

For my parents and Cecilia

Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum

Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Roman military theorist,
De Re Militarii, 4th century AD

Contents

Acknowledgements	13
Abbreviations	15
INTRODUCTION	19
PART I	
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER: SINGLE-SERVICE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENTS, 1989–1996	43
Introduction	45
1 An Era of Cumulative Changes: The Environment Shaping Britain’s Armed Forces, 1989–1996	48
1.1 Strategic Environment: The Lack of Defence Policy Guidance	49
1.2 Technological Environment: A ‘Revolution in Military Expectations’	61
1.3 Social Environment: Mounting Pressure on the ‘Postmodern Military’	70
2 The Capability-Based Army: Land Power Leads the Way into Doctrine Development	78
2.1 Organisational Culture: The Two Armies	79
2.2 Doctrinal Debate: From the Bagnall Reforms to Operation Granby	86
2.3 Formal Doctrine: The Manoeuvrist Approach	98
3 ‘Instrument of First Choice’: The Emancipation of Air Power after the Gulf War	104
3.1 Organisational Culture: The Royal Air Force as the Junior Service	105
3.2 Doctrinal Debate: The Gulf War, Technology and New Constraints	112
3.3 Formal Doctrine: Strategic Air Offensive Revisited	122

4	Wider Peacekeeping: A Half-Completed Understanding of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping	129
4.1	Organisational Culture: The Legacy of Low-Intensity Operations	130
4.2	Doctrinal Debate: Justifying the Limitations of Bosnia	140
4.3	Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Wider Peacekeeping	148
5	Maritime Power Projection: A Navy for the New Strategic Environment	154
5.1	Organisational Culture: The Royal Navy as the Senior Service	155
5.2	Doctrinal Debate: Preparing a Trojan Horse for Joint Doctrine	164
5.3	Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Maritime Power Projection	168
6	Doctrine: Instrument of Service Policy and Change Management	177

PART II

CONSOLIDATION OF A POST-COLD WAR MILITARY STRATEGY: JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENTS, 1996–2002

	Introduction	187
7	Military Transformation Rebalanced: The Environment Shaping Britain's Armed Forces, 1996–2002	190
7.1	Strategic Environment: Consolidation of a Post-Cold War Defence Policy	190
7.2	Technological Environment: The Growing 'System of Systems'	199
7.3	Social Environment: The Military's 'Right to Be Different'	204
8	Peace Enforcement: The New Rationale for Post-Cold War Crisis Interventions	211
8.1	Organisational Culture: The Changing Attitude towards Peacekeeping	212
8.2	Doctrinal Debate: Marrying Counter-Insurgency and Coercion Theory	214
8.3	Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Peace Enforcement	221
9	British Defence Doctrine: Breakthrough of a Joint Military-Strategic Doctrine	229
9.1	Organisational Culture: Jointery – The 'Purple Trend'	230
9.2	Doctrinal Debate: British Defence Doctrine and the Lessons from Kosovo	235
9.3	Formal Doctrine: The 'British Approach to Military Operations'	247

10 The ‘Post-11 September’ Military: Doctrine and the Rise of Asymmetric Conflict, 2001/02	259
10.1 The British Debate on Asymmetry prior to ‘11 September’	262
10.2 The ‘New Chapter’ – A Blueprint for Further Military Transformation	266
10.3 Afghanistan 2001/02 – The Merging and Blurring of Military Operations	274
11 Doctrine: Institutionalising a Culture of Innovation	285
CONCLUSION	295
BIBLIOGRAPHY	313
APPENDICES	355
A Chronology – Major Events in British Defence and Doctrinal Evolution	357
B British Doctrine Community	365
C Hierarchy of British Doctrinal Documents	367

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Lambs Conduit Street,
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Markus Mäder

Abbreviations

9/11	Terror attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001
AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
ACSC	Army Command and Staff College
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFM	Army Field Manual
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AP 3000	Air Publication 3000 (<i>British Air Power Doctrine</i>)
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
AWC	Air Warfare Centre
BA	British Army
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BDD 1 / 2	British Defence Doctrine, 1 st Edition (1997) / 2 nd Edition (2001)
BMD 1 / 2	British Military Doctrine, 1 st Edition (1989) / 2 nd Edition (1996)
BMDG	British Military Doctrine Group
BR 1806	British Maritime Doctrine
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COIN	Counter-Insurgency

CSRC	Conflict Studies Research Centre
DfID	Department for International Development
DGD&D	Directorate General of Development and Doctrine
DPKO	UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DSD	Defence Studies Department (<i>King's College London</i>)
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HCSC	Higher Command and Staff Course
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
HQ	Headquarters
IFOR	Implementation Force
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JDCC	Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
JRDF	Joint Rapid Deployment Force
JRRF	Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
JSCSC	Joint Services Command and Staff College
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
KCL	King's College London
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MAS	NATO Military Agency for Standardisation

MNB C	Multinational Brigade Centre (<i>KFOR</i>)
MND	Multinational Division
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTR	Military-Technological Revolution
MWC	Maritime Warfare Centre
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
OGD	Other Government Department
OODA	Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action (<i>Loop</i>)
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	NATO Partnership for Peace
PGM	Precision-Guided Munition
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RAF	Royal Air Force
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RN	Royal Navy
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SCSI	Strategic and Combat Studies Institute
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
SF	Special Forces (<i>British term, as opposed to Special Operations Forces/SOF in US and NATO terminology</i>)

SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communications
SOF	Special Operations Forces (<i>US and NATO term</i>)
SOUTHAG	Southern Army Group
SSBN	Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Firing Submarine
TASM	Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile
TF	Task Force
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSO	The Stationery Office (<i>until 1996 HMSO</i>)
UCK	Ushtria Clirimtare Kosovës (<i>Kosovo Liberation Army</i>)
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (<i>in Former Yugoslavia</i>)
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPK	Wider Peacekeeping

Introduction

Throughout the 1990s Britain's Armed Forces became an international hallmark for military excellence. They set up a record as an effective instrument for crisis intervention in the post-Cold War era, proving their ability in warfighting, counter-terrorism, policing, peacekeeping and humanitarian situations alike – in as diverse places as Northern Ireland, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, and – most recently – Iraq. This list does not only represent an impressive performance of military professionalism in the public eye but also an expression of conceptual excellence behind the scenes.

This record stands at a time when military affairs have become ever more complex. The post-Cold War strategic environment has seen the emergence of new transnational security risks and regional instabilities – the results of a globalising yet simultaneously fragmenting world. The technological progress of the past two decades has generated an intense debate over a potential Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which holds out the prospect of redefining the use of military power in international affairs. At the same time, the profound change in postmodern society has confronted the military with unprecedented pressures to adapt their organisational norms and concepts of warfare.

The combined impact of these changes has thrust the Western military into a sustained process of transformation. They have embarked on reformulating their role in a post-Cold War and postmodern world, responding to an intricate and sometimes contradictory network of changed strategic priorities, high political expectations, new technological possibilities and rising moral constraints. Forged in various conflicts and crises, a post-Cold War military role-understanding has emerged that reaches beyond traditional territorial defence and requires far greater flexibility. The contemporary Western military has to be a warfighter, a diplomat, a peacekeeper, a media performer and a law enforcer. And he is expected seamlessly to switch from one role to the other, sometimes handling all of them simultaneously – an imperative induced by the multitude of interests and actors present on the stage of international interventions: from conventional enemy forces, irregulars and terrorists, warlords and criminals, friendly coalition units, civilians caught up in the fighting, to international civil agencies, non-governmental humanitarians and media representatives.

Britain's post-Cold War military transformation, maturing over a decade of continuous operational activity and conceptual development,

has produced a convincing approach to address this complexity. Based on an expeditionary and capability-driven military strategy, Britain's Armed Forces have come to provide a powerful and versatile response to the diverse post-Cold War security challenges.¹ In conceptual terms, the British approach is, above all, an effort to merge well-proven experience from the past with innovative new thinking and to strike a balance between the human dynamic of conflict and the exploitation of technological superiority. At the heart of this successful transformation lies the evolution of British military doctrine during the 1990s.

There has never been a lack of innovative military thinking in modern British history, as names like Julian Corbett, J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart suggest. But military thought and doctrine are not synonymous. The first is personal, the latter institutional.² Doctrine is more than the formal publication of military concepts. It stands for an institutional culture of conceptual thinking on the nature of conflict and the best conduct of warfare. It is the military's instrument for analysing past experience, guiding current operations and exploring future challenges.

Britain's pre-1989 Armed Forces did not appreciate this central idea behind doctrine. Traditionally, British officers did not care about intellectual debate and felt deep reluctance towards any formal writings. At best, some sort of doctrine existed as tactical instruction manuals. However, they were considered to be something for the classroom but irrelevant in the field. Operational experience was handed down informally, often by word of mouth, through generations of officers. It remained compartmentalised within the military's various groupings. In the absence of formal statements on the overall role of the British Armed Forces, a common starting point for the study of conflict did not exist. In such an organisational culture, innovation was left to coincidence, largely steered by what was already known or physically available.

- 1 The term 'expeditionary' describes a military strategy that is focused on crisis intervention and the global projection of military force tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective abroad. See: Deverell, Jack. *Coalition Warfare and Expeditionary Operations*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 18–21, p. 20; Fry, Robert. *Operations in a Changed Strategic Environment*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 3 (June 1995), pp. 33–36.
- 2 Reid, Brian Holden. *Studies in British Military Thought. Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, p. 1.

The period after 1989 witnessed the reversal of this attitude. A British ‘soldier-scholar’ emerged who was interested in the conceptual development of his institution.³ Formal doctrine statements started to be published, with particular efforts on the military-strategic level. This process intensified and by the end of the decade doctrine was firmly embedded within Britain’s Armed Forces, giving evidence of an institution in search of more coherence in its conceptual bedrock.

This doctoral thesis’ key question therefore aims to analyse the evolution of British military-strategic doctrine in the decade after the Cold War. *What caused this change of attitude towards doctrine? Which events and perceptions, which debates and schools of thought drove the evolution of Britain’s military-strategic doctrine?*

The focus lies on two inextricably linked tracks: the growing relevance British doctrine gained in an institutional sense; and the emerging, specifically British post-Cold War military strategy expressed in doctrine. Military strategy is the development and application of military power to help achieve grand-strategic objectives; it is the military component of grand strategy or, in other words, security and defence policy.⁴ Flowing from this, the military-strategic doctrine reflects the roles, concepts and capabilities the armed forces deem necessary for accomplishing their contribution to grand strategy.⁵ Military-strategic doctrine is the bridge that links policy objectives with operational effect. Given this function as a ‘hinge’, the military-strategic level of doctrine provides the most

3 For ‘soldier-scholar’ see Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (eds). *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 19.

4 Military strategy: “The application of military resources to help achieve grand-strategic objectives. It is the military component of grand strategy and is formulated from political direction. It is concerned with determining the military-strategic objectives and desired end-state required to achieve grand strategic aims, the military action needed to achieve these objectives, the resources to be allocated and the constraints to be applied.” In: *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (Joint Warfare Publication 0-01-1)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director General of Joint Doctrine and Concepts on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. Shrivenham: JDCC/ MoD, 4th Edition, 2002, p. M-9.

5 Grand strategy: “The application of national resources to achieve national policy objectives (including alliance or coalition objectives). This will invariably include diplomatic and economic resources as well as military.” In: *Ibid*, p. G-2.

fertile ground for examining the above mentioned key question. While occasionally operational level doctrine is included in the analysis, tactical doctrine and technical procedures are not germane to this thesis.⁶

Three aspects are particularly relevant to analyse the evolution of British military-strategic doctrine: the organisational culture prevailing at the time a specific doctrinal strand began to evolve; the process and debate of doctrine development; and the key themes of formally published doctrine. The following set of secondary questions therefore guides the examination:

Organisational culture: What was the historical role-understanding of the Services; how did the military culture perceive its role in the changing environment; what major perceptions, interests and schools of thought prevailed; and, consequently, what are their implications for doctrinal evolution? By addressing these questions, the underlying driving forces of post-1989 military transformation, the dominant organisational culture and the historically grown role-understanding of the British Armed Forces can be identified. The events, perceptions and trends that guided doctrinalists become apparent. In brief, the organisational culture constitutes the starting ground for the development of a specific strand of doctrine.

Doctrinal debate: What were the institutional arrangements for generating doctrine; who were the key actors in the process; what were the motives, the intended function and, respectively, the target audience of the formal doctrine to be published; and, how did the conceptual schools of thought interact within the debate? Flowing from this, it becomes clear which interests drove the development of doctrine. Equally, the answer to these questions gives evidence of which conceptual schools of thought shaped doctrine, which continuities were carried forward from previous institutional experience and which changes were adopted by including new experience from recent operations.

Formal doctrine: What are the core themes of a specific doctrinal document; what continuities and what shifts can be identified; and, finally, what impact had the formulation of a specific doctrine on the

6 Operational level of war: “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.” In: Ibid, p. O-4. Tactical level of war: “The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.” In: Ibid, p. T-2.

overall doctrinal evolution and military transformation? Formal doctrine illustrates a conceptual snap shot at a given time, officially published and promulgated by the military leadership. As a result, the examination of formal military-strategic doctrine reveals the role-understanding of Britain's Armed Forces and displays the required concepts and capabilities for playing this role. Equally, it provides conclusions to what extent strategic, technological and social aspects were merged into the organisation's collective thinking.

The uniqueness of the 1990s appears to be the simultaneity of enormous changes across the entire environment shaping the military. Following a chronological approach, the thesis' temporal definition is therefore linked to the cumulation of strategic, technological and social changes. In strategic terms, the period between 1989 and 2001 constitutes the transitional phase in which international affairs moved from the Cold War into an era of asymmetric conflict, graphically marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Twin Towers. In technological terms, the 1990s represent the start of a new surge of technological advances, dominated by the so-called information and communications revolution. In social terms, the last decade of the 20th century stands for the major shifts in the civil-military relationship, which impelled the military to adjust their thought and action more to the norms of civilian society. Doctrinal evolution between 1989 and 2002 reflects the way the British Armed Forces reacted to these developments.

In the first half of the 1990s, the idea of doctrine began to be embraced by the three individual Services – the British Army (BA), the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Air Force (RAF). Their conceptual debate in these years was shaped by contradictory circumstances. On the one hand, the prevailing political and social climate – characterised by the hope of a conflict-free world and the 'peace dividend' to be cashed in after the end of the East-West conflict – suggested an overall decline of military power. On the other, the growing demand for military involvement in international crisis management and the prospect of 'sanitised' high-technology war – as displayed in the Gulf conflict 1990/91 – generated rising expectations in the use of conventional military forces. At the same time, the revaluation of Britain's security and defence policy, a lingering process affected by the same uncertainties, caused a lack of grand-strategic guidance. Against this backdrop, the Services became seriously concerned about their organisational health and began generating

their own guidelines in order to fill this conceptual gap and justify their role in the post-Cold War era. With the Soviet threat gone, the Services shifted towards a rationale that guided their force development on the basis of capabilities rather than a clearly defined adversary. In the light of inter-service rivalry over the shrinking defence budget, doctrine also served as an instrument of Service policy, designed not just to explain the new nature of post-Cold War conflict but also, and particularly, to communicate the continued relevance of land, maritime or air capabilities. As a result, these first post-1989 doctrinal concepts developed as separate strands within the three Services.

In the second half of the 1990s, doctrine development widened beyond these traditional Service boundaries and merged separate doctrinal strands into a unified and consolidated concept. This joint doctrine development was initially driven by the same motive as single-service doctrine, namely to publish a formal document that explained the role of Britain's Armed Forces in the changed environment. The custodians of joint doctrine, mainly the Central Staff of the MoD, further utilised the conceptual momentum to devise a first consolidated view on post-Cold War military strategy. Fuelled by its own success and an uninterrupted flow of operational experience, doctrine development became an integral part of Britain's military transformation. A 'doctrinal community' emerged that provided a platform for innovative thinking across and beyond the military. The establishment of a Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) in 1999 marked this new institutional significance of British doctrine. Within the space of a decade, the traditional mistrust had turned into affection; the previously despised idea of 'having doctrine' had turned into a proud boast of having good doctrine.

Military doctrine is usually viewed as a pure function of defence policy. For defence planners and military commanders, this is the appropriate assumption: the formulation of sound military doctrine is ideally accomplished by breaking down the logical cascade from the nation's grand-strategic interests and objectives to the military-strategic and the operational levels of warfare. For the historian interested in exploring doctrinal evolution, however, this approach is not entirely satisfactory, as it tends to neglect additional factors influencing the process. Doctrine does not develop in a vacuum. It is not merely the product of strategic and technological considerations, particularly not in the context of contemporary Western society, in which military organisations are increasingly

exposed to social change. Military doctrine is the product of a combination of collective perceptions and institutional interests shaped by a number of factors – such as the experience of past conflict, the nature of potential enemies, the perception of current operations, the incorporation of change from the military’s parent society, the introduction of new technologies or the nature of inter-service competition.

Flowing from this, the thesis uses, as its overall methodology, an approach best described as a ‘framework of doctrinal evolution’. It is based on the assumption that doctrine evolves in the context of the military’s collective perceptions and institutional interests, in other words their organisational culture. Professional military – like the British – constitute a self-contained social organisation with a very distinct culture, which can be defined as the sum of the intellectual, professional and traditional values and beliefs of the officer corps. This culture influences how officers perceive their external environment in general and security threats in particular.⁷ The organisational culture is the filter through which the organisation’s members view the world. This filter also influences the thinking of doctrinalists – the relevant actors in the development of doctrine, such as key officials in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), senior military commanders and their subordinated doctrine developing staffs.⁸ Doctrine, therefore, is not conceived by unbiased individuals in an ‘open space’ but is bound to the organisation’s collective perception of histori-

7 The first mention of ‘military culture’ dates back to the birth of modern military sociology in the aftermath of the Second World War. See: Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19th Edition, 2002 (first published in 1957); Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960. See also: Dandeker, Christopher. *On “The Need to be Different”: Recent Trends in Military Culture*. In: Strachan, Hew (ed.). *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 173–187; Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett (eds). *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 312–313.

8 In essence, this ‘framework of doctrinal evolution’ constitutes an adapted version of Elizabeth Kier’s methodological approach in analysing British and French defence policies and military doctrines in the interwar period. See Kier, Elizabeth. *Culture and Military Doctrine*. In: *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65–93, p. 69. For the theory of ‘organisational culture’ see Pettigrew, Andrew. *On Studying Organisational Culture*. In: *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 570–581.

cal experience and current interests. Although the ideas and efforts of individual doctrinalists are undoubtedly essential, this thesis tends to view doctrinal evolution as a systemic phenomenon.

Naturally, a considerable part of the military's organisational culture is shaped by national circumstances, such as the country's geographic position, its history and politics, its understanding of the military's role within the state and the wider civil-military relationship. To be more precise, a nation's military organisation does not constitute one single homogenous organisation but embodies various suborganisations. Consequently, different organisational cultures exist within Britain's Armed Forces. In particular the three single Services have over the course of their history developed distinct Service cultures. At times, even different subcultures emerged within one Service. As a result, specific schools of thought developed on how the military should pursue their role and what contributions the land, naval and air forces were to make.

A brief display of the historical origin of British doctrine is necessary to understand this thesis' definition of military-strategic doctrine.⁹ Being the state's primary instrument of organised violence, all military institutions developed, in some way or the other, a concept about warfare, a bridge between strategic thought and operational action. Military doctrine in its contemporary understanding, though, is only two centuries old. It emerged when early-modern military analysts displayed a growing interest in establishing concepts on war and military operations, rooted in two developments in late 18th century continental Europe: the establishment of centralised military academies, for the purpose of educating and training professional officers more effectively; and the newly discovered study of military history, which was deemed to be useful to draw conclusions for future battlefields.¹⁰

Such examinations became particularly customary in the wake of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century. They built

9 For the historical origin of military doctrine see: Gooch, John, Charles Grant et alera. *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine. Papers Presented at a Conference Sponsored by the Director General of Development and Doctrine at Larkhill, March 1996 (The Occasional 30)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997, p. 5; Johnston, Paul. *Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies*. In: Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 30–39.

10 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 39–53.

on the rationalism of that epoch, the strong belief in the power of science and the applicability of natural laws to all realms of life. Behind it lay the intention to distil enduring principles for action from past experience and teach this body of precepts to future officers. It was during this period that the term ‘doctrine’ entered the military vocabulary, deriving from the Latin word ‘doctrina’, originally used in religious context to designate the body of correct beliefs taught by the Roman Catholic Church. Among those early military theorists Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz are the first to be mentioned as their ideas had a profound influence on later Anglo-American military thinking.¹¹

With the emergence of modern tri-service forces in the World Wars of the 20th century, the idea of military doctrine widened beyond tactical and operational guidance. Its additional purpose was to define the Services’ overall role within grand strategy. This was also the time when the notion of doctrine was taken up by British thinkers. In the 1920s Major General Fuller defined doctrine as the ‘central idea’ of the military.¹² But

11 Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779–1869): Swiss strategic theorist; served in the French and later Russian Army during the Napoleonic Wars, where he rose to the rank of General; represents the climactic figure of the rationalist approach to warfare and is commonly associated with the formulation of the so-called ‘Principles of War’; among his most influential works is ‘*Traité de Grande Opérations Militaire*’, published in 1816. See: Jomini, Antoine-Henri. *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*. Translated by S. B. Holabird. New York, 1865; Moran, Daniel. *Strategic Theory and the History of War*. In: Baylis, John et altera (eds). *Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 17–44, pp. 24–25.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831): German war theorist; served as an officer in the Prussian Army during the Napoleonic Wars, later head of the Military Academy in Berlin; he conducted a comprehensive theoretical study on war, (‘*Vom Kriege*’), which was published one year after his death. See: von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Edited and Translated by M. Howard and P. Paret. New Jersey, Princeton UP, 1976; Lanir, Zvi. *The ‘Principles of War’ and Military Thinking*. In: *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1–17, p. 6.

12 John Frederick Charles Fuller (1876–1966): military historian and strategic theorist, considered to be the father of British armoured warfare, served in the First World War, rose to the rank of Major General in the British Army; among his most influential works are: Fuller, J. F. C. *The Foundations of the Science of War*. London: Hutchinson, 1926; Fuller, J. F. C. *The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct*. New York: Rutgers University Press, 1961.

in due course British military culture failed to recognise the relevance of his statement. One of the main reasons was that doctrine came to be the synonym for fierce inter-service rivalry in the interwar period, when the British Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy fought over a deeply cut defence budget. The consequence was that Britain's post-1945 Services realigned with their traditional role-understanding rather than trying to promote conceptual innovation through doctrine development. Although in the course of the Cold War new ideas of conventional military power emerged, Britain's Services viewed military strategy largely in the context of NATO, where nuclear deterrence was the main concept.¹³

In the decade after the Cold War, the term doctrine has become a buzzword for any mention of defence-related thought, thereby unlocking a Pandora's box of interpretations, definitions and expectations. It has come to mean all things to all men on all levels: for some doctrine is equivalent to national security strategy; some use it in a purely operational context; and others still regard it as a term for tactical principles. Doctrine, in fact, can exist on all these levels; it is therefore crucial to define its context. For the contemporary Western military, the core purpose of doctrine is to provide informed guidance for the chaos of conflict and establish an intellectual framework for the planning and conduct of operations. This understanding is also enshrined in NATO's definition, which states that doctrine is a set of "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application."¹⁴

In the context of this study, the focus lies on military-strategic doctrine. It is understood as the military's body of conceptual core thinking about their role within security and defence, the nature of conflict and the best way to apply military force. It considers these issues in the light of strategic, technological and social possibilities as well as limitations. The purpose of such high-level doctrine is to be a general guideline for all military affairs, giving a sense of direction to military strategy, structures and

13 Gordon, Andrew. *What Do We Mean by Doctrine and Why Does It Evolve?* Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Dr. Andrew Gordon, Defence Studies Department, King's College London.

14 *Allied Administrative Publication 6 (2003) – NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*. Brussels: NATO Standardisation Agency, 2001, p. 2-D7. URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm>.

organisations, equipment procurement, leadership, training and operations. By defining doctrine in such an institutional sense, two components are relevant: the *doctrinal debate* and *formal doctrine*.

Doctrinal debate reflects the underlying conceptual debate within which doctrinalists think, work, debate and write. It is largely an internal process, taking place in specified circles and channels within the military. Nevertheless, there are links to external actors, particularly since the postmodern military has started to interact with academics.¹⁵ The output of this process of doctrinal debate is the second component: formal doctrine, contained in official, and usually published documents. These documents represent formally accepted thinking. They are promulgated by high-level military authorities and taught in training and education. Formal military-strategic doctrine is widely distributed: to commanders, teaching staff and officers, policy-makers and government officials, allied forces, academic circles and the interested general public – the scope of the target audience depending on the doctrine's purpose. While the doctrinal debate is a continuing and iterative process, formal doctrine marks a consolidated, 'frozen' image of the status of conceptual development at a given time.

Due to the currently large interest in British doctrine and the growing doctrinal debate in Anglo-American military and academic circles, numerous examinations on the subject have been published both by scholars and practitioners. No study, however, has yet approached the British doctrinal evolution of the 1990s from an integrated perspective, presenting doctrine as the product of strategic, technological and social changes. The two reasons are the obvious, direct link between strategy and doctrine and the difficulty of establishing a tool to identify and measure the impact of influences not related to security. Doctrine analysts, RMA theorists and military sociologists have all provided important clues on the recent military transformation. Unfortunately, they have not yet systematically shared their conclusions. Part of this thesis' intention is to combine considerations from these three academic fields and start bridging this gap.

A number of fundamental studies on military doctrine have been invaluable starting points for this thesis. As far as the historical dimension of

15 Aldred, Margaret. *Britain's MoD Links with the Academic Community*. In: *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, Vol. 123, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 261–269.

British strategy and military doctrine is concerned, the thesis drew upon authors such as Beckett, French, Murray, Millett and Overy.¹⁶ Insight into the more recent conceptual developments of Britain's Armed Forces has been offered mainly by Daddow, Gooch, McInnes and Reid.¹⁷ A very intense debate has evolved around the development of a post-Cold War peacekeeping doctrine. The British focus has recently expanded to include the more traditional debate on imperial and post-imperial counter-insurgency into the examination of post-Cold War peace operations. In this context, the following authors provided important inputs: Connaughton, Mackinlay, Mockaitis and Thornton.¹⁸

The most useful starting point for analysing the conceptual development of Britain's Armed Forces has been provided by John Mackinlay. He identified four distinct military schools of thought that evolved in the course of the 20th century: warfighting, counter-insurgency, traditional

- 16 Beckett, Ian F. W. *Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency since 1945*. In: McInnes, Colin and Gary D. Sheffield (eds). *Warfare in the Twentieth Century – Theory and Practice*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp. 194–212; French, David. *The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990; Murray/Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*; Overy, Richard. *Doctrine Not Dogma. Lessons From the Past*. In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 33–47.
- 17 Daddow, Oliver J. *Facing the Future: History in the Writing of British Military Doctrine*. In: Defence Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 157–164; Gooch/Grant, *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*; McInnes, Colin. *Hot War Cold War. The British Army's Way in Warfare 1945–95*. London: Brassey's, 1996; Reid, Brian Holden. *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98 (The Occasional 33)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1998.
- 18 Connaughton, Richard. *Peacekeeping and Military Intervention (The Occasional 3)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1995; Mackinlay, John (ed.). *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*. Providence, RI: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996; Mockaitis, Thomas R. *From Counter-Insurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old Games?* In: Schmidl, Erwin A. (ed.). *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Autumn 1999), *Special Issue 'Peace Operations between War and Peace'*, pp. 40–57; Thornton, Rod. *The Role of Peace Support Operation Doctrine in the British Army*. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 41–62.

peacekeeping and post-Cold War intervention.¹⁹ Each of these schools of thought grew within its own framework of practitioners and scholars and generated its own body of literature. Thoughts from one concept did not easily transfer into another, as there were “conceptual fire walls”²⁰ between them. Only during the 1990s did they start to mingle more freely. The significance of Mackinlay’s categorisation is that it offers a framework to characterise the differences between various doctrinal strands and to better understand their interaction.

For exploring the technological dimension of recent doctrinal evolution, the vast body of literature concerned with the RMA has been tapped.²¹ Of particular interest have been examinations that focus on the conceptual implications of the adoption of new technologies. With respect to the British RMA debate the following authors have offered vital thoughts: Caddick, Freedman, Sabin and Wise.²²

In order to track down the implications of social issues on doctrinal development, this thesis has also followed the military sociological discus-

19 Mackinlay, John. *Developing a Culture of Intervention*. Paper Presented at the 4th Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 11 April 2003 by Dr. John Mackinlay, Centre for Defence Studies, KCL. Though thus far only used for teaching purposes and not yet comprehensively published, a synopsis of Mackinlay’s concept has appeared in a recent journal article: Mackinlay, John. *NATO and bin Laden*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 6 (December 2001), pp. 36–40.

20 Ibid, p. 39.

21 For a general overview of the RMA debate see: Arquilla, John. *The “Velvet” Revolution in Military Affairs*. In: World Policy Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 32–43; Kirkpatrick, David. *Revolutions in Military Technology, and Their Consequences*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 4 (August 2001), pp. 67–73; Orme, John. *The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity*. In: International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 138–167; Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *Technology, the RMA and Future War*. In: Strategic Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 63–70.

22 Caddick, David. *Revolution in Military Affairs – Panacea or Myth?* In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 40–63; Freedman, Lawrence. *Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. In: Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1998), pp. 55–66; Freedman, Lawrence. *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs (Adelphi Paper 318)*. London: Oxford University Press, 1998; Sabin, Philip A. G. *The Shape of Future War. Are Traditional Weapons Platforms Becoming Obsolete?* In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1998), pp. 45–57; Wise, G. J. *Network-Centric Warfare: Evolution or Revolution?* In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 65–85.

sion in the 1990s. The notion of the ‘postmodern military’ – suggested in an anthology by Moskos, Williams and Segal – has assumed lead character in the study of Western military organisations in the post-Cold War era.²³ A very crucial contribution of military sociology to doctrinal research is the examination of the military’s changing self-image, which evidently has become part of their military-strategic role-understanding. Terms like ‘miles protector’, ‘soldier-diplomat’ or ‘soldier-scholar’ give evidence of this profound shift away from mere warfighting.²⁴ Particularly Dandeker and Strachan reveal important aspects of the British military’s conceptual reorientation towards postmodern society.²⁵ A particular issue indicating the impact of social change on military doctrine is the emergence of the so-called ‘warfighting ethos’ in formal doctrine and literature alike. It reflects the military’s response to pressures from wider society to incorporate civil trends such as individualism or risk adversity.²⁶

The thesis’ primary sources are published government documents. British security and defence policy papers offer evidence of the strategic environment in which doctrinal evolution unfolded – such as *Options for*

23 Moskos/Williams/Segal, *The Postmodern Military*.

24 The term ‘miles protector’ – or ‘guardian soldier’ – was first coined by Gustav Däniker, a Swiss strategic theorist, to portray the new type of post-Cold War soldier whose traditional role as a defender of national territory has been complemented by the requirement to protect, help and save the weak and vulnerable in the context of international crises. See: Däniker, Gustav. *Wende Golfkrieg: Vom Wesen und Gebrauch künftiger Streitkräfte*. Frankfurt am Main: Report-Verlag, 1992; Däniker, Gustav. *The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces (UNIDIR Research Paper 36)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995. For ‘soldier-diplomat’ and ‘soldier-scholar’ see Moskos/Williams/Segal, *The Postmodern Military*, p. 19.

25 Dandeker, Christopher. On “The Need to Be Different”: *Recent Trends in Military Culture*. In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 173–187; Dandeker, Christopher and Fiona Paton. *The Military and Social Change: A Personnel Strategy for the British Armed Forces (London Defence Studies 39)*. London: Brassey’s, 1997; Dandeker, Christopher. *The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military*. In: Moskos/Williams/Segal, *The Postmodern Military*, pp. 32–50.

26 Roberts, Sebastian. *Fit to Fight: The Conceptual Component – An Approach to Military Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century*. In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 191–201.

*Change or the Strategic Defence Review.*²⁷ Of further use were the MoD's annual *Defence White Papers*.²⁸ Key sources are the official doctrine documents, promulgated either by the MoD or one of the three Services. These high-level military-strategic doctrines have all been published: the British Army's *British Military Doctrine* (BMD), the Royal Air Force's *Air Power Doctrine* (AP 3000) and the Royal Navy's *British Maritime Doctrine* (BR 1806), whose first editions have all been produced between 1989 and 1995, with revised versions appearing in due course.²⁹ Apart from these single-service publications, a number of operational doctrines were also instrumental to driving the overall conceptual evolution. Particularly *Wider Peacekeeping* (WPK) and *Peace Support Operations Doctrine* addressed the growing field of international peace interventions.³⁰ The most vital formal source has been Britain's joint military-strategic doctrine entitled *British Defence Doctrine* (BDD), which was published

- 27 *Options for Change*. In: United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 6th Series, Volume 177, 25 July 1990. London: HMSO, 1990; *The Strategic Defence Review – Modern Forces for the Modern World*. Cm 3999. London: TSO, 1998. URL http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/wp_contents.htm.
- 28 Until 1997 the Ministry of Defence's annual defence policy reports were called *Statement on the Defence Estimates*. In 1999 they were renamed to *Defence White Paper* and one year later replaced by a series of policy papers addressing specific, topic-related issues. For instance: *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995 – Stable Forces in a Stable Britain*. Cm 2800. London: HMSO, 1995; *Defence White Paper 1999 – Modernising Defence*. Cm 4446. London: TSO, 1999. URL <http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper1999/index.htm>; *Policy Paper No. 1 – Defence Diplomacy*. London: TSO, 2000. URL <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/diplomacy.htm>.
- 29 The most recently published being: *Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (Army Code 71451)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 2nd Edition, 1996; *British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the Air Staff. London: TSO, 3rd Edition, 1999; *British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*. By Command of the Defence Council. London: TSO, 2nd Edition, 1999.
- 30 *Wider Peacekeeping*. *Army Field Manual Volume 5, Operations Other Than War, Part 2*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Land Warfare on Behalf of the Chief of the General Staff. London: HMSO, 1995; *Peace Support Operations (Joint Warfare Publication 3-50)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of Joint Operations on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. Northwood: PJHQ/MoD, 1998.

in 1997 and updated in 2001.³¹ Altogether, these documents constitute a system of related keystone documents representing the body of formal British doctrine.

For analysing the doctrinal debate a number of secondary sources have been used: conference papers, public lecture statements and seminar notes of senior military officials and doctrinalists.³² Among the various government-related and independent research centres providing these secondary sources, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) in London has been the most important. RUSI serves as a fruitful platform for Britain's defence debate. Its seminars and conferences as well as its bimonthly *RUSI Journal* are extensively used by defence policy-makers, senior military chiefs and defence scholars to exchange their views. Especially during the first half of the 1990s, when the doctrinal debate was not yet firmly established, RUSI provided a stage for debate.³³ During the second half of the 1990s, the conceptual debate widened and benefited from the creation of additional journals – for instance the RAF's *Air Power Review* or *International Peacekeeping*.³⁴ The growing interaction between Britain's defence establishment and academia has generated a vast amount of such secondary sources from both, practitioners testing their ideas vis-à-vis scholars and defence analysts offering their views in exchange. The careful examination of this secondary source material fills some of the gaps inevitably left open by the fact that the bulk of internal working papers have not yet been declassified – thus assisting

31 *British Defence Doctrine (Joint Warfare Publication 0-01)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director of Joint Warfare on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. London: Caldwell Prince, 1997; *British Defence Doctrine (Joint Warfare Publication 0-01)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. Shrivenham: JDCC/MoD, 2nd Edition, 2001.

32 The most important being: Centre for Defence Studies (CDS; International Policy Institute, KCL, London); Defence Studies Department (DSD; KCL, Shrivenham); Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (Shrivenham); Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC; Shrivenham); Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI; London); Strategic and Combat Studies Institute (SCSI; Camberley).

33 URL <http://www.rusi.org>.

34 The first journal of the RAF's *Air Power Review* was published in January 1998.

in the identification of the soft factors, the issues ‘between the lines’ of formal doctrine development.³⁵

For the examination of such a contemporary subject, the conduct of oral history interviews is indispensable. The inclusion of the perceptions of individuals involved in the events complements the analysis of written source material. In the context of this thesis, a number of interviews with key doctrinalists have been conducted.³⁶ The oral history dimension of this examination has been specifically strengthened by the author’s participation in the British Military Doctrine Group (BMDG). The BMDG seminar series, organised by the Defence Studies Department (DSD) of King’s College London (KCL) and supported by the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) as well as the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, brought together defence practitioners and scholars for the study of British doctrine. Among them were many of the Services’ doctrine directors and most of the authors of doctrine publications. The first-hand accounts they offered provided crucial insights into the British doctrine development during the 1990s.³⁷

The thesis is divided into two main parts, based on the major shift of emphasis from single-service doctrine developments in the first half of the 1990s to joint doctrine in the second half. *Part 1* explores the doctrinal evolution from 1989 to 1996. The first chapter explores the changes in the strategic, technological and social fields in more detail,

35 For this thesis, the following journals and periodicals have been used: *Adelphi Paper* (IISS); *Armed Forces and Society* (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces); *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal* (British Army); *British Army Review* (DGD&D); *Contemporary Security Policy*; *Defense and Security Analysis* (until 2001 *Defense Analysis*); *International Peacekeeping* (Plymouth International Studies Centre); *London Defence Studies* (CDS); *RAF Air Power Review* (RAF); *RUSI Journal* (RUSI); *Security Studies*; *Small Wars and Insurgencies*; *Survival* (IISS); *The Journal of Strategic Studies*; *The Occasional* (SCSI).

36 For a detailed list of the oral history interviews conducted by the author see Bibliography.

37 This Ph.D. thesis has benefited greatly from the presentations given and discussions held in the course of the BMDG seminars in 2002/03. For more details on the BMDG seminar see URL <http://www.jscsc.org.uk/dsd/esrc.htm>. For a detailed list of the BMDG seminar papers used for this thesis see Bibliography. Since the BMDG discussions have been conducted under the ‘Chatham House Rules’, no specific individuals are attributed to the thoughts based on the panel discussions.

thereby outlining the framework in which doctrine began to evolve. It embraces three developments: first, the changing British defence policy, which tried, not without difficulty, to redefine the strategic parameters for its Armed Forces in a dynamically changing era; second, the powerful demonstration of technological superiority in the Gulf War of 1991, which activated an intensive RMA debate and, above all, gave rise to a new perception about the utility of military force; and third, the mounting social pressure on the military to civilianise. (*Chapter 1*)

The British Army's move towards doctrine set in shortly before the Cold War came to its formal end. Its first product, a comprehensive doctrine on the use of land power was formulated in 1989 and aligned closely with the US *AirLand Battle* idea. By applying this concept of 'manoeuvre warfare' in the Gulf operations of 1991 with striking success, US-British land power set new standards. But the conflict also demonstrated the growing constraints imposed upon military force, as operations had to be conducted in the full light of media attention and public scrutiny. In 1996 the British Army published a consolidated, capability-based, land power doctrine for the post-Cold War era. Many of its intellectual elements – like the 'concept of fighting power', the 'manoeuvrist approach' or 'mission command' – had a major impact on subsequent joint doctrine development. (*Chapter 2*)

The Royal Air Force followed suit in developing a new attitude about doctrine, drafting a first high-level statement on air power in 1991. Having been the junior Service for many decades, the Royal Air Force regarded the Gulf War as a defining moment in the emancipation of air power theory. The extensive use of new technologies had been particularly instrumental to the devastating effect of the offensive air campaign against Iraq. After several decades in the supportive role of land warfare, air power advanced to be the preferred instrument of intervention, as it offered a way to shape events on the ground from a safe distance and with the prospect of minimum casualties and 'collateral damage'. In the light of casualty-shy and risk-averse Western electorates, these qualities became crucial. By 1993 RAF doctrinalists produced a revised concept on the use of offensive air power for strategic effect in the new world order. It was an important step in the development of effects-based operations, as they were conducted later in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. (*Chapter 3*)

A particular momentum which pushed doctrinal evolution forward derived from the new mission of peace operations. In the context of com-

plicated intra-state conflicts, traditional UN peacekeeping of interposition and cease-fire monitoring reached its limits. The British Army, involved in the international efforts to bring peace to Bosnia in the absence of the warring parties' cooperation and consent, began exploring new ways of operating under these circumstances. Their response was a concept of 'wider peacekeeping', formally presented in 1994. It marked an important first step towards a post-Cold War understanding of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). However, hampered by distinct Service interests at the time and limited political resolve of the international community, the doctrine remained a half-completed understanding of the changed operational requirements and thus failed to cross the line into something new. (*Chapter 4*)

The last Service to incorporate the new understanding of doctrine was the Royal Navy. Its organisational culture was particularly hostile towards formal writings on the Service's role, and only the impending development of a joint doctrine convinced the Service's leadership to formulate its own doctrinal statement. It was to ensure the influence of maritime ideas on the further conceptual development of Britain's Armed Forces. Benefiting from a vast experience of 'out-of-area' operations during the 1980s, however, the RN's doctrinalists were quick to grasp the implications of the changed environment. By 1995 they presented their concept of post-Cold War maritime power. Its main emphasis was the shift from sea control to power projection and littoral warfare. (*Chapter 5*)

A summary of the doctrinal developments of the first half of the 1990s reveals the re-emergence of conventional military power as an instrument in its own right. After having been subordinated to strategic nuclear deterrence during the major part of the Cold War, conventional forces obtained a new relevance as a versatile tool in shaping the conditions for the resolution of regional crises. With the post-Cold War strategic focus on stability projection and international crisis response new military capabilities came to the fore of conceptual thinking – such as rapid reaction, deployability, multinationality and interoperability. At the same time growing political, legal and moral constraints on the conduct of military operations called for the build-up of more precision-strike capabilities, which allowed for a selective and discriminatory use of lethal force. Doctrine assumed an important function to justify the Services' roles in, and view of the new strategic era. By the mid-1990s all three Services had recognised the utility of doctrine to address the uncertainty of their environment. (*Chapter 6*)

Part 2 continues to examine Britain's doctrinal evolution from 1996 to 2002. Again, the first chapter defines the strategic, technological and social trends at the time in question and their implications on the further process of military transformation. The overall forces of change intensified, but at the same time, a consolidated defence policy – exemplified in the *Strategic Defence Review* (SDR) of 1998 – provided a more coherent strategic guideline. Britain's Armed Forces also gained a better understanding of the RMA, as the possibilities and limitations of the new technologies became clearer in the light of operational experience. The concept narrowing down the previously unlimited RMA ideas came to be called 'network-centric warfare'. Britain's military also learned to address the consequences of social change; they incorporated unavoidable adjustments and drew a line against external expectations that jeopardised military effectiveness. (*Chapter 7*)

The first strand of joint doctrine development occurred in the field of peacekeeping. Initially the exclusive concern of the Army, the revision of 'wider peacekeeping' represented a more balanced effort that took into account joint considerations. The difficulties inherent in post-Cold War peacekeeping caused British doctrinalists to realign with more traditional ideas of counter-insurgency (COIN). Finally, the merging of existing counter-insurgency principles and recent developments in coercion theory marked the breakthrough of a new rationale for post-Cold War Peace Support Operations (PSO): the concept of peace enforcement. In 1997/98 Britain's Armed Forces published this approach of how to operate in the environment of so-called 'complex emergencies'. In the highly volatile circumstances of failed states, the monopoly of power first had to be restored and maintained with robust, or even coercive measures – before peace could be kept. (*Chapter 8*)

The peak of Britain's post-Cold War doctrinal evolution came with the development of a joint military-strategic doctrine. Since the start of the 1990s Britain constantly provided key contributions to multinational crisis interventions. On the basis of this experience, a distinctly British post-Cold War military-strategic rationale emerged, codified in the new *British Defence Doctrine* of 1997. It focused on the concept of expeditionary and joint operations, which were to tackle security risks at their place of origin and to respond to regional instabilities with the deployment of robust rapid reaction forces. (*Chapter 9*)

Another defining impact on military transformation was caused by the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), which represented the dramatic rise of asymmetric warfare. Based on the operational experience from Afghanistan in 2001/02, the British military embarked on refining its role in the fight against asymmetry in general and against terrorism in particular. The implications of the post-9/11 campaigns pointed to the increasingly blurred character of military operations: combat, peace support and humanitarian activities were conducted within the same theatre of operations at the same time. While this debate has only just started, British doctrine proved its relevance by anticipating the main implications of asymmetric conflict and by building on Britain's past experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism roles.³⁸ (*Chapter 10*)

An overall assessment of the conceptual evolution between 1996 and 2002 suggests two main developments: first, British post-Cold War military strategy assumed a consolidated and coherent form, bringing together the Services' separate understanding of the use of military power. Second, doctrine underwent a process of institutionalisation. By the turn of the century, the relevance of doctrine as the 'central idea' was accepted throughout Britain's defence establishment, and her Armed Forces had established an advanced mechanism of doctrine development that was to ensure the best possible course of innovation. (*Chapter 11*)

38 The Iraq War 2003 is not included in the analysis of this thesis. However, since the events underline many of the issues and trends discussed in the course of this thesis, some preliminary considerations on the military implications of the Iraq War are undertaken as part of the Conclusion (see Conclusion).

Part I
The Re-emergence
of Conventional Military Power:
Single-Service Doctrine Developments,
1989–1996

Introduction

During the four and a half decades of East-West rivalry, Britain's military-strategic thinking had ossified under the imperatives of Alliance strategy and nuclear deterrence. In Britain's Armed Forces there was no military-strategic concept other than their contributions to NATO defence. The first half of the 1990s witnessed the re-emergence of conventional military power as a dominant element of strategy. Simultaneously, Britain's three Services discovered the institutional significance of doctrine development. Doctrine became an instrument to convey the message of the military's utility and thus justify their role in the new security environment. The revaluation of conventional military capabilities and the embracing of the idea of doctrine were made possible by the end of the Cold War and carried forward by the concurrency of technological progress and social change.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave way to fundamental geopolitical change. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, hopes for a peaceful world emerged. The initial impact on Western military forces seemed to be one of demise and marginalisation. However, in due course, the post-Cold War security environment set in motion a process of new military-strategic thinking. The end of superpower rivalry opened new avenues for national security and military strategies. NATO amended its agenda of deterrence and containment with stability projection and crisis management. In the Euro-Atlantic context, territorial defence moved to the foot of the agenda. While strategic nuclear deterrence disappeared from the centre-stage position it had assumed during the Cold War, conventional forces were soon in frequent use for shaping international affairs.

The conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1990/91 dampened expectations of the obsolescence of war – an idea that briefly emerged after the Berlin Wall had collapsed. The striking success of the US-led coalition against Iraqi forces catapulted the debate on an information-based Revolution in Military Affairs to the fore and suggested the emergence of a new type of warfare, dominated by high-technology military forces capable of conducting swift, decisive and surgical operations causing a minimum of human loss and collateral damage.

The United Nations was liberated from the yoke of competing superpower vetoes and embarked on addressing the regional conflicts that erupted in South-Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Traditional UN peacekeeping, devised for interposition between two warring states, soon ran into troubles in the diffuse environments of disintegrating societies, humanitarian disasters, ethnic cleansing and separatist insurgencies. The military forces involved in operations in Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia or Cambodia had to come up with more robust intervention concepts. By the mid-1990s, all signs indicated that the Western military were in the middle of a profound transformation process embracing their role-understanding, military-strategic and operational concepts, capabilities and force structures. New qualities were required, such as multifunctionality, modularity, multinationality, interoperability, jointery and deployability.¹ The need for rapid reaction called for light forces at a high readiness and equipped with the appropriate strategic sea and air lift capability. At the same time, NATO collective defence and the lessons from the Gulf War argued for the retention of well-balanced and heavily-armoured forces capable of bearing the brunt of high-intensity warfare.²

- 1 In British defence circles, the term 'jointery' is preferred to 'jointness' (which is primarily used in NATO and US terminology). Interoperability: "The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks." Deployability: "The capability of a force or force element to move or be moved to the area of operations in a given time." In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, pp. I-11 and D-6.
- 2 For an overview of the transformation of Western armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold War see: Burk, James (ed.). *The Adaptive Military. Armed Forces in a Turbulent World*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1998; De Nooy, Gert (ed.). *The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War (Nijhoff Law Special 21)*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996; De Nooy, Gert (ed.). *The Role of European Ground and Air Forces after the Cold War (Nijhoff Law Special 27)*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997; Haltiner, Karl W. et altera (eds). *Europas Armeen im Umbruch (Militär und Sozialwissenschaften 29)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002; Hobkirk, Michael D. *Land, Sea or Air? Military Priorities, Historical Choices*. London: Macmillan, 1992; Meyer, Wolfgang. *Streitkräfte auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert*. In: *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 45, No. 12 (December 1996), pp. 20–24; Moskos/Williams/Segal, *The Postmodern Military*.

Due to the unpredictable and volatile nature of the evolving security environment, British defence policy had difficulty in presenting a coherent and long-term concept for the employment and the modernisation of the military instrument. Challenged by major shifts in their environment, Britain's Armed Services discovered doctrine development as a plug to fill this gap and offer a conceptual response to the post-Cold War era.

Part 1 of this thesis first outlines the overarching atmosphere of strategic, technological and social circumstances in which doctrine evolved during the first half of the 1990s. It continues by exploring the doctrinal strands emerging within the three Services, the British Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. Their new doctrine statements offered a first package of military-strategic responses to the post-Cold War challenges. At the same time, doctrine gained institutional relevance and became an instrument to pursue specific Service interests. Doctrine remained, however, confined to Service structures and was not merged into a joint approach. The conceptual achievements during this period nevertheless marked the completion of the first important stage of post-Cold War military transformation: the shift from the threat-driven paradigm to a rationale that based the application and development of military power on capabilities. An amalgamated, joint military strategy for the new security environment was not yet formulated, but its single components came into being.

1 An Era of Cumulative Changes: The Environment Shaping Britain's Armed Forces, 1989–1996

The general mindset of Britain's Armed Forces at the end of the 20th century has to be viewed against the fundamental strategic, technological and social changes taking place – the combined effect of which Lawrence Freedman called the 'revolution in strategic affairs'.³ While many of these trends stretch across the whole of the decade and are difficult to associate with exact dates, there are nevertheless a number of identifiable characteristics which justify the distinction between the first (Part 1) and the second half (Part 2) of this thesis' timeframe.

Under the *Options for Change* defence policy, largely covering the first half of the 1990s, strategic thinking was characterised by contraction and the difficulty to adjust to the new era. Only with the *Strategic Defence Review* of 1998 did these trends reverse and a consolidated post-Cold War strategy emerge. At the same time, the technology debate was first dominated by the experience from the Gulf War, while in the second half of the 1990s the implications from various Peace Support Operations and the Kosovo air campaign brought new impetus to the discussion. In terms of social changes, the first half of the 1990s saw the British Armed Forces primarily reacting in a rather defensive way to rising external pressures – to ever growing peace dividend calls, to demands to civilianise the military community and to a widespread perception that NATO, and with it the basic role of high-intensity warfighting, had lost its *raison d'être*.⁴ It was only during the second half of the decade that the weights in the civil-military relationship were rebalanced and Britain's Armed Services claimed their rights and needs in a more pro-active manner. The

3 Freedman, Lawrence. *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs (Adelphi Paper 318)*. London: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 7–10.

4 Corterier, Peter. *Quo Vadis NATO?* In: *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March/April 1990), pp. 141–156. See also Edmonds, Martin. *British Army 2000. External Influences on Force Design (The Occasional 21)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996, p. 34.

following subchapters address the macroclimate of change during the first half of the 1990s.

1.1 Strategic Environment: The Lack of Defence Policy Guidance

Three developments of the immediate post-Cold War phase reflect the main changes in Britain's defence policy: first, the restructuring of military roles, mainly characterised by a process of downsizing and by lingering attempts to redefine Britain's responsibilities in international security; second, the reorientation of Britain's nuclear policy, which led to the formulation of a minimum necessary deterrence and reduced the relative importance of nuclear for the sake of conventional military power; and third, the transformation of NATO and the establishment of a new Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), in which Britain assumed a centre-stage role. These developments require detailed analysis to understand their relevance to military transformation.

Britain's post-Cold War defence policy officially began on 6 February 1990, when Secretary of State for Defence Tom King announced that the Ministry of Defence was beginning to study "options for change in the structure and deployment of our Armed Forces".⁵ The implication appeared to be that there were a variety of options to choose from and that a wide-ranging debate over the future of British defence policy was imminent after the dramatic change in Europe's strategic landscape.⁶ This *Options for Change* exercise was thus initiated by the changing East-West relations and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It was, however, fuelled

5 Grove, Eric. *The Army and British Security after the Cold War. Defence Planning for a New Era (The Occasional 20)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996. p. 5.

6 It is worth noting that the term 'review' was deliberately omitted in the announcement of the exercise, although it constituted a defence review in everything but name. The Conservative Government was reluctant to use the term due to bad experience with John Nott's Defence Review in 1981 and the tendency to evade financial pressure by denying that a complete review of defence policy was prevalent. See McInnes, Colin. *The Future of the British Army*. In: Clarke, Michael and Philip Sabin (eds). *British Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Brassey's, 1993, pp. 198–219, p. 199.

by growing defence budget constraints, caused by the peace dividend and a higher than expected inflation.⁷

On 25 July 1990, the Secretary of State for Defence presented the general framework of an adapted defence policy in a Statement to the House of Commons. Some basic assumptions of British defence policy were confirmed: NATO continued to play a crucial role for British security; an independent national nuclear deterrence was to be maintained; and Britain's leading role in the world and her global interests were upheld. The statement presented the following five defence roles for Britain's Armed Forces: nuclear deterrent; direct defence of the United Kingdom (UK); a contribution to NATO's defence of mainland Europe; a contribution to NATO's maritime defence of the Atlantic and the Channel; and non-NATO commitments, which included the defence of dependent territories such as Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands and a general capability for intervention outside the NATO area.⁸ This turned out to be a moderate rebalancing of the existing 'four-and-a-half defence roles' approach, the main difference being the reduced emphasis placed on the contribution to NATO's defence of mainland Europe.⁹ The statement's real focus, however, was on the planned reductions in the size of the British Armed Forces. The announcement constituted a serious cut of more than 25%, the brunt of which was to be borne by the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) based in Northern Germany.¹⁰ Britain's ground forces, providing the main part of the country's continental commitment, were to be reduced from 156,000 to about 120,000.¹¹

This first stage of *Options for Change* was in many respects the most important: it set the framework of future defence policy, and, later, more detailed studies would work within this framework. It was also the stage at which the various options were discussed. They were, however, discussed not in an open debate, but behind closed doors.¹² This approach of secrecy

7 Ibid, p. 200.

8 Mottram, Richard. *Options for Change: Process and Prospects*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 22–26, p. 24.

9 McInnes, *The Future of the British Army*, p. 203.

10 With the *Options for Change* reform and the creation of the ARRC, the British Army of the Rhine was renamed to British Forces Germany.

11 Grove, *The Army and British Security after the Cold War*, p. 5.

12 Mottram, *Options for Change*, pp. 22–23.

had precluded a wide-ranging debate even within the MoD and resulted in a lack of single-service consultation. The overall impression of this first stage of *Options for Change* was therefore one of frustration. It led to accusations that the military were not allowed sufficient input in the process and that the MoD's thinking was dominated by budget pressure. For many critics, the review was budget-driven instead of strategy-driven and the restructuring was nothing else than a downsizing exercise.¹³

The initial *Options for Change* reduction proposals were specified in the *Statement on the Defence Estimates* of 1991.¹⁴ The reduction plans had been delayed, ostensibly because of Operation Granby, Britain's involvement in the Gulf War, and also to allow consultations with NATO allies in the context of the proposed establishment of an Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.¹⁵ As will be discussed below, the ARRC saved the British Army from even farther-reaching reductions.

Another disturbance to the defence restructuring process came in the form of the Balkan conflicts. In the first half of the 1990s, each annual defence statement redefined defence roles and force structures. The changes suggested from year to year reflected the government's dilemma at the time: the fluid status of the security environment after the end of the Cold War did not yet present a predictable scenario upon which a new and coherent defence policy could be planned, while at the same time the defence budget was under constant pressure from all sides. In addition, unforeseeable regional crises kept confronting defence planners with new situations and new demands for military interventions. The questions over Britain's wider international interests and her continental commitment could not be answered in a satisfactory way. As a result, defence planning between 1990 and 1994 was more influenced by politics than by policy and underwent frequent readjustments to address short-term operational demands – as for instance the MoD's announcement on 3 February 1993 that an additional 5,000 troops were to be made available to the Army's front line units. This correction of manpower levels was an indirect ac-

13 McInnes, *The Future of the British Army*, p. 203.

14 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991 – Britain's Defence for the 90s*. Cm 1559-1. London: HMSO, 1991. An *Army White Paper* specified the reduction of the British Army: *Britain's Army for the 90s*. Cm 1595. London: HMSO, 1991.

15 It is worth noting that the *Army White Paper* was not matched by similar documents for the RN and RAF, an indication to the Army's centrality in the *Options for Change* review.

knowledge that the cutbacks had gone too far, and were jeopardising the availability of sufficient personnel for large, ongoing operations, particularly Northern Ireland or Bosnia.¹⁶

What eventually emerged until 1994 was a defence policy based on three defence roles. Defence Role 1 was largely about home defence and the defence of Britain's dependent territories. In reality, it was almost entirely about the preservation of an independent nuclear deterrent and support of the civil authorities in Northern Ireland. Defence Role 2 was the defence of Europe through NATO and was viewed as the key defence role. The lowest priority was attributed to Defence Role 3, which contained the remaining missions, in particular the out-of-area role and support for UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁷ This framework of defence roles marked the defence policy of a middle-ranking European power that maintained worldwide interests and responsibilities.¹⁸ The 1995 *Defence White Paper* further reconfirmed that the collective security through NATO remained the major determinant of the overall size, capability and readiness of Britain's Forces.¹⁹

The features emerging in British defence policy during the first half of the 1990s were: the constant financial contraction; the repeated attempts to achieve more efficiency and thus ease the budget pressures; the centrality of NATO to Britain's security; the emphasis of Britain's global role, incorporated in her status as a major trading power and as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council; the commitment to maintain strong military forces which allowed the country to 'punch above its weight'; the retention of a national nuclear deterrent; but also the absence of a

16 Inge, Peter. *The Capability-Based Army*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 1–3, p. 2.

17 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1993 – Defending Our Future*. Cm 2270. London: HMSO, 1993, p. 7.

18 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1992*. Cm 1981. London: HMSO, 1992. See also Guthrie, Charles. *The British Army at the Turn of the Century*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 3 (June 1996), pp. 5–9, p. 5.

