NATO Expansion

CIAO Draft
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At the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997, NATO leaders issued a formal invitation to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin talks on accession to full NATO membership.

1.

The expansion of the alliance to include three former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization seemed to some observers *the* epochal event to mark the end of the Cold War in Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called this decision "historic," and "an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe."[1] Henry Kissinger wrote, "the Clinton Administration should be applauded for braving both domestic and Russian opposition in urging the admission of new members into NATO." [2] At the same time, the venerable George Kennan did not mince words in his opposition to the expansion. In a *New York Times* editorial, Kennan avowed that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era." [3] The influential foreign policy analyst Michael Mandelbaum predicted that NATO expansion would be a "bridge to the nineteenth century…a tradition featuring great power rivalry, shifting alliances, and continuing concern with an unregulated military balance."[4]]

How significant is NATO expansion for theories of international politics? Surely it is hard to single out a discrete analytic outcome, a data point that could appropriately be used to 'test' the predictions of any particular theory. NATO expansion is deeply embedded in other central aspects of post-Cold War politics: the debacle in the former Yugoslavia, European Union procrastination, the vagaries of Russia's reform effort. Yet states that join NATO agree (at a minimum) to commit their armed forces to the defense of other states' independence and territorial integrity. This is the most significant peacetime commitment that sovereign states are likely to make to one another, and they do not make it lightly.

NATO's expansion in the face of the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to confound the straightforward predictions of realism — that an alliance whose enemy has gone away will see the common interests of the allied states deteriorate in ways that undermine the alliance and cause it to dissolve. Other schools of international relations theory answered back with contrary arguments: NATO was much more than a military alliance (or much less); NATO was ultimately just an organization trying to expand its reach and mission; NATO was re-casting its defenses against a new set of enemies.

But these high-level debates about the theoretical implications of NATO expansion seem strangely out of touch with the conventional politics that characterized the process. In retrospect, the story of NATO expansion is almost exasperating in its normalcy. This was commonplace diplomacy, and there have been no resulting huge discontinuities. IR theories seem indeterminate about the causes, and equally so the consequences, of NATO expansion, and for the most part do not give a good sense of the time-frame in which this kind of a decision really ought to matter for international

politics. This essay tells the story of NATO expansion from the perspective of diplomacy and foreign policy decision-making, as well as from the perspective of IR theory. The conclusion uses the NATO case to elaborate the interesting and subtle relationship between these two perspectives.

2.

The strategic debate around NATO expansion was for the most part quite straightforward. Those in favor of expansion saw a clear opportunity to consolidate America's Cold War 'victory' by locking in the allegiance of newly-democratic nations and helping to ensure their stability. They worried about a resurgent Russian military threat, and saw NATO as a prudent long-term insurance policy against that possibility. NATO expansion would also guarantee a continuing leadership role for the United States in Europe. Central Europe in particular would become a region of NATO (or American) influence, which was preferable to an alternative destiny of German influence or Russo-German rivalry.

Opponents of expansion countered each of these arguments. The consolidation of Europe was an economic and political question, not a security one, and should thus be the responsibility of the European Union instead of NATO. The collapse of Russian military power in Europe made an insurance policy at best superfluous, and rendered it not worth the considerable cost. At worst, NATO expansion would increase tensions in Russian-U.S. relations, strengthen nationalist and reactionary forces in Moscow, and just possibly undermine the precarious Russian domestic political balance which, at the time, stood tenuously favored reform. Expanding NATO membership to include some countries but

not others would have a hugely negative impact on those excluded. Furthermore, the strictly military implications were problematic. NATO would clearly suffer strategically if the military effectiveness of the alliance were diluted by the addition of these new members; but if NATO were instead to be strengthened by the additions, wouldn't the Russians have reason to fear?   It might be that pushing an effective NATO military presence eastward would invert the nuclear first-use strategy of the Cold War. NATO had earlier adopted this strategic posture to compensate for its conventional inferiority to Soviet forces — wouldn't the Russians be moved to do the same in the face of NATO conventional superiority?[5]

