

NATO

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POLARIS

Quarterly

Jean-Yves Poncelet

**NATO and the EU: the muscles of
Brussels need greater coordination**

MAJ Imre Porkolab

**Intelligence analysis in asymmetric
warfare**

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Afghanistan after 9/11

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Polaris Quarterly

The NATO School has the honour to present to you its third Quarterly issue of Polaris.

The Polaris Quarterly journal provides analytical, operational-level articles, in order to connect NATO's strategic documents with experience at the operational level.

The articles in the Polaris Quarterly journal are acquired from staff members of the NATO School, and from military and academic institutions from NATO and PfP members states.

This magazine contains analytical articles and provides a forum for discussion and an overview of current developments in international security. The authors assume responsibility for the coverage and reality of their articles, but the editors do urge reaction from the readers. Furthermore, readers are invited to contribute to Polaris Quarterly by submitting articles or comments on articles published in this journal

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Editor's foreword

Frequently, the relationship between NATO and the European Union regarding European defense and security is discussed. Does the "new" security concept of the European Union complement or challenge the defense and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region? Furthermore, how will new challenges shape new roles and new responsibilities for common security actors? The article written by Jean-Yves Poncelet, following the events of the EU Summits, gives a great summary of both the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and decisions aimed at creating new and effective structures and capabilities. It gives the readers correct and concrete information about the most important issues of the last twelve years and the security elements of the future EU Constitution. The author is a research fellow in the NATO School Research and Publication Department.

The war in Iraq and the present Stability and Support Operations (SASO) has brought to light a wide spectrum of problems regarding intelligence on both the strategic and operational levels. The author, Major Imre Porkoláb (HU-A), served eleven months in Iraq as an analysis chief in the southern sector of Iraq at the HQ of the Multinational Division. His goal in publishing this paper is to share his personal experiences in this asymmetric conflict, specifically regarding intelligence analysis. He investigates the practical problems of collection, analysis, and the sharing of intelligence data so that a more effective and successful counterinsurgency can be mounted.

He also highlights the importance and difficulties of human intelligence in this region, affected by historical and religious heritages and different tribal traditions.

Lieutenant Colonel Yevgueni Aliyev is a well known expert of arms control and arms reduction issues. The Quarterly Polaris has already published his studies on the implementation of the CFE Treaty on former Southern Caucasian Soviet states and its effect on the security climate in the region. In his last paper he discussed the problem of unaccounted for and uncontrolled armaments, and disclosed data regarding illegal deliveries of armaments and military equipment to the South-Caucasian region. The study gives a particular view in respect to the Armenian/Azeri conflict through Azeri lenses. This article is the last and most sensitive piece of a three part series; therefore, the Editorial Board intends to provide the possibility for readers to make comments.

The next article tackles a traditionally difficult question. How should militaries cooperate with civilians during and after a military operation? Of course, the nature of this problem has changed throughout the centuries, but it does not mean that the Commanders and troops of our time would have a simpler task regarding this issue. Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Jacques Pelletier (FR-A), Deputy Director of the NATO School Policy Department, discusses the role and importance of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) within NATO Operations based on the latest peace enforcing and

peacekeeping operations. He gives a correct definition of CIMIC and he also familiarises the reader with the purpose, functions, fields, and principles of effective activities.

Afghanistan was the theatre of the first campaign against international terrorism, where Coalition Forces crushed the Taliban regime after September 11, 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom and the following stabilization program has given the maligned country a great opportunity to build a new democratic and equitable state and society. Chiara Fortuna, a young research fellow at the NATO School authored this article, which is a condensed version of a larger study. This synopsis illustrates, in detail, recent events in Afghanistan.

Specifically, she highlights interesting details regarding different phases of the security sector reform led and coordinated by ISAF.

She also provides information about specialities of CIMIC operations and the results stemming from the activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The Editorial Board hopes that the autumn issue of the Quarterly Polaris provides useful and interesting information for its readers. In the spirit of academic freedom we encourage you to send us your comments or critiques so that they can be published in the Forum section of the next issue.

Colonel Andras Ujj Ph.D. (HU-AF)
Executive Editor

NATO and the EU: the muscles of Brussels need greater coordination

Jean-Yves Poncelet
Research Fellow at the NATO School

Brussels is an international capital that hosts two of the most prominent organizations dealing with security: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Although both have been in existence for more than 50 years and are located just a few kilometers away from each other, they have only begun to talk to each other within the past few years.

This article will first underline the recent developments in the EU's Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the changes the EU Constitution might bring within this rubric.

In a second part, the history of NATO-EU cooperation will be considered.

Finally, the author will try to define the way ahead for such a relationship.

1. Overview of the Common Foreign and Security Policy now, and the changes brought by the Constitutional Treaty

A. Maastricht

The European Union's decision to become serious about European Security was made during its Maastricht Treaty summit in 1992. Indeed, the end of the Cold War changed the nature of the threats faced by the European Union. The reunification of Germany and the collapse of Yugoslavia have led Member Nations to adopt CFSP. Five principles are set out in Article 11 of Title V of the Treaty of the European Union:

- A. to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union;
- B. to strengthen the security of the Union;

- C. to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- D. to promote international cooperation;
- E. To develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.

This policy is intergovernmental in nature and requires consensus (where in other areas, majority would suffice). Common positions and joint actions are the instruments used to make this policy effective. Those tools are to be used as a new way to take action, accompanying the more traditional methods such as trade policy and development cooperation. CFSP is also characterized by the less important role played by the

Commission, whose role is to propose legislation and execute the budget; the European Parliament, whose role is to pose questions and propose recommendations to the Council, and annually debate the state of affairs of CFSP; and the Court of Justice. This contrasts with their powerful roles in other areas concerning common policies of the EU.

Common positions are decided by the Council of the EU and are used as a general framework for the policy undertaken by the Member States and helps to coordinate their actions (Art 15). Joint actions address specific situations where operational action by the EU is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and condition for their implementation (Art.14).

B. Amsterdam

In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty implemented the reinforcement of the EU's capacity for action by adopting a new instrument: the common strategy. It is decided by consensus by the European Council of Head of States and Governments, which sets out their objectives, durations and means to be made available (Art 13). It gives the general framework for actions under the Union's three pillars in order to ensure consistency in its external relations.

The treaty also brought some changes into the decision-making procedures. As for CFSP, the general rules remain unanimity but this is now accompanied by a constructive abstention. This mechanism allows a state to abstain

from voting without blocking the adoption of the decision. The number of abstainers should not account for more than one third of the weighted Council vote. If a letter of intention formalizes the abstention, the decision is not legally binding to those abstaining, but they should accept that the decision commits the Union and that state must refrain from any action that might conflict with the EU's action.

In two cases a decision can be adopted by qualified majority voting: (1) if the decision applies a common strategy defined by the EU Council; (2) if the decision implements a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council. However, this mechanism is tempered by a clause that allows states to block the decision because their vital interests are at stake. The Council decides with a qualified majority vote to pass the issue to the European Council for a unanimous decision by the Head of States and Governments.

It is worth noting that the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of reinforced cooperation, but that mechanism could not be used in matters related to ESDP. Amsterdam also created new institutions such as the Secretariat General of the EU council and its High Representative (HR) for CFSP, and a Policy Planning and Rapid Alert Unit.

The treaty incorporated the objective of a common and foreign security policy: "*The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.*"¹

¹ Amsterdam Treaty, Article J.4.1

C. The European Security and Defense Policy

At a Franco-British bilateral meeting in Saint Malo in 1998, the British government decided to lift its objection to the EU acquiring an autonomous military capacity. This meeting can be considered as the real launch of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)². It represents the EU's capacity to gather military and civilian tools to acquire a global capacity for managing crises and preventing conflicts. It is under this policy that the EU led its operations in Bosnia, FYROM and Democratic Republic of Congo.

During the European Council of June 1999 in Köln, the EU placed crisis management tasks at the core of the EU Security and Defense Policy.

Incorporated into CFSP, ESDP has three components: military crisis management, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. The first two components are understood as Petersberg Tasks, introduced into the Title V of the Treaty on the European Union. The tasks defined at the Petersberg summit specifically refer to operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. During following summits, the EU developed its military and civilian components in order to fulfill these missions³.

The third component of ESDP, conflict prevention, aims at avoiding violent conflicts and ensuring long-term stability by attaining four

objectives: using the EU's instruments in a more systematic and coordinated manner; identifying and combating the causes of conflict; improving the EU's capacity to respond to emerging conflicts; and promoting international cooperation, including with other international organizations.

D. Helsinki

In 1999, the EU set up a new program called the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. This program aimed to have Member Nations "... *deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year...*"⁴

In 2003, this ambitious capability program was evaluated by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC): "...*the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls. These limitations and/or constraints are on deployment time and high risk may*

² Lord Robertson, then future Secretary-General of NATO, was one of the initiator of this declaration.

³ See below points D and E.

⁴ European Union, Helsinki Headline Goal available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>

arise at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when conducting concurrent operations...”⁵ That is why the European Union set up a new program called “the 2010 Headline Goal”, which is built on the genuine Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 and is designed to meet the existing shortfalls. However, it does not only tend to fulfill the shortcomings identified by GAERC but also implements new objectives such as:

- The ability to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of Crisis Response Operations;
- The ability to retain the capability to conduct concurrent operations, thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement;
- Increasing interoperability, sustainability, and deployability.

The two most noticeable objectives are:

- The establishment of a European Defense Agency;
- The creation of Battlegroups by 2007.

The European Defense Agency will coordinate hardware purchases, promote European defense research and end Europe's long tradition of duplication in armaments research, development, and procurement. On June 14, 2004 the Council reached political agreement on a Joint Action establishing the European Defense Agency. It should enable the Agency

⁵ GAERC, Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, 19 May 2003 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/gac.htm#sd190503f

to begin functioning by the end of the year. “The Agency is ascribed four functions, relating to: defense capabilities development; armaments co-operation; the European defense technological and industrial base and defense equipment market; research and technology”⁶.

The Battlegroups concept has been elaborated in order to boost the EU's capability to quickly deal with crises anywhere in the world. It is based on an initiative from France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to create rapidly deployable multinational units of about 1500 soldiers. This concept specifically encourages structured cooperation⁷.

E. 2001: Nice, Goteborg and beyond

Since Nice in 2001, three permanent structures (first proposed at the Köln Summit) were created. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) has the right to take appropriate decisions to ensure the political control and the strategic conduct of any operation (Art. 25); The EU Military Committee (EUMC); and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) located at the Kortenberg building. The Nice treaty also incorporated in the European Union the operational functions of the Western European Union.

Introduced at Nice, enhanced cooperation (Art 271) for the implementation of a common action or a common position in CFSP implies that “*Member States which intend to deepen integration*

⁶ EU Council Statement quoted in *Green light for European Defence Agency* available at http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/European_Council/EUNews.2004-06-16.5933

⁷ As stated in the draft EU constitution. See below for details.

*between themselves regarding a subject matter which is of particular interest to them, or where they may be ready to take the next step in integration while some of their European partners are not yet, may make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Union*⁸. Enhanced cooperation does not concern issues having military implications or consequences in the defense and security realm. The High Representative informs the Commission, the European Parliament and all Members of the Council of the decision of some states to deepen cooperation.

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was formally incorporated in the CFSP at Nice.

Furthermore in 2001 the Goteborg summit developed the civilian component of ESDP by establishing 4 primary instruments:

- A. Police cooperation. This means that the EU should be able to send, on short notice, 5000 policemen to accomplish various tasks ranging from restoring order to the training of local police.
- B. Strengthening the rule of law by sending judges, prosecutors, etc.
- C. Reconstruction of the civilian administration by sending a team of experts to ensure the tenure of elections or basic state duties such as electricity or water provisions, education, taxation.

⁸ JAEGER, Thomas, *Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice and Flexibility in the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, European Foreign Affairs Review No 7, 2002, p 298.

- D. Ensuring civil protection to assist humanitarian actors in an emergency situation.

At the Laeken Summit in 2001 the EU declared its ESDP component as operational.

In 2003, an important document was approved at the Brussels Summit: the EU strategy paper drafted by Javier Solana "A secure Europe in a better world". The main features of this paper include the necessity for the EU to be ready to share the responsibility with the US for global security. Three key threats to Europe are identified as being international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and failed states and organized crime. It also sets up three strategic objectives: (1) to contribute to stability and good governance in the immediate neighborhood (Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Southern Caucasus, the Mediterranean); (2) to strengthen an international order based on effective multilateralism; and (3) to counter threats, old and new. The paper underlines the necessity for international cooperation and the importance of the transatlantic link, NATO being an important expression of this relationship. Finally, the paper assesses that to enhance security, the EU should be more active, more coherent and more capable.

F. The Future Constitution

The future EU Constitutional Treaty will better define the CFSP missions so that the EU citizens' opinions are better reflected. Its missions will be to maintain the Petersberg tasks as its core but it also underlines the role that the EU could play in areas such as conflict prevention, joint disarmaments operations, military advice and assistance tasks, as well

as post conflict stabilization tasks. Besides these tasks, the fight against terrorism (*inter alia* by supporting third countries) occupies an important place. Article III-210 is worth noting for its mutual solidarity clause that aims at ensuring the convergence of Member States' actions in security affairs. New instruments are to be created as well: A Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs⁹ (meaning that the post of High Representative for CFSP will be deleted) while the European Parliament functions will be strengthened.

On the mechanisms side: QMV will be extended to matters on which the European Council has laid down strategic guidelines.

In the draft Treaty defense is mentioned as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in Article 40. It allows the deployment of an operational capacity (military and/or civilian) which can be used outside the European Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. In this field, decisions regarding positions and actions are made unanimously, such as decisions on implementation of these actions.

Nevertheless, the Treaty opens a possibility for a structural cooperation¹⁰. CSDP also creates a mutual defense clause that can be established as a closer cooperation until a true Common Defense Policy is set up by the Council. This explicitly refers to the case of any Member State being the victim of an aggression on its

territory and is very similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. CSDP also imagines a solidarity clause, meaning that if a state is victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, other Member Nations have the obligation¹¹ to support this state. Furthermore, the Constitution also allows the use of enhanced cooperation in matters involving military and defense issues. It requires the involvement of at least one third of all Member States. It is proposed by the Commission, consented by the European Parliament, and granted by the Council after a Qualified Majority Voting. For issues relating to CFSP, the request comes from the Member States, is addressed to the Council of Ministers, forwarded to the UMFA and the rest of the Commission (which gives an opinion), and finally to the European Parliament for information.

On the defense side, the EU constitutional Treaty allows the use of enhanced cooperation and structured cooperation for more demanding missions and closer cooperation for mutual defense obligations. A constructive abstention has been created in order to allow those not willing to take part in common military activities to permit the rest to do so¹². Finally, the constitution also includes a mutual defense obligation (sometimes referred as the assistance clause) somewhat similar to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

In total, it should be understood that ESDP is only an instrument among others to exert the EU's influence to

⁹ In fact, this function is double hatted as the EU Foreign Affairs Minister will also act as the Commission's Vice President.