19 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995 – Stable Forces in a Strong Britain*. Cm 2800. London: HMSO, 1995. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (ed.). *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy. Volume I: 1995–1997*. London: HMSO, 1998, pp. 65–69.

clear and agreed rationale for revising defence policy in the post-Cold War era, which resulted in repeated shifting and readjusting of budgets, priorities and operational commitments.²⁰ Freedman concluded that “the unstable combination of defence contraction and military activism was a natural consequence of defence policy being caught up between pressures on public expenditure and a determination to continue to play a world role”.²¹ As a result, Britain’s Armed Services were facing considerable shortcomings that affected their organisational health: they lacked proper strategic guidance and suffered from financial under-resourcing and a constant operational overcommitment.²²

The nuclear element of Britain’s post-Cold War defence policy requires more detailed examination. It reflects both continuity and change. Continuity occurred with respect to nuclear concepts. Strategic nuclear deterrence was to remain a cornerstone of British security. Compared to the vast conceptual developments concerning conventional military forces, the nuclear strategy appeared to undergo surprisingly little adaptation to the new security environment. Change, however, did occur with respect to the size and scope of nuclear capabilities. During the first years of the 1990s a number of reductions and disinvestments of Britain’s nuclear arsenal were undertaken. The significance for nuclear policy’s influence on military transformation lies in its relative loss of weight. While nuclear deterrence had previously dominated security strategy and dictated the subordinated role of conventional forces, the post-Cold War era witnessed the conceptual decline, or at least stagnancy, of nuclear forces.

To begin with, Britain’s immediate post-Cold War defence policy maintained the importance of nuclear deterrence. The 1994 *Statement on the Defence Estimates* cautioned against rejecting the Cold War security

20 See: Rifkind, Malcolm. *Peacekeeping or Peacemaking?* In: *Military Technology*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April 1993), pp. 10–14. Cowper-Coles, Sherard. *From Defence to Security: British Policy in Transition*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 142–161, p. 142.

21 Freedman, Lawrence. *The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 13.

22 Sabin, Philip A. G. *British Defence Choices beyond ‘Options for Change’*. In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (1993), pp. 267–287. See also McInnes, Colin. *Labour’s Strategic Defence Review*. In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998), pp. 823–845, p. 827.

framework of nuclear deterrence.²³ The retention of a minimum nuclear deterrence was deemed to be necessary, in line with NATO's *New Strategic Concept* that noted that "nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable, and thus remain essential to preserve peace".²⁴ At first glance, therefore, British nuclear policy showed a high degree of continuity.²⁵

Nevertheless, the threat rationale shifted somewhat. British nuclear deterrence was officially no longer geared up against the Soviet Union but considered to be needed as a general deterrence in an unpredictable world – for instance to deter Third World potentates from using nuclear or any other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).²⁶ Overall, the British nuclear debate was characterised by the reluctance to embrace new policy or conceptual innovation. In the Cold War, deterrence had mainly worked because the threat came from a well organised and rational group of countries which had a comparable strategic culture and therefore could be dissuaded from risking a nuclear Armageddon. In 1992, Britain's Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind also cautioned against any "belief that nuclear deterrence is straightforwardly exportable from the traditional East-West context".²⁷

Still, only a few voices in Britain's security and defence circles showed similar concerns, the great majority of analysts and policy-makers sparing little sympathy with such tendencies to question the continuing utility of nuclear weapons.²⁸ Although the concept of a 'second centre of decision-making' was difficult to uphold in a post-Soviet era, London remained convinced that nuclear weapons still represented a significant part of the 'transatlantic glue' and of European stability. In conceptual terms,

23 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1994 – Defending Our Future*. Cm 2550. London: HMSO, 1994.

24 *The New Strategic Concept*. Rome, 7/8 November 1991. URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm>. See also Witney, Nicholas K. J. *British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 96–112, p. 97.

25 *Ibid*, p. 96.

26 Bellamy, Christopher. *Soldier of Fortune: Britain's New Military Role*. In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1992), pp. 443–456, p. 449.

27 Witney, *British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War*, p. 103.

28 Quinlan, Michael. *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 142, No. 6 (December 1997), pp. 1–4.

Britain's nuclear policy remained Cold War- and NATO-oriented.²⁹ It had little to offer in the context of growing regional instabilities, where Britain's national survival was not at stake but her global responsibility nevertheless demanded involvement.

There was some willingness to adjust nuclear capabilities to the changed circumstances. British nuclear forces in due course became smaller and less diverse. The replacement of the Polaris system through Trident had already been decided by the Thatcher Government in the late 1980s. The submarine-based Trident featured multiple, independently targeted warheads. The capability of the planned four-boat force would constitute a more powerful capability than before, continuing to provide strategic nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War environment. The first of the new Trident submarines became operational in 1994.³⁰ In due course, some nuclear house-clearing was undertaken, since the reduced need for strategic deterrence could easily be maintained by the RN's Trident system alone. In alignment with NATO nuclear policy, the Royal Air Force's substrategic nuclear role was abolished.³¹ Apart from this amplification of the Services' nuclear division of labour, nuclear strategy underwent relatively little adaptation and, as a consequence, had little impact on post-Cold War military-strategic thinking.

A more innovative impetus for British military transformation stemmed from NATO. The establishment of the Alliance's new Rapid Reaction Corps saw pivotal involvement of Britain's Armed Forces, particularly the Army. For forty years NATO had enjoyed a clear military rationale – to deter and if necessary defend against a potential Soviet strategic attack. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, that threat disappeared from immediate policy concerns. This left NATO with

29 Witney, *British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War*, p. 96.

30 *Ibid*, p. 97.

31 Initially, the Conservative Government remained committed to a substrategic deterrent, an air-launched stand-off Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM), to replace the RAF's ageing WE-177 free fall nuclear bombs. 1993 Secretary of State for Defence Rifkind finally announced the decision that the WE-177 bombs would not be replaced. The original purpose for TASM was to hit targets in Eastern Europe without having to brave Warsaw Pact air defences. With the Warsaw Pact gone, the substrategic role of nuclear weapons was no longer necessary, and NATO withdrew all its tactical nuclear weapons. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1994/95*, p. 35.

the challenge of not merely having to justify its continued existence, but also of having to devise a force structure to meet the less clear scenarios of a post-Soviet world order. There remained the intention for keeping a residual capability to meet the possibility of a resurgent Soviet threat. In addition, the idea emerged to establish a rapid reaction capability to meet a variety of other contingencies.³² The shift from deterrence and containment towards stability projection and crisis management only became official Alliance strategy at the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991.³³ The adaptation of NATO force structure, however, began more than a year earlier. Britain was one of its key drivers. As a result, the British Army ended up with the task of providing substantial elements for the new ARRC.

The ARRC featured two major innovations which would become important elements of post-Cold War military transformation – its rapid reaction capability and a new emphasis on multinationality. In order to understand the reasoning behind the creation of the ARRC, one has to consider NATO's historical force structure. To defend Germany, NATO had constructed not so much a battle plan as an order of battle, which was based upon two major formations – Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Southern Army Group (SOUTHAG) – each consisting of several national corps.³⁴ Each national corps was responsible for a specific sector of the front and essentially fought its own battle. This arrangement of corps in layers along the Inner German border from North to South was labelled 'the layer cake'.³⁵ NATO's 'forward defence' of the Central Region was less a centrally controlled, coherent plan of action than a

32 McInnes, Colin. *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps (London Defence Studies 15)*. London: Brassey's, 1993, p. 1.

33 *The New Strategic Concept*. Rome, 7/8 November 1991. URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm>. For 'stability projection' see Däniker, Gustav., *Stabilisierung" als strategische Aufgabe*. In: Europäische Sicherheit, Vol. 43, No. 10 (October 1994), pp. 508–512.

34 Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) consisted of I (Netherlands) Corps, I (West German) Corps, I (UK) Corps and I (Belgian) Corps; Southern Army Group (SOUTHAG) consisted of III (West German) Corps, V (US) Corps, VII (US) Corps and II (West German) Corps.

35 For a detailed description of NATO's 'layer cake' force structure see Millar, Peter. *The Central Region Layer Cake: An Essential Ingredient*. In: Mackenzie, Jeremy J. G. and Brian Holden Reid (eds). *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*. London: Tri-Service Press, 1989, pp. 13–32.

centrally coordinated liaison between national corps commanders fighting on their own clearly defined, familiar and thus prepared battleground.³⁶

Given this well-established traditional defence plan, NATO reacted surprisingly quickly to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. Within months of the Warsaw Pact's disintegration a new force structure to replace the layer cake was being developed at NATO's military headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). By the middle of 1990, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) revealed his proposals for a new force structure. Although these initial suggestions were to be significantly amended before being accepted by NATO in April 1991, they represent an important stepping stone in the movement towards a new force structure.³⁷

SHAPE suggested three types of forces: covering forces, main defence forces and reaction forces. They would be arranged in an East-West manner, as opposed to the North-South arrangement of the former 'layer cake'. Furthest to the East, covering forces comprising light divisions, would identify and delay any aggression directed towards NATO. Behind these and further to the West, main defence forces, consisting of armoured divisions, would engage and destroy the enemy. Finally, reaction forces would provide the reserve, ready to reinforce quickly any threatened sector of NATO's front from centralised positions. For the purpose of demonstrating the Alliance's resolve, these reaction forces would be multinational. From this original proposal, the concept of reaction forces progressed into that of a single rapid reaction corps under a specified commander and with a permanent headquarters.³⁸

This initial proposal reflects the following important developments. First, due to the increased warning time NATO abandoned the structure of tightly organised corps with pre-assigned troops, preferring instead a more flexible arrangement. Second, the plan opened the door for the establishment of multinational corps by considering the option of mixing divisions of different national origin into newly formed corps. For the first time in NATO's history the principle of multinationality was applied for

36 McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, p. 3.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

38 McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, pp. 4–5.

the corps level.³⁹ With the establishment of the Multinational Division Central (MND C) and the Multinational Division South (MND S), the Alliance lowered multinationality even below corps level.⁴⁰

This initial force structure concept, presented in summer 1990, was clearly geared to the residual Soviet threat and remained focused on territorial defence. Even the new notion of reaction forces still referred to a potential crisis occurring from the East. Following the unfolding crisis in the Persian Gulf in late 1990, however, the idea of a rapid reaction corps began to be considered not just as an instrument for NATO's core function of collective defence but also as an option for responding to out-of-area crises. On 12 April 1991, a variant of the draft concept was agreed by the NATO Military Committee and presented to the North Atlantic Council on 6 June 1991. The structure finally agreed was one of main defence forces, augmentation forces as strategic reserves and reaction forces.⁴¹ The last comprised *immediate* and *rapid* reaction forces. Immediate reaction forces, deployable within weeks, would largely be formed from existing units such as the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, and standing naval forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The rapid reaction forces, however, would be provided by the newly established multinational ARRC, supported by NATO air and naval forces as required.⁴²

The ARRC's mission would be twofold: to contribute to NATO collective defence, mainly as a reserve to the main defence forces, and to assist in crisis management for any NATO contingency, including potential activities outside of NATO's traditional perimeter, by providing an early, militarily significant response.⁴³ In NATO's *New Strategic Concept*, which was adopted in November 1991, this force structure was confirmed.

In September 1990 SACEUR approached Britain to provide the commander of the ARRC and consequently most of its headquarters

39 Dorman, Andrew. *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*. In: Defense Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2001), pp. 187–202, p. 192.

40 Mackenzie, Jeremy J. G. *The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps – Making It Work*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No. 1 (February 1993), pp. 16–20.

41 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1991/92*, p. 46.

42 *Britain's Army for the 90s*, p. 2.

43 McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, p. 13.

staff.⁴⁴ The reasoning behind this appears to have been influenced by the political requirement for a major European member to provide the corps leadership and by the reputation of British experience and willingness to undertake operations outside of Europe. NATO's request came at a time when Britain was conducting the *Options for Change* review. Despite the ongoing deployment to the Persian Gulf, Britain's military felt the downsizing plans looming above them like a sword of Damocles. The announcement of June 1990 to reduce the forces by a third was not finalised, since the detailed planning had yet to be conducted. Assuming leadership of the ARRC implied making a substantial contribution to those forces the corps could call upon. As a consequence, NATO's interest in British leadership for the ARRC bolstered the justification of retaining large and well-balanced national forces.

As the major part of the ARRC would be composed of land forces, the British Army in particular was very keen to seize this opportunity. From all three Services the Army feared downsizing most, as first plans suggested that the Army units based in Germany might be cut by half. By assuming command responsibility of the ARRC and the associated troop contributions, the British Army would have less trouble to justify both its size and the retention of large armoured forces. In the end, Britain agreed on assuming the corps' leadership and pushed strongly for the establishment of the ARRC in NATO committees.⁴⁵

By 1992 the ARRC was devised in detail. On 2 October 1992, its headquarters under the first commander, British Lieutenant General Jeremy Mackenzie, was formed.⁴⁶ Ten NATO divisions were earmarked to the ARRC; contingency plans envisioned the deployment of a maximum

44 For an overview of Britain's involvement in the ARRC see: Heyman, Charles (ed.). *The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 1999–2000*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1998, pp. 13–14; McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, pp. 9–33.

45 Bellamy, *Soldier of Fortune: Britain's New Military Role*, p. 451.

46 Commander ARRC (COMARRC) would always be a British three-star general. See also Mackenzie, *The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps*, pp. 16–20.

of four divisions at the same time.⁴⁷ Eventually, the British contribution encompassed the majority of the corps staff, substantial corps troops and two full divisions, the 1st UK Armoured Division based in Germany and the 3rd UK Division based in Great Britain. The provision of these two divisions demonstrated the importance Britain placed on the ARRC.

In sum, the ARRC incorporated the more flexible and more multinational force structure of a transforming NATO which added crisis management to its core mission of collective defence. The debate evolving around the new rapid reaction capability also fuelled the discussion of possible out-of-area operations. The request for British leadership demonstrated that NATO members appreciated Britain's expertise in expeditionary operations and the quality of her all-professional Armed Services. Britain's main contribution to NATO would henceforth be linked to the Alliance's new reaction capability; in the words of Christopher Bellamy, Defence Correspondent of *The Independent*, British ARRC units would form "NATO's crack mercenary troops".⁴⁸ In the context of the military's organisational interest, the willingness to assume ARRC responsibilities was obvious, as it served as damage reduction in the downsizing process. Particularly the Army was pleased with its new role as the key contributor to NATO's new rapid reaction capability.⁴⁹ Conceptually, Britain's key involvement in the ARRC was an important step in the shift away from territorial defence towards the focus on expeditionary operations.

47 The Divisions earmarked to the ARRC are: Multinational Division Centre; Multinational Division South; 1st (UK) Armoured Division; 1st (US) Armoured Division; 1st (TU) Mechanised Division; 2nd (GR) Mechanised Infantry Division; 3rd (IT) Mechanised Division; 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division; 7th (GE) Panzerdivision; Spanish Rapid Reaction Division. See: Heyman, *The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom*, p. 14; URL <http://www.arcc.nato.int/>.

48 In a rather anecdotal manner Bellamy stated: "A cynic might suggest that the British are world-beaters in three things: farming, popular music and warfare. They make good mercenaries, and in the ARRC they will be NATO's crack mercenary troops." In: Bellamy, *Soldier of Fortune: Britain's New Military Role*, p. 451.

49 The British Army of the Rhine was nevertheless cut from around 50,000 to 23,000. See Yardley, Michael. *Towards the Future*. In: Chandler/Beckett, *The Oxford History of the British Army*, pp. 416–431.

1.2 Technological Environment: A ‘Revolution in Military Expectations’

Technology has always played a large role in the history of warfare.⁵⁰ The technological environment shaping Britain’s Armed Forces in the 1990s is closely linked to the US-dominated idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs – the belief that the exploitation of current technologies would fundamentally alter the nature and conduct of warfare and thus provide a new perspective on international affairs. The idea was rooted in the US technological advances of the late 1970s and 1980s, which caused Soviet concerns of an impending Military-Technological Revolution (MTR) with the potential of altering the Cold War’s military balance between East and West.⁵¹

Having experienced no major military operation since the traumatic failure in Vietnam, the pre-1989 US decision-makers were hesitant towards the overt use of conventional military power.⁵² Despite such political reservations, the US Armed Forces undertook serious efforts to find technological solutions which made the use of military force more effective. A number of new high-technology weapon systems were on the verge of becoming operational before the Cold War came to an end: Precision-Guided Munition (PGM), long-range cruise missiles or the highly secret stealth bombers. At the same time, decisive leaps forward occurred in the field of information and communications technologies. The idea to merge all these technological innovations into an integrated system promised to revolutionise the way war was fought. Most of the new technologies were, however, still waiting to be tested under operational circumstances. Nevertheless the circle of defence analysts and military

50 For the aspect of technology in security and defence studies see: Cohen, Eliot. *Technology and Warfare*. In: Baylis, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, pp. 235–253; Kirkpatrick, *Revolutions in Military Technology*.

51 The term ‘Military-Technological Revolution’ (MTR) was first coined by the Soviet Chief of General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov in the late 1970s, who was concerned about the growing superiority of conventional Western weapon systems.

52 The use of overt military power against Libya (1985) and later Panama (1989) were exceptions in this era of military self-restraint. See Eberle, James. *The Utility of Military Power*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 135, No. 4 (Winter 1990), pp. 42–52, p. 48.

officers who believed in the power of technology to change the parameters of modern warfighting was growing.⁵³

The events after 1989 transformed these initial ideas of a Military-Technological Revolution into a broad momentum. The end of the Cold War removed the fear of military conflict escalating into an uncontrollable nuclear Armageddon, while the Gulf War demonstrated the potential of technologically superior forces. Suddenly, warfighting appeared to be swift in its conduct, decisive in its result and affordable in terms of its political and social damage. The Gulf War was portrayed as the first information war and was considered to be the advent of the revolutionary form of warfare which would materialise through further technological advances.⁵⁴ In 1993 Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's first Director of Net Assessment, suggested the term 'Revolution in Military Affairs' to describe this unfolding transformation:

[Revolution in Military Affairs is defined as] a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.⁵⁵

Marshall's definition indicates that he understood the vital relation between the technological and the conceptual dimensions: revolutionary change could only be generated if the potential of technological advantage was exploited by conceptual innovation. For many other analysts in the US and in other defence communities, however, technology became the dominating component of the RMA. It is this perception that became a crucial aspect of Western military transformation during the 1990s. Whether the claims of RMA proponents hold good or not is secondary – the fact is that the American-led RMA came to permeate

53 For a critical approach to the US-led RMA debate see Jablonsky, David. *US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. In: Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 18–36.

54 See for instance: Anson, Peter and Dennis Cummings. *The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 4 (August 1991), pp. 45–53; Leibstone, Marvin and Ezio Bonsignore. *US Military versus Iraq: The "New Warfare"*. In: Military Technology, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1998), pp. 6–19.

55 Wise, *Network-Centric Warfare*, pp. 67–68.

Western military thinking. Based on the possibilities it offered, the military instrument gained a new utility and acceptability in the psyche of Western nations.⁵⁶ In order to understand the pivotal impact of the Gulf War on Western military transformation, the events and their contemporary interpretation must be explored in more detail.

The Gulf War 1990/91 was a defining moment in several respects. On a political level, the successful build-up of a powerful international coalition with the aim to re-establish the sovereignty of a state invaded by an aggressor marked the United Nation's new capacity to act in the name of international stability. After the Iraqi dictator had resisted diplomatic and economic pressures, the US-led coalition liberated Kuwait by applying military force. The result of the conflict implied that in the post-Cold War environment conventional military power could be used actively to shape international affairs – an option which had been severely limited during the previous decades of East-West antagonism. The events also generated the impression that modern warfare was politically and morally tolerable even for peace-loving Western democracies.⁵⁷

For military power, the most crucial implications concerned the use of high-technology. The success of superior Western equipment and training against Iraq's Soviet-based armaments was decisive. Furthermore, the disproportionate casualty ratio between attackers and defenders was unparalleled in the history of warfare.⁵⁸ For many commentators, it was

56 One of the earliest post-Cold War analysis of the impact of technology on warfare has been provided by Van Creveld, Martin. *On Future War*. London: Brassey's, 1991. See also Van Creveld, Martin. *High Technology and the Transformation of War*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 5 (October 1992), pp. 76–81 and No. 6 (December 1992), pp. 61–64.

57 Freedman, *Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, pp. 55–56.

58 Total coalition casualties – 223 personnel killed in action during hostilities, of which 24 were British – were exceptionally light considering the vastness and intensity of the campaign (40 Iraqi divisions were destroyed, of which 29 totally). See *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991*, p. 25. The coalition's air loss rate in offensive sorties was less than 0.25% (compared to Korea 1953 4%, Vietnam 1967–1975 1.0% and the Falklands 1982 with 6.0% for Argentinean and under 2.0% for British sorties. See: Biddle, Stephen. *Victory Misunderstood. What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict*. In: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139–179; Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh. *How Kuwait Was Won. Strategy in the Gulf War*. In: International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 5–40; Vallance, Andrew. G. B. *The Future: Offensive Air Operations*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 22–27, p. 24.

the first glimpse of a new type of war, characterised by maximum military effectiveness and minimum human cost. Centre-stage in this revolutionary approach to warfare was the new information technology. A network of electronic and imagery surveillance and reconnaissance systems, linked with far-reaching and secure data processing systems and precision-strike weapons provided overwhelming military results. The high tempo of operations and the accuracy of coalition strikes, particularly by air, rendered Iraqi forces impotent. In the eyes of RMA proponents, Operation Desert Storm was the catalyst which demonstrated that these recent technological trends would soon fundamentally alter the way modern military conflicts were conducted: with minimum friendly casualties and negligible collateral damage but with devastating effect on the opponent. Air power advocates in particular interpreted the unparalleled result of the air campaign as suggesting a new way of warfare.⁵⁹

RMA sceptics, however, disputed the revolutionary dimension of technology and cautioned against overstating the technological factor in armed conflict and neglecting others. They also warned against painting an unrealistic picture of clean and bloodless war and thus raising false expectations in political and public minds.⁶⁰ Stephen Biddle, for instance, argued that the interpretation of the Gulf War as the advent of the RMA was a misconstruction. According to him, the one-sidedness of the military campaign was not so much due to mere technological dominance but represented the synergistic interaction between technology and skill imbalance. The use of high-technology allowed the US-led coalition to capitalise upon Iraqi mistakes disproportionately, but the precondition for this was the superior operational concept and training of coalition forces. Therefore Biddle viewed the radical outcome of 1991 less as a revolution than as a new ability to exploit an opponent's mistakes and poor training.⁶¹

Similar views were expressed by others. For Efraim Karsh the Gulf War represented the superiority of an advanced manoeuvre-oriented operational doctrine – in essence the *AirLand Battle* devised in the

59 See for instance Graydon, Michael. *RAF: Present and Future Challenges*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 140, No. 3 (June 1995), pp. 1–7, p. 6.

60 Press, Daryl G. *The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare*. In: *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5–44.

61 Biddle, *Victory Misunderstood*, pp. 140–141.

1980s – over an archaic attrition-oriented one.⁶² Such a perception of the Gulf War consequently warned against attributing military success solely to technology itself and neglecting other elements of warfare, such as organisational and conceptual aspects, leadership, morale and training. This put the significance of high-technology into a more moderate perspective, cautioning against devoting too much attention to technological magic at the expense of organisational and conceptual innovation. Technological superiority could only be exploited if it were met by appropriate conceptual adjustments. This dispute over whether the impending change in warfare was evolutionary or revolutionary continued throughout the 1990s.⁶³

These considerations apply likewise to Britain's Armed Forces. Their involvement in the Gulf War was substantial but did not match the US in technological terms. The British Government had been surprised by Saddam Hussein's move into Kuwait on 2 August 1990 like most other nations. As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, determined to play a leading role in the world, and as the closest ally of the United States, its decision to deploy troops to the Gulf was undisputed. The British deployment, labelled Operation Granby and officially commencing on 9 August 1990, encompassed about 45,000 troops from all three Services in its end-state.⁶⁴ As a consequence, the Gulf War witnessed the country's largest military deployment since the Suez Crisis in 1956. Since no previous contingency scenario had foreseen the sending of such a large-scale

62 *US Army Field Manual 100-5. Blueprint for the AirLand Battle*. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1991 (originally published: Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986). See also Karsh, Efraim. *Reflections on the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict*. In: *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 303–320, p. 313. Another author emphasising the conceptual superiority of the *AirLand Battle* as a determinant for the war's outcome was Summers, Harry G. *Military Doctrine: Blueprint for Force Planning*. In: *Strategic Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 9–22.

63 See: Caddick, *Revolution in Military Affairs – Panacea or Myth*, pp. 40–63; O'Hanlon, Michael. *Revolution in Military Affairs: radikale Veränderung versus nachhaltige Entwicklung*. In: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, Vol. 168, No. 6 (June 2002), p. 6.

64 For further details on Operations Granby and Desert Storm see: De la Billière, Peter. *The Gulf Conflict: Planning and Execution*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 136, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 7–12; De la Billière, Peter. *Storm Command. A Personal Account of the Gulf War*. London: Harper Collins, 1993; Freedman, *The Politics of British Defence, 1979–1998*, pp. 36–40; *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991*, pp. 7–28.

force to the Gulf, the deployment was characterised by improvisation and a gradual build-up over several months. The large-scale deployments brought all three Services to a virtual standstill elsewhere and stretched the British Armed Forces to the limit. In order to send a fully equipped and fully manned division to the Persian Gulf, the British Army of the Rhine had to undergo considerable ‘cannibalisation’ of equipment and personnel.⁶⁵ For defence planners, this was an indication of how under-resourced Britain’s Armed Forces had become.⁶⁶ It also demonstrated the general lack of projection capabilities, particularly with respect to rapid reaction. The coalition build-up took six months to deploy, prepare, test, adjust, maintain and make fully operational the forces and their weapon systems.⁶⁷

All three of Britain’s Armed Services contributed important elements to the coalition’s effort. From the outset of the crisis, the Royal Navy was part of the coalition patrol force enforcing the UN embargo against Iraq. After hostilities had broken out, several RN surface ships contributed to the coalition’s air defence and mine counter-measures.⁶⁸ The RAF was involved in the air campaign with several squadrons of combat and support aircraft.⁶⁹ The most significant British contribution was with regard to ground operations. Britain first committed the 7th Armoured Brigade, which was fully operational by mid-November and was assigned to the 1st (US) Marine Expeditionary Forces. When the probability of a major offensive increased, the British Government on 22 November made the decision to send an additional combat formation, the 4th Armoured Brigade, as well as a divisional headquarters and associated support troops to the theatre. These reinforcements made Britain the most important contributor

65 Farndale, Martin. *United Kingdom Land Forces Role and Structure into the 21st Century*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 7–12, p. 7.

66 Yardley, *Towards the Future*, p. 421.

67 Rochlin, Gene I. and Chris C. Demchak. *The Gulf War: Technological and Organisational Implications*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May/June 1991), pp. 260–273, p. 265.

68 Miller, David. *UK Forces in the Gulf War. Analysis of a Commitment*. In: *Military Technology*, Vol. 15, No. 7 (July 1991), pp. 39–50, pp. 39–40. For further details on the Royal Navy’s contribution to Operation Granby see Craig, C. J. S. *Gulf War: The Maritime Campaign*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 4 (August 1992), pp. 11–16.

69 Irving, Niall. *The Gulf Air Campaign – An Overview*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 10–14.

after the US, increasing her political as well as her military profile. As a consequence, the British insisted that their forces should be part of the main thrust of Operation Desert Storm. This led to the reassignment of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division to VII (US) Corps, which constituted the main offensive force in Schwarzkopf's 'left hook' envelopment aimed at penetrating deep into Iraq and neutralising Saddam's main operational forces.⁷⁰

After the cessation of hostilities, the military had gathered a large number of lessons to be learned from the short but intensive war. For the Royal Navy, the main lesson proved to be the need for versatility of modern maritime forces. Maritime forces had covered the entire spectrum of tasks from embargo surveillance to combat operations.⁷¹ With respect to the Royal Air Force the Gulf War's main implication was no doubt the overwhelming utility modern air power had demonstrated. For many analysts, the Gulf War proved that air power had at last reached its ideal application. The air campaign had been central to the command and control warfare paralysing the Iraqi leadership, and the preparation of the ground assault. The total air supremacy held by the coalition air forces, however, narrowed the applicability of these lessons since such favourable circumstances could not be guaranteed for every scenario. In addition, there were voices pointing to the considerable problems which occurred in the planning and execution of the air campaign.⁷² Nevertheless, in the eyes of the public at large, the coalition air campaign and its high profile use of new technologies became the synonym for modern warfare.⁷³

For the British Army, the ground war experience constituted the baptism of fire of the conceptual developments during the late 1980s which had led to the adoption of the manoeuvrist approach and the rediscovery of the operational level of war. The concept of all-arms battle groups operating under these terms had proved its value. Ground operations were swift and decisive, the main objectives accomplished when the political

70 For further details on the British Army's contribution to Operation Granby see: McInnes, *Hot War Cold War*, pp. 76–113; Smith, Rupert. *The Gulf War: The Land Battle*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 1–5.

71 Miller, *UK Forces in the Gulf War*, p. 49.

72 Murray, Williamson. *Air War in the Gulf: The Limits of Air Power*. In: Strategic Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 28–38.

73 Press, *The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare*, p. 43.

leaders called a halt after only 100 hours of fighting.⁷⁴ The Army viewed the war as a demonstration that high-intensity warfare remained a realistic scenario in the post-Cold War strategic era. This conclusion implied the continued need for heavy armoured troops.⁷⁵ Altogether, the British Forces came back from the Gulf with a strengthened self-confidence and with a multitude of lessons to be exploited for further conceptual improvements.⁷⁶

As a consequence, the Gulf War became a shaping event of British military thinking. In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the RMA debate found its way into Britain's defence community. Many observers agreed with the main arguments of American RMA proponents. In the overall atmosphere of praise some British analysts, however, pointed out certain problem areas. Firstly, the Gulf War was fought under unusually favourable conditions and therefore many of the conclusions drawn lacked general applicability. Saddam's military-strategic mistakes or the unique air supremacy could not be taken for granted for any future operation. Secondly, the picture of a clean, surgical and nearly cost-free warfare was an illusory exaggeration of facts. The image created by the media coverage of the war was one of precision-guided weapons which never faltered or missed. Contrary to such public perception, only 10 to 15% of all ammunition used during the air campaign had been precision-guided.⁷⁷ Thirdly, the problem of friendly fire was far from being solved. In fact, the Gulf campaign's high tempo and the effectivity of the weapons employed had caused a high proportion of 'blue-on-blue' casualties.⁷⁸ As some analysts rightly pointed out, no high-technology

74 McInnes, *Hot War Cold War*, p. 108.

75 Yardley, *Towards the Future*, p. 418.

76 Towle, Philip. *Maintaining Balanced Forces*. In: Clarke/Sabin, *British Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 90–101.

77 Peach, Stuart. *The Doctrine of Targeting for Effect*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 6 (December 2000), pp. 69–72, p. 71.

78 For a detailed analysis of 'friendly fire' casualties during the Gulf War see Norton, Chris. *Operation Allied Force*. In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 59–87, p. 73. For a critical review of air power and RMA issues in the Gulf War see: Arquilla, *The "Velvet" Revolution in Military Affairs*, Biddle, *Victory Misunderstood*; Murray, *Air War in the Gulf: The Limits of Air Power*; Press, *The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare*; Rochlin/Demchak, *The Gulf War: Technological and Organisational Implications*.

could entirely eliminate the unpredictability of conflict or lift Clausewitz's famous 'fog of war'.⁷⁹

For those who cared to analyse these less comfortable aspects of the conflict, serious concerns emerged for future military operations. Despite the use of high-technology forces, death of innocent civilians or damage to infrastructure could never be factored out. Flowing from this, the distorted public perception of surgical and clean warfighting held the potential for military disaster: once the shocking reality of warfare hit the high public and political expectations, support for a longer-term military operation could be withdrawn, thereby jeopardising its success.⁸⁰ Furthermore, only the US possessed the means to think seriously about revolutionary change. In order to align with the technological level of US conventional warfare, British Forces would need major investment; at the same time, however, there was no doubt that the shrinking of Britain's defence budget would continue. As coalition partner, the British military was capable of profiting from and contributing to US high-technology warfare. Coalition warfare and the need for a high degree of interoperability with US Armed Forces became ever more important aspects of British military strategic thinking.

In sum, the Gulf War was a catalyst for the RMA debate and had a significant impact on Western military thinking. It demonstrated the potential of modern technology and justified related investment. At the same time, it generated a new use of the military instrument in Western perception, a 'revolution in military expectations' so to speak.⁸¹ Western politicians and their publics henceforth assumed that military power would achieve the results observed in the Gulf War. Although Britain's Armed

79 The term 'fog of war' was coined by Carl von Clausewitz to depict the fact that decision-makers could never have a complete overview of the process of war, which was non-linear and chaotic in nature. A commander's perception of the battlespace thus remains clouded even when technological superiority gives him an advantage, due to the inevitable uncertainty, unpredictability, friction, doubt or error. See Owens, *Technology, the RMA and Future War*, p. 65.

80 During the NATO-led air campaign against Serbia in 1999 (Operation Allied Force) some 35–40% of the bombs and missiles used were precision-guided. Only during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002 did the proportion of precision-guided ammunition – estimated at 80–90% – reach substantial levels. See Gray, Peter W. *Air Power in the Modern World*. In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 1–15, p. 7.

81 Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, p. 29.

Forces were anxious to identify and draw the right lessons from the Gulf campaign and were less inclined than their US counterparts to overrate the RMA, they were not exempt from this ambiguous implication.⁸²

1.3 Social Environment: Mounting Pressure on the 'Postmodern Military'

Another fundamental factor impinging on the military stemmed from society. It was the result of a development that sociologists have come to describe as the shift from industrial to post-industrial or postmodern society.⁸³ Socio-cultural trends – such as individualism, pluralism or consumerism – and macro-economic shifts led to large-scale changes in the social order of Western nations. Sociologist Bradford Booth argues that these shifts included the “declining importance of the nation-state and national markets and the subsequent growth of global and subnational social organisations, dramatic change in cultural attitudes and opinions and a general uncertainty about the meaning and purpose of central roles and institutions”.⁸⁴ These trends are both cause and effect of an increasingly globalised society.⁸⁵ Such major reorientations in society at large could

82 For an overall assessment of the Gulf War's impact see Freedman, Lawrence. *The Changing Forms of Military Conflict*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 39–56. For a detailed analysis of the coalition strategy see Freedman/Karsh, *How Kuwait Was Won. Strategy in the Gulf War*.

83 The notion of the 'postindustrial society' has first been introduced by Daniel Bell. He has argued that while industrial societies are characterised by large-scale manufacturing and the production of goods, in postindustrial societies the service sector is the backbone of the economy and information becomes a valued resource and leads to the reorientation of formal organisations around information technology and management. See Bell, Daniel. *The Axial Age of Technology. Foreword in "The Coming of Postindustrial Society": Special Anniversary Edition*. New York: Basic Books, 1999 (first published in 1973).

84 Booth, Bradford, Meyer Kestnbaum and David R. Segal. *Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?* In: *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 319–342, p. 321.

85 The notion of 'globalisation' has been defined by Giddens as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events many miles away and vice versa”. See Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 64.

not go without affecting the civil-military relationship, which became apparent in the form of three related developments: the marginalisation of the military institution in Western society; the civilianisation of military structures and procedures; and the increasing influence of public opinion and the media on military strategy.

According to social theory, armed forces are distinctly ‘modern’ organisations based on rationalism and the concept of the nation-state. They are characterised by a hierarchical structure and an emphasis on collective values.⁸⁶ They embody the state’s sovereignty, its claim to the monopoly of force within its territory and consequently the state’s right to maintain armed forces for this purpose. As a consequence, the military community sets great store by national symbols, traditions, and the importance of unity, all of which distinguishes it from modern Western society.

As public identification with the nation-state started to decrease and the individual’s rights began to be rated higher than those of the collective, the value gap between society at large and the military organisation grew.⁸⁷ In conjunction with the end of the Cold War in Europe and the resulting lack of a direct military threat to Western countries, the military became less important in Western public perception – a phenomenon which military sociologists have labelled the “marginalisation of Western military culture in their host societies”.⁸⁸ Those European countries whose defence system was based on conscription encountered, for the first time since the *levée en masse* of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, doubts on the state-imposed military obligations from large parts of their population. The focus on individual freedom, governmental transparency, democracy and open media challenged some of the military organisations’ values and procedures. In order to reduce this process of estrangement, the military was forced to accept certain non-military norms in its relationship with wider society. The ‘postmodern military’ came to symbolise this new

86 Ibid, pp. 323 and 330.

87 Reid, John. *The Armed Forces and Society*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 30–34.

88 Booth/Kestnbaum/Segal, *Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern*, p. 337. See also Edmonds, *British Army 2000. External Influences on Force Design*, p. 11.

relationship between Western military organisations and their social environment.⁸⁹

This process of social change evolved gradually, and its beginning can be tracked back to the social and economic circumstances in the aftermath of the Second World War. Under the shadow of the Cold War's military threat, Western military institutions enjoyed large public support for their way of keeping a distance between themselves and civilian society as a necessity for national security. After this prospect of a war of national survival disappeared, such military exclusivity came under question. This trend was intensified by the demands of a globalised information society. The combined effect of these political, economic and social developments led to the fundamental reshaping of Western civil-military relations during the last decade of the 20th century.

Hand in hand with this marginalisation went the civilianisation of military norms. National Service was not a British tradition and had only been imposed in periods of immediate and large-scale threats to national security, such as the two World Wars. In the early 1960s, Britain's Armed Forces again resorted to an all-volunteer professional force. As a result, their social composition did not proportionately reflect society at large, as is the case with armies based on a conscription system. Although as a professional force the British military constituted a much more self-contained community than conscription armies, the pressure of postmodern social change did not spare them either. The military's organisational forms and procedures were to some degree civilianised, fuelled by the trend that the perception of the military profession shifted from the 'institutional' model towards the 'occupational' model. A growing number of commentators argued that military service could be regarded as any other job outside the Service.⁹⁰ Consequently, they demanded that the military's personnel policy readjusted their working conditions to civilian practices. In this context, a debate ensued over the right of the military community to be

89 Moskos defined five characteristics for postmodern military organisations: increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres; diminution of differences within the armed forces with respect to service, branch and rank; transformation of military missions from warfighting to humanitarian and constabulary tasks; application of military force in multilateral context; and internationalisation of military structures. See Moskos/Williams/Segal, *The Postmodern Military*, pp. 2–3.

90 Edmonds, *British Army 2000. External Influences on Force Design*, p. 49.

different from society. The British Armed Forces themselves, supported by a number of defence academics, argued that they needed to retain their distinct norms in order to accomplish their equally distinct mission of warfighting.⁹¹ External opponents, however, called for the military ethos and way of life to keep pace with the trends of civilian society.

Flowing from this, the general perception about how the Services were supposed to prepare for and conduct military operations changed. The expectations of Western postmodern society were ambiguous and generated hitherto unknown restraints for the use of military force. On the one hand, the atmosphere of relief after the end of the Cold War and the hope for a just world order made military solutions to international problems a course of action not favoured by governments accountable to an open and democratic public. After the threat of Soviet attack had dissolved, most Western armed forces were largely involved in conflicts that Freedman has called “wars of choice”, rather than “wars of national survival”.⁹² On the other hand, if Western nations had to resort to the use of overt military force, they felt deep reluctance towards the potential risk and costs involved. War was therefore expected to be conducted without friendly casualties, a minimum of economic and social damage and even without disproportionate enemy losses. The Gulf War 1991 became the benchmark against which the repercussions and results of any war would be measured.⁹³

This trend was also reflected in the changing relationship between the military and the media. The widespread perception of modern warfare to be clean, surgical and nearly bloodless was, apart from corresponding with postmodern society’s socio-cultural trends, mainly the result of how the

91 Dandeker, Christopher. *On “The Need to Be Different”: Military Uniqueness and Civil-Military Relations in Modern Society*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 4–9.

92 Freedman, Lawrence. *The Future of Military Strategy*. In: Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1996, pp. 7–23, pp. 7–9.

93 Collateral damage: “Damage to personnel and property adjacent to, but not forming part of, an authorised target.” In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. C-9. See also: Orme, *The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity*, p. 141; White, Craig. *Is There a Role for Air Power in the Post-Cold War World?* In: *RAF Air Power Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 29–43, p. 33.

Gulf War had been portrayed by the electronic media.⁹⁴ The news channels reporting on the conflict, above all CNN, provided Western TV spectators with war images never seen before: low-flying cruise missiles in the streets of Baghdad on the way to their target, or televised laser-guided bombs hitting specific parts of individual buildings. No doubt, the accuracy and effectivity of modern air power could reduce casualties and damage, and the swiftness of manoeuvre-oriented land forces could shorten lengthy campaigns. But the detailed examination of the Gulf operations revealed a more sober, and thus less favourable picture of modern warfare. The conduct of military operations was far from fulfilling the high expectations of a risk-averse public. Yet the perception of many politicians and their electorates was not shaped by the warnings of defence analysts but by the sketchy impression on TV screens.

This unrealistic perception of war and the media as the carrier of this image created a vicious circle. The “chimera of a clean, cost-free war” – also referred to as the ‘CNN effect’ – carried the potential for political and military disaster, since it raised distorted public expectations.⁹⁵ The shock of the American public over the deaths of several US soldiers on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of US Forces was an early demonstration of the “low tolerance of democratic publics for casualties on distant battlefields”⁹⁶ and the vulnerability of military interventions dependent on the sensitive climate of domestic public opinion. Furthermore, the seemingly systematic media coverage gave the false impression that military events were transparent. The political and public demand for permanent accountability and justification of every single step of military action not only jeopardised operational security but could also turn tactical failures into strategic disaster. For Britain’s military planners and commanders, these were worrying trends. They had the potential to alter the traditional relationship between civilian

94 For a detailed analysis of the changing relationship between the military and the media see Badsey, Stephen. *Modern Military Operations and the Media (The Occasional 8)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1994.

95 Rochlin/Demchak, *The Gulf War: Technological and Organisational Implications*, p. 269. See also: Gray, *Air Power in the Modern World*, p. 7; Tulak, Arthur N. and James E. Hutton. *Information System Components of Information Operations*. In: *Military Review*, Vol. 78, No. 5, (September–November 1998), pp. 18–25, pp. 22–23.

96 Orme, *The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity*, p. 141.

society and their Armed Forces, which so far had been characterised by mutual trust and a robust tolerance on the side of the British public for the necessities and consequences of military action.⁹⁷

* * *

The synergy of strategic, technological and social pressures on the British Armed Forces was about to transform the military institution and the way it thought about warfare fundamentally. Overall political guidance was weak and Britain's immediate post-Cold War defence policy remained reactive. As a consequence, the government's strategic guidance for Britain's military remained sketchy.⁹⁸ At the same time, technological progress and social change complicated the process of military transformation.

Britain's geostrategic status of power and her overarching security interests did not change completely with the end of the Cold War. There was, in fact, a high degree of continuity. The country continued to pursue a leading role on the international stage through her permanent membership in the UN Security Council, her 'special relationship' with the US, her NATO membership, her close bonds with Commonwealth states and former colonies and her status as a nuclear power. The evolving post-Cold War security environment, however, called for a change in strategy. While the overall security interests remained constant, their priorities, ways and means had to be adapted. The international events and developments in the first half of the 1990s were complex, multidimensional, dynamic and, in many cases, unpredictable.

Britain's security and defence policy, consequently, underwent a process of searching and was shaped by a process of downsizing which did not provide a corresponding concept for the new security environment. Defence roles, resource priorities, force balances and operational tasks were constantly reformulated. The *Options for Change* process and its aftermath were more influenced by politics than by policy. Nevertheless, some strategic conclusions emerged, gradually forming the framework for the British Armed Forces' post-Cold War role-understanding.

Britain would continue to justify her seat as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council by major contributions to UN peacekeeping

97 Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, pp. 15–17.

98 Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium*, pp. 192–193.

operations. NATO's collective defence remained central to Britain's security. The British Army and the RAF were expected to keep up their obligations to the defence of the European mainland, although the forces based in Germany were reduced. Britain also backed the Western Alliance's reorientation towards stability projection and crisis management by providing key elements for the ARRC. Equally, the operations conducted in the Gulf called for retaining heavy forces capable of managing the higher end of the conflict spectrum. The status of nuclear power meant that the Royal Navy had to continue to maintain the country's independent strategic deterrence. The Royal Air Force had proved the utility of modern air power during the air campaign in the Gulf and was expected to play a crucial role in any future operation.

The widespread global interests and connections of Britain, however, went beyond Europe and called for a military capability which offered the option to act on her own and out-of-area. In sum, all Services had to familiarise themselves with the prospect of more complex operations abroad, whether as part of a coalition or in an independent national framework.⁹⁹ The overall trend in British defence, therefore, pointed towards an increasingly expeditionary military strategy, which implied a projectable and balanced force structure covering the whole range of modern military capabilities. In addition, the psychological impact of the Gulf War raised public expectations that military force could be applied with minimum cost.

The initial lack of strategic guidance made the reorientation of the British Armed Forces' roles ever more difficult.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, a series of unforeseen military commitments called for more operational guidelines for the new tasks at hand. This conceptual gap was exacerbated by pressures at home, mainly exercised through budget politics and the need to justify the military's warfighting capability in a post-Cold War environment, where numerous voices in society at large expected the emergence of a peaceful world and the respective down-scaling of Britain's military profile. The reductions and disinvestments of *Options for*

99 The determination to uphold the capability for independent national operations was a result of Britain's continued relationship with former colonies and had also been shaped by the perception of the Falklands War 1982. See Pollard, A. J. G. *The Army: Is Less Enough?* In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), pp. 19–23, p. 23.

100 Pollard, *The Army: Is Less Enough*, p. 19.

Change, the personnel overstretch, the calls for civilianising the military and the absence of a clear strategic perspective gradually threatened the organisational health of Britain's military.¹⁰¹ The development of sound doctrine, which addressed the unfolding dilemmas of post-Cold War military power, was about to become a central part of the Armed Forces' response to these rising pressures of change.

101 For instance Baynes, John. *No Reward but Honour? The British Soldier in the 1990s*. London: Brassey's, 1991.

2 The Capability-Based Army: Land Power Leads the Way into Doctrine Development

The British Army was the first of the three Services to enter what could be called the ‘doctrine business’. As a matter of fact, its efforts to activate a conceptual debate predate the end of the Cold War. In close alignment with the US Armed Forces’ reorientation after the Vietnam War and their development of an *AirLand Battle* concept for the European battlefield, the British Army produced its own formal military-strategic doctrine for land warfare as early as 1989.¹⁰² Although it was originally tailored for the specific circumstances of NATO’s Central Front, the validity of the Army’s approach to high-intensity operations was in due course confirmed by the successful performance of its 1st Armoured Division during the Gulf War 1991. As a result, British land power doctrine displays a high degree of continuity from the late 1980s to the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, the period following the Gulf War saw new efforts to adapt Army doctrine to new security priorities and incorporate the rising demand of Operations Other Than War into its conceptual bedrock. At the same time, the absence of a direct military threat of strategic dimension led to a reorientation of military thinking from threat-driven to capability-based planning.

This chapter first describes the British Army’s distinct organisational culture, which set the stage for the doctrine development prior to and after the end of the Cold War. As a second step, it outlines the doctrinal process which started with the so-called Bagnall Reforms and continued with the post-Gulf War doctrinal debate. Thereafter, the chapter analyses the Army’s formal doctrinal document *British Military Doctrine*, which was published in 1989 and updated in 1996; in this context, the focus rests upon the second edition which reflects the Army’s post-Cold War

102 *Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (Army Code 71451)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. London: HMSO, 1989; *Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (Army Code 71451)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 2nd Edition, 1996. URL http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/bmd.pdf.

understanding of doctrine. It further displays the Army's concept of the manoeuvrist approach that in due course became an integral part of joint doctrine.¹⁰³

2.1 Organisational Culture: The Two Armies

The evolution of British Army doctrine is linked with its history and its structure during the last two hundred years which brought about the co-existence of two separate military subcultures. The post-1945 Army was divided into the 'empire troops', conducting imperial and post-imperial security operations, and the British Army of the Rhine, in charge of Cold War continental warfighting.¹⁰⁴

During the 19th century, the Army and its regimental system evolved as a response to the problems of imperial defence, the Army's prime role being one of an imperial gendarmerie. Its main duty was to garrison the colonies often great distances away from the British homeland and the European continent.¹⁰⁵ The very strengths of its regimental system – the camaraderie of the close-knit regimental family and the esprit de corps of relatively small expeditionary units of volunteer regulars trusting each other – were characteristics ideally suited to defending and policing the colonies.¹⁰⁶ Usually, the opponents facing these forces were local rebels or separatist settlers. In contrast to large-scale warfighting, as it frequently occurred on European battlefields, these imperial wars were limited in terms of scope and intensity and came to be called 'small wars' by Charles

103 The title *Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine* reflects that in British terminology 'military' is sometimes used to specifically refer to 'land warfare', as opposed to 'maritime' or 'air warfare'.

104 Sheffield, Gary D. *Themes in Army Doctrine*. Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Dr. Gary Sheffield, Defence Studies Department, KCL.

105 Reid, *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98*, p. 12.

106 Chandler/Beckett, *The Oxford History of the British Army*, p. xvi. See also Kiszely, John P. *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945 (The Occasional 26)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997, p. 10.

Callwell, a British Army officer, at the end of the 19th century.¹⁰⁷ This kind of imperial security operations dominated the Army's role up to and in between the two World Wars. The Army's pre-1945 organisational culture therefore perceived the major continental battles from 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945, which were associated with mass involvements of men and material and maintained by a recruiting system of national conscription, as historical anomalies.

After the Second World War with decolonisation setting in, Britain moved into her post-imperial phase. During the protracted retreat from the Empire, the Army seemed to resort to its traditional role. The huge infrastructure for continental warfighting was scaled down after Germany's defeat, and large parts of the Army were again used for policing the territories remaining under British control. In the context of various insurgencies, triggered by local and regional power struggles in the wake of Britain's gradual retreat, the Army was facing a new quality of opposition in places such as Burma, Malaya, Kenya, Aden or Oman.¹⁰⁸ Still, its traditional expertise in imperial policing served as a suitable starting point in these post-1945 emergencies. Some of the principles of imperial policing – such as the use of minimum necessary force and the subordination of the military campaign to the political objectives of the government – remained applicable, even though these new operations were conducted under more complex circumstances. Furthermore, the body of 'small wars' literature was vast and influential within the Army's

107 Charles Callwell (1859–1928): British Army officer who produced an early manual for imperial security operations in 1896. See Callwell, Charles Edward. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. Introduction by Douglas Porch. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 3rd Edition, 1996 (first published in 1896). For a historical analysis of imperial policing see Beckett, Ian. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies. Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750*. London: Routledge, 2001.

108 During the withdrawal from the Empire, the British Army was constantly engaged in counter-insurgency or anti-guerrilla operations: Malaya 1948–1960; Kenya 1952–1956; Muscat and Oman 1957–1959; Aden 1962; Brunei and Borneo 1962–1966; Dhofar/Oman 1970–1976. From 1969 onwards the Army was also continuously deployed to Northern Ireland to provide Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). See: Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. *The Post-War Army 1945–1963*. In: Chandler/Beckett, *The Oxford History of the British Army*, pp. 317–342; Mockaitis, Thomas R. *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.

establishment, albeit in those days not understood as formal doctrine. Callwell's groundbreaking work had been succeeded by many authors writing semi-official first-hand accounts or official manuals for imperial policing in the 1920s and 1930s, and the period after 1945 brought about authors addressing the more complex post-imperial security operations in the context of decolonisation.¹⁰⁹

Flowing from this, the Army's deployment to Northern Ireland from 1969 onwards came to be conceptually linked to the tradition of imperial policing and post-imperial counter-insurgency operations. The role in Northern Ireland was carried out under the label Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), which meant small units spread across the entire province in support of police and other civil authorities rather than large-scale military operations under purely military command and control.¹¹⁰

High-intensity and large-scale warfighting was only attributed to the Army in the course of the wars of national survival during the 20th century: the two World Wars and the subsequent conflict with the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the mission of defending Great Britain against invasion had been assigned to the Royal Navy. Only in times of a direct threat to the country did the British resort to national conscription and to the use of the Army for home defence. Under these exceptional circumstances, home defence meant that Britain committed large forces to warfighting

109 Other influential works on British imperial policing and counter-insurgency were: Gwynn, Charles. *Imperial Policing*. London: Macmillan, 1934; *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (Army Field Manual)*. London: HMSO, 1949; Walker, Walter. *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: 1952; Thompson, Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: Chatto & Windus, 1966. See also Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, p. 5.

110 British Army doctrinalists insist, however, that there were also distinct disparities to be taken into consideration between Northern Ireland and imperial/post-imperial counter-insurgency operations. See: Bulloch, G. *The Application of Military Doctrine to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations – A British Perspective*. In: *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 165–177, p. 165; *The Application of Force – An Introduction to British Army Doctrine and to the Conduct of Operations (Army Code 71622)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 1998, p. 4.2.

on the continent in order to readjust the European balance of power. Not just for the military establishment but in the country's overall strategic culture were these phases of huge military mobilisation, with large forces committed to Europe, perceived as aberrations from Britain's traditional strategic behaviour.¹¹¹

In 1932, under the impression of the horrible attrition suffered by land forces during the First World War, Basil Liddell Hart had argued for the return to what he called the "British way in warfare".¹¹² For him and many subsequent authors this traditional approach to security meant that the Royal Navy was the primary instrument to defend the homeland, while the Army was responsible for controlling the colonies. It was considered to be the particularly British strategy: emphasising the combination of maritime power and limited expeditionary land operations that allowed for maintaining the empire and thus the global balance of power while avoiding the commitment of land forces to the entangling conflicts on the European mainland.¹¹³ Despite the strong supporting echo Liddell Hart's thesis received in the interwar years, the Second World War again forced Britain to intervene on the continent and send an enlarged, conscription-based Army into high-intensity infantry and tank battles both on the European and other fronts. This experience paved the way for the permanent inclusion of a second military subculture into the British Army. Next to imperial policing, continental warfighting assumed equal importance in the Service's *raison d'être*. The balance of the Army's organisational culture was about to change.

At first sight one could argue that the post-1945 British Army was still dominated by its traditional roles and structures, bearing in mind the many

111 Strachan, Hew. *The British Way in Warfare*. In: Chandler, David and Ian Beckett (eds). *The Oxford History of the British Army*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 399–415, pp. 408–409.

112 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970): British military historian and strategic theorist; served in the First World War, Captain in the British Army; one of his most influential work was: Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. *The British Way in Warfare*. London: Faber & Faber, 1932. See also: Biddle, Stephen. *Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*. In: Baylis, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, pp. 91–112, pp. 97–98; Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought*, pp. 150–167.

113 For the 'British way in warfare' see: French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000*, pp. xii–xiii; Freedman, *The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98*, pp. 27–29; Macmillan, Alan. *Strategic Culture and National Ways in Warfare: The British Case*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 140, No. 5 (October 1995), pp. 33–38.

post-imperial security operations and the abolition of national drafting in 1963. The small, all-volunteer professional force re-emerging was easily associated with the pre-war imperial gendarmerie. The emergence of the Cold War and the prospect of a clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, however, ensured that warfighting gradually became the prevailing subculture within the Army. Henceforth, the Army's primary role was to contribute to NATO's collective defence. This included the provision of large forces stationed on European mainland. Such a permanent continental commitment marked a clear, and thus far the strongest, break with Liddell Hart's understanding of the traditional British way in warfare. The Army's new role and dominant subculture was embodied in the large British Army of the Rhine, responsible for the defence of Northern Germany. BAOR commanders were preparing corps-sized troops for high-intensity armoured warfare in order to counter a potential Soviet onslaught on Western Europe.¹¹⁴ Those officers rooted their tradition and expertise on the armoured units who fought in the Second World War, particularly the experience of the 8th Army under the generalship of Bernard Law Montgomery.¹¹⁵ Montgomery, later rising to the rank of Field Marshal, also became the first Commander-in-Chief BAOR and Deputy SACEUR in the 1950s and was very influential in the thinking and education of a whole generation of British officers.

As a result, the British Army in the second half of the 20th century virtually consisted of two very distinct conceptual camps with their particular organisational subcultures: one skilled in expeditionary 'small wars', considering itself in line with the traditional British way in warfare; and another skilled in armoured warfare and focusing on major war in a European context. Although a certain degree of permeability existed and some personnel gained experience in both armies, this dichotomy nevertheless bred two conceptually differing groups of soldiers.¹¹⁶ Particularly within the 'small wars' army – characterised by small expeditionary

114 For a historical analysis of BAOR see McInnes, *Hot War Cold War*, pp. 53–75.

115 Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein, 1st Viscount of Hindhead (1887–1976): British Army officer, served in the First and the Second World War; Commander 8th Army in North Africa and Normandy in 1942/43. For Montgomery's conceptual influence see Kiszely, *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945*, pp. 7–9.

116 Sheffield, *Themes in Army Doctrine*. BMDG 1/2002.

forces engaged across the entire globe far away from any central headquarters – personal leadership and experience were valued more than formal manuals. In fact, these parts of the Army shared a profound aversion towards doctrinal statements or detailed planning according to set principles. Instead they upheld virtues such as improvisation, intuition, common sense and flexibility, which in their eyes were negated by the formalised prescription of doctrine. It was an attitude characterised by the belief that success depended much more on experience and grasp of the circumstances than on meticulous planning and preparation. The regimental system of the Army only bolstered such a mindset, as each regiment had a distinct approach to handling military matters, and the regiment's experience was kept within its closed community. In such a climate, doctrine had no place.

It was in the other army, where officers were training for large-scale operations in a European theatre of war and the framework of a permanent alliance, that over the decades an interest to develop more comprehensive military concepts emerged. Manoeuvring and coordinating armoured divisions against a massive Soviet attack required detailed and long-term planning, established procedures of combined-arms cooperation and above all a common understanding of warfare. Such a mindset could not be achieved by the traditional sense for improvisation and a belief that everything would be “all right at the night”.¹¹⁷ Neither could it be achieved by the deliberate negligence of intellectual debate hitherto cultivated in Britain's military establishment. It was thus the British Army of the Rhine that provided the stage for the Bagnall Reforms and the Army's resulting interest in doctrine. One could argue that these reforms are the British equivalent to the US Army's doctrinal renaissance after the Vietnam War which ultimately led to the development of the *AirLand Battle* doctrine.¹¹⁸

117 Reid, Brian Holden. *Bagnall and the Ginger Group in Retrospect*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Professor Brian Holden Reid, War Studies Department, KCL.

118 For the US Army's doctrinal evolution after Vietnam see: Romjue, John L. *The Evolution of American Army Doctrine*. In: Gooch/Grant, *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, pp. 52–80; Spiller, Roger J. *In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army after Vietnam*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 6 (December 1997), pp. 41–54.

The existence of two distinct subcultures was further expressed by their budget rivalry. As Britain declined to the status of a medium-sized power following the end of the Second World War and her defence resources became scarcer than ever, a conceptual debate evolved over which Services of the Armed Forces in general, and the different parts of the Army in particular, should get the bulk of investments. Post-imperial emergency operations far away from home tended to call for light expeditionary forces with the appropriate means of air and sea deployability. In contrast, success in an all-out war in Europe depended on the availability of heavy armoured units with tanks, massive artillery firepower and close air support, forward-based on the continent with all the necessary logistical support. Although under-resourcing was a problem shared by the entire British military during the decades of the Cold War, BAOR clearly won the resource competition within the Army.

