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Paper prepared for a workshop on the analysis of political cleavages and party competition, Duke University, Dept. of Political Science, April 2/3 2004

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Paper prepared for the workshop on the analysis of political cleavages and party competition, Duke University, Dept. of Political Science, April 2/3 2004. Paper presents first results from a research project conducted jointly by a team at the University of Zurich (Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, Simon Bornschier, Timotheos Frey, Romain Lachat) and by a team at the University of Munich (Prof. Edgard Grande, Dr Martin Dolezal). It is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation and by the German Research Foundation.

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Introduction

The political consequences of the process of globalization are manifold. On the one hand, this process leads to the formation of new channels of political representation at the supranational level and opens up new opportunities for transnational, international, and supranational political representation and mobilization (Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999). On the other hand, the same processes have profound political implications at the national level. National politics are challenged both "from above" – through new forms of international cooperation and a process of supranational integration – and "from below," at the regional and local level. While the political consequences of globalization have most often been studied at the supra- or transnational level, we shall focus on the effects of globalization on national politics. We believe that, paradoxically, the political reactions to economic and cultural globalization are bound to manifest themselves above all at the national level: given that the democratic political inclusion of the citizens is still mainly a national affair, nation-states still constitute the major arenas for political mobilization. Our study focuses on Western European countries, where "denationalization" means, first of all, European integration. For the present argument, however, this aspect of the European context is not essential. Europeanization and European integration can be seen as special cases of a more general phenomenon.

Michael Zürn suggests to view the process of globalization as a process of "denationalization" (Beisheim, Dreher et al. 1999; Zürn 1998), i.e. as a process that leads to the lowering and "unbundling" of boundaries of nation-states (Ruggie 1993). This process has already begun in the 1950s. It is neither linear, nor automatic or self-reproducing. But this process has accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s (Zürn 1998). Following David Held and his collaborators (Held, McGrew et al. 1999: 425), who have probably presented the most detailed and measured account of the phenomenon in question, we may argue that "in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences – that is in terms of how globalization is organized and reproduced." From a Rokkanean perspective, we may conceive of the contemporary opening up of boundaries as a new "critical juncture," which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts.

This is the starting point of a research project in which we are currently involved. In this paper, we shall present in more detail our expectations regarding the formation and articulation of new political cleavages, and present some first results from our project. In the next section, we discuss how the process of denationalization is expected to lead to the formation of a new conflict, opposing "winners" and "losers" of the process of globalization. This conflict is expected to constitute a potential for processes of political mobilization within national political contexts. We shall then examine how this potential can be articulated at the level of political parties. In order to understand how new political cleavages may result from the process of denationalization, it is crucial to focus not only on transformations in the electorate (the demand side of electoral competition), but to consider also which strategies political parties follow, and how they can benefit from these new potentials (the supply side of politics). In this paper, we shall deal more particu-

larly with the process of transformation on the supply side. The third section deals with variations between national political contexts. The transformation of national politics depends not only on processes at the supranational level, but is also conditioned by specific contextual characteristics. Next, we shall present our research design with which we study the transformation of the supply side and, finally, we present some preliminary results for Switzerland and France.

A new structural conflict between losers and winners of globalization

Three assumptions guide our analysis:

- First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not the same for all members of a national community. We expect them to give rise to new disparities, new oppositions and new forms of competition.
- Second, we assume that citizens perceive these differences between "losers" and "winners" of globalization, and that these categories are politically articulated.
- Third, we expect that these new oppositions are not aligned with, but crosscut the traditional structural and political cleavages.

The "losers" of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat for their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The "winners," on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced. The essential criterion for determining the impact of the opening up of national boundaries on individual life chances is whether or not someone possesses *exit options*. As Zygmunt Baumann (1998: 9) has observed, *mobility* becomes the most powerful factor of stratification. There are those who are mobile, because they control convertible resources allowing them to exit, and there are those who remain locked-in, because they lack these resources.

The question of the structural changes induced by globalization is a point of controversy. It is widely debated in political science and in sociology (see for example Beck 1997, 1998a, 1998b). For our purposes, we can identify three mechanisms, which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of globalization. First among these is the increase in *economic competition*, which results from the globalization process. Over the last decades, a series of transformations in the American economy have resulted in a massive pressure towards deregulations in Western European countries, leading in turn to a dramatic erosion of protected property rights. Schwartz (2001: 44) suggests to understand the impact of globalization as "the erosion of politically based property rights and their streams of income, and as reactions to that erosion". The individuals and the firms which are most directly affected by this erosion are those who worked in "sheltered" sectors, i.e. sectors that were, since the 1930s, sheltered from market pressures through

public regulation.[1] Those measures disconnected income streams (in the form of wages, employment, or profits) from the outcome of the market. Schwartz's distinction between sectors sheltered from the market, on the one hand, and sectors exposed to the market, on the other, has much in common with the distinction between export-oriented firms and firms oriented towards the domestic market.[2] With the international pressure towards deregulation, the cleavage between these two sectors intensifies. Firms exposed to market pressures try to impose market disciplines on traditionally sheltered sectors, so as to bring down their own costs of production and to remain competitive on the international market. Firms in sheltered sectors, by contrast, seek to defend their property rights. Workers in exposed sectors also have an interest in the lowering of production costs, as their jobs directly depend on the international competitivity of their firm. Workers in sheltered sectors, by contrast, have the same interest in protectionist measures as their employers. Globalization thus leads to a *sectoral* cleavage, which cuts across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions.

As a result of globalization, the increasing economic competition is, however, not only defined in sectoral, but also in *ethnic* terms – ethnic taken here in a large sense (including language and religious criteria). This is a consequence of the massive immigration into Western Europe of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European population on the one hand, and of the increasing opportunities for delocalizing jobs into distant, and ethnically distinct regions of the globe, on the other hand. Thus, the increasing economic competition is linked to a second mechanism – an increasing *cultural competition*. In the immigration countries, ethnically different populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity and to the standard of living of the natives. Furthermore, with the opening up of national borders, the European nation-states have been granting expanding social rights and privileges – though no political rights – to the migrants (Soysal 1994: 130), which increases the perception of competition on the part of the native population. However, this potential economic and cultural threat is not perceived and experienced in the same way by all members of a national community. In this respect, the individual level of education plays a key role. *Education* has a "liberalising" effect, i.e. it induces a general shift in political value orientations toward cultural liberalism (cosmopolitanism, universalism). It contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language skills, which give access to other cultures. Individuals who are poorly educated are usually less tolerant and do not have

1 Such measures include: „trade protection, minimum wages, centralized collective bargaining, product market regulation, zoning, the delegated control over markets to producer groups, and […] formal welfare states" (Schwartz 2001: 31).

2 Schwartz emphasizes however the difference between the two classifications. Considering them as equivalent is misleading, he argues, because few commodities or services are not subject to international trade. Furthermore, he considers the stranded investments of the "sheltered" sectors to be a central problem, which is different from the issue of the opportunity costs of the export-oriented sectors. For a similar argument, see Frieden (1991: 440): "The principal beneficiaries of the broad economic trends of the last two decades have been internationally oriented firms and the financial services industries; the principal losers have been nationally based industrial firms"; and Frieden and Rogowski (Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 46): "... exogenous easing of trade will be associated with increased demands for liberalization from the relatively competitive, and with increased demands of protection from the relatively uncompetitive, groups"

the resources to communicate with foreigners or to understand other cultures in a more general sense (Lipset 1963). Furthermore, they are more often confronted to immigrants than individuals with a higher level of educational, as they are often in direct competition with them on the labour market. Finally, higher education has also become an indispensable asset for one's professional success. It provides the necessary specialized skills, which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one's exit options. It is certainly true that this evolution is less a consequence of globalization than of the process of deindustrialization and of technological change. But from the point of view of the affected groups, it is central to understand how they *perceive* and to whom they attribute their relative loss in life chances.