¹⁰ That is if states decide to execute a task together because they have higher criteria of military capabilities.

¹¹ It is not a legally binding clause

¹² If any member state feels its vital interests are at stake through a common military operation, then it can block the decision to undertake such an action.

prevent instability and to make the EU look more credible.

2. NATO-EU Relations: a historical perspective

Formal relations between the two institutions are a relatively new phenomenon. The first formal mention of NATO-EU relations was made during the NATO foreign Ministers Meeting in December 2000. “*Consultations and co-operation will be developed between NATO and the EU on questions of common interests relating to security, defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is ensured*”¹³. This first step was rapidly followed by an exchange of letters by the then Secretary-General, Lord Robertson and the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (then ensuring the EU presidency), Anna Lindh. These defined “*the scope of cooperation and the modalities of consultation between the two institutions*”¹⁴. It also officially marked the start of official meetings at staff and senior levels.

Those meetings led to a first common document on ESDP¹⁵. It defines the principles for the NATO-EU relationship based on a partnership¹⁶. It ensures *consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency*. It respects equality and decision-making

autonomy as well as the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and ensures *coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations*.

March 2003 saw an acceleration of events: on March 14th NATO and EU signed an agreement on “Security of Information”.

On the 17th the so called Berlin-plus agreement was reached. This is probably, until now, the most important cooperation agreement between the two entities. In practical terms it means four things. First, that the EU has an assured access to NATO’s planning capacities. Second, in the case where the EU wants to conduct its own operation, there will be a presumption of availability that NATO’s assets¹⁷ could be available for use by the EU. Third, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe¹⁸ would be available to the EU to serve as the operational commander. Finally, NATO’s defense planning system will be made available to the EU in order to ensure that the EU’s military requirements are fed into that system. This means that the EU could either use NATO assets to conduct an operation (the Operation Commander being the DSACEUR and the Operation HQ being SHAPE) or can conduct the operation using its own assets (the Operation Commander will then be designated by the Military Staff and

¹³ NATO, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of NAC held on 14 and 15 December 2000* available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-124e.htm>

¹⁴ *NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership* available at <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html>

¹⁵ *EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>

¹⁶ That means that even if the two organisations are different in nature their actions in crisis management are mutually reinforcing.

¹⁷ i.e. AWACS, aircraft, HQs, NATO Response Force, etc.

¹⁸ He always is a European

the Operation HQ will be one out of the Helsinki Force Catalogue). The second option was used to conduct ARTEMIS, the EU operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Directly following this agreement, on March 31st, the NATO-led operation "Allied Harmony" was handed over to the EU-led Operation "Concordia" in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

May 2003 saw the creation of a NATO-EU Capability Group, demonstrating the willingness to increase interoperability between the two institutions.

Another step to increase interoperability and cooperation in theatre was the joint crisis management exercise (CME/CMX in November 2003).

From December 2003, NATO and the EU started discussions regarding a possible termination of the SFOR mission and a transition to an EU-led mission. This transition is, since the Istanbul Summit, much more than an option and will probably take place in December 2004.

The Istanbul Summit in June 2004 strongly reaffirmed the need for a NATO-EU cooperation: *"The recent enlargements of NATO and the EU are a major step towards a Europe whole and free, and a strong confirmation that our organizations share common values and strategic interests. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership on the basis of and since the conclusion of the Berlin+ arrangements. NATO and the EU continue to cooperate effectively in the Western Balkans, and are committed to assist the*

*countries of the region in their further integration into Euro-Atlantic structure. NATO-EU relations now cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. We are determined to work together to further develop the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organizations, in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of our two organizations"*¹⁹

In total, NATO and the EU have reached a certain level of cooperation, the most visible one being the Berlin+ Agreement. However, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political Security Committee do meet on a regular basis. Other meetings also take place at the military committee level as well as staff to staff level. The first military cooperation in theatre happened in FYROM (operation Concordia) and will be followed in December 2004 by operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO and the EU have also established a capabilities group (PCC-ECAP) to improve coordination, cohesion, and interoperability. Finally, in order to test the command structures, the two organizations held a common exercise in 2003.

¹⁹ NATO, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, paragraph 26, 2004, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

Conclusion: the way to further cooperation

Cooperation between NATO and the EU has long been more efficient in theater than in the political arena. As mentioned above, this is now evolving. Even if progress has been made in the last few years, there is still a lot to be done. The following describes a series of areas or issues where the EU and NATO are involved, or might be involved, in the near future. Quite often policies from each institution are overlapping and the objectives are usually the same. The danger lies in that both organizations might compete against one another. A fact is that each one has a comparative advantage: NATO's experience in defense reform is very valuable and well recognized, while the EU has at its disposal a all range of instruments (diplomacy, trade and development aid) that could be used as "a carrot or a stick" in order to promote democratic changes and stability.

There are two ways to look at the issues that might need deeper cooperation: a functional approach and a geographical approach.

Let us start with the geographical approach.

In the **Balkans**, much work has been done and is still ongoing. Even if at some point cooperation was difficult at the political level, it was proven successful in theater. The Balkans have been very useful in terms of testing the main agreements between the two institutions. Besides stabilization and reconstruction efforts, NATO and the EU should continue to deepen their relationship, particularly through a continuous "lessons learned process". Very often, the greatest steps in

cooperation are first achieved during operations, and then translated into political agreements. The concerted approach defined to manage the stabilization of the area is an idea that could easily be exported to other areas where both organizations are engaged.

The **Caucasus and the Black Sea region** are areas where the EU and NATO should coordinate their actions. This very strategic region is now located at the borders of the two organizations. The security vacuum has to be addressed. The EU is already present in Georgia with its EUJUST operation and NATO is trying to address this issue via the Partnership for Peace mechanisms. Even though the situation is not as tense as it was some years ago, there are still latent conflicts that are frozen for the moment, but which could be reactivated very easily. For example, the tragedy of Beslan in September 2004 can be analyzed as an attempt to destabilize the region.

The **Mediterranean area and the Middle East** is probably a more difficult issue as both organizations obviously have developed a strong interest in the area. The EU has indeed involved itself through the Barcelona Process while NATO is developing its Mediterranean Dialogue and is launching its newly created Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. It is fair to say that NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has not reach the same level of achievement as for the Partnership for Peace Program. Christopher Donnelly enumerates several reasons for this: *"They include a lack of investment of time, people and money; a profound suspicion and ignorance of NATO on*

*the part of many countries in the region; the lack of those mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on which the success of NATO and the Partnership for Peace is based, and, the inability to decouple wider regional security issues from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*²⁰. However, at the Istanbul Summit NATO “*decided to enhance [its] Mediterranean Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East Region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*”²¹. This new initiative is mainly designed to offer advice on a whole range of issues (defense reform, defense budgeting, defense planning and civil-military relations), aiming to improving interoperability, enhancing the fight against terrorism “*through information sharing and maritime cooperation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and fighting illegal trafficking*”²².

The EU, through its Barcelona Process, has for objective “*to establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial partnership and a social, cultural and human partnership*”²³. It now focuses on

²⁰ Donnelly, Christopher, *Building a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East*, NATO Review, Spring 2004, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html>

²¹ NATO, *Istanbul Summit Communique*, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

²² NATO, *NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm>

²³ European Union, *Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15001.htm>

three key aspects: “*the political and security aspect aims to establish a common area of peace and stability; the economic and financial aspect hopes to allow the creation of an area of shared prosperity; the social, cultural and human aspect aims to develop human resources and promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies*”²⁴.

In the security arena, the agreement aims at combating terrorism and organized crime. It also tackles the issue of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as arms control. They agreed on the objective of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

The need for coordination between NATO and the EU is thus very clear in the Mediterranean Basin.

Central Asia still represents a challenge for NATO and the EU. NATO recently appointed a special representative for this region to reinforce its PfP activities with Central Asia Partners. The EU, through its TACIS program, promotes democracy, market economy, and the rule of law.

Finally, **Africa** might become the next area of interest for NATO, as publicly mentioned on several occasions by General James Jones, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The EU is already present in the area and has already carried out a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, operation ARTEMIS. Most of the EU nations already have strong ties and deep cooperation with most sub-Saharan countries, for obvious historical reasons. If the predictions

²⁴ Ibidem

of General Jones come true, NATO should make the best possible use of the EU experience in the African continent.

On the functional side there are various areas in which NATO and the EU should enhance their cooperation.

One such area is **the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**. NATO and the EU underlined in June 2003 their willingness to develop closer cooperation on these issues. Both organizations exchanged information on their activities in these areas.

Closely related is the issue of **intelligence sharing**. Nations usually do exchange intelligence but on an ad hoc basis (i.e. mainly bilaterally). Trust and confidence are the basis of these two organizations. It could be useful to create an integrated intelligence collection agency. Another aspect of the war on terrorism is **the fight against organized crime** in particular illegal trafficking of drugs or human beings. The EU already considers this issue as very important and NATO is developing a program on the trafficking of women in South Eastern Europe.

Moreover, both organizations do underline the need for **reform in the defense sector** of emergent democracies. Joint efforts and coordination are needed in order to avoid duplication, waste of resources, and competition. For example, institution building, reforming of the Armed Forces, improving the democratic control of the armed forces, and reforming the defense industry sector are areas in

which both organizations have a great role to play.

Finally, **border security and border management** are issues of growing importance for both organizations.

This article has shown how the EU is adapting to new challenges in the post 9-11 era. The Union has been through the difficult and time-consuming process of reforming its institutions in order to acquire credibility regarding its security policy. Currently, the EU has the comparative advantage of using various means, not only diplomatic, but also instruments dealing with development aid, trade relations...that are backed by a more and more credible military arm.


At this time, NATO can be considered as the only multinational institution that is able to deal effectively with peace support operations.

After the last enlargements, nineteen countries have membership in both organizations. This should help to build cooperation and avoid duplication and competition between the EU and NATO.

It is about time to address the difficult issues and to make a clear, well-defined choice about the future trends in cooperation between the two institutions. The concerted approach of NATO and the EU for the Western Balkans is a great initiative. This framework should be used to meet challenges in other areas of the world to face global issues like the fight against terrorism. A possible way for further and deeper cooperation could involve, as a first step, the creation of common task force groups that

would discuss the best way to deal with a particular issue, making the best possible use out of NATO and EU assets.

Of course, the cooperation between NATO and the EU should also take into account actions of the OSCE. One should not forget that as demonstrated in the Balkans, to deal effectively with new threats a closer international cooperation is needed.



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Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

MAJ Imre Porkolab

Coalition Forces are currently engaging a counterinsurgency in Iraq. Former Regime elements (FREs), terrorist organisations, foreign fighters, religious fanatics, organised crime syndicates, and rouge religious leaders present the greatest danger to peace and order. These organisations and groups are using a combination of terrorist and guerrilla tactics against the Coalition, with the aim of driving them out of Iraq and to counter the present Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and nation building efforts. Their ultimate goal is to expand their own influence within the region. From the analyses of various attacks, it becomes evident that they are more and more sophisticated, while the targeting has concurrently shifted toward “soft-targets” (NGOs, IOs, and non-military targets). The aim of this article is to help operational planners, security analysts, and military personnel understand some lessons learned from this asymmetric conflict, specifically regarding intelligence analysis, and drawing on my experience as an analysis chief in the southern sector of Iraq.

The threat

Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, intelligence estimates had reported hundreds of thousands of regular Iraqi troops, most of them elite Republican Guard soldiers. According to American estimates, approximately 375,000 regular soldiers and an additional 80,000 to 100,000 Republican Guard soldiers were expected to fight against the Coalition. The same source estimated 2,600 tanks and 6,000 other fighting vehicles were to be used. Fierce fight was expected in and around the large cities, especially Baghdad. On the other hand, the Iraqi population was expected to welcome the liberators, especially the Shiite population in the south. As we all now know these estimates were false; the well organised Iraqi army simply “disappeared.” Tanks were only sporadically spotted and the

Coalition Forces were quickly envisioned as an occupying force. The Coalition Forces (trained and prepared for a third generation war¹) found themselves in an asymmetric war, where intelligence collection and analysis methods had to be tailored to the situation. Both the Iraq and Afghan conflicts have exposed the fact that there is a serious danger regarding “post conflict” challenges.

Mass armies have been trained and equipped to counter similar forces. These current conflicts have exposed critical failures in our understanding of challenges faced in the 21st Century, particularly regarding asymmetric warfare, and the strategic climate in which every

¹ William S. Lind: Understanding Fourth Generation War, Military Review 2004. September – October, p.13

element of a multinational contingent must function. The aftermath of a conventional conflict is most likely going to be low intensity leading into an armed nation building process that will last for months or years after a conventional struggle is over.

The current Iraqi guerrilla war grew out of a defeated hierarchical party-state structure. Much of the hierarchy and state structure remain intact within remnant guerrilla organizations. Furthermore, foreign combatants, including al-Qaeda (AQ) members have entered Iraq to fight the Coalition. Because some of them do not blend in well, many have since left or assumed specialized support roles such as bomb manufacturers, suicide bombers, or instructors. The Iraqi combatants have little experience in fighting as actual guerrillas, but some do have counterinsurgency experience against Kurds and Shiite Iraqis. The insurgency has a strong urban component; furthermore, religious sites in Shiite dominated areas are equally important.

Guerrillas and terrorists are hiding amongst the local population, and as a result it is very hard to identify and locate them. They enjoy the support of the locals and continuously recruit from them for the purposes of future operations. They rely on the young and poor, of which there are far too many. They utilise their surroundings and terrain better than the Coalition soldiers, and are aware of the cultural and moral deficiencies of the west, always ready to exploit these weaknesses. From experiences in Afghanistan, they know that urban areas are favourable for their operations, because they can easily blend into the crowd after conducting terrorist attacks. The soldiers in most

cases are unable to strike back or follow the perpetrators, due to the possibility of collateral damage.

The insurgents are also aware of their technological disadvantage, but at the same time know that the western advantage of using sophisticated equipment cannot be fully exploited in this type of environment. They are not as well equipped as the Coalition Forces, mainly equipped with small arms; therefore, they are forced to be inventive in the use of these weapons. They mainly operate in small groups, but at the same time some influential religious leaders have the capability to form and maintain a considerable militia in a relatively short time. Their actions sometimes seem to be brutal and irrational, but the cultural and religious differences have to be taken into consideration when one tries to understand their actions. They know that the Coalition does not need to be defeated; rather the constant actions will create the desired effect, especially when portrayed in the worldwide media.

In sum, the well equipped and trained Coalition is forced day by day to battle a group of armed and organised fanatics in Iraq, who are financially supported and exploit western moral weaknesses quite well.

Collection of intelligence data

The military intelligence effort devoted to combating threats in an asymmetric environment has little in common with conventional intelligence operations in support of conventional manoeuvre warfare. Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlefield (IPB), signals intelligence, and electronic intelligence take different forms or are not applicable. The Intel Officer (S2) or Intelligence Staff at Corps & Division levels (G2) deal with a different type of war and need to take a unique approach. Within the Multi-National Division Central South (MND CS) the units represented on the picture below are used as the primary means of military intelligence gathering.