After 1989, when the Soviet threat disappeared and the peace dividend dominated British defence policy, the defence budget debate received fresh impetus. Since the *Options for Change* plan was to downsize the Army in particular, the question of the right force balance became centre-stage. The Army's relevant commanders and spokesmen reached the conclusion that while heavy armoured units had to be retained for the purpose of remaining committed to NATO defence, there was, at the same time, the need to bolster up the ability for lighter and faster expeditionary deployments. In their understanding, the lessons from the Gulf War as well as the need for deploying armoured units alongside lighter forces to Bosnia left no doubt that the maintenance of a well-balanced force, including heavy armoured fighting units, was crucial. The change of role from BAOR to the ARRC underpinned the Service's interests in maintaining a balanced force structure and its effort to keep up the ability to fight at corps level and taking into account the new requirement for increased deployability.¹¹⁹ Under the pressure of the Government's plan to downsize and re-role the Army the two previously competing military subcultures of 'small wars' and high-intensity warfighting started to amalgamate.

It was thus the British Army's NATO part preparing for high-intensity conflict that first embarked on doctrine development. Officers serving in BAOR and concerned with the prospects of all-arms battles in Europe started a process of conceptual renewal resulting in the formulation of a

119 Mackenzie, *The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps*, pp. 16–20.

military-strategic doctrine for land power. In the wake of this new interest in doctrine, the Army also started to address and process the vast amount of experience of its older subculture, the one dealing with low-intensity and counter-insurgency conflicts – this latter doctrinal strand, however, is being addressed in the chapter on the evolution of post-Cold War peacekeeping doctrine. The following paragraphs focus on the doctrinal strand evolving from high-intensity land warfare as prepared for and envisaged by the British Army in Germany.

2.2 Doctrinal Debate: From the Bagnall Reforms to Operation Granby

The initial phase of the Army's doctrinal renaissance is closely linked to Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall.¹²⁰ His name does not only stand for his personal involvement in the process but has come to symbolise the efforts of a whole generation of British officers in pursuing new conceptual thinking during the second half of the 1980s. As Commander I (UK) Corps 1981–1983, Commander-in-Chief BAOR and NORTHAG 1983–1985, and then as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) 1985–1988, Bagnall's aim was to improve the quality of Britain's conventional contribution to NATO's forward defence.

“Nuclear deterrence”, Bagnall argued, “requires a visible capacity to wage war if it fails. Although it is not always fully appreciated, of equal importance to and complementing nuclear deterrence is the conventional

120 Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall (1927–2002): British Army officer during the Cold War, became Chief of the General Staff; considered to be the father of modern British military doctrine. Field Marshal Bagnall was scheduled to give a presentation to the BMDG in May 2002 on his personal involvement in British Army doctrine development, but unfortunately passed away shortly before. For an analysis of Bagnall's personal influence on British doctrinal development see: Dorman, Andrew. *Playing the Whitehall Game: The Bagnall Reforms in Retrospect*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Dr. Andrew Dorman, Defence Studies Department, KCL; Kiszely, *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945*, pp. 26–28; Reid, *Bagnall and the Ginger Group in Retrospect*, BMDG 2/2002.

capability to make it credible.”¹²¹ So far British war plans had been based upon one document, the General Defence Plan for the Central Region, which mainly allowed for each division to conduct its own battle.¹²² Bagnall had the intention to expand the coordination of military action beyond divisional level and plan a coordinated corps battle. Associated with the revival of the operational aspect of warfare, Bagnall further envisaged a less rigid, more mobile approach to defence, which was to provide a greater proportion of ground forces for operational manoeuvre in order to be able to counter Soviet penetrations and to exploit tactical opportunities.

For the purpose of further exploring these ideas of manoeuvre warfare, Bagnall involved the brainpower of his key subordinates within BAOR. He established an informal group, the so-called ‘Ginger Group’¹²³, whose members shared the dedication to take forward Bagnall’s military reform plans. The circle of members was unofficial and constantly changing. Among the individuals involved were various British officers who later rose to higher ranks and played important roles either in the conduct of land operations in the Gulf War – such as Major General Rupert Smith as Commander 1st (UK) Armoured Division or Brigadier Patrick Cordingley as Commander of 7th Armoured Brigade – or in the promotion of further doctrinal development, as for example General Sir Jeremie Mackenzie, who in October 1992 became the first Commander ARRC and published various papers on doctrine.¹²⁴

Although this process of debating doctrinal issues started from an informal group and initially focused on land warfare and the specific circumstances of the British responsibilities within NATO’s ‘layer cake’ defence, these men thought about Bagnall’s ideas beyond his tenure as Commander-in-Chief BAOR and took the debate beyond his intention to

121 Foreword by Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, in: Mackenzie, Jeremie J. G. and Brian Holden Reid (eds). *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*. London: Tri-Service Press, 1989, p. vii.

122 Willcocks, M. A. *Future Conflict and Military Doctrine*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 6–10, p. 6.

123 Presumably named after the colour of Field Marshal Bagnall’s hair.

124 For instance Mackenzie/Reid, *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*.

reform the warfighting at the Central Front.¹²⁵ It was thus an ideal situation for institutional change, in which top-down leadership, embodied in Bagnall's determination to do something about the conceptual deficit encountered in BAOR, and the bottom-up efforts of innovative mid-career thinkers concurred, thereby setting the ground for a new culture of doctrine development.

After assuming the position as Chief of the General Staff, Bagnall was responsible for another important step of institutional change: in 1988 he presided over the formation of a Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), whose purpose was to educate the senior commanders at the operational level of command. Bagnall and his officers opposed the Army's over-pragmatism and mindset of improvisation, an attitude particularly strong in the 'small wars' culture of the Army's more traditional circles. Bagnall's argument was that the operational level of command – the coordination of a military campaign at the corps level and above – was a highly complex matter:

To organise, train and lead land and air formations of a multinational Alliance, capable of fielding several million men in an emergency, requires commanders and staff officers who can think and act at the operational level of war. Hence the need for the Higher Command and Staff Course which trains selected army and air force officers, including those of our allies, to fill these demanding appointments.¹²⁶

The object of the course was therefore to prepare selected senior officers for operational command and staff appointments in national and international headquarters. Its further purpose was to expand their intellectual horizons and make them recognise the complexity of warfare and high-level command. As a consequence, the HCSC's curriculum included room for intellectual debate on warfare in general and operational concepts in particular.

One specific way of intellectual exploration was through the study of military history for the purpose of analysing historical lessons of warfare. It was recognised that history could be a double-edged instrument for

125 Dorman, *Playing the Whitehall Game: The Bagnall Reforms in Retrospect*, BMDG 2/2002.

126 Foreword by Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, in: Mackenzie/Reid, *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*, pp. vii–viii.

doctrine development as the line between its use and misuse was thin. Nevertheless, the idea that a systematic and objective analysis of past experience could be used as a fertile ground for improving current thinking prevailed.¹²⁷ On the basis of such improved higher military education, an increasing number of officers started to challenge long-cherished but never objectively reviewed principles, above all the seeming importance of “holding vital ground”.¹²⁸ Instead, they argued for mobility and operational flexibility. They acknowledged the centrality of a manoeuvre-oriented approach to military operations, focusing on agility, tempo and shock directed against the opponent’s weak points rather than on the set-piece, attritional and territory-oriented battle.¹²⁹

Bagnall’s personality was undoubtedly a pivotal driving force behind the innovative efforts of his younger officers. Appraising Bagnall’s personal influence, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge remarked in 1994:

[In] the past the British Army really did not have a proper doctrine until perhaps Field Marshal Bagnall – then General Bagnall – became Commander-in-Chief BAOR. ... Bagnall recognised that a single plan [the General Defence Plan] should not drive doctrine and that there was a need to conceive a military doctrine which taught people not what to think but how to think about going to war and warfighting.¹³⁰

Bagnall’s actions and decisions, taken in powerful capacities within Britain’s military establishment, clearly affected the organisational cul-

127 Bagnall himself propagated the study of military history and published his own historical examination: Bagnall, Nigel. *The Punic Wars*. London: Hutchinson, 1990. See also Reid, Brian Holden (ed.). *Military Power. Land Warfare in Theory and Practice*. London: Frank Cass, 1997, p. 2.

128 Reid, *Bagnall and the Ginger Group in Retrospect*, BMDG 2/2002.

129 Later definitions of the concepts: Attritional warfare: “A style of warfare characterised by the application of substantial combat power that reduces an enemy’s ability to fight through loss of personnel and equipment. Essentially, it aims at the physical destruction of the enemy.” Manoeuvre warfare: “Warfighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion – his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole – rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.” In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, pp. A-28 and M-3.

130 Inge, *The Capability-Based Army*, p. 2.

ture of the Army. Nevertheless, the changing of culture was not only the result of his personal efforts but was equally brought about by the specific circumstances of the time. The historian Williamson Murray argues that military innovation can only be successful when accompanied by the appropriate institutional change and set in a culture that promotes innovative thinking; top-down leadership can lead to revolutionary, short-term change but does itself not guarantee sustained, evolutionary innovation.¹³¹ Applied to the period of the late 1980s, Murray's argument suggests that Bagnall's leadership and reform plans were complemented by the organisational culture at the time. Developments outside the British Army also contributed to the shift from the decade-long anti-doctrine deadweight to a sustained doctrinal renaissance.

A vital external influence stemmed from the US Armed Forces, which underwent a similar phase of innovation some years before the British. The 1980s were the time of radical reform within the American defence establishment, triggered on the one hand by the traumatic experience in Vietnam and on the other by events that suggested a wave of improvements in conventional warfare, such as the 'Operational Group' concept emerging in the Soviet Union and the lessons identified in the Arab-Israeli War in 1973.¹³²

Since the late 1970s, a number of US strategists were arguing that the US military fundamentally change their attitude towards warfare. Authors like William Lind and Edward Luttwak criticised the US approach to war and claimed that it was attritional and based on a self-image of material superiority but at the same time lacked flexibility. They argued that a 'maneuver warfare' approach, which would focus on the organisational disruption rather than the physical destruction of the enemy, was a more promising recipe for military success.¹³³ This intensifying conceptual debate, which fell on fertile ground as the US military was keen to get over its Vietnam trauma, led to a revival of doctrine. Two of the major stepping stones of this process were the establishment of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1976 and the formula-

131 Murray/Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, pp. 306–310.

132 Mackenzie/Reid, *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*, p. 5.

133 Note the differing spelling in US (maneuver) and British (manoeuvre) doctrine. For the origin of the US debate see also Kiszely, John P. *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 36–40, p. 37.

tion of the *AirLand Battle* in 1983, which came to be the manifestation of the new approach to warfare.¹³⁴

These US developments had a vital impact on British doctrinal evolution.¹³⁵ Due to the close interaction between the US and the British defence establishments, the new ideas soon made their way across the Atlantic. In 1985, Richard Simpkins, a retired British Army officer, published his book *Race to the Swift*, in which he presented manoeuvre theory as the antithesis to attrition theory.¹³⁶ Similar to Lind's observation with respect to the American military, Simpkin claimed that the attritional approach to war was an inherent characteristic of the British military, exemplified by the tradition of set-piece battles fought by Montgomery's 8th Army during the Second World War.¹³⁷ Simpkin's book, which became widely read at the Army Command and Staff College (ACSC) in Camberley, marked the starting shot of the British debate over manoeuvre warfare.¹³⁸ A number of British analysts followed to explore the aspects of this new approach. Gradually the view emerged that the most promising way to military victory was to shatter the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight rather than destroy his men and material. Strength should be applied to areas of particular enemy weaknesses, his strategic or operational 'Achilles heel' so to speak. Momentum, tempo, shock and surprise were the key features of this approach.

Such ideas were not entirely new. They were in fact a rediscovery of earlier claims by Anglo-American strategic thinkers. Manoeuvre-oriented warfare associated very much with Fuller's 'brain warfare' and Liddell

134 Lock-Pullan, Richard. *Manoeuvre Warfare: Where Did It Come from and Why?* Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Dr. Richard Lock-Pullan, Defence Studies Department, KCL.

135 "Army Doctrine in the 1990s" – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 3/2002.

136 Brigadier Richard Simpkin (1921–1986): British Army officer. See Simpkin, Richard E. *Race to the Swift*. London: Brassey's, 1985. See also Kiszely, *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945*, p. 19.

137 Kiszely, *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*, p. 37.

138 "Army Doctrine in the 1990s" – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 3/2002.

Hart's 'indirect approach'.¹³⁹ Their ideas therefore attracted a wave of renewed interest in the late 1980s.¹⁴⁰ With the Ginger Group's and the HCSC's emphasis on the study of military history, the ties to these early concepts of mobile and indirect thinking were re-established. In addition, a number of other classical works on war and military strategies were rediscovered, among them Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Carl von Clausewitz' *On War*. Although it was apparent that warfare in the end was a mixture between manoeuvre and attrition, the manoeuvre-oriented thinking implied that the main effort should lie on outmanoeuvring and disrupting the organisational and moral cohesion of an enemy, as opposed to merely holding ground and destroying physical means. In essence, manoeuvre warfare concentrated on systemic instead of cumulative destruction. The exchange of ideas between US and British defence circles in general and the import of manoeuvre-oriented thinking to the British Army in particular were thus instrumental to British doctrine development at the end of the 1980s.¹⁴¹

Another external factor stimulating doctrine development from 1990 onwards was the British Government's defence policy under the *Options for Change* scheme. As outlined previously, the establishment of the ARRC was a crucial element in the Army's case to justify its continued importance in a post-Cold War world and the need to retain well-balanced

139 Fuller's description of 'brain warfare': „There are two ways of destroying an organisation: (i) by wearing it down (dissipating it); (ii) by rendering it inoperative (unhinging it). In war, the first comprises the killing, wounding, capturing and disarming of the enemy's soldiers (body warfare). The second, the rendering inoperative of his powers of command (brain warfare). Taking a single man as an example, the first method might be compared to a succession of slight wounds which eventually cause him to bleed to death; the second – a shot through the head.” In: Fuller, J. F. C. *On Future Warfare*. London: Sifton Praed, 1928, p. 93. See also Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought*, pp. 33–48. The bottom line of Liddell Hart's 'indirect approach': “The true aim in war is the mind of the hostile ruler not the body of his troops.” In: Liddell Hart, Basil. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967, p. 219. See also Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought*, pp. 150–167.

140 Kiszely, *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945*, pp. 5–7.

141 In 1994 the Army Command and Staff College concluded that the term 'manoeuvre warfare' might be misleading as it could too easily be referred to mere physical movement. In an effort to stress the focus on the mental activity required to outmanoeuvre the opponent, the Army therefore introduced the term 'manoeuvrist approach'. See Kiszely, *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*, p. 37.

land forces capable of operations at the corps level. In this context, doctrine became a key instrument for preserving the Army's long-term interests. A sound military-strategic doctrine, based on manoeuvre warfare and the operational level of command, underpinned the effort to maintain the entire spectrum of land warfare capabilities and keep a significant number of troops based on the European continent. It should be mentioned at this point that the first edition of *British Military Doctrine* was produced by early 1989, prior to any intention to reduce the Army establishment; it was tailored to the context of NATO defence. The Army's continuing, even intensifying interest in doctrine development, however, received further impetus from the defence policy debate following *Options for Change*.

The most defining event for the post-Cold War British Army was Operation Granby, Britain's contribution to the Gulf War in 1990/91. It not only upheld the momentum of doctrinal evolution by reconfirming the importance of operational command, but in fact provoked a fresh and, for the officer generation at the time, unprecedented wave of operational experience that nourished the conceptual debate. While air power advocates saw the Gulf War primarily as an air power show, many analysts pointed to the equally impressive success of the ground offensive. The British Army's 1st Armoured Division proved its skill and determination as part of Schwarzkopf's main attack force.¹⁴² American and British operational concepts of manoeuvre warfare passed their baptism of fire. The British Forces' performance during the Gulf campaign was highly regarded by the general public and defence circles alike.

The event became a new benchmark for military effectiveness and force development. In due course the "yardstick of Operation Granby"¹⁴³ measured whether a unit had reached the appropriate level of warfighting effectiveness – the ultimate question for a formation's readiness for high-intensity operations being whether it would have been deployed to the Gulf. Furthermore, the war's impact could be felt on the defence policy level: It dampened the enthusiasm for a peaceful world order that had spread following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Though this did not reverse

142 For a more detailed account of the British Army's involvement in the Gulf War see Carver, Michael. *Britain's Army in the 20th Century*. London: Pan Books, 1999, pp. 459–472.

143 Pollard, *The Army: Is Less Enough*, p. 21.

the negative trend in Britain's defence budget, there is strong indication that the impression of the Gulf War reduced the peace dividend's vigour.¹⁴⁴ It strengthened the argument for retaining a balanced force structure for both of the Army's main roles, contributing to NATO's collective defence while being ready for out-of-area contingencies. Particularly for the latter, Operation Granby demonstrated the utility of conventional military power and the need for highly mobile and projectable forces.¹⁴⁵ With hindsight, the British Army's involvement in and perception of the Gulf War represents the first step away from its threat-driven understanding of military strategy, resting upon the NATO scenario, towards a paradigm based more on a palette of general military capabilities, which would be deployed to wherever the need arose.

In the wake of the Army's manoeuvre warfare debate and its use of doctrinal ideas to represent Service interests, a new understanding of doctrine emerged. Previously the British military had used the NATO definition for doctrine, which had been agreed by the Alliance's national military establishments in the early 1970s; it understood doctrine as a set of "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives" and emphasised that it was "authoritative but requires judgement in application".¹⁴⁶ This definition remained valid but was rather suitable for tactical and operational level concepts. For the military-strategic dimension of doctrine, and the new organisational relevance attached to it, this was insufficient. The first edition of *British Military Doctrine* therefore outlined the function of doctrine as establishing "a framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application".¹⁴⁷ A later Army definition from 1994 suggested:

Doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time; it considers the nature of current and future conflicts and the Army's likely involvement in

144 Stone, Anthony. *Future Imperfect*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 3 (June 1999), pp. 54–58.

145 Orme, *The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity*, pp. 138–141.

146 *Allied Administrative Publication 6(2003)*, p. 2-D-7.

147 *Design for Military Operations*, 1st Ed., pp. 1–2.

them in order to provide the basis against which to prepare it in peace and employ it successfully on operations.¹⁴⁸

This definition reflected the relatively new and not yet unchallenged relevance of doctrine. A “formal expression” meant that doctrine had to be formally written and promulgated. Equally, doctrine had to be “accepted” within the Army and was not to be imposed as a dogma – an argument directed towards doctrine sceptics who warned against potential rigidity of thinking caused by doctrine. At a “given time” meant that doctrine was supposed to be relevant for the specific time or circumstances and was not written for eternity; in other words, doctrine had to be constantly developed and reviewed against the changing circumstances of the Service’s external environment. The effort of the Army to redefine the definition and scope of doctrine reflects the fact that doctrine came to be understood as a process of institutional importance.¹⁴⁹

The new significance of doctrine was further expressed in the way Army doctrinalists defined the so-called ‘concept of fighting power’, a notion first presented in 1989 and refined in subsequent doctrines. Fighting power – the ability of a military organisation to fight – was viewed as the product of three interrelated and equally important components: a conceptual, a moral and a physical component. The physical component contained the means to fight, such as manpower, equipment, logistics as well as training and readiness. The moral component was concerned with the ability to get people to fight, through motivation, sound management and leadership. The conceptual component encompassed the underlying thought process. It comprised doctrine in its wider sense: the intellectual debate, the development of formal doctrine and its dissemination to the training, operational and force development authorities.

But doctrine also contributed to the moral component as it addressed issues of leadership, motivation or ethical constraints in warfare. In this concept of fighting power doctrine was an integral part of military-strategic

148 *Army Doctrine Publication Volume 1, Operations (Army Code 71565)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 1994, § 0110. URL http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/ops.pdf.

149 Willcocks, *Future Conflict and Military Doctrine*, p. 6.

and operational success.¹⁵⁰ The simple idea of defining the complexity of military effectiveness as the product of a conceptual, a physical and a moral component was another achievement of British Army doctrine that indicated the way towards a capability-based paradigm. In due course it was adopted by the Army's sister Services and also incorporated into British joint doctrine.¹⁵¹

With the intensification of the conceptual debate, the need arose to establish an organisation responsible for doctrine development. The Army embarked on institutionalising its doctrinal process. Initially, the Inspectorate General of Doctrine and Training at Upavon was established in summer 1993. It was an attempt to centralise the Army's doctrine, planning and training entities. Within less than a year, the Inspectorate was reorganised into two separate authorities, one of which was the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine (DGD&D).¹⁵² Within the DGD&D, the Director Land Warfare was responsible for the Army's doctrine development. The creation of this think tank was a significant

150 For the debate over the concept 'fighting power' see: *Design for Military Operations*, 2nd Ed., chapter 4-1; Grant, Charles. *The Use of History in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine*. In: Gooch/Grant, *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, pp. 7–17, pp. 14–16; Guthrie, Charles. *The British Army at the Turn of the Century*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 3 (June 1996), pp. 5–9, p. 5; Hawley, Alan. *People not Personnel: The Human Dimension of Fighting Power*. In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 213–226; Melvin, Mungo. *Continuity and Change: How British Army Doctrine is Evolving to Match the Balanced Force*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 4 (August 2002), pp. 38–44, p. 40; Mileham, Patrick. *Military Virtues 1: The Right to Be Different?* In: Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1998), pp. 169–189, p. 170; Roberts, *Fit to Fight: The Conceptual Component – An Approach to Military Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century*; Torrance, Iain. *The Moral Component*. In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 202–212.

151 See also: *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 1st Ed., p. 6.2; *British Defence Doctrine*, 2nd Ed., pp. 4-1 to 4-7). The RAF incorporated the concept in *British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the Air Staff. London: MoD, 3rd Edition, 1999, pp. 1.2.12–1.2.17.

152 The Inspectorate General of Doctrine and Training was separated into two independent organisations: the Army Training and Recruiting Agency (ATRA) and the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine (DGD&D); the DGD&D contained two bodies, one of which was headed by the Director Land Warfare.

step forward in developing doctrine systematically and gives evidence of the fundamental change of attitude towards the idea of doctrine. The threat-driven rationale of the Cold War was abandoned; subsequently the Army's structure and force planning would be driven by doctrine. After the establishment of this new doctrine think tank, Field Marshal Inge concluded: "[During the Cold War] we justified, trained, organised and equipped the Army against the Warsaw Pact. It made it easy to justify the Army and we failed to look beyond this obvious threat in order to develop a more universal military doctrine."¹⁵³

The DGD&D's main purpose was to design this universal military doctrine and develop the Service's conceptual guidelines on the basis of capabilities. Major General M. A. Willcocks, the first Director Land Warfare, put doctrine into this overarching context when describing his job: "I am charged with developing doctrine for the Army and hence with deriving the capabilities and a view of the consequent structures and equipment requirements that result."¹⁵⁴ In line with the conceptual needs at the time, the Director Land Warfare embarked on two major projects: the revision of the 1989 edition BMD, resulting from the implications of the end of the Cold War and the experience from the Gulf operations; and the development of a post-Cold War peacekeeping doctrine, a need emerging from the Army's involvement in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁵

Apart from establishing the think tank in Upavon, another development indicated that the concept of doctrine received a new degree of attention: the growing number of doctrine-related articles in the *British Army Review* and the *RUSI Journal* as well as a host of other publications stemming from HCSC graduates. The Army Command and Staff College in Camberley added its own think tank to the debate, by founding the Strategic and Combat Studies Institute (SCSI) in 1991. Many of its occasional research

153 Inge, *The Capability-Based Army*, p. 1.

154 Willcocks, *Future Conflict and Military Doctrine*, p. 7.

155 Bellamy, Christopher. *Britain's Military Think Tank: Future Role*. In: *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, Vol. 123, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 411–414, p. 411.

papers addressed doctrinal issues.¹⁵⁶ By 1993, the Army had transformed the initial impetus, triggered by the manoeuvre warfare debate and the subsequent publication of BMD as the first high-level doctrine, into a sustained doctrinal process within its own Service. Undoubtedly, from the Army's perspective doctrine had become an essential part in the reevaluation of its role and capabilities in the post-Cold War era.

2.3 Formal Doctrine: The Manoeuvrist Approach

At the core of British Army doctrine was the emergence of the so-called manoeuvrist approach, understood as a military-strategic and operational principle of action. Its formulation was a gradual process taking place between 1989 and 1996 and manifested in three major Army publications: the *British Military Doctrine* in 1989, the *Army Doctrine Publication* (ADP) in 1994 and the second edition of *British Military Doctrine* in 1996. Albeit initially an Army concept, the debate over the manoeuvrist approach spread across Service boundaries and the concept was integrated into Britain's first joint doctrine in 1997.

As outlined above, the Bagnall Reforms had resulted in the creation of the HCSC with the specific aim of educating future commanders and senior staff officers on the operational level of warfare. The three-month course was held for the first time at Camberley in early 1988. As the Army

156 Doctrine-related studies published by the SCSi during the 1990s are: McInnes, Colin. *Men, Machines and the Emergence of Modern Warfare (The Occasional 2)*, 1992; Connaughton, Richard. *Peacekeeping and Military Intervention (The Occasional 3)*, 1992; Irwin, Alistair. *The Levels of War, Operational Art and Planning (The Occasional 5)*, 1993; Carlyle, Robert. *Clausewitz' Contemporary Relevance (The Occasional 16)*, 1995; Lord, Christopher. *Intermediate Deployments: The Strategy and Doctrine of Peacekeeping-Type Operations (The Occasional 25)*, 1996; Kiszely, John P. *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945 (The Occasional 26)*, 1997; Gooch, John, Charles Grant et al. *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine (The Occasional 30)*, 1997; Reid, Brian Holden. *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98 (The Occasional 33)*, 1998; Bond, Brian and Mungo Melvin (eds). *The Nature of Future Conflict: Implications for Force Development (The Occasional 36)*, 1998; Hills, Alice. *Doctrine, Criminality, and Future British Army Operations: A Half-Completed Understanding (The Occasional 39)*, 2000.

had no suitable NATO or British doctrine to use as a general teaching manual for operational and military-strategic thinking, the idea emerged to write one as a matter of urgency.¹⁵⁷ The production of a formal doctrine outlining the new understanding of warfare started in the context of the first Higher Command and Staff Course and was ordered by Major General Walters, the Director of the HCSC. The outcome was the *Design for Military Operations – British Military Doctrine*, published in 1989. According to Brian Holden Reid – lecturer in war studies at King’s College London, resident historian at the ACSC and co-author of *British Military Doctrine* – Field Marshal Bagnall, by then CGS, personally pushed the promulgation of the new doctrine.¹⁵⁸ Before the establishment of the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, the HCSC was the Army’s principal debating ground and catalyst for further developments in military doctrine. Out of the first courses between 1988 and 1991, no less than thirty-two papers were published.¹⁵⁹

In 1994 another crucial Army doctrine was published, entitled *ADP 1 Operations*.¹⁶⁰ Although its name suggested a focus on the operational level of command, the work nevertheless represented the further development of many aspects that had been introduced in BMD. Two years later, in 1996, BMD was updated in the form of a second edition. Both documents, ADP 1 and BMD 2, reflect a doctrinal thinking that incorporated the post-Cold War environment and included the implications brought about by Operation Granby. The key messages of the first edition BMD were the revival of the operational level of command and the propagation of the manoeuvre warfare approach. Although the concept became widely accepted, particularly after Operation Granby, arguments over the appropriate terminology remained. For some, the term ‘manoeuvre warfare’ was potentially misleading since ‘manoeuvre’ was primarily associated with physical movement on the tactical level.

As a consequence, in the second edition of BMD the term ‘manoeuvrist approach’ was adopted, which better encapsulated the idea of the

157 Introduction by Mungo Melvin, in: Reid, *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98*, p. 5.

158 “*Army Doctrine in the 1990s*” – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 3/2002.

159 Selected papers from HCSC 1 to 4 (1988–91) were published in: Mackenzie/Reid, *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*; Reid, Brian Holden (ed.), *The Science of War: Back to First Principles*. London: Routledge, 1993.

160 *Army Doctrine Publication 1 Operations*.

mental activity required to outmanoeuvre an enemy. It was defined as “an approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed”.¹⁶¹ The focus on the mental aspect of manoeuvre rather than its physical interpretation was further strengthened by the view that it was applicable to any conflict or military operation:

The principles and thought process that underpin the theory of manoeuvre warfare are equally applicable to Operations Other Than War. This is because the successful application of the manoeuvrist approach inspires a particular attitude of mind and a method of analysis that is relevant to any circumstances involving the use of military force to resolve conflict.¹⁶²

A number of new aspects reflected the crucial impact of the Gulf War on Army doctrinalists. The nature of coalition warfare, for instance, was elaborated in detail, from the planning of joint and combined air and land campaigns to the specific challenge of cultural differences existing among militaries from different nations.¹⁶³ Another subject of modern warfare as experienced during Operation Granby was the complex relationship between military forces and the media in the theatre of operations.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, the socio-political pressure on the armed forces with regard to casualties was considered and recognised as a growing potential problem. ADP 1 for instance stated:

Access to images of violence and danger from the theatre of operations lowers the public threshold to tolerance of casualties. While the mission must not be compromised, a balance will have to be struck between destruction and coercion by other means to ensure that unwarranted casualties do not erode public support and the morale of

161 *Design for Military Operations*, 2nd Ed.

162 *Ibid.* See also Wallace, J. J. A. *Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War*. In: Reid, Brian Holden (ed.). *Military Power. Land Warfare in Theory and Practice*. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 207–226.

163 *Army Doctrine Publication 1 Operations*, § 0625.

164 *Ibid.*, § 0444.

the force. Keeping friendly casualties to the minimum will continue to be a major planning factor, while controlling the number of enemy casualties may also have to be considered.¹⁶⁵

With this statement the rising constraint caused by a powerful cycle of public opinion and media pressure was for the first time addressed on the level of operational and military-strategic thinking. It is worth noting that the necessity to reduce the opponent's casualties was thereby also introduced. Inflicting excessive enemy casualties was no longer considered to be an expression of military competence but rather perceived as a disproportionate and unnecessary use of lethal force revealing either incompetence or moral indifference. In the contest of winning domestic and international public opinion for the conduct of a military intervention operation, the avoidance of any casualties, friend and foe, thus became pivotal.

An early example of adverse public reactions to unnecessary enemy casualties was the case of the Amiriyah bunker during the Gulf air campaign: the destruction of the Iraqi air raid bunker, believed to be part of the regime's command and control system caused the death of several hundred civilians and led to an international public outcry.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, the coalition air forces' attacks on Iraqi military units retreating from Kuwait in February 1991, which resulted in televised images of countless burned out vehicles scattered along what came to be called the 'highway of death', were widely perceived as unnecessary remorselessness towards an already defeated enemy – although the coalition commanders' operational rationale was mainly to erode Saddam's military power which he might use for suppressing Kurdish and Shiite minorities. Nevertheless, the negative public response to these events had induced the doctrinal considerations on the control of enemy casualties.

The two editions of BMD and the first volume of the *Army Doctrine Publication* series, *Operations*, were a manifestation of the Army's change of attitude towards doctrine after 1989. The new quality of these doctrinal

165 Ibid, § 0116. See also NATO definition of 'manoeuvre' in *Allied Administrative Publication 6(2003)*, p. 2-M-2: "The employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission."

166 Peach, *The Doctrine of Targeting for Effect*, p. 71.

works was that they were written with the military-strategic level in mind. The widespread acceptance of the publications within the Army required a cultural change, initiated by Bagnall's reform plans and sustained by a new generation of leadership concerned with redefining the role and capabilities so as to keep the Service fit in an era of change.

* * *

Clearly, Army doctrine had assumed lead character in British doctrine development. The Army's doctrinal achievements between 1989 and 1996 were instrumental in two respects. First, by making doctrine an important part of post-Cold War transformation, the Service showed the potential utility of doctrine. Second, by formulating the manoeuvrist approach, Army doctrinalists provided a key element of wider British doctrinal thinking evolving during the 1990s. As further outlined in the subsequent chapters on air power, maritime and joint doctrine, the manoeuvrist approach henceforth was an indispensable part of the doctrinal debate. Equally, the concept of fighting power was incorporated into Britain's overall military-strategic doctrine and adopted by the other Services.

Historians still debate over how much Bagnall's personal influence contributed to the doctrinal surge witnessed in the British Army at the end of the Cold War. Some take a systemic approach focusing on the doctrine development as a result of the particular structural circumstances at the time. Others prefer a perspective emphasising the distinct personality of Field Marshal Bagnall and the revolutionary drive of his leadership. This thesis suggests that the most convincing case lies in between. The emergence of a sustained interest in doctrine within the Army at the time was enabled by the fruitful constellation that there was both strong leadership, encouraging innovation from top-down, and a generation of officers keen on pushing change from bottom-up.

Bagnall's initial aim was to improve BAOR's capabilities in the face of serious operational deficiencies and to buy time at the Central Front for conventional forces; in his own mind, he might have been less concerned with doctrine as such. Whatever his intention, however, he paved the way to the establishment of the Higher Command and Staff Course and the publication of *British Military Doctrine*, and his influential personality made the notion of doctrine presentable in the higher defence establishment. The former Commander-in-Chief BAOR and CGS dragged

behind him, like a comet, a generation of Army officers determined to promote conceptual change.¹⁶⁷ The sustained drive for military-strategic doctrine to become ever more relevant, however, could not have emerged without the imperatives of the new era of international security. Faced by fundamental challenges of strategic, technological and social shifts, the Army establishment recognised the importance of creating a culture of innovation that would ensure conceptual health in the long run.

In the balance between nuclear versus conventional strategy, the 1989 edition of BMD marked the first shift towards the re-emerging utility of conventional military power. The rediscovery of the military-strategic and operational levels of warfare was the very embodiment of this development. Furthermore, manoeuvre warfare was designed to improve Britain's conventional capabilities. It particularly redefined the role of land forces and reintroduced the cooperation at the corps level.

The second edition of BMD reflected the Army's adoption of a capability-based approach to force planning. Facing the budget competition of inter-service rivalry, the Army commanders were keen to prove their Service's continued relevance in a dramatically changed world order. In 1993/94, the establishment of the DGD&D strengthened the Service's willingness and ability to design concepts for future conflicts. These efforts of conceptual reorientation were bolstered by the success in the Gulf War and by the establishment of the ARRC. Particularly the ARRC commitment set the framework for retaining armoured warfare skills on the continent while at the same time exploring an extended expeditionary role.

The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s saw a pivotal turning point in British doctrinal evolution. The British Army's cultural change at the end of the Cold War laid the foundation for the rapid and comprehensive conceptual renewal occurring in the first half of the 1990s. The pioneering act of successfully entering the doctrine business as the first of Britain's Armed Services did not go unnoticed by airmen and naval officers. In fact, British Army doctrine came to have a snowball effect across the entire British Armed Forces.¹⁶⁸

167 "Army Doctrine in the 1980s" – Panel Discussion 1, BMDG 2/2002.

168 Reid, *Bagnall and the Ginger Group in Retrospect*, BMDG 2/2002.

3 'Instrument of First Choice': The Emancipation of Air Power after the Gulf War

The Royal Air Force's efforts to enter the doctrine business followed suit behind the British Army's. It was equally linked to a close interaction with US conceptual developments. The RAF's first high-level doctrine, *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, was published in early 1991.¹⁶⁹ It represented an attempt to rebalance the RAF's role in relation to ground operations, following the innovative adoption of the *AirLand Battle* for NATO's Central Front. Just around the time of AP 3000's release, the Gulf air campaign turned into a defining moment for modern air power. As a result, the RAF's 1991 doctrine publication was rapidly overtaken by these events. Only two years later the Royal Air Force therefore published a second, revised edition of AP 3000. This updated doctrine took into consideration the lessons from the Gulf War and highlighted the relevance of air power in modern warfare. It represented Britain's first post-Cold War air power doctrine.¹⁷⁰

To begin with, this chapter establishes the Royal Air Force's distinct organisational culture by shortly outlining its legacy as the junior Service within the UK's Armed Forces. It further examines the doctrinal debate ensuing at the end of the 1980s, which together with the impact of the Gulf War led to a sustained process of emancipation of air power. Post-Cold War air power was no longer limited to its supportive role in ground operations but assumed its own military-strategic profile.

A detailed examination of the widely-debated current concepts on air power goes beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus therefore lies on a brief analysis of the implications of the second edition of British air power doctrine, which put forward a concept of strategic air offensive adjusted to the post-Cold War environment and thus bore the hallmarks of the later concept of 'effects-based targeting'. The chapter finally argues

169 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the Air Staff. London: Royal Air Force, 1991.

170 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the Air Staff. London: HMSO, 2nd Edition, 1993.

that due to changing political, technological and social circumstances air power became the military-strategic ‘instrument of first choice’ of decision-makers.¹⁷¹

3.1 Organisational Culture: The Royal Air Force as the Junior Service

In the history of warfare, air power has been the most recent addition. Its emergence began during the First World War. Britain’s initial military aviation was not organised as an independent Service but as specialist forces of the British Army (the Royal Flying Corps) and the Royal Navy (the Royal Navy Air Service). The first military use of aircraft was for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. With the ensuing exchanges of fire between enemy aircraft and the development of forward-facing machine guns, the reconnaissance role called for the need to defend one’s own reconnaissance aircraft while attacking the enemy’s – hence the creation of the fighter role and air-to-air combat as a mission in its own right. Although these initial roles of air power were of relatively limited military effectiveness in the vast struggle of total war between 1914 and 1918, the advantage offered by the control of the airspace above the battlefield was recognised by most military commanders.

Another significant air power development during the First World War was strategic bombing. The idea of attacking the enemy’s homeland from the air and thus projecting the destructive effect of military force deep into the heartland of nations “spread terror far out of proportion to the weight of explosives delivered”.¹⁷² Still, despite the production, use and destruction of tens of thousands of aircraft, air power did not play a crucial role in the course of the First World War. The potential of the aerial-delivered bomb, however, promised to revolutionise warfare and thus turned the interwar air forces into a military instrument in their own right. Defence analysts and military commanders recognised the potential

171 British definition of air power: „The ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth. Air Platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle.” In: *British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 3rd Ed., p. 1.2.1

172 Graydon, Michael. *Air Power: Roles and Changing Priorities*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 137, No. 4 (August 1991), pp. 28–34, p. 29.

of emerging air power and concluded that air forces had to be organised as a separate arm of military power. This was also the case in Britain, where the Royal Air Force was formally established in 1918.¹⁷³

A significant contribution to air power thinking in the aftermath of the First World War came from an Italian General, Giulio Douhet, who published *The Command of the Air* in 1921.¹⁷⁴ As a former artillery officer Douhet had experienced the futility of offensive land operations in the trenches of the First World War, where masses of men and material were wasted, often for irrelevant gains of terrain. He declared that in the future air power would become the decisive factor in the strategic equation of military conflict; whichever side could win in the air would achieve overall victory. The profound psychological effect of air power through the massive bombing of urban and industrial centres would undermine the population's will to fight and eventually leave its government no choice but to surrender.

Other attempts to further exploit the military use of aircraft were undertaken by Germany. During the interwar period, the German military developed their concept of close air support, which they put to effect for the first time during the Spanish Civil War 1936 to 1939 and later in the Second World War's 'Blitzkrieg' offensives.

In comparison, British efforts to advance air power thinking were moderate and lacked decisive impetus. Although Douhet's ideas were published in an English translation in 1923, the British defence establishment showed little interest in learning the recent air power lessons and exploring the military potential of the aircraft. During the 1920s, the newly established RAF was under constant risk of being re-absorbed into the Army or the Royal Navy.¹⁷⁵ Britain's military establishment was

173 Garden, Timothy. *Air Power: Theory and Practice*. In: Baylis, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, pp. 137–157, pp. 141–142.

174 Giulio Douhet (1869–1930): Italian strategic theorist, served as an artillery officer in the Italian Army during the First World War, rose to the rank of General; during the 1920s he conceived air power as an independent military force and predicted the emergence of strategic bombing; his most significant theoretical work was: Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari*. London: Faber & Faber, 1943. See also Garden, *Air Power: Theory and Practice*, p. 143.

175 Garden, Timothy. *Re-Inventing the Royal Air Force*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 141, No. 5 (October 1996), pp. 55–57, p. 55.

mainly concerned with a wave of reductions in structures and manpower. To make matters worse, not many experienced airmen had survived the war to build a strong air power lobby. The remaining RAF units were primarily employed in the context of imperial policing in order to support and, at times, replace ground forces, such as in Somaliland and later in Iraq.¹⁷⁶

One of the few high-ranking British military interested in developing air power thinking was Hugh Trenchard, who had served with the Royal Flying Corps and had risen to be the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of the newly established RAF.¹⁷⁷ According to Timothy Garden, Trenchard was a “strong believer in offensive air power and of the importance of the bomber in any future war”.¹⁷⁸ For Trenchard, the significance of strategic bombing was less in its psychological effect but rather in its potential to destroy an adversary’s economic and public infrastructure and thus cripple the physical ability to wage war.

The rivalry between Britain’s three Services, exacerbated by a political atmosphere of defence budget cuts, forced the Royal Air Force as the most junior Service actively to promote its interests and uphold its status as an independent force. In this context, the idea of strategic bombing was desirable to prove not only the importance of air power’s contribution to military conflict but also the need to retain a well funded and independently organised air force. In due course, the RAF propagated the message of strategic bombing as the ultimate and self-justifying role of air power. In the analysis of later air power historians, like for instance Christina Goulter, the RAF’s status as the junior Service, struggling in the fierce inter-service rivalry of the 1920s and 1930s, was responsible for the overstated role attributed to strategic bombing aimed at psychological effect.¹⁷⁹ The problem was that these ideas were not matched by

176 Ibid.

177 Air Marshal Hugh Montague Trenchard (1873–1956): officer in the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War; became the first Chief of the Air Staff of the newly established RAF.

178 Garden, *Air Power: Theory and Practice*, p. 142.

179 Goulter, Christina. *Air Power Doctrine in the 1980s*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Dr. Christina Goulter, Defence Studies Department, KCL.

the available technology at the time, whether it was reach, lift capacity or accuracy.

When the Second World War broke out, Germany was better prepared to fight in the air than its opponents. After the run down of British Forces during the interwar period, the RAF was particularly ill prepared and lacked a balanced force structure, which was restored “only after frantic industrial efforts” at the outset of the war.¹⁸⁰ In the course of the war, every theoretical concept of air power was put to the test and modified, leading to the emergence of all the main roles of modern air power. In 1940, the Battle of Britain demonstrated the overall importance of air supremacy. The desert campaigns in North Africa witnessed the emergence of close air support as a tactical role, which substantially contributed to the success of allied land operations. In the Battle of the Atlantic, air power showed its significance in maritime operations and in the protection of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). With continuing improvements in reach, speed and lift capacity of aircraft, air power’s reconnaissance, air transport, search and rescue and other supporting tasks became indispensable force multipliers for both land and maritime power. In sum, the Second World War witnessed the emergence of modern air power and laid the foundation for the broad spectrum of roles evolving in its aftermath.¹⁸¹

Most importantly, the theory of strategic bombing was also put into practice during the Second World War. Britain’s efforts to conduct aerial bombing against Germany were a mixture between Douhet’s idea of the psychological shock directed against the population’s morale and Trenchard’s focus on the economic effect of strategic bombing – with an initial emphasis on psychological shock. In any event, Britain’s strategic bombing campaign in 1941/42 turned out to be less effective than expected. The proponents of strategic bombing underestimated the resolve of Germany’s war willingness; instead of breaking this will, the nightly bombing of cities did in fact strengthen the determination of the

180 Graydon, *Air Power: Roles and Changing Priorities*, p. 29.

181 A list of Britain’s modern air power roles contains: airborne early warning and control; air interdiction; air reconnaissance and surveillance; air-to-air refueling; anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface ship operations; combat search and rescue; close air support; defensive counter-air operations; electronic warfare; offensive counter-air operations; strategic airlift; strategic bombing; suppression of enemy air defences; and tactical air transport. See Garden, *Air Power: Theory and Practice*, p. 148.

population to endure the hardship of conflict. Douhet's predictions of causing psychological shock and terror through aerial bombardments and thus making the enemy surrender did not deliver the expected results.¹⁸² Furthermore, British air power advocates overestimated their own resources for a sustained bombing campaign of war-critical infrastructure. In his examination of British air power doctrine, Richard Overy came to the conclusion that despite some adjustments under Air Marshal Arthur Harris, the RAF officer in charge of Bomber Command, the focus on psychological shock had turned strategic bombing into a dogma.¹⁸³

Some rectification of strategic bombing eventually came through the US air campaign. US air power theory considered the advantage of aerial power projection to be the potential to affect the enemy's economic infrastructure. In addition to this clear focus on the economic aspect, the US Armed Forces had the appropriate military resources to carry out a sustained bombing campaign. Their aerial mass attacks, carried out by daylight to increase accuracy, focused on the destruction of Germany's war-critical infrastructure, such as arms and ammunitions factories, oil refineries and lines of communication. After two years of such sustained bombing by the US Army Air Forces, Germany's economic ability to maintain the level of high-intensity war started to crumble. In contrast to this successful contribution of US air power to the overall war effort, the RAF's concept of strategic bombing had failed.¹⁸⁴ Strategic bombing had become too closely linked to justifying the Service's independence. The experience of the failed idea of strategic bombing contributed to the RAF's anti-intellectualism in the subsequent decades, characterised by wide-spread reluctance within the Service to formulate grand concepts on paper.¹⁸⁵

The nuclear revolution at the end of the Second World War, however, gave fresh argument for Douhet's theory, as the devastating effect of two aerial-delivered nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the immediate surrender of Japan. Such unprecedented military

182 Overy, *Doctrine Not Dogma*, pp. 34–35.

183 Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris (1892–1984): officer in the Royal Air Force, Commander of Bomber Command and responsible for Britain's strategic bombing campaign against Germany during the Second World War. See Overy, *Doctrine Not Dogma*, p. 35.

184 Garden, *Air Power: Theory and Practice*, pp. 146–147.

185 Goulter, *Air Power Doctrine in the 1980s*, BMDG 2/2002.

power, concentrated in one single weapon, represented a quantum leap in mankind's ability to wage war and thus led to the emergence of an entirely new strategic thinking. It also caused the concept of strategic bombing to survive its initial failures.¹⁸⁶ With innovations in jet engines and missile technology in the 1950s, air power became an important means of delivery for nuclear weapons, first through the strategic bomber and later through long-range ballistic missiles. The strategy of nuclear deterrence developed from 'massive retaliation' in the 1950s to 'flexible response' in the mid-1960s. Britain's air power thinking during the first half of the Cold War was dominated by the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons through bombers. This lasted until the Royal Navy's Polaris submarines assumed the sole responsibility for strategic nuclear deterrence.¹⁸⁷ The RAF was left with the capability to deliver substrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons – a decision that represented a defeat in the inter-service rivalry over nuclear capabilities.

After NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response in 1967, the importance of conventional capabilities began to be reviewed. Still, the interest and investment in nuclear capabilities continued to overshadow conventional military power. The RAF's remaining, non-nuclear air power roles aligned with NATO's overall defence in Europe and focused on two main areas. The first one was air power's contribution to the Allied Command Atlantic, where the SLOCs between the US and Europe had to be protected. In this context, the defence of the UK's airspace was of paramount importance, since Great Britain served as a transition point for US reinforcements to the European mainland. In geostrategic terms, Great Britain was the platform to project military power into Europe. Air power's second mission was its contribution to Allied Command Europe, particularly the defence of the Central Region through the provision of tactical air support to NATO's 'layer cake' defence.¹⁸⁸

As a consequence, the Royal Air Force managed to retain throughout the decades of the Cold War the full spectrum of air power roles – apart

186 Gray, Peter W. *Themes in Royal Air Force Doctrine*. Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Group Captain Peter W. Gray, JDCC.

187 Garden, *Re-inventing the Royal Air Force*, p. 56.

188 Graydon, *Air Power: Roles and Changing Priorities*, p. 29.

from losing the task to deliver strategic nuclear weapons. Another result of this focus on NATO defence was that the RAF's own conceptual development stagnated: the Service's roles, structures and procurement priorities were based on the scenario of the East-West confrontation in the Euro-Atlantic region as outlined in NATO strategy. Air power thinking was driven by two factors: the specific threat of a Soviet attack and the pace of technological innovation. The RAF's only doctrinal publication during the Cold War, *AP 1300 Operations*, appeared in 1957. The document argued for the primacy of strategic bombing, thus reflecting the competition between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force over the role of nuclear deterrence in the late 1950s. Since this role was subsequently handed over exclusively to the Royal Navy, the document became rapidly obsolete and was officially withdrawn in 1971 without replacement.¹⁸⁹

Since the RAF based its organisational health on the concept of strategic bombing, the failure to secure the nuclear deterrence role and instead put up with the second rank of a substrategic capability affected the Service's organisational culture in a negative way. The interest of air officers to engage in conceptual debate began to wane. They considered doctrine to be 'dirty work' that rendered the RAF vulnerable to bureaucratic politics and inter-service rivalry. The shared experience was that it seemed better to remain flexible and not to commit key concepts, upon which the Service's interests rested, to formal writings. The result of this attitude was that the development of British air power was driven by existing technology and quantitative needs, not by conceptual innovation. The RAF's conceptual mind in the period from the 1960s to the late 1980s was therefore characterised by a vacuum in doctrine development, shaping a generation of airmen who were primarily concerned with tactical and technical issues.¹⁹⁰ As far as operational guidelines were concerned, British airmen relied on existing NATO doctrine without establishing a mechanism for developing a coordinated national input to it – in other

189 Vallance, Andrew G. B. *From AP 1300 to AP 3000*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Vallance, SHAPE.

190 *Ibid.*

words, they relinquished the formulation of operational doctrine to other air forces.¹⁹¹

This historical legacy was instrumental in defining the British understanding of their air force's role. For more than half of its history, strategic bombing was seen as the RAF's principal role and *raison d'être*, central to its creation and at the core of its continued existence as an independent Service.¹⁹² Such theoretical aspirations had, however, not yet been matched by serviceable technologies. Pre-1945 air power concepts were characterised by oversimplification and over-ambition, since they offered visions of capability which could not be met by existing technology – a dilemma Michael Graydon called the “lure of technology”.¹⁹³ After it failed to put the idea of strategic air power into practice, the RAF's organisational culture became doctrine-averse.

The post-1945 RAF remained the junior Service within Britain's military establishment. Air power largely stuck to its tactical support role. Structures and deployments were geared up to a potential East-West confrontation; RAF units were forward-based to the European continent and dominated by relatively short-range systems, ideally suited for providing air support to ground forces in case of a Soviet attack.¹⁹⁴ The other side of the coin was that conceptual thinking within the RAF had ground to a halt from the 1950s onwards.

3.2 Doctrinal Debate: The Gulf War, Technology and New Constraints

Similarly to what happened in the area of Western land warfare thinking, the wake up call for air power doctrine in the 1980s came from the US. In the light of their Vietnam experience, US analysts began to think in a more joint fashion about the employment of air power. Although tactical level concepts, such as air mobility or close air support, had

191 The RAF primarily used NATO's *ATP 33-B Combined Air Operations*.

192 Vallance, Andrew G. B. (ed.). *Air Power. Collected Essays on Doctrine*. London: HMSO, 1990, p. xviii.

193 Lambert, Andrew and Arthur C. Williamson (eds). *The Dynamics of Air Power*. Royal Air Force Staff College Bracknell & London: HMSO, 1996, p. iii.

194 Graydon, *Air Power: Roles and Changing Priorities*, p. 30.

been employed successfully and had led to intense organisational and technological development in conventional air warfare, Vietnam caused the Americans to think deep and hard about the use of military power. They also started to examine the coercive use of air power, particularly after Operation Rolling Thunder, the repeated strategic bombing of North Vietnam, had shown very limited effect.¹⁹⁵ In the context of these efforts the *AirLand Battle* was developed, which aimed at better coordination between ground and air forces.¹⁹⁶

For the British Armed Forces, the Falklands War in 1982 had undoubtedly been a direct and formative experience. The South Atlantic operations occurred in a time when military power was primarily part of the Cold War's equation of mutual deterrence. Western military forces rarely saw overt deployment in a high-intensity environment. With respect to air and maritime power the Falklands War reconfirmed the importance of air superiority and sea control as prerequisites for amphibious operations. Its impact on doctrinal thinking, however, was less significant than the Vietnam War – a fact that seems to underpin the conclusion that experience of failure generates more innovative energy in a military organisation than success. Vietnam might have been the Americans' war but it cast a very long shadow over all Western armed forces.

While US analysts conceived the *AirLand Battle*, British thinkers, by contrast, were still concerned with individual air power roles with “no clear ideas or teaching as to how best these could be combined”.¹⁹⁷ Initial

195 Operation Rolling Thunder was analysed by US Air Force Colonel John Warden, who developed a theory about the coercive use of offensive air power, which characterised the adversary as a ‘system of five rings’. See: Warden, John A. *The Air Campaign*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988; Warden, John A. *The Enemy as a System*. In: *Air Power Journal*, Vol. 9, No 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 40–55. For the limited outcome of Operation Rolling Thunder see also Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. *How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*. In: *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93–128, pp. 113–115.

196 For the development of the *AirLand Battle* as a conceptual innovation of the US Armed Forces see: Lock-Pullan, Richard. *Civilian Ideas and Military Innovation: Manoeuvre Warfare and Organisational Change in the US Army*. In: *War & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (May 2002), pp. 125–147; Romjue, *The Evolution of American Army Doctrine*, pp. 72–73.

197 Vallance, *From AP 1300 to AP 3000*, BMDG 2/2002.

concerns over the RAF's conceptual vacuum began to emerge by the mid-1980s, and the debate within the Service was gradually activated by individuals who shared these concerns. Parallel to the Army's efforts at the time, these airmen exploited the impact of US thinking to point out the doctrinal weakness of their own Service. One of those was Group Captain Andrew Vallance, who was to become the main author of the RAF's first high-level doctrine. He wrote an MPhil thesis on the development of RAF air power doctrine from 1957 to 1987 and concluded that some form of an underlying doctrine seemed to exist but was not formally stated. He further argued that RAF conceptual thinking lacked coherence and was preoccupied with technology. Procurement programmes dominated conceptual considerations rather than the reverse. Air power roles were largely defined by what technological capabilities were affordable and thus available. The RAF's lack of conceptual and organisational awareness was so great that, according to Vallance, some American security and defence academics asked questions about RAF doctrine "which the Service could not even begin to answer".¹⁹⁸

Recognising the relevance of doctrine was one step, overcoming the institutional reluctance to address it was another. As the analysis of the Royal Air Force's organisational culture highlighted, there was a somewhat natural tendency of aviators to reject contemplation in favour of action and to focus on technical and tactical issues rather than complicated operational or even military-strategic concepts, which, so was the perception, at best would be ignored and at worst made the RAF vulnerable to inter-service rivalries. To many airmen, the idea of codifying an air power doctrine was thus irrelevant, superfluous or even dangerous.¹⁹⁹

In the event, the growing number of doctrine proponents within the RAF received strong support from external events. The fall of the Berlin Wall in autumn 1989 heralded the end of the Cold War and led to the previously mentioned *Options for Change* downsizing policy. Like its sister Services, the RAF had an inherent interest in retaining a balanced force structure – which meant the full spectrum of air power roles. Senior RAF officials at the turn of the decade expressed their view that, while

198 "Royal Air Force Doctrine in the 1980s" – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 2/2002. See also Vallance, Andrew G. B. (ed.). *Air Power. Collected Essays on Doctrine*. London: HMSO, 1990, pp. xvii–xviii.

199 Vallance, *Air Power. Collected Essays on Doctrine*, p. x.

the RAF was ready to reduce numbers, none of the air power role should be abandoned.²⁰⁰ They argued that the retention of the entire range of capabilities was in the interest of British defence policy. Their message also included the particular preservation of the role to deliver sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Realising that core Service interests might be at risk in the ensuing downsizing process, doctrine gained attraction as an instrument for justifying the roles and priorities of British air power.

The first effort to formulate a high-level doctrine was thus undertaken in 1989/90, though, with respect to the operational environment, still under a Cold War paradigm. The doctrine process was characterised by a conjunction of top-down and bottom-up efforts. Group Captain Vallance, by then Director of Defence Studies for the RAF, was supported by RAF chiefs in his determination to promote air power thinking and formulate a doctrine. A preliminary, semi-official work, consisting of a collection of essays on doctrine and air power of various nations, was published in January 1990. In its foreword, Air Vice Marshal Sandy Hunter, Commandant of the RAF Staff College, confirmed the changing attitude towards doctrine:

To many, any attempt to set out an air power doctrine is irrelevant or even superfluous. Some see codifying a mixture of principle and practical experience as more likely to create a straitjacket than to make a platform for further evolution. ... I believe that just the opposite is the case, for a number of reasons. It is always as well to set out on a journey, knowing where you are starting from – and how you might get to your destination. A statement of doctrine provides that certainty. ... It offers a firm foundation from which to go forward. Far from inhibiting flexibility, air power's matchless characteristic, doctrine provides the springboard from which to enhance it.²⁰¹

Hunter went on to explain that doctrine had become more relevant than ever before, due to changing political and technological circumstances which forced the military to have ready answers and well articulated arguments for questions such as: "How would we fight the air battle? How do we justify our priorities? What grounds do we have for our

200 Palin, Roger. *An Airman's Thoughts about the Future*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 7–12, p. 10.

201 Vallance, *Air Power. Collected Essays on Doctrine*, pp. ix–x.

force structure? How can we harness technology to improve our ability to fight?”²⁰² Hunter’s words indicate that the RAF’s threat-driven thinking shifted towards a capability-based approach. The uncertainty and fluidity of the unfolding post-Cold War world order was to be answered by a doctrine which provided flexibility and a wide spectrum of options. Technology should not drive doctrine but doctrine should determine how technology could best be used for providing the right choice of priorities and capabilities. This attitude was supported by an essay written by Squadron Leader D. Daulby, who argued that while the RAF was good at tactical level guidelines a clear statement of basic, high level doctrine was “long overdue”; he even suggested the formation of an RAF doctrine centre.²⁰³

Group Captain Vallance was then tasked with writing an air power doctrine. Based on the crucial preliminary work provided by the collection of essays, the project advanced rapidly and the first official RAF air power doctrine, designated AP 3000, was published in early 1991. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding, highlighted the new doctrine’s three aims as:

First, to foster a more cohesive approach to air power education within the Service; second, to be the foundation of our contribution to the formulation of joint-service doctrine, and Alliance doctrine with NATO or other allies; and, finally, to enhance the understanding of air power within our sister Services, the Civil Service, Parliament and the general public.²⁰⁴

Apart from reflecting the fundamental change of doctrinal understanding within the RAF, the target audience as mentioned gives evidence of the Service’s conscious attempt to influence the wider defence establishment’s perception of air power. The formulation and publication of AP 3000 was an important step towards the emancipation of air power and contributed to the RAF’s effort to justify its role in the light of the changing security environment.

202 Ibid, p. x.

203 Daulby, D. *Doctrine Development. Or: Why Did We Do It That Way?* In: Vallance, Andrew G. B. (ed.). *Air Power. Collected Essays on Doctrine*. London: HMSO, 1990, pp. 15–28.

204 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 1st Ed., p. v.

The turning point for air power, however, came with the Gulf War in 1991. The disproportionate success of the US-led air campaign became the strongest argument for air power advocates. The contribution of the allied air forces to the campaign proved to be more than a supporting role and was in fact interpreted by many as a war-winning role. Airmen were henceforth considered to be equal partners to their military and maritime counterparts in the all-arms high-intensity warfare. Finally, it appeared, military aviation could apply its technological edge to a degree which proved decisive, and live up to early 20th century imaginations.