The diplomatic history of the decision to expand NATO unfolds against the backdrop of these arguments. But it does not look to be deeply determined by them. The history reveals a familiar process of intrabureaucratic wrangling and disagreement about the parameters of uncertainty over strategies, costs, and international as well as domestic political implications. International relations theories and strategic arguments (as well as more mundane ideas) were deployed in this process, to uncertain effect. NATO expansion was not the product of a single discrete decision reached on the basis of clear arguments, but rather the result of a series of incremental decisions driven by things like the timing of summits and the determined advocacy of a few key individuals who coaxed President Clinton to action. This was conventional policy-making — not a surprise to anyone familiar with governments, but revealing in several ways of a complex relationship between theory and practice at key moments in post-Cold War diplomatic history.

James Goldgeier divides the decision-making story into three clear phases.[6] In

phase one, the entering Clinton Administration found itself under quick and intense

pressure to deal with the very complex problem of plotting NATO's future. Secretary of

State Warren Christopher told a June 1993 meeting of NATO foreign ministers that the

question of expansion was not at that moment on the US agenda, but he also recognized

the necessity to have *some* plan for NATO, and soon. Clinton was heavily lobbied by

Poland's Lech Walesa and the Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel, both of whom told the

President in vehement and highly emotional terms that NATO membership was their top

foreign policy priority.

As the Washington bureaucracy geared up its preparations for a NATO heads of

state meeting scheduled for January 1994, Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony

Lake, began seriously to ask the question, "Why not expand NATO now?" Lake

proposed that a developing foreign policy doctrine around the idea of 'enlargement' —

which proposed that a widening community of market-oriented and democratic states

would share essential interests with the US and evolve in peaceful ways — prescribed

NATO expansion sooner rather than later. While he found support for key elements of

this view within the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, many other key State

Department officials (particularly Strobe Talbott, then ambassador at large for the former

Soviet states) were deeply opposed to NATO expansion because of the possible effect on

Russian domestic politics. The Pentagon generally resisted the idea of expanding the

alliance on the grounds that it would dilute the military effectiveness of NATO. General

Shalikashvili (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) offered as an alternative the

Partnership for Peace, a series of consultations and joint exercises that even Russia could

join. Clearly, the PFP was designed to enable Washington to partially answer the pointed questions of Walesa and Havel, while postponing any question of formal enlargement, or the even more difficult questions about NATO's ultimate role in 21st century Europe.[7]

The debate reached the President's desk in October. Clinton managed it with a compromise: at the NATO heads of state meeting in January, he would formally present the PFP, along with a deliberately vague statement about NATO's intention to eventually expand.

This hardly settled the matter. In the hectic weeks of preparation leading up to the January summit, those on each side of the debate seized on the President's ambiguous compromise to claim that they had in fact now been given Clinton's endorsement and could move their initiative forward. This was phase two of the process, a conventional bureaucratic political dynamic where a summit deadline becomes the driving force behind a decision. The focal question was simple: what would Clinton actually say to the NATO heads of state in Brussels?

Foreign policy elites outside the administration weighed in more heavily at this point. Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brezinski, and James Baker each spoke out publicly on the issue, calling for a more explicit path to NATO membership and for one version or another of a 'clear roadmap.'[8] Within the administration, Lake pressed his case against the opposition of a bureaucracy — including the majority of his own staff at the NSC — which remained reluctant to accelerate expansion. Shalikashvili continued to stress the PFP as the core of administration policy; the Pentagon's ideal scenario was to have countries participate in the PFP for a number of years before the alliance would consider seriously the issue of expansion. On January 4th Clinton seemed to endorse this position:

I'm not against expanding NATO. I just think that if you look at the consensus of the NATO members at this time, there's not a consensus to expand NATO at this time and we don't want to give the impression that we're creating another dividing line in Europe after we've worked decades to get rid of the one that existed before.[9][Clinton, 1994 #89]