A third mechanism related to the opening up of borders increases the *political competition* between nation-states, on the one hand, and supra- or international political actors, on the other. Nation-states loose part of their autonomy of action. Most scholars agree, for example, that the possibilities for an independent macro-economic policy have been drastically reduced because of the liberalization of the financial markets. This is obvious in the European context, where an autonomous monetary policy has no longer been possible since the creation of a European central bank. These changes also create winners and losers in specific ways. First of all, there may be material losers to the extent that the reduction of a State's autonomy may imply a reduction of its administrative apparatus. But, more importantly, winners and losers also result from differences in their *identification with the national community.* Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications to understand support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong identification with their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a weakening of the national political institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms will perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of supranational political institutions.[3] The attachment to national traditions, national languages, and religious values plays a prominent role here – as does the integration into cosmopolitan (transnational) individual networks.[4]

To sum up, the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community. Following the realistic theory of group conflict, we consider that the threats perceived by the losers and their related attitudes do have a real basis. They are not simply illusions or rest on false consciousness. Moreover, we assume that individuals do not perceive cul-

3 For the distinction between norms of exclusion and universalist norms, see Hardin (1995: chapters 4 and following).

4 Traditionally, integration into cosmopolitan networks was the preserve of a small elite. Today, however, the Jet Set is not the only group which is forming transnationally and which is developing identities that rival with territorially more circumscribed identities (Badie 1997: 453f.).

tural and material threats as distinct phenomena[5]. As Martin Kohli (2000: 118) argues, identity and interest are mutually reinforcing factors of social integration.

The political articulation and organization of the new structural conflict

The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute in turn *political potentials*, which can be articulated by political organizations. However, given the heterogeneous composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which domestic politics have traditionally been based. This makes it difficult for national political actors to organize these new potentials. In addition, the composition of the groups of winners and losers varies between national contexts, making it even more difficult to organize them at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the European Union. This heterogeneity reinforces the already mentioned political paradox of globalization: due to their heterogeneity, the new political potentials created by this process are most likely to be articulated and dealt with at the level of the national political process.

We thus suggest that, paradoxically, the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries render them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance increases. More specifically, the destructuring of national boundaries leads to a "sectorialization" and an "ethnicization" of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differences, respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation, and political mobilization. As far as the ethnicization of politics is concerned, the theory of ethnic competition holds that majority groups will react to the rise of new threats with *exclusionary measures* (Olzak 1992). At a general level, we would expect losers of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on national independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from the increased competition, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. We shall refer here to this antagonism between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between *integration* and *demarcation*.[6]

In order to discuss the political articulation of this new structural conflict, it is useful to specify it in two ways. First, we should distinguish between an *economic* dimension and a *cultural* dimension of the integration/demarcation divide. On each of these two dimensions, we can further distinguish between an open, integrationist position, and a defensive, protectionist position. In the economic domain, a neoliberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the national markets. In the cultural domain, a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan position is opposing a position in favour of protecting the national culture and citizenship

5 Bobo (1999: 457): "… the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of 'realistic group conflict versus prejudice' empirically nonsensical".

6 Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence.

in its civic, political, and social sense. The orientations on the two dimensions need not necessarily coincide – and empirically, they are only loosely related.

Second, the notion of integration needs to be clarified. More integration may simply mean the removal of boundaries and other obstacles to free and undistorted international competition – that is purely *negative integration* in Scharpfs' terminology (1999: 45). By contrast, integration may also refer to what Scharpf has called a process of *positive integration*, i.e. a process of reconstruction of a system of regulation at the supranational level. Scharpf has introduced these concepts with respect to the economic dimension, but one can also apply them to the cultural side: "negative integration" in cultural terms would simply mean cultural dedifferentiation – a cultural homogenization, possibly in the direction of an Americanization or of the expansion of the Western way of life and Western political ideas across the entire globe. "Positive integration" would mean the introduction of a system of regulation at the supranational level that allows for the peaceful coexistence of a multicultural society. In the European context, it could also mean the creation of a distinctively European identity and a European political community, which may coexist with lower level territorial identities and communities.

Combining these two elements, we arrive at a nine-fold typology of possible positions with regard to the integration/demarcation divide (*Table 1*). This typology presents the range of possible interpretative packages or master-frames, which are available to political entrepreneurs for the articulation of the new structural antagonism. In *Table 1*, some possible empirical combinations are also suggested.

New structural conflicts put the established political organizations (parties, interest groups) under pressure. They are the product of former social, economic, and cultural conflicts. If they do not succeed in adapting their programmatic offer to the new situation, they face the risk that new political actors (parties, interest groups, or social movements) mobilize specific segments of the electorate on the basis of the new social conflict. We, therefore, begin our analysis by considering how established political actors react to these new potentials. We focus here on *political parties*. In spite of the increasing importance of national and transnational social movements, political parties still have a key position for the articulation and organization of political interests, and for the recruitment of the political personnel.

Table 1: Typology of general orientations with regard to the integration/demarcation divide

Cultural dimension		**Economic dimension**		
		Positive integration	Negative integration	Demarcation
		liberalism		protectionism
Positive integration		*New Left* supranational regulation supranational identity formation/ multicultural.	*Third Way*	*Old Left* economic protectionism multiculturalism
Negative integration	liberalism		*Neoliberalism* no barriers to competition cultural homogenization	
Demarcation	protectionism		*New radical Right (winning formula)* economic liberalism cultural protectionism	*New radical Right* economic protectionism cultural protection.

Typically *mainstream political parties* have so far taken a rather undifferentiated position with respect to the new cleavage. They seem to be uncertain about it, because (a) they are internally divided with regard to the question of integration, (b) they are divided as Euro-families as a result of their variable insertion into national party configurations, and (c) they are not in a position to form a strong alliance between different sectoral and cultural interests. As a result, mass attitudes do not get clearly structured by mainstream political parties. Broadly speaking, however, whether on the left or on the right, the mainstream parties tend to view the process of economic denationalization both as inevitable and beneficial for the maintenance of their established positions. Thus, analyzing the main party families – the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats – at the EU level, Hix (1999) has noted that, between 1976 and 1994, all three gradually converged on moderately pro-Integration positions.

As a first hypothesis, we would thus suggest that, in Western Europe, (a) mainstream parties will tend to formulate a winners' programme, i.e. a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration and that (b) mainstream parties on the right will tend to favour "negative integration," while mainstream parties on the left will tend to support steps in the direction of "positive integration." This hypothesis implies that "left" and "right" are not outdated concepts. It rather suggests that the new dividing line – similarly to the conflict between authoritarian and libertarian values (Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998a) – will be integrated into the left-right division, which, in the process, will again be transformed.

One attempt to come to terms with the problems posed by the new dividing line was the "Third Way," formulated by the British Labour Party and later also discussed in other countries – especially in Germany. Anthony Giddens (1998: 26) describes it as "a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adapt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past three decades." Although the Third Way has largely disappeared again from the political debate, it still constitutes an interesting attempt to deal with the changing cleavage structure. Two aspects are central to all versions of Third Way politics: a) the socio-cultural aspect of reconceptualising the ideas of community, nation, and citizenship (civic, political and social) in a globalizing world, and b) the repositioning of the left with respect to the neoliberal economic programme. Third way politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it, and seeks to combine a neoliberal endorsement of free trade with a core concern with social justice (Giddens 1998: 64ff.). For the architects of the Third Way, taking globalization seriously also requires steps in the direction of "positive integration," in the form of global economic governance, global ecological management, regulation of corporate power, control of warfare and fostering of transnational democracy (Giddens 2000: 122-162).

The indecision of the mainstream political parties and their tendency to moderately opt for the winners' side suggest a second general hypothesis: we face an *increasing political fragmentation* (Zürn 2001), with the strengthening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a losers' programme. Peripheral actors on the right are expected to be *culturally* more protectionist, and peripheral actors on the left to be *economically* either more protectionist or more positively integrationist than their respective mainstream counterparts. Thus, analyzing the *Euroscepticism* of political parties in different European countries, Taggart (1998) found that it is the more peripheral

parties (on both sides of the political spectrum), rather than parties more central to their party systems, which are most likely to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue.

The movements of the new radical right have found an ideological package that most successfully appeals to the interests and fears of many of the losers of globalization. The main characteristics of this new radical right are its xenophobia or even racism, expressed in its opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and its populist appeal to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the dominant political elites. The new radical right is clearly defensive on the cultural dimension. At the same time, it is populist in its instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment as well as in its appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense. It builds on the losers' fears with regard to the removal of national borders, and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made solutions. This "national-populism" constitutes the common characteristic of all organizations of the Western European radical right. As Betz (2003) observes, its position on immigration is increasingly becoming part of a larger programme, which poses a fundamental challenge to liberal democracies. He now describes this programme as a "combination of differential nativism and comprehensive protectionism". In an earlier assessment (Betz 1993), he had still identified neoliberal economic elements in the programmes of the radical right. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) had pointed out that not all radical parties on the right shared this element, but had insisted that the most successful ones among them did at the time. According to Kitschelt, the combination of cultural protectionism and economic neoliberalism constituted the "winning formula" allowing these parties to forge electoral coalitions appealing both to their declining middle-class clientele and to the losers from the unskilled working class. More recently, Kitschelt (2001: 435) also noted that some radical right parties (like the FPÖ in Austria or the Front National in France) have moderated their neoliberal appeals and started to focus more on the themes of a reactive nationalism and of ethnocentrism.