See Table 1, page 29.

The S2 and G2 in this type of environment are involved in a mixture of police investigative work and military procedures normally used in SASO. Association matrixes, network analysis, cultural analysis, traffic-flow analysis, and financial-transaction analysis are normally police tools that should be staples of the intelligence effort in a counterinsurgency.² Adopting these tools does not imply adopting accompanying restrictions on combat lethality or local rules of engagement that apply to police forces.

Iraq soon will establish an elected civilian government. Converting former police states into those governed by rule of law will cause many problems, but new Iraqi police and military forces are being trained and equipped to deal with local problems. Frankly, a close co-operation with the present governing council is needed to focus the intelligence gathering efforts. The collection efforts of local police forces must also be integrated into the intelligence process. The MPs are also a prime source of

intelligence in many cases. The military and police conduct covert and overt collection operations for different functions and under different rules. Nevertheless, the raw data and intelligence produced might be mutually supportive.

Intelligence analysis

The flow of incoming data within the MND CS is represented on the following chart. As demonstrated in the chart, many intelligence sources have provided data. Above all this a myriad of other possible intelligence data sources exist. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Military Police (MP), Civil(ian) Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been a constant partner in the information sharing process.

National Intelligence Cells (NIC) were also readily available to help with strategic level assessments. In this type of environment “strategic corporals” (soldiers at Command Posts, returning from convoys, or patrols) also provided valuable information.³

See Table 2, page 29.

Trying to chart the guerrillas’ and terrorists’ battle orders is a flight of fantasy in Iraq. Throughout an insurgency intelligence personnel are tracking many organisations and individuals, not constituted forces. It is like completing a huge puzzle without having the original picture available. To be a good analyst, intelligence personnel first need to understand the language, history,

² Colleen McCue, Emily S. Stone and Teresa P. Gooch: Data mining and value added analysis. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin November, 2003. p. 3.

³ Originally defined by Gen. Charles Krulak, US Marine Corps Commandant between 1995-1999. Mark Burgess: Navigating the Three-Block War and the Urban Triad, 4. April 2003., p. 2. www.cdi.org

and culture of the area in which they must work. Army foreign area officers (FAOs) are trained in these areas and need to be assigned to brigades, not held at senior headquarters. FAOs are essential to understanding the culture, but problems remain even when FAOs are present.

The nature of Iraqi society makes the populace experts at hiding, dissimulating, and deceiving. Loyalties are to family, close associates, fellow villagers, and clan or tribal members. Census data is so dated as to be almost useless. In the case of Iraq, Baathist party membership rosters, military manning charts, police records, and Fedayeen registration books are useful. Another brilliant idea was the reinstatement of monthly payments to ex-Iraqi soldiers by the Coalitions Forces, who have turned up in large numbers to get paid.

Much intelligence data is derived from analysis of family relations, development of association matrixes, and contact network charts. Close liaisons with the local police departments, development of agent networks, and detailed data files on known guerrillas help the intelligence section gain local insight. Information technology can also help. Specialists can intercept, track, and triangulate cell phone calls. Geographic Information Systems software can use GPS to locate sites of past ambushes and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks and calculate possible future attack sites, assembly areas, safe houses, and residences. Financial transactions, cell phone transmissions, and travel patterns can also provide valuable data to intelligence analysts on most wanted individuals. Finding a

particular guerrilla is tiring and exhaustive work. Many questions have to be answered before a target folder is ready to be passed over to the operations guys who can plan and order the apprehension of these personnel.

Extensive data files are a boring but necessary part of finding guerrillas. However, computer data-mining⁴ can ease the job considerably by providing assistance regarding optimum force deployments, risk assessments, behavioural analyses, and force protection. Of course using pads of butcher-board paper, yellow stickies, and a large wall chart is a good substitute in most cases. Dedicated intelligence personnel perform brilliantly, but time and energy could have been greatly reduced with current software applications and computerized databases. Intelligence against a counterinsurgency needs a computerized database that can be readily shared by different organisations. This requires uniformity in software and procedures. A database is only as good as its data, so standard forms are essential.

Technology makes life easier, but a lot of old-fashioned intelligence gathering methods and analysis is still required to achieve the desired effect. Special Operations Forces, supporting psychological operations (PSYOP), and CIMIC units should be briefed regularly and visited so that information is exchanged regularly.

⁴ Colleen McCue, Emily S. Stone and Teresa P. Gooch: Data mining and value added analysis. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin November 2003. p.5.

Religious issues

Religious extremism has always been related to religious places. In the central south sector two places, Najaf and Karbala, Islamic holy cities, should be considered as vitally important. Based upon an agreement, Coalition soldiers are not allowed to enter the Mosques; moreover, they are not allowed to come within 200 meters of either perimeter. It is well known that radical Islamic terror organizations have no compunction against using mosques as platforms for their infrastructure and operational activities. In Iraq mosques have been frequently abused as a platform for radicals. Sermons serve to mobilize sympathizers and recruit new militants for planned terror attacks, while arms and explosives are hidden in mosques; furthermore, the Imam's loud speakers are used to call the community to arms, as it has occurred before in Iraq. These mosques are also safe havens for meetings.

This asymmetric situation lends an advantage to which ever side is perceived as the weaker party in the confrontation - a fact that is exploited to undermine the legitimacy of the "aggressor" in local and international public opinion. This asymmetry must be taken into consideration when collecting intelligence data in religious places. Troops must to be well-briefed as to the sensitive and highly explosive nature of their mission and in its potential side effects.

In the southern sector the security situation was driven by the fact that the Badr Organisation was the most influential paramilitary organisation, but in order to gain political influence

in the future it was interested in co-operating with Coalition Forces. It was a significant force that could not be neglected or overlooked; nevertheless, it cannot be treated as a source of information. Radical Islamic organisations pose a far greater threat than any other organisation in the long term. If it is in their interest to promote peace and nation building efforts and to co-operate with Coalition Forces they can contribute to the overall goal, but if they choose otherwise, a large militia can be established in no time. It would be backed by many thousands of protesters comprised of the local population, hindering mission accomplishment and intelligence work.

HUMINT

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the driving force of intelligence production and analysis in a counterinsurgency. The military does not have nearly enough translators and interrogators who can speak the primary languages. Mastery of primary forms of languages is not always enough, because local dialects frustrate effective communication. Furthermore, soldiers/linguists often have little training regarding the culture, history, and customs of the regions. If the translator is an outsider, he is less of a target for threats and blackmail, but also less trusted and accepted by the locals. Often people will not want to speak through a local translator because they are providing information they might not want others to know. They prefer to talk to uniformed personnel. Interviews should be rehearsed to ensure the translator understands the topic of conversation and has time to master unfamiliar vocabulary.

HUMINT teams usually produce a lot of data that has to be analysed in detail as soon as possible. For this reason different HUMINT teams should have a common reporting system and forms, and then try to pass the information as soon as possible to the proper data repositories. If this does not happen, the analyst will have no time and chance to prepare an in-depth analysis of the situation and expected upcoming events.

The mobile interrogation team is another useful tool. As in many cases the real perpetrators should not be moved frequently while their intelligence value is determined; a mobile interrogation team is the best solution. The interrogator should schedule more time for conversations because translated conversations normally take three times as long as the same conversation would between native speakers. The translator in this case also needs frequent breaks. Non-stop translation work is tiring, and tired translators make mistakes. Correct translations are critical. Time is also a critical factor. Imagine an accident with many captured people around the scene, and the interrogator has to determine in a relatively short time which of the captured personnel have intelligence value. If someone seems to be valuable, he can then be transported for a more detailed interrogation.

Patrols can generate excellent HUMINT as well. However, getting the data is not an automatic process. All participants have to be regularly briefed as to what they are looking for. Debriefings are crucial and easily neglected. Soldiers want to maintain their equipment and get some rest after a mission, but the

mission is not over until participants are debriefed. Timely and professional debriefings are essential because it provides information, keeps observers focused, and keeps the intelligence effort tuned to the tactical arena where the counterinsurgency is fought.

Checkpoints can also be a good source of information. Permanent vehicle checkpoints are not as effective as mobile vehicle checkpoints because people who cannot pass a checkpoint will normally avoid it. People are more accepting of a vehicle checkpoint than a pedestrian one. While the primary objective of the vehicle checkpoint is to interdict supplies, weapons, and likely enemies, the primary objective of the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information.

One of the most striking aspects of the Iraq War is not the heavy reliance on technology; rather it is how rarely technical data is supplemented with HUMINT. During most of the Counter Insurgency (COIN) phase, Coalition Forces tried to support the mission by building effective HUMINT, but a full partnership with the local Iraqis was neglected. Rather than rely on Iraqis for language skills and an understanding of the local situation and conditions, a network of local informers was established and analysis was carried out independently by the Coalition. Experience demonstrates that in the intelligence gathering process, national technical means and open-source intelligence cannot substitute HUMINT. "Soft" intelligence has become far more important, due to the fact that technology-based tools have severe limits in a COIN

environment. The ability to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (IS&R) coverage is of immense value for a commander trying to establish a Common Operating Picture (COP). Technology based intelligence does not provide the end user an ability to understand the world, deal with complex political issues, and fight effectively in the face of terrorism.

Information Sharing

The intelligence community is large and pervasive. Unfortunately, various agencies conduct their intelligence data analysis in bureaucratic stovepipes, which run straight from the tactical level to the highest strategic levels with little sharing along the way. In theory, the community is supposed to share intelligence at the highest strategic level and then pass that information back down to the people who need it. In practice, this seldom happens as different NICs are working together only on a “need to know” basis. This means that raw data is seldom passed back — just agreed-on intelligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenized product from which dissenting views and contradicting evidence has been removed or discounted, so the community can have a common vantage. This practice might serve policy-level intelligence customers, but it does not provide timely or relevant intelligence to the tactical user.

If intelligence does come back down the stovepipe, it often arrives too late. To solve this problem the tactical intelligence officer needs to meet, visit, and cultivate connections with counterparts in other agencies to access raw data and preliminary

analyses as they go up the various stovepipes. Conversely, the tactical intelligence officer needs to reciprocate so that the relationship is mutually supportive. This also applies to the various NICs within organisations. Intelligence sharing should extend to neighbouring units, coalition partners, and combat service and combat service support units. Military police and truck drivers see more of the countryside than anyone and should be a prime source of information.

Summary

Intelligence in an asymmetric environment has always been a tough job, which differs from intelligence in manoeuvre warfare, due to its more protracted nature and requirement to function in a cultural context. Technology can help, but in most cases intelligence data has to be generated by traditional means (such as patrols and agents), gathered as events occur. The aim of analysis is to predict the future, based on facts. For this purpose lots of data is necessary. Ground and air sensors have improved markedly over the past decade and should be used and maintained; cellular telephones and computer communications are also an exploitable technology. However, experience shows that despite all these technological advantages, they cannot be fully exploited in this type of environment.

Emphasis has to be placed on the HUMINT collection sources and methods. The problem with HUMINT is that it generates a lot of data, which has to be thoroughly cross-checked and analysed. Most of this data can be neglected, but the puzzle can only be put together with

thorough and detailed hard work. SIGINT is more reliable, as people seldom think that they can be intercepted and usually tell the truth, but this type of collection is occasional and in most cases not proactive. Bribes and rewards often produce results if the information is reliable; furthermore, they do not typically lead to the informer being killed.

Regarding voluntary sources of information, it has to be emphasized that money is scarce; therefore, it seems to be a good incentive, but it works both ways. In most cases it produces false information, as people would do anything just to get paid. From all the aforementioned information it should be evident that there are many tools available to those tracking guerrillas. A comprehensive and co-ordinated approach using a mixture of the latest science and proven old fashioned techniques can most effectively accomplish this mission.

Table 1.





Table 2.



ARMS CONTROL AND UNCONTROLLED ARMS

Lieutenant Colonel, Ph.D. Aliyev Yevgueniy,
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Within the framework of implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the problem of unaccounted for and uncontrolled armaments, and facts of illegal deliveries of armaments and military equipment to the South-Caucasian region are considered and analyzed.

We are witnesses of the complex geopolitical processes occurring all over the world, which frequently have a global and universal character. The events that developed around Iraq are a bright example of that. One of the original causes underlying that crisis is the desire of superpower states to provide a control over weapons of mass destruction. This is intended to prevent the possession of these weapons by "derelict" states, states belonging to the so-called "axes of evil." An important factor in the formation of safety and stability all over the world, in particular within Europe, is a necessity to provide a control not only over the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, but also on quantities and the transference of conventional arms. The solution to this difficult and important task is explained in a number of international arms control agreements and documents.

Presently Europe is in a situation where if the new Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) implementation were delayed, it could lead to adverse consequences. Unfortunately, this document and the ensuing procedures of Treaty implementation in the zones of local conflict are not sufficiently developed. The problem is that so-called "grey zones," zones within which the application of the CFE Treaty is

difficult, as well as uncontrolled and unaccounted for arms are not considered. The presence of a significant number of uncontrolled and unaccounted for arms within the former USSR territories helps the development of separatism and terrorism.

There are some states in the area of the CFE Treaty application¹ that contain within their borders so-called "grey zones." The following are the zones of local conflict that fall into this category: territories occupied by the Armenian armed formations in Azerbaijan; Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia; the Trans-Dniestrian region in Moldova; and Chechnya is considered such an area for the Russian Federation. We shall not consider the nature of these conflicts, only concerning ourselves with the issues concerning the process of implementation of international arms control agreements in these zones.

What relates these regional conflicts from the perspective of arms control experts? The answer is obviously the presence of unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms; a significant amount of personnel in illegal armed formations; the existence of essential

¹ Aliyev, Yevgueniy. "International Arms Control: the Beginning of the Process." *Polaris Quarterly* 1.1 (2004): 3-12.

illegal deliveries of arms, military equipment, military properties, and ammunition in the regions; and the impossibility of carrying out international arms control inspections.

The first and largest-scale local conflict in the territory of the former Soviet area is the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict related to territorial claims of Armenia with Azerbaijan. The result of this conflict is that a significant amount of territory is removed from the governance of international law; furthermore, there is a large regional military presence concentrated there. Occupied Azerbaijan territories became for Armenia an area where it is possible to hide all surpluses of arms and military equipment.

