

**THE UNITED KINGDOM  
AND  
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

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**PROGRESS REPORT**

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**Introduction**

*11 September*

On 11 September 2001 Al Qa'ida terrorists hijacked four passenger aircraft in the United States. The terrorists flew two of these aircraft into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, killing over 2,800 people, and the third into the US Department of Defense at the Pentagon in Washington DC, killing 184. The fourth plane, also intended for Washington DC, crashed into fields in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after the passengers overpowered the hijackers. All 40 passengers and crew were killed.

2. Although these attacks took place in the United States, the repercussions were felt all across the globe. 85 nations lost citizens in the attacks. 67 of those who died were British citizens; many more had close family ties to the United Kingdom. The families of the dead received immediate, and continuing, consular support from the staff at the Consulate General in New York, who worked closely with the FCO in London and police Family Liaison Officers both in New York and around the UK. The aim was to provide the best possible support to those affected by the attacks; help with flights and accommodation for those visiting new York; and provide assistance with legal and other issues.

3. It was clear from the outset that we have not merely an interest, but an obligation to bring those responsible for their murder to account. It was very clear too that the United Kingdom and the international community as a whole had an obligation to act to prevent further terrorist attacks. The nature of the challenge was revealed in a new light – international terrorism could be more

than a heinous crime, it could represent a strategic threat to national, and international security.

*Campaign objectives*

4. A month after 11 September the Government set out its objectives for the campaign against international terrorism. First and foremost, our priority was – and still is – to protect the United Kingdom and its overseas territories and prevent further terrorist attacks. More widely, the campaign was, and is, about eliminating terrorism as a force in international affairs. We have not acted alone. Tackling these challenges has required the closest co-operation with our EU and wider international partners. This paper summarises what has been achieved since then and where we plan to focus our future effort. However, despite all the work set out in this report, there can be no guarantee that the terrorists will not strike again.

### **Afghanistan**

*Al Qa'ida and the Taliban*

5. Within days of 11 September, it was clear that the terrorist attacks in the United States had been possible mainly because Usama bin Laden and Al Qa'ida were able to draw on the support and shelter of the Taliban regime. There was no doubt that bin Laden and his accomplices were preparing for further attacks and the US issued an ultimatum to the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, to hand over Usama bin Laden. Once it became clear that the Taliban would neither give up bin Laden nor cease to harbour terrorists, action in self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter was not only justified but essential. The US, which suffered more victims in the terrorist attacks than any other country, led a military campaign in Afghanistan and provided the overwhelming bulk of the military forces.

6. The UK was involved from the outset alongside the US. In the early stages of the campaign Royal Navy Tomahawk missiles were fired at targets in Afghanistan, while throughout, British command and control, reconnaissance and tanker aircraft flew sorties in support of coalition strike action. The airbase at Diego Garcia was used by the United States and other key coalition allies.

The UK also provided the deputy Commander for all Coalition naval forces in theatre, and liaison officers at every major US headquarters. The UK Agencies worked closely with foreign counterparts to provide crucial support to military operations, to identify terrorists and terrorist bases, and prevent terrorist activity.

*Political &  
diplomatic  
action*

7. On the political and diplomatic front, British Ministers and officials remained in close touch with their American counter-parts and, in the weeks following the terrorist attacks, the UK mounted an intensive diplomatic campaign to build and sustain political and practical support for the coalition. This was a key factor in the success of the action in Afghanistan. Arab and Gulf States were among the first to condemn the 11 September attacks, with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference strongly denouncing them as contrary to Islamic religious teachings. Russia worked closely with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and took forward proposals with the EU for a new role for Russia in Euro-Atlantic security and for further development of EU/ NATO links. China expressed solidarity with the US over the atrocities on 11 September and has been supportive of international action against terrorism.

8. Diplomatic efforts were also concentrated on Afghanistan's neighbours with Pakistan's decision to support the coalition being of immense importance. Iran, with whom we have a number of areas of common interest in Afghan policy, was also supportive. The UK liaised closely with the Central Asian states in support of coalition action, for example on clearances for overflights and use of forward mounting bases. In Afghanistan itself, following the withdrawal of the Taliban from Kabul on 19 November, the UK was among the first to open a national representative office in the city. The fall of the Taliban was greeted enthusiastically by the Afghan people.

*Task Force  
Jacana*

9. As the Taliban withdrew from Kabul, British forces helped the coalition secure the airfield at Bagram. Later, in March 2002, a 1,700-strong force built

around 45 Commando, Royal Marines, – known as Task Force JACANA – were deployed as part of the US-led coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan, where their role was to prevent terrorists from operating and to destroy their infrastructure. More widely, patrols by Task Force JACANA and by our coalition partners, played a major part in providing a secure environment in the build up to the Emergency Loya Jirga in June. After four successful operations, the Commandos returned to the United Kingdom in July. However, we have maintained the capability to rapidly re-deploy similar forces to Afghanistan to conduct further operations against terrorism should the need arise.

*Denying an  
alternative  
base*

10. In parallel with these operations in Afghanistan, British military personnel also participated in coalition operations aimed at denying terrorists an alternative base outside Afghanistan. From December 2001, these included maritime patrols in the Arabian Sea aimed at deterring and, if necessary, intercepting any attempt by Al Qa'ida/Taliban personnel to flee by sea. This will have hindered any early attempts by Al Qa'ida to establish an alternative base, for example in the Horn of Africa. As well as these operations, the task force engaged in a range of valuable intelligence gathering tasks.

*Commitment to  
Afghanistan*

11. However, our operations have not been limited to those aimed directly at terrorists. We also recognise the need to help Afghanistan become a peaceful and stable country where terrorism has no place.

*ISAF*

12. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was an important step towards that goal. Created on 20 December, when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1386, its main task is to assist the Afghan Interim Authority (IA) and now the Transitional Authority, in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The UK agreed to lead the force and the first British ISAF troops were deployed within a few days. By the time ISAF achieved full operating capability on 18 February 2002, there were 5,000 troops from 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 2,000 of those troops were British. Other nations have since contributed too, including the Czech Republic (who provided a field hospital), Albania and Ireland, as well as Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia.