In the RAF's perception, three distinct air power strengths became apparent in the course of the Gulf crisis. The first strength referred to the initial response, which depended on the reach and the speed of reaction that could only be provided by air power. After Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the challenge was to contain the situation rapidly and prevent further aggression against Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states – in other words, to buy time by demonstrating military resolve as rapidly and effectively as possible. A crucial part of this first phase of the international response, the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, was accomplished by the immediate deployment of air force units, both US and British. Within 48 hours of the British Government's declaration on 9 August 1990 to assist in the containment of the Iraqi aggression, a squadron of Tornado F3 air defence fighters arrived in Saudi Arabia. The build-up continued, and within days the RAF had gathered an operationally ready air power force of offensive, defensive and combat support capabilities in the Gulf region. These assets were deployed over 3,000 miles from their main bases – an even more impressive performance when considering that the RAF's role and structure at the time were still geared up for the defence of Central Europe. Air power proved to be the only capability with significant combat strength that could be deployed over long range within such a short amount of time.²⁰⁵

The second strength became apparent after hostilities had broken out, through the integrated air campaign against Iraqi strategic and operational capabilities. It not only reconfirmed the fact that air superiority was a prerequisite for any offensive action but more importantly demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency modern air power could bring to bear. The

205 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991*, pp. 10–11. See also Irving, *The Gulf Air Campaign*, p. 10.

four phases of the air campaign, which were originally planned to run sequentially, soon merged and overlapped. Adverse weather conditions in the region and other, less anticipated challenges – such as the need to divert a great deal of air assets for what became known as the ‘great Scud chase’ – hampered the planners’ initial ideas, but they did not question the unprecedented effect air power had on the outcome of the war. The air campaign created the conditions for a swift and decisive land operation: it substantially reduced Iraq’s strategic capabilities to wage a protracted war, destroyed the command and control channels between the regime’s leadership and its armed forces and eroded the cohesion and morale of Iraqi forces.²⁰⁶

Air power’s third strength came to the fore once ground operations started. It was the validation of the *AirLand Battle*, originally conceived for the Cold War’s European battlefield and now put to effect for the first time against Saddam Hussein’s military forces. The so-called ‘100 hour land war’ was in fact a highly integrated land-air operation, in which the land and air components operated together as equal partners.²⁰⁷ Although in the course of post-war analysis many military thinkers cautioned against generalising the lessons from the Gulf, the overwhelming impression remained a powerful validation of the growing relevance of offensive air power and of the revolutionary potential of modern technology.²⁰⁸

A new aspect was the accuracy of air-delivered munitions which helped to minimise unintended civilian casualties and collateral damage. British capacity to employ precision-guided weaponry was still limited, but the RAF’s contribution to the coalition air campaign covered the full spectrum of roles and targets.²⁰⁹ While the operational experience seemed to confirm many of the ideas of air power advocates, the huge effort of deploying air force assets to the Gulf and keeping them operational under

206 Allison, John. *The Royal Air Force in an Era of Change*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 41–45, p. 42.

207 Jackson, Brendan. *Air Power*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 4 (August 1992), p. 27.

208 Some critical considerations about air power in the Gulf War were presented by: Biddle, *Victory Misunderstood*; Murray, *Air War in the Gulf*; Press, *The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare*.

209 The RAF deployed less than 150 aircraft to the Gulf but they encompassed virtually the full spectrum of combat and combat support capabilities. See: Irving, *The Gulf Air Campaign*, p. 14.

difficult circumstances also showed the limitations and weaknesses of the RAF's arsenal. Many components had to undergo urgent modifications and enhancements before being operational, and the organisational arrangements were clearly not yet geared up for expeditionary operations far away from the homeland.²¹⁰

Against this background of experience, the RAF's efforts in doctrinal development intensified. The first air power doctrine published in 1991 needed refining, not so much for its grand theories – airmen had long contemplated air power as employed in the Gulf – than for the analysis of the welcome experience reconfirming them. After all, the Gulf War was a great opportunity to justify strong air power capabilities. The campaign's numerous 'lessons learned' had to be exploited in doctrinal terms. Air power was not just considered to have played a crucial part in the successful Gulf War but also to promise to play an even larger and more active role in the new post-Cold War security environment.

In a RUSI presentation in 1991, Group Captain Vallance highlighted the increasing importance of offensive air power, which he attributed to the fundamental changes in the operational and technological environment. He pointed out that “the likely evolution of the operational environment is set to strengthen the utility of offensive air operations”, which would be significant “in and out of the NATO area, for deterrence and crisis management and for high and lower-intensity conflicts”.²¹¹ With the evolving operational environment Vallance meant the shift away from fixed NATO scenarios towards less clearly defined operations. At the same time, the peace dividend resulted in a reduction of overall force levels and forward-deployed forces. These trends called for greater flexibility and mobility, which were both inherent strengths of air power. Vallance and some other analysts pointed out the advancements in technology that could be expected to occur in the time ahead. Even with doctrine air power would continue to be much more a product of technology than land or maritime power. The process of improvements in accuracy of air-delivered weaponry, lifting power and penetration capability as well as in the field of navigation, information or stealth technology was

210 Ibid, p. 11.

211 Vallance, *The Future: Offensive Air Operations*, p. 23.

continuing with unbroken pace and promised to make the application of air power ever more effective and efficient.²¹²

The lively doctrinal debate triggered by the Gulf air campaign's lessons led to the publication of a second edition of AP 3000 in 1993. The doctrine's three main aims remained unchanged. A new aspect in the Service's doctrinal understanding, however, became apparent in Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon's foreword, in which he pointed out that the RAF understood doctrine as a process of constant revision and development. In the light of recent strategic changes since the first publication – such as the “collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the growth in instability”²¹³ – such a revision had become necessary within a short time. Moreover, Graydon stated that “the RAF's air power doctrine has been reviewed and refined in the light of operational experience in the Gulf and elsewhere”.²¹⁴ Consequently, the major change compared to the first edition of AP 3000 was the shift away from the NATO scenario towards a more general readiness to apply air power globally and to emphasise the utility of offensive air operations.²¹⁵

By the mid-1990s, the RAF had created a mechanism of doctrine development, based on its understanding of doctrine as a continuous process and as an instrument to provide more coherent guidance for the RAF's military-strategic and operational framework. A crucial, though informal, component of this doctrinal process was the series of Air Power Workshops, starting in 1994 under the auspices of the Chief of the Air Staff and co-organised by the RAF Staff College in Bracknell and the Centre for Defence Studies in London. It brought together academics, independent analysts and military officers to discuss and explore air power in all its aspects. In due course, the results of the seminars were published and, though not representing the official line of the MoD or the RAF, the

212 Taylor, N. E. *Air Power – Future Challenges and the Applications of Technology*. In: Centre for Defence Studies (ed.). *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994*. London: Brassey's, 1994, pp. 49–65.

213 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 2nd Ed., p. v.

214 *Ibid.*

215 Mason, Tony. *Exploring Uncertainty: The Environment and Doctrinal Revision*. Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Professor Air Chief Marshal Tony Mason, University of Birmingham.

collection of essays illustrated the scope and contents of the doctrinal debate.²¹⁶ The workshop's publication of 1996, *The Dynamics of Air Power*, examined the debate over the use of air power in Peace Support Operations, particularly the use of coercive air power as part of a peace enforcement action. Such interest was obviously fuelled by the experience from Operation Deliberate Force in late 1995, the NATO-led air strikes against Bosnian Serbs.²¹⁷ A later volume, *Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power in its Wider Context*, examined the increasing use of information technology and the implication of the RMA on air power.²¹⁸ A succession of Directors of Defence Studies (RAF) – such as Andrew Vallance, Neil Taylor, Andrew Lambert, Stuart Peach and Peter Gray – produced and promoted a growing body of doctrinal literature on air power.

Another significant step in the RAF's doctrinal process came with the creation of the *Air Power Review* in 1998, initiated by Stuart Peach.²¹⁹ With this latest platform for air power thinking, the RAF aimed at widening the conceptual debate even further. All these efforts of writing and debating give evidence of an innovative conceptual process, which was fuelled by the RAF's intensive operational experience during the 1990s. After the Gulf air campaign, the RAF was constantly involved in Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, the US-British patrolling of the 'no fly zones' over Iraq, and in various NATO air patrols as part of the Alliance's crisis management in the Balkans.

216 Foreword by Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, in: Lambert/Williamson, *The Dynamics of Air Power*, p. iv. Foreword by Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Jones, in: Peach, Stuart (ed.). *Perspectives on Air Power. Air Power in Its Wider Context*. Defence Studies (Royal Air Force), Joint Services Command and Staff College Bracknell & London: HMSO, 1998, p. iv.

217 Lambert/Williamson, *The Dynamics of Air Power*.

218 Peach, *Perspectives on Air Power*.

219 Finn, Chris. *British Air Power Doctrine in the 1990s*. Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Group Captain Chris Finn, Director of Defence Studies (RAF). Stuart Peach later rose to the rank of Air Commodore and became Commandant of the RAF Air Warfare Centre.

3.3 Formal Doctrine: Strategic Air Offensive Revisited

It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to address conclusively the issue of modern air power, which is an ongoing debate particularly in US and British defence circles. The following subchapter merely aims to explore the major direction British air power has taken in its second edition in 1993. This updated version of AP 3000 placed the concept of strategic air offensive into the post-Cold War environment, based on a thorough historical analysis of previous conflicts and the more recent Gulf War. It becomes apparent that this 1993 doctrine already established the basis for the later concept of ‘effects-based targeting’ – which was to be formulated towards the end of the 1990s – and adjusted air power to a more expeditionary role.

AP 3000 characterised air power in terms of strengths and limitations. It identified three primary strengths: height, speed and reach. The combined result of these inherent strengths meant that air power possessed a number of unique advantages. One was its ubiquity, as air power could counter or pose simultaneous threats across a far wider geographical area than surface systems and much faster than maritime-based forces. Another was flexibility, since aircraft could perform a wide variety of actions, produce a wide range of effects and be adapted comparatively easy to changing circumstances. Furthermore, the speed and reach of air power offered a unique responsiveness: air power could be deployed rapidly into distant theatres to provide visible and timely support for an ally – the picture in the doctrinalists’ mind no doubt being Operation Desert Shield – and to act as a deterrent to aggression. The final advantage suggested by AP 3000 was air power’s ability of concentration. The underlying thought was that air power could concentrate the projection and application of military might in time and space and thus accomplish devastating moral and physical effects. These inherent strengths implied that air power played an important role in any military operation, whether in crisis management or in a major conflict.

Nevertheless, AP 3000 also recognised three distinct limitations that had to be borne in mind when considering the use of air power: impermanence, limited payload and fragility. In terms of military strategy, impermanence was the most significant limitation. It acknowledged that aircraft could not stay airborne indefinitely; the permanent surveil-

lance of an area was possible, given sufficient resources of air-to-air refuelling, but in contrast to ground forces, air power could never tightly control or hold territory. Overall, AP 3000 concluded that the growing effectiveness of modern air power systems had progressively widened the possibilities of application, with the result that the RAF could offer political and military decision-makers a wide range of options to pursue security and defence policy.²²⁰

Based upon air power's unique strengths, AP 3000 adapted the concept of strategic bombing to the post-1989 era. The aim of a strategic air offensive campaign was defined as "the use of air power to strike directly and with precision at the enemy's strategic centres of gravity including leadership, military forces, infrastructure and research and production facilities"; it further emphasised that the right selection of targets was "fundamental to the success of the strategic air offensive".²²¹ Conceptually, this was nothing new; strategic bombing from the First to the Second World War had largely been conducted with a similar rationale in mind.

AP 3000, however, argued that the Gulf War of 1991 was the first strategic air offensive to achieve the intended effect. The coalition air attacks severely damaged Iraq's research and production capabilities for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They destroyed nearly half of the country's oil-refining capacity and cut the military supply routes and main lines of communication to the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.²²² Coalition air forces were able to attack many of Iraq's centres of gravity "within a single wave, thus achieving strategic paralysis of the enemy".²²³ Air power shattered the ability of the Iraqi leadership to maintain a coordinated war effort even before land operations commenced. Furthermore, the proportion of civilian casualties and collateral damage remained uniquely low in relation to the wide-ranging damage inflicted upon Iraq's strategic and military installations. On the basis of this analysis, the doctrine suggested that modern air warfare technology provided air forces with an unprecedented capability to implement the idea of strategic air offensive. Having said that, the doctrine, however, defined one essential precondition for a successful strategic air offensive:

220 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 2nd Ed. p. 14.

221 *Ibid*, p. 69.

222 *Ibid*, p. 71.

223 *Ibid*.

Unfocused attacks are unlikely to yield decisive results; the target sets must be carefully chosen and linked directly to the grand-strategic object of the war. Strategic air offensive operations are likely to be shaped by political constraints and aims.²²⁴

One of the key targets was an opponent's command and control structure: "The true military object in any war is the enemy's strategy, so attacks on those who formulate and control the enemy's strategy and the means by which that strategy is disseminated ... are natural targets for strategic air attack."²²⁵ The term 'manoeuvrist warfare' was not explicitly mentioned in AP 3000, but the focus on paralysing the opponent's leadership and attacking neuralgic points rather than relying on mass bombing of equipment indicates that air power doctrinalists harmonised their ideas with the Army's doctrinal thinking on manoeuvre warfare.²²⁶ Arguably, the devastating effect of modern air power is inherently manoeuvrist as it tends to attack the opponent's coherence and limit his flexibility.

The emphasis put on target selection – which had to take into consideration both the opponent's physical and psychological centres of gravity – and the imperative of surgical execution forecast the doctrine of effects-based targeting in all but its name. However, in the first half of the 1990s the RAF did not yet possess sufficient PGM capacity to implement the concept fully, but they were able to contribute to a large-scale strategic air campaign as the junior partner alongside US air power.²²⁷

Furthermore, the fact that doctrine put forward a concept of warfare that was supposed to steer and facilitate force development and equipment procurement demonstrates that the RAF had grasped the core idea of high-level doctrine. The thorough analysis of the Gulf War and the formulation of a coherent post-Cold War air strategy were strong arguments to retain a balanced force structure and to invest in the acquisition of precision technology.

The accuracy and destructiveness of modern air power technology also gave rise to the idea of 'conventional deterrence'. In 1993 British air power

224 Ibid, p. 72.

225 Ibid, p. 75.

226 Finn, *British Air Power Doctrine in the 1990s*, BMDG 3/2002. The next revision of British air power doctrine, published in 1999, saw the incorporation of the manoeuvrist terminology. See *British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 3rd Ed., p. 1.2.13.

227 Mason, *Exploring Uncertainty*, BMDG 3/2002.

doctrine suggested that a conventional air offensive could be used for influencing the strategic behaviour of opponents through deterrence:

The threat, or the use, of conventional strategic air offensive action provides governments with a flexible and responsive instrument of crisis management. It can be used as a means of signalling political intentions, either independently or in conjunction with other force elements ... It could also be used to deter impending aggression, signal resolve, threaten escalation, demonstrate friendly capabilities or eliminate specific enemy capabilities ... An aggressor must always take into account that – if the victim state has a strategic air offensive capability – it can retaliate immediately and strike at any part of its national infrastructure.²²⁸

The language used bears striking resemblance to the one of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War – only that now the notion of ‘deterrence’ was no longer monopolised by nuclear theory but was extended to conventional air power.²²⁹ Britain belonged to the few leading Western nations that possessed globally projectable offensive air capabilities. The idea of conventional air offensive seemed specifically useful for deterring or, if deterrence failed, punishing Third World dictators and terrorism-sponsoring states. US and British air power was in due course applied in the context of various military interventions against such trouble makers, apart from providing a continuous air presence in the ‘no fly zones’ above Iraq. Later it emerged, however, that the conventional air power deterrence remained tied to the limitations inherent in any deterrence: it was subject to the opponent being an organised state or at least a leadership with a comparable strategic rationale. The deterring, or coercive, effect of air power did not seem to materialise when it was directed against non-state or substate actors, whose physical and psychological centres of gravity were less tangible and could therefore not be easily targeted from the air.²³⁰ But this debate over the role of air power against asymmetric and non-state adversaries only emerged in the second half of the 1990s.

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228 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 2nd Ed., p. 74.

229 For ‘conventional deterrence’ see also Guertner, Gary L. *Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces*. In: *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 60–71.

230 “*Air Force Doctrine in the 1990s*” – Panel Discussion 1, BMDG 3/2002.

The RAF's post-1989 doctrinal evolution reflects the rise of conventional air power in a dynamically changing environment, triggered by a combination of technological advance and the demands of a new world order. While the conceptual debate over nuclear deterrence degraded, the possibilities of conventional air power became a primary theme in US and British defence circles. On the basis of Western technological dominance, which suggested that potential adversaries were no longer prepared to take on the Western military on a conventional battlefield, even the idea of 'conventional deterrence' emerged. The strengths inherent in modern air power – above all its ubiquity, flexibility and responsiveness – were at the centre of such thinking. They offered the prospect that the behaviour of dictatorial regimes could be kept in check by the mere threat of air power. The fact that air power provided an instrument of intervention without the hazards associated with land operations, made it a crucial element of the idea of conventional deterrence. Air power, finally, had come of age and had undergone a process of emancipation. It was transformed into an equal partner in a joint battlespace and a preferred option in 'wars of choice' where limited Western interests were at stake.

At around the same time as the British Army, the RAF recognised the significance of establishing a coherent and systematic doctrine development process and seeking a close link with US conceptual reviews. AP 3000's first edition was the breakthrough that signalled the RAF's change of attitude towards doctrine. While it was conceived during the last months of the Cold War, it nevertheless provided a sound starting point for the debate over post-Cold War British air power. In the words of Group Captain Chris Finn, "it was the anvil on which people could bang their hammers and swords".²³¹

The second edition, following two years later, demonstrated that air power doctrine had crossed the line into the new era, expressing both post-Cold War and post-Gulf War thoughts. It indicated the change of direction from NATO-oriented scenarios to a more general expeditionary warfare, where British air power had to be able to fight as part of ad hoc coalitions and in a potentially expanded geographical area far away from homeland bases.²³² AP 3000's second edition was by any standard a

231 Finn, *British Air Power Doctrine in the 1990s*, BMDG 3/2002.

232 "Air Force Doctrine in the 1990s" – Panel Discussion 1, BMDG 3/2002.

mature doctrinal statement about post-Cold War air power, which served as a guideline for the coming years.

Furthermore, the RAF started to address the issue of technology management, a particular air power issue since air weaponry was much more driven by technological innovation than land and maritime systems. The Service was intent to reverse this dependence:

Doctrine and technology are to a certain extent interactive, but the overall development of air power can only be coherent if doctrine drives technological advance. Since the Second World War, unfortunately, the opposite has been the reality: the pace and dynamism of technological advance has been so great that technology has driven doctrine. That situation needs to be reversed in the future if air power is to be developed more coherently henceforth.²³³

The 1990s can indeed be called a decade of air power. Its flexibility turned out to be crucial in many international crises. For the governments of Western democratic societies, air power became the ‘instrument of first choice’: it promised the option of intervention with less human, financial – and thus political – liability than the commitment of large-scale land forces. And it held out the prospect of rapid effect while putting only a limited number of friendly combatants at risk.²³⁴ Such promises were particularly appealing to Western governments caught in the dilemma of ‘disinterested interventionism’: the pressure to intervene militarily in regional conflicts on humanitarian grounds, fuelled by a well-informed public audience demanding that ‘something must be done’, but – without national interests being at stake – lacking the determination to pay the potential price of intervention.²³⁵

233 Taylor, *Air Power – Future Challenges and the Applications of Technology*, p. 65.

234 Allison, *The Royal Air Force in an Era of Change*, p. 42.

235 The notion of ‘disinterested interventionism’ was introduced by Edward Luttwak: Luttwak, Edward N. *Give War a Chance*. In: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July/August 1999). URL <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990701faessay990/edward-n-luttwak/give-war-a-chance.html>. See also: Luttwak, Edward N. *A Post-Heroic Military Policy: The New Season of Bellicosity*. In: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 33–44; *Wars of Intervention. Why and When to Go In*. In: *The Economist*, 6 January 2001, pp. 17–19.

Although AP 3000's second edition did acknowledge that strategic air offensives tended to be most effective when fully integrated into a theatre, i.e. joint, campaign, it maintained that they could also be carried out largely independently of other military components.²³⁶ In a climate of defence reductions and Service rivalry, this was a strong message on behalf of air power. This aspect of the air power debate – air power versus land power intervention – reached its climax during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when the majority of NATO governments categorically ruled out the deployment of land forces and air power remained the only military component available to force the Milosevic regime back to the negotiating table. As later analyses of the events suggested, the air strikes against Serbia were but a part of a wider range of diplomatic, economic and military factors that eventually coerced Milosevic.²³⁷ In political and military decision-making circles, air power nevertheless retained its status as the 'instrument of first choice'.

The connection between the overwhelming technological dominance of Western air power and the rise of asymmetric challenges did not come to the fore of the debate until the end of the 1990s. By that time doctrine was firmly established within the RAF as a continuous process of development, and the role of air power in asymmetric conflict was approached with an imaginative mind.²³⁸ AP 3000's third edition, published in 1999, adjusted to the expeditionary strategy of the *Strategic Defence Review* and to the joint vocabulary of *British Defence Doctrine*; in terms of air power application, the third edition represented the formulation of the doctrine of effects-based targeting.²³⁹

236 *Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 2nd Ed., p. 71.

237 Byman, Daniel L. and Matthew C. Waxman. *Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate*. In: *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5–38.

238 See for instance: Gray, Peter W. (ed.). *Air Power 21. Challenges for the New Century*. Norwich: HMSO, 2000; Pape, Robert A. *The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power*. In: *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 93–114; White, Craig. *Air Power and the Changing Nature of Terrorism*. In: *RAF Air Power Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 103–119.

239 Peach, *The Doctrine of Targeting for Effect*, p. 69.

4 Wider Peacekeeping: A Half-Completed Understanding of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping

The efforts to formulate a concept for post-Cold War peacekeeping became a pacemaker of British doctrine development in the 1990s. Initially, it took some time for the Western military establishments to discover the gap between traditional UN peacekeeping, mainly comprising interposition and observation, and the operational requirements of restoring the peace in post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. After UNPROFOR in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) faced mounting difficulties on the ground, however, the differences started to become apparent. What international peacekeepers encountered in Bosnia was, in fact, breaking the ground into a new type of operation, since the conflict environment was more complex than that of traditional UN peacekeeping.

In due course, the British Army, the Service mostly involved in providing British UNPROFOR contingents from summer 1992 onwards, took the decision to produce a manual for post-Cold War peacekeeping operations which would assist commanders with understanding the tasks. At the same time the doctrine was supposed to demonstrate the Army's position on the possibilities and limitations in the Bosnia operation. The result was *Wider Peacekeeping*, appearing as an *Army Field Manual* (AFM) in late 1994 and published to a wider audience in early 1995.²⁴⁰ *Wider Peacekeeping* was but a first step of developing a concept for post-Cold War peacekeeping. Given Britain's extensive expertise from Northern Ireland and post-colonial counter-insurgencies and their internationally praised performance in Bosnia, it was surprising that the new concept did not link up with the tradition of counter-insurgency but instead remained largely stuck in the straitjacket of UN peacekeeping. The reason for this must be seen in the combination of the Army's organisational interests at the time the UN operation in Bosnia was conducted.

240 *Wider Peacekeeping. Army Field Manual Volume 5, Operations Other Than War, Part 2*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Land Warfare on Behalf of the Chief of the General Staff. London: HMSO, 1995.

This chapter therefore starts with exploring the status of the Army's organisational culture at the time the UNPROFOR involvement set in. Two differing schools of thought were relevant: counter-insurgency and UN peacekeeping, both tailored to their own particular environment. The chapter then outlines how these schools of thought influenced the doctrinal debate on post-Cold War peacekeeping and how the traditional UN peacekeeping ideas prevailed. As a next step, the chapter analyses the resulting doctrine, *Wider Peacekeeping* published in 1995, which represented a concept that reached beyond traditional peacekeeping but failed to recognise the necessary link with counter-insurgency. It concludes by arguing that *Wider Peacekeeping* nevertheless marked a significant step in Britain's post-Cold War doctrinal evolution, mainly as a stimulator of debate and as a first, though half-completed, attempt to design a new conceptual framework for Operations Other Than War.

4.1 Organisational Culture: The Legacy of Low-Intensity Operations

As outlined previously, the post-1945 Army was split into two large communities, one concerned with low-intensity security operations in the context of post-imperial obligations, the other focusing on high-intensity warfighting in Europe as part of the Cold War. The first stemmed from the tradition of imperial policing but after 1945 turned into so-called counter-insurgency. When Britain began to participate in the new realm of UN peacekeeping missions, this was a task naturally affiliated to low-intensity security operations. The strategic and operational circumstances, however, were different: counter-insurgency was conducted in a strictly national framework and included the robust use of military force, while UN peacekeeping was characterised by its international character and a restriction on the use of force to self-defence. As a result, the two fields remained intellectually apart, each having its own group of advocates and its own body of literature. The different origins and characteristics of the two concepts must briefly be explored.

Insurgency is a concept designed to overthrow a state from within, using the weight of popular support and non-conventional methods, like guerrilla warfare or terrorism, to overwhelm the government and its security forces. In ADP 1 *Operations* insurgency is described as “the

actions of a minority group within the state intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change”.²⁴¹ A successful insurgent has to woo the population so that they would provide him with funds, recruits, intelligence, logistic support and concealment. As the insurgent succeeds he draws power away from the state and establishes his own no-go areas, which are in effect sub-states within the state. The end-state is to overthrow the existing government and establish the insurgent’s preferred form of state power.²⁴²

Counter-insurgency operations, as the name suggests, are military operations aimed at countering insurgencies. Emerging in the colonial and post-colonial context of the post-1945 world order, counter-insurgency remained usually a national matter. The British concept of counter-insurgency operations, reaching its peak during the country’s retreat from the Empire between 1945 and 1975, was considered to be one of the more successful. It was characterised by the main assumption that the military forces were only one component of an overarching long-term political campaign. In order to neutralise the insurgency, the government had to conduct political or social reforms which would remove the grievances that had become the banners of the insurgent. Most insurgencies were linked to the objective of gaining independence, a demand the British colonial power could no longer ignore in an era of global decolonisation. From Britain’s perspective, therefore, success was measured by the fact that the retreat from the colonies proceeded in an orderly manner. The strategic aim was to retain intact political and economic relations with the former colonies and, in the context of the Cold War, to deny radical insurgents with a Marxist-Leninist philosophy the access to power in newly independent states. Therefore, British Forces had to support the efforts of the civil authorities, whose primacy over the military campaign was given. As a consequence, the aim of military counter-insurgency operations was not victory as such but rather the neutralisation of the insurgent’s military presence and the provision of a favourable security environment in which political, economic and social reform could pave

241 *Army Doctrine Publication 1 Operations*, § 0719.

242 A comprehensive study on the concept of ‘insurgency’ is presented by Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, pp. 1–23.

the way to the insurgent's marginalisation and the political solution of the conflict.²⁴³

The British counter-insurgency concept has been described by a number of commentators, many of whom had personally participated in campaigns.²⁴⁴ These publications, however, were the efforts of individuals; an institutional mechanism to write down the many valuable lessons and to distribute them systematically within the Army did not exist before the 1990s. Preserved in a collective though unwritten body of understanding, the experience of several decades of post-colonial COIN involvement nevertheless merged into a specifically British approach to use military force: while robust methods to eliminate the violent elements of insurgencies were used, the overarching principle was to apply military force with the minimum necessary degree. The rewards for such self-imposed restraint lay in the degree of consent that could be engendered which, together with the employment of what came to be called the 'hearts and minds' approach, facilitated the achievement of mission goals. This concept of applying minimum force and winning the goodwill of the population in the area of operations proved successful in various counter-insurgencies.²⁴⁵ It marked a clear contrast to the use of force in warfighting circumstances, where limitation in the application of lethal force was irrelevant. British counter-insurgency had thus developed into a distinct school of military thought, which provided a framework for a force-level below general warfighting but above UN peacekeeping. Until the end of the Cold War this concept had only been used in a national context. A few defence analysts argued for its potential to influence the required reform of post-Cold War peacekeeping. The debate they stimulated was, however, not strong enough yet to have a decisive impact on the first stage of peacekeeping revision.

243 For a detailed analysis of British counter-insurgency thinking see: Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*; Wallace, *Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War*.

244 For instance: Kitson, Frank *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber & Faber, 1991 (first published in 1971); Kitson, Frank. *Bunch of Five*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1975; Thompson, Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: Chatto & Windus, 1966; Walker, Walter. *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur, 1952.

245 Bulloch, *The Application of Military Doctrine to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations*, p. 174.

One of the reasons was that the British Army was also involved in traditional UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. An overhaul of peacekeeping concepts was therefore associated with this previous experience. Traditional peacekeeping forces, ranging from unarmed observers to interposition forces, were characterised by a distinct set of criteria: their international mandate, usually in a UN framework; their multinational force composition; their strict limitation on the use of force to self-defence; and their overall focus on preserving the status quo rather than shaping a new situation on the ground.²⁴⁶ These criteria shed light on the difference to counter-insurgency, where military forces actively contributed to the shaping of a favourable environment.

In many cases, Britain's contribution to UN peacekeeping was provided by the same British Army units that were also involved in post-colonial counter-insurgencies. As a consequence, officers were familiar with both concepts and undoubtedly regarded them as two different types of military operations. Counter-insurgency was strictly national, the insurgent's consent was not required for military operations, and force could, though with the minimal level needed, be applied pro-actively. In contrast, peacekeeping was international, required the consent of all warring parties, and the use of force was limited to self-defence. The classical UN peacekeeping operation with substantial British participation was Cyprus (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP), where the peacekeepers had the mission to interpose between two warring

246 One exception from this pattern of using force merely for self-defence was the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964. See Mackinlay, John and Randolph Kent. *Complex Emergencies Doctrine – The British Are Still the Best*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 39–44, p. 39. For further details on ONUC see URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm>. See also: Schmidl, Erwin A. *The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century*. In: Schmidl, Erwin A. (ed.). *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Autumn 1999), *Special Issue 'Peace Operations between War and Peace'*, pp. 4–20; Mackinlay, John. *The Development of Peacekeeping Forces*. In: Spillmann, Kurt R, Thomas Bernauer, Jürg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger (eds). *Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives (Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy 9)*. Bern: Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 55–73.

parties and monitor the cease-fire.²⁴⁷ While the UN peacekeeping school of thought did not grow deep roots in Britain's military establishment, it was still strong enough to serve as a starting point for the doctrinalists who in the first half of the 1990s were tasked with reforming the concept of peacekeeping.²⁴⁸

The proposition that the British Army treated doctrine with a considerable amount of suspicion, as outlined in the previous chapters, applies particularly to those parts of the Army involved in low-intensity conflicts, like peacekeeping and counter-insurgency. British contingents involved in these operations were small, usually the size of one or more battalions. There was therefore no need to coordinate large forces on an operational level of command. The process of merging experience into collective principles of action for subsequent deployments was confined to the individual units involved and hardly ever crossed regimental boundaries. The intellectual debate over the circumstances and potential concepts for COIN and peacekeeping operations was therefore very limited. As the historian Brian Holden Reid described it, there was a "fundamental and instinctive reality in the British Army – a widespread reluctance to formulate scientific, doctrinal statements; a preference upheld by the pragmatic and empirical tradition to review and resolve each problem as it occurs on its own terms free from any system".²⁴⁹ In the case of peacekeeping, it was not until 1988 that a doctrinal work with the claim for wider recognition under the title *Peacekeeping Operations* appeared. It was obviously a manual describing the traditional UN peacekeeping

247 The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After the hostilities of 1974, the mission's responsibilities were expanded. UNFICYP remains on the island up to today to supervise cease-fire lines, maintain a buffer zone and undertake humanitarian activities. See URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/index.html>. For the culture of 'international peacekeeping see: Elron, Efrat, Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari. *Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces*. In: *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 73–98; Moskos, Charles C. *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

248 Mackinlay, *Developing a Culture of Intervention*, BMDG 4/2003.

249 Reid, *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98*, p. 12.

tasks, where universal consent and absolute impartiality were regarded as preconditions.²⁵⁰

In the case of counter-insurgency, the Army's antipathy towards doctrine had led to a similar situation. Despite the many post-Second World War COIN operations and the Army's self-perception as a source of expertise in this field, lessons were rarely written down in official documents and even more rarely spread across the entire Army. Existing manuals tended to be conflict-specific. The problem with this approach was that useful information did not easily rise to the top of the military hierarchy from where it could have been widely distributed. Rather, such information tended to get bottled up in the compartments of the Army's regimental system and had to be carried by individual seasoned veterans from one campaign to the next.²⁵¹ The first attempt to write a consolidated concept for counter-insurgency operations came only in 1969, under the title *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*.²⁵² Unfortunately, however, this was the year when the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland and the British Army's support of the civil authorities in the province started. The lessons from Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, Oman or Aden turned out to be not directly applicable to Northern Ireland, a fact which hardly contributed to the attraction of this first counter-insurgency doctrine. As a consequence, the counter-insurgency subculture of the British Army remained adverse towards the idea of doctrine. Its operations were subject to conflict-specific circumstances and appeared to be successfully addressed by the experience of individual regiments and battalions. And, as with peacekeeping, its contingencies did not require the coordination of division-sized units.²⁵³

A detailed study of the role of British PSO doctrine in the British Army by Rod Thornton provides more insight into the Service's counter-insurgency thinking and explains the lack of doctrine as the result of two circumstances.²⁵⁴ First, the Army preferred to rely on the vast corpus of

250 *Peacekeeping Operations. Army Field Manual Volume 5, Part 1*. London: HMSO, 1988.

251 Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, p. 133.

252 *Land Operations (Vol. III). Counter-Revolutionary Operations*. London: HMSO, 1969. An updated version appeared in 1977.

253 Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, p. 5.

254 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 44.

experience that it had gained in its history of ‘small wars’. Such experience, handed down orally within regiments and often deliberately kept within the regiment’s context in a spirit of competition, was felt to give officers the ability to deal with conflicts at the lower end of the conflict spectrum without recourse to formal solutions written down in authoritative manuals. In the absence of doctrine, commanders enjoyed large freedom of action in the conduct of operations. Flowing from this, there existed a generally accepted understanding which viewed tactics as being the opinion of the senior officer present and not the opinion expressed in a document written by some staff officer far away from the theatre of operations. Since in counter-insurgency operations tactical level action was predominant, this view was difficult to refute.²⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, the Army perceived this preference for “dealing with a problem on its individual merits rather than being the prisoner of preordained staff college prescriptions” as one of its key strengths.²⁵⁶

The second reason for the COIN advocates’ reluctance towards doctrine was the relationship that the Army had developed with policy-makers. Rather than being adversarial, it was a relationship marked by a mutual confidence. Before the Second World War, it had been traditional for London to leave the conduct of imperial policing operations to the Service chiefs. One reason why British soldiers were able to act with such freedom of action and retain their politicians’ trust was the previously mentioned concept of minimum force. After 1945 military leaders, realising that the defeat of insurgents striving for independence needed something more than sheer military muscle, looked for more civilian direction. What was needed was a package of measures – political, economic, social and military.²⁵⁷ The civil-military relationship that developed worked well on the whole, and the Army was generally left to deal with operational matters as it saw fit within an agreed framework.

In Borneo, Malaya, Kenya, Aden and later in Northern Ireland, the Army was given power, but power within a civil context. Having an Army comfortable with political dictates and overall strategic aims gave senior officers a degree of confidence to decentralise and delegate down to the

255 Kiszely, *The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945*, p. 10.

256 Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, p. 184.

257 *Ibid*, p. 189.

lowest levels of command, again encouraging displays of initiative and discouraging seemingly prescriptive doctrinal solutions.²⁵⁸ The result was that the British Army's junior leadership, such as section and platoon commanders conducting patrols or checkpoints, gained unparalleled experience in handling difficult situation and making their own decisions. Again, this high degree of delegation, of decentralised command and of highly skilled leadership in the field were all regarded as important qualities – which they indeed were and would continue to be as the appropriate behaviour of British troops in the even more complex post-Cold War environment has confirmed. The general perception of traditional COIN advocates within the Army was that doctrine would jeopardise these very qualities – an attitude that undoubtedly misunderstood the idea of military doctrine.

On the basis of such experience a distinct military subculture of counter-insurgency had grown over several decades. It embraced a number of crucial guiding principles on how the military could successfully contribute their part to a campaign conducted in a complex political environment. These key principles were – the primacy of civil power, which meant that the military tasks were subordinate to the overarching political aims of the government in the area of operations; the close cooperation with the police and other government authorities; the use of minimum force; the political character of insurgencies and, as a consequence, the importance of the psychological campaign to win the population's 'hearts and minds'; and the need for sound intelligence and the conduct of small unit operations to neutralise the offensive elements of the insurgency.²⁵⁹ While there were sporadically some doctrinal works appearing, the British Army preferred to rely more on the qualities of its personnel and the inherent experience that the regiments and the officers possessed. Those regiments were familiar with the outlined principles of action on the basis of their own regimental way of handing down experience and knowledge from one generation of officers to the next.

258 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 45.

259 For British counter-insurgency principles see: Bulloch, *The Application of Military Doctrine to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations*, pp. 165–177; Farrar-Hockley, *The Post-War Army 1945–1963*, pp. 317–342.

This compartmentalisation of COIN expertise had its downside: it hamstrung doctrinal development. With the hindsight of the historian, it seems obvious that these well-proven COIN principles are particularly attractive for their applicability to post-Cold War military interventions. The counter-insurgency expertise inherent in many British regiments contributed to their good performance in Cambodia, Bosnia and other places of post-Cold War peace missions. However, in the absence of formal doctrine, the conceptual link between counter-insurgency and a more effective peacekeeping concept was not immediately recognised.

Hence, when the Army deployed to Bosnia in summer 1992, it was no surprise that those officers who possessed counter-insurgency or peacekeeping experience felt themselves equal to the task despite the lack of general operational guidance. The perception was that the Army's inherent flexibility and confidence grown over many low-intensity campaigns provided the ideal starting point for addressing the situation in Bosnia. This perception proved to be correct, as the tactical success of British UNPROFOR contingents suggest.²⁶⁰ Surprisingly, however, the observation was not yet translated into conceptual innovation. There was clearly a view within the organisation that there was no need for any new doctrine, as for example Brigadier Andrew Cumming, commander of the first British troops in Bosnia, stated:

There is nothing remarkable or unique about Operation Grapple [the operational designation of Britain's deployment to UNPROFOR] which demands any radical rethink of doctrine. Both our doctrine and our education and, most importantly, our officers and soldiers are good enough to adapt to any change of role or circumstance to achieve the best results.²⁶¹

The doctrine he meant was undoubtedly the existing tactical level manuals on peacekeeping and counter-insurgency. At this initial stage, the

260 Clarke, Michael. *The Lessons of Bosnia for the British Military*. In: Centre for Defence Studies (ed.). *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1995*. London, Brassey's, 1995, pp. 41–58, p. 54. See also Rose, Michael. *The British Army in Bosnia: Facing up to New Challenges*. In: *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, Vol. 125, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 133–137.

261 As quoted in: Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 45.

majority of the British Army's relevant figures therefore did not consider the Bosnia deployment as a new type of operation, and certainly not one necessitating fresh conceptual development. There were, however, others voicing the need for new thinking. One of those was Colonel Alastair Duncan, the Commanding Officer of the second regiment sent to Bosnia. He expressed quite a contradictory view with regard to Bosnia:

There was no template to be drawn from my experiences in the Army and the easy solution of 'it has worked somewhere else so it will work here' was clearly a non-starter. [Bosnia] wasn't a task the British Army had done before.²⁶²

One of the reasons for this difference in opinions was that its commentators did not speak about the same level of doctrine. On the tactical level, British experience in low-intensity conflicts undoubtedly facilitated a successful conduct of the tasks at hand. On the operational and strategic levels, however, there clearly emerged an inconsistency in the international crisis management. Many of the advocates for a new doctrinal effort addressing Bosnia were familiar with the warfighting subculture as it had emerged in the BAOR circles. While the warfighters initially regarded the involvement in Bosnia as a distraction from their real business, namely training for major war, they nevertheless were the first to acknowledge the lack of appropriate doctrinal guidance.

In short, the Army's prevailing organisational culture at the start of Operation Grapple was characterised by a mixture of partially contradicting attitudes. Apart from BAOR's warfighting circles, doctrine was not regarded highly yet. The COIN soldiers possessed vast experience and expertise in their field and were keen to tackle the challenges of the Balkans with their sense of pragmatism and improvisation. Their knowledge would have provided a useful starting point to re-orientate peacekeeping and adapt it to the new realities, but due to their intellectual shyness this expertise was not widely spread and the potential of counter-insurgency thinking thus not easily recognised. A manual for peacekeeping did exist but was, measured by its weight and influence, negligible. In the words of British defence analyst John Mackinlay, traditional peacekeeping was a "moribund military culture" which lacked its own lobby and would

262 Ibid. See also Duncan, Alastair. *Operating in Bosnia*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 11–18.

soon be overcome by the post-Cold War developments.²⁶³ Nevertheless, when in the light of Bosnia the decision was taken to explore what was beyond peacekeeping, the traditional UN peacekeeping – instead of COIN experience – served as the obvious link.

4.2 Doctrinal Debate: Justifying the Limitations of Bosnia

The formulation of Britain's first post-Cold War peacekeeping doctrine is inextricably linked to Bosnia. Despite the above mentioned prevailing perception that there was no need for doctrinal revision, Bosnia was an event of instrumental impact, driving the British Army into major doctrine development. It induced the dispute between those who wanted to stick to traditional peacekeeping and those who pressed for a new conceptual approach.

By 1993 there was a wider international debate emerging over the question whether peacekeeping should retain its traditional form or was in need of reform. The debate was conducted by a growing community of security and defence analysts, international relations theorists, government and UN officials, military officers and humanitarians. Their interest was triggered by the virtual explosion of UN peacekeeping missions, a result of the outbreak of a number of regional conflicts after the Cold War, and the new operational requirements these civil war-like emergencies brought with them. Most prominent among these conflicts was the disintegration of Former Yugoslavia, which by 1992 reached a new level of escalation in Bosnia. Despite some early successes in Namibia and Central America between 1989 and 1991, the subsequent difficulties encountered in Cambodia and Bosnia, as well as the sense of failure felt from Somalia and Rwanda, gradually eroded the principles of traditional UN peacekeeping.²⁶⁴

263 Mackinlay, *Developing a Culture of Intervention*, BMDG 4/2003.

264 Namibia: UNTAG, April 1989–March 1990; Central America: ONUCA, November 1989–January 1992; Cambodia: UNTAC, March 1992–September 1993; Bosnia: UNPROFOR, September 1991–December 1995; Somalia: UNOSOM I, April 1992–March 1993 and UNOSOM II, March 1993–March 1995; Rwanda: UNAMIR, October 1993–March 1996. See also: Biermann, Wolfgang and Martin Vadset (eds). *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia. Peacekeepers' Views on the Limits and Possibilities of the United*

Traditionalists nevertheless kept arguing that these operations did not actually break new ground and that peacekeeping had to retain its original *modus operandi*, which rested on the universal consent of all conflict parties involved. The use of force had to remain limited to strict self-defence. Applying force as defined by chapter VII of the UN Charter would, in their view, compromise UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping and warfighting were two activities which under no circumstances could be mixed.²⁶⁵

Reformist commentators, however, saw an urgent need to adapt this, in their eyes, obsolete approach to peace operations, which had been designed for the era of the Cold War. UN missions were dominated then by interposition and observation between state entities which had been waging war against each other but were committed in principle to the international resolution of their dispute. They had therefore agreed to cooperate with a UN peacekeeping force. The reformists argued that this arrangement no longer worked in the environment of intra-state conflicts, where societies and states had fallen apart and consent-based peacekeeping forces were rendered hostage to local parties opposed to any peace process or to warlords with their own, sometimes merely criminal agenda.²⁶⁶ Their basic argument was that traditional UN peacekeeping was simply not designed for such situations. They called for a new approach, for the exploration of the ‘middle ground’ between peacekeeping and warfighting which would enable the international forces to take a more robust posture and use military force in support of a farther reaching mandate than interposition or observation of a cease-fire. In due course, this school of thought focused on the concept of ‘peace enforcement’ – but its breakthrough would not occur before the mid-1990s.²⁶⁷

Nations in a Civil War-Like Conflict. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999; Duffey, Tamara. *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War World*. In: *Civil Wars*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1–23; Klep, Chris and Donna Winslow. *Learning Lessons the Hard Way – Somalia and Srebrenica Compared*. In: Schmidl, Erwin A. (ed.). *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Autumn 1999), *Special Issue ‘Peace Operations between War and Peace’*, pp. 93–137; *Peacekeeping – The UN’s Missions Impossible*. In: *The Economist*, 5 August 2000, p. 22–26.

265 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, p. 24.

266 Mackinlay, John. *Defining Warlords*. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 48–62.

267 Mackinlay, John. *Improving Multifunctional Forces*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 149–173, p. 152.

With Britain's status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and her substantial participation in several UN operations, this debate was also conducted in British defence circles. Some officers and scholars were worried that the British Army was ill prepared for the tasks resulting from the post-Cold War security environment. One of the first to raise concern over the Army's obsolete and conceptually neglected approach towards peacekeeping was John Mackinlay. A former battalion commander who left the British Army in 1991 for an academic career, Mackinlay soon became one of Britain's most energetic proponents of a new doctrine for peacekeeping.²⁶⁸ He criticised the fact that the Army treated peacekeeping as a 'backwater event' by isolating it from the mainstream of military thought, which focused on warfighting. The British Army's warrior culture, Mackinlay argued, perceived peacekeeping as the "wet philosophy of UN soldiering" and had therefore put little thought into the 1988 *Peacekeeping Operations* manual, which, as a result, was an "essentially backward looking document".²⁶⁹ Even before the experience from Bosnia had settled in the minds of senior Army officers, Mackinlay highlighted the need to revise this obsolete understanding of peacekeeping. He backed his argument by analysing some of the earliest post-Cold War UN missions, particularly the one in Cambodia.²⁷⁰

A very significant operation which indicated a new rationale of intervention was Operation Haven. Britain had a leading role in this operation, which saw a multinational intervention in Northern Iraq from April to July 1991 to protect the Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein's regime and deliver humanitarian aid to the internally displaced Kurds in the wake of the Iraqi dictator's post-Gulf War backlash. Its characteristics – a multinational intervention within a sovereign state, a strong mandate to protect and deliver aid, the robust approach to the use of force in a hostile environment – displayed many of the hallmarks of later 'humanitarian

268 For instance: Mackinlay, John. *Why the British Army Should Take Peacekeeping More Seriously*. In: British Army Review, No. 98 (August 1991), p. 11; Mackinlay, John and Jarat Chopra. *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993*. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1993.

269 Interview with John Mackinlay. See also Mackinlay, *Why the British Army Should Take Peacekeeping More Seriously*, p. 11.

270 Mackinlay, John. *A Role for the Peacekeeper in Cambodia*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 26–30.

interventions' or NATO-led Peace Support Operations. It was the first occasion on which Western military forces conducted operations on humanitarian ground in the territory of another state without an invitation from the respective government. In addition, it was the first occasion on which a large multinational coalition force, consisting at its peak of over 23,000 troops from 13 different nations, had worked together for humanitarian purposes not only at the military level, but also with respect to a number of civilian UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGO).²⁷¹ Due to its temporal and geographical association to Operation Desert Storm, however, Operation Haven was generally perceived as merely a footnote of the Gulf War. Under the umbrella of this high-intensity conflict, the hostilities of which had ceased only a few weeks before, the far-reaching implications of Operation Haven were only recognised by a minority of analysts.²⁷²

Bosnia finally did the trick. The deployment of British troops in support of UNPROFOR provided the operational background to trigger the doctrinal development called for by reformists. Despite the initial perception of 'no need for a new doctrine', the number of officers dissatisfied with existing guidelines grew. In their perspective, Bosnia seemed to contain new aspects and to represent a type of operation lying beyond traditional UN peacekeeping. In 1993, the Director Land Warfare, Major General Willcocks, assumed the task of formulating a new peacekeeping doctrine, which would process the experience flowing back from Bosnia. After the initial reluctance of the Army to recognise Bosnia as a novelty,

271 Britain's contribution to Operation Haven was the deployment of 5,000 personnel at short notice (commanded by 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines). *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991*, p. 28. For a detailed account see Ross, R. *Some Early Lessons from Operation Haven*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 19–25.

272 As mentioned earlier, Däniker's model of the 'guardian soldier' constituted a remarkably early attempt to merge the post-Cold War military intervention culture with warfighting rather than develop it from traditional peacekeeping. See: Däniker, *Wende Golfkrieg*; Däniker, Gustav. *Der "Miles Protector" lebt und wirkt*. In: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Vol. 166, No. 6 (June 2000), pp. 7–9. See also Dandeker, Christopher and James Gow. *Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping*. In: Schmidl, Erwin A. (ed.). *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Autumn 1999), *Special Issue 'Peace Operations between War and Peace'*, pp. 58–79, p. 61.

this top-down decision represented a shift in attitude: senior Army commanders felt that the Service needed some doctrine to demonstrate its determination to address the problems occurring in UNPROFOR.

Work for the first draft was conducted under the project designation ‘beyond peacekeeping’.²⁷³ Under Colonel Alan Mallinson, two mid-level officers – Lieutenant Colonels Charles Dobbie and Philip Wilkinson – embarked on the project. While Dobbie was assigned as the principal author of the manual, Wilkinson’s task was to interact with British troops deployed to Bosnia in order to collect their experience and potential lessons learned.²⁷⁴ The team’s conceptual starting point was the existing *Peacekeeping Operations* manual from 1988.

From the outset, the overarching dispute between traditionalists and reformists was reflected in the project. Mallinson and Dobbie were followers of traditional peacekeeping. For them, the defining criterion between peacekeeping and peace enforcement was the notion of consent.²⁷⁵ Consent had to be absolute, both on the political and the operational levels. Consent within the operation had to be ensured by complete impartiality. Peace enforcement, in Dobbie’s and Mallinson’s view, was warfighting in the sense of the Gulf or the Korean War, which required the identification of a clear enemy. If peacekeeping and peace enforcement were blurred, consent would be lost and thus a ‘Rubicon’ crossed, which could only result in failure.²⁷⁶

Philip Wilkinson, on the other hand, was not disinclined to explore the ‘middle ground’ beyond peacekeeping in a more pro-active manner. His influence at this initial stage, however, was limited, since Mallinson was the project leader and Dobbie was the principal author. Fiercer opposition was expressed by external commentators like John Mackinlay and Richard Connaughton, a former Colonel of Defence Studies at the Army Command and Staff College before he retired in 1992. They all opted for

273 Bellamy, *Britain’s Military Think Tank*, p. 414.

274 Wilkinson, Philip. *The Development of Doctrine for PSO*. Paper Presented at the 4th Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 11 April 2003 by Colonel (Army, Ret.) Philip Wilkinson, Centre for Defence Studies, KCL.

275 Mallinson, Alan. *When Peacekeeping Crosses the Line*. In: Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 October 1995, p. 23.

276 Dobbie, Charles. *A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 121–148.

the exploration of the ‘middle ground’. Still, Dobbie’s view dominated the doctrinal work at that stage, and Britain’s first post-Cold War peace-keeping concept was devised along traditional lines, while the avenue of merging it with counter-insurgency ideas was not yet explored.

The retention of the principle of consent and the insistence on the clear separation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement were also promoted on the basis of the experience from Somalia. Britain had not contributed any forces to the UN’s Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), but the doctrinalists in Upavon eagerly analysed the experience of other nations.²⁷⁷ A clear distinction was observed between the European and Commonwealth military on the one hand and the US military on the other. According to Dobbie, Somalia demonstrated the importance of impartiality, patience, trust, mediation, restraint and the avoidance of escalation – all of them serving to develop cooperation by protecting and supporting the all-important consent. He concluded that “the requirement for consent is the parent of the principles and techniques of wider peacekeeping”.²⁷⁸ Dobbie’s view was shaped by analysing UNOSOM II, conducted from early 1993 to early 1995. Particularly the escalating encounters between US Forces and the Somali warlord Aidid in late 1993 sharply demonstrated the contrast between American over-reliance on force and ignorance of impartiality on the one hand and the restraint and conciliatory way of Australian, French and Belgian troops on the other.²⁷⁹

Several drafts of ‘beyond peacekeeping’ were written under the influence of this perception. By 1994 the Army was two years into its continued deployment to Bosnia and had experienced major difficulties due to the

277 Woodhouse, Tom. *The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies*. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 24–37, pp. 26 and 32. For more details on the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) see URL http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2.htm.

278 Dobbie, *A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping*, p. 144.

279 In Dobbie’s eyes, particularly the incident in Mogadishu in October 1993 – when US Task Force Ranger lost 18 soldiers and killed hundreds of local civilians in a raid on the stronghold of Somali faction leader Mohammed Farah Aidid – gave evidence of the failure of a too aggressive approach to peacekeeping. The incident has become well-known as ‘Blackhawk Down’ due to a book presenting a detailed account: Bowden, Mark. *Blackhawk Down*. London: Bantam Press, 1999.

absence of international determination, expressed in the weak mandate of UNPROFOR, and the growing ‘mission creep’.²⁸⁰ Commanders on the ground were keen to receive more adept principles of action, and commanders at home were keen to have a document at hand which could explain to the government and the wider public what the Army was doing in Bosnia. As a result, the pressure to publish the manual grew.

At that time, Charles Dobbie resigned from the Army, an event that saw Wilkinson made the lead writer of the project. He consolidated a final version, which was published as *Wider Peacekeeping* in late 1994. On the whole, the document was still characterised by Dobbie’s black-and-white approach to peacekeeping. The 1995 *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, which announced the completion of the new doctrine for peacekeeping, reflected this view by concluding that “today’s peacekeeping operations are intrinsically no different from traditional peacekeeping – hence the choice of the term wider peacekeeping”.²⁸¹ Wilkinson, who had from early on displayed awareness of the ‘middle ground’, insisted on the provisional character of the WPK manual. His intention was to continue the work and in due course present an updated version.²⁸² Equally, several senior Army officers expressed their view that this did not constitute the final word of post-Cold War peacekeeping. Within the military establishment, the overall response to WPK was therefore characterised by scepticism.

Why then did the Army promulgate a document of which it was itself so critical from the outset? The motive behind the publication of *Wider Peacekeeping* has to be seen in the political environment at the time and the specific context of Bosnia. It seems clear that the Service was of two

280 Mission creep: NATO views ‘mission creep’ as one of the risks of multinational cooperation due to differing national interests or unclear political aims for an operation; it is described as an “adoption of additional tasks to a mission that may not conform to the original purpose and run counter to the political and military intentions of some of the nations that contribute to the multinational operation”. In: *Allied Joint Doctrine (Allied Joint Publication 01(A) Change 1)*. Brussels: NATO Military Agency for Standardisation, 1999, p. 2.10. See also Pugh, Michael. *From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep? Implications of New Peace Support Operations Doctrine (Defence Studies 2/1997)*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997, p. 9.

281 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, p. 24.

282 “*The Origins and Development of PSO Doctrine*” – Panel Discussion 1, BMDG 4/2003.

minds during the late summer of 1992 when demands were being made for British troops to be sent to Bosnia. It was the pressure of society at large, the wide-spread calls that ‘something must be done’ against the bloodshed in the Balkans, urging the British Government to deploy troops. In addition, it was the wider global perspective of Britain’s security strategy and her Security Council responsibilities which required it. From the Army’s perspective, there were some obvious benefits because an operation abroad would provide the Army with a new task and thus emphasise the need for resources against the background of downsizing. On the other hand, parts of the Army’s establishment had severe reservations concerning involvement in Bosnia, fearing a dangerous entanglement in the Balkans’ civil wars and a potential over-stretch of personnel if more and more such operations became commonplace.²⁸³ Consensus seemed to form around a reluctance to engage, although in the end the politicians decided to deploy anyway.

As a result, the Army’s favour of non-involvement also impinged on the project of writing a new peacekeeping doctrine. This was the reason that the team was dominated by traditionalists such as Alan Mallinson and Charles Dobbie. Their concern about crossing a ‘Rubicon’ clearly showed that there was little enthusiasm for seeing British troops in the intricate environment of Bosnia. Moreover, if Dobbie was the man commissioned by senior military figures to write British Army doctrine, one might assume that his attitude largely reflected theirs.²⁸⁴

Undoubtedly, senior commanders considered the dangers of mission creep to be particularly great in Bosnia. As time passed by, however, the situation seemed to be manageable so long as the Army was involved in merely escorting convoys. The sending of only 1,800 troops was not a profound threat to the other core tasks such as maintaining a NATO mainland presence in Germany and supporting the civil authorities in Northern Ireland. But the Bosnia operation clearly had the potential to expand and to entangle the Army in intense intra-state conflict with the possibility of casualties and a sense of failure. The mission’s success, on the other hand, depended on various external actors and political factors. It was therefore a natural reflex of the Army to resist being drawn

283 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 48.

284 *Ibid*, p. 49.

into a situation in which the question of success or failure could not be influenced by the organisation itself.

Nevertheless, as the atrocities of ethnic cleansing and humanitarian disasters in Bosnia became public, the pressure was raising in political, academic and media circles to take a more aggressive approach in addressing the warring parties. The debate and publication of *Wider Peacekeeping* represented the Army's mechanism to lay out the limits of its involvement in Bosnia. It was a statement to justify what could and what could not be done, and to resist the adoption of dramatically new roles and missions. *Wider Peacekeeping* was therefore a means for justifying and explaining the Army's actions as part of UNPROFOR. The document was supposed to show who was right in the debate over Bosnia and to illuminate the difficulties involved in moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. It was thus an educational document, more political than military, primarily addressed towards an external audience. As Rod Thornton concludes in his study on the role of British PSO doctrine during the 1990s, "*Wider Peacekeeping* was not needed for the escort of convoys but it was needed to explain why the mission should not go beyond escorting convoys – it was a statement of what the Army could and could not do."²⁸⁵

4.3 Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Wider Peacekeeping

Wider Peacekeeping constitutes an important intermediary step from traditional UN peacekeeping to the later concept of Peace Support Operations. Although counter-insurgency thinking was not yet included into WPK, the doctrine nevertheless provided a useful bridge to explore new avenues.

First, the doctrine provided a new terminology and introduced the term of Peace Support Operations. They were defined as "the generic term used to describe those military operations in which UN-sponsored multinational forces may be used".²⁸⁶ WPK identified three categories of such operations: peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping was defined as "operations carried out with

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 51.