The success of the radical right exercises a strong appeal for established parties on the right and it contributes to the right's restructuration. The rise of the Austrian FPÖ and of the Swiss People's Party illustrates this point. In both cases, an established party of the right radicalized and adopted a programme including strong national-populist elements.

On the *left*, we also find more peripheral political actors defending the losers, although with less success than the radical right. The *old communist left*, where it still exists, tends to be economically, but not necessarily culturally protectionist. The French Communists and the French Mouvement des Citoyens (dissident socialists led by Jean-Pierre Chevènement) have, for example, campaigned against the Maastricht treaty in 1992, but they have also fought against racism and the Front National (Szarka 1999: 25-28). The *New left*, i.e. the Greens, the remnants of the new social movements of the seventies and eighties, and a new type of transnational social movement have rather come to accept the phenomenon of globalization and to mobilize for "positive integration," economically (e.g. Tobin Tax) and culturally (e.g. extension of human rights' regimes) – they are not "anti-globalization", but for "another form of globalization" ("altermondialiste"). Democratization of supranational regimes and subordination of economic integration to social, cultural and political controls are the keys to their programme (Ayres 2001: 56). They provide the red thread linking the euroscepticism of the radical left (Taggart 1998) to the mobilization of the

SMOs against the supranational organizations, of which the large demonstrations against the G8 summits of Genoa in 2001 and of Evian in 2003 only constitute the last links in a longer chain. In 1988 already, very large crowds protested against the IMF and World Bank congress in Berlin (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). On the left, the "winning formula" may be a combination of moderate economic liberalism with full support for positive integration – socially, culturally and politically.

Contextual variations in the restructuring of the national political space

The outcome of the political restructuration of the national political space in a given country will depend on the existing political context. Most importantly, it will depend on the *relative strength of the traditional cleavages and the new cleavage* (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995). The stronger the relative strength of the traditional political divisions, the smaller is the capacity of the new division to destructure the national political landscape. To put it simply: in a country, such as Northern Ireland, where entrenched religious conflicts predominate domestic politics, the new division between "winners" and "losers" will only play a subsidiary role. In such a situation, the new division will be instrumentalized by the opponents of the traditional conflict, but it will hardly be able to restructure the political space. According to this hypothesis, there is a zero-sum relationship with regard to the strength of the traditional and of the new cleavages. For the same reason, we would also expect individual-level differences *within* national contexts: the stronger the integration of citizens in traditional political organizations like parties, trade-unions, associations, but also in churches and confessional organizations, the more difficult it will be to mobilize them on the basis of the new structural conflict.

The *level of economic development* should also play a prominent role with regard to the contextual variations. In economically highly developed countries, we would expect the new cleavage to be particularly strong, because the traditional class cleavage tends to be pacified, but also because the economic opportunities in such countries tend to attract migrants from the less developed parts of the world. This, in turn, increases ethnic competition in the country and leads to defensive reactions on the part of the native population. Moreover, the more highly developed a country and the more privileged its citizens, the more likely it is that any form of supranational regulation will imply the sharing of some of the national economic advantages with less privileged populations. For less economically advanced countries, by contrast, opening up may constitute the opportunity to catch up economically, socially and politically. Thus, the countries of the European South look to European integration in the hope that through the process of integration, domestic problems can be solved which they have been unable to solve by themselves in their post-war history (Haller 1999: 274). European integration may serve to strengthen their economy and their democratic institutions. For Eastern Europe, Turkey and the South of the Mediterranean, the opening up towards Europe may serve the same purpose. This should attenuate the new cleavage in such countries. Similar phenomena may be observed between different regions within a given nation-state. For example, the new cleavage is arguably much stronger and politically more consequential in the North of Italy than in the South of the country, as is suggested by the rise of the Lega Nord.

The impact of the level of economic development may be modified by the *tradition of economic openness* of a national context. In this respect, small European countries have a long tradition of economic liberalism and integration into world markets (Katzenstein 1985). They have followed strategies to compensate, at the national level, for the negative consequences of this integration. These strategies not only imply an expansion of the welfare state, but also measures specifically designed to protect those sectors of the economy which are oriented towards the domestic market. Such measures were especially important in the "liberal-conservative" variant of democratic corporatism, which characterizes Switzerland, among others (Mach 2001). With the globalization process, this kind of compensatory strategies is put under strong pressure, which leads to the creation of a large potential of losers in a country like Switzerland.

The *economic situation* of a country and the *number of immigrants* also have an impact on the development of the new cleavage. On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Quillian (1995) has shown that racial prejudice against minority groups increases with perceived threats to dominant national groups. Perceived threat, in turn, is a function of economic conditions and of the size of the minorities. Accordingly, prejudice against immigrants and racial minorities increases with the size of these groups and with economic recession.

The impact of the opening up of boundaries may also be modified by the *social-cultural heritage*, which is above all reflected in the conceptualization of a country's political community, nationhood and citizenship. We may distinguish between at least *three models of citizenship and nationhood*: the "differentialist" or "ethnic", the "universalistic" or "republican", and the "multicultural" model. The three models differ sharply from one another with respect to their openness and integrative capacity (see, e.g. Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). We may expect them to have diverging implications for the development of the new cleavage. The ethnical and republican models, which emphasize the cultural differences between the natives and the immigrants, are more likely than the multicultural model to contribute to a reinforcement of the new conflict. This conflict is probably particularly explosive in economically highly developed countries which combine a tradition of economic liberalism with a tradition of socio-cultural closure. Such a combination creates a tension that is difficult to resolve if the opening up of boundaries concerns not only the economic, but also the political, cultural, and social boundaries. It is characteristic of Switzerland and of the Belgian region of Flanders, where the polarization on the question of international integration, indeed, proves to be particularly strong.

The form and outcome of the restructuring of the national political landscape also depends, of course, on the *national political institutions. Institutional access* obviously is a major determinant of the form the transformation takes. Political systems, which, as a result of their majoritarian institutions and of the exclusive strategies of their major political actors, do not allow an easy institutional access, risk a radicalization of the process of restructuration and a high level of conflictuality. Political systems with institutions that allow for extensive power sharing, by contrast, are more likely to experience a peaceful and gradual transformation. Similarly, we expect a substitutive relationship between the integrative capacity of established actors and the level of radicalization of the process.

The *rise of new actors* is much easier in consensus-democratic systems than in majoritarian ones. In consensus democracies, they not only benefit from easy access to institutions (e.g. because of proportional representation or multilevel governments), but also from the collusive arrangements among the established parties and the social partners typical of such democracies. Grand coalitions, for example, are conducive to the mobilization of new actors on the left and on the right. Thus, the early success of the German neo-fascist NPD in the late 1960s was in large measure a reaction to the grand coalition formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the SPD. Once competitive party politics were re-established between the CDU and SPD, the NPD disappeared from the scene. Similarly, the radical right seized its opportunity in the small Western European countries that follow the pattern of Lijphart's (1999) "consensus democracy" most closely: Haider's Liberal Party (FPÖ) benefited tremendously from its opposition against the "Lager" mentality in Austria (Plasser and Ulram 2000); the Vlaamse Blok mobilized against the complicated "pillarised" structure in Belgium (Billiet 1998: 189; Billiet and Swyngedouw 1999: 168); and the Swiss People's Party openly turned against the "consociational" composition of the Swiss government.

Finally, the restructuring of the national political space is also conditioned by the kind of boundary removal or boundary building that will be chosen. In the European context, much depends on the shape that the European Union is going to take and on the political opportunities for the structuring of political alternatives at the European level. Bartolini (2000: 11f.) suggests that the process of European integration contributes to a destructuring of the domestic cleavages and party structures, but constitutes only a weak and improbable basis for an effective process of structuring of political alternatives at the EU level. This is even more true of the global level, where the equivalent of a national political community is very largely absent. By default, it is still the nation-state, which constitutes the context for the structuring of political alternatives.