13. ISAF has been highly successful. In its first six months, over 2,100 joint patrols were mounted with the Kabul Police, resulting in a 70% decrease in crime rates in the city. Nearly three million bombs, shells, bullets and land mines were destroyed. It also recruited and trained the First Battalion of the Afghan National Guard, which was to play a key role in providing security at the Emergency Loya Jirga.

14. In addition to ISAF's security assistance operations, its programme of civil-military co-operation contributed greatly to bringing about a return to normality in the city, with over £1.8 million spent on or committed to around 250 projects covering education, health, administration, roads and refurbishment of utilities. As agreed, after six months the UK handed over as ISAF lead nation to Turkey on 20 June 2002. The United Kingdom continued to support ISAF with around 400 troops in Kabul. The contribution made by British forces to ISAF has been welcomed by the Afghan people and the International Community, and is something of which we can justifiably be proud.

*Security  
Sector  
Reform*

15. Long-term stability in Afghanistan will depend too on reform of the country's Security Sector – a prerequisite for a sustainable reconstruction process. The training of the First Battalion of the Afghan National Guard by ISAF was a start. The UK was a driving force at G8 meetings held between March and July 2002 where member countries, UN representatives and key Afghan Ministers took the first steps on agreeing priorities for Security Sector Reform, including the replacement of the numerous regional armed factions with an Afghan National Army answerable to a National Security Council in

Kabul. The US is leading on army training, the Germans on police reform, the Italians on the judiciary, and the Japanese and UN jointly on demobilisation. The UK has pledged £18 million from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool for Security Sector Reform in the financial year 2002-03.

*Drugs*

16. The UK agreed to lead on the counter-narcotics effort. With 90% of Europe's heroin originating as opium poppy grown in Afghanistan, action on counter-narcotics has been a high priority for the Government, and for financial support from the FCO's Drugs and Crime Fund. The proceeds from drugs contribute to conflict and regional instability and undermine global security by funding terrorism and sustaining those opposed to the Bonn Agreement. Eliminating drugs from Afghanistan requires a sustained commitment by the international community.

17. The Afghan Interim and Transitional Administrations supported the United Kingdom lead with a tough stance on drugs. In January they introduced a ban on production, trafficking and processing. On 8 April they implemented an eradication programme that resulted in the destruction of about a third of the 2002 harvest in the main poppy growing areas. In July, the UK chaired the first international drug co-ordination meeting in Kabul. The event was opened by President Karzai and was attended by Afghan Ministers and over 100 participants from donor countries, international organisations and NGOs.

*Humanitarian and Developmental assistance*

18. In addition to contributing to the military and security assistance needed to stabilise Afghanistan, Britain has also provided vital humanitarian assistance, focussed primarily on the reduction of poverty. Before 11 September, Afghanistan was already in the grip of a severe humanitarian crisis with three years of drought on top of two decades of conflict: over three million people were receiving food assistance from the UN World Food Programme, and famine conditions and malnutrition were widespread.

19. The UK was already a major humanitarian donor, giving £32 million since 1997, and we were one of the first countries to commit money to the

current crisis, quickly disbursing £60 million to humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Our first priorities were to help meet immediate life-saving needs (food, water, healthcare and shelter), to support refugee needs in neighbouring countries, to help host populations through programmes which benefited them, to strengthen international humanitarian agency capacity and co-ordination, and to support the political process. We have also made a major contribution to Afghanistan's humanitarian needs through the EU. This programme spent over €550 million between 1990 and 2001, with €45 million committed so far this year.

20. These priorities quickly broadened to include work on recovery needs, including support for UNICEF's "Back to School" programme and capacity building in the Interim Administration. A co-ordinated international aid strategy was essential. We also contributed financially to UN efforts to facilitate the start of the reconstruction. The UK provided support through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for start-up costs for the Ministry for Women's Affairs, and has also given £700,000 (\$1m) to the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to support women's leadership in re-building Afghanistan. Furthermore, in recognition of the enormity of the challenge that lay ahead in rebuilding Afghanistan, the Government led the way in emphasising the need for a long-term approach with sustained investment backed by the political will to complete the task. At the ministerial-level Reconstruction Conference in Tokyo on 28 January 2002, the Government pledged £200 million bilaterally over the next five years. The first elements of this pledge are already being disbursed. The EU pledged €1 billion over the same time period, increasing substantially the amount of UK money targeted at reconstruction and development.

*Loya Jirga*

21. UN talks on Afghanistan in November/December 2001 resulted in the signing of the Bonn Agreement, which provided a blueprint for the governing of Afghanistan for the following two years, including agreement on the

composition of the Interim Administration and a commitment to hold an Emergency Loya Jirga within six months. Following a predominantly peaceful district and regional selection process, more than 1,500 delegates took part in the Emergency Loya Jirga in Kabul from 11 to 19 June. This offered a diverse cross section of Afghanistan's population the opportunity to express their views in a secure environment. It was the first time in decades that the Afghan people had been able to participate in political decision-making and included the highest proportion of women participating in any Loya Jirga. The UK contributed financially to the Loya Jirga Commission. The holding of such a large and peaceful gathering so soon after the Interim Administration had taken office was a great tribute to the Afghan people and their leaders, and a significant step on the road to democratic elections in 2004.

*Priorities for  
the future of  
Afghanistan*

22. Afghanistan has come a long way since 11 September: the Bonn Process is on track, a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted, refugees are returning in large numbers (1.3 million so far – an enormous sign of confidence in the future of the country), the security situation in Kabul has eased, the international community has remained engaged and continues to commit significant resources, neighbouring countries have generally contributed positively to reconstruction efforts, ISAF – led initially by the UK – has helped provide security in Kabul and created the conditions for a successful Emergency Loya Jirga, which in turn has produced a more broad-based Transitional Administration.

23. However, much remains to be done. Many vulnerable people remain reliant on food aid. Remnants of Al Qa'ida and the Taliban are still active and can still threaten the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The attempted assassination of President Karzai this month and the assassination of Vice President Haji Qader in Kabul in July indicates how fragile the security situation remains. There is an urgent requirement for the Transitional Administration to deliver a reconstruction dividend that is visible on the ground; to build its capacity and extend its authority in the regions; and to



centralise revenue collection. It must improve security throughout Afghanistan by building up strong national security institutions while reducing, and eventually disbanding, private military factions; in a country where most national institutions have been destroyed or undermined, this is a complex and daunting task. Those refugees whose skills will be essential in re-building Afghanistan and its infrastructure must be encouraged to return and to stay. The international community's support is vital and we must remain engaged on all these fronts.