By imputing the reason for delay to the NATO allies and not making a clear statement about U.S. policy preferences, Clinton left himself and his policy advisors considerable wiggle room. Lake continued to push for more forceful statements. When the President presented the PFP proposal in Brussels, he said it "sets in motion a process that leads to enlargement of NATO." Later, in Prague, Clinton specified that the PFP was not "a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialogue so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how."[10] This was a subtle but important shift of tone, although there was still plenty of ambiguity. Expansion skeptics interpreted "when" as being a long time off, and believed that Clinton had put off any practical discussion of expansion for the indefinite future. Lake, however, read this as a clear endorsement of his position, and a license to proceed with a planning process that would make the "when" happen as soon as possible.

Phase three of the story began to take shape around the planning for Clinton's scheduled visit to Poland in July 1994. Lake put together a small group of close advisors in April to generate a policy paper and action plan, outside the normal interagency process. Late in the game, they brought in Strobe Talbott (now deputy secretary of state) to try to gain the support of this key bureaucratic player and close friend of the President. Talbott seemed to understand that the momentum had changed, and he shifted from opposing expansion to trying to make sure that expansion would proceed in a way that minimized risks to the U.S.-Russian relationship. In Warsaw in July, the President made

an even more forceful statement, saying that the time had come to discuss what the next steps on NATO should be. In September, Clinton told Russian President Yeltsin that, while NATO would not embarrass Yeltsin by announcing new member states in the run-up to Russia's 1996 elections, the alliance was indeed going to expand.

These statements certainly empowered proponents of expansion within the administration to press their case. Responsibility for leading the process now passed to Richard Holbrooke, who was brought back from his ambassador post in Germany to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Holbrooke, who was known for his ambition and ruthless politics, made it clear that he was going to drive the expansion process hard because Clinton wanted it to happen.

Facing down senior officials from the Pentagon and the Defense Department at his first major interagency meeting on NATO expansion in late September, Holbrooke left no doubt that he interpreted the President's statements as a mandate to proceed rapidly, and that his interpretation would be definitive. Rather than deal directly with the various interpretations of what U.S. policy on expansion actually was at the moment, he did a bureaucratic end-run and instructed the Defense Department to prepare a report on the full range of military requirements new member states would have to meet in order to join NATO.

The Pentagon complied, even though top officials there did not believe that the administration had yet made a formal decision to proceed with expansion. Secretary of Defense William Perry now forced an explicit answer to that question by asking the President for a meeting of foreign policy principals on the issue. Perry argued in favor of postponing any consideration of enlargement for at least a year while moving forward on

PFP, ut the President sided with Lake and formally endorsed an explicit plan. This was the plan that would lead ultimately to the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which in turn set the diplomatic stage for the July 1997 NATO summit where the process of expansion officially began.

As with all digested histories, this is a selective snapshot of the decision-making process. There were other key elements at play: working with the NATO allies to assure their support, managing concerns about the potential fallout for Russia, and laying the groundwork for the necessary Senate ratification of any agreement for expansion. From a theoretical perspective, the most troubling omission is that we simply don't have deep access to Clinton's decisional calculus. Why did the President choose the way he did, when he did?

Most of what we know is based on the reports of other interested actors, or on inferences from Clinton's statements. The President was probably persuaded to some degree by the emotional appeals of Walesa and Havel. Given the strategic uncertainty surrounding NATO's military missions, it was helpful to be able to take steps around shared values as well as shared interests, which at this point were somewhat harder to define. Interestingly, the President seems to have been predisposed to favor Lake's nascent foreign policy doctrine of enlargement. The argument that democracies do not fight wars against other democracies, contested as it may be among scholars, had become a powerful foreign policy belief in much of Washington, and particularly within the Democratic Party. Clinton seems to have been confident that he could manage the potential downside with Russia, in part through his personal relationship with Yeltsin. And it seems clear that NATO expansion presented an opportunity to display definitive

foreign policy leadership in Europe, at a time when U.S. policy on Bosnia was faltering. There is little firm evidence to suggest that domestic electoral politics played a central role, although Clinton was surely aware of key Midwestern voting blocs with strong cultural and ethnic ties to Central Europe.[11] And although there was certainly some money to be made by defense contractors selling updated equipment and facilities to new NATO allies, there is little evidence that the machinations of a military-industrial complex drove the process forward.