Research design

In order to study the impact of globalization on the national political space, we study *six Western European countries*: Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands. These countries are very similar in many respects, but present some systematic variations with regard to the central contextual aspects just discussed. They include three large and three small countries – the latter being characterized by their tradition of integration into the world markets and their compensatory strategies. Furthermore, each one of the three large countries represents one of the three models of citizenship – the ethnical (Germany), republican (France), and multicultural (Britain) model. The smaller countries vary also in this respect with Austria and Switzerland representing the ethnical model and the Netherlands the multicultural one. Country size is also closely related to the criterion of the type of democracy. The smaller countries are closer to the consensual type, while the larger ones rather correspond to the majoritarian type, except for Germany, which, with its federalist structure and its strong power-sharing on the parties-executive dimension, closely resembles the consensual democracies (Lijphart 1999). Finally, the six countries also differ with regard to their relationship with the EU. Germany, France, and the Netherlands belong to the six core member states and constitute the driving force of an "ever closer union". Britain and Austria joined the EU later, and are still characterized by a rather high level of euroscepticism, while Switzerland still has not joined the EU.

Our comparative analysis focuses on *national elections*. We consider national elections still to be the crucibles for the structuring of national political contexts.[7] We shall analyse the elections of the 1990s and early 2000s and, for each country, we add one electoral contest from the 1970s as a point of reference from a period before the national politics were undergoing the restructuring effect of globalization. We include all the elections of the nineties in our analysis, because we assume, in line with a renewed realignment-theory (Martin 2000) that a structural transformation of the national political context may occur across a series of critical elections over an extended period of time. As far as the demand side of the electoral process is concerned, we rely on post-election surveys. They will allow us to identify the social-structural basis of party choice, and to see how sharply winners and losers of globalization diverge in their political orientations and in their party preferences. For the analysis of the supply side of electoral competition, which will be the focus of our attention here, we assume that the macro-historical structural change linked to globalization is articulated by the issue-specific positions taken by the parties during the electoral campaigns and by the salience they attribute to the different issues. In order to identify the salience of the campaign issues for the various parties and their issue-specific positions we rely on a content analysis of newspapers coverage, television news, and political advertisements during the electoral campaigns.

* * *

7 National elections are more appropriate than European elections, as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1995).

In this paper, we shall present results on the supply side for two countries – Switzerland and France – based on an analysis of the editorial part of two major daily newspapers. For each country we chose a quality paper and a tabloid – *Le Monde* and *le Parisien* for France, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Blick* for Switzerland. For each one of the four electoral campaigns that we analyze per country, all the articles related to the electoral contest or to politics in general have been selected in both newspapers for the last two months before Election Day. For the articles selected the headlines and the first paragraph were coded *sentence by sentence* using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder and Rietberg 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). This method is designed to code every relationship between "political objects" (i.e. either between two political actors or between a political actor and a political issue) appearing in the text. For the present purposes, we are only interested in relationships between political actors, on the one hand, and political issues on the other. The sentences are reduced to their most basic structure (the so called "core sentences") indicating only its subject (political actor) and its object (issue) as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. The direction was quantified using a scale ranging from –1 to +1 (with three intermediary positions). Altogether, we coded 8569 actor-issue sentences for France and 3261 for Switzerland.

Political actors were coded according to their party membership. For the analysis, we have regrouped them into a limited number of categories. For Switzerland, we distinguish the four major party families – *Social-democrats* (SP), *Christian-democrats* (including the Christian-democratic party (CVP), the minor Christian-socialists, the very minor Evangelical party and other small center-parties), *Liberals* (including both the Radical-democratic and the minor, more conservative Liberal party), and *Conservatives* (the Swiss People's Party, SVP) – and the small parties of the radical left (mainly the Greens with some very minor socialist and communist parties) and the radical right (the Swiss Democrats, the Freedom Party, the Lega and the Federal Democratic Union, all very minor). For France, we limit ourselves to the four major parties – *Communists* (PCF), *Socialists* (PSF), *Center-right* (UDF- Union pour la Democratie Française) and *Gaullists* (RPR- Rassemblement pour la République) –, the MRG (Radicaux de Gauche) for 1978 only, the small parties of the radical left (mainly Greens and Trotzkyites) and the not so small parties of the radical right (Front national (FN) and its offsprings).

For the *political issues*, we coded more than 200 categories in the case of Switzerland and almost twice as many in the case of France. For the analysis, we have regrouped them into a limited number of broader categories. The regrouping into more encompassing categories is important for both theoretical and technical reasons. From a *theoretical* perspective, the specific issues raised during a campaign vary from one election to the other as a result of the policy attention cycle, which in turn depends on the development of the policy-making process in the various political subsystems of a given polity. Issues may come up on the electoral agenda as a result of internal dynamics in certain political subsystems or as a result of external shocks – catastrophes (such as September 11 in 2001, the flood in Eastern Germany 2002, or the war in Kosovo in 1999) or economic crises. Although the specific issues raised during a given campaign are, therefore, somewhat unpredictable, they still refer to only a limited set of basic structural conflicts, which they articulate in variable ways. The theoretical challenge is to regroup the variable set of

specific issues into a limited set of basic categories capable of capturing the underlying dimensions of conflict. Technically, we also need a limited set of categories so as to have enough cases per category for all elections covered. It is important to keep in mind that the results of the analysis crucially depend on this seemingly technical operation of regrouping the issues. For our purposes, we propose the following 13 categories (we indicate in brackets the abbreviations used to refer to them):

- Support for the welfare state, expansion of the welfare state, defense against welfare state retrenchment [*welfare*]
- Environmental protection [*environment*]
- Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state's deficit, cut on expenditures, reduction of taxes, fiscal retrenchment [*budget*]
- Support for more domestic competition, for economic deregulation, for privatisation, against state planning; opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors [*economic liberalism*]
- Support for the goals of the "new social movements" (with the exception of the environmental movement): peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights, freedom of political expression, cultural diversity and international cooperation; opposition to racism and support of abortion [*cultural liberalism*]
- Support for European integration and for EU-membership (in Switzerland) [*europe*]
- Support for education, culture, and research [*culture*]
- Support for neutrality (in Switzerland), national independence, traditional (moral) values, patriotism, national strength and a Europe of nations (in France), repression of the use of drugs [*cultural protectionism*]
- Support for a tough immigration and integration policy [*immigration*]
- Support for the army and a strong national defence [*army*]
- Support for more law and order, fight against criminality [*security*]
- Support for various forms of institutional reform such as extension of direct democratic rights, modification of form of government, reform of federalism (in Switzerland) and introduction of proportional electoral system, referendums, reduction of presidential term, decentralization, limitation of office cumulation (in France) [*instit reform*]
- Support for public service: for more efficiency in public administration (e.g. NPM), for protection of public servants, against reduction of the number of public servants, against nationalisations (in France), for public transportation [*public service*]

The first four categories are intended to refer to the traditional *economic opposition between state and market*, i.e. to the class-based opposition between left and right. On this dimension, the left tends to defend the welfare state and to promote environmental protection, while the right tends to

support economic liberalism and budgetary rigor[8]. At least, this is what we are used to expect. As is well known, environmental protection has come to be assimilated to the traditional, class-based left-right divide. More recently, third way approaches have come to blur the distinctions, as has the recognition on both sides of the traditional divide that structural budgetary deficits cannot be sustained forever. The next seven categories all refer to the *cultural dimension*. We first distinguish between three categories defending a universalist, cosmopolitan point of view: support for cultural liberalism, European integration and education, culture and research. European integration is the closest we come to an operationalization of positive integration, but we understand that for some altermondialists, the way the EU now functions is not exactly what they expect from a supranational regulatory agency. Next, we add four categories for the opposing point of view: support for cultural protectionism, for a tough immigration policy, law and order and a strong army. A tough immigration policy is the closest we get to the notion of national protection. There are two additional categories – promotion of institutional reform and defense of public service. Both are somewhat heterogenous: the former includes all kinds of reforms, while the latter not only refers to the defense of public service, but also the defense of public transportation (including specific projects such as the NEAT in Switzerland).

All categories are formulated in such a way that they have a clear *direction*. For example, the relationship with the category "europe" of a party supporting the adhesion of Switzerland to the EU takes a positive value (+1). Or, if a party advocates an increase in the state's expenditures, its relationship with the category 'budget' will be negative (-1). This kind of data offer valuable information on two central aspects of the supply side of electoral competition: the *positions* of political parties regarding the various political issues, and the *salience* of these issues for a given political party. The position of an actor on a category of issues is computed by averaging over all core sentences which contain a relationship between this actor and any of the issues belonging to this category. The salience of a category of issues refers to the frequency with which a given political party takes position on this category.[9] It is important to understand that both aspects are relevant for an adequate description of the political space. Parties do not only differ from one another with respect to the positions they advocate, but also with respect to the priorities they set.