24. In counter-narcotics, the UK will continue to develop and co-ordinate international assistance in the areas of law enforcement, rural reconstruction, institution building and demand reduction. The long-term commitment of the international community will be necessary to help Afghanistan rid itself of drugs for good. Reductions in opium cultivation levels will only be sustainable once farmers, currently dependent on drugs to provide for themselves and their families, have access to alternative forms of licit livelihood.

25. On the developmental front, our continued focus will be the elimination of poverty. Priorities include activities to support the humanitarian effort (with an emphasis on moving away from food handouts to food-for-work and cash-for-work programmes), to build capacity in the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, to advise on security sector reform, to continue to support the political process, to help develop sustainable livelihood opportunities, and to improve the effectiveness of external assistance. The majority of direct funding will be in the form of contributions to UN agencies or channelled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The EU programme will be the UK's largest indirect contribution.

### **Strengthening domestic counter terrorism measures**

26. The attacks of 11 September 2001 served as a stark reminder that the world faces a serious security threat from extremists who misuse the teachings of their religions and exploit social, economic and political grievances to

recruit and seek support for terror. Here in the UK, our concern about Al Qa'ida and extremists who share their aims is not new – the Government was well aware before 11 September that Usama bin Laden and his networks posed a serious threat. However, last September's attacks changed our appreciation of the vulnerability of UK interests to international terrorism, as well as our understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat – both the sophistication of the planning and the willingness of the terrorists to inflict mass civilian casualties. Since then we have kept the nature of that threat under constant review and have developed our response accordingly.

27. Although extremist networks have been disrupted by coalition military action, many Al Qa'ida associated terrorists who underwent training in Afghanistan remain both in neighbouring countries and outside the region, and continue to pose a serious threat. Their networks are weakened but far-reaching and it is clear that some of these extremists see UK interests at home and overseas as a target.

*United Kingdom experience pre 11 September*

28. Regrettably, we here already had much experience of terrorism and dealing with terrorists. As a result, before last September, we already had legislation in place that made it hard for terrorists to operate; we already had tight security at our airports; and we already had effective and well-established counter-terrorist structures. Many branches of Government had robust contingency plans in place. However, these measures were designed to counter the threat from terrorism on a very different scale. The Government's effort to tackle domestic terrorism has not in any way decreased, but following 11 September 2001, the Government has, as a matter of urgency, been rethinking security across the board to identify vulnerabilities and tighten existing security measures to make the United Kingdom even safer.

*New policy framework*

29. Work in this area has been co-ordinated by three Ministerial Committees (two of which are new since 11 September) – the War Cabinet (DOP(IT)), chaired by the Prime Minister, which was established to oversee the campaign;

DOP(IT)(T), chaired by the Home Secretary, which co-ordinates policy on protective and preventative security; and the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), also chaired by the Home Secretary, which is tasked with ensuring supplies and essential services in an emergency. Working together within the framework of a Government-wide counter-terrorism strategy, which is updated regularly, the action to counter terrorism has been taken forward by all branches of Government. Departments retain responsibility for their specific areas of expertise, but the work is co-ordinated through a series of committees, which involve both Ministers and officials. Government Departments are working closely with the emergency services, local authorities and the Devolved Administrations to ensure joined-up planning in all aspects of counter-terrorism. Some of this work has been publicly visible; some of it – for reasons of national security – has had to be done in secret.

30. The Government took rapid action address the new level of threat following 11 September, building on London's considerable experience in coping with terrorism and other major incidents over the last 30 years. Nick Raynsford, as Minister for London, convened a London Resilience Cabinet Committee which included the Mayor and all London's key services. An inter-agency London Resilience Team (LRT) was set up to carry out a comprehensive review of London's preparedness. The recommendations flowing from their report are being rapidly implemented. A new strategic emergency planning regime for the capital (headed by the Minister and Mayor) has been introduced. New pan-London command, control and communication arrangements have been developed. A programme of pan-London exercises is underway. A generic emergency plan for London is being prepared. Detailed planning has taken place for evacuation of key areas. London's contingency plans against chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents have been closely examined, and new resources have been deployed.

31. Given the nature of the attacks on 11 September, aviation security has been a central strand of the Government's work. Having learnt lessons from

the Lockerbie disaster, the UK already had some of the most comprehensive aviation security programmes in the world. Key measures such as the security screening of all hold baggage and of personnel entering an airport's Restricted Zone, both staff and crew, were standard here. However, following 11 September we tightened security in the United Kingdom further. With the co-operation of the aviation industry hundreds of additional security staff have been employed and enhanced security measures have been introduced, both on the ground and in the air. However, we will keep all measures under constant review and it is essential that everyone in the industry remains vigilant at all times.

32. On the ground, the screening and searching of passengers and their cabin baggage at airports has been stepped up; tighter rules have been enforced on the carriage of potential weapons on aircraft; and additional screening procedures have also been introduced. Funding has been made available to the police service to provide enhanced security measures at a number of non-designated airports and aircraft maintenance facilities in England and Wales. New aviation security powers permitting the removal and arrest of those found in restricted areas, and detention of aircraft for security reasons, have been created. Tighter controls on the issue and management of airport passes have also been introduced. Where lapses have occurred, we have taken immediate action in response. The Government expects all airport operators and airlines to remain extremely vigilant.

33. In the air too a number of new security enhancements have been put in place. Among them, the new Civil Aviation Authority regulations requiring that all cockpit doors be locked during flight and banning visits to the flight deck, and further measures requiring new intrusion resistant cockpit doors to be fitted to UK-registered aircraft by April 2003 – well ahead of international requirements.