²⁸⁶ *Wider Peacekeeping*, p. 1.2.

the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict”.²⁸⁷ Wider peacekeeping was described as “the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile”.²⁸⁸ The tasks flowing from this were listed as conflict prevention, demobilisation operations, military assistance, humanitarian relief and the guarantee or denial of movement. Peace enforcement was defined as “operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities”.²⁸⁹ This categorisation clearly illustrates the ‘Rubicon’ approach of the authors. Wider peacekeeping was not detached from the idea of consent. Peace enforcement, in the sense of warfighting, was clearly not bound to consent and was therefore situated on the other side of the Rubicon.²⁹⁰

The new doctrine nevertheless acknowledged the changing operational environment in intra-state conflicts, for which ‘wider peacekeeping’ was supposed to be the answer. It listed the following potential characteristics for such situations: numerous parties to a conflict – as opposed to the traditional interposition between two formerly warring nations; the existence of undisciplined factions, not responsive to their formal authorities; an ineffective cease-fire; the general absence of law and order; gross violations of human rights; the risk of local armed resistance to UN forces; the presence and involvement of large numbers of civilian organisations, both governmental and non-governmental; the collapse of public infrastructure; the presence of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons; and an ill-defined area of operations.²⁹¹ Based on the complexity of this operational environment, the manual concluded:

Wider peacekeeping operations are thus likely to occur in environments that bear the characteristics of civil war or insurgency. The grievances of parties to the conflict may have origins that are barely comprehen-

287 Ibid.

288 Ibid.

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid, p. 1.3.

291 Ibid, p. 1.7

sible to outsiders. ... Random atrocity and large-scale human suffering may characterise the overall security environment.²⁹²

Clearly, the nature of the post-Cold War peacekeeping circumstances was recognised and described, all but in name, in its new complexity.²⁹³ Also, remarkably, the observation was made that the likely scenario had the characteristics of civil war or insurgency. At the same time, however, the document presented the concept of wider peacekeeping as based on the absolute consent of these very conflict parties it described as numerous, undisciplined, diffuse, not responsive to any authority and ready to put up armed resistance to international peace forces. This conceptual contradiction illustrates the fact that the unsolved debate between traditionalists and reformists – in this case between Dobbie and Wilkinson – had found its way into the published version of WPK. It further displays early signs of the idea to establish a link with counter-insurgency thinking, although the overall direction of the document did not yet depart from its roots in traditional peacekeeping.

Despite these encouraging new elements, WPK was not received well within the Army. The impression that the concept was still attached to an obsolete form of peacekeeping deterred those who called for a deeper reorientation. In the eyes of the reformists, it was merely a mild adaptation of the previous peacekeeping doctrine of 1988. The concept was flawed because it failed to establish the link to the Army's traditional COIN thinking and carried too much UN peacekeeping baggage to represent a truly new approach. The intellectual firewall between traditional peacekeeping and counter-insurgency had not been overcome. The document's prescriptive character, on the other hand, weakened its acceptance by those who otherwise might have welcomed a revised version of the peacekeeping manual. In their eyes, WPK was too negative and lacked flexibility.

The majority of readers correctly considered it to be more a political document than a military one. While other single-service doctrines – like the *British Military Doctrine* of 1989 or the *Air Power Doctrine* of 1993 – also represented the pursuing of particular Service

292 Ibid, p. 1.8.

293 The notion of 'complex emergencies' was only adapted into British PSO doctrine in 1997. See also Mackinlay, John. *Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies*. In: *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 114–131.

interests, they were nevertheless recognised for establishing new military-strategic and operational frameworks and providing some guidance for the future. WPK on the other hand, was judged to be a narrow document of its specific time and for its specific place, formulated for a specific situation. For warfighters, it remained the ‘wet philosophy of UN soldiering’. Neither was it a doctrine for the new type of operations emerging. It was rather aimed at solving a current problem: limiting the operation in Bosnia.²⁹⁴ It was calculated to prevent ‘something going wrong’ and, in the end, Mackinlay was right to point out that it “read like a military guide for individual survival, not as a doctrine for involvement in a multinational, multifunctional force”.²⁹⁵

* * *

Although WPK received harsh criticism and did not yet present the solution to the debate between peacekeeping traditionalists and reformists, it nevertheless was the first major step towards a new understanding of peace operations. In its substance, it carried a considerable amount of pre-1989 peacekeeping thoughts. In its overall relevance and in the debate it triggered, however, it provided a useful terminology and a starting point for a more comprehensive understanding of post-Cold War peacekeeping. As Wilkinson himself emphasised immediately after its publication, the document was considered as a provisional snapshot of an ongoing conceptual development.²⁹⁶

WPK is an excellent example of how early post-Cold War doctrine was also driven by the concurrence of external factors and specific internal interests. It was the political and social pressure at the time, which catapulted the Army into Bosnia in the absence of a clear strategy for solving the turmoils of the Balkan civil wars. As soon as the troops were deployed, the forces’ day-to-day activities demanded more coherent guidelines on the military-strategic and operational levels. Based on the interest to ensure its organisational health, the Army needed to justify its case for

294 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, pp. 51–52.

295 Mackinlay, John. *NGOs and Military Peacekeepers: Friends or Foes?* In: Jane’s International Defence Review 30, July 1997, p. 51.

296 Wilkinson, *The Development of Doctrine for PSO*, BMDG 4/2003.

limiting the involvement in Bosnia. By pushing the publication of the new doctrine, senior Army chiefs seemed to be responding to the sort of issues Mackinlay and others were raising and to the kind of problems troops were reporting back.

In reality however, the new doctrine presented largely the old type of peacekeeping and reflected the fact that the conceptual shift was only half-completed. If it was nothing new, and if senior officers seemed to reject the idea of doctrine for Bosnia anyway, there had to be some other rationale for its production. While the stated aim of *Wider Peacekeeping* was to act as “guidance to field commanders and staffs”, the document was produced with a broader audience in mind.²⁹⁷ By 1995 it was distributed to libraries and universities, was freely available in bookshops and was announced abroad as the definitive Peace Support Operations doctrine – which contradicted the internal view of its provisional character. On the back cover of the published version, it was nevertheless pointed out that the doctrine understood itself to be a “basis for discussion”. This describes, arguably, the document’s main function in the context of Britain’s overall doctrinal evolution during the 1990s: it served as a generator of debate.²⁹⁸

The idea of the Army’s counter-insurgency and peacekeeping circles being keen on doctrinal debate was certainly a novelty. *Wider Peacekeeping* was used as a means to persuade an external audience of the limits of the ensuing engagement in Bosnia and of the rightness of the Army’s doings. In short, the doctrine had a clear political function serving specific Service interests: the justification of its behaviour vis-à-vis Bosnia. In this context, WPK was also a response to wider social trends. The growing awareness of faraway conflict zones made Western civilian society demand intervention in humanitarian crises.

To conclude, *Wider Peacekeeping*’s place in British doctrinal evolution must therefore be seen as a catalyst for the intensifying debate on international military interventions. The resulting doctrine manual was, despite its flawed concept, probably the first British single-service doctrinal publication to acquire broad national and international inter-

297 *Wider Peacekeeping*, p. xii.

298 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 46.

est.²⁹⁹ Despite internal opposition, the doctrine represented the Service's first step of thinking about post-Cold War peacekeeping. It provided a useful platform from which further doctrine could be developed. And it undoubtedly met its aim to provoke further doctrinal discussion. Before Bosnia, only the Army's warfighting culture had developed a sense for understanding the relevance of doctrine in furthering Service interests. The promulgation of *Wider Peacekeeping* therefore marked the British Army's second major achievement in doctrinal evolution, as it extended the idea of doctrine into the area of Operations Other Than War.

299 Codner, Michael. *Purple Prose and Purple Passion: The Joint Defence Centre*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 36–40.

5 Maritime Power Projection: A Navy for the New Strategic Environment

Of the three Services, the Royal Navy was the last one to produce a high-level doctrine outlining its role in the post-Cold War environment. The appearance of *Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)* in 1995 was a conceptual milestone for maritime power.³⁰⁰ In military-strategic terms, BR 1806 marked the shift from command of the sea towards a broader approach of maritime power projection.

Despite this comparatively late codification of a new role-understanding, the Navy displayed the self-perception of being well prepared for the new tasks at hand. Internally, the collective view was that naval forces were inherently versatile and post-Cold War tasks showed a high degree of continuity compared to the Royal Navy's operations in the 1980s. A high-level doctrine was therefore not deemed necessary in the period after 1989. Confronted with inter-service rivalry, the Royal Navy gradually acknowledged the need for a written statement of its role in the new strategic environment.

Why did the Royal Navy publish its first post-Cold War military-strategic doctrine several years later than its sister Services?³⁰¹ The answer to this question is associated with the Service's specific organisational culture. This chapter therefore first explores the Royal Navy's organisational culture, characterised by its historical role-understanding as the senior Service and the process of contraction of naval capabilities during

300 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*. By Command of the Defence Council. London: HMSO, 1995.

301 A different opinion is expressed by Commander Steven Haines, principal author of BR 1806, 2nd Ed. and BDD, 2nd Ed. He has argued that the Royal Navy's BR 1806, published in 1995, was in fact Britain's first real military-strategic doctrine, based on the assumption that the Army's British Military Doctrine, published in 1989, was merely an operational-level doctrine and presented conclusions which the Royal Navy had already developed in the 1970s in form of its 'group deployments'. See Haines, Steven. *BR 1806 1995–2000*. Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Commander Steven Haines (RN), JDCC.

the Cold War. As a next step the chapter focuses on the debate leading to the production of BR 1806. Then an analysis of the doctrine's main themes demonstrates that – once the value of doctrine was recognised – the naval doctrinalists managed to grasp the challenges of the new strategic era fairly quickly. As a result, the concept of maritime power projection became the centre-piece of the Royal Navy in the 1990s.

5.1 Organisational Culture: The Royal Navy as the Senior Service

During her tenure period as a great power, from 1688 to the end of the Second World War, Britain was a sea power.³⁰² The British Empire's predominant military instrument was the Royal Navy. It provided both home defence and the means to reach the colonies and protect the relevant international trade routes. The defence of Great Britain as an island was subject to the control of the surrounding waters. In the geopolitics of great colonial powers, naval forces were the prime currency, and the Royal Navy's strategic weight and global reach ensured British dominance. The Army's role, in turn, was mainly confined to policing the Empire's various regions, the operations often characterised as internal security operations for suppressing local uprisings. The Army's contribution to home defence was restricted to a means of last resort by providing reserve units in the unlikely case of invasion. Only in the exceptional circumstances of the two World Wars did the Army's role match the Navy's strategic significance. This century-old understanding of the Services' distribution of roles made the Royal Navy to be the 'senior Service' well into the 20th century and left a distinctive mark on its organisational culture.³⁰³

In the context of Britain's long-standing great power status, two conceptual schools of thought on the proper use of sea power emerged. The first school of thought, also referred to as the 'Nelson tradition',

302 French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000*, p. xi–xviii. For 'sea power' see Tangredi, Sam J. *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*. In: Baylis, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, pp. 113–136.

303 Coker, Christopher. *British Maritime Power: Historical Perspectives*. In: Coker, Christopher, Michael Clarke and Colin McInnes. *British Maritime Power: Historical, Security and Military Perspectives (London Defence Studies 41)*. London: Brassey's, 1997, pp. 3–18.

contended that the proper application of maritime power was based on the principles of the decisive fleet engagement and the command of the sea. The Nelson tradition was associated with the history of the Royal Navy as the ultimate instrument of victory in the wars of national survival of the 19th and 20th centuries and with the large naval battles fought under Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson.³⁰⁴ Its concept received a significant input from the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US Navy Captain presenting the first comprehensive modern sea power theory in the run up to the First World War.³⁰⁵ His conclusions, a major part of which he had drawn from analysing the rise of British sea power from 1688 to 1805, argued for sea power as a strategic element in its own right and suggested that major wars were decided by decisive naval battles leading to the victor's command of the sea. The Nelson tradition was particularly strong up to the Second World War, coinciding with the period of the Royal Navy's status as senior Service.³⁰⁶

A second school of thought simultaneously emerging within the Royal Navy saw the application of maritime power as tightly linked with operations on land. Its main advocates were two British naval theorists of the first half of the 20th century, Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.³⁰⁷ The 'Corbett tradition' saw the relevance of a major fleet

304 Vice Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson, Viscount (1758–1805): Royal Navy officer in the Napoleonic War; regarded as the greatest officer in the history of the Royal Navy and associated with the climax of British sea power; killed in the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805, in the moment of his greatest victory against the combined French-Spanish fleet.

305 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914): American naval historian and strategic theorist; Captain in the US Navy; considered to be the father of modern sea power theory; his most influential work was: Mahan, Thayer Alfred. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1805*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1980 (first published in 1890). See also: Fry, Robert. *End of the Continental Century*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 15–18, p. 16; Tangredi, *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*, p. 116.

306 For a detailed analysis of the 'Nelson tradition' see Slater, Jock. *The Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 20–24, pp. 20–21.

307 Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922): British naval historian and strategic theorist; his most influential work was: Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988 (first published in 1911). Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond (1871–1946): Admiral in the Royal Navy and strategic theorist; his most influential work was: Richmond, Herbert

engagement only in so far as its effect could be measured in the prosecution of a land campaign. In the recurring debate of British strategists over maritime versus continental strategy, the Corbett school of thought joined rank with Liddell Hart's British way in warfare – the conduct of limited expeditionary operations in a minor theatre sustained from the sea and accompanied by the subsidy of local allies.³⁰⁸ To a certain extent the Corbett tradition anticipated the concept of maritime power projection that would prevail much later, after the end of the Cold War.

The post-1945 world order altered the balance in Britain's debate over maritime and continental roles, the long-term effect of which was a decline of the Navy's traditional seniority status. Two main factors were responsible for this development: the Cold War and the retreat from the Empire. From 1947 onwards, the East-West conflict dominated the international security agenda. As a key member of NATO, the United Kingdom committed itself to the defence of Europe. Its main contribution to the Alliance's collective defence was provided by the Army and the RAF, both maintaining large forward-based forces on the continent, where they specifically fit into the Alliance's military strategy for the Central Front. Britain's naval role within NATO's collective defence, meanwhile, was less clear-cut and underwent a lingering process of searching for its appropriate contribution throughout the Cold War.

The naval decline was further fuelled by Britain's simultaneous retreat from the Empire and the degradation of the country's great power status. Maintaining a navy of global importance was as much a function of economy as of defence. While the United States assumed super power status after 1945, Britain's growing economic difficulties gradually eroded the basis for maintaining the required size of a 'blue-water navy' – a navy capable of ensuring command of the sea in a global context. From 1949 onwards, while a growing number of former British colonies were lost to independence, Britain's military presence overseas was reduced. The imperial retreat generated a constant need for the Army, which for several decades collected valuable experience in low-intensity conflicts. The Royal Navy's role was the provision of strategic sea lift – or in other words carrying the Army's troops. While this was an important

W. *Sea Power in the Modern World*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934. Corbett and Richmond refined Mahan's sea power ideas into modern maritime strategy. See also *Tangredi, Sea Power: Theory and Practice*, pp. 122–123.

308 Slater, *The Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations*, p. 21.

component of military action, it provided little opportunity for glory. The protection of imperial Sea Lines of Communication declined in relative importance. In parallel, the defence of Europe became more important. This conceptual regionalisation of British defence policy during the Cold War and the retreat from the empire put the emphasis on land and air rather than naval capabilities.³⁰⁹

Within NATO, the United States was the dominant military power across the entire spectrum. During the first half of the Cold War, the Alliance's major war scenario acted on the assumption of a very short duration of war with the Soviet Union. With respect to naval capabilities, the US Navy provided the necessary power for NATO's needs, which was mainly the protection of the transatlantic SLOC. The control of the Eastern Atlantic Region was a vital element of NATO's reinforcement plans for the defence of Europe. As a consequence, the Soviet Navy had to be denied access to the Atlantic. In this respect, Britain's naval Service contributed to the Alliance's maritime strategy.³¹⁰ In real terms, however, the US Navy's preponderance was so overwhelming that its Soviet opponent was no match. In case of major war, the US could have taken on the Soviet Navy on its own, both keeping it at bay globally and simultaneously commanding the vital reinforcement routes to Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that Britain's sharing in naval burdens was highly appreciated, the Royal Navy's role could be compared to that of a 'spare wheel for a very short race'.³¹¹

Since the conceptual regionalisation and physical reduction of naval capacities continued throughout the Cold War years, the Navy's role seemed to be more and more blurred.³¹² Naval officers in the 1970s strongly felt the uncertainty within their Service. This general unease, which threatened to affect the organisational health, was amplified by the general disinclination in Western countries to use overt conventional military forces. It was the time of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, with

309 Coker, Christopher, Michael Clarke and Colin McInnes. *British Maritime Power: Historical, Security and Military Perspectives (London Defence Studies 41)*. London: Brassey's, 1997, pp. 3–11. See also Freedman, *The Politics of British Defence, 1979–1998*, p. 82.

310 A particular British speciality in the control of the Eastern Atlantic Region was anti-submarine warfare.

311 "Navy Doctrine in the 1980s" – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 2/2002.

312 Interview with Michael Codner.

its accompanying sense of military failure, and the Carter Administration's overall strategic hesitance.

One role, in which the Navy's contribution remained crucial and tangible, was the provision of strategic nuclear deterrence. From the 1960s onwards, the Royal Navy's fleet of Polaris submarines constituted the centre-piece of the country's independent nuclear deterrence. Although in the geostrategic balance of power, Soviet nuclear capabilities were counterweighted and deterred by US strategic nuclear forces, Britain was determined to have an independent nuclear capability and thus provide a 'second centre of decision-taking'. Strategic nuclear deterrence as the Navy's role remained, however, a constant issue of inter-service rivalry. The RAF in particular tried for a long time to compete for the role of strategic nuclear deterrence.³¹³

The descent from its status as the senior Service into a Service whose role in a potential major conflict was not entirely clear, made the Royal Navy a relatively easy target in times of defence budget reductions. The Nott Review of 1981 marked such a particularly threatening attack in the eyes of the naval leadership.³¹⁴ The government's idea at the time was a much reduced Navy limited to Europe and the North Atlantic. The purpose was to generate substantial savings in the overall defence budget. As it happens, these plans were overtaken by the outbreak of the Falklands War in 1982. The deployment of a strong naval task force to the South Atlantic was an indispensable component of Britain's response to the Argentinean invasion. The conflict demonstrated the importance of maritime power and of joint amphibious operations. The Falklands virtually saved the Royal Navy from far-reaching reductions by providing the stage to prove the importance of a balanced naval force with

313 Quinlan, *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 1–4.

314 The Nott Review of 1981, called after the Secretary of State for Defence, suggested a substantial reduction of the RN's surface fleet and an enhancement of the maritime air and submarine capabilities. See: "Navy Doctrine in the 1980s" – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 2/2002; Bellany, Ian. *Reviewing Britain's Defence*. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, pp. 150–151.

global reach – if the British Government wished to retain the ability for independent national action.³¹⁵

The 1980s brought about the turning point in the Navy's conceptual crisis. At global level the Reagan Administration's re-emphasis on military strength radiated into Western security and defence circles. In Britain, the Falklands War seemed to prove the long-forgotten utility of conventional military force in out-of-area contingencies – previously, for many years, larger operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum had only been contemplated in the Alliance's framework. In NATO planning, the new assumption prevailed that a clash between NATO and the Soviet Union might go longer than previously anticipated. In naval planning, NATO concepts became strongly influenced by the new US *Maritime Strategy* announced in 1986, which suggested a more offensive approach. In case of major war, so the paper pointed out, the US Navy, supported by its NATO allies, would seek to knock the Soviet Navy actively out of the war instead of merely holding it at bay.³¹⁶ In this scenario the Royal Navy would play a more significant role than previously anticipated. This conceptual rebalancing of conventional maritime forces concurred with similar efforts in land and air warfare in the wake of the *AirLand Battle* debate.

The Royal Navy's confidence grew further through a number of operational involvements. While on paper the prime responsibility remained the contribution to the protection of the Eastern Atlantic Region, the 1980s witnessed a number of British naval deployments across the entire globe. Shortly after the Falklands War, the Armilla Patrol commenced: as the widening Iraq-Iran conflict threatened the unhindered flow of oil, several Western countries sent naval task forces to the Persian Gulf to protect international merchant ships. The mission was one of regional

315 Bathurst, Benjamin. *The Royal Navy – Taking Maritime Power into the New Millennium*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 4 (August 1995), pp. 7–13, p. 7. Similar views are expressed in: Bellany, *Reviewing Britain's Defence*, p. 159; Hill, Richard. *Navy Doctrine in the 1980s: Swirls, Eddies and Countercurrents*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Admiral (RN, Ret.) Richard Hill, Editor Naval Review.

316 Tangredi, *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*, pp. 125–129.

sea control encompassing surveillance, escorting and anti-mine tasks.³¹⁷ The Royal Navy was constantly involved in these operations during the 1980s. Then, after Iraq's invasion into Kuwait in the summer of 1990, British ships were part of a coalition patrol force tasked with imposing the UN embargo against Saddam Hussein.³¹⁸ After hostilities broke out, they participated in the military operations to liberate Kuwait. The Royal Navy's contribution to the coalition's naval force was small in comparison to that of the US. But, given the close ties and mutual trust between the two navies established over years of combined NATO exercises, the British were given an important role to play, which included some forward air defence for the US Navy's carriers and battle groups and anti-mine tasks.³¹⁹

While the Royal Navy's formal mission remained with NATO and the preparation for a potential major war, the ten years of Armilla Patrol in the Gulf produced very different experiences. The conceptual debate within the Royal Navy was thus no longer just preoccupied with the nature and duration of a single NATO scenario but was particularly fuelled by the implications of expeditionary operations. In terms of geography, they were clearly global and out-of-area. This questioned the regionalisation of the Navy to the Euro-Atlantic theatre that had taken place during the previous years. It further emphasised the need for a balanced maritime force covering the entire spectrum of capabilities. Concerning the use of force and the types of military tasks involved, such operations required flexibility and versatility, as the spectrum of tasks ranged from 'show of force' and embargo enforcement to fully-fledged warfighting. Thus, the Royal Navy's operational reality during the last decade of the Cold War foreshadowed the style of maritime force required in the new world order,

317 Codner, Michael. *British Maritime Doctrine and National Military Strategy*. In: Centre for Defence Studies (ed.). *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1996*. London: Brassey's, 1996, pp. 88–104, p. 4. Sea control: "The condition that exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of sea for one's own purpose for a period of time and, if necessary, deny its use to an opponent. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below." In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. S-3.

318 Abbott, Peter. *A Rationale for Maritime Forces in the New Strategic Environment*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 138, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 32–39, pp. 34–35.

319 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1991*, pp. 12 and 20–21. See also Craig, *Gulf War: The Maritime Campaign*, pp. 11–16.

namely the shift from sea control, as part of containment and deterrence, towards maritime power projection as part of stability projection and crisis intervention.³²⁰

This recovery of institutional confidence and the experimenting with various expeditionary tasks in the 1980s laid the foundation for the Royal Navy's rapid adaptation to post-Cold War priorities. Conceptually, however, these developments were not put into formal writing immediately. The Royal Navy's organisational culture was dominated by wide-spread aversion against written doctrine. Procedure manuals and tactical level doctrine for naval warfare had always existed in great variety – high-level doctrine fixing the Service's military-strategic framework was a different matter. Naval commanders felt uneasy about formulating a concept that appeared to be inherently prescriptive. As a matter of fact, they even considered it to be dangerous for admirals to be bound by formulae.³²¹ Prescriptive doctrine could endanger flexibility and freedom of action, two principles held high in the maritime environment and embedded in the Navy's decentralised command and control philosophy.³²²

Conceptual thinking therefore developed in a rather organic, improvised manner, emerging in line with the needs of actual naval operations. Committing the Service's role and posture as well as its perception of future operations into one specific paper was considered unnecessarily risky in the inter-service competition and dogmatic with respect to the Service chiefs' freedom of action. Internally, the perspective was that the Royal Navy had always had a higher level doctrine – for those who knew where to look it up, as the conceptual basis was spread across several reports and studies.³²³ Clearly, this way of developing and processing conceptual thinking lacked a systematic and coherent approach, not to

320 Parry, Chris. *Navy Doctrine in the 1980s – Changes and Continuity at Sea*. Paper Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 by Commodore Chris Parry, MoD. See also Fry, *Operations in a Changed Strategic Environment*, p. 35.

321 Codner, *British Maritime Doctrine and National Military Strategy*, p. 3.

322 For decades the Royal Navy went about its business on a tactical-level manual called 'Fighting Instructions'. The document was however classified 'Secret' and hardly used by naval officers. Interview with Michael Codner.

323 Grove, Eric. *Themes in Navy Doctrine*. Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Dr. Eric Grove, Department of Politics, University of Hull.

mention the difficulty of teaching such dispersed wisdom. The notion that the purpose of military doctrine was not prescription but rather the provision of a common starting ground for innovative thinking had not yet trickled into the Navy's understanding. More change was needed to impact on the Service to overcome the aversion against doctrine writing.

The *Options for Change* process directed the main pressure of downsizing towards the Army. The Royal Navy was nevertheless forced to endure its share of reductions, which amounted to about 20 % of its size.³²⁴ In the 1993 *Statement on the Defence Estimates* the three Defence Roles expressing British defence policy were broken down into some fifty military tasks.³²⁵ Some of these military tasks concerning the maritime component were the "security of the Falklands and South Georgia" under Defence Role One, the "maritime rapid reaction forces [for NATO]" under Defence Role Two and the "provision of a military contribution to operations under international auspices" as part of Defence Role Three.³²⁶ The emerging trend reflected the fact that Britain's post-Cold War military strategy required more expeditionary forces, able to conduct sustained operations at great distance from their home base.³²⁷

Maritime power was crucial for such expeditionary operations; its traditional hallmarks were reach, self-sufficiency, independence from host nation support and its capacity to contribute to the entire spectrum of military tasks, from constabulary operations – for instance anti-drug smuggling surveillance – to coercion and ultimately high-intensity warfare, including strategic nuclear strikes.³²⁸ Furthermore, the disappearance of

324 Bathurst, *The Royal Navy – Taking Maritime Power into the New Millennium*, p. 8.

325 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1993*.

326 Defence Role One was to ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories; Defence Role Two was to insure against any major external threat to the United Kingdom and her allies (NATO); Defence Role Three was the promotion of the United Kingdom's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and security (including UN or OSCE mandated operations). See *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., pp. 25–28.

327 Till, Geoffrey. *Naval Planning after the Cold War*. In: Centre for Defence Studies (ed.). *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1993*. London: Brassey's, 1993, pp. 82–98, pp. 90–93.

328 Oswald, Julian. *The Reach and Scope of Maritime Power*. In *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 135, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 9–14, pp. 10–11.

the Soviet Navy meant that the attention and resources could be switched away from securing the control of the sea towards its exploitation.³²⁹ Exploitation meant that the control of the oceans was only a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. It was the precondition to apply maritime power in support of specific interests. Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, expressed this shift of maritime power in a presentation in March 1990:

The UK Government will continue to require maritime forces to be directed towards low-intensity security which will involve peacekeeping, disaster relief, protection of fishery and off-shore assets, operations to counter drug-running and piracy, and making a contribution to the control of the maritime environment. At the same time we must retain the capability at the higher level to defend our homeland, our dependent territories and our national interests worldwide.³³⁰

Admiral Oswald's statement demonstrates that the Royal Navy had an early understanding of the required shift maritime power was going to make in post-Cold War times. Due to the intensive need for naval forces in out-of-area contingencies during the 1980s, the Royal Navy had gradually familiarised itself with the notion of power projection. Furthermore, the idea to reverse the Navy's Cold War regionalisation into a maritime force capable of global commitments concurred with the Service's core interests.

5.2 Doctrinal Debate: Preparing a Trojan Horse for Joint Doctrine

Paradoxically, the Royal Navy's immediate post-Cold War leadership clearly understood the new military-strategic rationale but refused to acknowledge the need to codify this understanding into a high-level doctrine. The idea to write a doctrine, wherein the Navy's adapted role would be explained to a wider readership, did therefore not arise within the admiralty but rather in mid-career circles.

329 Till, *Naval Planning after the Cold War*, p. 85.

330 Oswald, *The Reach and Scope of Maritime Power*, p. 14.

Some of the first ideas about post-Cold War maritime strategy were discussed in a number of papers produced within the Naval Staff in 1992 and 1993. While British ships were involved in patrolling the Adriatic Sea to enforce the arms embargo imposed upon the warring parties of Former Yugoslavia, the authors of these papers insisted on basing their considerations mainly on operations in the 1980s – which again reflects the strong sense of continuity felt by the Navy. Nevertheless, Operation Sharp Guard, Britain's contribution to the maritime blockade in the Adriatic from 1993 to 1996, provided some additional experience of the new use of maritime power.³³¹

Three of these internal papers were of particular importance in staking out the conceptual field for the development of a post-Cold War maritime doctrine. The first one of these Naval Staff papers was entitled *A Navy for the Nineties*; it specifically emphasised the relevance of the Navy's existing force structure and the operational experience, gathered during the 1980s, for the time ahead.³³² The second paper, *Maritime Power: A Change in Emphasis*, went a step further and noted for the first time the conceptual shift from sea control to power projection as the Navy's *raison d'être*.³³³ Further conceptual considerations were undertaken in the 1993 paper *Conventional Deterrence in the New Strategic Environment*, where the use of maritime force in support of diplomacy was explored.³³⁴ The paper made a significant early link between conventional forces and deterrence. In this context, the paper's authors also addressed the use of force in unclear political situations, which they expected to be more often the case in the blurred circumstances of regional crises.

By 1993 the key ideas of post-Cold War maritime thinking were carved out: power projection as the Royal Navy's most important contribution to the country's expeditionary military strategy and the use of maritime

331 Blackham, J.J. *Maritime Peacekeeping*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No. 4 (August 1993), pp. 18–23. See also *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, 1995, p. 51.

332 See Slater, Jock. *A Fleet for the 90s*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No. 1 (February 1993), pp. 8–20.

333 Codner, Michael. *The Development of the Royal Navy's Strategic Doctrine 1991–95*. Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Commander (RN, Ret.) Michael Codner, Assistant Director (Military Sciences), RUSI.

334 Michael Codner was involved in the writing of this paper. Interview with Michael Codner.

force in support of diplomacy. At the same time, the US Navy had strongly pushed its doctrinal development and published a strategy paper called *From the Sea*. It outlined the US understanding of modern maritime forces and their power projection capabilities. This paper immediately assumed lead character within Western naval thinking and particularly for Britain, due to the close ties between the two countries' navies.³³⁵

Parallel to this, the Army's *British Military Doctrine* and the RAF's *Air Power Doctrine* were attracting interest and praise, demonstrating that the Navy's two sister Services had made important steps into doctrine development. While the admiralty agreed with the new role-understanding, they remained sceptical about the benefit of writing a doctrine. In the MoD's Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, however, a different view emerged. The increasingly joint character of ongoing operations raised the question of whether Britain's Armed Forces might in the near future conceive a joint doctrine. If so, the Naval Staff argued, the contributions of the three Services would be based on their respective single-service doctrines. The lack of a Royal Navy doctrine might therefore turn into a serious disadvantage as it would be more difficult to ensure naval influence on joint thinking.

Two consecutive Directors of Naval Staff Duties, Commodores Alan West and John McAnally, therefore began pushing the idea of writing a maritime doctrine. Both had attended the Army's Higher Command and Staff Course and were familiar with the notion of written doctrine and its significance for promoting Service interests and guiding military strategy. They established an informal group of Naval Staff officers, called the 'Committee of Taste', to explore the development of a Royal Navy doctrine.³³⁶ Commander Michael Codner, a Royal Navy officer who had been teaching at the US Naval War College in Newport and had returned to join the Naval Staff in 1992, participated in the committee's discussions. In his retrospective, the purpose of a maritime doctrine was considered to be twofold: on the one hand to present a coherent rationale for post-Cold War maritime strategy, on the other to provide a sort of

335 "Navy Doctrine in the 1990s" – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 3/2002.

336 Directors of Naval Staff Duties: 1993–1994 Commodore Alan West; 1994–1995 Commodore John McAnally. "Navy Doctrine in the 1990s" – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 3/2002.

‘Trojan Horse’ that would ensure the inclusion of maritime thinking into joint thinking.³³⁷

Lacking both an institutionalised doctrinal process and top-down guidance, the Royal Navy’s first doctrine project was organised on an ad hoc basis. The project officially started in April 1993. Some mid-career officers were tasked with collecting relevant material which was then discussed in the Committee of Taste. Of particular importance was a doctrine seminar held at the Naval Staff College in Greenwich in November 1994, which also provided the exchange of ideas with a wider circle of naval officers and academics.³³⁸ In due course Michael Codner was tasked with the actual writing of the doctrinal document. He received further assistance from Dr. Eric Grove, a naval historian from the University of Hull.³³⁹ Both had been involved from the beginning and were also familiar with US maritime thinking, particularly Codner as an alumnus of and lecturer at the US Naval War College.³⁴⁰ After the conclusion of the Greenwich seminar the two authors started work and delivered a first draft six weeks later. After internal circulation, for the purpose of reviewing, and the amendment of a glossary, the Directorate of Naval Staff Duties published the *Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* at the end of 1995.

While the Royal Navy’s senior leadership did not oppose the project, which was largely pushed bottom-up, they did not express great interest either. As some of the involved doctrinalists remember, the feeling at the time was that some senior commanders “thought it a bit of a nuisance”.³⁴¹ However, once the final draft was presented, the Navy Board accepted it as formal doctrine and considered it to be an authoritative starting point for future debate. In his foreword to BR 1806 Admiral Sir Jock Slater, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff at the time, expressed his supportive attitude and acknowledged the need for doctrine:

There has always been a doctrine, an evolving set of principles, practices and procedures that has provided the basis for our actions.

337 “*Navy Doctrine in the 1990s*” – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 3/2002.

338 Interview with Michael Codner.

339 “*Navy Doctrine in the 1990s*” – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 3/2002.

340 Interview with Michael Codner.

341 “*Navy Doctrine in the 1990s*” – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 3/2002.

This doctrine has been laid out somewhat piecemeal in various publications and there has never been a single official unclassified book describing why and how we do our business. This publication [BR 1806] aims to fill that gap by drawing together the fundamentals of maritime doctrine.³⁴²

Slater further emphasised that it was “current doctrine which gives us all – both within the Service and beyond – a firmer idea of what we are about” and that it was “a necessary foundation for the formulation of joint doctrine with the other Services”.³⁴³ Since one of the doctrine’s main objectives was to strengthen the Navy’s profile in the inter-service debate, BR 1806 was launched with a press conference at RUSI and distributed widely. The target audience were government officials and high-ranking MoD and military personnel as well as politicians and interested media representatives.³⁴⁴

5.3 Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Maritime Power Projection

The publication of *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* marked the first maritime doctrine on the military-strategic level. After the Service’s long-standing resistance against the idea of a high-level doctrine, one of the first accomplishments of BR 1806 was to present the Royal Navy’s new understanding of the role of doctrine:

[Doctrine is] a framework of principles, practices and procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis for action. Maritime doctrine fulfils this function for the use of military power at and from the sea to achieve policy objectives. ... This publication is concerned with the

342 Foreword by Admiral Sir Jock Slater, in: *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed.

343 Ibid.

344 In its introduction, BR 1806 provides a different priority of target audience: first Royal Navy and Royal Marines officers and second the “wider readership which includes other Services, the Civil Service, Parliament, the academic community and the news media”. In: *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., pp. 11–12.

principles that govern the translation of national security and defence policy into maritime strategy, campaigns and operations.³⁴⁵

The authors of BR 1806 had anticipated the fear of doctrine sceptics who tended to equate doctrine to dogma. As outlined previously, this attitude was particularly strong in naval circles. In order to forestall such potential criticism, BR 1806 noted that it was “important to prevent it [doctrine] becoming dogma” and that doctrine “must evolve as its political and strategic foundations alter, and in the light of new technology, the lessons of experience and the insights of operational analysis”.³⁴⁶ This statement reflects the Royal Navy’s recognition of the role of military doctrine as it had been introduced by the other Services.

An important novelty of the Navy’s role-understanding was reflected in the fact that BR 1806 outlined a *maritime* as opposed to a *naval* military strategy. The distinction between the two notions was explained as follows:

This document is specifically concerned with the application of maritime power, as opposed to naval power. The difference is significant. Maritime power is inherently joint in nature. It emanates from forces drawn from all three Services, both sea and land based, supported by national and commercial resources, exercising influence over sea, land and air environments.³⁴⁷

This conceptual link to jointery demonstrates the Navy’s clear understanding of current and future military operations in which the classical separation of land, air and naval forces became less applicable; it also hints at the maritime doctrine’s implicit intention of securing Service influence in a potential joint doctrine. The notion of maritime power, which according to the authors could be traced back to Corbett’s writings, was introduced only in BR 1806 and would hence be part of Britain’s military vocabulary.³⁴⁸ The new doctrine was, in essence, an adaptation of the Corbett school of thought to the post-Cold War environment.

345 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 12.

346 *Ibid*, p. 13.

347 *Ibid*, pp. 14–15.

348 Grove, Eric. *BR 1806: The Intellectual Foundations*. Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Dr. Eric Grove, Department of Politics, University of Hull.

The relevant defence policy papers in the post-*Options for Change* period, mainly the *Defence White Papers* between 1993 and 1995, provided only a sketchy guidance for maritime purposes. As a consequence, the first chapter of BR 1806 dealt with Britain's security and defence policy and with a general understanding of armed conflict in order to position maritime military strategy within the broader strategic framework.³⁴⁹ The second chapter presented a concept for the categorisation of the use of force. In establishing a single conceptual framework to cover all applications of maritime force, the doctrine proposed to distinguish three basic modes in which armed force could be used: military, constabulary and benign.³⁵⁰ The essence of the military mode was that combat power was used, threatened or implied in such a way as to create or negate a decisive event. The constabulary mode of using force was also known as policing. In a constabulary operation a national or international law or mandate would be upheld by the threat or use of minimum force only as a last resort. The third category, the benign use of force, would be applicable when capabilities not directly related to combat were employed, such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

This categorisation of military, constabulary and benign use of force was criticised by voices outside the Navy, particularly the Army. The naval doctrinalists, however, considered the categorisation to be useful for the maritime environment in which the tasks at hand could range from non-combat roles such as 'estate management at sea' to military roles in the context of sea control, sea denial or maritime power projection.³⁵¹ After all, the notion of constabulary use of force was appropriate when describing maritime forces upholding or enforcing national and international laws, mandates or regimes on the seas. The authors disapproved of the Army's terminology, which distinguished between 'war' and 'Operations Other Than War'.³⁵² Although BR 1806 otherwise tended to

349 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., pp. 18–25.

350 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

351 For 'estate management at sea' see Tangredi, *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*. Geoffrey Till describes the same concept as 'good order at sea'. See Till, *Naval Planning after the Cold War*, p. 88.

352 By 2001 the joint terminology suggested the use of 'Other Operations' rather than 'Operations Other Than War', to reflect the need for similar combat capabilities in situations short of war. See *Joint Operations (Joint Warfare*

correspond with the two existing sister Services' operational concepts, the Navy preferred to stick to its own categorisation of the use of force; the concept was retained even in BR 1806's second edition, which was published in 1999.

The central military-strategic theme of the document was maritime power projection. The expression, originally coined in the 1970s, had up to this point been related to combat operations from the sea against the land; it had further been associated primarily with the US Navy rather than its European counterparts. The new maritime doctrine's merit was to introduce the concept into British military understanding and define it in a broader sense: "The projection of maritime power is the application of maritime power from the sea to influence events on land directly. [It] is a concept that has broad application both during hostilities and for crisis management."³⁵³ The concept was no longer understood in an exclusively combat-related context. Power projection was considered equally central for crisis management. It was an important contribution to naval diplomacy, providing the principal seaborne instruments of coercion and reassurance. The sailing of power projection forces in itself could already demonstrate political resolve without a specific statement of commitment. A maritime power projection force could furthermore provide the main or the lead elements of an intervention operation, a non-combatant evacuation or a mobile base for humanitarian assistance or Peace Support Operations.³⁵⁴ Thus, in BR 1806's new definition, maritime power projection became applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. It claimed to be the central part of the maritime component of Britain's expeditionary military strategy.³⁵⁵

The concept of sea control, which was very closely linked to maritime power projection, was another important theme of BR 1806. Sea control was defined as "the condition in which one has freedom of action to

Publication 3-00). Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff. Shrivenham: JDCC/MoD, 2001, p. Glossary-7.

353 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 70.

354 Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) are defined as: "Operations involving the removal of UK nationals, and others if requested, from foreign territory using military forces to carry out that removal." In: *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 22.

355 *Ibid*, p. 71.

use the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time, and, where necessary, to deny its use to the enemy".³⁵⁶ Sea control was freedom of action translated into the maritime environment; it was, therefore, a requirement for the use of the sea, whether in peace, crisis or war. Sea control was noted to be not an end in itself but a means to ensure access to the SLOCs and the exploitation of the oceans for other purposes. Sea control was the precondition for maritime power projection.³⁵⁷

The operational level of the new doctrine, therefore, addressed the military application of maritime power, based on the concepts of sea control and power projection. As the document stated, military applications did not fall neatly into the two categories of power projection and sea control since a degree of sea control was considered to be an enabling requirement for most maritime roles and tasks.³⁵⁸

The Royal Navy's first task remained the maintenance of strategic nuclear deterrence. It was ensured by the Navy's fleet of Nuclear Powered Missile Firing Submarines (SSBN).³⁵⁹ The new Trident ballistic missile system, which replaced the Polaris system during the first half of the 1990s, ensured the flexibility to provide both strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons. As previously outlined, apart from some modernisation post-1989 British nuclear policy did not change substantially compared to the period of the Cold War. The Royal Navy's deterrent role did therefore not feature any fundamental change either. The short paragraph in BR 1806 addressing the subject of nuclear deterrence implies the relative decline of its significance in conceptual terms. The interesting issues laid undoubtedly in the new possibilities of, and requirements for, conventional power.³⁶⁰

More attention was therefore raised by the various conventional uses of maritime forces: combat operations against land forces, combat operations in defence of forces ashore, evacuation operations, and naval force in support of diplomacy were all discussed in details. The relatively new concept of Peace Support Operations was also touched

356 Ibid, p. 66.

357 Ibid, pp. 66–67.

358 Ibid, p. 82.

359 Witney, *British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War*, pp. 97–98.

360 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 83.

on.³⁶¹ Some of these roles displayed a high degree of continuity from the Navy's operations in the 1980s.

A concept that called for a new definition and an adaptation to post-Cold War circumstances was the idea of 'naval force in support of diplomacy'. BR 1806 presented naval diplomacy as part of a continuum of military actions employing coercion, persuasion and reassurance that linked peacetime presence at one extreme – i.e. when the targets and effects might be non-specific – with, at the other end of the scale, the coercion of a clearly defined enemy after major hostilities had begun.³⁶² Naval diplomacy would be preventive, precautionary or even pre-emptive in character. In this context, another significant contribution of BR 1806 was the issue of political objectives. While selection and maintenance of the aim was accepted as a general principle of war, the experience of maritime forces in crisis management was that political objectives were more often than not opaque, multiple and liable to change. The very concept of maritime power offered the government choices when political objectives were unclear.³⁶³

BR 1806 also linked up with the debate on manoeuvre warfare, which originated in operational level developments of the 1980s and had been introduced into British military thinking through the Army's *British Military Doctrine*. For the Navy's doctrinalists, manoeuvre as a rationale for warfare was an ambiguous concept that seemed to have little relevance in a maritime context – except in highly figurative senses of seizing and maintaining the initiative and of achieving success through disruption rather than physical destruction. From their perspective, maritime power was inherently manoeuvrist:

Historically and from the standpoint of modern doctrine, a navy does not have a choice between manoeuvre and other styles of warfare. Manoeuvre warfare theory is the intelligent use of force and is a logical development of the 'principles of war', particularly the principles

361 A more comprehensive approach to Peace Support Operations, however, came with BR 1806's second edition in 1999. See *Naval Capabilities: The Launch of the British Maritime Doctrine*. Panel on the 'Second Edition of BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine' at RUSI on 17 May 1999. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 4 (August 1999), pp. 65–71, p. 70.

362 Codner, *British Maritime Doctrine*, p. 14.

363 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 87.

of surprise, flexibility, concentration of force and economy of effort. Maritime forces have the combination of mobility, firepower, flexibility and responsive command and control systems that is ideal for manoeuvre warfare. It may be considered more an attitude of mind than an operational blueprint.³⁶⁴

Thus, despite expressing a certain degree of unease with the notion of manoeuvre warfare, the authors basically integrated the concept into maritime doctrine. The manoeuvre warfare concept became a recurring issue in British doctrinal debate during the 1990s.³⁶⁵ It was gradually refined by all three Services and included into joint doctrine by 1997.

* * *

In the post-Cold War era the Royal Navy was moving away from the naval tradition dominated by the twin concepts of command of the sea and decisive fleet engagement – the Nelson tradition – towards a military-strategic framework where the emphasis was on joint force projection from the sea to the land – the Corbett tradition.³⁶⁶ Corbett's school of thought prevailed because it provided a starting point to translate maritime power into the new world order. In essence, it corresponded with the overall shift from containment to stability projection, similar to the Army's shift from territorial defence to rapid reaction. As many of the new security challenges called for crisis interventions in faraway regions, maritime forces became ever more important due to their global reach, logistical flexibility and military versatility. The Royal Navy's contribution to NATO maritime forces remained unchanged, but the threat of the Soviet Navy was no longer decisive for force planning and conceptual develop-

364 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., pp. 73–74. See also Codner, *British Maritime Doctrine*, p. 14. Principles of war: "Guides to action and fundamental tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning, but their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with circumstances." In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. P-11.

365 For instance: Fry, Robert. *Myths of Manoeuvre*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 142, No. 6 (December 1997), pp. 5–8; Fry, Robert. *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 143, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 41–44; Gray, Peter W. *The Contribution of Air Power to Manoeuvre Warfare*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 145, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 60–62.

366 Fry, *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*, p. 43.

ment.³⁶⁷ The Navy was required to provide a broad set of capabilities for a wide range of tasks and to transform its understanding of maritime power into a component of the emerging expeditionary military strategy.³⁶⁸

By mid-1995 the Royal Navy had overcome its scepticism about the relevance of doctrine. The main driving force behind the first doctrine publication was Service politics – to construct the previously mentioned Trojan Horse ensuring the Service’s influence on joint programmes. The immediate post-Cold War era confronted the armed forces with a contraction of defence capabilities, a certain lack of strategic guidance and a high frequency of operational commitments. Air and land forces had been quick to draft high-level documents setting out their specific roles within an increasingly complex and joint environment. This background finally convinced the naval leadership that it was time to throw overboard its traditional aversion against formal doctrine and draw level with the other Services. The process of developing BR 1806 went along improvised lines and the spadework was done lower down the chain of command. Under the patronage of two successive Directors of Naval Staff Duties, a group of mid-career officers, familiar with US maritime concepts, drafted the doctrine. Although some admirals remained disinterested in doctrine while BR 1806 was being drafted, the end product was readily accepted as the thinking of the Service’s leadership and was officially endorsed by the Navy Board.

In its substance, the key message of BR 1806 was its emphasis on influencing events ashore from the sea and the direct contribution thereby to an expeditionary military strategy that allowed Britain to act abroad, whether independently or as part of a coalition. The prominent definition of maritime power projection as a fundamental concept was an important statement of purpose.³⁶⁹ The broadening of this definition beyond specific combat operations to include most applications of maritime power from the sea was to ensure the Royal Navy’s relevant role in any joint operation. Rapid reaction and jointery were both drivers and conclusions of the new maritime doctrine.

367 Abbott, Peter. *The Maritime Component of British and Allied Military Strategy*.

In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 6 (December 1996), pp. 6–11.

368 Cobbold, Richard. *A Joint Maritime-Based Expeditionary Capability*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 4 (August 1997), pp. 23–30, p. 23.

369 Till, *Europe’s Maritime Strategy*, pp. 34–35.

In sum, BR 1806 represented a coherent approach to the new strategic environment and its maritime implications. The innovative aspect was not so much a fundamentally new understanding of maritime strategy, the single elements of which had started to emerge before 1989. As outlined above, the Service had unanimously recognised the necessary change of direction early on, based on various out-of-area involvements preceding the end of the Cold War. The real innovation, however, was the acceptance of formal doctrine as a high-level statement of the Service's role and as an instrument of change management. While the document was considered to be authoritative, it was emphasised that it should not be "worshipped as holy writ".³⁷⁰ BR 1806 was understood to be the collectively accepted and formally promulgated maritime doctrine at the date of publication. Doctrine development, however, would continue. Henceforth maritime doctrine was to be a continuous process of conceptual development, exploring new avenues and revising existing ones. At last, the Navy had entered the 'doctrine business'. A second, revised edition of BR 1806, adjusted to the new framework of the *Strategic Defence Review* and the *British Defence Doctrine*, was published four years later.³⁷¹

370 *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 1st Ed., p. 184.

371 *Naval Capabilities: The Launch of the British Maritime Doctrine*, pp. 65–71.

6 Doctrine: Instrument of Service Policy and Change Management

The evolution of British military doctrine during the 1990s is connected to the efforts of rebalancing nuclear and conventional military power in the late 1980s. Towards the very end of the Cold War the decade-long predominance of nuclear deterrence was complemented by an upgrade of conventional capabilities – which finally rendered the strategy of ‘flexible response’ truly flexible. The breakthrough of conventional military power as a military-strategic instrument in its own right, however, only occurred once the Cold War paradigm disappeared and Western defence establishments had to come to terms with the uncertainty and dynamics of a new era. The fresh interest in conceptual innovation and the idea of written doctrine reflect these developments.

Viewed in a larger perspective, the first signs of the re-emergence of conventional military power were already set in motion in the mid-1970s, when the impact of the Vietnam War forced the US Armed Forces to review their conceptual bedrock.³⁷² Against this backdrop of hard-won lessons from limited but high-intensity conflicts, defence analysts and military commanders alike started questioning the over-reliance on nuclear deterrence. In the rationale of the early Cold War the sole strategic role of conventional forces had been to serve as a subfunction of deterrence: to buy time and thus delay the crossing of the nuclear threshold.³⁷³ For this purpose, however, they needed to be credible – a requirement that appeared to have been neglected for many years and called for more investment and new conceptual approaches. The formulation of the *AirLand Battle* and the *Maritime Strategy* as well as the refocusing on the operational level of warfare in NATO’s layer cake defence has to be viewed in this larger context.

This climate of innovation also reached Britain’s Armed Forces, first in the British Army of the Rhine, where cross-corps battle plans were

372 Spiller, *In the Shadow of the Dragon*, pp. 45–46.

373 Farndale, *United Kingdom Land Forces Role and Structure into the 21st Century*, p. 7. See also Mackenzie/Reid, *British Army and the Operational Level of War*, p. 2.

drawn up and the possibilities of manoeuvre warfare explored.³⁷⁴ All these developments are indications that conventional military power entered the process of reevaluation before 1989. As long as the Soviet threat remained the predominant issue of Western security concerns, however, nuclear strategy ruled the day and overshadowed any consideration in conventional warfare development. Only with the strategic, technological and social changes in the aftermath of the Cold War could conventional capabilities come to serve as an active instrument for shaping international affairs.

At first sight the re-emergence of conventional military strategy was hardly foreshadowed by the dramatic change of 1989. The end of the East-West confrontation gave way to widespread hopes of international affairs entering a peaceful era in which differences of interest would be solved without resorting to the use of military force. After national survival was no longer at stake, postmodern Western society was less inclined to bear the human, economic and political costs and moral responsibilities of military action.

Within short time this initial sense of optimism was dampened as the end of superpower competition unleashed a wave of regional and ethnic conflicts. The international response, led by the major Western powers and usually with considerable British contribution, called for the deployment of intervention forces to contain and stabilise some of the more serious crises. In the unfolding post-Cold War strategic environment, conventional military power was more frequently used to influence and shape the conditions on the ground for a political resolution of regional and intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, the recent advancements in military technology made the use of lethal force appear to be more cost-effective and discriminate, a perception that reduced the political liability of military intervention somewhat. The prospect of 'sanitised war' based on the use of high-technology precision weapons, and public expectations to stop mindless bloodshed in far away civil wars resulted in growing demands for humanitarian interventions. The result was a rising number of Western military deployments.

The simultaneity of these changes, creating both new possibilities and new constraints for the use of military force, were powerful drivers of the Services' conceptual progress after 1989. Their organisational culture, formed by the collective perception of past experience and current roles,

374 Romjue, *The Evolution of American Army Doctrine*, p. 70.

had to absorb new missions and adjust military-strategic and operational concepts to the new circumstances. As Britain was part of the group of nations leading international stabilisation and crisis response efforts, her Armed Forces were required to offer a selection of choices. The associated military tasks covered a wide spectrum, ranging from mere show of force and preventive deployment, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to coercion by air strikes or direct military intervention on the ground. This was a tall order for defence planners and military commanders, considering the fact that their organisation underwent a serious downsizing and could not yet build upon a clearly defined post-Cold War security and defence policy framework.

At the same time, the many ongoing operations produced a steady flow of experience. A generation of British officers, previously preoccupied with the planning and preparing of the defence of Europe against a specific enemy, was now confronted with the need to rapidly familiarise themselves with a variety of new operational challenges. Not surprisingly, there was a strong need to process the cumulating field experience and to respond to the circumstances of new regional conflicts. As a result, military-strategic and operational level doctrines gained new relevance.

Another conceptual challenge originated from the RMA debate erupting in the first half of the 1990s. The new technological possibilities meant that conventional weapon systems received new leverage. On the one hand, this was due to the end of the predominance of nuclear strategy, under which the most important thinkers on military affairs had not been soldiers but civilians, the so-called “wizards of Armageddon”.³⁷⁵ On the other, the end of the Cold War coincided with a cumulation of significant technological advances becoming operational. The Gulf War 1990/91 provided the first signs of this growing network that linked information processing and communications systems with surveillance and reconnaissance platforms as well as with precision-guided weapons. Although a detailed analysis of the Gulf War has shown that the one-sided result was not only the result of Western technological superiority but also of extraordinary strategic and operational circumstances, the event nevertheless represented the prelude to a profound and vigorously pursued military transformation focusing on the technological aspect of warfare.

375 Summers, *Military Doctrine: Blueprint for Force Planning*, p. 10. See also Van Creveld, *High Technology and Transformation of War*, p. 80.

As a result, the employment and integration of high-technology systems became one of the key issues of military thinking during the 1990s, a process first and foremost led by the United States.³⁷⁶

As the closest allies of the United States, Britain was intent to participate in this transformation, though on a lower level. Still, British military theorists remained cautious not to over-emphasise the technological aspect of warfare at the expense of organisational and conceptual requirements. The experience from Northern Ireland and other low-intensity conflicts taught them to remain focused on the human aspects of conflict, which could not be addressed by mere technological superiority or by the use of massive firepower.

Paradoxically, while strategic and technological considerations resulted in a new readiness of Western governments to use military force for limited interventions, trends in the public consciousness ran counter to it. Postmodern Western society, in which political power was diffused away from the state to a growing number of non-state actors, turned out to be increasingly reluctant to bear the costs of armed conflicts.³⁷⁷ The early 1990s were the time of the peace dividend, manifested in the reduction of force structures and defence budgets and the public questioning of the military's warfighting role. Although the military action against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait had generally been accepted as a necessity, the successful conduct of the campaign already implied the limits of future military deployments which were not connected to direct national interests. In the eyes of a large public, warfare had to be conducted, if at all, surgically and with an absolute minimum of human loss and damaged infrastructure – on either side.

The success of the US-led coalition in the Gulf had nurtured such expectations. Political and moral constraints on the conduct of military operations influenced further doctrinal thinking. Notions like 'surgical strike capabilities', 'no friendly casualties', 'nonlethal weapons' or 'collateral damage' entered the doctrinal debate.³⁷⁸ Furthermore, doctrine had to address the role of the media in Western society. Postmodern

376 Freedman, *RMA in der Zukunft: nukleare versus konventionelle Strategie*, p. 19.

377 Eberle, *Utility of Military Power*, p. 47.

378 For an overview of non-lethal weaponry see Foster, Gregory D. *Nonlethality: Arming the Postmodern Military*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 5 (October 1997), pp. 56–63.

military operations were expected to be transparent; each step, each decision had to be accounted for publicly and at times even real-time. Such considerations clearly entered the domain of doctrine development. British doctrine started to address the delicate relationship between the military and the media. In the battle for public opinion, the military soon learned to recognise the media as part of the battlespace. Military commanders, assisted by press and information officers, had to be capable of handling the representatives of international news channels reporting from the theatre of operations. Public relations became a crucial part of military operations.

All the three Services' doctrines of the early 1990 reveal that doctrine in the immediate aftermath of the strategic change 1989/91 fulfilled three particular functions. Firstly, it was to provide an explanation and thus justification for the Services' continuing relevance in the post-Cold War era and thereby to respond to wide-spread public requests to downscale the military, both in terms of equipment and personnel as well as with respect to its warfighting role. Doctrine development served as an institutional instrument to address the strategic, technological and socio-political changes. In this respect, doctrine was a political statement on behalf of Britain's Armed Services, directed at an external audience: government officials, members of parliament, the media and the interested public. The three Services' doctrines did not merely outline the operational warfare in their associated environment but also a military-strategic framework pursuing their specific interest. A primary concern of all Services was to retain a balanced force structure and the full spectrum of capabilities, which specifically included the ability to operate at the higher end of the conflict spectrum.

Secondly, doctrine was to provide military-strategic guidelines within the Services themselves in the face of a rapidly changing environment. The shift from threat-driven to capability-based thinking occurred in a climate not only of defence contraction but also of scarce strategic guidance on the part of the Government. The long-term force development could no longer be based on the rationale of the Warsaw Pact's order of battle but had to address a multi-faceted and diffuse array of risks and dangers. Military doctrine was supposed address such ambiguities and compensate for the conceptual gaps left by a national defence policy that had not yet assumed a consolidated form. The increasing number of doctrine publications and related articles appearing in defence journals

demonstrated the rise to prominence of the British soldier-scholar, who was eager to argue for and debate over the intellectual underpinning of his institution.

Thirdly, the intensification of doctrine development was an attempt to provide conceptual guidance for military commanders challenged by the new operational environment and the more complex spectrum of conflict. Post-Cold War military operations usually took place in situations that could be described neither as war nor as peace. Particularly the British involvement in the Balkans from 1992 onwards raised a number of questions which needed fresh thinking. Furthermore, the experience from the Gulf War demonstrated that modern high-intensity warfare called for more flexible, more mobile and more effective forces, as the speed of operations accelerated and the expectations in avoiding casualties and collateral damage increased. Not surprisingly, the manoeuvrist approach, with its move away from attrition-based warfare, assumed centre-stage position in post-Cold War military thinking. This third purpose of doctrine mainly addressed an internal audience: the commanders and staff officers as well as MoD officials who were tasked with conducting military operations and designing the capabilities for future missions.

The thinking evolving around the new type of post-Cold War peace operations became an important pacemaker of British doctrinal evolution. As the United Kingdom's security policy demanded to maintain a prominent international role, the British Armed Forces got involved in a number of international peace operations. This new generation of peacekeeping interventions turned out to be far more complex than the UN's traditional concept foresaw and therefore called for conceptual reevaluation. The British counter-insurgency experience, which would have provided an invaluable starting ground, remained largely untapped in the process of formulating *Wider Peacekeeping*. The document's main purpose was political, despite its claim to address the new operational environment of peacekeeping. It served to justify the British Army's limited involvement in Bosnia. Although it received strong criticism from within, *Wider Peacekeeping* was nevertheless an important stimulator of the debate over a new approach to post-Cold War Operations Other Than War.

