Russia intends to modernize its Tu-160 strategic bomber fleet so that they can be equipped with high precision cruise missiles and PGM air bombs, and will be capable of carrying out air reconnaissance and electronic warfare.

The reinforcement of conventional forces, with the aim of forming joint groupings of forces and creating a unified and centralised command and control system, is especially directed at lifting the levels of mobility and of arms and equipment. These groupings of forces will be tasked to destroy illegal armed formations, terrorist groups and organizations, as well as their bases, training centres, storages and communication sites. In order to successfully carry out tasks in the present stage of warfare the conventional forces must be very mobile, deployable at short notice and in any direction. Because of the size of Russia's territory the capacities of the military transport aviation are of great importance. For an effective unified and centralized command and control system to be installed cooperation among the services of the RF Armed Forces (MoD) and the

troops of other security departments is a prerequisite. This cooperation is to be realized by a joint training of the staffs of these forces and troops.

For airpower these objectives mean the following. The training of officers at all levels in the field of disguise (*maskirovka*), disinformation, reconnaissance, cooperation with tanks and artillery, as well as target guidance for close-air-support aircraft and army aviation (rotary wing) is to be increased. Pilots should be trained in terrorist tactics. Furthermore their flight currency should be lifted by expanding resources for air units in unstable regions, by at least securing the present number of annual flying hours and by practising the use of PGMs in simulators.

Conclusions

Reviewing the airpower aspects of the October 2003 RF security document "Current tasks of the development of the Russian armed forces", the first and foremost conclusion can be described in one word: realism. In this document the lines expressed in the 2000 version of Russia's Military Doctrine, emphasizing asymmetric warfare and discussing military actions at lower levels than military strategy, are continued and even further expanded. However, the implementation of these plans might be a concern.

¹⁸ "Aktual'nyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii", pp. 59-66.

Rightly this document focuses on asymmetric conflicts as being on the forefront nowadays, instead of large-scale conventional wars. Clearly analyses of recent Western-led conflicts and of their own experiences in Chechnya, has convinced the RF military-political leadership to concentrate on irregular warfare. Since this perception in the October 2003 document is stronger expressed than in the 2000 doctrine, the assumption could be made that the conservative part of Russia's security establishment has lost influence in decision making, from which modern thinking military leaders have benefited. Standpoints stressing the importance of information and electronic warfare, unified command and control and joint warfare, which were already included in the 2000 doctrine, are repeated in the October 2003 document.

Looking more closely at the consequences for airpower, the following can be said. The weight of airpower in Russian warfare thinking has been reinforced. As performed in the present second Chechen conflict, airpower receives a key role, not only at the start of a conflict but also as a vital asset for successful operations of ground forces. The enhanced role of airpower has also led to another conclusion; more attention should be given to anti-aircraft defence. At the operational level this new military thinking results in the crea-

tion of joint groupings of forces, as the best organizational structure for fighting an irregular enemy. In 1999, at the start of the current Chechen conflict, such a joint grouping of forces was formed for the first time. Furthermore, this security document provides realistic options for improving the output of airpower, by striving for a more efficient use of human as well as of material resources.

I would like to distinguish two areas of problems. First, regarding the structure and capabilities of the air forces, the position of the strategic bomber force continues to be ground for concern. In describing the development of the air forces during the last decade I mentioned that the military-political leadership has attached much value to a state-of-the-art strategic bomber fleet. However, as has been the case in the past, it is likely that the preferential status of the strategic air force will continue to entail deprivation of means for the other elements of military aviation, such as transport and ground support aviation, as well as rotary wing. In dealing with an irregular enemy not strategic (nuclear) aviation but the latter elements of the air forces are used. Thus, a continued emphasis on strategic air force is likely to hinder the plans for reorganizing the (air) forces towards irregular warfare.