34. The UK is concerned about the risk to its interests from the potential exploitation by terrorists of vulnerabilities in aviation security overseas. We have therefore also been active in raising international standards of aviation security through enhanced co-operation, in the G8 particularly. We have promoted the introduction of enhanced measures, backed by force of law, in the EU. At the global level we have pledged, with G8 partners, to contribute funding and expertise to raise standards worldwide and to introduce mandatory audits of airport security to be conducted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

*Improving  
civil nuclear  
security*

35. Of course, the work to improve security goes much wider than aviation. Enhanced protective measures are already in place in other key sectors too, including at civil nuclear and at critical infrastructure facilities. The United Kingdom's civil nuclear sites apply comprehensive, stringent security measures regulated by the Department of Trade and Industry's Office for Civil Nuclear Security, the security regulator. Following the events of 11 September, all relevant precautions were reviewed and are kept under review. A number of measures were put in place promptly or strengthened around all civil nuclear sites. Security arrangements protecting sensitive areas inside sites have also been extended and reinforced, and fire-fighting and other mitigation measures have been strengthened.

36. These measures have been backed up by new legislation. Legislation in respect of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons has been enhanced to ensure the protection and security of civil nuclear sites; new offences of aiding and abetting the overseas use or development of such weapons and related training have been introduced; and there are new powers relating to laboratories holding stocks of potentially dangerous substances. The law has also been extended to cover hoaxes and the use of such substances.

*Providing  
protective  
security advice  
to key sectors*

37. In addition, the Government has in place a programme to provide protective security advice to critical sectors of United Kingdom industry. Prior

to 11 September, there were already extensive and well developed arrangements to deliver advice designed to respond to threats associated with terrorism linked to Northern Ireland. However, since then, the programme has been reinforced and enhanced, with a particular focus on reducing the risks from suicide and chemical or biological terrorist attacks. At the same time the number of industrial operations receiving advice on counter-terrorism precautions has been substantially increased – to include not only operations critical to the national infrastructure but also a wide range of sites and sectors that might now be considered as targets by international terrorists and that would if successfully attacked have the potential to cause significant damage to life and property. Work to reduce some key vulnerabilities at such sites will be an important medium – and, in a few cases, long-term priority. Extra resources are being put in place to ensure that this advice is provided as soon as possible, and a priority-based system drawn-up, but there remains much work to do in this area. Protective security advice is made available to a broad range of contacts in the business and commercial community too, including, for example, the retail sector and operators of major public venues, such as sports stadia.

*Clamping  
down on  
extremists*

38. In parallel to these protective measures, the Government has been making it harder for extremists and suspected terrorists to operate. The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 bolstered and enlarged existing provisions for dealing with terrorists. It is tough, but necessarily so and the measures it introduced have had a deterrent and disruptive effect. It provides powers to counter all forms of terrorist threat from all sources whilst ensuring the protection of the rights of the individual and consistency with the UK's international commitments. Its rapid implementation reflects the Government's determined and timely response to the events of 11 September.

39. The Act ensures that the law enforcement agencies have the powers and information – including inter-agency exchanges – necessary to counter terrorist activity. Other powers in the legislation include targeting terrorist funding

through account monitoring, freezing assets, seizing cash and securing the disclosure of information; deterring and preventing abuses of immigration and asylum procedures by allowing extended detention of those suspected of being international terrorists but who cannot immediately be removed from the country. In addition the Act includes a range of enhanced investigative powers for the police.

*A strong  
partnership  
between the  
Police and  
the Security  
Service*

40. Police investigations into terrorist activity both at home and abroad have intensified. To that end the close working relationships that already existed with other areas of Government, UK intelligence agencies and international partners have been strengthened. The partnership following 11 September between the Security Service and the Police has been particularly important. On the protective security side, they have been working together in the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office (NaCTSO) to deal with new terrorist tactics, as well as to thwart and subdue conventional attacks. On the operational side, the already close relationship is being further enhanced following the creation of the Police International Counter Terrorist Unit (PICTU). The unit, jointly staffed by Special Branch, Anti-Terrorist Branch and Security Service officers will facilitate and assist in existing arrangements for the co-ordination of operations to counter international terrorism.

41. In the months ahead, the general capacity of UK counter-terrorist policing will further increase in order to enhance the police contribution to reducing the threat of public harm.

42. A number of major joint operations against suspected international terrorists in the United Kingdom have been carried out following the events of 11 September. We are prevented by legal reasons from giving details of those operations in this paper, but we are able to confirm that they have resulted in a number of arrests and had significant impact on the terrorists. It is worth noting too that, despite the focus on international terrorism, the police and the Security Service have not neglected their efforts to combat Irish terrorism. One

notable operation since 11 September resulted in a number of arrests and caused a substantial reduction in the dissidents' mainland capabilities.

*Increased intelligence effort*

43. Intelligence has played a vital role in operations against terrorism. The Security Service continues to lead on countering the threat from international terrorism to the United Kingdom and UK interests overseas. It works closely with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and with Government Departments as well as United Kingdom law enforcement agencies and a wide range of security and intelligence organisations overseas, to investigate and disrupt terrorist plans, including the procurement of funds. Since 11 September the effort devoted to countering terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida has been increased substantially across all the intelligence services. The Joint Intelligence Committee, supported by the Intelligence and Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, has continued to provide regular advice to Ministers on the threat.

*Gathering intelligence on the terrorist threat*

44. In the United Kingdom the key intelligence priority has been to increase efforts to locate and identify terrorists and their supporters based in this country, and to disrupt their activities here. As part of this work to make the United Kingdom a more difficult operating environment for those wishing to plan or mount attacks, the Security Service has interviewed some of those detained following military and other counter-terrorist operations in the wake of 11 September. Together with the police, the Security Service has also interviewed a large number of United Kingdom residents with suspected links to terrorism in order to obtain information about possible threats to United Kingdom interests both here and abroad.

45. At the same time, the Service has, in conjunction with SIS, reinforced links to allied services abroad in order to develop an increased flow of intelligence on extremists based in, or associated with, the United Kingdom.

*Enhanced civil contingency arrangements*

46. In parallel with these enhanced arrangements aimed at preventing further attacks, the Government has also strengthened contingency



arrangements for dealing with terrorist incidents. Although no one realised at the time how vital the work would shortly become, a new Civil Contingencies Secretariat was set up within the Cabinet Office in July 2001. Since then, a major cross-Departmental programme of work has been taken forward under the leadership of the Home Secretary to enhance the country's resilience and counter the new threat from terrorism. In June 2002, Sir David Omand was appointed to the new post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office to add to our capacity to co-ordinate security, intelligence and consequence management matters and deal with major emergencies as they arise.