Let us carry out the analysis of some quantity indicators on arms and equipment transferred to the armed formations of Nagorniy Karabakh (NK) by various methods. It is worth mentioning that the following military equipment is subject to the CFE Treaty: battle tanks (BT), armed combat vehicles (ACV), artillery with a 100 mm caliber and above (Art), combat aircrafts (CA), and attack helicopters (AH).²

The first supplier of unaccounted for and uncontrolled heavy arms to the Armenian armed formations in NK was the 366 motor-rifle regiment (MRR), a unit from the twenty-three divisions of the 4th army of the former USSR deployed in Azerbaijan. Aviation Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), assured that the 366th MRR

² Ibid.

would hold full neutrality in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict³. Nevertheless, the military equipment and men of this regiment took part in the fighting and retaliatory operations against the Azerbaijani population of NK. According to the first exchange of military information provided by the USSR (valid as of November 19, 1990), there were 13 battle tanks, 120 armored combat vehicles, and 16 pieces of artillery in the 366th MRR. According to the official data provided by the Russian party, there were nine T-72 BTs, eighty-seven ACVs (5 BTR-70, 49 BMP-1, 28 BMP-2, and 5 BRM-1k) captured by Armenians during the withdraw of the Regiment from NK in March of 1992. During the September 2003 bilateral Azerbaijan-Russian negotiations regarding the implementation of the reduction liabilities in each category of conventional armaments and concordance numbers of the Treaty limited equipment (TLE) withdrawn from Russian jurisdictions on the territory of Azerbaijan, the Russian delegation has presented information that the 366th MRR had left 25 BTs and 102 ACVs in NK.⁴

Further charges regarding arms and military equipment deployed in the occupied territory by Armenian formations were brought forward during the process of separation of the former USSR military property located in the territory of Armenia. According to the minutes of the bilateral consultations of three Transcaucasian States with the

³ V. Safikhanov Blood on armour, newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 37 (24216), 22 February, 2002.

⁴ Minutes of the bilateral negotiations of representatives of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on implementing the reduction liability of conventional armaments of the former USSR and the coordination of the quantity of CFE Treaty limited armaments and equipment, and the withdrawal of the territory of Azerbaijan from the jurisdiction of Russia. Baku, September 20-21, 1993.

Russian Federation, the process of separation of the former USSR military property came to an end in September 1993.⁵ Analysis made on the basis of transfers to Armenia TLE quantities allows certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the transfer of arms to the conflict zone.

See Table I. page 43.

Analysis of figures evidently show that during the most active period of battle operations (1992-1993) in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, a huge number of offensive arms "disappeared" in the territory of Armenia (90 BTs, 253 ACVs, and 97 pieces of Artillery). It seems obvious that it is necessary to look for the aforementioned equipment in NK.

So far Armenia and Russia have coordinated the number of officially transferred armaments to Armenia. These coordinated figures were divulged by Russia in the 1994 annual exchange of military information within the framework of the CFE Treaty.

See Table II. page 44.

⁵ Sources from: Minutes of bilateral negotiations of representatives of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on implementing of reduction liability of conventional armaments of the former USSR and the coordination of quantity of the CFE Treaty limited armaments and equipment, withdrawn from the jurisdiction of Russia on the territory of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, Baku, September 20-21, 1993.

Minutes of bilateral consultations of representatives of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation on implementing of reduction liability of the former USSR. Armenia, Yerevan, September, 1993.

Minutes of bilateral consultations of representatives of the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation on implementing of reduction liability of the former USSR. Georgia, Tbilisi, August 20, 1993.

JCG of OSCE Consolidated Matrix on the basis of data available as of 1 January, 2003. Document JCG.TOI/22/03, 23 June 2003.

The differences here are less pronounced than previously, but it does not mean that the military equipment has been returned back from NK to Armenia. The equipment remained in Armenian armed formation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Promulgated figures demonstrated only a coordinated position between the Russian Federation and Armenia concerning arms transference.

Because of the 1996 finalized last reduction period of the CFE Treaty and more intensive activity of the international CFE inspections, Armenia was obliged to change its tactics regarding the preparation of official military information. This was necessary to demonstrate that Armenia was ready to fulfill all CFE Treaty provisions.

See Table III. page 45.

The data shows a dynamic of a continued decrease in the TLE quantity on the Russian military base in Armenia. All this military equipment has been transferred illegally to the Armenian armed formation. It is definitive that Russia has transferred equipment to Armenia through 1995, only within framework of the former USSR military property separation in the territory of Armenia. Not less than 183 BTs, 494 ACVs, 274 pieces of Artillery, and 7 AHs were transferred⁶.

Simultaneously, to justify observable TLE quantity leapfrogging and to hide the facts of TLE illegal transference to the occupied territories, Armenia had distributed to all CFE Treaty participating States a notification on irreversible TLE losses in the battle

⁶ Author's own estimations.

area and on the transference of a certain number of TLE to other State force structures⁷:

- On November 14, 1995 Armenia presented to the OSCE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) information on irreversible TLE losses during the battle operations “at the border with Azerbaijan.” They were notified that between 1992 and 1994 Armenia lost 52 BTs, 94 ACVs, and 5 Artillery pieces.
- In 1995 a reduction of 18 ACVs was carried out by Armenia within the framework of the CFE Treaty.
- In 1994-1995 67 ACVs were reassigned to the government structure of internal security.

See Table IV. page 46.

Information submitted by Armenia regarding irreversible TLE losses at the “border with Azerbaijan” causes doubt as to its reliability. It is difficult to consider the above mentioned armaments as irreversibly lost equipment, because they were not inspected by an international Inspection Team. It could be assumed that Armenia was trying to remove a certain number of TLE from inventories, so that they could be deployed to occupied territories. There exists uncontestable proof of the deployment of the TLEs (accepted from Russian troops in the

⁷ Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and CFE Treaty Notifications, accordingly:
Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia: 15/3841 dated August 24, 1994; 15/5521 dated November 24, 1994 and 15/6713 dated November 10, 1995. CFE Notification CFE/AM/95-14
CFE Notifications: OBCE/PA/94/17; OBCE/AM/95-11; CFE/AM/97/04/F12 and CFE/AM/00/005/F12/O

territory of Armenia in 1992-1993) in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, during battle operations deep in the territory of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Armed Forces captured 22 T-72 Armenian battle tanks and 14 ACVs. Factory identification numbers of that equipment met that of the factory identification numbers of TLE turned over to Armenia by the Russian Federation. Earlier this equipment belonged to the deployed 15th and 164th Motor-Rifle Divisions of the Russian Federation in Armenia. Information regarding this fact has been distributed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan amongst the OSCE member states⁸.

When completing a general situational analysis it is necessary to take into account the information about the Azerbaijan TLE losses for 1992-1994 (186 BTs, 119 ACVs, and 57 artillery systems). These armaments remained primarily in the occupied territories. Undoubtedly, a significant amount of this equipment has been restored and is now in the occupational force⁹.

We do not have a full picture of the unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms in the occupied territories of

⁸ Official information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan distributed in Joint Consultative Group of OSCE in 1994.

Statement by Azerbaijan Deputy Minister of Defence Colonel M. Beydullayev at the JCG session, 29 April, 1997. JCG document JCG.REF(AZ)/92/97, Vienna, 29 April, 1997.

Facts on the illegal transfer of arms, equipment and military property by Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia.

http://www.armenianreality.com/massacres_in_azerbaijan/conf4.htm

⁹ I.JCG of OSCE Consolidated Matrix on the basis of data available as of 1 January, 2003. Document JCG.TOI/22/03, 23 June 2003.
JCG documents JCG.DEL/29/01, 30 October 2001; JCG.DEL/30/01, 6 November 2001; JCG.DEL/32/01, 13 November 2001.

Azerbaijan, if we do not take into account similar processes of the military property separation in Georgia.

See Table V. page 46.

On the basis of that data it is possible to conclude that there was a significant quantity of unaccounted for and uncontrolled TLEs in Georgia. A part of these unaccounted for heavy armaments have been illegally transferred by Russia to the armed formations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara (Abashidze's period)¹⁰. The following are estimations of TLE numbers in the illegal armed formations.

See Table VI. Page 47.

This equipment has been partially captured from Georgian Armed Forces. For instance, in September 1993 the Abkhazian civil guardsmen captured seventy pieces of armored equipment, more than eighty artillery pieces of different calibers, five BM-21 "Grad" Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), forty-two 120 mm and 80 mm mortars, and more. Some military equipment cascaded to the armed formations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the Russian military units located outside the territory of Georgia. Similar processes were observed in Adjara before the establishment of Georgian governmental control over this rebellious region. For example, Abashidze (former leader of Adjara) spent 50 million U.S. dollars on the

purchase of four T-72 BTs, several ACVs and BM-21 "Grad" MLRSs, and combat support helicopters and other weapons in April 2004.¹¹

Thus, taking into account all above-mentioned figures, there remain approximately several hundred pieces of uncontrolled heavy armaments in the territory of Georgia. Undoubtedly, some of these weapons should be searched for in the Armenian armed formations deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

It is necessary to note that recently Russia has carried out a large delivery of heavy armored equipment in this region in relation to the aggravation of a situation in South Ossetia (July - August 2004)¹². They sent twenty-two BMP-2 armored infantry fighting vehicles and eighteen BTR-70 armored personnel carrier vehicles to the area. All the ACVs were transferred to the South-Ossetia armed formations that have caused even more complications in Georgian-Russian relations and increased the number of weapons belonging to the nongovernmental armed formations in the Caucasian region.

The Russian Tanks Repair Factory, at 142 BTRZ in Tbilisi, Georgia, was an additional source of heavy armaments for Armenian occupational armed forces. The dynamics of TLE quantities at this factory for the period 1992-1996 is

¹⁰V. Baranets, *General Staff without secrets*, Moscow, 1999 (Russian vers.)
V. Petrov *How Transcaucasus was arming*, Arms Export, 3, May-June, 2002
The Caucasus: *Armed and Divided*. Edited by D. Hiscock and A. Matveeva. Saferworld, April, 2003.

¹¹ Simonjan, Ju. "Saakashvili has threatened to dismiss Abashidze." *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 14 April 2004: 5. <www.ng.ru>.

¹² Russia Sends 40 Armored Vehicles to South Ossetia, The Moscow News, 21/07/2004. <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/07/21/ossetia.shtml>

indicative of the points made in my argument.

See Table VII. page 47.

It is worth noting that until 1995 the factory was under the central subordination of the Russian Federation, and after 1995 it was subordinated to the Group of Russian Troops in Transcaucasus (GRVZ). Recently the factory was transferred to the Ministry of Defence of Georgia.

Analysis of the TLE quantity at this factory evidently shows that in 1993-1996 there was an active hidden process of TLE transference from the factory to different military formations, including the Armed Forces of Armenia. We did not observe any correlation of dynamics of TLE quantity in the factory and TLE quantity in the Armenian Armed Forces and on the Russian Military Bases in Armenia.¹³ Also, there was no information (CFE notifications) regarding heavy arms exports from the Southern Caucasus. All above mentioned points indicate that these weapons fall into the category of unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms, and were sent to the regional conflict zones, including occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

There is a very well known and sensational scandal dealing with illegal arms transferring to Armenia by the Russian Federation from 1993 to 1996, which is after the end of the official separation of the former USSR military property placed in the territories of state-assignees of the former USSR.¹⁴ This issue has been officially raised during a session of the Russia State Duma in 1997, by the Chairman of

the Duma Defence Committee, General Rokhlin. It has been noted that arms and military property with a total cost above 1.5 billion U.S. dollars were illegally and freely transferred to Armenia¹⁵.

See Table VIII. page 48.

The process of transferring arms, equipment, and military property was carried out illegally and secretly, and without interstate agreements. Arms and equipment have been partially transferred according to the instructions of the General Staff (GS), signed by former Chief of the GS from the Armed Forces of Russia, Army General Kolesnikov. Deliveries were carried out under the watch of Army General Grachev, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, who was among other high-ranking executors of that swindle, such as General Reut, the commander of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus. The weapons were delivered by trains not only from Russian military bases in Armenia and Georgia, but also from various cities in Russia including: Akhtubinsk, Mozdok, Ivanov, Omsk, Ulyanovsk. IL-76 Transport aircrafts also completed 139 flights

¹⁵ Aferograd , *newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya* 39 (11477), 3 April,1997.
BARANETS, *General Staff without secrets* , Moscow, 1999
Newspaper *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 13 (40), 5 April, 1997.
SIPRI, *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia* .Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Stockholm, July,2003.
Statement of the Azerbaijan delegation on the Annual Vienna Document 1994 implementation assessment meeting, 2-4 March, 1998. Document FSC.AIAM/33/98, 4 March, 1998.
Facts on the illegal transfer of arms, equipment and military property by Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia.
http://www.armenianreality.com/massacres_in_azerbaijan/conf4.htm

¹³ Aliyev, "Arms Control in Transcaucasia."

¹⁴ Ibid.

transporting illegal arms and military property¹⁶.

During the same period the Russian Federation delivered eight R-17 "Scud" operative-tactical missiles systems to Armenia, capable of carry chemical or nuclear warheads.¹⁷ To prepare specialists for R-17 missile systems, twenty officers and warrant officers from the Ministry of Defence of Armenia attended a practical training course of the Russian Ministry of Defence at the Missile Training Center "Kapustin Yar."

The transference of armaments to the "grey zone" continued to occur. That process was confirmed by the fact that NK military representatives accepted fighting vehicles, optical devices, electronic equipment, and other arms from the factories in Nizhni Tagil, Saint Petersburg, and other cities in Russia.

Between 1997 and 1998, and after promulgation of the illegal transference of arms, Russia and Armenia tried to present it as a continuing process of the division of former USSR military property. Nevertheless, Armenia has officially received only 154 BTs, 379 ACVs,

259 artillery pieces from Russia up until 1993.¹⁸ If one simultaneously analyzes the dynamics of TLE quantity changes in the Armed Forces of Armenia for the period 1994-1999 (Table IX), we do not observe any correlation of these figures with the quantity of new arms shipments to Armenia. During this period the reverse is observed; there is a reduction of the TLE quantity in the Armenian Armed Forces.

See Table IX. page 49.

That facts demonstrate that practically all military equipment delivered illegally by Russia to Armenia (Table VIII) has passed through the category of unaccounted for and uncontrolled equipment, and has been transferred to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan¹⁹.

At the same time Armenia received new samples of military equipment from Russia. In 1994, the new air-defence system "Tunguska," which has been deployed in Khankendi, NK, was delivered to Armenia²⁰.

¹⁶ Aferograd, *newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya* 39 (11477), 3 April, 1997.

BARANETS, *General Staff without secrets*, Moscow, 1999

Newspaper *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 13 (40), 5 April, 1997.

SIPRI, *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Stockholm, July, 2003.

For what in Moscow would like to settle a score with general Rokhlin, *newspaper Panorama*, 69 (326), 12 April, 1997.

6. Facts on the illegal transfer of arms, equipment and military property by Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia.

http://www.armenianreality.com/massacres_in_azerbaijan/conf4.htm

¹⁷ Kenzhetaev, M. "Defence industry of the Republic of Armenia." *Arms Export* 6 (October - December 1997).

¹⁸ Minutes of bilateral consultations of representatives of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation on implementing of reduction liability of the former USSR. Armenia, Yerevan, September, 1993.

Statement of A. Urnov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Russian Federation in Armenia, 16 February, 1997.

¹⁹ Conclusion that resulting from the absence of these TLE in annual CFE data exchange and from non discovering this equipment during CFE Inspections on the territory of Armenia.

Statement of the Azerbaijan delegation on the Annual Vienna Document 1994 implementation assessment meeting, 2-4 March, 1998. Document FSC.AIAM/33/98, 4 March, 1998.