It is frustrating (but by no means unusual) that the available historical evidence does not provide a definitive explanation for the decision to expand NATO. The question then becomes, What kind of theoretical leverage can be gained from what is known about the story?

3.

One role of theory is to suggest what it is that actors should want, or should do, in order to best achieve their goals (which are often assumed). Theories of security institutions generally start with the assumption that states want to maximize their security at minimum cost and with the minimum necessary derogation to their autonomy. Even at such a high level of abstraction, major theoretical traditions in international politics gave strikingly inconsistent arguments about NATO's future. Realists, for example, could be found both prescribing and predicting NATO expansion (as an insurance policy against future threats) and prescribing and predicting the dissolution of NATO (as an alliance without a shared enemy). Some institutionalists saw NATO as an essential part of a persistent regime; others looked to the OSCE as the institutional setting in which

European security ought to be or would be managed. The debate was surely clouded by policy advocacy and (in part as a result) by confusion about the relevant 'dependent variable' — is theory in this setting predictive of state preferences, of state behavior, of short-term outcomes, or perhaps of longer-term outcomes that have not yet emerged? Even so, theoretical confusion on such a central question of international political behavior suggests to me that it is necessary to go back to first principles and re-cast the way the question is being posed.

What are states trying to do when they create or join a European security institution at the end of the Cold War? This is not a trivial question: there exist twenty or perhaps thirty relevant states (not to mention other influential actors); different attitudes toward risk; substantial uncertainty about the future; complicated legacies of political, cultural, and ethnic discord; military organizations in the process of reform; and more. Any institutional design for European security is, at best, a messy experiment.

Assume that states understand this, and that the notion of designing an 'optimal' institution is not a serious one. States simply wish to create or join an institution that will increase their security against perceived threats. The institution is fundamentally a set of promises or contracts that member states make between themselves. Constructing a security institution can then be seen as a kind of contracting problem. And in an anarchic international environment, the central question becomes this: *ex post*, will a state fulfill the terms of the contract that is signed *ex ante*?[12] Institutions, then, are mechanisms that enhance the credibility of certain promises that states would like to make to each other.

Groups of states face two kinds of threats to which promises might apply. The first is usually the main reason they join together at all — an external threat from a

potential aggressor who is not part of the group. The second is more insidious, but often

just as dangerous. It is an internal threat from a member of the group itself, who at some

point in the future might choose to betray its alliance partners and use force against them

to gain an advantage. A group of states can create an institutional structure that is

designed to lessen one or the other threat, ut it is very hard to design an institutional

structure that lessens both at the same time.

Figure 1 below illustrates the logic of this dilemma. The key element is the

particular kind of promise that states want to make to one another. I use this lever to

differentiate between two ideal types of security institutions, the alliance and the security

community. Political scientists use both of these terms frequently, but often imprecisely.

The obvious advantage of viewing both through the context of promises and contracting

is to create a unified theoretical perspective that can highlight the logical differences

between them.