Table 2 presents the overall salience of the 13 issue categories and the corresponding positional polarization of all the political parties taken together for each one of the two countries. Salience is simply measured by the relative number of core sentences in the press, polarization is measured by the issue-specific standard deviation of the overall direction of the campaigns. The higher the standard deviation, the larger the spread of positions presented on a given issue in the press during the campaigns covered by this study. These two indicators give us an idea of the general orientation of the electoral campaigns in the two countries. As is immediately apparent from the table, the *relative salience* of the two main hypothetical dimensions varies between France

8 Economic protectionism is part of the economic liberalism category (with opposing sign), since there were only few core sentences defending this goal.

9 The positions of the parties on the different categories of issues and the corresponding saliences can be found in the appendix, in tables A1 to A4.

and Switzerland: in France, the class-based dimension is still predominant in terms of its salience during electoral campaigns, while in Switzerland the cultural dimensions tends to predominate. This confirms the notion that traditional class-conflicts are still more important in France (see Kriesi et al. 1995), while the new conflict about the opening up of national boundaries should be particularly explosive in a country like Switzerland. In addition, and rather unexpectedly, the table also makes clear that, apart from two exceptions, the electoral campaigns have been equally polarized in the two countries or rather more polarized in Switzerland. The exceptions concern budgetary rigor and the army, the two domains giving rise to a greater polarization in France. Overall, the cultural dimension is not only more salient but also more polarizing in Switzerland than in France.

On the basis of these data, it is possible to construct a graphical representation of the positions of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space, using the method of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a very flexible method that allows representing graphically information on similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects (Borg and Groenen 1997; Cox and Cox 2001; Kruskal and Wish 1978). In our case, the issue positions of parties give us information on the "similarity" or "distance" between a group of parties and a group of issues. If a party from the Left, for example, strongly supports an expansion of the welfare state, we would expect the distance between this party and the category "welfare" to be small. Thus, if we represent the parties and issues in a common space, this party and the category "welfare" should be located close to each other.

Table 2: Overall salience (percentages) and positional polarization (standard deviations) on the 13 issue categories for France and Switzerland

Issue	**salience**		**position**	
	Switzerland	France	Switzerland	France
welfare	10.9	28.0	0.80	0.65
environment	9.7	2.1	0.86	0.70
budget	4.6	7.8	0.86	**0.95**
economic liberalism	6.7	5.5	0.94	0.93
subtotal	*31.9*	*43.4*	*0.86*	*0.79*
cultural liberalism	10.6	7.0	0.79	0.62
europe	8.9	4.2	0.95	0.73
culture	6.4	4.9	0.94	0.48
cultural protectionism	3.5	1.5	0.83	0.55
immigration	7.0	3.6	0.98	0.94
army	2.8	2.2	0.91	**0.95**
security	2.5	4.6	0.71	0.43
subtotal	*41.7*	*28.0*	*0.92*	*0.71*
institutional reform	7.5	8.1	0.96	0.87
public service	5.3	2.9	0.94	0.92
others	13.5	17.6	0.92	0.75
Total	100.0%	100.0%	*0.91*	*0.78*

Furthermore, a variant of MDS, called Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS), allows to account simultaneously for the *similarities* between pairs of objects (parties and issues, in our case) and for the *salience* of these relationships.[10] This means that, when representing our data in a low-dimensional space, the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than the less salient ones. Distortions of "real" distances are unavoidable. But with WMMDS, these distortions will be smaller for more salient relationships, resulting in a more accurate representation of the relative positions of parties and issues.

Main results

Our central interest here lies in the configuration of the partisan space and in its transformation from the seventies to the end of the nineties. We want to let the positions of parties vary over time while keeping the dimensions of the political space constant. To this end, we have performed a WMMDS by computing the distances between parties and issues separately for each election. We have thus 33 "objects" to be represented in our political space in the case of Switzerland and 38 in the case of France: the 13 categories of issues for each one of the two countries and 20 positions for political parties in Switzerland (one for every election year for the major parties and one for only two election years for the two types of radical parties[11]) and 25 positions for parties in France (one for every election year for all parties, plus one for 1978 for the MRG). The resulting two-dimensional configurations for the two countries are displayed in *Figures 1 and 2*. The goodness-of-fit of this solution is rather unsatisfactory for both countries, but we cannot improve the fit by increasing the number of dimensions[12]. The 13 issues are represented by their abbreviations. The position of the political parties are represented by their short-hand names, followed by the number of the corresponding election year. The different positions of a party are connected by a line. This makes it easier to follow the evolution of their position over time.

The dimensions resulting from an MDS analysis (i.e. the horizontal and vertical axes in figure 1) are not substantially meaningful. As a matter of fact, the solution can freely be rotated, as the distances between the objects constitute the only relevant information. Yet, by considering how the different issues are positioned relative to each other, we can try to identify axes that are substantially meaningful and that can help us identify an underlying structure. To this end, we have traced two dashed lines in the two figures, guided by our theoretical interpretation of these results. It must be emphasized that these additional axes are not a product of the MDS analysis

10 Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be estimated using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.

11 There were not enough core sentences for the radical left and the radical right for the other two election years to warrant their inclusion in the analysis.

12 The measure for the goodness-of-fit, the stress I statistic, takes a value of .36 for the Swiss case and of .46 for France, which is considered to be rather high. However, we can be confident that a two-dimensional solution is appropriate: the value of the normalized raw stress statistic decreases substantially when the number of dimensions is increased from 1 to 2, but adding more dimensions only results in marginal changes of this statistic. Furthermore, we have tried to avoid local minima by estimating the model with a large number of different starting configurations.

itself. We have simply located them on the basis of our own interpretation of the configuration. The first of these axes connects the welfare issue with the issue of economic liberalism and runs horizontally from left to right. In our view, it corresponds to the traditional left-right divide. It opposes support for the welfare state and for environmental protection, on one side, to economic liberalism, on the other. By contrast, the second axis, connecting support for European integration with opposition to immigration, can be interpreted as an opposition between integration and demarcation, or between "openness" and "closure." We could have drawn a third axis by connecting support for cultural liberalism with its opposite, support for cultural protectionism. This third contrast closely parallels our second, cultural axis. We have not drawn it so as not to overburden an already complicated graphical presentation. The three contrasts help us to configure the political space in the two countries. The most striking aspect of the resulting configurations is *the extent to which their general structure is similar in both countries.* In France as well as in Switzerland, the same

Figure 1: The development of the Swiss configuration of parties: results of the MDS analysis



two axes – the economic, class-based left-right divide and the cultural integration-demarcation conflict – constitute the two-dimensional space. Note that these two axes do not exactly correspond to the new cleavage we outlined in the theoretical part of the paper. Much rather, the two dimensions represent two more general contrasts. The economic dimension of the hypothetical integration-demarcation cleavage has been integrated into a more general social-economic-ecological dimension, while the cultural dimension of the integration-demarcation cleavage has become the predominant element of a more general cultural dimension that also includes the contrast between the cultural liberalism of the new social movements, on the one hand, and the defense of tradition by old-time conservatives, on the other.

Figure 2: The development of the French configuration of parties: results of the MDS analysis



The main differences in the positioning of the issues between the two countries lies in the fact that culture, cultural protectionism and security are more consensual, i.e. more like valence issues, in France than they are in Switzerland. This is expressed by their more central location in the French space. Culture, the defense of a strong France and security (law and order) are values that tend to be embraced by all parties in France. In Switzerland, by contrast, culture, education and research are clearly associated with the left, while security and the defense of traditional values are clearly associated with the right. On the other hand, budgetary rigor has been a more consensual issue in Switzerland. In the seventies, even the social-democrats were defending it, a position which they have increasingly abandoned in the course of the nineties. A last (minor) difference between the two spatial configurations concerns institutional reform: in France, issues of institutional reform are more closely associated with the left, in Switzerland more so with the conservative and the radical right. The Swiss location of the issue may surprise, but it reflects the continuous attacks, which the conservative and radical right have launched throughout the nineties against the Swiss system of consensual and collegial government, and their populist demand for an expansion of the direct-democratic rights.