²⁰ R.RZAYEV, *Smuggling at the international level*, newspaper *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, 20 April 1997.

Now we cannot cover all Country, newspaper *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* 41 (401), 29 October 2004. http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2001-09-14/4_ambaryn.html

Facts on the illegal transfer of arms, equipment and military property by Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia. http://www.armenianreality.com/massacres_in_azerbaijan/conf4.htm

All the aforementioned points explain the appearance of a significant amount of arms and military equipment in the territories of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian forces. As a result of these illegal deliveries of arms, the military parity in Transcaucasia has been broken; furthermore, the following norms of international law and laws of the Russian Federation (RF) are disregarded:

- **the law of RF “On defense”** indicates that the transference, sale, and liquidation of weapons, military equipment, and property is established by the government of the Russian Federation;
- and **Article 2 of the Provision “On military - technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign countries”** was contradicted by **Order No. 623-RPC of the President of the Russian Federation** on September 9, 1993, prohibiting all arms, military equipment, and ammunition supplies to Armenia and Azerbaijan until a special order was given and a peaceful settlement of the conflict in NK was reached.

There does exist **a criminal amenability** clause in Russian legislation:

- for the illegal transfer of weapons and ammunition (Article 222 of the RF Criminal Code);
- and for planning, preparation, or promotion of military

aggression (Article 353 of the RF Criminal Code).

Besides the Russian legislation, a number of international legal norms have been violated.

UNITED NATIONS Documents

- **Security Council Resolution No. 853 (paragraph 10) of July 29, 1993**
The resolution calls for states to refrain from the delivery of weapons and military property, which could bring about the escalation of a conflict or continued occupation of a territory.
- **Security Council Resolution No. 884 (paragraph 6) of November 12, 1993**
Strongly calls all states in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any interference that could spread conflict and undermine peace and security in the region.
- **General Assembly Resolution 51/45 F**
It considers measures on the prevention of illegal deliveries and the illegal use of conventional weapon.
- **General Assembly Resolution 51/47 B**
(Report of the Commission on disarmament)

CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)

They formulated a declaration on abstaining from the use or threat of force between the states. (Meeting of the Council of the CIS Heads of States on March 20, 1992 in Kiev)

Paragraph 2 of the Declaration stated that member states declare that they “..do not deliver weapons to the zones of conflicts.”

- Agreement on Collective Security (May 15, 1992)

Article 1: “... Member-States will not take part in actions directed against other member-states.”

- Memorandum of Peacekeeping and Stability in the CIS (February 10, 1995)

Violation of paragraphs 1,3,5,8, and 9.

- The Tashkent Agreement on principles and compliance with the CFE Treaty (May 15, 1992)

Violation of Article 4, paragraph 1.

The following arms control military-political agreements were also violated.

CFE Treaty

The following portions of the CFE Treaty were also violated:

- Article VIII, paragraph 8, and Article XIII;
- the Protocol on notification and information exchange, Section VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B);
- the Protocol on notification and information exchange, Section IX, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B);
- the Protocol on notification and information exchange, Section X, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B);
- and information about arms deliveries was not reflected in annual military information exchanges presented according to provisions of Protocol on notification and information exchange, Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C).

1994 Vienna Document of Negotiations on Confidence and Security building Measures

Unauthentic information has been presented within the framework of the annual military information exchange (Chapter I, paragraphs 9,10, 13, 14, and 15)

Global Military Information Exchange

Unauthentic information was presented in violation of paragraphs 3,4, and 6.

UN Register on Conventional Arms and Equipment (In accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L)

Presentation of unauthentic information

Deliveries of Russian weapons to Armenia had a significant role in furthering the aggression of Armenian forces and their occupation of Azerbaijan territories. Azerbaijan repeatedly addressed the Russian Federation with requirements to solve the problem of illegal arms deliveries to Armenia and to eliminate the consequences of those deliveries. There was a Trilateral Commission created, established by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia to resolve that issue. However, this structure was not capable of doing anything because Armenia and Russia were not interested in divulging all the facts and they did not demonstrate a commitment to the accomplishment of a political resolution. The criminal case opened by the Russian Federation on that issue was later closed.

Azerbaijan addressed the international partners within the framework of the CFE Treaty regarding this problem. It was noted that numerous CFE Treaty inspections in the territory of Armenia were inefficient; therefore, they did not reveal huge quantities of TLEs supplied by Russia to Armenia.

Impunity has resulted in other countries carrying out illegal deliveries of arms and military property to Armenia. In 1999, one non-state-owned firm from China delivered eight WM-80 272 mm MLRSs to Armenia, while they only notified the international community

of four. There is information that some Chinese WM-80 MLRSs, and also some S-300 air defence missile systems received from Russia are deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan²¹.

Total estimations of unaccounted for and uncontrolled TLE deployed in occupied territories of Azerbaijan reflect that Armenian armed formations have in the territory of Azerbaijan a TLE quantity exceeding maximal levels of TLE holdings for Azerbaijan, which was established in the Tashkent Agreement of 1992.²²

The Republic of Azerbaijan repeatedly initiated within the OSCE discussions the problem of unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms. In 1996, Azerbaijan distributed the following information about uncontrolled equipment on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan to the OSCE.

See Table X. page 49.

In the final document of the first conference to review the operation of the CFE Treaty, and the concluding act of the negotiation on

²¹ S. SULTANOGLU, *Chine must choose to be friends with Azerbaijan or not*, newspaper Zerkalo, 31, 12 June, 1999.

R.RZAYEV, *Smuggling at the international level*, newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 1997. Declaration of Parliament (Milli Medjlis) of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1 February, 1998.

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Baku, 29 January 1999.

²² Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and related Documents, Arms Control Section, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1996.

Statement by Azerbaijan Deputy Minister of Defence Colonel M.Beydullayev at the JCG session, 29 April, 1997. JCG document JCG.REF(AZ)/92/97, Vienna, 29 April, 1997.

Facts on the illegal transfer of arms, equipment and military property by Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia.

http://www.armenianreality.com/massacres_in_azerbaijan/conf4.htm

personnel strength accepted in Vienna on May 31, 1996, concerns were expressed over the difficulties of some State Parties to fully comply within their territories with the provisions of the Treaty and its related documents regarding TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled items addressed in the Treaty²³. It was stressed that there is a need to reach a relevant political solution to elaborate on necessary measures to enable the implementation of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible. A readiness to address the issue of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), including the ways and means to facilitate the resolution of this issue, was expressed. In December 1996, within the framework of the JCG a decision on TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled items was accepted. The following decisions were then mentioned.

1. The JCG will very attentively consider reliable information provided through official channels on TLE uncontrolled and unaccounted for items, including information on their quantity, types, and placement.

2. On the basis of the analysis of this information, and also taking into account other political aspects, multinational inspection team visits to these regions may be organized. Appropriate

reports to the JCG will be provided by these teams. The cost of these visits will be covered by the states whose representatives participate in these visits. JCG will elaborate on the system used to carrying out these visits and the content of the reports.

3. After implementing the visits and providing reports, JCG will consider further steps that may be necessary.

This decision was accepted in relation to situations in Azerbaijan (NK), Armenia, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Trans-Dniestrian region), and Russia (Chechnya).

To start the mechanism incorporated in the accepted JCG decision, Azerbaijan has prepared and presented information on arms and military equipment available in the Armenian armed formations in the occupied territories (Table X). In 1997, more accurate unaccounted for and uncontrolled TLE data was provided (taking into account illegal TLE transferences from Russia to Armenia) regarding deployments of the Armenian military formations placed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Information indicates the presence of 316 BTs, 324 ACVs, and 322 Artillery pieces. Unfortunately, this very interesting and prospective initiative of the OSCE had no continuation. In 1997, the attempt was made to carry out multinational international inspections intended to reveal the quantity and location of unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms in the territories of the Trans-Dniestrian

²³ Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna, 15-31 May 1996. URL <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfe1reve.htm>

region (Moldova); however, this inspection broke down due to the non-constructive position of Russia and Trans-Dniestrian authorities.

The inconsistent position of the Russian Federation toward separatism has led to a significant quantity of unaccounted for and uncontrolled heavy treaty limited arms and also small arms and light weapons to saturate the Southern Caucasian region. The military balance in the region has been disrupted. Estimations show that Armenia may potentially have the following quantity of TLE.






See Table XI. page 49.

These figures explain the reason for difficulties in the negotiation process regarding the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Regarding the process of closing Russian military bases in Georgia (the decision accepted at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE in 1999), there

has been observed an intensive weapons transfer from the territory of Georgia to the territory of Armenia. Taking into account previous experiences, this process demands steadfast attention and control by the states participating in the CFE Treaty, so that a further increase in the level of unaccounted for and uncontrolled arms in the region can be prevented. These illegal weapons stimulate separatism and terrorism in the Caucasus. Recent terrorist acts in Beslan and North Ossetia confirm this notion.






In the case of successful negotiations for the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, there will arise a problem of accounting for TLE quantities, assessing the coordinates of illegal weapons, and then their withdrawal from the region under the control of international intermediaries. This problem demands steadfast attention from military and civil experts in the field of international arms control.

Table I. The Number of TLE in the territory of Armenia (1992)¹.

<i>Category and date</i> TLE	Valid as of 19.11. 90	In Armed Forces of Armenia. Valid as of 15.12.1992	In Russian Troops in Armenia. Valid as of 15.12.1992	Total in Armenia Valid as of 15.12.1992	<i>Difference in numbers from 19.11.90 and 15.12.92</i>
Battle Tanks (BT) 	258	77	91	168	-90
Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV) 	641	189	199	388	-253
Artillery with caliber of 100 mm and above (Art) 	357	160	100	260	-97
Combat Aircrafts (CA) 	0	3	0	3	+3
Attack Helicopters (AH) 	7	13	0	13	+6






¹ based on Initial CFE data exchange of USSR valid as of November 19, 1990; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Republic of Armenia, presented 15 December, 1992; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Russian Federation, presented 15 December, 1992

Table II. TLE number in the territory of Armenia (1993-1994)².

<i>Date and category</i>	Valid as of 19.11.90	In Armed Forces of Armenia. Valid as of 15.12.93	Russian Troops in Armenia. Valid as of 15.12.93	Total in Armenia Valid as of 15.12.93	Difference in numbers from 19.11.90 to 15.12.93
TLE					
Battle Tanks (BT) 	258	154	82	236	-22
Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV) 	641	379	193	572	-69
Artillery with caliber of 100 mm and above (Art) 	357	259	100	359	+2
Combat Aircrafts (CA) 	0	3	0	3	+3
Attack Helicopters (AH) 	7	4	0	4	-3

² based on Initial CFE data exchange of USSR valid as of November 19, 1990; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Republic of Armenia, presented 15 December, 1993; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Russian Federation, presented 15 December, 1993

Table III. TLE numbers in the territory of Armenia (1995-1996)³.






<i>Date and category</i>	Valid as of 19.11.90	In Armed Forces of Armenia valid as of 15.12.95	Russian Troops in Armenia valid as of 15.12.95	Total in Armenia valid as of 15.12.95	Difference in numbers from 19.11.90 to 15.12.95
TLE					
Battle Tanks (BT) 	258	101	75	176	-82
Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV) 	641	218	147	365	-276
Artillery with caliber of 100 mm and above (Art) 	357	225	83	308	-49
Combat Aircrafts (CA) 	0	6	0	6	+6
Attack Helicopters (AH) 	7	7	0	7	0

³ based on Initial CFE data exchange of USSR valid as of November 19, 1990; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Republic of Armenia, presented 15 December, 1995; Annual exchange of military information (CFE Treaty) of the Russian Federation, presented 15 December, 1995

**Table IV. Armenian TLE losses for 1992-1994
(information distributed to the OSCE by the Republic of Armenia)⁴.**

TLE	Quantity	Date
BT	4	July 1992
ACV	9	
BT	17	August 1992
ACV	8	
Art	1	
BT	1	February 1992
ACV	21	
Art	1	
BT	4	November 1992
ACV	4	
Art	1	
BT	5	June and July 1993
ACV	52	
Art	21	
BT	2	September 1993
ACV	3	
BT	12	January 1994
ACV	36	
BT	10	February 1994
ACV	25	

Table V. TLE numbers in the territory of Georgia (1992-1993).

<i>Date and category</i>	Valid as of 19.11. 90	In Armed Forces of Georgia, valid as of 20.08. 93	Russian Troops in Georgia, valid as of 15.12. 92	Total in Georgia, valid as of 1993	Difference in numbers from 19.11.90 to 1993
 Battle Tanks (BT)	850	109	268	377	-473
 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV)	1054	164	598	762	-292
 Artillery with caliber of 100 mm and above (Art)	363	76	221	297	-66
 Combat Aircrafts (CA)	245	33	-	33	-212
 Attack Helicopters (AH)	48	6	?	?	?

⁴ For Table VI were used data from Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia: 15/3841 dated August 24, 1994; 15/5521 dated November 24, 1994 and 15/6713 dated November 10, 1995.

See also JCG of OSCE Consolidated Matrix on the basis of data available as of 1 January, 2003. Document JCG.TOI/22/03, 23 June 2003.

Table VI. Quantity of conventional armaments in the armed formations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

56









Category of TLE	Abkhazia	South Ossetia
 BT	35-50	Up to 30
 ACV	Up to 80	Up to 65
 Art	Up to 80	Up to 30
 CA	6	?
 AH	?	?

Table VII. TLE numbers at 142 BTRZ (Tbilisi).

TLE category	92	93	95	96 (01.01)	96 (01.06)	97	99
 BT	66	57	45	0	19	26	28
 ACV	316	290	193	0	66	71	10 2
 Art	-	-	222	1	1	2	2

⁵⁶ARAS, J., *Armed Caucasus*, Stake 1&2 (2000).

MUKHIN. *Sukhumi is ready for everything*, *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 39 (2000): 2. www.nwo.ng.ru.

Transcaucasian arsenal, *Obshaya Gazeta* 29 February 1996.

HRAMCHIHIN, A., *Bluff on the North Caucasus*, *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 30 (2004): 3. www.nwo.ng.ru.

Table VIII. Russian illegal deliveries of military property to Armenia from January 1993 to December 1996 (based on average commercial prices)⁵⁷.