Figure 1

	Alliance	**Security Community**
Purpose	States join to defend against a common external enemy	States join to increase common welfare by enhancing interdependence
What kind of promise?	An attack on one is an attack on all: "I will use force to defend my allies even when my own security is not threatened"	Disputes between states are settled peaceably: "I will not use force against any member of the security community"
What kinds of institutions	Authoritative or hierarchical	Egalitarian decision

add credibility to the promise?	decision structure. Unified military command. Maximum integration of armed forces	structure. Peaceful dispute settlement procedures. Other means for enhancing transparency, such as sharing information and confidence-building measures

In an ideal-type alliance, states join together to defend against a common external enemy. This requires that states make promises to each other that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all. Each individual state must promise that it will use force to defend its allies even when its own security is not immediately threatened. This is a difficult promise to make credible *ex ante*, since, *ex post,* the incentives to defect would frequently be high. History is full of cases where the alliance promise was not very credible and was not in fact adhered to when push came to shove. What is less easy to see in the historical record is the non-appearance of alliances that might have come to be if such a promise could have been made in a credible way. The consequence is that even states which have no overt intention to defect or free-ride on alliance commitments must take steps to enhance the credibility of their promises, to bind themselves in ways that would discourage defection, and to reassure their allies that they are in fact so bound.

There are many different ways to partially enhance the credibility of an alliance promise. The US came up with several tricks during the Cold War to try to make its promise credible to the European allies. Forward basing of American soldiers and nuclear weapons — the so-called 'tripwire' — were the most obvious. Institutional arrangements can contribute as well. An alliance is most credible if states can agree to an authoritative, or at least a hierarchical decision-making structure. A unified military command with as much coordination among national armed forces as is practicable

would also contribute to the alliance's credibility. States might also choose to agree to joint training, exercises, and procurement. The aim of these measures would be to maximize integration of command, deployment, and operation of armed forces, so that when an external threat challenged the alliance, individual states would find it prohibitively difficult to do anything other than proceed with the plans of the alliance and fight in defense of the group.

The goals of a security community are different, and actually somewhat broader. States in a security community engage each other in high levels of economic, social, and political interdependence. Their willingness to do so rests on a promise that they will not use force among themselves and that disputes will be settled peaceably. States that cannot credibly make such a promise will be constrained from accepting the vulnerabilities that accompany the kind of interdependence that yields the collective benefits of a security community.

While it is probably easier for states that share democratic values, norms, and a common history of successful cooperation to promise credibly that they will not use force against each other in the future, those things by themselves are not likely to be sufficient. Institutions can play a reinforcing role here, as they do in alliance systems. But the ideal-type institutions of a security community would look very different from those of an alliance. Authority and coercion go against the notion of formally equal states that recognize each other's legitimate sovereignty. Thus, instead of stressing hierarchy, the institutions of a security community would stress equivalence. Decisions would be made by consensus and implemented voluntarily. The primary function of institutions would be to enhance transparency and to facilitate the sharing of information among states that

have every reason to want to share information with each other. Confidence-building measures and legal-technical procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes are more important here than the efficient decision-making and implementation structures more suited to an alliance.

This kind of analysis could be developed further with additional arguments from organization theory, or elaborated into formal models. But even in this simple state, it yields an important insight: *There are clear contradictions between the kinds of institutions that make sense for an alliance and those that make sense for a security community*. The lack of a 'perfect' institutional structure for European security going forward into the 21st century is not just a matter of politicians' inability to think clearly or to solve problems rationally. And it is not only a matter of uncertainty about the contours of the future environment, although that is certainly a complicating factor. It is, fundamentally, a matter of a logical contradiction that cannot be solved in its current form. Europe almost certainly needs both an alliance and a security community going forward, but it cannot have either without some cost to the other.

NATO is a peculiar mix of an alliance and a security community. I have written in detail elsewhere about the quirky story of how it got to be that way, but for the current debate on enlargement the story of NATO's origins is less important. Over time, NATO's principle alliance goal — to defend Western Europe against external aggression from the Soviet Union — was balanced against a security community goal — to prevent the use of force between NATO member states and particularly to solve the Franco-German security problem. NATO's institutional structure, predictably, reflects a compromise between the logical demands of these goals. Like all compromises, it is awkward. It

includes unprecedented elements of supra-sovereign authority over the armed forces of states. At the same time, it constrains that authority in ways that severely complicate the task of mounting an efficient and effective defense.