The re-emergence of conventional military power – reflected in the intensive doctrinal debate set in motion by the three Services – marked the first major step in the creation of a British post-Cold War military strategy. Some of the concepts and ideas were clearly geared up to the

new strategic environment, while some elements remained linked to previous perceptions. Nevertheless, the doctrinal evolution from 1989 to 1996 displayed the silhouette of a new military strategy emerging, which shifted away from the rationale of threat-driven territorial defence and nuclear deterrence towards a concept of capability-based forces intervening in crises and trouble spots for the purpose of projecting stability and preventing the further spread of instability.

Part II
Consolidation
of a Post-Cold War Military Strategy:
Joint Doctrine Developments,
1996–2002

Introduction

The developments in the second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of a consolidated British post-Cold War military strategy. The growing number of military interventions not only generated a vast flow of operational experience but also made the Armed Services to be in the focus of the Government's security policy with respect to crisis management.

A fresh phase of military transformation was initiated by the intermediary success of NATO's stabilising role in Bosnia, starting in late 1995 with the replacement of UNPROFOR by the more robust Implementation Force (IFOR). It received further impetus through the Kosovo crisis 1999, when NATO conducted offensive air operations to force the Milosevic regime into compliance. The coercive air campaign and the subsequent deployment of an international stabilisation force into Kosovo (KFOR) came to serve as a new model of intervention. Further British deployments towards the end of the decade – to East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (2000) and Macedonia (2001) – underlined the importance of joint expeditionary forces. With the *Strategic Defence Review* of 1998, British security and defence policy was placed into a consolidated strategic framework. Gradually, Britain's military regained its organisational health, as the downward trends in defence budgets and personnel levels came to a halt towards the end of the decade.¹

Not long after that, however, events pushed the evolution of military-strategic concepts yet a step further. The attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 marked the advent of a new security challenge: the threat of international terrorism directed against highly developed societies and aiming at mass destruction. Although terrorism had already attracted the attention of security analysts for some time, the terror attacks on Washington and New York marked a turning point. The events brought the potential impact of terrorism home to Western society which had felt relatively comfortable and at a safe distance from the trouble spots across the world. The new opportunities of industrialisation, information revolution and a globalised economy, however, altered fundamental

1 For a detailed analysis of the *Strategic Defence Review* see McInnes, *Labour's Strategic Defence Review*, pp. 823–845.

principles of international relations. The nation-state was losing its relative weight of power, non-state actors and small groups of individuals could cause strategic impact. WMD could be used by non-definable and unpredictable opponents, thus challenging the concept of deterrence as it had been dominant during the Cold War. Asymmetric threats came to dominate the international security agenda. The military operations in Afghanistan in 2002, again conducted by a US-led coalition, prompted a further chapter of conceptual debate over the military's role in crisis intervention in general and counter-terrorism in particular.

Military doctrine, meanwhile, entered its next stage of post-Cold War evolution. After the successful doctrinal developments of the three Services, the effort shifted towards the formulation of joint military-strategic doctrine. The land, maritime and air power doctrines were merged into an overall conceptual basis. The result was the emergence of a consolidated British military-strategic doctrine for the post-Cold War security environment. At the same time, doctrine underwent a process of institutionalisation. Its development was harmonised across the three Services through the establishment of a network of single-service and joint authorities, the incorporation of a commonly agreed terminology and the setting up of a hierarchy for all doctrinal statements. While in the first half of the 1990s the emphasis in doctrine development had laid on the pursuit of single-service interests, it now turned into a crucial instrument of promoting institutional innovation, fully integrated in the military's organisational culture. As a consequence, the contents of doctrine became more mature and more balanced.

To begin with, this second part of the thesis outlines the major forces of change shaping the British Armed Forces and their implications for military doctrine during the second half of the 1990s. Although the major strategic, technological and social trends set out in Part 1 remained instrumental, there were some significant new aspects. Part 2 then continues to explore the efforts to revise *Wider Peacekeeping*, which resulted in a new doctrine for Peace Support Operations that fully embraced the concept of peace enforcement. A key development of joint doctrine was the formulation of *British Defence Doctrine* in 1997 and its revision in 2001, which provided a military-strategic concept distilled from the various military lessons of the 1990s. The new urge of doctrinal development triggered by the rising threat of asymmetric conflict is explored in the context of the British Government's *New Chapter* of the *Strategic*

Defence Review. The thesis does, by no means, present a final answer to these latest doctrinal developments but rather examines the emerging trends and the direction of the current debate.

7 Military Transformation Rebalanced: The Environment Shaping Britain's Armed Forces, 1996–2002

As outlined previously, the macroclimate embracing post-Cold War military transformation remained the same for the entire period examined in this thesis. Britain's Armed Forces were challenged by the tasks of finding their role in a new strategic era, incorporating a cumulation of technological advances and absorbing the pressures of postmodern social changes. By depicting this overall pattern in more detail, however, some essential shifts occurring in the second half of the decade can be observed.

With respect to the strategic environment, it was the *Strategic Defence Review* in 1998 that symbolised the consolidation of post-Cold War defence policy and resulted in essential adjustments of the military's role, structure and capabilities. With respect to the technological environment, the debate in the second half of the 1990s was fuelled by a number of offensive air campaigns in the Balkans and the Middle East, while the infinite field of RMA thinking started to focus on the concept of 'network-centric warfare'. The military's response to the trend of civilianisation meanwhile shifted from a reactive to a more proactive manner, exemplified by the British Armed Forces' claim of a 'right to be different'. Overall, it could be argued that these shifts after the mid-1990s were the building blocks that enabled Britain's Armed Forces to regain their organisational health. The following subchapters explore these trends in more detail.

7.1 Strategic Environment: Consolidation of a Post-Cold War Defence Policy

By the mid-1990s the period of turbulence immediately following the end of the Cold War was left behind and Britain's defence policy was set on a somewhat steadier course. This attitude was also expressed in the 1995 *Defence White Paper*: it noted that the *Options for Change* downsizing was concluded and that the *Front Line First* study of 1994 had identified the potential for savings without reducing the front-line

capabilities further.² Various initiatives were launched to enhance the capability for joint operations and rapid reaction. But the turning point for British post-Cold War defence policy came with the defence review in 1997/98, the results of which were published in a paper called the *Strategic Defence Review*.

Defence was not an issue in the 1997 general election. In fact, there was remarkable convergence among the political parties on the major defence issues. Nevertheless, against the background of concerns about the Services' operational overstretch, undermanning and equipment shortfalls, the need for a comprehensive defence review was demanded by a rising number of commentators and was also propagated in New Labour's election manifesto.³ After Labour's victory in May 1997, the new Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson formally launched the work for the *Strategic Defence Review*.⁴ The aim was to provide the basis for a coherent, long-term defence programme up to 2015, fit for the needs of the post-Cold War world. The review was supposed to provide Britain's Armed Forces with a "new sense of clarity, coherence and consensus" and consider how their roles, missions and capabilities should be adjusted to meet the new realities.⁵ Though the work was originally scheduled to take six months, the *White Paper* was only published on 8 July 1998. In his introduction Robertson described the review as "radical", leading "to a fundamental reshaping of our forces" while being "firmly grounded in foreign policy".⁶

The review did not start from scratch. With respect to the strategic framework of Britain's defence policy, the assumptions having emerged in the years since 1989 were acknowledged. The review confirmed that Britain played a leading role in the world and that her Armed Forces

2 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, pp. 7–8.

3 For instance: Campbell, Menzies. *British Security and Defence Policy*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 3 (June 1997), pp. 35–38; Clark, David. *Labour's Defence and Security Policy*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 3 (June 1997), pp. 33–36; Rogers, Paul. *Reviewing Britain's Security*. In: International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1997), pp. 655–669.

4 Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, 28 May 1997. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (ed.) *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy. Volume II: 1997–1998*. London: TSO, 2003, p. 3.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *The Strategic Defence Review*, pp. 1–2.

were an important element of this international responsibility. NATO continued to be the foundation of European and, consequently, British security. Flowing from this, the need for strong and well balanced conventional forces and the retention of a minimum nuclear deterrence were reconfirmed. All of these assumptions represented the continuity with previous defence policy. The strategic framework, thus, was not radically new. Rather the SDR's accomplishment was considered to be a consolidation of existing wisdom.⁷

There was clearly a shift of emphasis from residual military threats in Europe to new transnational risks, like drug trafficking, terrorism and migration. They could result from regional instabilities, ethnic conflicts and competition over scarce resources in far away places.⁸ The identification of these risks was not new, but the issues were placed higher on the list of defence priorities. Interdependence, globalisation and the importance of international stability meant that these were problems which Britain could not ignore. The *Strategic Defence Review* therefore concluded:

The challenge now is to move from stability based on fear to stability based on the active management of these risks, seeking to prevent conflicts rather than suppress them. This requires an integrated external policy through which we can pursue our interests using all the instruments at our disposal, including diplomatic, developmental and military. We must make sure that the Armed Forces can play as full and effective a part in dealing with these new risks as with the old.⁹

Robertson pointed out that “we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us”.¹⁰ This marked the conclusion of the shift from a security and defence framework based on territorial defence and protection towards the rationale of using the military instrument in close integration with other governmental authorities and in applying military force as a preventive and stabilising instrument concentrated at the place where the roots of these security risks originated, rather than merely suppressing their symptoms.

7 McInnes, *Labour's Strategic Defence Review*, p. 831.

8 *The Strategic Defence Review*, pp. 8–9.

9 *Ibid*, p. 5. See also Rogers, *Reviewing Britain's Security*, p. 656.

10 *The Strategic Defence Review*, p. 2.

The SDR clearly stated that military forces were to play a key role in promoting British security interests at home and abroad. For this purpose, eight Defence Missions were formulated: 1) peacetime security; 2) security of the overseas territories; 3) defence diplomacy; 4) support to wider British interests; 5) peace support and humanitarian operations; 6) regional conflict outside the NATO area; 7) regional conflict inside the NATO area; 8) strategic attack on NATO.¹¹ In essence, this rearrangement of previous Defence Roles reflected a more analytic and more internationalist approach to defence than before, although the general direction was the same. The pattern of demands on military force emerging from these Defence Missions was considered to be fundamentally different from the Cold War, as the most demanding individual scenario against which one had to plan was “no longer all-out war in Europe but a major regional crisis involving our national interest, perhaps on NATO’s periphery or in the Gulf”.¹²

Some innovation was provided by the incorporation of ‘defence diplomacy’ as a full mission. It was also the only Defence Mission in the SDR to be accorded a ‘supporting essay’ in its own right, signifying the importance attached to it as an innovative shift in defence policy. Defence diplomacy was described as an increasingly important means by which the military could “act as a force for good in the world”.¹³ The new Defence Mission was established for the following aim:

To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MoD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁴

The three main areas of defence diplomacy activities were identified as: arms control, including confidence-building measures and non-proliferation initiatives; a new military task termed ‘Outreach’ which involved visits, military assistance, joint exercises and training programmes in Central and Eastern Europe; and a range of similar activities outside

11 Ibid, chapter 3.

12 Ibid, p. 209.

13 *The Strategic Defence Review – Supporting Essays*. London: TSO, 1998, pp. 4.1–4.3.

14 Ibid.

Europe.¹⁵ Although none of these activities were particularly new, the difference came in the new status accorded to them. It was again an indication of the foreign policy base of SDR and the importance attached to stability, within Europe and beyond.¹⁶ The difference from before was that these disparate activities were drawn together under one common purpose, rebalanced and presented as a Defence Mission. Furthermore, the defence diplomacy tasks were coordinated with the activities of other government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DfID).¹⁷ In essence, defence diplomacy was the British Armed Forces' contribution to conflict prevention.

The SDR also drew attention to Britain's position within Europe, pointing out that Britain was a leading member of the EU, based on her NATO membership and her 'special relationship' with the United States.¹⁸ This represented an attitude ready to exploit Britain's middle position between the US and Europe as a particular strength. The significant change in Britain's approach towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was presented at the St. Malo meetings in December 1998, when the British and French Governments agreed that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".¹⁹ Previously, Britain had sought to preserve US involvement in military operations at all costs. The shift in attitude reflected the experience from the first half of the 1990s, when the US had been reluctant to get militarily involved in the Balkans prior to the Dayton agreements.

15 *The Strategic Defence Review*, pp. 14–15.

16 McInnes, *Labour's Strategic Defence Review*, p. 837.

17 For 'defence diplomacy' see: Hills, Alice. *Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform*. In: Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 46–67; *Policy Paper No. 1 – Defence Diplomacy*.

18 Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium*, p. 195. See also Mauer, Victor. *Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union – Rückblick und Ausblick*. In: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Vol. 169, No. 6 (June 2003), pp. 10–12, p. 11.

19 Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France, 3/4 December 1998. Quoted as in: Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium*, p. 195.

The process of establishing the necessary political and military instruments for the EU seemed set for slow progress – until the Kosovo experience provided a renewed impetus. During the peak of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Europeans found themselves totally dependent upon an American decision to use force and to exercise control over the conduct of the air campaign. When the Americans subsequently put a limit on their own ground deployment, the Europeans were struggling to put sufficient land forces together in time to implement the peace agreement following the air campaign. Despite the ‘special relationship’, the British Government shared the overall European perception that after Kosovo the effort for an independent European military capacity had to be reinvigorated and pushed forward by concrete proposals. This led to the headline goals endorsed at the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999.²⁰

The Helsinki headline goals foresaw the provision by 2003 of up to 60,000 forces for the most demanding crisis management tasks, drawn from a pool of deployable units, able to conduct operations at corps level and militarily self-sustaining for at least one year. In due course, the British Government earmarked around 12,000 troops supported by 18 warships and 72 combat aircraft.²¹ Politically, the British support of the proposed European force represented the abandonment of previous opposition against the development of any independent European capacity. Clearly, the Labour Government tried to re-establish Britain at the centre of European security and at the same time to remain the special ally of the US. In terms of capabilities, the SDR and its follow-up political initiatives were aimed at giving Britain three options: the option to use force in conjunction with its European partners; the option to undertake independent action in support of dependent territories or as a lead nation for a Commonwealth-type operation; and the option to act in cooperation with the United States outside NATO.²²

20 Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium*, p. 196.

21 These forces were, of course, ‘dual-hatted’ to NATO. See Hoon, Geoff. Statement on “*European Defence Cooperation*” at the House of Commons on 22 November 2000 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL <http://www.uk/index.php3?page=2&nid=1059&view=812&cat=0>.

22 As for instance in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. See Guthrie, Charles. *Bringing the Armed Forces into a New Millennium*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 1–6, p. 1.

In respect to nuclear capacity, no fundamental change occurred. The SDR stated that only the minimum nuclear deterrence required for protecting the country's vital interests was to be maintained. A further reduction in stocks was put forward. The plan to operate four Vanguard class SSBNs with the Trident nuclear capability, providing both the strategic and substrategic role, remained unchanged.²³ Some other measures reflected a slight adjustment in nuclear policy. The total number of nuclear warheads to be purchased was reduced to under 200. Nuclear patrolling was conducted by only one submarine at a time and at a reduced state of alert. The patrol's missiles were de-targeted and were kept at several days' notice to fire, rather than minutes as during the Cold War. The maximum number of warheads each SSBN would carry in its 16 Trident missiles was halved to 48.²⁴ Furthermore, the Trident system implicitly assumed both a strategic and a substrategic role, as the decision was taken to abandon the RAF's substrategic nuclear capacity.²⁵ Apart from these numerical adjustments, nuclear policy did not undergo any further change during the second half of the 1990s.

The pro-active shaping of the international security environment and the stabilisation of crises required an enhanced power projection capability. For this purpose, the SDR presented a major restructuring and modernisation of Britain's Armed Forces, acknowledging that the downsizing of regular personnel and the neglect of modernising conventional forces had reached its critical limit. While military personnel were constantly deployed on operations, exercises and garrison duties across the entire globe, the related problems of overstretch and undermanning had turned

23 Fact Sheet on Nuclear Deterrent. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, p. 268. The first Vanguard-class SSBN started its operational duty in December 1994.

24 According to the SDR, the total of operationally available Trident warheads was 192 (compared to the initially planned purchase of around 300). See Hooton, E. R. *Britain's Strategic Defence Review: Smiles All Around*. In: *Military Technology*, Vol. 22, No. 9 (September 1998), pp. 32–36, p. 32.

25 The RAF's last WE-177 nuclear gravity bomb was withdrawn from service in March 1998. See: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1995/96*, p. 35; McInnes, *Labour's Strategic Defence Review*, p. 841.

into a serious concern.²⁶ Although the continuing operational strain and the many years of drawbacks meant that the military overcommitment would not be solved immediately, the SDR promised to rectify the situation in the long run. If the military were supposed to act as a “force for good in the world”²⁷, their deployability had to be improved.

Manpower was one issue, another was the provision of strategic lift capability and of high-readiness units. In the centre of this process lay the establishment of the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) which would enable the UK Armed Forces to deploy appropriate military power rapidly to any trouble spot abroad. The JRRF initiative foresaw a major enhancement of rapid reaction capabilities. The idea was to have available a pool of powerful and versatile forces drawn from all three Services and earmarked to be deployable at short notice so that any force package could be tailored according to the specific operational circumstances. These forces had to be joint and include high-intensity-capable offensive units in order to cover the full spectrum of potential military roles.²⁸

Flowing from the importance of these new rapid reaction forces, the Royal Navy was to improve its strategic sealift and offensive strike capabilities. All nuclear-powered attack submarines were to be equipped

26 *The Army: Overstretched and over There*. In: *The Economist*, 17 July 1999, p. 38. The SDR proposed a ‘Policy for People’ initiative to address these shortcomings and break the vicious circle of overstretch and undermanning. See *The Strategic Defence Review*. In: *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, pp. 220–224.

27 Introduction by Rt. Hon. George Robertson, in: *The Strategic Defence Review*, p. 2.

28 The JRRF plan mainly foresaw two echelons of forces. The first was the high-readiness echelon, also called ‘spearhead forces’, able to conduct ‘early entry operations’: They comprised a maritime task force group, an air power package, which could be used initially to deter or contain aggression, lead battle groups of land and amphibious forces (including an armoured battle group), and a Special Forces (SF) component. The second echelon foresaw additional naval and air forces to reinforce the initial force packages so that they could undertake substantial combat operations and give them a significant offensive capability; it further included a brigade-sized force for land operations. For the command and control of the force packages the JRRF plan put forward the creation of a fully equipped and rapidly deployable Joint Task Force HQ, able to command initial forces and to expand to command a larger force; a nucleus of a second HQ was to ensure the command of a second contingency. See *The Strategic Defence Review – Supporting Essays*, pp. 8.1–8.5

with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), fitted with conventional warheads for a range of up to 1,000 miles inland. The Navy's overall force projection capability was to be significantly increased in the long-term outlook, by the replacement of Britain's current medium-sized aircraft carriers through two larger vessels, designated Future Aircraft Carriers and scheduled for 2012. Furthermore, amphibious warfare and maritime support forces were to be expanded, emphasising the shift in maritime power away from 'open ocean' and antisubmarine warfare towards littoral operations and the support of land operations from the sea.²⁹

The structure of the Royal Air Force was also adapted to the increasing demand of rapid reaction capabilities, shifting from the defence of the United Kingdom to expeditionary deployments in crisis situations. The strategic transport fleet was to be supplemented with four C-17 aircraft. Among the various modernisation programmes, from which the RAF's offensive capacities would benefit, the intention to purchase the Storm Shadow stand-off air to surface cruise missile stood out.³⁰ Together with the Navy's acquisition of TLAMs, the Storm Shadow constituted a serious step of Britain's Armed Forces into the age of precision-guided long range cruise missiles.

The Army, meanwhile, received an extra 3,300 regular troops, a measure aimed at easing the land forces' chronic overstretch in personnel. The Army still provided the majority of troops deployed to Northern Ireland and the Balkans as well as those assigned to the ARRC. Further modernisations with respect to the Army were supposed to provide a new air manoeuvre brigade equipped with Apache attack helicopters and to improve the overall deployability of troops and assets. The restructuring of the Army drew upon recent experiences in the Balkans. As a consequence, the SDR particularly recognised the need for robust, balanced,

29 Message from the First Sea Lord. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, pp. 239–24. See also Hooton, *Britain's Strategic Defence Review*, p. 33.

30 Message from the Chief of the Air Staff. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, pp. 244–246.

high-intensity-capable and rapidly deployable land forces supported by the appropriate naval and air packages.³¹

Although efforts to establish better intervention capabilities had been under way for some time, the JRRF concept aimed at a new quality of rapid reaction. In line with the SDR's internationalist approach to security and defence policy and its emphasis on the military as an instrument to influence international affairs, the plans for modernisation and the build-up of rapid reaction forces established the basis for an expeditionary military strategy. Improvements in jointery, deployability, interoperability and sustainability were all major themes in SDR. For the first time since the announcement of *Options for Change* in early 1990, the trend of downsizing came to a halt and was gradually reversed.³² In contrast with the *Options for Change* review the SDR managed to gain approval from all relevant government organisations: the MoD, the Armed Forces, the FCO and the Treasury.

7.2 Technological Environment: The Growing 'System of Systems'

The following paragraphs summarise the course of the RMA debate after its initial post-Cold War phase. As outlined earlier, the Gulf War's primary impact was that the military instrument gained a new acceptability in the psyche of Western nations and thus led to new expectations. The perception of the first 'electronic war' or 'information war' ever fought, however, was in due course countered by many defence analysts.³³ They argued that the Gulf War had not introduced a new kind of warfare; the impressive success was considered to be less the product of technology than of organisational and conceptual aspects, like the huge skill imbalance between the opposing forces and the application of the *AirLand Battle* concept developed during the 1980s. As Efraim Karsh pointed out, the Gulf

31 Message from the Chief of the General Staff. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, pp. 241–244. See also Bridge, T. D. *Modern Forces for the Modern World: The SDR Promises Much*. In: *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, Vol. 128, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 263–268.

32 Bridge, *Modern Forces for the Modern World*, p. 268.

33 Arquilla, *The „Velvet” Revolution in Military Affairs*, p. 33.

War rather presented “the triumph of an advanced manoeuvre-oriented operational doctrine over an archaic attrition-oriented one”.³⁴

Nevertheless, some characteristics emerging from the Gulf operations, particularly the air campaign, were commonly perceived as bearing the potential for an impending Revolution in Military Affairs. The impact of technology on the military was mainly underpinned by the accelerating information and communications revolution. The renewed momentum driving the RMA debate in the second half of the 1990s can be subsumed under the notion of ‘network-centric warfare’. Although a whole array of military-technological advancements – such as stealth technology, PGMs and secure global communications networks – contributed to the perception of an unfolding revolution, it was the developments in the field of information technology that became the focus of RMA thinking. This debate remained dominated by the US.³⁵

By the mid-1990s, the developed world’s fruits of the information and communications revolution were cumulating into what can be called the start of the ‘information age’. This process was underlined by the enormous technological advancements in the areas of the personal computer and the internet, which created a new and growing network of information and communication channels. Driven by its need to optimise profits, economy was the first realm of life to exploit the rapid exchange of information for better integration and streamlining of processes. The access to information and its control through networked computing fundamentally changed the underlying economics of business and had a dramatic effect on competitive performance. Networking information had the potential to improve corporate understanding, thus empowering decisions at lower levels, enable speedier reaction and make business more agile. Agile businesses were able not only to share information better, but gather it better, generally improving the reach, richness, accuracy and relevance of their information. As a result, those businesses systematically using the new technologies gained competitive advantage over those which did not. In due course, the belief grew that the same thinking could be applied to the military – after all, the cut-and-thrust of

34 Karsh, *Reflections on the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict*, p. 313.

35 Caddick, *Revolution in Military Affairs – Panacea or Myth*, p. 49.

business competition to some extent resembled the pressures inherent in armed conflict.³⁶

The concept of network-centric warfare was understood as military operations that delivered decisive effect through the networking of information systems and forces. The term was first used by the US Navy, which described it as “an operational concept which marks a fundamental shift from platform-centric operations towards network-centric operations, deriving its power from the effective linking of dispersed knowledgeable entities”.³⁷ Based on the assumption that information was power, the US Armed Forces recognised that information superiority was a key enabler of military transformation. As a consequence, the concepts of information warfare and network-centric warfare became important elements of RMA thinking. In 1996 US Admiral William Owens, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published an article in which he described the emergence of a ‘system of systems’ through the integration of long-range precision-guided weapons, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and information processing.³⁸ Being a fierce advocate of the RMA, Owens claimed that the systematic use of information technologies would enable the US military to establish absolute information dominance. Information dominance was defined as the capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. This would result in a dramatic improvement of situational awareness and lead to a transparent battlespace. Based on this belief, RMA enthusiasts envisaged the elimination of the ‘friction’ of combat and even the lifting of the notorious ‘fog of war’.³⁹

There were, however, sceptics warning that technology was not the solution to every military problem. A network-centric military force would have to include corresponding conceptual and organisational

36 Wise, *Network-Centric Warfare: Evolution or Revolution*, p. 71.

37 Sabin, *The Future Shape of War*, p. 49.

38 Owens, William. *System of Systems: US Emerging Dominant Battlefield Awareness Promises to Dissipate ‘Fog of War’*. In: *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 133, No. 1 (January 1996), p. 47. See also Cohen, *Technology and Warfare*, pp. 242–243.

39 Owens, *Technology, the RMA and Future War*, p. 64. See also Vego, Milan. *Network-Centric Warfare: Its Promises and Problems*. In: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, Vol. 169, No. 6 (June 2003), pp. 24–27.

innovations.⁴⁰ Some analysts pointed out that network-centric warfare was limited to the tactical level of conflict. They acknowledged that it enabled more speed and accuracy in the application of firepower through a faster ‘sensor-to-shooter’ cycle. But the strategic and operational decision-making processes, which required a different timeframe, could not be fundamentally transformed by mere information technology.⁴¹

Others were concerned about the general overconfidence in technology. Although they did not deny the possibilities of network-centric warfare for achieving dominant battlefield awareness, the idea of lifting the ‘fog of war’ was considered to be unrealistic and even dangerous. They further pointed out that the RMA failed to address the lesser end of the conflict spectrum and the challenges of asymmetry. After all, not only the West could benefit from the information revolution but also potential adversaries who could exploit the vulnerabilities of information societies through their own information warfare or high-technology terrorist methods.⁴² While the Western countries exploited technology to strengthen their existing superiority in conventional weapons, potential adversaries might increasingly choose to adopt alternative weapons and unconventional, or asymmetric, strategies, including the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. These more critical voices therefore concluded that the RMA could only succeed when technological innovation was met by appropriate conceptual and organisational changes and when asymmetric threats and low-intensity conflicts were properly addressed.⁴³

Britain’s RMA thinking was linked to the wider debate taking place in the US. To a certain extent, however, British analysts were more inclined to view the promising technological advancements in an evolutionary

40 See: O’Hanlon, Michael. *Revolution in Military Affairs*, p. 6; Treddenick, John. *The Realisation of the RMA: Challenges and Opportunities*. In: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Vol. 168, No. 6 (June 2002), pp. 10–11; *Womit muss die Armee der Zukunft rechnen? Fragen zu einer zeitgemässen Verteidigungspolitik*. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 February 1998, p. 11.

41 Vego, *Network-Centric Warfare: Its Promise and Problems*, p. 24.

42 Irwin, Alistair. *The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield*. In: Reid, Brian Holden (ed.). *Military Power. Land Warfare in Theory and Practice*. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 227–251, p. 231.

43 Caddick, *Revolution in Military Affairs – Panacea or Myth*, p. 62. See also Gray, Colin S. *The RMA and Intervention: A Sceptical View*. In: McInnes/Wheeler, *Dimensions of Western Military Intervention*, pp. 52–65.

rather than a revolutionary way. Although they acknowledged that network-centric warfare might have some impact at the tactical level, they considered their operational and strategic significance to be limited.⁴⁴ In 1998 Lawrence Freedman, for instance, warned of expecting too much of the British potential for an RMA:

If we assume that current British budgetary restraints will persist, then it would be unwise to expect substantial resources to be devoted to the more imaginative versions of the RMA. Immediate operational requirements will keep the country focused on the infantry and Special Forces as well as seeing through established [procurement] programmes ... The issues in British defence policy involve potential overstretch on manpower and shortages of firepower.⁴⁵

Freedman's statement demonstrates that Britain's defence establishment approached the RMA debate pragmatically, bearing in mind their limitation in resources and their constant involvement in peacekeeping and other low-intensity conflicts, which in the end depended on the solid work of soldiers 'on the ground'. The same conclusion had also been drawn in the SDR, which emphasised the vital role of the infantry in the new strategic environment and opted against any further reductions in the number of regular infantry battalions.⁴⁶ The RMA deserved only to be taken seriously as long as it kept in touch with the realities of the post-Cold War security environment.

Despite such reservations, Britain's Armed Forces accepted the potential advantages of RMA concepts. With the SDR modernisation

44 Colin McInnes, in: *Naval Capabilities: The Launch of the British Maritime Doctrine*, p. 71.

45 Freedman, *Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, p. 64. Special Forces: "Troops who are selected, trained and organised to special levels and are usually employed in pursuit of strategic objectives." In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. S-12. NATO uses the term 'Special Operations Forces' (SOF); see *Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01(A) Change 1)*, p. 8.1. Network-centric warfare: "A concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors and information systems to enable decision-makers through shared awareness to achieve the aim in a timely and efficient manner." In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. N-5.

46 Fact Sheet on Infantry. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, p. 280.

programmes Britain's capability of precision strikes gradually improved. PGM stockpiles were enlarged, and more investment went into the purchase of enabling technologies, such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems. The shocking experience of overwhelming US dominance during NATO's air campaign against Serbia in spring 1999, which plainly highlighted Europe's military impotence, reconfirmed Britain's determination to invest in the acquisition of high-technology systems. Later, in the wake of the Afghanistan operations in 2001/02, where the US demonstrated the disproportionate effect that could be delivered by small but technologically-advanced joint forces, Britain also formally adopted the idea of network-centric capabilities as an objective of her military transformation.

7.3 Social Environment: The Military's 'Right to Be Different'

The social environment of Britain's Armed Forces and their relationship with society at large was dominated by the same underlying trends during the entire decade of the 1990s, a phenomenon best summarised by Moskos' term of the 'postmodern military'. What distinguishes the second from the first half of the decade is that, while the pace of socio-cultural and political change accelerated, the military learned to respond more coherently to the growing pressure on its distinct culture.⁴⁷

The intensive search for consonance between military and civilian life concerned the Armed Forces as an institution with a distinct set of values. Increasingly, not only the military themselves but a number of defence analysts became worried about this strain in the civil-military relationship. According to British military sociologist Christopher Dandeker the Armed Services were "janus-faced organisations"⁴⁸ – on the one hand military effectiveness forced them to differ from civilian society, on the other

47 For a good overview of the implications of social change on Britain's Armed Forces see: Beevor, Antony. *The Army and Modern Society*. In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 63–74; Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. xiii–xxiv.

48 Dandeker, *On "The Need to Be Different": Recent Trends in Military Culture*, pp. 173–187.

hand they had to be responsive to the change evolving in the society they served. During the Cold War, the military could largely count on public understanding for their distinct culture. After all, they had to train and prepare people for a potential war with the Soviet Union. In the absence of such a major threat after 1989, however, it became more difficult to argue for the uniqueness of military culture in a society characterised by individualism and pluralism.

On the basis of this social mood, a debate ensued over the extent of the British Armed Forces' 'need to be different'. The demand for civilianising military norms materialised with issues like the acceptance of homosexuality to military service and the acknowledgement of women in combat roles or the increasing concerns about the risks involved in the military profession. Such human resource matters were rising up the political agenda of the Services.⁴⁹ Advocates of the military's reservations to adjust to social trends argued that the issue was about maintaining efficiency in the military's core business of fighting high-intensity war, which no other state institution was capable of doing.⁵⁰

The introduction of certain postmodern attitudes into the military institution was perceived by many officers as jeopardising this very ability of warfighting. The 'blame and compensation culture' spreading in society at large, the belief in unfettered individual freedom without self-responsibility, the growing risk aversion and, flowing from that, the diminishing willingness to accept hardship, all threatened to erode core military values.⁵¹ These values were instrumental to the martial spirit that enabled the Armed Services to prepare their personnel for the experience of warfighting. In the final analysis this also jeopardised the military's other roles. Their self-motivation to be prepared for combat also gave them the competence to master OOTW situations. The cumulative effect of civilianising trends, it was feared, would eventually undermine military effectiveness.

Although the pressure of civilianisation concerned the entire military institution, the British Army felt more affected by this debate than its

49 Dandeker, *On "The Need to Be Different": Military Uniqueness and Civil-Military Relations in Modern Society*, pp. 4–9.

50 Reid, *The Armed Forces and Society*, pp. 30–34.

51 Dandeker, *On "The Need to Be Different": Military Uniqueness and Civil-Military Relations in Modern Society*, p. 9.

sister Services; the peculiar and somewhat detached environments of the maritime and air forces seemed less vulnerable to postmodern demands than the Army's way of life.⁵² In 1995, the Army therefore launched a study on the subject, which resulted in an internal paper with the title *The Extent to Which the Army Has the Right to Be Different*; it became also known as the *Army Ethos Paper*.⁵³ The core argument was built around the notion of 'ethos', which was described as "that spirit which enables soldiers to fight" and was based "principally on motivation, which in turn calls for high degrees of commitment, self-sacrifice and mutual trust".⁵⁴ Several academic studies followed addressing the issue of how the military could preserve its fighting spirit, a collective mindset it regarded as a precondition for accomplishing its mission.⁵⁵

In his annual lecture as Chief of the Defence Staff in December 2000, General Sir Charles Guthrie emphasised these concerns: "We need to guard against such ill-conceived ideas [of civilianising the military] ... they must understand that military life is, and should be, different. Training for, or taking part in, battle is not like going to the office."⁵⁶ He further pointed to the dangerous perception that military forces could engage

52 For instance Inge, *The Capability-based Army*, p.3. Evidence of similar concerns in the RAF appears in: Allison, *The Royal Air Force in an Era of Change*, p. 45.

53 This Army Board Paper remained confidential and was thus not published. See: Mileham, Patrick. *Fighting Spirit: Has It a Future?* In: Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 242–257, p. 243; Mileham, Patrick. *Military Virtues 1: The Right to Be Different?* In: Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1998), pp. 169–190, p. 170; Mileham, Patrick. *Military Virtues 2: The British Army Ethos*. In: Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No 3 (1998), pp. 227–246.

54 Mileham, *Fighting Spirit*, p. 243.

55 Such as the following papers in Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*: Kirke, Charles. *A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit in the British Army*, pp. 227–241; Hawley, *People not Personnel: The Human Dimension of Fighting Power*, pp. 213–226; Roberts, *Fit to Fight: The Conceptual Component – An Approach to Military Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 191–201; Torrance, *The Moral Component*, pp. 202–212. Similar arguments are raised by: Dandeker/Paton *The Military and Social Change*. Howard, Michael. *The Armed Forces and the Community*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 9–12.

56 Guthrie, Charles. *British Defence – The Chief of the Defence Staff's Lecture 2000*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 1–7, p. 7.

in cost-free combat with little or no loss of life and warned that “if we hamstring our fighting Services with inadequate funding, poor equipment, under-manning and inappropriate legislation then we will create a generation of sailors, soldiers and airmen who are little more than a gendarmerie.”⁵⁷ In 2000 the Army published a doctrinal statement called *Soldiering – The Military Covenant*. The document specifically addressed the moral ethos underpinning military effectiveness:

The purpose and measure of the British Army is military effectiveness: success in war and on other operations. Ultimately this means that every soldier is a weapon bearer, so all must be prepared personally to make the decision to engage an enemy or to place themselves in harm’s way. All British soldiers share the legal right and duty to fight and if necessary, kill, according to their orders, and an unlimited liability to give their lives in doing so. This is the unique nature of soldiering.⁵⁸

This ethos statement reflected a more self-conscious response to social trends tending to put the military’s doings on an equal footing with civilian norms. The self-consciousness of Britain’s Services was strengthened by the uninterrupted demand of military crisis interventions, in places like Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor or Kosovo. They were widely perceived as successful operations demonstrating the forces’ professionalism. The military’s reaction to civilianisation and the defence of their distinct culture, on the other hand, also reflected the mounting social pressure in the civil-military relationship.

In response doctrinalists began describing the military’s self-perception of modern soldiering, a concept that reflected the various roles the postmodern, or post-Cold War, soldier had to be able to assume – the roles of warfighter, law enforcer, peacekeeper, media performer and even diplomat. The core argument was, however, that the warfighting capability remained the underlying paradigm of military thinking and

57 Ibid.

58 *Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5, Soldiering – The Military Covenant (Army Code 71642)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 2000, p. 1.1.

effectiveness.⁵⁹ From a military perspective, it was relatively easy to adapt a soldier trained for high-intensity warfare to other forms of conflict, but the converse did not apply:

Warfare is the most demanding [military activity] ... It is a fundamental tenet of British military doctrine that the Army should be organised, trained and equipped first and foremost for war. By preparing to fight, the prospect of success across the full range of operations is enhanced. The reverse is not true. This is why the Army defines military effectiveness as fighting power.⁶⁰

While the constabulisation of the majority of military tasks in the post-Cold War environment was widely accepted also within the Services, the military insisted on the necessity to continue to base their conceptual bedrock and moral *raison d'être* on the ability to fight wars. The fact that these issues entered the focus of doctrine development demonstrates that the British military recognised the need to incorporate change in accordance with their institutional needs. In the context of their relationship with society at large, they had to recognise which issues of social change could be adopted and which had to be countered because of their incompatibility with institutional core values. Sound doctrine development undoubtedly supported this process. It also provided the intellectual mechanism to refute more convincingly those commentators demanding changes undesired by the military.

* * *

The external environment of Britain's Armed Forces during the second half of the 1990s was hardly more favourable than before. The pressure to adjust to major strategic, technological and social changes increased.

59 This rationale also appears in various joint doctrine publications, for instance: *Joint Operations (JWP 3-00)*, p. 1.1. See also: Dandeker/Gow, *Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping*, pp. 58–59; Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, p. xviii.

60 *Army Doctrine Publication 5 Soldiering*, pp. 1.2–1.3.

The challenges posed by the new strategic era, though, became somewhat clearer. British defence planners and military officers could build on a growing stock of experience gained in continuous involvement in crisis interventions. In due course the ability of Britain's military to respond appropriately to the changing circumstances improved. After a period of uncertainty and a status of constant operational overstretch and undermanning they managed to gradually regain their organisational and, as part of that, conceptual health.

The long-term strategic direction taken by the SDR was instrumental to this. It provided the framework to look afresh at the roles and missions of Britain's Armed Forces and formulate a coherent military strategy designed for the post-Cold War realities. The ability to intervene in crises and use the military for the stabilisation of conflicts became an integral part of the government's wider internationalist agenda. The trend of downsizing came to a halt, the force structure was adjusted to expeditionary needs, and a broad programme of modernisation was about to rectify the Services' under-resourcing. For the collective psyche of Britain's Services the SDR constituted a turnaround.

The complexity in the military's external environment grew further. The international dynamics continued to be characterised by the combined processes of globalisation and fragmentation, giving way to more instability and inequality, which generated 'failed states' and breeding grounds for new troubles. Against the backdrop of unrivalled Western superiority in conventional military forces, the likelihood of adversaries adopting asymmetric strategies increased. New concerns were the proliferation of WMD and information warfare. The spread of high-technology, readily available on world markets and exploitable for causing disproportionate effect, disclosed the inherent vulnerabilities of open society. In this context, large-scale terrorist attacks were another issue of concern moving up the security agenda. For some time, the worst imaginations of super-terrorism did not attract much interest beyond the circles of security analysts. On 11 September 2001, however, this new kind of terrorism entered worldwide public awareness and manifested itself as a strategic force able to influence international affairs.

Western politicians increasingly opted for military interventions to respond to regional instabilities, while their electorates largely accepted this new military activism. At the same time political, moral and legal constraints made the conduct of military operations an ever more difficult

undertaking.⁶¹ Public expectations for rapid, discriminate and bloodless military action were seemingly reconfirmed by the use of air power in the Balkans from 1993 to 1999. The systematic use of high-technology undoubtedly made conventional forces more useful. Still, in the eyes of more sceptical observers, these events could not disguise the fact that in most cases air power alone could not achieve the strategic objectives. For the resolution of conflicts in collapsed societies, air power and information technology did not appear to be the crucial factors for success.

Admiral Owens' shared battlespace awareness was not a remedy to solve the complexity of crisis interventions short of major hostilities – to lift the 'fog of Operations Other Than War' so to speak. Such developments had in fact a double-edged impact on the conduct of operations. The combined effect of ever growing public expectations for bloodless and cost-free war, the intolerance of casualties and collateral damage and the availability of instant media reporting put great pressures on the political, military-strategic and operational decision-making cycles.⁶²

Notwithstanding all these challenges, by the end of the decade Britain's Armed Forces regained their organisational health and vigorously embarked on profound modernisation. They were determined to capitalise on their record of success in various post-Cold War operations and on the consolidated strategic guidance provided by the SDR.

61 Wheeler, Nicholas J. *The Political and Moral Limits of Western Military Intervention to Protect Civilians in Danger*. In: McInnes, Colin and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds). *Dimensions of Western Military Intervention*. Special Issue of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2001), pp. 1–27.

62 Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, pp. 15–16.

8 Peace Enforcement: The New Rationale for Post-Cold War Crisis Interventions

The result of the debate over *Wider Peacekeeping* was, as outlined in Part 1, the formulation of an uncompleted doctrinal statement. As the difficulties of the international forces in the Balkans continued, the demand to take a more robust approach to peacekeeping grew stronger. It finally manifested itself in the adoption of the concept of 'peace enforcement'. Doctrinally, the new rationale was first endorsed in Britain's *Peace Support Operations*, a document published in early 1998. The doctrine abandoned the idea of absolute consent and instead suggested the need to use coercive, though impartial, methods to restore the monopoly of power and force warring parties to accept the terms of the international mandate.

The chapter first explores the British Army's motive to move beyond *Wider Peacekeeping*. By the mid-1990s the situation in the Balkans changed, as did the military's perception of the mission. While *Wider Peacekeeping* had reflected their concern to get involved, they subsequently developed a sustained interest to remain involved. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on the doctrinal debate leading to the emergence of the concept of peace enforcement. Its formulation was tantamount to the move from traditional to a new type of peacekeeping and for the first time included counter-insurgency thinking. This conceptual shift was strongly influenced by the turnaround occurring in Bosnia in 1995 – embodied in NATO's Operation Deliberate Force and the replacement of UNPROFOR by IFOR.

8.1 Organisational Culture: The Changing Attitude towards Peacekeeping

By 1995 the Army felt that British operations in Bosnia had, after all, ‘not gone all that badly’. While some frustration over the political stalemate and the UN’s impotence remained, many commentators referred to the outstanding behaviour of British troops in UNPROFOR.⁶³ Despite the continuous difficulties facing the troops in Bosnia and the occasional casualties, the dangerous entanglements of the Yugoslavian civil war had largely been averted. The Service’s organisational health did not seem to have taken damage through the involvement. After all, the operations resulted in some institutional benefits: they provided an opportunity to prove the military’s value in a time when it was still suffering from the aftermath of the *Options for Change* downsizing. Furthermore, the volatility encountered in the Balkans theatre of operations strengthened the argument for retaining well balanced ground forces; in many situations armoured units with their protection, mobility and firepower had proven highly useful to deter further escalation and calm down overzealous warring parties. Flowing from this, the attitude towards the new type of peacekeeping operations gradually changed.⁶⁴

Senior Army chiefs were not satisfied with the message conveyed by *Wider Peacekeeping*. Among those were Lieutenant Generals Michael Rose, who was commander of UNPROFOR until early 1995, and Mike Jackson, who was selected to assume command of UNPROFOR at the end of the year – in the event, after the conclusion of the Dayton talks, he spent the first half of 1996 in Bosnia commanding IFOR’s Multinational Division South West instead. Based on their own first-hand experience, these officers recognised that the doctrinal gap between traditional peacekeeping and the new operational requirements had not yet been filled. They were therefore ready to support the revision of *Wider Peacekeeping*.⁶⁵

63 Clarke, *The Lessons of Bosnia for the British Military*, p. 54.

64 “*PSO Doctrine into the Twenty-First Century*” – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 4/2003.

65 See Rose’s personal account of his tenure as Commander UNPROFOR: Rose, Michael. *Fighting for Peace. Bosnia 1994*. London: Harvill Press, 1998. For ‘doctrine gap’ see Donald, Dominick. *The Doctrine Gap: The Enduring Problem of Contemporary Peace Support Operations Thinking*. In: McInnes, Colin and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds). *Dimensions of Western Security Policy*.

Mike Jackson became Director General of Development and Doctrine in 1996 and brought with him a great deal of IFOR experience. The new boss at Upavon was no doubt keen to explore the ‘middle ground’ of peace enforcement. At the same time, the traditionalist doctrine writers Mallinson and Dobbie had left the DGD&D, which resulted in Colonel Philip Wilkinson being the chief architect of any future British PSO doctrine.⁶⁶

The PSO doctrine team at Upavon also received support from other quarters, namely the Royal Navy and the RAF, both of which had also become involved in peacekeeping tasks by the mid-1990s. In its initial phase, Bosnia had been an operation conducted exclusively by the Army. With the widening of UNPROFOR’s mandate and with the gradual involvement of NATO assets in support of UN forces this picture changed. The enforcement of the weapons embargo imposed on Former Yugoslavia, Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea, saw a substantial contribution of Royal Navy patrols. The Navy also provided vital offshore logistical support for the UK troops spread across the Balkans theatre.⁶⁷ The Royal Air Force meanwhile participated in NATO’s air patrolling over Bosnia, Operation Deny Flight starting in April 1993, to monitor and then enforce the air exclusion zone. From August 1993 onwards, NATO air patrols were also tasked with providing direct air support for UN troops.⁶⁸ The growing activities of naval and air forces in Peace Support Operations triggered their interest in becoming involved in the conceptual debate. Although the revision of *Wider Peacekeeping* was to remain in the custody of the DGD&D doctrine team, all three Services agreed that they needed a joint concept for PSO. In due course the Army’s sister Services and the newly established Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood

Special Issue of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2001), pp. 107–139.

66 According to Wilkinson, they both left the Army to join the priesthood. Wilkinson, *The Development of Doctrine for PSO*, BMDG 4/2003.

67 *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, p. 51. See also Blackham, *Maritime Peacekeeping*, pp. 18–23.

68 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1993/94*, p. 30 and *Military Balance 1994/95*, p. 35. See also Clarke, *The Lessons of Bosnia for the British Military*, p. 55.

delivered significant inputs to the project. For the purpose of stressing its joint character, the *Peace Support Operations* doctrine was formally endorsed under the direction of the PJHQ.⁶⁹

8.2 Doctrinal Debate: Marrying Counter-Insurgency and Coercion Theory

With WPK having soon outlived its political aim of limiting the Army's involvement in Bosnia and with the broad cross-service consensus to develop a better and more joint approach to post-Cold War peacekeeping, the traditionalists had lost the battle of opinions. The territory was prepared to design a concept for peace enforcement which would show a way out of the dilemmas encountered in Bosnia and Somalia.

In May 1995 Wilkinson expressed his own ideas of Peace Support Operations in the *British Army Review*. He argued that peace enforcement was not, as initial versions in WPK claimed, synonymous with warfighting. He insisted on the existence of the 'middle ground', where true peace enforcement could lie. Peace support was not all about consent. In fact, peace enforcement could operate without consent, but the use of force had to be impartial and even-handed. Wilkinson stressed that this kind of peace enforcement, however, required a suitable force structure for it to be implemented successfully. The deployment of PSO troops required a force ratio suited to any potential local opposition. *Wider Peacekeeping* clearly did not provide the doctrinal framework for such a type of peace enforcement. What was needed, Wilkinson pointed out, was a new doctrine that covered the entire PSO spectrum, not just peacekeeping.⁷⁰

In Wilkinson's own understanding, WPK had been a provisional manual, designed to offer guidance to the units operating in the specific circumstances of UNPROFOR in the absence of a robust mandate. He admitted that it was not a document about peace enforcement, since UNPROFOR was not authorised for peace enforcement. He further noted

69 In the absence of a centralised joint doctrine centre, the PJHQ assumed responsibility for the production of *Joint Warfare Publications*. In 1999 this task was transferred to the newly created Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.

70 Thornton, *The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army*, p. 53.

that PSO could not be seen in a purely national sense but was self-evidently a multinational matter that involved a wider group of civilian agencies and military forces. As a consequence, PSO doctrine had to establish a framework of operations under which all involved actors could work together, in tune with the overall objective.⁷¹

By the mid-1990s a culture of doctrinal debate was firmly established within Britain's defence community. Doctrinalists were keen to accept external contributions to the debate. This made the influence of analysts like Mackinlay and Connaughton on the military's doctrine development tangible. In one of his articles, which had appeared even before WPK was published, Connaughton already claimed that "consent and impartiality are far too fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built".⁷² Connaughton heavily criticised WPK by describing it as "unhelpful and implausible", "dangerous nonsense", "an unhelpful irrelevance" and a "last war" doctrine.⁷³ For Connaughton there was clearly a 'middle ground' to be found beyond traditional peacekeeping but short of warfighting, which would allow for determined action even in the absence of consent.

Similarly, Mackinlay continued his efforts to call for a more robust approach to "second generation multinational forces"⁷⁴, as he dubbed them to highlight the distinction from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping forces. For Mackinlay peace enforcement was an indispensable requirement for the new type of operations. His most significant contribution to the conceptual development of post-Cold War British doctrine was, arguably, to illuminate the association between British counter-insurgency expertise and the demanding circumstances of post-Cold War peacekeeping.⁷⁵ In a wider sense, he was the first to embark on dismantling the intellectual firewall that existed between the counter-insurgency and the peacekeeping schools of thought.

71 Ibid, p. 54.

72 Richard Connaughton: *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 9 April 1994, p. 20.

73 Connaughton, Richard. *Wider Peacekeeping – How Wide off the Mark?* In: *British Army Review*, No. 111 (December 1995), pp. 57–63.

74 The term 'second generation multinational forces' was first mentioned in Mackinlay/Chopra, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations*.

75 See: Mackinlay, *Improving Multifunctional Forces*; Mackinlay, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*; Mackinlay/ Kent, *Complex Emergencies Doctrine – The British Are Still the Best*.

In due course some other scholars and practitioners further examined the idea – like, for instance, G. Bulloch, a retired Brigadier attached to the DGD&D where he was tasked with writing a revision of the British counter-insurgency doctrine.⁷⁶ Another theorist to suggest the inherent continuity from Britain’s colonial and post-colonial ‘small wars’ to post-Cold War Peace Support Operations was Thomas Mockaitis. He suggested that this link should be exploited more systematically.⁷⁷ Such discussions reflected the fact that British PSO thinking detached itself from the straitjacket of traditional peacekeeping and started to experiment with the combination of new ideas of peace enforcement and older counter-insurgency principles.

Another thinking that made a vital contribution to the emergence of the concept of peace enforcement was the theory of coercion. Much of the theoretical writing on coercion reaches back to early Cold War strategies.⁷⁸ But only in the post-Cold War era, when strategic literature was no longer dominated by nuclear deterrence, did coercion theorists assume a higher profile within the community of strategic studies. Coercion can roughly be defined as the art of influencing human behaviour by the use of force or the threat to use it. Coercive force, as opposed to unlimited force, is applied gradually and in conjunction with diplomacy, which leaves the adversary, the actor to be coerced, with an element of choice. Some analysts, therefore, describe coercion as the ‘diplomacy of violence’ that offers a package of ‘carrots and sticks’.⁷⁹ The ultimate purpose is not to destroy the adversary physically but to prevent or stop him from doing something, to make him reverse a certain policy or to make him act

76 Bulloch, *The Application of Military Doctrine to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations*, p. 171. Bulloch also linked PSO and COIN operations to the manoeuvrist debate, an approach that had so far been restricted to the warfighting school of thought. Although the physical destruction of an insurgent remained important, he argued, the attack on his will and his moral cohesion had to be the main effort of any counter-insurgency campaign – an idea that was also applicable to Peace Support Operations.

77 Mockaitis, *From Counter-Insurgency to Peace Enforcement*, pp. 40–57.

78 The beginning of ‘coercion theory’ is linked to Schelling, Thomas. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

79 Hyde-Price, Adrian. “*Burning a Path to Peace*”? – *Democracies and Military Coercion*. Paper Presented at the 4th Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 11 April 2003 by Professor Adrian Hyde-Price, University of Leicester.

in the coercer's preferred way. The concept is based on the assumption that a rational adversary, one with similar values and perceptions to the coercer's, is subject to a cost benefit analysis and therefore at some stage responds with compliance to the threat of or use of force.⁸⁰

The rise of coercion to the forefront of post-Cold War strategic theories was connected to two developments. Firstly, the new effectiveness of conventional military power, above all air power, offered the possibility to apply lethal force in a gradual and more selective manner; consequently, the risk of uncontrolled escalation was low.⁸¹ Secondly, coercion became specifically attractive for Western governments torn between the principal disapproval of liberal democracies to use military force as an instrument of international affairs and the urge to intervene militarily in regional conflicts on humanitarian grounds. In this dilemma the concept of coercion appeared to be a feasible compromise. The best-case scenario of coercion was that the threat of force might be sufficient; in the event military force nevertheless had to be applied, the effectiveness of Western technology held out the prospect of a short conflict with a tolerable degree of damage on both sides.⁸² From the mid-1990s onwards, the possibilities and limitations of coercion was a constant subject of debate. Each coercive air campaign provided fresh food for discussion. The idea of peace enforcement was related to the concept of coercion, and PSO doctrinalists were keen to use both schools of thought to explore more effective ways to ensure the compliance of uncooperative warring factions.⁸³

80 For more detailed studies on coercion theory see Freedman, Lawrence (ed.), *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

81 Post-Cold War concepts of coercive air power have become strongly influenced by Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. British contributions to the debate on coercion are for instance: Clarke, Michael. *Air Power, Force and Coercion*. In: Lambert/Williamson, *The Dynamics of Air Power*, pp. 67–85; Freedman, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*; Gray, Peter W. *Air Power and Coercion*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 4 (August 2000), pp. 37–41; Lambert, Andrew. *The Future of Air Power*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 148, No. 3 (June 2003), pp. 46–53.

82 McInnes/Wheeler, *Dimensions of Western Military Intervention*, pp. 2–5.

83 Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. *British PSO Doctrine: Perfect in Theory but Problematic in Practice*. Paper Presented at the 4th Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 11 April 2003 by Professor Peter Viggo Jakobsen, University of Copenhagen.

The final impulse to establish peace enforcement as a valid doctrinal concept was delivered by events in the Balkans in 1995. Since 1993 NATO supported the UN in the stabilisation of South Eastern Europe. Although the arrangement provided for close air support to UNPROFOR in case of need, effective use of this was not yet made.⁸⁴ Only in late summer 1995, after some events had escalated the situation on the ground – such as the hostage-taking of UNPROFOR personnel by Bosnian Serb forces, the fall of the so-called ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica and Zepa and its subsequent massacres, and the mortar attack on a marketplace in Sarajevo on 28 August – did policy-makers finally opt for decisive action.⁸⁵ Under the designation Operation Deliberate Force NATO conducted the first extended air campaign against Bosnian Serb military targets. The air attacks lasted for several weeks and had a real impact. After the conclusion of Deliberate Force the conditions in Bosnia changed – the way was paved for the Dayton Peace Agreement, and in December 1995 the command of the international forces in the Balkans switched from the UN to NATO.

As later studies have pointed out, Dayton was the combined effort of several developments, which by summer 1995 had created the conditions for the effective use of force and the subsequent success of reaching a conflict resolution: the success of the Croatian campaign in Western Slavonia and the Krajina had weakened the overall strategic position of the Bosnian Serb Army; UNPROFOR had reduced its vulnerability through a series of troop relocations after the hostage crisis; at the same time Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, another British officer commanding UNPROFOR, had created a rapid reaction force comprising British, French and Dutch forces that provided him with a counter-artillery capability; furthermore, the command and control arrangements for the use of NATO air power in support of the UN had been improved prior to Deliberate Force; and finally, by mid-1995 the warring factions of the Bosnian conflicts were showing signs of exhaustion.

84 For a firsthand account of the difficult working relationship between NATO and UN at the time see Rose, *Fighting for Peace*.

85 Rifkind, Malcolm. The Risk We Must Face in Bosnia. Article in the Evening Standard, 27 July 1995. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (ed.). *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy. Volume I: 1995–1997*. London: HMSO, 1998, p. 1235.

All these developments had facilitated the successful outcome of Operation Deliberate Force.⁸⁶ In the euphoria following Dayton, however, the impact of these other factors was overlooked by many. For most Western observers NATO's coercive air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs stood out as the crucial and, for some, single factor to have shaped the circumstances for a conflict resolution in Bosnia.⁸⁷ Operation Deliberate Force undoubtedly constituted an unparalleled level of force in peacekeeping standards at the time.

Equally instrumental to the doctrinalists' perception, however, was the success of IFOR, which managed to stabilise the situation on the ground within a remarkably short period of time. In comparison with UNPROFOR, the Alliance's Implementation Force was a substantially beefed up combat force of around 60,000 troops. Based on its strong posture, its robust Rules of Engagement (ROE), and its resolve to use force when necessary, IFOR was able to prevent further hostilities in Bosnia and ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.⁸⁸ IFOR's heavily armed, well protected and combat-ready troops and the deliberate show of force to deter any potential agreement breaker embodied the new remedy of peace enforcement that ended the vicious circle of protracted

86 Berdal, Mats R. *Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990s*. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 55–74, p. 64–66.

87 Allison, *The Royal Air Force in an Era of Change*, p. 42. For a critical review of this interpretation of Operation Deliberate Force see: Applegate, R. A. D. *Observations on the Use of Force in Complex Emergencies*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 147, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 22–27; Berdal, *Lessons Not Learned*, p. 64.

88 Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo, 12 December 1995. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. I*, p. 1199. See also Smith, Leighton W. *NATO's IFOR in Action. Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations*. In: *Strategic Forum*, No. 154 (January 1999), p. 1.

conflict and international impotence.⁸⁹ The repainting of vehicle markings from UNPROFOR to IFOR, covered by the international media in December 1995, came to be the graphic symbol of the shift from old to new peacekeeping.

British Forces were crucially involved in setting up IFOR. The UK provided around 12,500 troops, assumed the command of one of the three Multinational Divisions and, with Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker, also provided IFOR's ground component commander.⁹⁰ The British military establishment welcomed the more proactive PSO posture embodied in IFOR. At the 1995 annual CDS lecture Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge confirmed this attitude: "Peace Support Operations, as we have seen not only in Bosnia but elsewhere, are much more complicated, much more messy [sic] and much more dangerous than perhaps we had realised in the past."⁹¹ As a consequence, Inge emphasised, the precondition for success in peacekeeping was a true warfighting capability, both in mind and in material.⁹²

By 1996 two vital elements of Britain's new approach to PSO had emerged: the association of peacekeeping with traditional counter-insurgency principles, and the concept of peace enforcement. Wilkinson now had 'carte blanche', as he himself remembered the change of attitude; he was backed by senior military chiefs to formulate a more flexible and more effective concept for post-Cold War peacekeeping.⁹³ The new

89 Biermann/Vadset, *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*, pp. 356–357. For a definition of 'Rules of Engagement' see *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, p. 4.8: "Directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force may be used. ROE will reflect legal and political constraints, but they will always authorise self-defence and should never inhibit a commander's ability to take all necessary action to protect his force. While it is highly desirable that national contingents within the same force harmonise their ROE, national laws often override UN and Force ROE."