N	Category	Price per item	Quantity	Total cost in US \$
1	R-17 Missiles Launcher Systems "Scud"	210,000	8	1,680,000
	R-17 Operative-Tactical Missiles	210,000	32	6,720,000
2	Air Defence Missiles System (ADMS) "Krug"	300,000	27	8,100,000
	Missiles for this unit	300,000	349	104,700,000
3	Missiles for ADMS "Osa"	200,000	40	8,000,000
4	T-72 BTs	1,200,000	84	100,800,000
5	BMP-2 ACVs	280,000	50	14,000,000
6	D-30 Howitzers (122 mm)	52,000	36	1,872,000
7	D-20 Howitzers (152 mm)	40,000	18	720,000
8	D-1 Howitzers (152 mm)	50,000	18	900,000
9	BM-21 MLRSs "Grad"	250,000	18	4,500,000
10	Mortars	12,000	26	312,000
11	Portable air-defence systems "Igla"	40,000	40	1,600,000
	Missiles for this unit	40,000	200	8,000,000
12	Grenade launchers	2,500	20	50,000
13	Machine-guns	400	306	122,400
14	Submachine guns	120	7,910	949,200
15	Pistols	60	1,847	110,820
16	Shells (various)	400	489,160	195,644,000
17	BMP-2 Shells	30	478,480	14,354,400
18	ACVs with anti-tank guided missiles launchers	330,000	4	1,320,000
	Anti-tanks guided missiles	8,400	945	7,938,000
19	Hand grenades	30	345,800	10,374,000
20	Cartridges (various)	1	227,253,000	227,253,000
21	Other samples of weapons, military equipment and munitions			270,000,000

(This data is not complete.)

⁵⁷ Statement of the Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defence Committee, General Rokhlin in 1997.

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Table IX. Dynamics of TLE quantity in Armenian Armed Forces (1994-1999).




TLE category	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
 BT	154	102	101	102	102	102
 ACV	379	285	218	218	218	204
 Art	259	225	225	225	225	225

Table X. Unaccounted for and uncontrolled TLE of Armenian forces deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (valid as of 1996).

No	Military units	Location	BT	ACV	Art
1	538 Indep. Moto-rifle Regiment	Agdaban	10	15	15
2	2 Indep. Moto-rifle Brigade	Karakhanbeyli	23	20	34
3	83 Indep. Moto-rifle Brigade	Dashkesan	18	25	20
4	Mardakert Infantry Division	Agdere	60	71	67
5	Askeran Infantry Regiment	Agdam	27	38	37
6	Martuni Infantry Regiment	Martuni	38	51	38
7	Gadrut Infantry Regiment	Gadrut	20	25	18
8	Stepanakert Infantry Regiment	Khankendi	12	24	22
9	Khodzaly Training Center	Khodzaly	40	2	39
10	Shusha Infantry Regiment	Shusha	5	7	8
11	Total Quantities:		253	278	298

Table XI. Military potential of Armenia.

Category of TLE	Quantity of TLE in AF of Armenia. Valid as of 2004	Quantity of TLE on Russian Military Bases in Armenia. Valid as of 2004	Quantity of TLE in the Armenian occupational forces	Total
 BT	110	74	316	500
 ACV	140	224	324	1188
 Art	229	84	322	635

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THE ROLE OF CIMIC WITHIN NATO OPERATIONS

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BACKGROUND

Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within our Armed Forces and the following statement is one of the best examples. As he was commander of all Allied troops across Europe in 1944, General D. D. EISENHOWER said: **“The sooner I can get rid of the questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live 10 years each week, of which at least 9 are absorbed in political and economic matters... and what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply shortage, no power, no food, no fuel, and corpses all over town...”**

But, during the Cold war, this was seen as presenting little more than a logistic or a public information challenge. The priority was put on Host Nation Support, particularly from Germany, but also from other NATO countries.

However, the last NATO operation beyond its own domestic borders

presented different and more complex challenges.

Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept. This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than has existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready "to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations."

Indeed operations have underlined the requirement to co-ordinate activities with national and local governments as well as both International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Civil/Military Cooperation (CIMIC) supports the Commander in achieving this; CIMIC is a command responsibility.

DEFINITION AND APPLICATION

NATO CIMIC is defined as:

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

Four further factors govern the application of CIMIC:

- a. CIMIC activities are an integral part of the Force Commander's plan. They are conducted in support of the military.
- b. The CIMIC staffs are fully integrated into each military Headquarters and are

authorised to co-ordinate CIMIC activities in the Operations Area.

- c. In co-operating with a potentially wide range of civilian bodies, NATO forces will, as far as possible and within military means and capabilities, accommodate and support the activities of these bodies, providing this does

not compromise the mission.

- d. The main goal of CIMIC is to establish a link between the civilian organisations and the Force commander. If civilian activities are carried out by military units, they must be transferred as quickly and efficiently as possible to appropriate civilian organisations and/or authorities.

THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

Every conflict, whatever its nature, requires the force commander to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations.

Furthermore, commanders must take into account the presence of large numbers of ***IOs and NGOs*** with their own aims, methods and perspectives, all of which may have to be reconciled with those of NATO. Challenges will be enhanced by the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local communities. Therefore, effective relationships with a wide range of civilian organisations as well as local populations, governments and military forces will be essential to future conflict resolutions. CIMIC is the Commander's tool in establishing and maintaining these relationships.

The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of NATO objectives in operations. In meeting this purpose CIMIC staffs will:

- a. Liaise with civil ***actors*** at the appropriate level.
- b. Engage in planning with appropriate civilian bodies before and during an operation.
- c. Carry-out continuous assessments of the local civil environment, including local needs in order to identify the extent of any vacuum and how that vacuum might be filled.
- d. Oversee the conduct of civil-related activities by military forces, including the provision of requisite functional specialists.
- e. Work towards a timely and smooth transition of civil responsibilities to the proper authorities.
- f. Work with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.
- g. Advise the Commander on all of the above.

CORE FUNCTIONS

The above activities will contribute towards the following core functions:

- a. **Civil-Military Liaison.** The aim of Civil Military Liaison is to provide the co-ordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations. Such a liaison early in the planning process and immediately following the deployment of forces provides the basis from which the other CIMIC functions develop. It will be a fundamental part of the planning and development process of the other core CIMIC functions. Establishment of a liaison at the political level by NATO is a pre-condition of success. Liaisons and joint planning at the Strategic level and within the area of operation will flow from this. Liaisons with civil authorities and organisations are facilitated by, amongst other things, an appropriate public information policy. This will require the adequate and timely dissemination of the achievements and progress made through civil-military co-operation, which will in turn help in obtaining the support of the population, IOs and NGOs.
- b. **Support to the Civil Environment.** Support to the civil environment covers a wide spectrum of CIMIC activities. For the purposes of this document, support is

provided to the civil environment in concordance with a NATO military mission. Normally it is not support under the direction of civil authorities. It can involve a wide range of military resources; information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. It will generally only take place where and when it is required to create conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the military mission and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task. Decisions regarding depth, duration and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level, taking into account political as well as military and civil factors.

- c. **Support to the Force.** NATO commanders, depending on the circumstances, will require significant civilian support from within their theatre of operations. As well as co-ordination of efforts to minimise disruption to military operations, such as population and resource control, the force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. Commanders will also seek as much tacit civilian support for operations as possible. CIMIC will play a major role in all these areas.

THE COMPONENTS OF A CIMIC CAPABILITY

In order to achieve all of the above, NATO needs a dedicated CIMIC capability. This capability exists when the following three components are in place:

- a. Fully developed policy, doctrine and concepts.
- b. The understanding and ability to put doctrine into practice.
- c. The physical capacity in the form of trained personnel, formed units and supporting resources.

The **conceptual aspect** of the capability encompasses policy, doctrine, planning and procedures throughout the NATO commands and includes the supervision and co-ordination of the conduct of CIMIC during training and operations.

The **training aspect** of the capability covers, but is not limited to, courses, presentations, conferences and seminars as well as the monitoring and application of lessons learned. Most important is the full integration of CIMIC play in all relevant NATO exercises. Only by exercising capabilities will the relevant lessons be learned and refinements made.

The **physical aspect** of the capability comprises the resources the Commander needs to execute CIMIC related activities in a given situation. Because one situation will differ from another, the composition of these assets cannot be prescriptive. The minimum requirement is a CIMIC staff at all HQ levels. Their role is to advise the

Commander, prepare and develop the CIMIC assessment and the CIMIC lines of activities in support of the Commander's plan and to maintain liaisons. As a result of assessments, existing military forces might be tasked through the chain of command to carry out CIMIC activities. ***As a further option, although CIMIC activities are within the domain of all military personnel, there may be a requirement for additional CIMIC assets to be deployed into a theatre in direct support of the mission.*** These will fall into one of two categories:

- a. **CIMIC Forces.** CIMIC forces are designed to support the NATO Commander with a structured organisation to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the Commander's mission. Their size and the length of time they may be deployed will be determined both by the nature of the task and by how quickly the appropriate civilian organisations and structures can be put in place.
- b. **Functional specialists.** Functional specialists are deployed because a specific requirement for their expertise - which cannot otherwise be found within the area of operations - has been identified. They may come from a wide range of sources and are not

necessarily military personnel. They may be required to assist in assessments, analysis, the planning process or they

may be required for the execution of specific projects.

RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

NATO CIMIC occupies one part of the spectrum of civil-military relations. There are a number of associated activities within this spectrum which, although different, are either closely associated with CIMIC or can be confused with it. Principal among these associated activities are:

a. **Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE).**

In the broadest sense CIMIC is primarily concerned with co-operation rather than support or assistance to civilian bodies, although at the practical level support will, of course, take place. For example, MAHE in the context of disaster relief can take place nationally or internationally. In both cases a national or multinational military force is called upon to carry out specified tasks for finite periods under the direct auspices of a civilian authority. That authority may be national or international in nature. Although in either case CIMIC staff may carry out liaison work, neither activity constitutes a CIMIC activity per se.

b. **Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).** CEP is concerned with the protection of and support of domestic populations,

usually in the context of disasters or war. In the current security environment, a core function of CEP is to remain responsive to military planning regarding operations. This includes planning for civil support such as strategic, logistic and communications facilities. CIMIC within an area of operation is not co-ordinated by CEP staff.

c. **Host Nation Support (HNS).**

HNS seeks to provide the NATO Commander and the sending nations with support available in the form of material, facilities and services including area security and administrative support in accordance with negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and the host government. As such, HNS facilitates the introduction of forces into an area of operation by providing essential reception, staging and onward movement support. HNS may also reduce the amount of logistic forces and materials required to sustain and re-deploy forces that otherwise must be provided by sending nations. CIMIC will normally be employed to facilitate the execution of HNS.

THE PRINCIPLES OF CIMIC

There are precepts that influence the conduct of CIMIC across the spectrum of conflicts. They fall into two broad categories:

a. **Principles Governing the Military Direction of CIMIC.**

These principles guide the internal military processes, which enable the development of a CIMIC support plan and regulate its execution.

b. **Principles Governing the Civil-Military Relationship.**

These principles offer guidance on the establishment and maintenance of effective civil-military relationships with civilian authorities, lead agencies, organisations and populations.

A. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE MILITARY DIRECTION OF CIMIC

Mission Primacy. NATO conducts CIMIC activities in support of a military mission. However, in a Crisis Response Operation, the military will have been deployed as but one part of the International Community's efforts to resolve a complex political emergency. Indeed the military may have been given an explicit supporting role to an overall civil authority within the JOA; therefore, in such situations long term military objectives are unlikely to clash with those of most of the civilian organisations working in an area of operations. Nonetheless, only the Commander can decide how far military resources will be committed to CIMIC tasks. Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without

an assessment of the resources, in co-ordination with civilian agencies, and the prioritisation of military tasks. Furthermore, any local CIMIC tasks planned by subordinate commanders should be first authorised, and if necessary, deconflicted so that they do not compromise long term theatre level objectives.

Command Direction. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to direct CIMIC activities, achieve the necessary unity of command and effort and recognise the importance of integrating into the overall effort. Commanders should be aware of the impact of military operations on the civil environment and the impact of the civil environment on their operations. They should prioritise and direct CIMIC activities in such a way that military effectiveness is maintained without adding unnecessary civil hardship or compromising civil objectives.

Economy. Commanders must seek to avoid the use of military assets on non-military tasks. CIMIC activities are often carried out in circumstances where the civil population faces an inadequate infrastructure and widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Military resources are finite and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the minimum required to achieve a given authorised task in support of the civilian population or civilian organisations should be used. Commanders must guard against creating long term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, IOs or NGOs. Once provided, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be

difficult as it may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, and may cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.

Concentration. Assets available for CIMIC are likely to be limited; therefore they should be concentrated on tasks of the highest priority. Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the military force and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest. On the other hand, dissipation of assets may have minimal impact and runs the risk of unnecessarily prolonging the achievement of the desired end-state.

Legal Obligations and Humanitarian Considerations.

Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with the *Law of Armed Conflict*. They also must take into account the humanitarian consequences of the operation. Respect of these principles will help the force to be accepted by the local population.

B. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Cultural Awareness. A sustained sensitivity towards *local* customs, *mores*, *culture* and ways of life are of fundamental importance to all missions. In a politically sensitive environment a thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news event and seriously undermine the mission's chances of success. The military must acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. CIMIC plays a vital role in ensuring cultural awareness of the forces through education.

Common Goals. Once a relationship has been established, it will usually need to be maintained, and whenever possible strengthened in order to survive disagreements, setbacks, compromises and even threats from third parties. In spite of the fact that those operating within a JOA may have different immediate interests, common goals shared by NATO forces and civilian organisations must be established and recognised. NATO operations take place in rapidly changing environments where decision-making processes must be responsive and streamlined. Each participating organisation must understand the political and resource commitments required. This understanding forms the basis of civil-military co-operation; commitments are made in anticipation of achieving objectives and not in meeting deadlines.

Shared Responsibility. The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil organisations and agencies with which NATO military forces must co-operate are extremely diverse. The analysis of common goals must lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial relationship. CIMIC must establish *co-operation arrangements* and transition mechanisms with the civilian organisations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities.

Consent. Every effort should be made to secure and retain the willing co-operation of civilian organisations with which the allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves poor results and will not endure. Loss of consent

can occur suddenly, for reasons that seem trivial, and commanders must be prepared to expend time and energy in its pursuit and retention.

Transparency. Successful CIMIC requires the mutual trust and confidence of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC **tasks and activities** should be transparent, demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment. Tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times. These tensions will be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion and poor communications. Transparency is vital in preventing and defusing such potentially volatile situations because it installs trust, increases confidence and encourages mutual understanding. CIMIC staff must work closely with intelligence assets to obtain the most timely and accurate information that may be passed to civilian organisations in time to be effective. Much of this information, such as refugee movements, given to the civilian organisations and lead agencies may assist the commander greatly, by allowing the appropriate civilian agency to react in a timely manner while minimally diverting military resources. Such information allows the civilian agencies to tailor themselves to the developing situation and prevents the military from unnecessarily expending its resources or from becoming

unnecessarily entrenched in an operation. Specific rules and arrangements to declassify military information should be made in advance.

Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation. Differences between military and civilian organisations - whether perceived or otherwise - require an investment in time and understanding so that they may be overcome. Civilian organisations with which the military will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels through CIMIC staffs with representatives of appropriate civilian organisations and lead agencies should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.

CONCLUSION

The most recent NATO operations have shown that relationships between the military and civilian forces exist at all levels and in many different contexts; therefore, NATO must be able to work in cooperation with governmental, international and non-governmental organizations. CIMIC provides an essential link between military forces and the civil environment.

In summary, CIMIC could be defined by the following three core functions: CIMIC has to provide the **civil-military liaison**, in order to **support the force**, but also the **civilian environment**. The long term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to the crisis.