NATO's institutional structure was at once a source of frustration for military planners and a source of comfort for political analysts. The military planners wanted a more effective alliance. The political analysts assumed away the challenge of deterrence, and proclaimed that NATO was first and foremost a "political alliance" — by which they meant something approximating a security community.

In fact, NATO was and is both. It promotes both objectives, in ways that are certainly non-optimal, often clumsy, and sometimes expensive.

When the Cold War ended, NATO's peculiar institutional structure attracted new criticism. It was portrayed as a historical anachronism, an inefficient jumble of incentives, a poorly-organized and unwieldy organization that could not re-cast itself to fit new realities and should be junked. This criticism missed the important point that states later recognized when they chose NATO as the preferred institutional framework within which to go forward. Quirky historical processes sometimes generate structures that are reasonably well adapted to an unexpected change in their environment. Under conditions of great uncertainty, to be 'adapted' often means to remain *adaptable*. Hedging your bets is not a good way to create efficiency in the pursuit of any single particular goal, but it can be a very attractive approach when the environment is changing in ways that make the goal or goals that will be desired more uncertain. NATO made sense precisely because it allowed states to postpone (perhaps for a very long time?) any explicit decision between alliance and security community in Europe.

4.

Dramatic historical discontinuities sometimes force exacting scrutiny of existing policies and institutions. The end of the Cold War in Europe put NATO under the microscope. Many IR theorists and policy analysts were implicitly uncomfortable with the peculiar institutional structure of NATO. Some wanted (not necessarily in a conscious way) to force a de facto decision about NATO: Is this an alliance or a security community? The problem is that this question is based more in an intellectual agenda more than in a political agenda. State leaders did not desire to make that decision and were under no practical pressure to do so.

Many advocates of expansion wanted to see NATO as a security community. It would then make sense to admit states on the basis of their democratic standing, how their governments and armies behave, how they expressed 'Western' or 'democratic' values, etc. Many opponents of expansion wanted to see NATO as an alliance. In that case it would make sense to admit states on the basis of concrete security interests, i.e., territories that were critically important for existing NATO states, or that could make a valuable contribution to NATO's own protection. Alliances do not strengthen themselves by including weak, dependent, and vulnerable new states that are geographically situated between two great powers. Of course, these were not the only arguments that could be derived logically from presumptions about what kind of security institution Europe needed — for example, the security community argument was also relevant to OSCE. But state leaders did not want to rely on OSCE, precisely because it did not have enough of what an alliance offers in its structure.

NATO is a massive institutional 'fudge' between alliance and security community. It has been so throughout its life and it remains so. It has made decisions about new members for both reasons. NATO admitted Turkey principally for strategic security reasons. It admitted Portugal in part to stabilize democratic rule and enlarge a security community. In 1955, of course, it admitted the Federal Republic of Germany for both kinds of reasons.

Forty years later, the Central Europeans also wanted to join NATO for both kinds of reasons. They clearly wanted to be part of an alliance for the security promises it offers. They also wanted to import a template for the reform and reconstruction of the military — and just as the *acquis communitaire* of the EU offers a template for constructing a modern legal-economic infrastructure, NATO offers the same for a modern military force. They also wanted clear recognition and endorsement of their ongoing achievements in the reconstruction of democracy, civil society, and the rule of law , in part to stabilize those achievements and to drive the process forward. NATO was not the perfect answer to any of these needs. But it was a partial answer to all of them.

The story of NATO expansion suggests a real lesson in modesty about theoretical understandings of security, institutions, and the nexus between them. By reframing around the concepts of alliance and security community the question of why states chose to expand NATO, I was able to get some theoretical traction on preferences and decisions that otherwise look inconsistent or peculiar. But even these arguments do not yield precise expectations on clearly defined dependent variables. At best, they identify one important causal force behind a set of decisions that was surely driven forward by many other causal forces as well.