47. Much has been done in what is a continuous effort to improve the country's preparedness. The key capabilities required for an effective response to a crisis that threatens to disrupt the United Kingdom have been identified and lead Departments tasked with ensuring that these capabilities are in place. Business continuity plans for Government departments have been revised and emergency plans for central Government have been exercised. The emergency services have all reviewed their capabilities for dealing with terrorist attacks: hospitals and ambulance services have improved their preparedness (including by putting in place 300 mobile decontamination units and 8,000 sets of personal protection equipment for dealing with chemical and biological incidents); specialist training has been provided to strengthen the ability of police forces and fire services nationally to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents; and the fire service has a major programme designed to improve its ability to respond to catastrophic incidents and has been given substantial resource (over £50M) to establish a mass decontamination service

48. In parallel, the Government has started the equipment procurement process to ensure full compatibility of communications between the emergency services (including fully funding a new national fire service radio system), and with the military. There has been co-ordinated planning too with suppliers of

essential services and a UK reserve national stock of pharmaceuticals (including medical countermeasures against e.g. anthrax, smallpox and radioactive exposure) and equipment is ready for rapid deployment. A new Health Protection Agency, which will bring together a number of existing services under one umbrella, will provide specialist support for health protection and health emergency planning. The Agency will be better equipped to deal with a range of emergencies and provide a comprehensive, unified national response.

*A Civil  
Contingencies  
Bill*

49. The Government is also preparing a modern statutory and regulatory framework for dealing with all forms of civil challenge to modern society. Proposals for new legislation will be introduced as soon as Parliamentary time allows and will aim to: create the environment in which Government, the public and organisations are better able to prepare for and deal with domestic crises. To this end we are also working with our EU partners to enhance our co-operative efforts in responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist threats.

*An  
additional  
role for the  
Reserves*

50. Domestic security remains the sole responsibility of the civil authorities, and in particular the police. However, there are situations in which, at the specific request of the civil authorities, the Armed Forces may be called upon to fulfil home defence and security tasks in support of the civil authorities. The Armed Forces are strengthening their arrangements for liaison with the civil authorities and regional levels of government. We have also published proposals to establish reaction forces of around 500 reservists from volunteer units of all three Services in each of the 11 regional Army Brigade areas of the country – some 5,000 to 6,000 reservists in all. These would aid the civil authorities in handling major incidents, with individuals committing themselves to turn out at short notice for a range of duties, including site search and clearance, transport and communications, and the control of movement of large numbers of the public. We have asked the Reserves and their employers, as well as any other interested parties, for comments on those proposals, after

which we will announce our plans. Subject to that, we would hope to have an initial Reaction Force capability in place by the end of the year.

*A New Chapter  
to the Strategic  
Defence  
Review (SDR)*

51. This additional role for the Reserves in support of the civil authorities is only one element of the work conducted by the Ministry of Defence to ensure that our defence policies, capabilities and force structures matched the new challenges that were so vividly and tragically illustrated on 11 September. This work was described as a New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and its conclusions were published in a White Paper on 18 July 2002.

*Protecting  
against  
renegade  
aircraft*

52. With the attacks of 11 September 2001 in mind, the work includes a review of the UK's air defence arrangements. Steps have been taken to improve our ability to respond to threats from renegade civil aircraft. Further enhancements to radar systems are in hand. We are investing too in airfields across the United Kingdom – RAF Marham in Norfolk, RAF St. Mawgan in Cornwall and RNAS Yeovilton in Somerset – so that they can support quick reaction alert aircraft when needed. Those are in addition to the bases that are already able to operate such aircraft, and will give us greater flexibility in our air defence arrangements.

*Protecting  
against  
renegade  
shipping*

53. Our maritime defences are important too. The MV Nisha incident last December demonstrated that we are prepared and able to respond to a threat made against the United Kingdom from the sea, but, in the light of that, the Government is taking forward work to review port and coastal water security more widely.

*The Armed  
Forces in the  
campaign  
against  
international  
terrorism*

54. However, experience shows that it is much better to engage our foes at a distance, rather than in our own country, and at a place and time of our own choosing. The New Chapter identifies specific tasks for our Armed Forces in the campaign against international terrorism. Firstly, they have a role helping to prevent terrorism emerging – for example by stabilisation operations of the kind seen this year in Kabul or in 2001 in Macedonia. Secondly, they have a role in deterring terrorist groups or states that might support them, or in

coercing them to stop doing so. And thirdly, the military have a role in disrupting terrorist groups or, in the last resort, in destroying them. Operations of this kind can range from interception at sea (requiring specialist boarding capabilities) through to the engagement of a group by combat troops or precision weapons. The Armed Forces will need to be fully prepared to perform these roles alongside the US and other partners.

*Military capabilities for dealing with terrorism*

55. The SDR set us on the path towards the capabilities required for these missions. In particular most require the kind of joint rapid reaction forces able to deploy rapidly, ready for combat. Many of the improvements needed in strategic lift – by sea and air – are in hand; and will have much wider use across a range of other operations. The New Chapter also envisages extra investment in airborne and other sensors and in networks to pass information quickly to allow engagement by ground troops (so-called ‘network-centric capability’ or ‘detect, decide, destroy’). We are also accelerating investment in unmanned air vehicles.

### **International Action to combat terrorism**

*The need for an international response*

56. The international reach of terrorist groups such as Al Qa’ida - their ability to carry out attacks, their support networks and their ability to recruit - means that no one state acting in isolation will be able to combat the threat they pose. Effective action against terrorism therefore has to be conducted on the international stage. The UK’s counter-terrorism agenda is now thoroughly integrated into other areas of our foreign policy and we are committed to maintaining the focus on counter-terrorism in our dealings with our partners overseas to promote a sustained commitment to combating terrorism throughout the world.

*Building and maintaining strong international consensus against terrorism*

57. UK bilateral diplomacy played a key role in moulding the coalition that formed against terrorism after 11 September and in maintaining the momentum behind it. The degree of international consensus was unprecedented, uniting a broad and diverse range of nations across the globe, including many from the

Islamic world. We united to condemn Al Qa'ida and to show that the international campaign against terrorism was not an attack on Islam. This broad coalition includes intelligence co-operation where our Intelligence and Security Agencies have significantly deepened their work against terrorism with their foreign counterparts in the Muslim world and elsewhere. New relationships to combat terrorism have been forged with foreign Intelligence and Security Services where little or no effective co-operation previously existed, and, thanks to intelligence, terrorist attacks have been thwarted in Europe, North Africa and South and South East Asia. Such partnerships are also vital in identifying and disrupting the terrorist acquisition of WMD, the drug-smuggling activities that finance many terrorist organisations, and their money-laundering efforts across the globe.