90 IFOR's land component commander was provided by HQ ARRC, which by default was in British hands. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1996/97*, p. 32.

91 Inge, Peter. *The Roles and Challenges of the British Armed Forces*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1–5, p. 3.

92 *Ibid.*

93 Wilkinson, *The Development of Doctrine for PSO*, BMDG 4/2003.

doctrine resulting from this fertile conceptual phase was endorsed in late 1997 and published in early 1998 under the title *Peace Support Operations* (JWP 3-50).

8.3 Formal Doctrine: The Concept of Peace Enforcement

The new PSO doctrine's move away from traditional to post-Cold War peacekeeping was embodied in the term 'complex emergencies', used to define the changed operational environment in which military interventions were conducted.⁹⁴ The notion of complex emergencies emerged in the international community of academics, humanitarians, military planners and UN staff officers in the mid-1990s. Mackinlay described its attributes in the following words:

A complex emergency is a humanitarian disaster that occurs in a conflict zone and is complicated by, or results from, the conflicting interests of warring parties. Its causes are seldom exclusively natural or military: in many cases a marginally subsistent population is precipitated towards disaster by the consequences of military action. ... The presence of militias and their interests in controlling and extorting the local population will impede and in some cases seriously threaten relief efforts. In addition to violence against the civilian population, civilian installations such as hospitals, schools, refugee centres and cultural sites will become war objectives and may be looted frequently or destroyed.⁹⁵

According to the new doctrine *Peace Support Operations*, complex emergencies were the result of the removal of regional superpower interests allowing new conflicts to emerge. No longer were the ambitions of ethnic groups and regional entities to gain status of autonomy limited by the imperatives of the East-West confrontation. As a consequence the number of intra-state, as opposed to inter-state conflicts, increased and the resulting operational environment of intervening international stabilisation forces was, as the new PSO doctrine suggested, rather com-

94 Mackinlay, John. *Peace Support Operations Doctrine*. In: *British Army Review*, No. 113 (August 1996), pp. 1–7.

95 Mackinlay, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, pp. 14–15.

plex. It was characterised by the presence of a multitude of international, regional, local, diplomatic, humanitarian, civilian and military actors with conflicting and overlapping interests.⁹⁶

The adoption of this definition of post-Cold War security suggested that *Peace Support Operations* had moved away from the traditional peacekeeping scenario, in which international forces interposed between two state entities with control over the monopoly of power. The new doctrine described an environment of collapsed states and disintegrated societies, where the state's monopoly of violence was shattered. In its absence, numerous substate or non-state actors – such as warlords, irregular troops, local militias, opposing ethnic or religious factions and international mercenaries – directed their violence against a defenceless population and its economic and social infrastructure. The purpose of the international military intervention was therefore the restoration of the monopoly of violence. Under such circumstances the insistence on consent on the operational and tactical levels was futile.⁹⁷

More promising was the application of traditional counter-insurgency principles, which foresaw an overall political solution but enabled military commanders to pursue the military campaign in a flexible and robust manner. The incorporation of this rationale indicated that this new reality had been accepted into formal British PSO doctrine. The new doctrine's foreword emphasised the link between PSO and previous COIN operations:

British Armed Forces have a long history of the type of operations which are now known as Peace Support Operations. While, traditionally, these have been within a colonial or post-colonial context, and owe their origin to the concepts of 'keeping the peace' and counter-insurgency operations, they are now being conducted in a far less certain, and potentially more volatile international environment. This post-Cold War setting is placing new pressures on commanders and

96 For 'complex emergencies' see also: Applegate, *Observations on the Use of Force in Complex Emergencies*, p. 22; Woodhouse, *The Gentle Hand of Peace*, pp. 31–32.

97 *Peace Support Operations*, (JWP 3-50), chapter 2. See also Wilkinson, Philip. *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies*. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 63–79, pp. 64–65.

service personnel alike, and emphasises the importance of operations which are joint and multinational, involving a wide range of civilian agencies.⁹⁸

Although the overall strategic environment distinguished complex emergencies from pre-1989 British counter-insurgencies, the basic tenets of COIN warfare held good on the operational and tactical levels of Peace Support Operations. By using the minimum necessary force and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population, the tasks of stabilising the environment and de-escalating the conflict were facilitated. At the same time, the more pro-active use of intelligence and Special Forces (SF) – another traditional counter-insurgency wisdom – allowed for a decisive response to factions unwilling to cooperate under the terms of the international mandate or deliberately attempting to escalate violence again.

The new PSO doctrine’s basic approach was one of ‘carrots and sticks’: it emphasised the understanding of when to offer incentives and when to apply force. This required close coordination with civilian agencies that were the prime movers of the peace mission. They would tell the military what conditions had to be created. To this end, it was necessary to have a civilian in charge of the overall operation who would develop mission plans and to whom the military forces would be subordinate. One of the lessons of British COIN experience was the importance of leaving purely military solutions aside and to work with civilian agencies, which would eventually lead to the “creation of a comprehensive and self-sustaining peace, rather than a superficial conflict by military force”.⁹⁹

A particular aspect of such complex emergencies was the fact that the civil overhead was international and much more multifaceted than in traditional counter-insurgency operations, where the overall political campaign had been steered by one national government with a homogenous set of interests. International and civil-military coordination was thus a key factor to the success of a PSO. Wilkinson, the principal author of Britain’s new PSO doctrine, had undertaken strong efforts to include the views of the various players in the humanitarian community – which in fact turned out to be less a community than a multitude of differing interest and approaches. Nevertheless, the British doctrinalists had recog-

98 *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, p. v.

99 Wilkinson, *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace*, p. 78.

nised that their PSO rationale could only be successful if it provided a framework for better Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).¹⁰⁰

The principle of minimum necessary force still held good, too. It was defined as “the measured and proportionate application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific objective and confined in effect to the legitimate target intended”.¹⁰¹ Military force had to be used in a judicious manner, peace enforcement measures had to be balanced against their impact on the long-term conflict resolution.

As far as the idea of consent was concerned, the new PSO doctrine considered the need for absolute consent as no longer viable. The so-called ‘Mogadishu line’ was crossed not when consent was breached, but only when impartiality was breached. The ‘Rubicon’ of consent – the main argument in Dobbie’s black-and-white approach of ‘peacekeeping versus peace enforcement (in the sense of warfighting)’ – was a matter of the past. The new doctrine described the idea of peace enforcement as follows:

Peace enforcement operations are coercive operations required in the absence of consent, or at least in the expectation of one, or all, of the parties failing to comply with agreed conditions. Peace enforcement will be necessary when the commander’s estimate deduces that peacekeeping techniques alone can not put an end to human rights violations and achieve the specified end-state.¹⁰²

The military’s main contribution in complex emergencies was to create and maintain a secure environment and thus shape the preconditions for a self-sustaining peace. Peace enforcement therefore required the deployment of credible forces prepared for combat action. The forces committed to the operation had to be of sufficient strength and needed backing by a robust mandate and the political will to apply that force: “To be credible, a peace enforcement force must be perceived as being willing and capable of overmatching whatever opposition it might be offered.”¹⁰³ Given such force capabilities, temporary loss of consent could be put up with. At the same time the forces had to be equipped and trained for building consent and winning the cooperation of the former warring parties: “A PSO force

100 *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, p. 2.9.

101 *Ibid*, p. 4.8.

102 *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, p. 3.4.

103 *Ibid*.

will ... need to be prepared to use both coercion and inducement in an even-handed manner.”¹⁰⁴ For the overall end-state or conflict resolution it was important to be considered impartial and to limit the necessity for enforcement measures to the absolute minimum.¹⁰⁵

The vital division on the scale of military roles hitherto lay between peace enforcement and proper warfighting, also referred to as enforcement. The first allowed for the use of force in order to restore peace and coerce, or enforce, compliance with an internationally agreed mandate while maintaining overall impartiality. The campaign’s objective was to support the civilian actors in their pursuit of a political conflict resolution. Warfighting, in contrast, was directed against a clearly designated enemy and aimed at military victory as the campaign’s objective.¹⁰⁶ Though enforcement in the sense of warfighting was not the subject of the doctrine, it was emphasised that such an operation could be the precursor to a PSO, by changing the correlation of local forces and shaping the conditions for an international force to enter – a scenario that became reality in the Kosovo crisis in 1999.¹⁰⁷

* * *

The events in the Balkans in the mid-1990s enabled the new doctrinal approach to prevail. With the publication of *Peace Support Operations* the British Armed Forces put forward a coherent concept for peace enforcement that addressed the realities of post-Cold War complex emergencies. It emphasised the significance of impartiality but abandoned the impracticable idea of in-theatre consent. It further argued for a powerful mandate, the provision of robust ROEs and the need for combat-ready forces. The new British PSO doctrine filled the conceptual gap between peacekeeping and warfighting. The formulation of *Peace Support Operations* reflected the marriage between traditional British COIN experience and the more recent theories of coercion and peace

104 Ibid.

105 Woodhouse, *The Gentle Hand of Peace*, p. 32.

106 *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, pp. 3.2–3.3.

107 Wilkinson, *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace*, pp. 71–72.

enforcement.¹⁰⁸ This vital accomplishment was consolidated in subsequent British doctrine manuals on OOTW.¹⁰⁹

Not just in name but also in substance could *Peace Support Operations* claim to be a joint doctrine. The DGD&D team headed by Wilkinson had widened the discourse both within and beyond Britain's Armed Services.¹¹⁰ In contrast to its predecessor *Wider Peacekeeping*, which had been published as an *Army Field Manual*, *Peace Support Operations* was promulgated under the editorship of the Permanent Joint Headquarters.¹¹¹

The publication gained much praise. In the eyes of British officers it achieved its aim "to give guidance to commanders and their staffs on the planning and conduct of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations".¹¹² In this respect *Peace Support Operations* fulfilled the idea of doctrine in its truest sense – to provide fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives and at the same time to stress common sense and judgement in application. It further translated the possibilities and limitations of multinational interventions into a commonly understandable language that assisted politicians, other government officials and civilian actors in grasping the military implications of their own efforts.

The publication of *Peace Support Operations* was also appreciated by the US TRADOC. Although some differences between US and British PSO thinking remained, TRADOC's doctrinal staff welcomed the more robust approach of the new British PSO doctrine.¹¹³ International praise

108 Jakobsen, *British PSO Doctrine: Perfect in Theory but Problematic in Practice*, BMDG 4/2003; Hyde-Price, "Burning a Path to Peace", BMDG 4/2003.

109 Mackinlay argues that the real breakthrough of putting the marriage between PSO and COIN principles into writing occurred with the publication of the following doctrine: *Counter-Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)*. *Army Field Manual Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 (Army Code 71749)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Development and Doctrine on Behalf of the Chief of the General Staff. London: Upavon. DGD&D, 2001. Interview with John Mackinlay.

110 For joint aspects of Peace Support Operations see *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, chapter 5.

111 Before the establishment of the JDCC in 2000, the PJHQ was responsible for the production of *Joint Warfare Publications*.

112 *Peace Support Operations (JWP 3-50)*, p. v.

113 There was nevertheless a difference between British and US terminology. British doctrinalists stressed the subordinate role of the military within the

for the publication was not confined to the US. Given the British reputation in overseas interventions and the shared IFOR/SFOR experience of a growing number of military establishments in the Euro-Atlantic community, Britain's new PSO doctrine attracted wide-spread interest. In 2001 NATO also issued a PSO doctrine that was strongly based on the British, while the Swedish Armed Forces copied *JWP 3-50* almost word by word.¹¹⁴

The doctrinal debate over PSO was, however, far from over. For hardcore critics, such as Connaughton or Mackinlay, the new doctrine did not yet reach far enough in its attempt to meet the operational requirements of complex emergencies. The advocates of *Peace Support Operations* themselves acknowledged that the development in this field of military operations was dynamic and required further revision in the coming years. Doctrine development meanwhile was firmly established in the British military's organisational culture and was understood as a continuous process of innovation and revision. Although the PSO doctrine was based on the experience of past and ongoing operations, some of the principles put forward had not yet stood the test of operational practice.

A major field of testing was opened up by the deployment of KFOR in June 1999, of which Britain was one of the leading nations. In due course the professionalism of British PSO contingents contributed substantially to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Kosovo. A further large-scale challenge was posed by Operation Palliser, the crisis intervention in Sierra Leone in summer 2000. Britain rapidly deployed a joint task force of 5,000 troops to the rescue of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was jeopardised by the outbreak of new hostilities and the uncooperative behaviour of some local factions. With the help of this powerful show of force and the conduct of effective peacekeeping

overall political campaign, thus preferring the term 'Peace Support Operations'. US doctrinalists, in contrast, were intent to emphasise the aspect that the military's role of providing a secure environment for the entire mission was highly complex and was not to be equalled with mere logistical support; they therefore preferred the term 'Peace Operations'. "*The Origins and Development of PSO Doctrine*" – Panel Discussion 1, BMDG 4/2003.

114 See: *Peace Support Operations (Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1)*. Brussels: NATO Military Agency for Standardisation, 2001; *Joint Military Doctrine: Peace Support Operations*. Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces, 1997.

and peace enforcement on the ground, the UN mission's authority and the conditions of the peace agreement were successfully restored.¹¹⁵

While these operations reconfirmed many aspects of British PSO doctrine, they inevitably provided further impulse for the ongoing debate. Various studies on PSO-related issues appearing between 1998 and 2002 reflect this.¹¹⁶ In 1999 British PSO doctrine was handed over from the DGD&D to the newly created Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. In the centre's mission statement PSO doctrine assumed a high profile, being one of its three core outputs: "[The JDCC will] lead the UK's contribution in promoting doctrine for PSO, in conjunction with OGDs [Other Government Departments], NGOs and the wider international community".¹¹⁷ It emphasised the intention to "increase effectiveness of UK and multinational doctrine for Peace Support Operations", to "promote an integrated approach to complex emergencies with civilian organisations" and to "encourage more effective Peace Support Operations by promoting the UK approach internationally".¹¹⁸ Britain's Armed Forces were determined to take the international lead in the field of PSO doctrine and to capitalise on their vast experience in this field and on the fruits of their doctrine development process.

Overall, *Peace Support Operations* was a more coherent doctrine than its predecessor. Its development was not hindered by overbearing Service interests. PSO had become a key issue in the post-Cold War transformation of military strategy and required the appropriate conceptual underpinning.

115 *Ministry of Defence Performance Report 2000/2001*. Cm 5290. London: TSO, 2001, p. 3. For a detailed analysis of Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone see Williams, Paul. *Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*. In: McInnes/Wheeler, *Dimensions of Western Military Intervention*, pp. 169–182.

116 For instance: Berdal, *Lessons Not Learned*; Connaughton, Richard. *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; Hills, Alice. *Doctrine, Criminality, and Future British Army Operations: A Half-Completed Understanding (The Occasional 39)*. Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 2000; Mackinlay, *Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies*.

117 Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. *Pamphlet on the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre*. Shrivenham: JDCC, 2001. See also URL <http://www.mod.uk/jdcc/pso.htm>.

118 *Pamphlet on the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre*.

9 British Defence Doctrine: Breakthrough of a Joint Military-Strategic Doctrine

In the past British Services had prepared for and conducted their own operations, which were subject to the strengths and weaknesses of their particular environments. Such military action therefore required only cross-service coordination but not integration. The need for more jointery – for having a military culture that transcended Service boundaries and allowed for the establishment of an integrated tri-service structure for the planning and execution of military operations – was first set in motion by the *AirLand Battle* concept as applied in the Gulf War in 1991. It intensified through subsequent efforts to exploit RMA technologies, which brought with it the integration of various operational capabilities. The required links between sea, land, air and space assets increased. The network of enabling functions like command and control, information management, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition or logistics grew. Simultaneously the tempo of military operations accelerated.

Against this backdrop, it was only a matter of time until Britain's doctrine advocates embarked on conceiving a doctrine that would place the widening efforts in jointery into a coherent conceptual framework. Britain's first military-strategic joint doctrine, entitled *British Defence Doctrine*, was released in 1997. The publication represented a breakthrough in the British Armed Forces' effort to formulate a post-Cold War military strategy.

The chapter first addresses the growing need for jointery that emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf War. It explores how this influenced Britain's military culture, which until then had been characterised by a particularly strong division of the three traditional Services. Thereafter the chapter examines how this first joint doctrine was developed. It argues that the production of *British Defence Doctrine* succeeded in merging the single Services' thoughts on post-Cold War military power into a unified approach. Due to the dynamic developments after 1997 – such as the publication of the SDR in 1998 and the Kosovo crisis a year later – the doctrinal debate on the military-strategic level remained intensive. It subsequently led to the publication of a second, revised version of *British*

Defence Doctrine in 2001. Drawing the major lines of both BDD editions together, the chapter attempts to characterise the status of formal British military-strategic doctrine at the turn of the century.

9.1 Organisational Culture: Jointery – The ‘Purple Trend’

Traditionally the organisational culture of Britain’s Armed Forces was largely dominated and divided by single-service thinking. The three individual Services did not only wear distinctly coloured uniforms and badges, but they also thought differently about warfare, had their particular structures and organisations, their distinct traditions and values, their Service ethos and their own officers’ training and higher education institutions. The military contribution to the country’s defence policy was defined along the lines of the three environmental components of land, sea and air capabilities. This became particularly apparent in the definition of the Services’ defence roles and in the rivalry over the allocation of resources. Inter-service coordination existed to a certain extent, but there was neither a commonly agreed understanding of military operations nor a permanently established joint command and control structure. Military power was defined in the specific environments of land, sea or air warfare and all subsequent matters of military relevance derived from this tripartition.¹¹⁹

The lack of joint thinking was to a certain extent also connected to the British military’s aversion against formal doctrine. Both phenomena – the missing jointery and the absence of formal doctrine – originated from the same traditional anti-intellectualism and a strong sense of inter-service rivalry. Parallel to the new awareness for doctrinal debate, the view on jointery changed as well. Gradually the Army’s green, the Royal Navy’s dark blue and the Royal Air Force’s light blue merged into a common understanding of warfare – symbolised by the composite colour of purple.¹²⁰ The main catalyst of this change in attitude was the combined effect of

119 Hobkirk, *Land, Sea or Air*, p. 3.

120 For the growing need of ‘jointery’ see: Codner, *Purple Prose and Purple Passion*, pp. 36–40; Garnett, Ian. *PJHQ – The Heart of UK Defence Capability*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 145, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 8–14; Slater, *The Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations*, p. 22.

the land, sea and air components in the Gulf War and the subsequent RMA debate.

The US-led liberation of Kuwait was in fact a combined and joint operation of a new quality, albeit the combined and joint structure adopted had never been tested before and was partially of an ad hoc nature.¹²¹ In the aftermath of the Gulf War, awareness was growing that joint military campaigns were crucial for the exploitation of Western technological superiority. The RMA outlook for shared battlespace awareness and a near-real time link between ISTAR systems and weapons platforms could only be implemented when all Services worked closely together and integrated their key assets at the operational level of command. In due course, the idea of jointery became a key subject of military transformation. In addition to the *AirLand Battle* conducted in the Gulf, the various mid- and low-intensity intervention operations of the early 1990s, where air and sea components supported the international peacekeeping troops on the ground, called for more inter-service and multinational cooperation. Senior British officers shared the view that in the future multinational and joint military campaigns were going to be the norm rather than the exception. Given the delicate nature of national sovereignty over the instrument of armed forces, integration across national boundaries could only develop in a slow and limited pace. The effort to improve jointery, however, lay under national authority and was subject to the Services' own ability to initiate change.

Naturally, at the end of the Cold War there was not yet a strong and independent lobby for jointery within Britain's Armed Services. Such a lobby emerged only gradually within the MoD's Central Staff. Under the direction of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), several initiatives were undertaken that focused on the improvement of jointery within Britain's Armed Forces. Furthermore, the single-service Chiefs of Staff accepted the need for more joint cooperation. When examining the future of air power in 1995, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, for instance, concluded that it was of "key importance to produce officers who can operate across the boundaries of Service disciplines, and for this we must develop and disseminate the understanding of joint doctrine and practice through bodies such as our own Air Warfare Centre."¹²² Although

121 Irving, *The Gulf Air Campaign*, p. 14.

122 Graydon, Michael. *RAF: Present and Future Challenges*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 3 (June 1995), pp. 1–7, p. 3.

the Services had a natural interest in influencing a potential joint doctrine with their own conceptual thinking, they clearly acknowledged the necessity to incorporate jointery into their Service's understanding.

According to Dandeker, this 'purple trend' of Britain's Services indicated their move towards a postmodern military organisation that also responded to social and political change. Increasing efforts to think more jointly were not just based on technological requirements but were also part of a larger change in the military's organisational culture, brought about by the pressure of shrinking defence budgets. As a result, the military needed to rationalise and share the available resources. Structures had to be streamlined so as to avoid unnecessary duplications. More cross-service cooperation was therefore also a consequence of the overall defence policy contraction in domestic politics and society at large.¹²³

In 1994 a series of studies was conducted by the Ministry of Defence focusing on the question of how to enhance jointery. They resulted in the proposal of three major tri-service initiatives: the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters, the creation of a Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) and the fusion of the existing single-service staff colleges into a new Joint Services Command and Staff College.¹²⁴ These suggested reforms were about to entrench jointery in the three crucial fields of military affairs: military-strategic and operational command and control; overall force structure and capabilities; and the training and education of commanders and staff officers. The ideas were endorsed on a high-level 'Tri-Service Conference on Defence in 2010', held in November 1995. In his opening address, Secretary of State for Defence Michael Portillo named jointery as one of the key issues of the further development of Britain's Armed Forces.¹²⁵

123 Dandeker, *On "The Need to Be Different": Recent Trends in Military Culture*, pp. 177–178.

124 The PJHQ and the JRDF were proposed in *Front Line First – The Defence Cost Study*. See *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, pp. 8 and 95–96. See also Guthrie, *Bringing the Armed Forces into a New Millennium*, p. 5.

125 Portillo, Michael. *British Operational Capability towards 2010: An Assessment of the Challenge – Introduction*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 141, No. 5 (October 1996), p. 25. See also: Boyd-Carpenter, Thomas. *Operational Capability into the Future: Rapid Response*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 141, No. 5 (October 1996), pp. 26–27; Codner, Michael. *Integration and Interoperability: The Who and the What*. In: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 141, No. 5 (October 1996), pp. 35–38; Hine, Patrick.

The Permanent Joint Headquarters, scheduled to become operational on 1 August 1996, was responsible for planning and executing UK-led joint and multinational operations. It further exercised operational command of British Forces assigned to combined and multinational operations led by other nations. According to Vice Admiral Sir Jon Garnett, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) in 2000, the decision to form the PJHQ was based on the “disruptive, duplicative, inefficient and ad hoc arrangements pertaining before 1994” – a blunt description of previous command and control circumstances dominated by inter-service rivalry.¹²⁶ Apart from exercising command and control for joint operations, the PJHQ received additional tasks in promoting jointery: the formulation of joint warfare doctrine at the operational and tactical level, the conduct of joint exercises and the assessment of joint capabilities and standards.¹²⁷ Particularly the mention of joint warfare doctrine indicated the importance of the link between jointery and doctrine development.

The Joint Rapid Deployment Force was to enhance Britain’s rapid reaction capability, by creating a pool of assigned units from all three Services for rapid interventions in a geographically wide operational area. Once fully established, the JRDF structure was to provide for the deployment of a force up to a reinforced brigade, complemented by appropriate air and sea components, and able to undertake a broad spectrum of missions either as part of a national response to a crisis or as part of an international coalition. Since speed of deployment and mobility in theatre were regarded as vital qualities of a rapid reaction capability, the JRDF was backed up by pre-assigned aircraft and ships for strategic transport and tactical mobility. In due course the JRDF was transformed into the more powerful Joint Rapid Reaction Forces discussed previously as part of the *Strategic Defence Review*.

Developments in Measures to Enhance Joint Operations. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, No. 5 (October 1996), pp. 28–30.

126 In April 2000 the staff of the PJHQ comprised 438 personnel. See Garnett, *PJHQ – The Heart of UK Defence Capability*, p. 8.

127 *Ibid*, p. 8. See also Hine, *Developments in Measures to Enhance Joint Operations*, p. 28.

In January 1997 the three separate single-service staff colleges were united into a new Joint Services Command and Staff College.¹²⁸ The main purpose of the JSCSC was to train officers from all three Services in the planning and conduct of joint and combined operations. Its responsibilities included the running of the Higher Command and Staff Course, which had previously been introduced and hosted by the Army, and the Advanced Command and Staff Course for mid-career officers and government officials. A unified command and staff training was to enable the three Services to achieve a common standard in the planning and conducting of operations. Furthermore, to ensure a high level of teaching in defence studies, the JSCSC subcontracted King's College London to provide an academic teaching staff.¹²⁹ Overall, the new college created an intellectual platform for developing the conceptual dimension of officer education and promoting a joint ethos.

All these efforts were well under way when the *Strategic Defence Review 1998* was published. As displayed earlier, with SDR the development of jointery was taken even further. The joint team of land, sea and air components was regarded to be crucial to the conduct of modern campaigns, even more so as Britain's military operations became increasingly expeditionary in their nature and the boundaries between the three environmental components became more and more artificial. Several new programmes were proposed by the SDR to widen and deepen joint structures and to optimise the use of scarce resources.¹³⁰

With respect to doctrine, the SDR put forward one particularly important idea: the establishment of a Joint Defence Centre, which would form a centralised think tank responsible for the development of joint

128 The four former Staff Colleges amalgamated into the JSCSC were: Joint Services Defence College (Greenwich); Royal Naval College (Greenwich); Army Command and Staff College (Camberley); and Royal Air Force Staff College (Bracknell). The new JSCSC was first at the location of the former RAF Staff College at Bracknell and moved to the site of the Royal Military College of Science in Shrivenham in August 2000. See *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*, p. 95.

129 The King's College London's teaching staff for the JSCSC is called the Defence Studies Department (DSD).

130 Such as the creation of the function of Joint Chief of Logistics, the pooling of rotary wing assets in a Joint Helicopter Command and the integration of the RN's Sea Harrier and the RAF's Harrier GR7 in the Joint Harrier Force.

doctrine. Within a few years, this SDR initiative was implemented: in 2000 such a think tank became operational under the name Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. The work for Britain's first joint doctrine in 1996/97, however, was conducted before the establishment of this centre.

9.2 Doctrinal Debate: British Defence Doctrine and the Lessons from Kosovo

By the mid-1990s, the need for an overarching framework of joint guidelines, from which the Services' doctrines would flow, was undisputed. Apart from the lack of a coherent joint doctrine, the British Armed Forces also felt a conceptual vacuum on the military-strategic level, mainly the result of the lack of defence policy guidance and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War environment. The initial problem was that the single-service Chiefs of Staff agreed to the formulation of a joint doctrine in principle but were reluctant to subdue their own doctrinal terminology to the authority of a new joint doctrine. Still, there had been some efforts under way within the MoD's Central Staff, under the auspices of the Director Force Development, to write such a joint doctrine. By the end of 1995, however, the work had run aground, shipwrecked mainly by routine staffing and committee debates and a lack of serious single-service commitment.¹³¹ In the absence of an endemic lobby for jointery within the Services, only a powerful top-down approach from within the MoD could rectify the matter.

The required top-down leadership came in the person of Air Chief Marshal Sir John Willis, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. In spring 1996 Willis personally commissioned the work for the drafting of a joint military-strategic doctrine. As the custodian of jointery within the MoD, the VCDS was determined to reinforce the concept and to consolidate it through the publication of a high-level doctrine. Such a document would establish the precedent that single-service doctrines derived from an overarching joint doctrine. At the same time, he recognised the need for the formulation of a coherent military strategy, which would translate the Armed Forces' contribution to security and defence policy into military tasks and capabilities. The wide-spread opinion at the time was that the

131 Interview with Bill Tyack.

Conservative Government had run out of steam and would most probably be replaced at the next general election, due in May 1997, by a New Labour Government. Labour's defence commentators were already hinting at the imminence of a defence review. With a probable defence review coming up, the VCDS considered the publication of a military-strategic doctrine to be a high priority for the interests of Britain's Armed Forces. Seven years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall they were still uneasily waiting for a formal strategic statement that looked beyond the one-year horizon of the annual *Statement on the Defence Estimates*.¹³²

Willis himself set the stage for a successful completion of the job. To ensure coherence in content and the delivery of an actual result in time, he put one individual officer in charge of the project: Air Commodore Bill Tyack, at the time an RAF officer in the Central Staff. He was assisted by a young Army officer, Major David Lawson. The basic purpose of the project, designated *British Defence Doctrine*, was to provide an unambiguous military-strategic statement to sit above joint and single-service operational and tactical doctrine as their overarching and authoritative source. The specific purpose with regard to the target audience was to guide top and middle levels in the MoD, operational headquarters and other governmental departments, to educate staff officers and defence officials and to inform the wider defence community. The future development of Britain's Armed Forces was to be supported by a coherent military-strategic doctrine of which a wide external audience would take note. The VCDS therefore wanted to "get something published" before the impending defence review.¹³³ Tyack and Lawson were given six months for the project.

The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff further arranged for the formal cooperation of all three Services as well as the PJHQ and the new JSCSC. He formed a reference group of associated key officials to oversee the work.¹³⁴ As soon as the single-service Chiefs of Staff realised that the new joint doctrine was actually going to happen, they signalled sincere

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Members of the reference group were: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff; Chief of Joint Operations (PJHQ); Assistant Chiefs of the Naval, General and Air Staffs; Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy); Assistant Under-Secretary (Policy); Commandant (Designate) JSCSC. Unpublished personal material of Bill Tyack.

interest in contributing to the work – and in ensuring the inclusion of their Services’ respective thinking, very much in the sense of the Royal Navy’s Trojan Horse motive behind BR 1806.¹³⁵ Bill Tyack received further support through an extensive consultation loop, which included various offices of the MoD and the FCO, representatives of NATO authorities, the Services’ warfare centres, and several operational commanders, among others the Assistant Chief of Staff of the PJHQ and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Northern Ireland.¹³⁶ This was to make sure that the new doctrine drew upon all relevant areas: defence policy, the experience of current operations and the expertise of conceptual and educational bodies. Furthermore, the final draft was going to be read by three senior commanders who acted as ‘wise men’ and were to ensure high-level affirmation.¹³⁷

In essence, the process for writing the first British military-strategic joint doctrine bore many of the hallmarks of the ideal doctrine development process: it was innovation promoted by top-down leadership, which allowed for credibility and strong support and had the authority to neutralise potential opposition emerging from single-service interests. At the same time it was innovation created by capitalising on the relevant internal and external brainpower. Furthermore, the authors analysed existing doctrines, incorporated current operational experience and embarked on extensive historical reading. Within the military establishment, the authors tapped the expertise and experience of the relevant institutional parts: conceptual development, embodied in the single-service warfare centres; training and education, ensured by interacting with the Services’ teaching authorities; and operational headquarters that possessed first-hand operational experience, such as the PJHQ or the GOC Northern Ireland. At the same time, the range of external consultative bodies and individuals, which

135 Interview with Michael Codner.

136 The three warfare centres: Directorate Land Warfare (part of DGD&D); Maritime Warfare Centre (MWC); and Air Warfare Centre (AWC). The academics involved were: Prof. Lawrence Freedman, KCL; Prof. Richard Holmes, Cranford University; Dr. Eric Grove, University of Hull (also involved in the drafting of BR 1806); Dr. Philip Sabin, KCL; and Commander (RN, retired) Michael Codner, RUSI. Unpublished personal material of Bill Tyack.

137 The three ‘wise men’ were: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, Lieutenant General The Hon. Sir Thomas Boyd-Carpenter and Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden. Interview with Bill Tyack.

included academics and non-military government offices, reflected the widened understanding of security and defence. The advocates of *British Defence Doctrine* did also acknowledge the continuing need for revision. From the outset the work had been conducted with the awareness that doctrine development was an ongoing process and that a published doctrinal document was subject to review.

Bill Tyack delivered the draft of *British Defence Doctrine* in September 1996. After some further refinement and circulation, the Chiefs of Staff approved it. The document was published in January 1997. The initial intention to release the document through the Chief of the Defence Staff was overruled by the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo. He signed the document himself and launched it in person on the occasion of a press conference. Initially the senior military officials felt uneasy about the fact that a non-political document, the military-strategic doctrine of Britain's Armed Forces, was signed and presented by a politician, which potentially put it in danger of being sucked into the political debate of the ongoing election campaign.

In the end, the new doctrine was well received both in military and political circles. Some doctrine purists, though, criticised the extensive baggage of defence policy and defence process contained in the document; in their view, policy and process were subject to political matters and thus not part of military doctrine. For others, however, this was the very strength of BDD, as it provided a conceptual link between defence policy and process on the one hand and military strategy on the other. The new doctrine explained the relationship between policy, process and doctrine. Establishing this linkage, thereby filling some part of the conceptual vacuum at the strategic and military-strategic levels, had in fact been a deliberate intention of the advocates of BDD. With hindsight, their main achievement was not so much to present fundamentally new thinking but to bring together the emerging post-Cold War military-strategic ideas under a common roof. As it turned out, the document was also extensively read by the incoming New Labour Government and strongly influenced the drafting of the *Strategic Defence Review* in 1997/98.¹³⁸

138 The Labour Party supposedly ordered 40 copies, despite initially attacking the defence doctrine launched by Conservative Secretary of State for Defence Portillo. Interview with Bill Tyack.

The publication of BDD marked the breakthrough in the development of British military-strategic doctrine. Until 1997 no comparable doctrinal statement had existed. In due course, the efforts to maintain conceptual innovation at this level were intensified. The responsibility for reviewing military-strategic doctrine and launching a subsequent edition of BDD was first kept within the Central Staff, under the responsibility of a new post, the Director of Joint Warfare. Within the next two years several attempts of revision were undertaken. The necessary additional stimulus, however, to produce a new version only came after the responsibility was handed over to the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. The new joint doctrine authority was henceforth in charge of drafting and reviewing military-strategic doctrine, albeit in close cooperation with a number of associated institutions and under the supervision of the Central Staff.¹³⁹

The need for updating the 1997 *British Defence Doctrine* became even more apparent in the light of major defence-related developments occurring after 1997. First, the previously outlined SDR provided a new strategic framework for Britain's security and defence policy and as a result rendered some of the defence policy elaborations in BDD obsolete. Second, the Kosovo crisis of 1999 suggested a thorough analysis of intervention concepts, particularly the coercive use of air power and the deployment of post-conflict stabilisation forces. More operational feedbacks fuelling the debate arrived from the East Timor and Sierra Leone operations. As much as these various crisis interventions confirmed the military strategy set out in BDD, they called for further refinement.¹⁴⁰

The events of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 in particular had a profound impact on military-strategic thinking and Britain's military transformation. On the military-strategic level, the Kosovo crisis comprised two different phases. The first one, Operation Allied Force, was an enforcement action that saw the extensive use of coercive air power; in fact, the NATO-led air strikes constituted the largest employment of Western air power since the Gulf War. Allied Force was altogether an experience that revealed large gaps and weaknesses in European defence. The second phase, Operation

139 See: Guthrie, *British Defence – The Chief of the Defence Staff's Lecture 2000*, p. 4; Garnett, *PJHQ – The Heart of UK Defence Capability*, p. 9. For the debate on the JDCC's role at the time see also Codner, *Purple Prose and Purple Passion*, pp. 36–40.

140 *The Logic of Sierra Leone. The Conflict There Is a Test Case for Britain's New Defence Doctrine*. In: *The Economist*, 20 May 2000, p. 50.

Joint Guardian, was a Peace Support Operation mandated by the UN that saw the deployment of an international force to stabilise post-conflict Kosovo. Overall, Joint Guardian confirmed the direction that post-Cold War peacekeeping had taken. In order to understand the implications for Britain's military transformation, the doctrinal implications of these two events of the Kosovo crisis must be explored in detail.

Operation Allied Force revealed the political fragility of NATO and its limitations in crisis management. The Alliance's cohesion was exposed to heavy strains because of the differences among the decision-making centres of the leading nations – as it became apparent in the dispute over the objectives of the air campaign and the political micromanagement over target lists. According to UK Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson, “Kosovo posed one of the toughest tests for NATO since the end of the Cold War”.¹⁴¹ In fact, the crisis put the Alliance's political and military credibility at stake. Consensus was the precondition for determined action. In order to achieve and maintain consensus in a coalition of Western democratic states, all wary of their domestic public opinion and with different strategic cultures and national interests, was a tall order in any event, and even more when the military was engaged in proper warfighting, in the simultaneous absence of a direct threat to the national survival of the involved states.

Public support depended on the moral legitimacy of the action and the way force was applied; a large amount of collateral damage, friendly casualties or fratricide could directly undermine the public, and thus political, backing of the intervention.¹⁴² One of the clearest lessons was that military might and technological superiority were neither a sufficient guarantee for a successful outcome of Western interventions nor insurance for NATO's success in any future crisis.¹⁴³ As a consequence, Britain's strategic assessment of Allied Force was very critical.¹⁴⁴ Although NATO remained the framework of British security, the Government, together

141 Robertson, George. *War in Kosovo: Some Preliminary Lessons*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 4 (August 1999), pp. 1–6, p. 2. A detailed report of the Government's conclusions on Kosovo is: *Kosovo – Lessons from the Crisis*. Cm 4724. London: TSO, 2000.

142 Norton, *Operation Allied Force*, p. 60.

143 Peach, *The Doctrine of Targeting for Effect*, p. 71.

144 George, Bruce. *The House of Commons Defence Committee Report Lessons of Kosovo*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 6 (December 2000), pp. 12–14, p. 12.

with other leading European nations, tried to use the shock of Kosovo for pushing the European Security and Defence Policy. At the same time, Britain was reminded of the importance to retain freedom of action at the national level. For this purpose the expansion of Britain's rapid reaction capability, as set out in the SDR, was instrumental: it enabled the country to act either in a NATO or European framework, as part of a wider 'coalition of the willing', on the side of the US under the arrangement of the 'special relationship' or even independently if the need arose.¹⁴⁵

Operation Allied Force disclosed Europe's military impotence. Around 80% of the key strategic and operational assets were provided by the US Armed Forces.¹⁴⁶ European states had deficiencies in every military area required for a large-scale intervention at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, even though the crisis occurred relatively close to permanent military bases in Europe.¹⁴⁷ Even the United Kingdom and France as Europe's most potent military powers had little to match US predominance in strategic surveillance and reconnaissance systems or all-weather precision weaponry. It was a shocking recognition of how much the transatlantic capability gap had widened. The bitter truth was that Europe's ability to use military power in international affairs depended to a large extent on US participation.¹⁴⁸ Britain was intent not to let this gap widen even more. As a direct consequence, efforts to acquire more stocks of all-weather high-precision weaponry and sufficient ISTAR assets were intensified.¹⁴⁹

145 Robertson, *War in Kosovo: Some Preliminary Lessons*, p. 1.

146 Ibid, p. 6. The IISS presented the following figures: 70% of aircraft assets, 80% of weapons/munitions and 90% of cruise missiles were US. The only other NATO member contributing cruise missiles was the UK. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1999/2000*, p. 30.

147 See Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium*, p. 197.

148 Binnendijk, Hans and Richard Kugler. *Transforming European Forces*. In: *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 117–132, p. 120.

149 Capability improvements in the following areas were regarded as vital as a consequence from the Kosovo crisis: precision joint all-weather attack capability; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; communications/data links, including secure air-to-air and ground communications, better 'sensor-to-shooter' links and satellite communications; electronic warfare and suppression of enemy air defences; air-to-air refuelling; battle damage assessment; strategic lift; readiness, deployability and sustainment; as well as close combat and force protection capability. See *Kosovo – Lessons from the Crisis*, p. 5 and chapters 6–9.

The air campaign also stimulated the debate over the use of coercive air power. Air power advocates judged Allied Force as a success since it eventually brought the intended result without NATO having to extend military enforcement to ground operations. More critical analysts, however, emphasised the weaknesses of coercion as applied by Western democracies in general and the limitations of air power in particular. They argued that the political and moral constraints imposed upon the military-strategic and operational levels of action had reduced the effectiveness of coercion. The military were unable to apply coercive force in a coherent way since the course of the campaign was micromanaged by the politicians. The politicians' over-optimistic assumptions in the beginning of the campaign – to a certain extent a legacy of the misinterpreted Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 – obstructed the planning of a long-term campaign. First, the air campaign's aim was declared by NATO political leaders as to be one of denying Serbian security forces the ability to prosecute their strategy of ethnic cleansing, through air strikes directed against FRY forces fielded in Kosovo. Later the aim was restated as being to coerce Milosevic to accept a peace settlement, through strategic attacks on Serbia's political and economic infrastructure. The effectiveness of the air attacks was further limited by an over-emphasis of force protection: NATO aircraft had to stay above 15,000 feet of altitude in order to minimise the risk of casualties. At the same time they had to avoid any collateral damage. These constraints, combined with bad weather, meant air power could not always deliver as effectively as its technological potential suggested.

A further political decision hampering the coercive effect of the campaign was the ruling out of a 'forced ground entry option'. This signalled NATO's lack of resolve and reduced its diplomatic leverage. In military-strategic terms, Allied Force gave evidence of the actual political, legal and moral constraints in which coercive military power was allowed to be implemented. As a result, the superiority of Western conventional technology could potentially be circumvented by exploiting the self-imposed restrictions of Western democracies on their way of warfare and by responding asymmetrically.¹⁵⁰ Although Milosevic had not quite succeeded in this and the Alliance finally prevailed, Allied Force was altogether a sobering experience of crisis management. The

150 *Kosovo – Lessons from the Crisis*, p. 35.

compliance of the regime was the result of the combination of political, diplomatic and military factors, not the least of which was the withdrawal of Russian political support to Milosevic. After thorough analysis only a handful of air power enthusiasts insisted on the centre-stage contribution of coercive air power. The more balanced view argued that crisis management based exclusively on coercive air power displayed serious limitations.¹⁵¹ In any event, Operation Allied Force raised the question of how future campaigns could be effective despite this growing network of constraints.¹⁵²

Operation Joint Guardian was a different matter, both politically and militarily. After Milosevic had agreed to the terms of the international community, NATO called off its bombing campaign and an international peace support force was deployed to Kosovo. It was led by the five framework nations France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States and included the participation of Russian troops. KFOR's mission was to deter any outbreak of further hostilities and to prevent the return of FRY forces into Kosovo. In addition, KFOR was charged with demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), establishing and maintaining a secure environment and giving support to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

The operational environment of Kosovo had the profile of a complex emergency as envisaged in British PSO doctrine, with the main emphasis on stabilising a war-torn region, restoring a monopoly of violence and shaping the conditions for conflict resolution and reconstruction. Such a PSO comprised a wide range of military tasks from ensuring freedom of movement, maintaining public order to protecting ethnic minorities and providing humanitarian assistance. The volatile and uncertain situation in the initial phase – with FRY security forces withdrawing and UCK fighters and criminal elements trying to exploit the power vacuum or to take revenge on the remaining Kosovo-Serb population – required a powerful force mix and a robust mandate. It was, all in all, a job at which Britain's Armed Forces with their vast experience from Northern Ireland,

151 A detailed overview of this argumentation is presented in Byman/Waxman, *Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate*, pp. 5–38. See also Barnett, Correlli, *The Fallibility of Air Power*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 59–60.

152 *Kein Konflikt nach traditionellem Muster. Fragen zur Kriegführung nach der Operation "Allied Force"*. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 March 2000, pp. 7–8.

IFOR and various post-colonial counter-insurgencies were particularly skilled.¹⁵³

Joint Guardian was also a vindication of recent efforts to improve the readiness and deployability of British Forces. Of the 20,000 Allied soldiers entering Kosovo on D-Day 12 June 1999, 8,000 were from the UK; from the nine battalions spearheading the entry operation, four were British.¹⁵⁴ With Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson in command of the ARRC, Britain provided the first Commander of KFOR. In due course 11,000 British troops were deployed to Kosovo, which was around a fourth of the force's total strength. The country's high profile in the implementation of KFOR and the rapid initial deployment reflected Britain's consolidated security and defence policy as outlined in SDR. KFOR grew to around 40,000 peacekeepers from nearly 40 different nations and became the most complex post-Cold War Peace Support Operation so far, with Britain assuming a lead role in the further stabilisation of the Southern Balkans.¹⁵⁵

The Kosovo crisis provided many lessons for politicians and military alike. Overall, the events confirmed British military-strategic and operational doctrines, but they also revealed issues where refinement was necessary. Considering both operations, Allied Force and Joint Guardian, in combination, doctrinalists began to view Kosovo as the new model of Western military intervention. In a first phase, coercion – or enforcement – was to set the stage for a political agreement. In a second phase, an international peace support force was deployed to stabilise the conflict environment and shape the circumstances for the political, diplomatic and humanitarian long-term measures. Applying military force in a 'war of choice' was a challenge to any loose coalition of Western democracies. Kosovo had disclosed more inherent vulnerabilities of open societies,

153 Fry, Robert. *A View from Kosovo*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 10–14, p. 11.

154 *Kosovo – Lessons from the Crisis*, p. 46. See also Jackson, Mike. *KFOR: The Inside Story*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 13–18, p. 15.

155 In August 1999 KFOR had 38,000 troops in Kosovo and 7,000 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The UK provided the framework for one of KFOR's five multinational brigades: Multinational Brigade Centre (MNBC). See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1999/2000*, p. 31.

characterised by full transparency of government action, real-time media coverage and a risk-averse public. Nevertheless, the military intervention in Kosovo was largely considered to be a success proving once again the extended utility of conventional military power.

To a certain extent, however, the multilateral arrangements of the Kosovo model and the sometimes conflicting interests of many of the involved nations only allowed for the containment, not the solution, of the problem – a conclusion that led the US to choose a different form of intervention two years later in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁶ In 1999 the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy incorporated these lessons into their conceptual thinking and published updates of their high-level doctrines – *British Air Power Doctrine* and *British Maritime Doctrine*. These renewed single-service efforts did not just fuel the doctrinal debate but also urged the custodians of joint doctrine to renew their efforts of revision, if they wanted BDD to retain its conceptual lead.

Apart from the profound doctrinal implications delivered by the continuous military involvement in the Balkans, some other developments suggested a refinement of *British Defence Doctrine*. A particular concern of doctrinalists was the extensive inclusion of explanations on defence policy and process in BDD. In 1997 this had made sense in order to compensate for the lack of strategic guidance, but now that the SDR had been published it was considered to be unnecessary. While defence policy was subject to short-term changes, doctrine tended to encapsulate more enduring aspects of conflict and military power. The reviewers of BDD therefore intended to revert to a narrower interpretation of military doctrine. Commander (RN) Steven Haines, the principal author of the revision, confirmed that the idea was to return to the main function of doctrine, which was to provide a body of conceptual core thinking on the nature and best conduct of warfare and thus provide a common starting ground for all individuals involved in the preparation and employment of military force. Comments on defence policy and defence process were to be kept to the necessary minimum.¹⁵⁷ In a RUSI article Major General

156 Mackinlay, John. *Opposing Insurgents during Peace Operations*. In: Tardy, Thierry (ed.). *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001*. London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 159–189.

157 Milton, Anthony. *British Defence Doctrine and the British Approach to Military Operations*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 6 (December 2001), pp. 41–44, p. 41.

Tony Milton, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts 2000/01, emphasised the intention to rectify this balance between pure doctrine and policy-related issues:

[If] doctrine is to serve any purpose at all, it must convey a clear message about how military commanders should think about the conduct of military operations. To do this effectively there is a need to identify those fundamental principles that guide military action in support of policy. Those principles must not be confused with either policy itself or with the processes used to deliver military capability in support of national interest.¹⁵⁸

The second version of *British Defence Doctrine*, published in 2001, was thus formulated to be a “clear and unambiguous statement of the essential elements of the British approach to military operations” which made it a “vitaly important source of guidance for those producing doctrine for all the UK’s military capabilities down to the tactical level”.¹⁵⁹ Milton acknowledged that BDD 2 was, compared to the first edition, not fundamentally new thinking but rather “a new and refreshed way of articulating the key elements” of British doctrinal thinking. He described the second edition of BDD as “a clear statement of current thinking [which] owes much to the past and the experience gained over periods of time. Nevertheless, the themes described are resilient and their relevance has been tested in a wide range of operations in recent years.”¹⁶⁰ While doctrinal thinking and the regular revision of formal doctrine were regarded to be a continuous process, British doctrinalists stressed the fact that good doctrine was to contain some enduring component. On the one hand, new operational experience was instrumental to refine doctrine, on the other not every new military operation should necessitate a full revision of existing doctrine.

The shift away from doctrine’s excursions into defence policy also reflects the fact that by the end of the 1990s Britain’s Armed Forces acted in the framework of a coherent security strategy that addressed the roles and missions the military were asked to perform. With SDR the conceptual cascade of national security interests, military strategy and force

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid, p. 44.

capabilities was re-established. The negative trend in defence resources had been stopped. The basic *raison d'être* of the military instrument was re-endorsed, as was the affiliated need to retain well-balanced forces capable of engaging at the high-intensity end of the conflict spectrum.

After the climate of doubts experienced in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the pendulum in the use of military power was now swinging towards the opposite: the growing tendency of leading Western governments, including the British, to intervene with military forces more readily than before. British commanders were under no illusion that the required preconditions for copybook interventions would ever be met; more often they would “have to use force to do what we can, rather than what we would wish to do”.¹⁶¹ The politicians’ rising expectations in, and lowering inhibition threshold to, military force had to be counterbalanced by military-strategic doctrine, which was to ensure that decision-makers understood both the strengths and also the limitations of the use of military force. It was of paramount importance that they recognised the overall conditions required for success, before they committed military forces to any international trouble spot.

9.3 Formal Doctrine: The ‘British Approach to Military Operations’

British Defence Doctrine encapsulates the conceptual bedrock of Britain’s post-Cold War military-strategic thinking. Although the second edition, published in 2001, formally superseded its predecessor from 1997, it is the combined analysis of both publications that demonstrates the emergence of this new British rationale for the use of military force in the changed postmodern and post-Cold War environment. While BDD 1 focused on explaining the link between defence policy and doctrine and exploring the new characteristics of modern armed conflict, BDD 2 refined the components of military strategy and put forward the key essentials of British military doctrine, incorporated in what was called the ‘British approach to military operations’.

To start with, BDD 1 discussed the nature of armed conflict in general and the implications of the new world order in particular. Largely based

161 Applegate, *Observations on the Use of Force in Complex Emergencies*, p. 27.

upon Clausewitz's thinking, it concluded that conflict was a political act and thus – despite its inherent violence, chaos and brutality – rarely unlimited. Success in armed conflict therefore had to be measured by the achievement of political aims, from which the military objectives, expressed in the form of a desired end-state, derived.¹⁶² The document carried on to identify the characteristics of conflict in the modern world, particularly the absence of a clear distinction between war and peace:

Even relatively minor, localised conflicts may have implications for world peace, stability and trade. Therefore many nations not directly engaged in conflict are involved in efforts to monitor, manage and resolve actual or potential conflicts. Against this background, technological, political and cultural developments shape the nature of modern conflict.¹⁶³

Further characteristics of modern conflict were considered to be the growing importance of information warfare; the simultaneous conduct of operations in all environments – sea, land, air and space – and the resulting need for jointery; the increasing asymmetry between potential opponents – on the one hand developed states with “modern, powerful and well-equipped forces but limited national interests or public support and severe political and moral constraints”, on the other a state or group of non-state actors with “small, lightly-equipped forces, unwilling to accept the norms of international law, with total commitment, and showing scant regard for life and property”.¹⁶⁴

Flowing from this set of circumstances, the doctrine argued that modern conflict was going to be fought increasingly in an asymmetric way and also in the spotlight of massive media attention, whose immediacy could “magnify the importance of relatively minor incidents and influence public opinion before the political authority can fully analyse the facts, putting additional pressure on political and military leaders”; on the other hand, the media could also be a “powerful conduit for positive information to boost morale and influence public reaction”.¹⁶⁵

BDD 2 attempted to draw together the major achievements of British doctrinal development during the 1990s and provide an overall guideline

162 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 1st Ed., pp. 2.2–2.4.

163 *Ibid*, p. 2.11.

164 *Ibid*, p. 2.12.

165 *Ibid*, p. 2.12–2.13.

of how to think when applying military force. It emphasised that doctrine was “not merely a record of past practice” but also “an assessment of the best approach based on a sound understanding of current imperatives and lessons learned from past experience – both the good and the bad”.¹⁶⁶ BDD 2 therefore identified six essential elements, or key themes, that ran through the entire doctrinal thinking of Britain’s Armed Forces: the ‘principles of war’; the warfighting ethos; the manoeuvrist approach; mission command; the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations; and flexibility and pragmatism. While doctrine was not supposed to prescribe *what* to think about the conduct of warfare, the understanding of these key themes aimed at offering a guideline of *how* to think about it. In accordance with the main purpose of the revised version of BDD, these six core themes were primarily addressed at those military and civilian decision-makers who were concerned with military strategy or the planning and conducting of operations. Furthermore, they permeated all levels of command down to the tactical one and could be applied to any part of the military, irrespective of sea, air, land or functional components.

The enduring ten ‘principles of war’ were not a new theme in British doctrinal thinking.¹⁶⁷ BDD 2 merely re-emphasised their significance as general guidelines for any type of operation and all levels of command, although it suggested that they were the most relevant at the military-strategic level, where they were supposed to establish a list of criteria against which courses of action affecting the national interest could be tested. The origin of the ‘principles of war’ lies in the warfighting school of thought and is based on the literature of classical strategic theory. An early list of such principles was introduced into the British Expeditionary Force during the First World War by J. F. C. Fuller.¹⁶⁸ In the course of the 20th century, the selection and emphasis of the principles altered,

166 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.1.

167 The ten ‘principles of war’: selection and maintenance of the aim; maintenance of morale; offensive action; security; surprise; concentration of force; economy of effort; flexibility; cooperation; and sustainability. See *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., pp. 3.1–3.4.

168 Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought*, p. 41. A reference to Fuller’s original set of principles is also provided in the US Army’s *AirLand Battle* doctrine: *US Army Field Manual 100-5. Blueprint for the AirLand Battle*. Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), 1991 (originally published: Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), p. 173.

but they remained a core subject of British military thinking. In the absence of a proper doctrinal body underlying them, however, the list rarely received serious attention other than as a useful source of reference. With the increased interest in conceptual development at the end of the Cold War, the principles again entered the focus of attention. The Army's *British Military Doctrine* of 1989 outlined them in detail, from where they found their way into joint doctrine. The authors of BDD 2 suggested that despite their enduring character these principles had to undergo regular examination on whether they still held good. In the end, BDD 2 adopted them without major changes.¹⁶⁹

The second essential element of BDD 2 was the so-called warfighting ethos.¹⁷⁰ Although claimed to be a persisting fundamental of British doctrinal thinking, this was a new issue in doctrine triggered by specific postmodern social circumstances. The formulation of the warfighting ethos was a response to the undesired calls for adjusting the military's values to their social environment. In a RUSI Journal article Major General Milton expressed these concerns:

Concern has been growing in recent years about the ways in which values in a broader society might have a negative effect on military forces – on the moral component of fighting power. The reality is that all those who wear the uniform of the UK's Armed Forces must be prepared to deliver lethal force and, if necessary, die for whatever legitimate cause the UK is fighting. The military profession is not, nor ever can be, risk-averse.¹⁷¹

He carried on warning that “no member of the UK's Armed Forces must ever be lulled into thinking that military operations are no longer about fighting wars and confronting risk”.¹⁷² These concerns about the erosion of military effectiveness were clearly the reason for enshrining the strong message on the warfighting ethos in the new doctrine. Similar to the Army's efforts to explain their ‘right to be different’, the purpose

169 According to Major General Milton, the wording was adjusted to an earlier version produced shortly after the Second World War and promulgated by Montgomery and Slim. See Milton, *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, p. 42. See also *The Application of Force (Army Code 71622)*, p. 2.6.

170 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.4.

171 Milton, *British Defence Doctrine*, p. 42.

172 *Ibid.*

of the warfighting ethos was to draw a line against civilianisation of military norms. More specifically, it was also a mindset considered to be crucial to the conduct of military operations. The success of British troops in the complex environment of recent peacekeeping operations was attributed to the fact that they went about their business with an attitude of ‘warfighting’, which gave them the conceptual ability and moral strength to control the potential escalation of violence. This meant that soldiers had to be mentally prepared to deliver lethal force when the need arose, even in non-combat situations, so as to keep the initiative and the monopoly of violence in their hands. Not just combat operations but also deterrence, coercion and stabilisation roles depended on this attitude. The warfighting ethos was, therefore, equally applicable to Operations Other Than War: “The ability to fight, and the ethos that gives meaning to it, is fundamental to the ability to deliver military capability because it generates in all individuals a mental and physical robustness and a level of training and equipment capable of sustaining them across a wide range of operations.”¹⁷³

Another key theme was the manoeuvrist approach. The concept had already been incorporated in BDD 1, which stated that “shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his material” was the underlying mindset for all military operations.¹⁷⁴ By 1999 the manoeuvrist vocabulary, which had its intellectual origins in the Army’s manoeuvre warfare, had also been formally adopted into *Air Power Doctrine* and *British Maritime Doctrine*. Both the RAF and the Navy had acknowledged that it was important to harmonise the terminology within Britain’s Armed Forces.¹⁷⁵ BDD 2 reconfirmed the centrality of the concept in the planning and conduct of military operations. Manoeuvre aimed to apply strength against the adversary’s identified vulnerabilities and to exploit momentum and tempo, which in combination would lead to shock and surprise, ultimately paralysing the adversary’s command and control ability. The emphasis of action was on defeat and disruption of the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight by taking the initiative and applying constant and unacceptable pressure at times and places least suspected.

173 Milton, *British Defence Doctrine*, p. 42.

174 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 1st Ed., p. 4.8.

175 *British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000)*, 3rd Ed., pp. 1.2.12–1.2.13; *British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806)*, 2nd Ed., pp. 39–41. See also: Fry, *The Meaning of Manoeuvre*; Gray, *The Contribution of Air Power to Manoeuvre Warfare*.

BDD 2 also put forward the central philosophy of command and control, summarised under the notion of mission command. It focused on achieving the right balance between delegation and control. The doctrine stated four enduring tenets to achieve mission command: timely decision-making; a clear understanding of the superior commander's intention; an ability on the part of subordinates to meet the superior's remit; and the commander's determination to see the plan through to a successful conclusion.¹⁷⁶ This required a style of command that promoted decentralised command, freedom of action as well as speed and initiative, but which at the same time was responsible to superior direction. In short, the commander instructed his subordinate about *what* to do and ensured the best possible conditions and directions – but left him the decision *how* to go about it. The notion of mission command had been put forward in the Army's ADP 2 *Command* in 1995.¹⁷⁷ Similar to the manoeuvrist approach, it was an attitude that met with the inherent command philosophies of all three Services. Conceptually, mission command was the implementation of the idea of doctrine into the area of command and control. The purpose of doctrine was to enable military officers under the stress of crisis and combat to act in line with the institution's common understanding of warfare and, on the basis of this, choose the best course of action. Likewise, mission command ensured that the command and control philosophy created the environment in which an attitude of individual thinking and of seizing the initiative was promoted.