The configuration of the space allows us now to discuss the location and the movement of the different parties within the space. As far as the general location of the parties is concerned, we are again struck by a major similarity: in both countries there essentially exists a *tripartite landscape*. As Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997a, 1997b) have noted already for France, the French parties are divided into three camps – the left, the moderate right and the radical right. Similarly, in Switzerland we can distinguish between the three camps of the left, the moderate and the conservative right. In both countries, the moderate right is in turn composed of two major elements – UDF and RPR in France, CVP and Liberals in Switzerland. The composition is somewhat different with respect to the other two camps, however. On the left, the socialists dominate in both countries, but in France, where they have to compete with the communists, the greens and various trotzkyite groups, the situation is more crowded on the left than in Switzerland, where they essentially have to face the greens only. On the conservative side, the situation also differs insofar as the main contender in this camp is an established party in Switzerland, which has completely decimated its more radical competitors in the course of the nineties, while in France the dominant party in this camp is itself a marginalized outsider in the system as a whole.

How did the parties move in this space? Let us first look at the *Swiss case*: On the left, the socialists have essentially moved in the direction of European integration, more opposition to cultural protectionism and less budgetary rigor. They have hardly made any steps in the direction of economic liberalism, however. They have consistently defended the welfare state and environmental protection. The radical left, i.e. above all the Greens, have been very sceptical with respect to Europe in the two campaigns for which we have a sufficient amount of data for them. In this respect they resemble the conservative SVP – the major party of the conservative right, which has been heavily opposed to European integration since the early nineties, but for different reasons. The Swiss radical left wants another (positive) supranational integration, while the SVP does not want any supranational integration at all. The SVP is generally very different from the radical left and from all the other parties as well: it has consistently been in favor of traditional

Swiss values, the army, budgetary rigor and law and order. Surprisingly, according to these data, its opposition to immigration appears to have somewhat weakened in the course of the nineties, which explains in part its move towards the lower middle of the space in 1995/99. We shall come back to this point in the conclusion. This move is also explained by the fact that, towards the end of the decade, this party abandoned the neoliberal turn, which it had taken in the early nineties, and returned to a more protectionist position (especially in its defense of agricultural interests). In 1991, the SVP rather closely represented Kitschelt's "winning formula". Its move away from neoliberalism did, however, not impede its electoral advance. On the contrary, although it no longer embraced a decidedly neoliberal position, its electoral success increased ever since. This suggests that neoliberalism, indeed, is not a key ingredient for a conservative right success. Moreover, the programmatic stance of the SVP suggests that support of budgetary rigor should not be confused with neoliberalism. The anti-statism of the SVP is highly selective and does not extend to interventions/regulations in favor of its core clients from the old middle class (farmers and small businesses and trades) or in favor of the beneficiaries of old age pensions. The radical right has been even more extreme than the SVP during the period for which we have reliable data.

Overall, the distance between the two polar camps in the Swiss configuration has increased, especially along the integration-demarcation axis, which constitutes, as we have seen in *Table 2* the more salient axis in the Swiss campaigns. The Swiss elections have increasingly become dominated by the cultural dimension of the hypothesized new cleavage as a result of the massive mobilization by the conservative SVP.

The two parties of the moderate right, which constitute the third camp in the Swiss party system, are located between the left and the conservative/radical right. We should interpret their somewhat erratic behavior against the background of the increasing polarization on the cultural dimension. These parties were basically on the defensive, caught between the anti-integration challenge of the SVP and the clear position in favor of the welfare state, of cultural liberalism and EU-integration adopted by the socialists. The Christian-democrats responded by moving to the left, in small, but consistent steps, and by vaccillating with respect to their stance on the cultural axis. The Liberals mainly moved back and forth along the social-economic axis and ended up in 1999 at about the location from where they had started out in 1975. Both of these parties are drawn back and forth between the positions defended by the left and by the conservative right, and their own attachment to economic liberalism and budgetary rigor.

In the case of France, we find two types of movement along the classic left-right axis – the more salient axis in this case – during the period covered. First, there is a general trend on the left to move towards a more economically liberal position. As far as the radical left and the communists are concerned, this movement is, although discernible, of very limited proportions. For the socialists, however, it has been more substantial. Between 1978 and 2002, the distance between their position and the pole marked by the issue of economic liberalism has been reduced by about a third. Second, a general movement towards the left has occurred in the elections of 1995. All the parties, including those on the left, moved towards the left in the campaign of 1995, but the movement was most pronounced for the parties of the right. This led to a reduction of the divide between the left and the moderate right. Discussing the general moderation of the parties

on the right in 1995, Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997a) speak of a "clouding of the left-right cleavage". However, this move was exceptional and had no lasting effect. In 2002, all the parties on the right returned to their original positions on the left-right axis, or moved even further to the right than where they had started in 1988. This is especially true of the UDF and the Front national. As a result of the general movement of the left towards a more pronounced economic liberalism, however, the distance between the left and the moderate right has been reduced in the nineties, as compared to the seventies. Faced with the double challenge of a moderating left and a decidedly national-conservative pole, the moderate right in France seems to have chosen for a firmer stance on economic liberalism and budgetary rigor in order to distinguish itself on both fronts.

The distances in the two graphs are not exactly comparable. To arrive at a more direct comparison of the *summary profiles* of the corresponding parties in the two countries, we have calculated their average positions on four *"macro-issues"*: two for the class-based left-right axis – a) support for welfare/environment and b) for economic liberalism/budgetary rigor – and two for the cultural axis – a) cultural openness (support for Europe, culture and cultural liberalism) and b) cultural closure (support for the army, security, tough measures against immigration and cultural protectionism). All other issues are combined into a residual category. Comparing the resulting profiles of corresponding parties, we find that the overall positioning of the conservative/radical right in Switzerland closely resembles that of the radical right in France (see first part of *Table 3*). The only difference between the two is one of emphasis (second part of *Table 3*), since the Front national puts more weight on the

Table 3: Direction on (average position) and salience (percentages) of four macro-issues by party and country

	radical left		**ps**		**cvp-udf**		**liberals-rpr**		**svp-radical right**	
isssue	CH	F	CH	F	CH	F	CH	F	CH	F
direction										
welfare/environm	0.81	0.94	0.84	0.86	0.55	0.65	0.41	0.52	0.11	0.16
ecoliberal/budget	-0.71	-0.68	-0.11	-0.13	0.30	0.49	0.67	0.70	0.53	0.64
cultural openness	**-0.19**	0.72	**0.66**	0.93	**0.51**	0.93	**0.34**	0.76	-0.31	-0.29
cultural closure	**-0.68**	0.09	**-0.30**	0.24	**0.28**	0.66	0.57	0.74	0.66	0.85
others	-0.34	0.58	0.33	0.47	0.35	0.60	0.32	0.51	-0.02	0.55
salience										
welfare/environm	25.5	**37.1**	28.0	**35.4**	18.9	**22.9**	16.6	**25.1**	14.5	17.4
ecoliberal/budget	2.4	12.1	12.0	11.7	9.3	15.7	16.1	16.6	9.6	9.4
cultural openness	**36.7**	13.5	**24.3**	18.3	**28.7**	17.6	**25.4**	14.9	**25.5**	13.3
cultural closure	10.5	9.7	12.5	7.9	18.7	7.0	12.7	13.7	28.5	**43.8**
others	24.8	27.6	23.2	26.8	24.4	36.8	29.2	29.7	21.9	16.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

promotion of cultural closure, while the opposition to cultural openness (i.e. EU-integration in particular) is more salient for the SVP and the radical right in Switzerland. As far as the radical left (including the PCF in France), the socialists, the pairs CVP-UDF and Liberals-RPR are concerned, their profiles generally resemble each other with respect to the two macro-issues on the

left-right axis, but they differ considerably with regard to the two issues on the cultural axis: the French parties in each pair are at the same time culturally more open and more closed than their Swiss equivalents. On the one hand, the French parties of the left and the moderate right are all more supportive of cultural openness than their Swiss counterparts – not only of European integration, but also of cultural liberalism and of culture/education; on the other hand, they all are also more supportive of law and order (security) and cultural protectionism (strong France) than the corresponding Swiss parties. By contrast, the differences are small with regard to the army and immigration – the other two main components of cultural closure. As far as the relative salience of the macro issues is concerned, the French parties of the left and the moderate right put more weight on welfare, but less on cultural openness than their Swiss equivalents.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to present the basic ideas as well as the design of a current research project on the transformation of the national political space in Western European countries, and to show some preliminary results. Based on data on the supply-side, i.e. the positioning of the parties during the electoral campaigns in the national press, we have been able to show that the national political space in both France and Switzerland is very similarly structured. The same two axis configure the national political space in these countries today. These two axis correspond to the traditional left-right opposition, on the one hand, and to an opposition between cultural openness and closure, on the other. In both countries, economic liberalism is part and parcel of the traditional left-right opposition today, while the cultural dimension of the hypothesized new cleavage turns out to be integrated into a more encompassing cultural opposition which also includes the themes articulated by the new social movements of the seventies and eighties. In terms of the typology introduced in *Table 1*, the positioning of the parties with respect to the two dimensions of the hypothetical new cleavage is similar in both countries and can be summarized as in *Table 4*. While moving towards economic liberalism, the French parties on the left have approached a position on the traditional left-right axis that the Swiss left has taken all along, but both have not embraced economic liberalism wholeheartedly. The moderate right is most closely associated with a combination of economic and cultural liberalism, with the French moderate right being more open to positive (i.e. European) integration than the Swiss. The conservative/radical right is very similarly positioned in both countries. Except for a brief neoliberal excursion of the Swiss SVP, it defends a staunchly protectionist position in both dimensions.