58. Although most of the Coalition troops in Afghanistan were from Europe, North America and Australasia, forces from the Philippines, Yemen, Pakistan and other coalition partners have also engaged terrorists militarily. Coalition members have also stepped up law enforcement efforts. Many hundreds of terrorists suspects are now behind bars, and by this and other means, significant terrorist attacks have been prevented in, inter alia, Europe, Morocco, the Philippines and Singapore.

*Bilateral  
alliances*

59. Traditional bilateral alliances have, of course, remained important too: our strong relationship with the USA has been an invaluable basis for our close co-operation in the fight against international terrorism. Elsewhere, bilateral co-operation has resulted in remarkable successes too – and not only in the fight against Al Qa'ida. One example is the operation which, for the first time, has had a major impact on N17 in Greece. A Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) team has been in Athens since the day British military attaché Brigadier Stephen Saunders was assassinated in June 2000. Since then they have been working closely with the Greek Police on the investigation and the wider hunt for N17. Two years on, key members of the group, including Stephen Saunders' confessed murderers, are in custody awaiting trial. The

*N17 success  
story*

contribution of the MPS, the UK Intelligence Agencies and the FCO in reaching this point has been enormous – a fact recognised publicly by the Greek Government and Police. We will continue to co-operate on security matters with the Greek authorities in the run-up to the 2004 Olympics in Athens.

*Assisting with  
counter-terrorism  
capacity building*

60. Building the operational capacities of States around the world to deter, detain or disrupt terrorist groups is another cornerstone of our counter terrorism policy. We are working with a diverse range of countries that have made a political commitment to tackle terrorism. In addition to the nuclear non-proliferation work outlined above, we have increased the volume of operational training in a range of fields, including crisis management, bomb-disposal, aviation security, hostage negotiation and police investigative skills. Training is underway, in various combinations, with India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Central Asian States and Nepal. Further operational packages are under development. We are also developing programmes to assist countries to draw-up their own counter terrorism legislation, based on UK and Commonwealth model legislation, and to build regulatory frameworks to disrupt networks used to transfer terrorist funds.

*Taking work  
forward in  
the  
multilateral  
institutions*

61. In the multilateral organisations too the UK has been well placed to encourage co-ordinated action against terrorism. Our membership of all of the main multinational groupings engaged in the campaign gives the United Kingdom a valuable opportunity to give direction to such action.

*The United  
Nations*

62. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington, the UK worked resolutely in the United Nations to achieve swift and effective action against terrorism. Security Council Resolution 1373, which was passed on 28 September 2001, for the first time imposed an obligation on all states to take a broad range of measures to suppress terrorism and block terrorist finances. The UK is driving forward that work through our chairmanship of the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). The CTC

monitors the compliance of member states with Security Council Resolution 1373 and is helping to build global counter terrorist capacity by working with states to analyse their assistance needs and recommend sources of advice and relevant expertise. By mid-2002, 167 of the UN's 189 states had reported to the Committee on the measures they have taken to combat terrorism, including to block flows of terrorist financing. We will continue to ensure that the Committee focuses its efforts on those who most need help without losing sight of the fact that all States need to improve their capabilities in this area.

63. We have also been successful in our lobbying for UN member States to ratify the international Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism. Overall, ratifications of the 12 UN Conventions are up over 15% since 11 September 2001: over 130 countries have signed the most recent Convention (the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism). This is a clear indication that States are beginning to strengthen the network of legislation they need to be able to take effective action against terrorists. The United Kingdom will continue to lobby member States to ratify, as we have done, all 12 Conventions.

64. This is important because these Conventions set minimum standards for international behaviour in a number of important areas, such as dealing with hijacking, hostage taking and other terrorist crimes. By ratifying the Conventions states show that they have, or intend to put in place, adequate legal and executive measures in place to help them play an effective role in the international effort to combat these crimes. But ratification is of course only a first step. As well as continuing our efforts to urge states to ratify them, we shall continue to promote greater implementation and use of the Conventions to raise international standards in this field.

*The EU*

65. The UK has promoted counter-terrorism measures in the European Union, G8 and NATO too. EU Heads of Government and JHA Ministers responded promptly and agreed a roadmap of counter-terrorism measures in

September 2001 aimed at supplementing measures taken domestically by addressing cross-border issues. The framework decision on a European arrest warrant will dramatically speed up extradition procedures and ensure that terrorists cannot escape justice by fleeing to another EU state. The agreement on common penalties for terrorist offences will ensure that anyone convicted anywhere in the EU of terrorism will receive an appropriate sentence. We have agreed measures that will permit the establishment of Joint investigative teams between police and law enforcers of another state and taken practical steps to increase the co-operation between Europe's intelligence and law-enforcement agencies to combat terrorism.. Europol has established a terrorism taskforce. And we and our partners have agreed a series of measures mirroring and extending UN requirements on the freezing of terrorist assets.

66. The Seville European Council in June committed the EU to continue to maintain the closest possible co-ordination with the United States and other partners in the fight against terrorism, and to contribute further to international efforts against terrorism. Through its political dialogue with third countries, the EU is encouraging others to take the necessary legislative and operational actions to combat terrorism. Recent signed agreements with Algeria and Lebanon have included these elements. Where appropriate, the EU is seeking to deliver assistance in counter-terrorist disciplines through existing programmes.

*The G8*

67. In the G8 we have paid particular attention to practical action to counter the threat of terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological materials and to improve international aviation security standards. We have also developed and shared best practice on dealing with terrorist incidents. And, we have worked with G8 partners to improve co-operation in legislative, judicial and information sharing fields.