The second area which is likely to cause problems is that of financial resources. The realistic view that modern specifically irregular warfare can only be fought with sophisticated weapon systems, such as PGMs and avionics providing all-weather capability, and by improving the training level of personnel, requires financial means. The current Russian armed forces, massive in form and still aimed at conventional large-scale warfare, demand a lot of money for upkeep. So far military reform plans have not offered a solution for this dilemma. Unless the military-political leadership decides to radically change the structure of the armed forces towards one which is capable of conducting asymmetric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of not only airpower but of the RF Armed Forces as a whole is expected to be hampered.

References:

M. de Haas, *The use of Russian Air Power in the Second Che-*

chen War, B59, Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, January 2003.

M. de Haas, "Russian airpower over Chechnya: lessons learned applied", *The Officer magazine*, Volume 15, Issue 6, September/October 2003, pp. 14-18.

M. de Haas, *Veiligheidsbeleid en airpower onder Jeltsin en Poetin: de ontwikkeling van het veiligheidsdenken in de Russische Federatie en de gevolgen ervan voor de inzet van het Russische luchtwapen (1992-2000)*, Utrecht: De Banier, 2004 ("Security policy and airpower under Yeltsin and Putin: The development of Russian security thinking and its consequences for the air forces (1992-2000)". The English version of this abridged PhD thesis will be published by Frank Cass Publishers, London, ISBN 0 7146 5608 9, in summer 2004).

FORUM

A Good Time to Reflect

Lieutenant Colonel Russell Myers, Course Director, Joint Operations Department, NATO School

In his article “The Contours of new Russian Airpower Thinking” Major De Haas outlines the recent Doctrinal shift by the Russian Federation in the application of Airpower. His description of the developments of Russian airpower over the last decade provided me an opportunity to comment on NATO’s own development and current challenges based on the new operational environment.

When I looked at the recent doctrinal shift by the Russians, it made me reflect on where NATO has been and really appreciate how far it has come with respect to doctrine and capability. NATO doctrine has shifted from **Deterrence** in the late 1940’s, **Massive Retaliation** in the mid 1950’s, **Flexible Response** in the early 1960’s, **Collective Defense** to **Collective Security** in the 1990’s. The latest shift in thinking includes **Crisis Management** as a fundamental security task of the Alliance. Each of these shifts in doctrinal thinking has meant fundamental changes in our multinational forces and equipment to gain the capabilities needed to fulfill the ever-changing mission requirements.

I see doctrine as a collection of justifiable ideas, knowledgeable theories, and time tested principles of warfare. It provides the guidance for the proper use of armed forces in selected operations. It is based on

what we have learned from our own war fighting experiences, and from those lessons learned by others throughout history. By developing officially sanctioned guidelines (doctrine), a common frame of references can be established. NATO’s current Graduated Readiness Force (GRF) structure provides that guidance to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces. Within the framework of the GRF’s NATO is committed to building a more mobile, flexible and highly responsive multinational force. It has come along way to realizing the type of capabilities it needs to meet current and future challenges.

You could say the Russians shift in airpower doctrine serves to validate the restructuring of NATO forces. Although Russia may have only captured the ideas in their doctrine, they to have identified the need for forces that are more joint, flexible, capable of moving quickly and attacking with greater precision.

As the Alliance interests increasingly fall outside the traditional Cold War boundaries, the need exists for a NATO force that can be tailored to fit a variety of missions with the capability of deploying quickly. With the inception of the NATO Response Force (NRF) this concept is now an operational reality.

The NRF has prompted many changes in the way NATO thinks and operates, not just from the Strategic level, but from the Operational and Tactical levels as well. Our current doctrine will not and should not remain stagnant for very long. To remain current and relevant NATO doctrine must be constantly adapted. The changes must come from those in the field and Headquarters that recognize the need for updates, refinements, and in some cases completely new doctrine, that supports the NATO Mission. Doctrine must remain a living document that is constantly scrutinized and challenged to provide the guidelines that lead us to success. This is particularly true in today's threat environment of terrorism and irregular warfare. The keys to success are having the ability to move quickly, the flexibility to handle a variety of missions, and the ability of NATO forces to adapt to changing threats and environments and still engage decisively.