When it comes to the presumed effects of NATO expansion, evaluating theories is an even harder task. Did NATO expansion 'work'? Even presuming that we know precisely what NATO expansion was intended to do, the question is still very difficult to answer. Political and economic reforms have proceeded apace in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. There has been no violent conflict in this part of Europe. Is NATO membership a contributing cause? The answer is "maybe" — there are far too many other variables at work and no well-controlled comparisons on offer. Russia, on the other hand, has probably gone downhill. But there is no hard evidence that NATO expansion had any direct effect on the course of Russian domestic politics. If Russian reform collapses in a nationalist backlash, some Western opponents of NATO expansion will portray this as vindicating their arguments. Expect to hear "I told you so." But will they really know that they were right?

What comes next? The stakes in NATO are likely to get larger. President Clinton committed the United States to review the enlargement process no later than 2002. The next round of potential applicants could raise new issues about core strategic concerns for Russia (the Baltics, to say nothing of Ukraine) and less stable domestic polities (Romania, Bulgaria). At the same time, NATO itself is undergoing substantial reorientation of its missions and the responsibilities and prerogatives of the European members. What was a complicated story in the 1990s will surely become even more complicated in the next decade.

Intellectually, from both a policy and a theoretical standpoint, the NATO question is probably best considered as an embedded part of a broader question. The normative form of that broader question is, What should be the American role in Europe? The

analytic behind it is this: Will Europe (Germany, individual European states, Europe as a whole) and the U.S. in the future see security interests very differently now that the Cold War is over?

That question has security, economic, and cultural drivers. It was a far too big, amorphous, and (frankly) frightening question to ask in a serious way in 1994 or 1996. But the future of NATO is ultimately embedded in that larger context, and in the long run NATO's future will follow from how it is answered.   Ironically, that might make the future of NATO more amenable to deep analysis by international relations theories, because the causal determinants would be connected to a more fundamental set of questions.

NATO Expansion Web Resources

The most comprehensive independent resource for information on NATO expansion on the web is a site maintained by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), available at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/index.html. The FAS' dossier contains analyses of the policy-making process, NATO documents on the issue, as well as documents from several key NATO allies.

For NATO's own account of its history, see http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/what-is.htm, and for the text of the original Washington Treaty establishing NATO in 1949 see http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

As to NATO enlargement itself, see http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/access.htm for a timeline on the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. A key document in the process was NATO's 1995 comprehensive study on enlargement at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm. While contemplating enlargement, NATO also pursued the Partnership for Peace (PFP), a current overview of which can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm.

At the Madrid Summit of 1997, NATO invited the first three former Warsaw Pact members to join. The invitation was a central element of the summit's communiqué, a document that can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/m970708/home.htm.

Two years later, at NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, the

Alliance formally welcomed the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as new members.

The summit was of course overshadowed by the war in Kosovo. For an overview of the

Anniversary Summit, with particular attention to the new members, see

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/ach-summ.htm. For the summit's official

communiqué, see http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm.

In addition to adding new members, dealing with the war in Kosovo, and

celebrating its anniversary, NATO also approved its New Strategic Concept,

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, as well as a Membership Action Plan

(MAP) that affirms NATO's "Open Door" policy for new members and lays out criteria

for future enlargement. A formulation of NATO's "Open Door" policy can be found at

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm, an overview of the Membership

Action Plan is at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm, and the actual MAP

document can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

In terms of the U.S. government, a key document laying out the Clinton

administration's policy is the State Department's 1997 Report to Congress on the issue of

NATO expansion, available at

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html. Other important

manifestations of the administration's policy can be found in Senate Foreign Relations

Committee testimony on the issue of expansion by Secretary of State Madleine Albright,

http://www.fas.org/man/nato/congress/1998/98022407_tpo.html, and by Secretary of

Defense William Cohen,

http://www.fas.org/man/nato/congress/1998/98022411_tpo.html, respectively.

The British government's position on NATO expansion and on NATO's role after

fifty years can be found in a speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Royal United

Service Institute, on the web at http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2094. See

also Blair's reporting on the Washington Summit back in the British House of Commons,

at http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2335.

ENDNOTES

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