*NATO*

68. In NATO we have promoted a new role for the Alliance in combating terrorism, which began with the decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington



Treaty for the first time and with the deployment of NATO assets in support of Coalition activities. NATO interoperability underpinned the ability of coalition forces to work together in Afghanistan. At their meeting in May 2002 in Reykjavik, NATO Foreign Ministers reiterated their determination to fight terrorism. They undertook to continue to strengthen national and collective capacities to protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack. They recognised the need to develop, at November's Prague Summit, new and balanced capabilities to meet new threats.

*Combating  
terrorist  
financing*

69. We have also worked with the international community to disrupt flows of finances to the terrorists. By identifying those groups and individuals linked to terrorism and blocking their accounts, the UN, the EU and the G7 have disrupted the flow of significant amounts of money to terrorist groups. Asset freezing remains a valuable tool in the campaign against terrorism. It complicates the process of transferring money internationally and the planning and committing of terrorist acts. By shining a spotlight on those flows, we have also created an important deterrent against those who previously thought that donating money to terrorist causes was risk free.

70. Internationally, the UK has joined G7 and EU partners in concerted and focused action to target, disrupt and close down sources of terrorist financing. The UK has worked closely with multilateral international institutions to take forward initiatives at global level and has offered technical assistance to overseas countries. The UK fully supports the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 8 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing agreed in October 2001. We are already largely compliant with these recommendations, but work is being taken forward to ensure our full compliance.

*UK action on  
terrorist  
financing*

71. In the United Kingdom, established procedures for freezing the assets of terrorists have been in place for a number of years including through the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act introduced

new police powers to freeze and seize terrorist funds and introduced tougher reporting requirements for financial institutions. A new domestic supervisory regime was also introduced to ensure that bureaux de change and money transmitters implement money-laundering regulations effectively.

72. All UK institutions, including – crucially – the financial services sector, responded swiftly and effectively in the aftermath of 11 September. By Orders in Council, the UK fully implemented respective UN Security Resolutions aimed at freezing the assets of the Taliban, Al Qa’ida and the global list of terrorists identified in UNSCR 1373. As a result the assets of over 200 individuals and 100 organisations have been frozen. In the United Kingdom, in total over \$100 million of terrorist assets have been frozen, including some \$10 million since 11 September. With the defeat of the Taliban, the Government has unfrozen some \$90 million of those assets to be returned to the new legitimate Afghan authorities.

73. Domestically, the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit, based within the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, has trebled its staff resources since 11 September. Special Branch seized cash from one particular proscribed terrorist organisation, which had a significant impact on that group’s ability to operate. It obtained evidence for the US authorities from British based financial institutions concerning the 11 September hijackers; and the UK has used terrorist finance offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 for the first time to convict members of the Real IRA.

74. Much remains to be done but we will continue to track down sources of suspected funding of terrorism. Our activities to help strangle the flow of funding for terrorism form a key part of our actions to combat terrorism.

75. We are also working bilaterally and with international partners to deny terrorist groups access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Complex global treaties, intricate verification arrangements, and sophisticated control regimes have an important role in this, but so, increasingly, do a wide range of

other approaches that focus on specific countries and practical assistance. For example, the UK will be contributing up to US \$750 million over ten years to a G8 initiative to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union (FSU); a programme established with the combined proliferation/terrorism threat very much in mind.

76. The Government has already established several major programmes to take this important work forward. Projects will include work on improving nuclear security at nuclear power plants and sites containing nuclear waste; assisting in decommissioning nuclear submarines and ensuring spent nuclear fuel is placed in a safe and secure location; work focused on keeping former weapons scientists and technicians in the FSU, and redirected to work on non-weapons activities; plutonium disposition projects involving the conversion of large quantities of Russian weapons grade plutonium into a non-weapons usable form; enhancing nuclear materials accountancy to reduce the risk that material could be lost or otherwise removed without detection; assistance in chemical weapons destruction and biological non-proliferation.

77. The UK is also contributing towards the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and providing expertise to help implement its Plan of Action aimed at combating nuclear terrorism.

*Engaging states that support or have supported terrorism*

78. We also engage those states that have supported terrorism in the past, in order to confront them with the unacceptability of such conduct and to demonstrate that their actions in supporting terrorism are counter productive. International action, including through the United Nations, has led to significant shifts in policy in Libya and Sudan – both governments have taken action against the terrorists who once sought refuge in their countries. This has allowed the international community to enter into processes to normalise relations with both countries.

*Tackling the root causes of terrorism*

79. The Government recognises that in order to counter international terrorism, the international community needs to address the political, social and

economic factors that create the conditions in which extremism breeds. In some cases, economic deprivation and political alienation may be direct factors in the emergence of terrorism; but more typically, terrorists exploit social and political grievances for their own purposes.

80. Addressing the root causes of terrorism is a major task requiring sustained international engagement over the long term. Much of this work ties in with the Government's broader foreign policy and development objectives. Well before the events of 11 September, the UK was actively engaged in working to spread the benefits of globalisation, to improve respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law and to promote democracy and good governance. We were at the forefront of international efforts to break the vicious cycle of poverty, working to reduce debt, remove unfair trade barriers, tackle killer disease and increase flows of development assistance. The UK was a strong and active supporter of the Millennium Development Goals, to which the international community committed itself. These remain the benchmark by which our efforts to eliminate poverty and its consequences will be judged. Since 11 September, all this work has become even more important.

*Conflict  
prevention*

81. Tackling state failure and preventing conflict have also acquired greater urgency. One of the key lessons from Afghanistan was the potential threat to global stability and security presented by failed and failing states when exploited by international terrorists. State failure can no longer be ignored or viewed as an issue of localised concern. We need to identify states at risk of failure and act with others to head off collapse. This demands a proactive foreign policy which seeks, where possible, to galvanise the international community to deal with such problems early.

82. Conflicts create the conditions in which terrorists can thrive, including by heightening ethnic tensions, weakening governmental structures and preventing economic development. Since 11 September, we have focused particular attention on helping to defuse tensions in the Middle East and

between India and Pakistan. Both crises present significant threats to regional stability and provide opportunities for terrorists and their backers. In both situations, the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Cabinet colleagues have been personally engaged in efforts to broker peace.

83. In the Middle East we worked constructively for the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1397, 1402 and 1403 and played a key part in resolving stand-offs in Bethlehem and Ramallah, taking bold and creative initiatives. Through the participation of the European Union in the Quartet we are helping to shape the international community's response to the ongoing crisis and its efforts to restart the political process. We are closely involved in efforts to assist the process of reform of the Palestinian Authority's security, political, economic and judicial structures, and are in regular contact with both parties urging them to take the steps needed to end the violence, build trust and resume political negotiations, which is the only way to secure a just and lasting peace.