The Russians may not have their fielded forces structured as they have identified in doctrine yet, but they do have the

guidelines needed to organize, train and equip, a force to accomplish those missions and capabilities they have defined. In contrast, NATO has the forces and structure in place with the challenge of educating and training that force on the effects, competencies and/or functions of the NRF and its combined/Joint capabilities. Just as the Russians and NATO have identified in doctrine, airpower plays a significant role in this new operational environment and it is the ability of NATO Air Forces to skillfully execute Tactical Airlift, Air Defense (AD), Offensive Counter Air (OCA), Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Aerial Reconnaissance, Air to Air Refueling (AAR), Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), Support Jamming (SJ), Close Air Support (CAS), Air Interdiction (AI), Special Operations, and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), that will set the conditions for the NRFs success. Tactical Airlift provides *mobility* and assists in the *sustainment* of forces. AD, OCA, SEAD and SJ provide *force protection* and insure our forces have *freedom of movement* while denying the enemy his ability to move freely. NATO AEW and Reconnaissance provide the intelligence to *execute on priorities* and *maintain operational focus*. AAR extends the use of NATO airborne assets to allow *greater flexibility* in covering the battle space. AI and CAS support the joint mission with precision and lethality. CSAR provides the capability to protect vital assets, deny the enemy any

bargaining chips or source of intelligence, and maintain the experience level needed to prosecute missions long-term.

In my opinion, it is the level to which NATO is able to train, plan, and execute these capabilities that will determine the effectiveness of the NRF.

At 0200 local time on the morning of 17 January 1991, airmen from all military services and 10 nations became the “Thunder and Lightning” of Operation Desert Storm...Literally in minutes, the coalition delivered a knockout blow to Iraqi air defenses and paved the way for thousands of air sorties to pummel Iraqi leadership, their command and control capabilities, essential services, infrastructure, and military forces. After only 28 days, the Iraqi army in Kuwait and eastern Iraq was so demoralized, disorganized, and degraded that coalition surface operations envisioned to require weeks took only days.¹⁹

I see doctrine as the means of setting the framework and guidelines necessary to make NATO forces successful. In Desert Storm, it was the ability to adapt, the doctrine of the day to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy and apply the strengths of the allied force that helped in the early achievement of the opera-

tional objectives. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the improved ability of airpower to engage in multiple missions simultaneously. This ability to provide direct support and conduct shaping operations simultaneously demonstrated the type of precision, flexibility, mobility and jointness that NATO doctrine should refine, develop and incorporate.

It is a good time to reflect on how far NATO has come over the last decade. We should be proud of the accomplishments, vigilant in our pursuit of readiness, secure in our tactics but never complacent. NATO doctrine and the application of airpower must remain flexible, adaptable, and ready.

¹⁹ Colonel Edward C. Mann III, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates*.

The NATO School Courses 2004

JOINT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

N3-05, "NATO Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Course"
N4-07, "Operational Logistics Planning Course"
N3-08, "Orientation to NATO Psychological Operations Planning Course"
N3-09, "Orientation to NATO Psychological Operations Course" (will be merged with N3-08 in 2005)
M3-15, "Introduction to NATO Joint Air Planning Course" (cancelled in 2005; N3-23 "Introduction to Employment of NATO Air Power" will be introduced in 2005)
N4-26, "ACO Air Logistics TACEVAL Course"
M4-29, "Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) Course"
M3-45, "NATO/Partner/Mediterranean Dialogue Operational Staff Officer Course"
N3-49, "Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Course"
M3-50, "NATO Peace Support Operations Course"
N3-51, "NATO Senior Officer Crisis Management Course"
M3-52, "Multinational Crisis Management Course"
P3-53, "Joint Operation Centre Course"
N3-54, "NATO Operational Planning Course (OPC)"
N3-58, "NATO Expeditionary Operations Course"
P4-90, "NATO Logistics Course (COSUP)"
M4-91, "Joint Maritime Logistics Course (Radiant Support)"
M4-92, "Movement Operational Planning Course"
M4-93, "Host Nation Support Course"