AFGHANISTAN AFTER 9/11

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Afghanistan is a shattered society. The participants in the Bonn Conference have set for the leaders and people of their country the formidable challenge of consolidating the peace process in less than three years. But it will take much more than 36 months to heal the wounds left by 23 years of war. The process of healing has started, however, and the members of the international community must be careful not to allow that process to reverse itself. This requires from all, a continued commitment and determination to stay the course. It also requires that realistic and achievable objectives be set.

~Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-General, 18 March 2002

The aim of this paper is to offer an insight into Afghanistan's realities in order to better understand all the efforts made in this country towards democratization.

I followed the developments after 9/11, the Multinational Coalition and NATO's role in fighting terrorism, as well as future options for stabilizing the country. The history of Afghanistan and its political and social conflicts are long and complex. After twenty-three years of an "internationalized civil war," the country was called a "failed state" with widespread humanitarian issues, massive displacements of the population, and huge reconstruction needs.

The phase of political destabilization started with the 1973 coup of Mohammed Daoud against King Zhair Shaha, who had ruled for forty years. The Soviet invasion in 1979, in the aftermath of a successful coup against the Soviet-backed Daoud, initiated the beginning of a ten-year long civil war. During this time different groups of *mujahedeen*, backed mainly by US-American and Pakistani financial and military

support, tried to oust the Soviet occupational forces.

What occurred in the following years was a continuation of the war between different factions over political control of Kabul and the rest of the country. Since 1994, a new political group called "Taliban," which was based on Islamic fundamentalism, developed in the refugee camps alongside the Pakistani border. Believed by some authorities to be supported by Pakistan, this group quickly succeeded with its military insurgence in Afghanistan, and by 1997 had gained control over most parts of the country, where it established a state based on Islamic fundamentalism and the application of strict *Sharia* law.

As a result of the 9/11 events, Afghanistan came back into the focus of the international community. The United Nations had a prominent role in defining the framework for a political transitional administration and also developed a political road map which included an Emergency Loya Girga¹ as an indigenous

¹ According to the Pashto Descriptive Dictionary, *jirga* is an original Pashto word, which in its common usage refers to the gathering of a few or a large number of people.

mechanism for an elected interim administration.

9/11 dramatically changed the common perception of a threat to security. Terrorism had been before 9/11 a domestic issue, and after that it was recognized as a global threat. It is not identified with a particular country. However, after the

application of Article 5 of the United Nations Charter, military operations were planned against those countries that had shown evidence of supporting terrorism. Afghanistan became the first target and Operation Enduring Freedom ensued.

9/11 AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The U.S. military response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon began on 7 October 2001 when a “war on terror” was declared.

The operation we now know as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was previously planned to have been called Operation Infinite Justice (this name is believed to have been changed following concerns that this might offend the Muslim community as Islam teaches that Allah is the only one who can provide Infinite Justice). The campaign, consisting of U.S. air strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by U.S. special operations, facilitated military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces.

Principally, OEF is a combat mission against anti-Afghan government militants; OEF forces do not conduct “peacekeeping” missions or routinely patrol Afghan neighborhoods. The primary mission is to combat Taliban fighters that have showed increased signs of regrouping in the south and east since mid-2003.

To combat these threats OEF forces, including Afghan troops, are almost constantly on the offensive. The main operations conducted by OEF are:

- **Operation Anaconda** began on March 1, 2002 in the mountainous Shahi Khot region, south of the city of Gardez, in eastern Afghanistan. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and SOF from several other nations set up observation posts. The 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division along with Afghan forces inserted units into the objective area covering some 60 to 70 square miles.

Operation Anaconda used a force of about 2,000 soldiers. More than half were U.S. conventional forces and Special Operations Forces. On March 17, 2002 Operation Anaconda concluded.

- **Operation Mountain Lion** began on April 15, 2002 with the objective of finding enemy fighters in the Gardez and Khost regions. It was the first major initiative since Operation Anaconda. The twelve day battle ended in March in the eastern Shah-i-Kot Mountains.

- **Operation Snipe** began on 2 May 2002. Personnel from the 45th Commando Group had commenced Operation Snipe to search and clear a significant area in the remote Afghan mountains believed to be used as a base by Al Qaida and Taliban forces. The successful conclusion of Snipe was announced on 13 May 2002.

- **Operation Mountain Sweep** began on August 18, 2002. This

Operation was the first for the Army 82nd Rangers and other coalition special operations forces to mount five combat air assault missions.

Mountain Sweep continued where Operation Mountain Lion left off, searching for Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and gathering information about those terrorist organizations. The operation took place mainly around the village of Dormat and Narizah, south of the cities of Khowst and Gardez.

- **Operation Mountain Blizzard** began in January 2004 and was a continuation of Coalition anti-terror and anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. It ended approximately on March 12, 2004.

- **Operation Mountain Storm** began upon the completion of Operation Mountain Blizzard. It was the next in the continuing series of operations in the south, southeast, and eastern Afghanistan, which was designated to destroy terrorist organizations and their infrastructure while continuing to focus on national stability and support.

See Table 1, page 74.

During OEF, Taliban control of the north collapsed first. Mazar-e-Sharif fell on November 9, 2001 to groups led by Dostam, the Shiite leader Ustad Mohaqqueq, and Commander Atta Muhammad. Northern Alliance forces then captured Kabul three days later. The Taliban collapse in the north was followed a loss of control of southern and eastern Afghanistan to pro-U.S. Pashtun forces, led by Hamid Karzai, who is now the President of Afghanistan. Karzai entered Afghanistan just after the September 11 attacks to

organize the Pashtun resistance and was supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became a central actor in U.S. efforts to oust the Taliban from Pashtun areas. Another Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without any coordination or support from U.S. forces, but was captured and killed by the Taliban.

In late March 2003 about 1,000 U.S. troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. During a visit to Afghanistan on May 1, 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan President Karzai said that major combat operations had ended.

Comparison of the U.S. air efforts in Afghanistan with other air operations

It is interesting to make a comparison between the level of U.S. air effort in the conventional phase of the Afghan War, and the U.S. air efforts during the Gulf War, Kosovo campaign, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While there are some minor definitional problems with the data, they clearly reflect a relatively constant level of total air and air strike efforts, but a steady increased in the use of precision guided munitions was clear. At the same time, it should be noted that key factors such as sortie rates, which are highly contingency dependent, and target mix differed strikingly in every case and that no quantifiable data is available on trends in terms of effectiveness of given munitions or aircraft.

See Table 2, page 74.

9/11 AND ISAF

After the 9/11 attacks, The Bonn Agreement¹ and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 created an international peacekeeping force with the aim of assisting the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security. United Nations personnel needed a secure environment in order to build security structures in Afghanistan.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO'S highest decision-making body, provides the political direction and co-ordination for the mission. ISAF is structured into four main components: **ISAF Headquarters** (operation-level direction and planning support to the Kabul Multinational Brigade), the **Kabul Multinational Brigade** (ISAF's tactical headquarters), **Kabul Afghan International Airport**, and the **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**.

The nations comprising the ISAF mission are the following: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. NATO nations have continually contributed more than 90% of the ISAF forces.

¹ In December 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, to decide on a plan for governing the country; as a result, the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)- made up of 30 members, headed by a chairman- was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority (TA), after which elections are held.

On October 14, 2003 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. In April 2004, Germany pledged an additional 100 soldiers to set up a branch of the Konduz PRT, based in the north-eastern city of Faizabad.

As of June 2004 ISAF's troop strength was at over 6,500 troops. France took command of the international force in charge of security of Kabul on August 11, 2004, at which point additional French troops were deployed to reinforce France's military contingent.

The Franco-German Eurocorps took over command of ISAF in August 2004 for a period of six months. They provide the core of the ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. Lieutenant General Jean-Louis Py is the commander of HQ ISAF VI. ISAF operates in conjunction with Afghan security forces in Kabul and coordinates with OEF forces as well.

Security Sector Reform under ISAF

The ISAF security sector reform agenda rests on five pillars: Military Reform , (led by the U.S.), Police Reform (led by Germany), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants (led by Japan), Counter Narcotics (led by U.K.), and Judicial Training (led by Italy).

1) Military and Police Reform

U.S. Special Operations Forces, in partnership with French and British officers, are training the new Afghan National Army (ANA). Up until 2003,

the Afghan National Army was comprised of 1,700-1,800 soldiers.² However, for every trained soldier in the national army, there are at least 100 armed men in local militias throughout the country. Further complicating the process is the high rate of desertion, approximately 40%. Low salaries and living conditions as well as confusion regarding the length and terms of service compelled many graduates to return home after training.³

Many officers in Afghanistan are illiterate and have only a primary education. To firmly establish the state's monopoly over the use of the force, a centrally trained professional police force must be deployed throughout the country.

Endeavoring to stimulate reform, the German government has rehabilitated the national police academy in Kabul, and has donated equipment and instructors.

An encouraging sign on the path toward creating the Afghan Army came in early June 2002 when the Afghan MOD formed a Military Commission intended to monitor and facilitate the training process. Misinformation over rates of salaries, conditions of training, and the contracted length of service are among the most common issues.

The U.S. and Germany are training a national police force. There are five training centers around Afghanistan, with the goal of producing 20,000 police officers trained and deployed by the time of national elections.⁴

² Current ANA strength is approximately 9,800 troops.

³ CARE International 3 (13 January 2003).

⁴ The first presidential election in the country's history was held on October 9, 2004. President Karzai won 60.2 % , Quaroni 18,6 % and Abdul Rashid Dostum 10.1 %.

2) The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process:

Japan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), in concert with the Afghan Government (Defense Ministry), are leading an international effort to demobilize up to 100,000 private militiamen by offering them alternate employment.

This is a lofty objective considering the innate resistance to disarmament displayed by Afghans throughout the country. Lastly, with a lack of employment opportunities in the country, weapons are a source of income. Poverty and the absence of economic opportunities are the main incentive in encouraging Afghans to enter militias or to engage in criminal activity.

In October 2003 the disarmament program began in Konduz, with militiamen beginning to hand in their weapons. A total of about 7,800 militiamen nationwide have been disarmed, including some in Kabul, with a long term goal of disarming 40,000 men before national elections.

3) Countering Narcotics

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) annual opium survey showed that during 2003 Afghanistan produced three-quarters of the world's illicit opium. Heroin production and trafficking produced on the Afghan opium economy is valued at an estimated \$1.3 billion.

The British Department for International Development (DfID) is the lead international coordinator regarding counter-narcotics .It assists in identifying specific issues

related to alternative livelihoods for poppy producers.

On 17 January 2002, in an attempt to arrest drug production, the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) banned poppy cultivation and the consumption of heroin while introducing an aggressive poppy eradication program.

It will be difficult for the ATA to lower production if they cannot provide alternative livelihoods for farmers; the key to counter-narcotics efforts

will be subsidies to farmers for growing alternative crops.

4) Judicial Reform

On 28 November 2002 a judicial reform commission, supported by the Italian government and UNDP, was established. Its aim is to create a national legal framework. In January 2003 a two-years project was initiated, called "Rebuilding the Justice System in Afghanistan." This project involves training judges and other law officers and increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary system.

CIMIC OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The current situation in Afghanistan offers a unique challenge to Civil Military Cooperation for a number of reasons. This includes continuing combat operations in some areas of the country, implementation of the PRT concept, and the presence of nation building agencies with a wide range of agendas and modalities.

The mission of CFC-A (Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan) is to conduct military operations in order to defeat international terrorism and to reduce its national and regional impact on the government of Afghanistan. The CFC-A mission is to promote peace, security, stability, reconstruction, and good governance in Afghanistan. In cooperation with the ATA and the international community, the Command has established PRTs throughout the country.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

In mid-December 2002 the Defense Department launched the concept of PRTs to provide "safe havens" for international aid workers involved in the reconstruction process. To extend the influence of the Kabul

government throughout Afghanistan, the Afghan government has also been attached to the PRTs.

PRTs are composed of U.S. forces, Defence Department Civil Affairs Officers, and representatives of U.S. aid and other agencies and allied personnel. There are ten U.S. run PRTs, each manned by about 50-100 military personnel. These PRTs are now in place in Gradez, Ghazni, Heart, Parwan, Qandahar, Jalalabad, Khost, Qalat, Asadabad, and Tarin Kowt.

At a NATO meeting in February 2004 NATO expressed its intent to take over at least five PRTs by mid-2004, mainly in the north. Britain, Italy, Turkey, and Norway agreed to take over one each. In addition to the Konduz PRT run by Germany, the Netherlands and Spain are considering taking over one as well.¹ ISAF has assumed command of the PRT in Konduz, and is currently planning for a future expansion by

¹ Graham, Bradley, NATO to Expand Force in Afghanistan. Washington Post, February 7, 2004. Knox, Noelle, NATO Allies Urged to Help More in Afghanistan. USA Today, April 27, 2004.

taking over existing PRTs and establishing new ones throughout the country.

Coordination mechanism of CIMIC:

Within Afghanistan, civil military coordination takes place at a number of levels. The established coordination mechanism currently in place is the following:

- The PRT Executive Steering Committee is a monthly meeting conducted with Government Ministers (led by the Minister of Interior), CFC-A, ISAF, UNAMA, and Embassy senior representatives to coordinate major PRT strategic principles;
- The PRT/Civil-Military Working Group advises the PRT Steering Committee. It includes representatives of UNAMA, the Ministry of the Interior, CFC-A, ISAF, nations contributing troops, aid organizations, and national embassies;
- The Joint Coordination Cell Meeting is a weekly meeting hosted by UNAMA (where UN/UNAMA officers interact with the government), CFC-A, and ISAF regarding all operational matters including heavy weapons cantonment, DDR, elections, disaster management, and assistance matters;
- ISAF KMNB G9 hosts weekly meetings at Camp Warehouse for local NGOs and CIMIC teams to coordinate activities in Kabul;
- The PRT Commander's Conference is a quarterly conference hosted by CFC-A where UNAMA and NGOs are invited for a one-day session to raise concerns directly with Coalition PRT Commanders;
- UNAMA gives Civil-military update briefings to the UN, NGOs, and Donors;

- Regional, Provincial, and District Coordination meetings supported by the UN, UNAMA, and NGO Field offices;
- Bilateral meetings are also held between the UN and UNAMA Field Office and civilian and military organizations;
- The UN, UNAMA, and NGO Field offices hold weekly security meetings; and
- There is also a bilateral engagement between local CIMIC and CA teams and NGOs and IOs.

The key to minimizing conflicts between civil-military organs is to maintain an open and constant communication, and also to respect differing means, abilities, and desires to effect communication.

All international organizations, as well as military forces will benefit from a continued dialogue regarding their respective mandated roles and procedures.

At both the institutional and individual levels, civilian and military personnel are encouraged to develop positive working relationships with their counterparts in other agencies, based on a mutual respect for their professionalism, their organization, and mandate.

Achievements in Security

Despite recent political and economic progress, Afghanistan remains a fractured state and a breeding-ground for the drug trade, inter-group rivalry, and internal violence. It is also a testing ground for a new form of multilateral intervention that has yet to achieve its mission.