Table 4: Positioning of the parties in the typology

Cultural dimension		**Economic dimension**		
		Positive integration	Negative integration	Demarcation
		liberalism		protectionism
Positive integration	liberalism	-	Moderate right (F)	socialists, communists (F), Greens
Negative integration		-	Moderate right (CH)	-
Demarcation	protectionism	-	SVP 1991	Conservative Right/radical right

Our analysis in this paper has been limited in three ways. First of all, we only have presented data on two of our six countries. Data on the other countries is not yet available. Second, we have only presented the supply side of the transformation of the national political space. This part of the analysis has to be completed by an analysis of the demand side: do the dimensions underlying the voters' attitudes correspond to the axis we have uncovered in the present analysis of the parties' political supply? Do the salience and the direction of the voters' political attitudes move in line with the movement of the parties? In particular: does the restructuring of the voters' attitudes precede, parallel or follow the restructuring of the competitive party space. Preliminary analyses of the Swiss case indicate that the restructuring of the voters' attitudes preceded rather

than followed the restructuring of the party space. Third, we have only presented one set of data on the supply side – the data on the editorial part in the press. We also have data on the advertisements of the parties during the electoral campaigns and on their presentation in TV-spots. The presentation of a given party by the press may differ from the party's self-presentation in its own advertisements. In the case of the Swiss SVP, for example, we believe that its relatively moderate stance on immigration that results from our analysis of the press will be belied by an analysis of its self-presentation in campaign ads. The completion of the analyses in these three directions – adding other sources on supply, complementing supply-based results by an analysis of the demand and comparing all six countries – constitutes the further agenda of our study.

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Appendix

In tables A1 to A4, we present the average positions and issue salience for the French and Swiss parties on the 13 categories of issues that we used for the MDS analysis

Table A1: Issue position of Swiss parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the category of issues

	ırmy	ultural lit	europe	Economic ib	mmigration	ultural rotectio- nism	Budgetary igor	ublic service	nstit reform	velfare	ulture	Environ- nent	ecurity
radical left													
91	-0.67	1.00	-0.83	-1.00	-0.78	-1.00	.	-0.83	0.00	0.70	1.00	0.96	-0.50
95	.	0.20	-0.50	0.00	-0.50	-1.00	.	-1.00	-0.17	1.00	.	0.68	.
social democrats													
75	0.17	0.64	.	-0.50	-0.20	.	1.00	1.00	0.28	0.81	0.20	0.83	-1.00
91	-0.73	0.89	0.70	-0.07	-0.44	0.40	0.38	1.00	0.14	0.66	-0.20	0.93	-1.00
95	0.13	0.53	0.56	-0.89	-0.33	-0.33	0.20	0.36	-0.37	0.92	1.00	0.95	1.00
99	.	1.00	1.00	0.25	-0.78	-1.00	-1.00	0.93	0.33	0.81	0.69	0.58	.
christian democrats+													
75	0.67	0.69	.	0.00	1.00	.	1.00	1.00	0.40	0.33	-0.44	.	0.43
91	-0.25	0.58	0.45	1.00	-0.14	0.45	0.50	1.00	0.90	0.68	0.00	0.54	1.00
95	1.00	-0.07	0.33	-0.38	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.11	0.25	1.00	1.00	0.33	1.00
99	.	1.00	1.00	-0.50	0.64	.	0.27	0.33	-1.00	1.00	0.91	0.10	0.00
liberals													
75	.	0.50	.	0.75	.	.	1.00	0.67	-0.04	0.74	-0.23	-0.11	0.82
91	1.00	0.62	0.36	0.79	0.58	0.64	-0.09	0.33	0.46	-0.31	-1.00	0.22	0.50
95	0.00	0.00	0.42	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.30	1.00	0.05	0.50	1.00	0.33	1.00
99	-1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.67	0.30	.	0.70	0.10	-1.00	0.80	0.35	0.00	1.00
Swiss People's Party													
75	1.00	0.00	.	-1.00	.	.	1.00	.	-0.20	0.33	-1.00	1.00	1.00
91	0.75	0.63	-0.35	0.64	0.67	0.73	0.60	-0.25	0.60	0.38	-0.50	-0.10	1.00
95	0.33	-0.60	-0.47	0.20	0.00	0.75	0.20	-0.25	-0.33	0.19	-0.50	0.92	1.00
99	.	1.00	-0.60	-0.33	0.08	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	-1.00	-0.66	1.00	1.00
radical right													
91	0.67	0.19	-1.00	0.67	0.88	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	.	0.06	1.00
95	.	0.33	-1.00	.	0.67	1.00	.	-0.67	0.67	-1.00	0.00	.	.

Table A2: Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during electoral campaign

	army	cultural lib	europe	Econo-mic lib	Immigration	cultural protec-tionism	Budgetary rigor	public service	instit reform	welfare	culture	Environ-ment	security
radical left													
91	4.79	5.85	31.38	2.66	4.79	1.60	0.00	18.62	2.66	5.32	2.66	14.89	1.06
95	0.00	18.87	7.55	3.77	7.55	3.77	0.00	3.77	5.66	7.55	0.00	35.85	0.00
social democrats													
75	5.08	23.73	0.00	3.39	4.24	0.00	5.08	0.85	13.56	22.88	4.24	5.08	2.54
91	4.25	15.44	9.65	11.20	6.95	3.86	5.02	0.77	2.70	13.51	1.93	11.58	0.39
95	4.06	15.23	4.57	9.14	1.52	1.52	2.54	7.11	9.64	24.87	0.51	10.66	1.02
99	0.00	1.32	1.32	2.63	11.84	2.63	1.32	9.21	3.95	10.53	17.11	7.89	0.00
christian democrats+													
75	3.70	16.05	0.00	1.23	1.23	0.00	8.64	3.70	18.52	11.11	11.11	0.00	8.64
91	3.56	10.67	14.22	1.33	9.33	9.33	1.78	3.56	4.44	9.78	0.89	16.00	2.67
95	1.30	19.48	3.90	10.39	7.79	5.19	2.60	11.69	10.39	2.60	2.60	11.69	1.30
99	0.00	18.18	2.27	4.55	7.95	0.00	17.05	3.41	2.27	6.82	19.32	5.68	2.27
liberals													
75	0.00	5.56	0.00	5.56	0.00	0.00	6.25	2.08	19.44	24.31	9.03	6.25	7.64
91	3.51	11.40	16.23	14.47	7.89	6.14	4.82	3.95	5.26	3.51	0.44	7.89	1.75
95	1.85	10.19	17.59	6.48	7.41	0.93	4.63	3.70	20.37	7.41	2.78	2.78	0.93
99	0.97	0.97	1.94	5.83	4.85	0.00	14.56	4.85	0.97	9.71	26.21	5.83	0.97
Swiss People's Party													
75	1.89	20.75	0.00	1.89	0.00	0.00	15.09	0.00	18.87	5.66	9.43	7.55	15.09
91	4.42	8.29	12.71	7.73	19.89	8.29	2.76	3.31	2.76	4.42	2.21	13.81	1.66
95	3.57	5.95	20.24	5.95	2.38	9.52	5.95	4.76	7.14	15.48	2.38	7.14	2.38
99	0.00	2.50	4.17	2.50	21.67	3.33	5.83	0.83	2.50	0.83	18.33	2.50	4.17
radical right													
91	6.90	9.20	12.64	6.90	18.39	12.64	2.30	4.60	1.15	1.15	0.00	19.54	2.30
95	0.00	8.57	2.86	0.00	34.29	2.86	0.00	17.14	17.14	11.43	2.86	0.00	0.00