OPERATIONS AND PLANS DEPARTMENT

N3-01, "NATO Space Operational Planning Course"
N2-02, "NATO Intelligence Course"
N2-03, "NATO Intelligence Analyst Course"
P2-04, "NATO Open Source Intelligence Course"
P3-06, "Ground Based Air Defence Course for PFP"
N3-14, "Introduction to Maritime Operations Course" (Note: Designed for officers without maritime experience)
N3-16, "NATO Senior Officer Information Operations and Command and Control Warfare Course" (2005: "NATO Senior Officer Information Operation Course")
N3-17, "NATO Conventional Targeting Course"
N3-19, "NATO Information Operations and Command and Control Warfare Course" (2005: "NATO Information Operation Course")
N3-20, "ACO Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Course"
N3-21, "NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Course"
N3-22, "NATO Operational Electronic Warfare Course"
N3-23, "Introduction to Employment of NATO Air Power Course" (new course in 2005, details will be available soon)
N3-24, "ACO Land Operational Evaluation (OE) Course"
N3-25, "ACO GBAD Operations TACEVAL Course"
N3-27, "ACO TACEVAL Force Protection Evaluator Course"
N3-28, "ACO Air & ASACS Operations TACEVAL Evaluator Course"
P5-39, "NATO Reserve Forces Integration Course"
N2-47, "NATO Intel Warning System (NIWS) Course"
M2-48, "NATO Geographic Officer Course"
N3-97, "NATO Conventional Weaponing Course"

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DEPARTMENT

N3-10, "NATO Nuclear Operations Course"
N3-11, "NATO Nuclear Surety Management Course"
N5-13, "NATO Nuclear Policy & Risks of Proliferation Course"
M3-70, "NATO NBC Defence Orientation Course" (merged with N3-70)
N3-71, "NATO NBC Warning and Reporting System – Manual Procedures Course"
N3-72, "NATO Advanced NBC Defence Operations and Exercise Planning Course"
N3-73, "NATO Officer NBC Defence Policy Course"
M3-75, "Environmental Protection of Military Forces Course"
M3-78, "Environmental Planning for NATO-Led Operations and Exercises Course"
M9-79, "Joint Medical Planner Course" (course number will change to M9-85 in 2005)
N3-80, "Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability Course"
N3-81, "NATO Biological Warfare Defence Awareness Course"
N3-83, "WMD Senior Officer Study Period"
M9-85, "Joint Medical Planner Course" (course number changed from M9-79 to M9-85 in 2005)
M9-86, "Senior Medical Staff Course"
N9-87, "Medical Intelligence Course"
M9-88, "Major Incident Medical Management and Support Course"

POLICY DEPARTMENT

S5-18, "Combined CFE Arms Control Verification Inspector/Escort Course"
P4-30, "Resource Management Education Programme (RMEP) Course"
N5-31, "NATO Senior Officer Policy Course"
M5-32, "NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course"
M5-33, "NATO Senior NCO Orientation Course"
P5-34, "NATO Legal Course"
N5-35, "Bi-SC Command and Control Course"
N5-36, "NATO Staff Officer Defence Planning Course"
M5-37, "NATO/PfP Chaplain Operations Course"
P4-38, "Resource Orientation Course"
M5-41, "NATO European Security Cooperation Course"
M5-42, "Multinational Forces Orientation Course"
S5-43, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Security Cooperation Course"
P5-44, "NATO Force Protection Course"
M5-46, "NATO Public Information Course"
M9-56, "NATO Civil Emergency Planning and Civil Military Cooperation (CEP/CIMIC) Course"
M9-57, "NATO Strategic / Operational Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Course"
M9-59, "NATO Operational Liaison Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Course"
M5-61, "Arms Control Counter-Proliferation Course" (pilot course)
M5-62, "Arms Control Implementation Orientation Course"
S5-63, "Arms Control Implementation Inspector/Escort Course"
S5-64, "Conventional Arms Control Information Exchange Course"
M5-65, "Arms Control - Vienna Document Compliance and Verification Course"
M5-66, "NATO Counter Terrorism Course"
M5-67, "NATO Operational Military Police Course"
M5-98, "NATO Academic Instructor Course"

For further information, please see www.natoschool.nato.int.