Continuing security incidents involving the local population and aid personnel have further undermined

public trust in the ability of the government, NATO/ISAF, and coalition forces to deal effectively with armed elements and to prevent the country from sliding towards chaos.

The main risk factors to stability in Afghanistan are represented by the following points.

- Social exclusion based on ethnicity, gender, and political affiliation
- Highly visible presence of foreign military that is “perceived as an occupational force.” This problem is complicated by the presence of two distinct foreign military operations in the country, OEF and ISAF. Both forces are in uniform and are distinguishable to the public. The only exception is represented by the presence of special forces, Operational Detachment-Alpha (OD-A), and intelligence and security personnel who dress in civilian clothes.
- Extremely poor nutrition and health conditions
- Domination of rogue leaders in the north and in the south, illegal taxation, and illegal economies
- Absence of employment opportunities/alternatives to the conflict/drug economy
- Human rights abuses and a lack of intervention

Afghanistan is experiencing a rebirth through international help.² Through comprehensive interviews,³ a statistically representative cross section of the Afghan population identified the following to be key priority needs:

- 1) Improved drinking water quality and quantity;

² For more details see the paper “Afghanistan Reborn”, U.S. Agency for International Development, October 2004.

³ For more details see the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan report.

- 2) Rehabilitation of irrigation systems;
- 3) Construction or repairing of rural roads;
- 4) Improvement to health facilities; and an
- 5) Improvement to education facilities.

There are however, positive aspects in facing the above issues.

- Although the Taliban threatened to kill anyone who registered to vote, **10 million Afghans registered to vote in the upcoming elections.**

Of those registered, more than 40% were women. Furthermore, the voter registration cards proved of value to the Afghans as their first and only identity card.

- **5 million children have been vaccinated.** Seventy-two clinics and hospitals have been rehabilitated. Afghanistan is healthier today than it was when the Taliban barred women from visiting nurses and doctors. Now the life expectancy is 46 years, and the population is growing at close to five per cent a year.

- **Reconstruction accelerated.** There has been more than \$8 billion in international aid pledged. The starting point for reconstruction was the repair of the country’s most important highway, running 300 miles from Kabul to Kandahar.

- **3.7 million Refugees returned.** Since the Taliban’s repressive rule ended in November 2001, there have been 100,000 Afghan refugees returning each month from Pakistani and Iranian camps. It is an epic pilgrimage of an entire people, from old men and women to small children born far from their homeland.

- **Private construction booming.** New Markets, homes, and mosques are rising out of the rubble from past conflict. For the first time in years,

Kabul enjoys a building boom. Foreign aid is fueling part of the building boom, the paving of roads, and the grading of secondary roads; furthermore, clinics, schools, and district centers are receiving funding. Nevertheless, much is driven by the Afghans themselves, including some of the 3.7 million refugees who returned from Pakistan, Iran, and the U.S., bringing their money and know how with them.

• **New Afghan Currency introduced.** The Afghani economic and financial reform is creating confidence as businesses invest and expand. In late 2002, U.S. aid programs financed the collection of all old Afghani currency, which had become nearly worthless and replaced them with new Afghan notes at a ratio of 1,000 old Afghanis per new Afghani note. By January 2003, the currency conversion was complete, reaching every small village and town in the country despite the lack of good roads in many places.

NATO School is also involved in the process of rebuilding Afghani armed forces. Education of the top military and civilian leaders is the aim of special courses run in the past at NATO School.

The Afghan officers (as students in the *Senior Officers NATO Orientation Course*) had the chance to live in an international environment and acquire important information presented to them in order to build new and efficient organizations both in the military and police structure.

I interviewed the Afghan students with the aim of understanding the insights of those directly involved in the Afghan reality, trying to seize

upon the level of confidence the Afghan population places in the International support mechanisms. I personally had the opportunity to interview a policeman from the Minister of the Interior. The following restate transcript is from that interview.⁴

Q: What is your role in the Afghan society?

A: My role is to provide security for Afghani citizens. As you know, in our country we have three forces: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary powers. I'm a police man and the police job is to provide security in the city. Our main role is law enforcement and the law is equal for our citizens. We should provide peace and stability in the society as well.

Q: What is the impact of the new political system for the Afghan society?

A: After the fall of the Taliban regime, there were no laws and no institutions. So, we had to create them. You know very well that during the Taliban regime there weren't any rules, any coordination, and any treaties. Human rights were constantly violated. Naturally, after the fall of the Taliban regime the new government has created laws based on international human right conventions and other conventions.

Q: In your opinion, which are the main security issues in your country today? Namely:

- **poppy cultivation**
- **force protection of US and NATO forces**
- **Crime Index**

⁴ I conducted the interview on the 9th of August at 10.30 on the Commandant's Conference Room at the NATO School in Oberammergau. An interpreter helped me in the translation of questions and answers.

A: As you know, Afghanistan is one of the biggest producers of poppy and there are a lot of poppy manufactures. This is not only an Afghan issue; it involved all international forces that are fighting this threat. We need help from international forces. Anti-poppy efforts fall into four main areas: alternative jobs, eradicating poppy in the field, interdiction, and enforcement of anti-drug laws. The two big issues and sources of insecurity and instability in Afghanistan are the cultivation of poppy and terrorism. A lot of countries in the world have this problem, and we can't cope alone, the International community has to help us. Helping the Afghan people in this fight is useful not only for the Afghans but for all the international community.

Q Can you tell me a few things regarding the cooperation between Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?

A: After the fall of the Taliban regime, according to the Bonn Agreement, the International Security Assistance Force helps the Afghans by providing security within the ATA area. The Bonn Agreement has three stages in which ISAF forces have to support us in monitoring the transfer of authority to the Afghan Transitional Authority and the creation of a Loya Jirga. These two steps have been passed

Conclusion

Afghanistan has to face many security challenges. Concreted efforts are needed to address the social and economic well-being of the Afghan population; to establish

successfully but the third step is not still completed. I mean the presidential elections, we are preparing for. The ISAF forces, under the UN mandate have done a very good job by working closely with ATA on security issues. Cooperation between the ISAF forces and the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defense, and National Directorate of security was very good from the beginning. They provide security and stability in Kabul and its area. ISAF has cooperated very well also through the CIMIC projects by providing buildings, schools, houses and so on. Recently, the expansion of ISAF out of Kabul and in different provinces is another positive aspect. The Afghan people see ISAF forces as reliable ones and they cooperated in providing security in the country. History always showed strong reactions of Afghanistan people against the foreign forces, but this time you can see that the people are very happy and they are reacting very positively regarding the ISAF forces on the ground. ISAF forces share responsibilities in providing security with Afghan forces, mainly on the operational level.

At the end of the interview, the students had expressed their gratitude and their appreciation for the quality and the level of instruction in the course they attended at the NATO school.

the rule of law to reconcile different parts in conflict and to build a transparent and self-functioning government.

Afghanistan has passed through many years of conflicts and suffering; everything must be done to ensure that this is stopped and that a new positive future is built.

The neighboring states and international community clearly play a major role on the way towards peace and reconstruction by providing human and financial support and by avoiding any negative interference.

I can conclude that the transformation of Afghanistan is a process that may last for a long time; it's important that the international community follow this

process in tight coordination with the ATA, which is headed in the right direction and is giving a true sense of hope to the Afghan people.

While the task of rebuilding Afghanistan is primarily one for the Afghans themselves, NATO is helping create the necessary stability that is a prerequisite for successful reconstruction. The Alliance has a chance to help them develop and build a functioning peaceful state.

It is clear that the stability of Afghanistan is an essential factor for the stability of central Asia; moreover, the entire world.

Table 1. Operation Enduring Freedom casualties as of May 21, 2004:¹

OEF U.S. Military Casualties	Total Deaths	KIA *	Non-Hostile	WIA RTD**	WIA not RTD***
In and Around Afghanistan	85	51	34		
Other locations	37	2	35		
Worldwide total	122	53	69	105	197

* Killed in Action

** Wounded in Action and returned to duty within 72 hours.

*** Wounded in Action and not returned to duty within 72 hours.

Table 2. US Airpower in Recent Regional Conflicts²

	Desert Storm	Serbia/Kosovo	Afghanistan	Iraq War**
Area of Operations in Square Miles	176,000	39,500	250,000	437,072
Length of War in Days	43	78	?	?
Total sorties During Period Reported	118,700	37,500	29,000	41,404
Percentage of Total Sorties Flown by U.S.*	85	60	92	93
Offensive Strike Sorties	41,300	10,808	17,500	18,695
Sorties per Day	2,800	200 climbing to 2,000	25 climbing to 200	1,100
Total Bombs Delivered*	265,000	23,000	22,000	26,096**
Precision-Guided Bombs Delivered*	20,450	8,050	12,500	16,845
Percentage of Total Munitions that are Precision-Guided	89	80	99	97
Percentage of Precision-Guided Weapons Delivered by U.S.	7-8%	35%	56%	68%
Combat Losses	38	2	0	7

* Data based on Micheal O'Hanlon and an estimate of 38,000 total sorties flown.

** Data based on Lt. Gen. T. Micheal Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the Numbers, April 30, 2003.

¹ OEF includes casualties that occurred in Afghanistan, Philippines, Pakistan, Kuwait, Persian Gulf, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Djibouty, Uzbekistan, Arabian Sea, Qatar and the North Arabian Peninsula.

² Significant definitional problems exist in making such counts and historical sources differ. This count is based on the work of Thomas Keane at Johns Hopkins University and on an article authored by Micheal E. O'Hanlon entitled "A Flawed Masterpiece" (Foreign Affairs, Vol 81, No. 3, March/April 2002, p.52)

Table 3. Afghanistan at a glance

Population: 27.7 million (July 2002 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Pashtun 44%, Tajik 25%, Uzbek 8%, Hazara 10%, others 13%.
Religions: Sunni Muslim 84%, Shiite Muslim 15%, other 1%
GDP Per Capita: \$ 8000/yr
External Debt: \$ 2,300 (1999, CIA World Fact book)
Major Exports: fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems.
Major Imports: food, petroleum, capital goods.

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The NATO School's Research and Publications Department will be hiring two research fellows. Positions are open to NATO and PfP members citizens. Successful applicants will be offered a one year contract and are expected to start in either late May or late June 2005.

In order to be eligible for NATO School Research Fellowship individuals should have a first degree, Master's degree, or equivalent experience. The degree or experience should fall within one of the following rubrics: Economics, Political Science, the Social Sciences, International Relations, Law, or another relevant field. Ph.D. candidates are also welcome to apply.

Ideally, NATO School research fellows will have some recent experience in another NATO body or agency.

Candidates should be fluent in oral and written English. Knowledge of other European languages is a further asset.

Fellows also need to be proficient using E-mail, internet browsers, and Microsoft Office 2000 or XP (Word, Power Point, and Excel).

Fellowship candidates should already have some experience with academic research and writing.

A NATO Secret security clearance or an EU national equivalent is required.

Research fellows are tasked with editing NATO School's publication, such as POLARIS Special Issue and POLARIS Quarterly Journal.

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On a time-available basis they conduct research on specific topics for the School's four academic departments, updating course materials for existing courses or to assist course directors in developing new courses.

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The NATO School's research fellows have a significant amount of freedom to launch their own individual projects, pending approval from the Department Director.

Applicants should forward the following items to the Research and Publications Department Director: *letter of application* stating their motivation, area of interest, and competencies; *a copy of their resume*; *a copy of their diploma*; and *two letters of recommendation* from referees acquainted with the applicant's recent work. Please don't send any original document.

Send your complete application package no later than February 1, 2005 via both E-mail and post to:

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N3-16, "NATO Senior Officer Information Operations and Command and Control Warfare Course" (2005: "NATO Senior Officer Information Operation Course")
N3-17, "NATO Conventional Targeting Course"
N3-19, "NATO Information Operations and Command and Control Warfare Course" (2005: "NATO Information Operation Course")
N3-20, "ACO Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Course"
N3-21, "NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Course"
N3-22, "NATO Operational Electronic Warfare Course"
N3-23, "Introduction to Employment of NATO Air Power Course" (new course in 2005, details will be available soon)
N3-24, "ACO Land Operational Evaluation (OE) Course"
N3-25, "ACO GBAD Operations TACEVAL Course"
N3-27, "ACO TACEVAL Force Protection Evaluator Course"
N3-28, "ACO Air & ASACS Operations TACEVAL Evaluator Course"
P5-39, "NATO Reserve Forces Integration Course"
N2-47, "NATO Intel Warning System (NIWS) Course"
M2-48, "NATO Geographic Officer Course"
N3-97, "NATO Conventional Weaponneering Course"

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N5-13, "NATO Nuclear Policy & Risks of Proliferation Course"
M3-70, "NATO NBC Defence Orientation Course" (merged with N3-70)
N3-71, "NATO NBC Warning and Reporting System – Manual Procedures Course"
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N3-73, "NATO Officer NBC Defence Policy Course"
M3-75, "Environmental Protection of Military Forces Course"
M3-78, "Environmental Planning for NATO-Led Operations and Exercises Course"
M9-79, "Joint Medical Planner Course" (course number will change to M9-85 in 2005)
N3-80, "Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability Course"
N3-81, "NATO Biological Warfare Defence Awareness Course"
N3-83, "WMD Senior Officer Study Period"
M9-85, "Joint Medical Planner Course" (course number changed from M9-79 to M9-85 in 2005)
M9-86, "Senior Medical Staff Course"
N9-87, "Medical Intelligence Course"
M9-88, "Major Incident Medical Management and Support Course"

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S5-18, "Combined CFE Arms Control Verification Inspector/Escort Course"
P4-30, "Resource Management Education Programme (RMEP) Course"
N5-31, "NATO Senior Officer Policy Course"
M5-32, "NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course"
M5-33, "NATO Senior NCO Orientation Course"
P5-34, "NATO Legal Course"
N5-35, "Bi-SC Command and Control Course"
N5-36, "NATO Staff Officer Defence Planning Course"
M5-37, "NATO/PfP Chaplain Operations Course"
P4-38, "Resource Orientation Course"
M5-41, "NATO European Security Cooperation Course"
M5-42, "Multinational Forces Orientation Course"
S5-43, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Security Cooperation Course"
P5-44, "NATO Force Protection Course"
M5-46, "NATO Public Information Course"
M9-56, "NATO Civil Emergency Planning and Civil Military Cooperation (CEP/CIMIC) Course"
M9-57, "NATO Strategic / Operational Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Course"
M9-59, "NATO Operational Liaison Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Course"
M5-61, "Arms Control Counter-Proliferation Course" (pilot course)
M5-62, "Arms Control Implementation Orientation Course"
S5-63, "Arms Control Implementation Inspector/Escort Course"
S5-64, "Conventional Arms Control Information Exchange Course"
M5-65, "Arms Control - Vienna Document Compliance and Verification Course"
M5-66, "NATO Counter Terrorism Course"
M5-67, "NATO Operational Military Police Course"
M5-98, "NATO Academic Instructor Course"