84. Alongside others, we have been in continuous dialogue with the Governments of India and Pakistan seeking to avert a major conflict. This has required constant attention from Ministers and officials. Over the past year, the Prime Minister has visited India and Pakistan twice, the Foreign Secretary has been to India three times and Pakistan four times, whilst the Defence Secretary has visited both countries on two occasions.

85. The UK has also been at the forefront of efforts to improve African peacekeeping capacity, an important strand of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. The Government's two conflict prevention pools (for Africa and the rest of the world) bring together the FCO, MoD and DfID in order to enhance UK activities in conflict prevention, combining the political, military and developmental aspects. We have redoubled our work to support the search for peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo - two of Africa's

longest running conflicts, which destabilise large parts of the continent and stymie development.

86. Promoting better understanding between cultures and religions must underpin all of these activities. Otherwise extremists will always have a fertile environment of misapprehension and fear in which to disseminate their messages. Liaison between the police and all sections of the community across the UK has been vital to provide essential reassurance and isolate those extremists seeking to promote terrorism and encourage community disquiet. It has also been important in ensuring that increased security demands do not have a detrimental effect on community relations – helped by the network of key community contacts and, most recently, by the embryonic Muslim Safety Forum. In addition, the Government has taken a number of steps to facilitate cultural understanding, including: proactive contacts across Government with faith communities in the United Kingdom, from the Prime Minister downwards; the promotion of interfaith dialogue, including the Christian/Islamic seminar at Lambeth Palace in early 2002; *Connecting Futures*, a British Council initiative to encourage interchange between young people from the United Kingdom and countries with large Muslim populations; and the creation of an Islamic Media Unit within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, helping to build a better understanding of United Kingdom policies amongst people in the Muslim world;

### **Conclusion**

87. A great deal has been achieved since 11 September 2001 – in Afghanistan and in almost every corner of the world. The concerted effort of the international community has impacted greatly on international terrorism, and in particular Al Qa'ida. The United Kingdom has played an important role.

88. However, there is no room for complacency. Although we are better prepared than previously – more aware of the threat, and how to counter it so as to reduce the likelihood of an attack, and with improved arrangements for dealing with the consequences of terrorism – there is still a great deal to be done. Despite the impact of the campaign so far on Al Qa’ida and other extremist groups, it is clear they retain the capability and intention to mount attacks and that United Kingdom interests may be a target.

89. For that reason, the United Kingdom will continue to work within the Coalition and through our own efforts to track down the remaining network of Al Qa’ida terrorists and bring them to justice. And we will continue to work to make the United Kingdom, our Dependent Territories and our interests overseas even safer and more resilient.

90. Over the next year, our priorities will include, :

- *To continue to deny Al Qa’ida a base in Afghanistan* by supporting the Transitional Authority; by continuing to flush out and disable Al Qa’ida remnants; by working with the EU, the UN and other agencies to reduce poverty in Afghanistan; by accelerating physical and institutional reconstruction and capacity building; by engaging the international community in the security sector reform programme; by leading on the counter-narcotics effort.
- *To ensure no state allows Al Qa’ida to establish a base elsewhere* by maintaining diplomatic pressure; by encouraging all states to sign, ratify and implement the 12 international counter-terrorism conventions and fully implement SCR 1373 working with law enforcement and intelligence agencies overseas to deter, detain and disrupt terrorist groups; by mounting further military deployments if necessary.
- *To protect the United Kingdom* inter alia; by pushing for a co-ordinated G8 approach to international transport security standards, including aviation,

shipping, ports and container distribution; by early introduction of reinforced cockpit doors on commercial passenger aircraft; by providing protective security advice to vulnerable sites and sectors; by enhancing air and sea defences, and making other enhancements outlined in the New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review; by continued close co-operation between all branches of Government and, in particular, between the police and the Intelligence Agencies; and by further enhancements to civil contingencies arrangements, set out in a Civil Contingencies Bill, including ensuring full compatibility of communications between the emergency services and with the military, setting up a new Health Protection Agency, and an additional role for the Reserves in support of the civil authorities;

- *To disrupt the Al Qa'ida network in the United Kingdom* by maintaining controls on and surveillance of known terrorist suspects; by maintaining the increased effort and capacity of the Intelligence Agencies to locate and identify terrorists and their supporters; by continued close liaison and exchange of information with foreign governments and intelligence agencies, particularly on extremists based in, or associated with, the United Kingdom; by reviewing and adding to the current list of proscribed terrorist organisations, if necessary; and by prosecuting criminal activity linked to individuals of groups of interest;
- *To disrupt the Al Qa'ida network internationally and prevent similar groups emerging* by preventing and disrupting terrorist support activity; by preventing and disrupting procurement of WMD; by providing appropriate training, including of terrorist financial investigation, to enable states to act efficiently to disrupt Al Qa'ida; by continued close liaison and exchange of information with foreign governments and intelligence agencies, as well as joint investigations and operations; by countering the disinformation spread by terrorist groups and their sponsors and supporters; and where necessary by taking military action.



- *To develop intelligence on the remaining Al Qa'ida networks* by continued close co-ordination with key international partners;
- *To pursue a concerted international attack on terrorist financing* by supporting the FATF 8 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing and assisting countries in implementing them; by encouraging closer sharing of information and case histories on financial intelligence and investigations between international partners; and by maintaining a close liaison and continued co-operation with the financial industry in the United Kingdom;
- *To support states in their efforts to combat terrorism* by delivering direct training and advice; by assisting counter-terrorism capacity building through the UN CTC; and by reinforcing IAEA and bilateral assistance to support states to secure and protect nuclear and radiological material;
- *To address the social, political and economic conditions that terrorists exploit* by working to tackle poverty; by promoting democracy and good governance; by working to improve respect for human rights; by seeking to identify states at risk of failing and addressing their individual problems; by working to prevent conflict and increase stability around the globe; and by promoting better understanding and cultural awareness both at home and overseas;
- *To maintain the coalition* by continued diplomatic action.

Cabinet Office  
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