Table A3 Issue position of French parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the category of issues

	army	cultural lib	europe	Econo-mic lib	Immigration	cultural protect	Budget. rigor	public service	instit reform	welfare	culture	Environ-ment	security
radical left													
78	-1.00	.	.	.	.	.	-1.00	1.00	1.00	0.85	.	1.00	.
88	1.00	1.00	1.00	-1.00	1.00	1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	.	1.00
95	0.33	1.00	0.33	.	.	.	-1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	.	1.00	.
2002	.	0.75	.	-1.00	-1.00	-0.33	-0.42	0.54	1.00	0.96	1.00	0.93	0.64
communists													
78	0.33	0.80	0.75	-0.73	-1.00	1.00	-0.76	-1.00	0.85	0.94	0.43	-1.00	.
88	-0.65	1.00	-1.00	-0.50	-0.45	.	-0.83	.	0.83	0.96	1.00	.	0.20
95	0.00	1.00	-0.20	-1.00	-1.00	1.00	-1.00	0.50	0.83	0.85	1.00	.	1.00
2002	.	1.00	.	.	-1.00	.	-0.33	0.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
socialists													
78	0.05	0.75	0.50	-0.33	.	0.00	-0.74	-0.44	0.52	0.91	0.37	1.00	1.00
88	-0.25	0.96	1.00	0.80	-0.48	.	-0.31	-0.03	0.25	0.81	1.00	0.50	0.38
95	-0.58	0.99	0.95	0.03	0.50	1.00	-0.45	0.03	0.57	0.98	0.94	1.00	0.71
2002	0.33	0.80	1.00	-0.71	-1.00	1.00	0.31	0.56	0.71	0.76	1.00	0.00	0.92
mrg 78	-0.20	0.63	0.60	-0.11	.	1.00	-0.50	-0.10	0.92	0.93	0.44	0.67	.
UDF													
78	0.67	0.91	1.00	-0.12	0.00	0.71	0.30	0.31	0.54	0.72	1.00	0.61	1.00
88	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.81	0.71	.	0.88	1.00	0.51	0.63	0.93	.	0.80
95	.	1.00	0.56	-1.00	0.00	.	1.00	.	0.78	0.60	.	.	.
2002	.	0.56	.	1.00	-1.00	.	0.67	0.33	0.20	0.53	1.00	.	1.00
RPR													
78	1.00	0.58	-0.14	0.68	-1.00	1.00	0.50	.	-0.39	0.38	1.00	0.33	1.00
88	1.00	0.76	0.91	0.54	0.49	1.00	1.00	0.71	-0.47	0.41	0.87	.	0.96
95	0.55	0.73	0.65	0.62	0.73	0.87	0.64	0.83	0.44	0.64	0.90	1.00	1.00
2002	1.00	0.78	1.00	1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.94	0.43	-0.24	0.44	1.00	0.00	1.00
Front national+													
78	.	0.33	.	.	0.80	1.00	-1.00	.	0.00	-0.15	1.00	.	1.00
88	0.67	-0.35	1.00	-0.33	0.94	1.00	0.88	1.00	0.89	0.23	-0.14	1.00	1.00
95	0.79	-0.58	-1.00	0.25	0.44	0.50	0.75	.	0.80	0.50	-0.33	.	1.00
2002	1.00	-0.33	-1.00	0.50	0.69	1.00	1.00	-0.25	0.33	0.00	0.50	.	1.00

Table A4 Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category

	army	cultural lib	europe	economic lib	Immigration	cultural protect	Budget. rigor	public service	instit reform	welfare	culture	Environment	security
radical left													
78	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00	0.00	4.00	26.00	0.00	12.00	0.00
88	1.92	3.85	1.92	1.92	1.92	0.00	3.85	0.00	3.85	73.08	3.85	0.00	1.92
95	10.00	3.33	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.00	6.67	13.33	26.67	0.00	10.00	0.00
2002	0.00	4.00	0.00	0.57	1.71	1.71	14.29	7.43	2.29	32.57	4.57	12.57	10.29
communists													
78	3.32	8.31	2.22	4.16	0.28	2.49	11.91	2.77	3.60	18.56	3.88	0.28	0.00
88	8.50	7.50	3.50	2.00	5.50	0.00	6.00	0.00	7.50	43.50	7.00	0.00	2.50
95	4.92	9.84	4.10	3.28	0.82	0.82	4.92	3.28	9.84	42.62	6.56	0.00	2.46
2002	0.00	5.00	0.00	0.00	3.75	0.00	15.00	3.75	3.75	51.25	3.75	2.50	3.75
socialists													
78	2.50	7.27	1.36	4.09	0.00	0.91	10.91	2.05	7.27	26.59	3.41	0.68	0.91
88	1.32	10.23	7.70	3.85	2.97	0.00	5.61	2.09	7.59	33.77	7.70	0.88	2.86
95	2.52	6.75	5.56	5.70	1.59	0.40	6.23	3.97	12.32	34.17	4.11	3.05	1.85
2002	0.73	6.59	2.93	1.46	2.20	1.46	10.98	2.20	5.12	41.95	2.68	0.49	11.71
mrg 78	1.98	6.35	1.98	7.54	0.00	0.79	8.33	3.97	9.52	23.81	6.35	2.38	0.00
UDF													
78	0.97	8.23	1.45	8.39	0.32	2.74	4.52	1.29	6.13	15.65	3.87	7.42	2.42
88	1.12	5.13	6.47	9.60	1.56	0.00	9.38	1.12	15.63	23.44	12.05	0.00	2.23
95	0.00	6.00	16.00	2.00	4.00	0.00	4.00	0.00	18.00	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2002	0.00	9.28	0.00	11.34	7.22	0.00	12.37	3.09	5.15	20.62	4.12	0.00	14.43
RPR													
78	0.95	4.13	2.22	12.38	0.32	4.44	9.21	0.00	7.30	19.37	3.17	0.95	3.81
88	1.37	5.81	3.76	5.98	9.40	1.03	4.96	2.39	9.74	24.62	5.13	0.00	8.03
95	3.31	5.38	8.07	7.56	1.55	1.55	10.14	2.69	11.39	26.71	5.07	0.62	2.17
2002	1.30	5.84	0.97	7.14	3.90	1.30	11.69	14.29	5.52	22.73	2.92	1.30	15.58
Front national+													
78	0.00	7.32	0.00	0.00	24.39	2.44	2.44	0.00	4.88	24.39	4.88	0.00	4.88
88	2.93	4.88	2.44	1.46	30.24	4.88	6.34	0.49	8.78	12.68	3.41	0.49	13.17
95	5.83	10.83	8.33	6.67	20.83	3.33	6.67	0.00	8.33	15.00	2.50	0.00	4.17
2002	0.69	4.14	3.45	2.76	17.24	6.21	7.59	5.52	2.07	23.45	2.76	0.00	20.69

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Hanspeter Kriesi is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Zurich and Director of the CIS. Born in 1948, he studied sociology, social and economic history, public law, and social psychology at the University of Bern. After working for two years at the Teachers' College of Aargau, he obtained a master's in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1975. From 1975 to 1984 he worked at the Sociological Institute of the University of Zurich, where he earned his Ph.D. in 1976 and habilitation (tenure) in 1980. From 1984 to 1988, Professor Kriesi chaired the political behavior research unit at the University of Amsterdam. He then taught comparative and Swiss politics at the University of Geneva, where he also chaired the Political Science Department from 1995 to 1998. In 2000 to 2001, Professor Kriesi was a Senior Research Fellow at the Social Science Research Center Berlin. He is the director of the National Priority Program "Switzerland: Towards the Future".

Romain Lachat studied political science at the University of Geneva and at the Free University of Berlin (Licence in 1998, DEA in 1999). From 1998 to 2002, he was an assistant at the Department of Political Science at the University of Geneva, where he worked as a doctoral research collaborator on the 1999 cycle of the Swiss Electoral Studies Project from 1999 to 2002. From 2000 to 2001, Romain Lachat was a guest researcher in the "Institutions and Political Change" unit of the Social Science Research Center Berlin. In October 2002, he joined Professor Kriesi's team as a teaching assistant at the University of Zurich and research collaborator on the "National political change in a globalizing world" project.

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