Another central theme of BDD 2 was the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations: "The full integration of military operations into an overall pattern of activity in the Joint Operations Area is crucial."¹⁷⁸ For some time, Britain's Armed Forces were undertaking efforts to promote their ability to conduct joint operations, operate together with military forces of other nations (multinational) and coordinate with a

176 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.7.

177 *Army Doctrine Publication Volume 2, Command (Army Code 71564)*. Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Upavon: DGD&D, 1995. URL http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/comd.pdf. See also Melvin, Mungo. *British Army Doctrine in the 1990s: Job Well Done, or Famous Last Words?* Paper Presented at the 3rd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 13 December 2002 by Brigadier Mungo Melvin, Director Land Warfare.

178 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.8.

“plethora of civilian agencies, both governmental and non-governmental” (integrated).¹⁷⁹ The aim of BDD 2 was therefore to provide the doctrinal framework for these trends. It portrayed them not merely as a necessity emerging from the growing complexity of post-Cold War interventions but emphasised the potential of enhancing the effect of operations when the particular strengths of all components were used to their best. Operations in a purely national and military framework had come to be the exception. BDD 2 therefore regarded the understanding of the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations as a vital attitude of mind.

The sixth key theme addressed by BDD 2 was labelled ‘flexibility and pragmatism’. These two attitudes were viewed as traditional British virtues, which had proved critical to many successful military actions, particularly in the days when commanders were uninterested in doctrine. Adopting them into military-strategic doctrine had two distinct purposes. First, doctrinalists thereby expressed their recognition of flexibility and pragmatism as two important qualities that should be actively maintained. They were regarded as the precondition to the manoeuvrist approach: “Commanders must be conditioned to think constantly of new ways of approaching an objective. Imaginative and innovative thinking is the true source of initiative.”¹⁸⁰ This did not only hold good for outmanoeuvring a conventional adversary but particularly when confronted with unprecedented situations in complex emergencies or asymmetric conflicts. Second, the adoption of flexibility and pragmatism in the highest formal doctrine aimed at countering the claim that doctrine was dogma. Although doctrine was fully embedded in Britain’s military culture by 2001, certain commentators remained sceptical about the value of formal doctrine. Some of them argued that doctrine was inherently dogmatic as it tended to hinder people from ‘thinking outside the box’.¹⁸¹

In BDD 2 the doctrinalists pointed out that British doctrine was flexible, as it was “constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if found wanting, changed to reflect the developing military environment”.¹⁸² British

179 Ibid.

180 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.9.

181 Daddow, *Facing the Future: History in the Writing of British Military Doctrine*, p. 161.

182 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 3.9.

doctrine, therefore, attempted to prevent obligatory prescriptive rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking about military operations. Dogma was considered to be the “resort of the idle and unimaginative mind” and therefore “anathema” to doctrine.¹⁸³ To have a common way of thinking outlined in doctrine was, however, instrumental to exploiting flexibility and pragmatism, as the Director of Joint Doctrine and Concepts explained:

The UK relies on its commanders’ judgement and encourages them to take innovative action. They need to do different things without surprising each other – it is the enemy they need to surprise. There is nothing new about this. It is the level of understanding that Nelson achieved with his captains – an instinctive grasp of the sheer potential of the unexpected. The predictability of flexibility and the application of a pragmatic turn of mind is part of the way the UK Armed Forces think.¹⁸⁴

By summarising these core essentials of the ‘British approach to military operations’, BDD 2 aimed at providing the common starting ground and the general guideline necessary for innovative and initiative thinking. Endorsed by formal doctrine, this framework of how to think about warfare was to give British commanders and soldiers the general mindset to tackle the varied challenges of the postmodern and post-Cold War operational environment. The ideas displayed a sophisticated understanding of doctrine, evidencing the stage of development of British military doctrine by 2001. In essence, BDD 2 forged the three Services’ doctrinal thinking of the preceding decade into a common concept.

* * *

The military-strategic doctrine that had emerged by the end of the 20th century provided a first coherent consolidation of post-Cold War rationales. Both editions of *British Defence Doctrine* are documents designed not only to display the uncertain and dynamic nature of international security but also to give a military-strategic response to it. Viewed in a larger historical context, Britain’s new joint and expeditionary military

183 Ibid.

184 Milton, *British Defence Doctrine*, p. 43.

strategy represented both continuity and change with the traditional strategic paradigm that had prevailed during the last 200 years.

The overall continuity, based upon Britain's historical strategic legacy, was geographic. Because of her geostrategic position as an island and her global commitments, Britain had fought most of her major wars on the continent of Europe or further afield. In brief, the British had always sought to conduct the defence of their country 'at arm's length'. From this unchanging strategic rationale a number of subordinated military-strategic consequences emerged.

First, Britain had always needed the ability to project military forces abroad and to sustain them far away from home bases, which required the scope and reach of a global sea power. Second, the conduct of such long-range military operations was a complex matter, as they tended to be joint – cooperation of naval and land forces – and expeditionary in nature. Britain therefore favoured the maintenance of relatively small professional forces, in contrast to the system of large conscript forces of most other major European powers. Third, because of the scope of military actions across the globe and the limited size of military capabilities, Britain's overall security depended on European coalitions, by which the balance of power was intended to be held in check in order to prevent a potential invasion of Britain. Fourth, the involvement in various 'small wars' had familiarised Britain's strategic culture with the concept of using military force for limited ends and in a restrictive way; the Clausewitzian notion of military force as an extension of policy was thus nothing new in British strategy. Apart from the two World Wars – historical periods that constituted major and immediate threats to the nation's survival – Britain's Armed Forces had always operated in an expeditionary role, based on the reach and scope of maritime power projection and the use of small, flexible land forces.¹⁸⁵

During the Cold War this overall understanding in British strategy remained generally unchanged, although the pattern became overshadowed by the priorities of NATO strategy, the first ever long-term peace-time alliance Britain had entered, with permanently committed land and air forces on the European mainland. As a consequence, Britain's force structure and capabilities were geared up to the defence of Europe, the country's military strategy being subordinated to that of the Alliance.

185 Ibid, pp. 4.2–4.6. Also: unpublished memorandum of Bill Tyack.

Parts of the military establishment continued to be involved in traditional 'small wars' in the process of the UK's gradual withdrawal from the Empire, but the overall focus of the Armed Services undoubtedly became NATO and Europe – as embodied in the military-strategic concepts of sea control, conventional territorial defence and nuclear deterrence. The traditional strength of joint and expeditionary operations in a national context became disused – apart from a few occasions which during the Cold War were regarded as exceptions from the main mission.

After the end of the Cold War, however, the patterns of traditional British military strategy were re-activated, albeit they underwent some adaptation. Post-Cold War security risks tended to be more transnational. Still, the military's core function of defending the nation and its sovereignty was taken care of relatively easily given the unchanged geostrategic position of Britain. As a result, Britain's Armed Forces approached the idea of force projection and crisis intervention, directed at addressing post-Cold War instabilities at their roots, more quickly than other European nations. Britain remained committed to the collective defence of NATO but in addition pioneered the implementation of the Alliance's new crisis management role incorporated in the ARRC. Britain's place in the world was reformulated with an even stronger emphasis on global commitments, deriving from the responsibilities and interests of a leading nation with far-reaching political and economic interdependencies.¹⁸⁶ As a consequence, Britain was intent to contribute her share to world peace and international stability and to use the particular strength and reputation of her professional Armed Forces as an instrument in international affairs. Stability projection, conflict prevention, crisis intervention and peace support were roles that were readily absorbed by Britain's Armed Forces. The precondition to pursue such a military strategy was that the forces were able to be deployed at short notice, to intervene robustly at any level of conflict and to operate in an expeditionary, joint and combined environment.

Two major changes, brought about by the end of the Cold War, nevertheless had a magnifying impact on this re-emergence of an expeditionary military strategy. One was the descent of territorial defence into irrelevance for the foreseeable future, the other the rise of conventional military

186 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 1st Ed., p. 5.2.

power to new effectiveness. Even during the period when Britain was a great sea power and created, consolidated and finally lost a global empire, the country's security had always been linked to the primary concern of defending territory against external aggression – whether it was homeland, colonial possessions or later NATO's Central Front. In the post-Cold War era, characterised by the absence of an external military threat and the unrivalled dominance of Western military power, territorial defence was no longer a priority of British national security. The instabilities of the post-Cold War world tended to affect societies irrespective of their geographic location and their measures of territorial defence. At the same time, conventional military power regained its utility as a strategic instrument in its own right once the threat of nuclear exchange between East and West no longer existed. Confronted with the need to intervene in various, geographically dispersed conflict regions and contain the spread of transnational security risks, Britain's Armed Forces adopted new ways of applying conventional military force, like the previously discussed coercion and peace enforcement concepts.

The disappearance of the long-standing rationale of territorial defence also impacted on the traditional British debate of 'maritime versus continental operations'. The arguing over the appropriate balance between the roles of sea and land power in the defence of Great Britain and her global interests had been a continuous theme in the country's strategic debate. As mentioned earlier, the most commonly agreed consensus emerged around the notion that Britain pursued a "maritime strategy in times of peace and limited war and an adaptive continental strategy in times of regional or global conflict", an approach called the 'British way in warfare'.¹⁸⁷ The overall force structure flowing from this military strategy was based on the powerful Royal Navy with global reach and a small Army. The empire was protected through the leverage of maritime power and forward-based garrisons; in the course of the 20th century air power joined the concert of military power but was considered rather as an important adjunct to the two more senior military components, after the strategic air bombardment had failed to show the intended effect.¹⁸⁸ The combined effect of the increased need for expeditionary land forces,

187 Fry, *Operations in a Changed Strategic Environment*, p. 35. See also French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000*, pp. xvi–xviii.

188 Fry, *Operations in a Changed Strategic Environment*, p. 35.

the rise of modern air power effectiveness and the shift in the Navy's role from sea control to power projection made Britain's military strategy entirely joint. The age-old debate over maritime and continental power had become as obsolete as territorial defence.

10 The 'Post-11 September' Military: Doctrine and the Rise of Asymmetric Conflict, 2001/02

The terror attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 have become a defining moment for contemporary international security. The events have heralded the transition into a new era of international security, one dominated by the threat of asymmetric conflict. This era of asymmetry calls into question the Western perception that has been prevalent during the past decade: that a peaceful world order is in the making, in which disputes and grievances would be resolved without resorting to extreme measures of violence; that the process of globalisation by and large would serve the benefit of all and draw the international community together; that the inevitable outbreak of regional conflicts could be contained from spreading by a relatively cost-free, minimalist interventionism; that the existing mechanisms for countering non-state troublemakers were sufficient; and that the developed nations were at a safe distance from the effects of conflicts and inequalities smouldering in collapsed states.

9/11 dramatically shattered these beliefs and demonstrated the complexity of security in a globalised world. Security analysts soon pointed out that the phenomenon of globalisation and international terrorism were connected to each other. At first glimpse, the growing transnational flow of capital, goods, persons and information created new opportunities from which the rich as well as the poor could benefit. Soon, however, it became apparent that globalisation did not necessarily lead to more security and less conflict but opened up new vulnerabilities, new tensions and new potential security threats.¹⁸⁹ Despite the widening interdependence of

189 For the strategic implications of '11 September' see Wenger, Andreas. *Der 11. September als Epochenwende: Kontinuität und Wandel in der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik*. In: Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (2002). Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 2002, pp. 11–26. For the connection between international terrorism and globalisation see Sandler, Todd. *Interview with Prof. Dr. Todd Sandler*. In: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Vol. 168, No. 12 (December 2002), pp. 4–5, p. 4.

states, forces of fragmentation and discrepancies in wealth between and within nations caused new sources of instability and catalysts for conflict. The free flow of resources and information also provided opportunities for transnational organised crime and international terrorism.¹⁹⁰ The new dimension of terrorism was, in the end, a product of this period of globalisation. ‘11 September’ has come to represent a much more powerful phenomenon than mere terrorism: bin Laden’s onslaught on the economic and political symbols of the Western lead nation has demonstrated the “globalisation of insurgency”.¹⁹¹

The global insurgent – or international terrorist – is characterised by a specific ideological and organisational constellation: his ideology and objectives are fundamentalist and aim at the destruction of a way of life rather than a concrete political achievement; his structure and capabilities are rooted in the environment of collapsed states and regional conflicts, where he has established a safe basis for recruitment, training and preparation; his network of like-minded cells is internationally linked and his operatives move freely, but well disguised, within the openness of the targeted society; his financing and logistics exploit the free flow of goods on the world market; his propaganda is geared up to the possibilities of the information age; and his attacks aim at mass effect, irrespective of the potential casualties and damage.¹⁹²

The international community has yet to come up with a recipe to address this new challenge. After absorbing the initial shock of 9/11, America set out to lead a broad coalition of nations into a “war on terrorism”, which foresaw a long-term and internationally coordinated strategy of political, diplomatic, economic, developmental, financial, legal, military and other security measures in order to reconstruct collapsed nations, dry out breeding grounds of terrorism and destroy identified terrorist networks.¹⁹³ It is not the aim of this thesis to evaluate the overall, and ongoing, campaign against international terrorism. The main concern herein is the ‘post-11

190 Torpy, G. L. *Future British Operations*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 8–12, p. 8.

191 Mackinlay, *NATO and bin Laden*, p. 36.

192 Mackinlay, *Opposing Insurgents during Peace Operations*, pp. 159–189. See also Schulte, Paul. “I Am Osama bin Laden”: A Strategic Warning and Challenge to the West. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 3 (June 2002), pp. 20–27.

193 Heymann, Philip B. *Dealing with Terrorism. An Overview*. In: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001), pp. 24–38.

September' military, or in other words the impact of the events on British military transformation. 9/11 has naturally raised the fundamental question of whether the military instrument of the 1990s is sufficiently flexible to accept a wider role in countering asymmetric threats.

To begin with, this chapter explores the British debate of asymmetric conflict since the end of the Cold War and argues that the British were relatively well prepared to design a wider role for the military in asymmetric conflict, due to their existing experience in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and expeditionary operations. It then examines the potential implications of the *New Chapter*, the British Government's amendment to the *Strategic Defence Review* in response to 9/11. The *New Chapter* displayed the intention to extend the military's role in homeland defence by assisting the civil authorities in security and protection operations, for both the prevention of and reaction to large-scale terrorist attacks. It further emphasised the significance of countering terrorism 'up stream', at its breeding ground. To shed more light on the military role in countering asymmetry abroad, the chapter examines the experience of Afghanistan in 2001/02. Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led campaign to remove the terrorist-harboursing Taliban regime and prevent al Qaeda terrorist cells from spreading beyond Afghanistan, bears the hallmarks of a new model of military intervention. This chapter argues that the operational environment encountered by US and British troops in Afghanistan has come to represent the prelude of 'post-11 September' soldiering: the blurring of strategic, operational and tactical levels; the systematic use of network-centric capabilities; the focus on joint and expeditionary operations; the blurring of the conflict spectrum and, as a consequence, the concurrency of combat, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, peace support and humanitarian operations within the same theatre of operations; and the use of military effect not merely for the containment of but rather the active elimination of sources of asymmetric threat.

10.1 The British Debate on Asymmetry prior to '11 September'

In its broadest sense, the concept of asymmetry in conflict describes warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent's strength. Asymmetric warfare is a relatively new expression in international security that emerged only since the end of the Cold War. The underlying idea, however, is not new: to respond with non-linear means to the employment of mainstream military force. In literature, the search for asymmetries, as a fundamental element of military strategy, can be tracked back to David's defeat of Goliath with a sling and a pebble. Despite the short history of contemporary studies on asymmetry, various definitions, typologies and counter-strategies have emerged. The purpose of this subchapter is not to provide a comprehensive examination of the subject but to briefly outline the British understanding of asymmetry as it emerged during the 1990s.¹⁹⁴

The growing superiority of Western military might since the end of the Cold War increased the likelihood that opponents would resort to unconventional, or asymmetric, means. While war of national survival became less imminent, Western lead nations became more frequently involved in military crisis interventions. Naturally, the intervening powers' interests were limited, or comparatively less determined than that of local actors. As a result, the debate on asymmetry initially focused on the vulnerability of Western states in the context of military interventions abroad.

A first hint of this development came with the Gulf War 1991. Saddam's overall strategy in 1990/91 was characterised by asymmetry. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh concluded that his idea was to rely on his defences around Kuwait and the heavy costs imposed on coalition forces if they could be drawn into potential killing zones. The strategy was based on deterring and if necessary sitting out the central thrust of the enemy campaign, by exacerbating the war's stresses and strains on the political cohesion of the coalition while absorbing the enemy air assault. Saddam strongly believed that the US' Achilles heel was its extreme sensitivity to casualties.¹⁹⁵ In the end, he could not inflict sufficient casualties on Western forces. Neither could he break the coalition's cohesion by trying

194 For a theoretical approach to asymmetry see Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, pp. 93–128.

195 Freedman/Karsh, *How Kuwait Was Won. Strategy in the Gulf War*, p. 15.

to rope Israel into the war through his Scud attacks, another attempt of asymmetry.¹⁹⁶ The conflict nevertheless displayed the potential of using asymmetric means to compensate for inferiority to Western conventional military power. The events in Mogadishu two years later, for instance, proved the point that a US intervention, conducted in the absence of vital national interest, was highly vulnerable to the asymmetry of stakes. On 3 October 1993, 18 US soldiers of Task Force Ranger were killed in a raid against the stronghold of Somali faction leader Aidid and in due course some of their mutilated bodies appeared on international TV screens. The incident was, arguably, critical to the Clinton Administration's decision for withdrawal from Somalia a few weeks later.¹⁹⁷

Although the UK Government considered its nation to be more robust to casualties than the US, the potential vulnerability of military intervention to an opposition that was raising the stakes disproportionately became a general concern. When BDD 1 described modern conflict, it named as one of its features the "increasingly stark asymmetry between the opponents".¹⁹⁸ Equally, the SDR emphasised that the existing technological superiority in conventional weapons led to the possibility that adversaries chose to "adapt alternative weapons and unconventional (or 'asymmetric') strategies, perhaps attacking us through vulnerabilities in our open civil societies".¹⁹⁹

Another attempt to circumvent the effect of a Western military intervention through asymmetric responses was undertaken by the Milosevic regime in 1999. In order to undermine NATO's cohesion, the Serbs skilfully exploited the psychological warfare fought in the media by highlighting the civilian casualties and collateral damage of the Alliance's bombing campaign. Milosevic further tried to overwhelm NATO through his ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, a manipulation of human misery which sparked a refugee crisis affecting the entire region.²⁰⁰ Though not successful, the tensions and strains within NATO's political and military decision-making circles underlined the difficulties asymmetric warfare could cause by

196 Rochlin/Demchak, *The Gulf War: Technological and Organisational Implications*, p. 269.

197 Orme, *The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity*, p. 141.

198 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 1st Ed., p. 2.12.

199 *The Strategic Defence Review*, p. 5.

200 For instance George, *The House of Commons Defence Committee Report Lessons of Kosovo*, pp. 12–14.

exploiting the vulnerabilities of democratic societies and their political, legal and moral constraints to their own warfighting.²⁰¹

In a *RUSI Whitehall Paper* published in 2000 Nicholas Newman presented a detailed study on the vulnerabilities of British intervention operations to asymmetric response. He suggested a useful typology that distinguished three types of asymmetry. One was the asymmetry of capabilities, or asymmetry in configuration, which comprised the use of military and technological niche or non-conventional capabilities such as ballistic missiles, information warfare, chemical weapons or terrorism. Another type was defined as the ethical asymmetry, describing the behaviour of an actor who did not restrain himself by legal or moral codes, or had such fundamentally different values and objectives that any conflict was inherently asymmetric. The third type was defined as asymmetry of stake, which described a strategy that focused on the will and commitment of an actor rather than trying to defeat his military forces.²⁰² Translated into British doctrinal language, asymmetry of stake constitutes the manoeuvrist approach of the actor whose military force is inferior. It was this type of asymmetry that became a growing concern for Western nations involved in military interventions abroad. The aim of an asymmetric actor was therefore to exploit one of these three potential asymmetries and thereby deter or disrupt an international military intervention.²⁰³ Western public opinion was obviously a key vulnerability in this understanding of asymmetry.

201 See also Gray, *The RMA and Intervention: A Sceptical View*, pp. 52–65.

202 Newman, Nicholas J. *Asymmetric Threats to British Military Intervention Operations*. London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2000, pp. 3–7. A similar typology was presented in formal doctrine by 2001: “The asymmetric nature of the opponent himself (ie he is difficult to identify and target or even to negotiate with); the asymmetric nature of an opponent’s ideals or culture (which are at variance to one’s own beliefs, priorities and moral constraints); and, the asymmetric methods that an opponent may employ to counter a qualitative or quantitative advantage, eg the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.” In: *Joint Operations (JWP 3-00)*, p. 5.22.

203 Newman, *Asymmetric Threats to British Military Intervention Operations*, p. 92. A later UK definition of asymmetry: “Actions undertaken by state or non-state parties (friendly or adversary), to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths and capitalise on perceived weaknesses through the exploitation of dissimilar values, strategies, organisations, and capabilities. Such actions are capable, by design or default, of achieving disproportionate effects, thereby gaining the

While the regimes of Saddam and Milosevic had in the end failed to turn these Western weaknesses into their own victory, there was a group of players emerging that was potentially more effective in exploiting asymmetry: the non-state actors. In the post-Cold War environment, the majority of conflicts had become decoupled from state monopoly and from the classical, symmetric norms that had governed inter-state wars. Intra-state conflicts became increasingly privatised and asymmetric, run by independent warlords, militias, transnational organised crime, mercenaries and terrorist networks who exploited the weakness of collapsed societies for their own agenda.²⁰⁴ British post-Cold War military doctrine addressed this new pattern of conflict and provided a promising starting point for the intervention in complex emergencies and the conduct of COIN or PSO operations. There was nevertheless a recurring debate over the question whether or not the British Armed Forces were sufficiently geared up to major asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors. Some commentators argued that despite efforts to enhance the rapid reaction capability the military's mindset was still focused on the image of a conventional battle and thus lacked the flexibility and imagination required for asymmetric conflict.²⁰⁵

A particular concern in the debate over asymmetric warfare was the growing rise of international terrorism during the 1990s. Terrorism – defined as the deliberate and organised use of violence, or the threat of violence, in order to attain leverage, influence and power to effect political change through the exploitation of fear²⁰⁶ – is by definition an asymmetric strategy. It is directed at the psychology of a broader public rather than at the physical power of the state. Britain had been confronted with terrorism in Northern Ireland since 1969, and the British Armed

instigator an advantage probably not attainable through conventional means.”
In: *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0-01.1)*, p. A-26.

204 Münkler, Herfried. *Das Ende des „klassischen“ Krieges. Warlords, Terrornetzwerke und die Zukunft kriegerischer Gewalt*. In: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 14 September 2002. URL <http://www.nzz.ch/dossiers/2003/terrorismus/2002.09.14-liarticle8DEA9.html>. See also: Hills, *Doctrine, Criminality, and Future British Army Operations*, pp. 6–8; Mandel, Robert. *The Privatisation of Security*. In: *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Fall 2001), pp. 129–151.

205 *Land Warfare. The Shape of the Battle ahead*. In: *The Economist*, 18 November 2000, pp. 33–36.

206 White, *Air Power and the Changing Nature of Terrorism*, p. 104.

Forces became familiar with their role of assisting the civil authorities in domestic counter-terrorism operations. The overall significance of offering a political solution and thus depriving the terrorist the friendly environment to conceal himself, the close cooperation of police, intelligence and military authorities and the extensive use of Special Forces were all principles integral to the British thinking on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The conceptual debate over terrorism, however, remained attached to regional contexts – the IRA against the UK, the ETA against Spain or the Hamas against Israel. Equally, asymmetry was still considered to be primarily a concern for intervening military forces.

In the second half of the 1990s the focus shifted towards the rise of international terrorism, a phenomenon triggered by a growing number of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamic fundamentalist groups against Western, mainly US, targets across the globe.²⁰⁷ Taking into account the proliferation of WMD and the spread of other forms of high-technology exploitable for violent purposes, various commentators warned of the dangerous potential of international terrorists. But it was the al Qaeda attack on 11 September 2001 that finally struck the message home. 9/11 catapulted the threat of super-terrorism to the fore of Western security concerns and placed asymmetric war into a new context.

10.2 The ‘New Chapter’ – A Blueprint for Further Military Transformation

With the conversion of civilian airliners into guided missiles and the subsequent collapse of the Twin Towers watched live by an international TV audience, the worst fears about asymmetric warfare came true. The attacks made clear that the comfort zone of Western society was no longer impenetrable, that the geographical distance from conflict regions was no longer a safeguard for national security. The perception that the Euro-Atlantic area of security could be protected from the effects of distant conflicts by the occasional ‘out-of-area’ stabilisation was also shattered – a

²⁰⁷ The major post-Cold War terror attacks against US targets (prior to 9/11) were: World Trade Centre 1993; US military Khobar Tower in Dhahran 1996; US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 1998; USS Cole in Yemen 2000. See White, *Air Power and the Changing Nature of Terrorism*, pp. 109–110.

conclusion highlighted by Secretary of State for Defence Hoon in a speech in November 2002: “It took the appalling events of 11 September 2001 to bring home to us the artificiality of the old geographical distinction and its irrelevance to the security problems we face now.”²⁰⁸

In a globalised world, non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, had assumed the ability and demonstrated the determination to strike strategically at the political, economic, and thus psychological, heart of developed nations. The vulnerability of open societies and sensitive infrastructures on the one hand, the unfettered availability of modern technologies to everybody on the other, made the orchestration of terror attacks with devastating effect easier than ever. At the same time, such terrorism was deeply connected to the environment of war-torn societies and collapsed states. In the “epicentre of complex emergencies”²⁰⁹, insurgent forces hostile to Western countries found a safe basis for recruiting, training, indoctrinating and preparing their operatives for terrorist activities. The majority of US and British security analysts agreed in their conclusion that the international community’s main strategy of the 1990s had become insufficient, as the existing crisis management merely contained the problems.

Britain’s conceptual response to 9/11 was twofold. On the one hand the government identified a need for refining the overall security strategy, on the other it argued that its strategic perception of the post-Cold War era, as outlined in SDR, was largely validated. Shortly after the events senior officials nevertheless emphasised the Government’s intention to analyse thoroughly the long-term strategic implications of the event. In October 2001, Hoon officially announced the drafting of an additional chapter of the SDR, the *New Chapter* as it came to be called. It would examine British security in the light of the growing asymmetric threat and the military’s contribution in countering terrorism.²¹⁰

208 Hoon, Geoff. Statement on “*Interventions in the New Security Environment*” at the Foreign Policy Centre on 12 November 2002 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=2143.

209 Mackinlay, *Opposing Insurgents during Peace Operations*, pp. 159–189.

210 Hoon, Geoff. Statement on “*11 September – A New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review*” at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London on 5 December 2001 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1247.

At the same time British defence officials made it clear that this was to be an additional chapter to the existing strategic framework that remained valid.²¹¹ In the CDS lecture at the end of 2001, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce emphasised this view: “If 11 September did anything to our views, it was to confirm that the direction we took with SDR was the right one.”²¹² The SDR had mainly been about adapting Britain’s military strategy to post-Cold War security risks, about intervening in conflicts which jeopardised British security interests from far away. The main purpose of the *New Chapter* was therefore to refine the thinking about asymmetric conflict and to design a more effective role for Britain’s Armed Services on the basis of the SDR’s expeditionary military strategy and its rapid reaction force structure.

Parallel to the work on the *New Chapter*, the military intervention in Afghanistan went under way. Operation Enduring Freedom was conducted by a US-led ‘coalition of the able and the willing’. While the US appreciated the broad international support to their ‘war on terror’, they preferred to restrict the actual military campaign of removing the Taliban regime and al Qaeda from Afghanistan to a number of carefully selected allies. Still mindful of the political and military difficulties experienced during the NATO air campaign against Serbia two years earlier, the Pentagon preferred unilateral military action, backed up by a small coalition of close military partners.²¹³ Among the few allies approached by the US for military assistance, Britain contributed the largest contingent. In military terms, the UK military was the only one with sufficient levels of deployability and interoperability to interact with America’s high-technology forces in a joint environment. Under the designation Operation Veritas, Britain supported the US Forces in the Middle East with a wide range of maritime, air and land capabilities.²¹⁴

211 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*. Cm 5566 Vol. I. London: TSO, 2002, introduction by the Secretary of State for Defence, p. 4. URL <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/newchapter.htm>.

212 Boyce, Michael. *UK Strategic Choices Following the Strategic Defence Review and 11 September*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 1–7, p. 7.

213 Binnendijk/Kugler, *Transforming European Forces*, p. 121.

214 *Ministry of Defence Performance Report 2001/2002*. Cm 5661. London: TSO, 2002, p. 7. URL <http://www.mod.uk/publications/performance2001/index.htm>.

The SDR's *New Chapter* was presented to Parliament on 18 July 2002. To begin with, the paper reconfirmed the overall direction of Britain's security strategy, by stating that "SDR provided a firm foundation on which to build" and "the direction which it had set for defence, together with lessons learned subsequently from, for example, the Kosovo campaign in 1999, continued to be broadly right. That was why the work was deliberately designed as a *New Chapter* rather than a new review."²¹⁵ The main theme was, as announced, to improve the strategy against terrorist threats and the respective role of Britain's Armed Forces. With regard to the overall strategy the document emphasised the need to improve international coordination and to intensify the cooperation within the Government's different departments. For the purpose of improving the British Armed Forces' input into counter-terrorism, the paper took a fresh look at military contributions to home defence and domestic security operations, which included the proposal for the fundamental restructuring of the reserve forces. It also formulated a range of military tasks to counter specific terrorist threats abroad. Another key issue was the incorporation of network-centric warfare. In short, the *New Chapter* suggested a whole set of conceptual and organisational reforms that would enable the British Armed Forces to contribute more effectively to the overall response to asymmetric threats.

The phenomenon of asymmetric threat had already been recognised in the SDR, which pointed out that "there are also new risks which threaten our security by attacking our way of life. We have seen new and horrifying forms of terrorism [and] there is an increasing danger from the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical technologies".²¹⁶ But, whereas the SDR saw these potential asymmetric threats as one of a range of tactics that an adversary might use, the *New Chapter* recognised the strategic effect asymmetric actors could potentially achieve. Britain's overall aim therefore was to prevent terrorists from using violence – particularly violence with mass effect – to achieve change in international affairs.²¹⁷ Turning to the required strategy, the document pointed out that countering terrorism was "usually a long-term business requiring the roots and causes

215 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 6. See also *Ministry of Defence Performance Report 2001/2002*, p. 16.

216 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 7.

217 Boyce, *UK Strategic Choices Following the SDR and 11 September*, p. 7.

to be addressed as well as the symptoms”.²¹⁸ A significant conceptual change the *New Chapter* suggested was the geographic definition of British security interests:

While the core regions identified in the SDR of Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean are likely to remain the primary focus of our interests, it is increasingly clear that a coherent and effective campaign against international terrorism – and indeed other contingencies – may require engagement further afield more often than perhaps we had previously assumed.²¹⁹

The role of the military was perceived as contributing to the entire spectrum of responses. For this purpose, four key conclusions were presented. First, ‘knowledge superiority’ over international terrorism had to be achieved in order to anticipate their plans; this concerned intelligence above all. Second, counter-terrorism embraced two main categories of opposition – the international terrorist organisations themselves and regimes that supported or sponsored them. Third, a specific focus had to be directed against terrorists who acquired, or tried to acquire, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices.²²⁰ The fourth conclusion comprised a categorisation of military effects; it suggested that military force could be applied for prevention, deterrence, coercion, disruption or destruction of terrorist opponents.

The military’s preventive role meant assistance in stability projection, which comprised defence diplomacy and Peace Support Operations. There was no fundamentally new aspect to this, but the paper highlighted the importance of engaging in post-conflict recovery, thereby contributing to dealing with the roots and causes and reducing the risk that terrorist networks could install themselves in collapsed states.

Deterrence was directed at both terrorist groups themselves and regimes that might support them. For this purpose, however, the concept of deterrence had to be refined. The UK’s nuclear deterrence remained a long-term insurance against major strategic military threats to the country, but it was of little use against actors who did not share the ‘threat-and-counterthreat’ rationale of the traditional Cold War nuclear deterrence.

218 Ibid, p. 10.

219 Ibid, pp. 12–13.

220 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 9.

Non-state groups did not possess the political, economic and military infrastructure that would make them susceptible to nuclear retaliation. Equally, the nuclear threatening against rogue regimes in case they cooperated with terrorist networks appeared to have limited credibility. More subtle tools were required to demonstrate that Britain had the means to hold at risk the values of any target group. The *New Chapter* therefore focused on conventional deterrence, based on the ability to strike flexibly and with high precision:

We also want it to be clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we have a broad range of responses available. ... We must therefore maintain a wide and flexible range of military options, including conventional weapons with a capacity for precision and penetration so as to minimise incidental damage ... Aggression against us will not secure political or military advantage, but invite a proportionately serious response.²²¹

In essence, the *New Chapter* adjusted the idea of ‘flexible response’ to the era of asymmetric conflict, as it tried to include non-state actors and unpredictable dictatorial regimes into the cost-benefit equation of deterrence. In case military deterrence and diplomatic persuasion failed, coercion came into play. Coercion envisaged the delivery of military effects, mainly based on precision strikes, in cadence with other lines of operation in order to convince an opponent to change, stop or reverse his behaviour without having to pay the full price. The role of coercion was mainly directed against regimes and states that potentially harboured or supported terrorists.²²²

In case terrorist cells were identified and could not be neutralised by law enforcement or other non-military means, the disruption and destruction by military force was the next step of escalation. Disruption and destruction meant the type of expeditionary operations conducted in and around Afghanistan: find-and-strike patrols directed against al Qaeda fighters as well as naval and air surveillance to intercept terrorist elements trying to escape to other regions. The aim was to target the

221 Ibid, p. 12.

222 Ibid, p. 9. For coercion see also Peach, *The Doctrine of Targeting for Effect*, p. 69.

sources and flows of material, finance and personnel of terrorist networks and deny them freedom of movement. It included raids on key terrorist facilities, like for instance training camps. The *New Chapter* pointed out that “find-and-strike operations in particular require high-intensity and integrated warfighting capacity, and the intelligence and politico-military decision-making capacity to act with speed and decisiveness.”²²³ At the same time, the study warned against misjudging the character of such military action:

[These operations] have occasionally presented opportunities for direct attack, but the cordoning and searching of terrain, and the destruction of hiding places and military equipment, also help deny terrorists the opportunity to organise and operate in Afghanistan. The phasing, scale and tempo may all differ from those of operations against a more conventional opponent. And the success of such operations may be measured more by our success in exploiting fleeting opportunities and deterring and disrupting future terrorist activity than by any decisive pitched battle.²²⁴

The need for high-intensity and integrated warfighting capacity led to the issue of network-centric warfare. The *New Chapter* emphasised the “growing importance we already attach to what is called network-centric capability” and stated that “we will accelerate and want to increase our investment in network-centric capabilities”.²²⁵ The transformation of Britain’s Armed Forces into a network-capable instrument was not a new theme, as the procurement efforts in sensor, network and precision strike assets during the major part of the 1990s underlined. The decisive effect that the combination of precision weapons and shared information systems could produce had been recognised for some time. After Operation Allied Force in 1999 had revealed the insufficiency of British PGM stocks for a sustained campaign, investments were intensified. The British view was nevertheless not to overstate the impact of technology on the overall outcome of conflicts, a lesson that had been learned by the very same crisis over Kosovo. In this context, the formal and unequivocal adoption of the concept of network-centric warfare by the *New Chapter*

223 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 10. See also Boyce, *UK Strategic Choices Following the SDR and 11 September*, p. 7.

224 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 10.

225 *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

was a shift of emphasis, as it made clear that Britain was determined to go along with the US-led RMA. Ultimately, the aim was to develop an enhanced ability to “detect, decide and destroy” an opponent, based on an integrated system of sensors, communication links, information processing and strike assets.²²⁶

Another theme put forward by the *New Chapter* was the military’s role in home defence. Northern Ireland had made Britain’s Armed Forces expert in military assistance to civil authorities in general and counter-terrorism operations in particular. The new dimension of asymmetric threat called for a widening of this role. Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Under-Secretary in the MoD, however, made it clear that the military’s role was to remain a supporting one:

As far as the domestic agenda is concerned, we [the MoD and the Armed Forces] are clear that our job is to support the civil authority in crisis management in whatever way we can. We do not seek a leading role in that. We see our primary role in counter-terrorism, for example, as being ‘up stream’, acting overseas, ideally to prevent attacks happening in the first place, rather than simply waiting for them to come to us in the UK. Nevertheless, in what the US calls ‘homeland security’, the MoD has a critical supporting role to play, essentially in the provision of specialist capabilities to support civil crisis management.²²⁷

Despite the requirement to support civil authorities at home in the prevention of and response to asymmetric threats, the *New Chapter* emphasised the intention that Britain was “not going to allow threats at home to tie up significant numbers of our high-readiness Armed Forces and prevent us from acting abroad”.²²⁸ The primary role of Britain’s professional military was to remain the conduct of expeditionary operations. As a consequence, the paper suggested that the reserve component in particular would have to be restructured to the mission of home defence. Manpower support and specialist skills of reserve forces, both volunteer

226 Hoon, Geoff. *The New Chapter – A Blueprint for Reform*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol 147, No. 4 (August 2002), pp. 10–15.

227 Tebbit, Kevin. *Interview with Sir Kevin Tebbit*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 4 (August 2002), pp. 31–36, p. 32.

228 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 24.

and regular reservists, had already become indispensable to ensure the sustainability of intervention forces. By the end of the 1990s the reservist component of PSOs averaged around 10 %; with respect to specialists, such as medical personnel, linguists or engineers, it was even higher.²²⁹ Furthermore, reservists replaced regulars in many capacities while the latter were deployed abroad. This general support role of the reserve forces had already been acknowledged in the SDR. The *New Chapter* went beyond that and argued for an extension of their role in supporting domestic civil authorities. For this purpose, their structure and training had to be reviewed. One of the ideas put forward was the creation of reaction forces drawn from volunteer reserves and designed to support the civil authorities in times of increased security needs or in a potential response to an unconventional terrorist attack.²³⁰

The *New Chapter* was written in response to 9/11, but the document's scope went beyond presenting short-term measures. It represented, in essence, a *Defence White Paper* that used the impact of the ongoing operations to consider the next phase of military transformation. The direction taken with SDR was not only reconfirmed but considerably specified. The post-11 September military, as suggested in the *New Chapter*, was to be an even more versatile instrument for long-term stabilisation and rapid intervention.

10.3 Afghanistan 2001/02 – The Merging and Blurring of Military Operations

Many of the conclusions presented in the *New Chapter* were based on the experience flowing back from Operation Veritas, the British contribution to the US campaign against the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda network. Particularly the unequivocal adoption of network-centric warfare was the result of the impressive performance of precision-guided US air power in combination with its network of surveillance, reconnaissance and target

229 Regular reservists are former servicemen and women with a continuing liability to be called into full time service. See *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 25.

230 Ibid, p. 25. See also *The Role of Reserves in Home Defence and Security – A Discussion Document*. London, 6 June 2002. URL http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/new_chapter/reserves/index.htm.

acquisition systems.²³¹ The ‘sensor-to-shooter cycle’ was considerably shortened due to the powerful synergy of network-centric capabilities. The US deployed a joint task force to the Middle East that managed to overthrow the Taliban regime within two months, with a combined military strategy of offensive air power and indigenous ground forces, the Northern Alliance. A key enabler of this military strategy turned out to be the extensive use of Special Forces. They not only complemented reconnaissance and target acquisition technologies through human observation on the ground but also coordinated the moves of Northern Alliance troops in order to translate the effects of the air campaign into success on the ground.²³² Behind this seemingly slender campaign stood the global maritime and aerial power projection of the US Armed Forces, which possessed the resources and capabilities to conduct sustained expeditionary operations at that level of intensity. In this context, it is worth noting that Britain’s *New Chapter* also reinforced the significance of the plans to procure two new aircraft carriers.²³³

For Britain’s Armed Forces Afghanistan was a large-scale joint expeditionary operation conducted in a high-intensity environment. It was the litmus test for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces which had become fully operational only in 2001. The initial deployment phase had been facilitated by the coincidence of Exercise Saif Sareea II, a large-scale combined and joint exercise taking place in Oman in autumn 2001, designed to test the effectiveness of the JRRF concept. The exercise involved more than 21,500 personnel, the largest single deployment since the Gulf War

231 Hoon, Geoff. Statement on “*Next Chapter SDR*” at City Forum Roundtable on 23 May 2002 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1727.

232 For an initial assessment of the use of air power in the Afghanistan operations see: Day, John. *After Afghanistan – The Role of Air Power*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 6 (December 2002), pp. 38–43; Gray, Peter W. *Air Power and Levels of Warfare*. In: RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–17; *Kriegsentscheidende Luftstreitkräfte? Moderne Luftkriegführung nach dem Afghanistankrieg*. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 January 2002. URL <http://www.nzz.ch/2002/01/15/al/page-article7VLCM.html>.

233 Boyce, *UK Strategic Choices Following the SDR and 11 September*, p. 7.

of 1991.²³⁴ In the course of the Afghanistan campaign, Britain sent substantial military assets to the Middle East region, including submarines equipped with TLAMs, surface ships as well as tanker, reconnaissance and other support aircraft and, presumably, Special Forces operating within Afghanistan. In an initial assessment of the RAF's operations Air Chief Marshal Sir John Day, Commander-in-Chief Strike, concluded: "Following the Afghanistan campaign, the RAF really understands what is meant by the term 'expeditionary air operations'. It is very different to the [forward]deployed air operations of the Cold War."²³⁵

After the unexpectedly swift collapse of the Taliban regime, Britain took the lead in building up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for the stabilisation of Kabul and the protection of the Afghan Interim Administration, starting in December 2001. With around 1,300 troops and the headquarters component, Britain once again provided the backbone of an international PSO force. By assuming the main responsibility in the initial phase of this complex emergency, the British Government signalled the importance of reconstructing failed states, such as Afghanistan, to prevent terrorism in the long run.²³⁶ In February 2002 at the request of the US, Britain deployed an additional land component task force of around 1,700 Royal Marines to Afghanistan, for combat operations against "residual pockets of resistance of al Qaeda and Taliban elements".²³⁷

Apart from reconfirming network-centric thinking and demonstrating that British rapid reaction capability had come of age, the Afghanistan

234 Ingram, Adam. Statement on "*British Forces Deployment to the Middle East and Exercise Saif Sareea 2*" at the House of Commons on 26 October 2001 by Adam Ingram MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=985.

235 Day, *After Afghanistan – The Role of Air Power*, p. 43.

236 Hoon, Geoff. Statement on "*Britain's Contribution to the International Security Assistance Force for Kabul, Operation Fingal*" at the House of Commons on 10 January 2002 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1336.

237 A first evaluation of British operations in Afghanistan was presented by: Hoon, Geoff. Statement on "*British Contributions to Operations in Afghanistan*" at the House of Commons on 20 June 2002 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://www.operations.mod.uk/veritas/statements/statement_20jun.htm.

operations delivered vital lessons for further military transformation. Of particular interest to doctrinalists, whose responsibility was the revising of current and the conceiving of future doctrine, were two developments that called into question traditional categories of thinking: the blurring of military operations and the compression of the levels of warfare. Both were developments observed for some years, but the events in Afghanistan in 2001/02 amplified their significance, implying that military transformation was about to reach another turning point.

The increasingly blurred character of military operations had been pointed out by US Marine Corps General Charles Krulak in 1997, who described the complexity of future urban operations as a ‘three-block war’, in which forces would have to conduct combat, peace support and humanitarian operations simultaneously within the same city.²³⁸ Though Afghanistan did not meet the classification of ‘urban warfare’, the concurrency depicted by Krulak’s ‘three-block war’ could be equally applied to what happened in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom. Within the same theatre of operations, the coalition deployed two differently constituted military forces and assumed a number of entirely different military roles. British troops were conducting conventional combat and counter-insurgency operations against Taliban and al Qaeda forces across the country, were simultaneously engaged in stabilisation efforts around Kabul, while also undertaking humanitarian assistance operations in various regions.

Formally these different roles were separated. Operation Veritas comprised all British force elements engaged in combat, while Operation Fingal provided the framework for Britain’s contribution to ISAF and the humanitarian efforts. The respective units operated under different operational headquarters and with specific Rules of Engagement. Veritas was about disrupting and destroying terrorist networks through direct military force. That became particularly apparent after the deployment of Task Force Jacana. This Royal Marines battlegroup conducted find-and-strike operations against remaining opposition elements; at the same time the troops needed to win the support of the local population and therefore delivered humanitarian assistance – very much in the sense of traditional British counter-insurgency, focused on the winning of hearts and minds.

238 See Krulak, Charles. *The Three-Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas*. In: Vital Speeches of the Day, No. 64, 15 December, pp. 139–141.

The overall perception of TF Jacana's mission was one of combat with potentially high-risk engagements against a determined adversary. The nature of such military action was emphasised by the Secretary of State for Defence himself in March 2002, when he announced in the House of Commons that the troops deployed to Afghanistan would "take part in warfighting operations", would carry out missions "in an unforgiving and hostile terrain against a dangerous enemy" and "may suffer casualties".²³⁹ Consequently, the ROEs were designed for combat operations. Operation Fingal, in contrast, was essentially about prevention. ISAF was conducting a Peace Support Operation in line with established doctrine. Although this included elements of counter-insurgency thinking, it was a more benign use of military force, without a clearly defined enemy, with more restrictive ROEs and with an emphasis on Civil-Military Cooperation to support the international reconstruction efforts.

Despite these obvious distinctions in the theatre of operations, all British Forces were integral parts of the same military-strategic objective: to stabilise and reconstruct a post-Taliban Afghanistan and deny terrorism the breeding ground it had exploited previously. As a consequence, there was a high degree of overlapping on the military-strategic and operational levels of command.²⁴⁰ Some of the more volatile PSO environments during the 1990s – like Somalia, Sierra Leone or Kosovo – had already indicated that the line between combat and peace support could become blurred. But even in the Kosovo crisis of 1999 there had been a clear temporal and operational separation between the enforcement action and the deployment of a peace support force. In Afghanistan 2001/02 such sequencing did not happen, an observation confirmed by the *New Chapter*: "It may well be (as has been the case in Afghanistan) that we

239 Hoon, Geoff. Statement on "*British Deployments to Afghanistan, Operations Fingal and Veritas*" at the House of Commons on 18 March 2002 by The Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. URL http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1561.

240 The Royal Marines Task Force Jacana did, in the end, have little direct enemy contact during its Afghanistan operations March to July 2002, which raised the disappointment of some British media. This does, however, not demonstrate the wrong assessment by the political and military leadership but rather a lack of awareness of the real nature of such military action on the side of the media in question. Interview with John Mackinlay.

will need to undertake find-and-strike operations at the same time as prevention or stabilisation operations.”²⁴¹

While the resulting complexity made the tasks of commanders and soldiers more difficult, the merging of different operations also worked to the advantage of the intervening powers. Given the appropriate political resolve, the military planners could design the most promising combination of military effects, using prevention, deterrence, coercion, disruption and destruction in concert with each other and tailored to the desired military-strategic end-state and the overall political campaign. This implied, however, that the conceptual development, on which further military transformation was supposed to be based, incorporated this new understanding of integrated military operations.

Among the first British doctrinalists raising this issue was John Mackinlay who argued that the rising threat of asymmetry and the required response diminished the significance of the Kosovo intervention as a milestone in conceptual development. He suggested that Afghanistan demonstrated the emergence of a new type of intervention which was based on an integrated use of combat, counter-insurgency, peace support and humanitarian forces. Such an integrated approach was required to reach beyond the containment of previous interventions and to provide a more pro-active shaping of the conditions.²⁴² Whether this new military-strategic rationale could be fully exploited to remedy the instability of the collapsed state depended, however, on the overall political resolve of the intervention and the civilian reconstruction efforts.

Another issue highlighted by the Afghanistan campaign was the compression of the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of action. In the traditional understanding of symmetric conflict, military forces tended to apply the levels of warfare to weapon systems and formations, categorised according to their range and firepower in battle. Long-range nuclear missiles were thus strategic weapons, while the value of an infantry battalion would remain limited to the tactical level. In an era characterised by growing asymmetry and the conceptual shift from platform-oriented to network-oriented thinking, this strict separation no longer held good. The phenomenon of blurring and overlapping levels of warfare had already been observed in the context of peacekeeping

241 *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, p. 14.

242 Mackinlay, *Opposing Insurgents during Peace Operations*, pp. 159–189.

operations, where tactical mistakes could have an adverse strategic impact: the disproportionate reaction of a few peacekeepers triggering an escalation of violence by one of the former warring factions – an event that according to traditional military orthodoxy would have been judged as a minor tactical issue – had the potential of sparking a chain reaction that ultimately affected political, and thus strategic, decisions. Instrumental to this reversal of tactical and strategic relevance were the powerful forces of the information age society and the speed with which media news were broadcast around the world. Similarly, terrorism was a concept that aimed to achieve strategic effect by tactical strike, using the impact of shock and surprise on the collective psyche of nations as a force multiplier.

In Afghanistan, the military's mixing and overlapping of their own levels of action went beyond previous experience, mainly due to network-enabled warfare, which integrated all sensors, decision-makers and shooters into a large network of networks. As a result, a commander at the military-strategic level could opt for a tactical asset for operational purpose.²⁴³ In such an integrated system, the one dominant factor was the intended effect of a military action, irrespective of traditional levels of hierarchy or service affiliations. With Afghanistan in mind, British doctrinalists began exploring new ideas for the distinction of the levels of warfare. According to Air Commodore Andrew Lambert, for instance, there were “no longer such things as strategic or tactical weapons; it's only the tactical or strategic effect that counts”.²⁴⁴ Similarly, Group Captain Peter Gray, the RAF's Director of Defence Studies at the JDCC, suggested that the classification of grand-strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels had to be applied to the effect on the opponent rather than the asset it originated from. While levels of warfare brought some clarity to the planning process, they had to be understood flexibly and in the context of each conflict.²⁴⁵ Overall, Afghanistan provided significant

243 For instance: so-called strategic bombers (B2, B1-B and B52) were used as tactical assets in the close air support role. See Day, *After Afghanistan – The Role of Air Power*, p. 42.

244 Lambert, *The Future of Air Power*, p. 47.

245 Gray, *Air Power and Levels of Warfare*, pp. 2 and 13.

implications for such refinement of doctrine in the post-11 September environment.

* * *

9/11 demonstrated the rise of asymmetric conflict to a strategic level. The security of developed nations became directly linked to the problems of collapsed states and could be threatened by insurgents rooted in these troubled areas. Every collapsed state was a potential breeding ground for terrorists and consequently a direct threat to international security. With the inherent vulnerabilities of democratic societies open to terrorist networks determined to use weapons or methods of mass effect, the existing strategy of stabilisation and crisis intervention needed adjustment. While terrorism – the symptom of inequalities, grievances and frustrations – was to be eliminated by the robust use of military, intelligence and law enforcement measures, the overall political effort had to focus on addressing the roots and causes of insurgencies, instead of merely containing the spread of their side effects. The *New Chapter* reviewed Britain's Armed Forces in the context of this new strategy. It confirmed the existing military strategy and its rapid reaction capability but simultaneously outlined the avenue for further military transformation as required for countering terrorism and other forms of asymmetry.

Flowing from this, 9/11 was also opening a 'new chapter' in the military's conceptual debate. Asymmetry had become the primary security concern. The challenge for Britain's Armed Forces was to redesign their role within the wider campaign against asymmetry in general and against terrorism in particular, both at home and abroad. The design of a 'post-11 September' military began to emerge. Afghanistan delivered key lessons, giving evidence of the use of all major concepts of military power developed during the 1990s. Offensive air power and Special Forces, united in a system of network-centric capabilities and based on a doctrine of effects-based targeting, were used to coerce, and ultimately neutralise, a terrorist-harboring regime. In due course aggressive counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations were conducted to destroy remaining groups of resistance. At the same time maritime and air power maintained the surveillance of the Gulf Region to impede the exfiltration of potential terrorists from Afghanistan. An international peace support force was established to stabilise the nucleus of a post-Taliban Afghanistan and provide a secure entry door for international reconstruction efforts.

All these military roles, ranging from the lower to the highest end of the conflict spectrum, were conducted simultaneously and under a unified military-strategic command.

Although the international arrangements in Afghanistan were far away from being fully coordinated and even the military's seemingly unified campaign developed in an improvised manner, Operation Enduring Freedom heralded the emergence of a new model of military intervention: an integrated operation using the synergy of the entire spectrum of military effects to address both symmetric and asymmetric opponents simultaneously and rapidly.

The operations also demonstrated a change of attitude in the acceptance of friendly casualties. Under the impact of 9/11 the threshold of tolerance of casualties in Western society rose. The military's overemphasis of force protection, arguably peaking in NATO's air campaign against Serbia in 1999, shifted back to a more practicable level. This was a vital precondition for conducting this new type of intervention operation, since it naturally implied higher risks than the disinterested interventions of the mid-1990s. The question of whether the initial momentum of the Afghanistan intervention can be translated into a long-term recovery of the country lies neither in the scope nor in the timeframe of this thesis; the sustained reluctance of the leading nations to expand the mandate of the international stabilisation force and extend the authority of the fragile Afghan Interim Administration beyond Kabul, however, justifies some scepticism. It seems that the legacy of disinterested interventionism has not been fully overcome yet.

As has every major campaign in the past decade, Afghanistan reinvigorated the RMA debate. Meanwhile both RMA enthusiasts and sceptics had established a consensus on the conclusion that the potential of new technologies could only be transformed into an exploitable advantage when matched by appropriate conceptual and organisational innovations. The *New Chapter* considered network-centric capability to be the most promising approach thus far and marked the intention of Britain's Armed Forces to incorporate RMA ideas more systematically. British RMA sceptics continued, however, to view the impact of technology as an evolutionary matter rather than a revolutionary one. They stressed the limitations of high-technology in dissipating the chaos of war and the need to focus on the human dynamic of conflict. In the end, the human factor was both the strength and limitation of military power. Moderate

technology could achieve a great deal, when the available resources and information were used by imaginative and initiative commanders; on the other hand, the most modern weapon systems were of limited use when the decision-makers were locked in an information overflow.

Particularly in the context of asymmetric opposition a combination of technological superiority and sound military and intelligence groundwork was pivotal. For reconnaissance, for instance, the human eye on the ground could be as important as satellite imagery. In any event, complete information dominance could never be achieved. This fundamental finding had been confirmed even in cases of overwhelming technological superiority, as for instance the US experience in Somalia and NATO's attack on Serbia. In Somalia US Forces employing the latest technologies were unable to achieve information dominance against a resourceful, indigenous opponent who could meet his needs with simple or easily available means, a situation aptly described by G. Wise: "The presence of real-time airborne surveillance did not deny Somali warlords the ability to coordinate their actions using mobile phones, or by signalling using burning car tyres."²⁴⁶ Similarly, information superiority did not prevent NATO from mistakenly striking trains, refugee convoys or the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The Serbs used deception, disinformation, camouflage and CNN to limit the effectivity of NATO's sensors. The Alliance had almost perfect intelligence about Milosevic's intentions, yet did not foresee his ethnic cleansing campaign in time to stop him.²⁴⁷

Afghanistan came up with its share of similar lessons: the problem of friendly fire, usually occurring at the interface between air and land and between national forces; or the unconfirmed destiny of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, of which some presumably succeeded in evading the coalition's information and firepower superiority. The bottom line was that more data did not necessarily equal better information or better decision-making. Still, the overall impression from Afghanistan was that the US and British Armed Forces had come a long way in using the superiority of their conventional weapon systems against non-conventional opponents to maximum effect.

The avenue of transformation taken by Britain's Armed Forces was largely validated by post-9/11 operations. It seemed that the British, again,

²⁴⁶ Wise, *Network-Centric Warfare*, p. 73.

²⁴⁷ Thomas, Timothy L. *Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority*. In: *Parameters*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 13–29.

had a head start in comparison with most other Western military forces, based on sustained efforts to enhance their rapid reaction capability and improve their counter-insurgency and PSO skills. They further benefited from a general understanding of how to exploit technological innovation without giving up well-tried concepts of the past.

When 9/11 redefined the strategic paradigm of the first post-Cold War decade, the revision of *British Defence Doctrine* was in its final stage. The event naturally raised the question whether the draft's main thrust would still be relevant. The Director General of Joint Doctrine and Concepts concluded that the revision had been thorough and needed no fundamental redrafting. BDD 2 was published according to schedule, six weeks after 11 September 2001.²⁴⁸ It addressed the issue of asymmetric conflict extensively, as the theme had become the focus of doctrinalists for some time; counter-terrorism abroad and support of civil authorities in security operations at home were not new themes for the British military. BDD 2 further anticipated the growing integration of military operations even before it became so evident in Afghanistan: "One real possibility is that the same forces may be required to employ warfighting techniques, to conduct PSOs and to provide humanitarian assistance all in the same area at the same time."²⁴⁹

Britain's Armed Forces were nevertheless keen to use the momentum of the current strategic turning point for accelerating their transformation. In an era dominated by asymmetry as the main security threat, territorial defence in the conventional sense became even less relevant and military power projection even more important. Notwithstanding their vital contribution in the fight against international terrorism, Britain's Armed Forces acknowledged that there was a long way to go to adjust their role to the new era of asymmetric conflict – an attitude summarised by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce in the annual CDS lecture in December 2001:

Our intent now to move beyond SDR has been reinforced by our experiences around the world since 1998 and on Veritas/Enduring Freedom. As we develop, we will have to stay in balance. ... But we must be lighter, more focused/precise and more flexible; and leave behind the inertia of the Cold War for good.²⁵⁰

248 Milton, *British Defence Doctrine*, p. 44.

249 *British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01)*, 2nd Ed., p. 6.5.

250 Boyce, *UK Strategic Choices Following the SDR and 11 September*, p 7.

11 Doctrine: Institutionalising a Culture of Innovation

By 2002 Britain's Armed Forces had consolidated their military-strategic rationale for the post-Cold War era. Military power had become an integral part of stability projection and crisis intervention, to counter both conventional and asymmetric threats. For this purpose, the forces had to be well balanced and capable for the conduct of joint expeditionary operations, comprising the entire range of tasks from combat to humanitarian assistance. The new understanding of military power was an amalgamation of traditional schools of thought and concepts developed during the 1990s. Lessons from the Balkans operations and the Afghanistan intervention were instrumental in shaping this approach. Warfighting, peacekeeping and counter-insurgency were merged with peace enforcement and coercion. The use of military force was focused on maximising the effects against selected target groups while minimising casualties and collateral damage. It further focused on exploiting the full spectrum of technological dominance in conventional warfare while keeping the human dynamic, particularly in asymmetric encounters, in mind. The emergence of the new military strategy was accompanied by the shift from single-service to joint doctrine development. Doctrine itself had turned into an instrument to promote the intended military transformation.

The significant status British doctrine had assumed by the start of the 21st century was also reflected in its institutionalisation. The British Armed Forces firmly embedded a culture of innovation and intellectual debate within their organisation. To claim that there was no serious military thinking before the discovery of formal doctrine in the 1990s would be a distortion. As the historical retrospects of this thesis have shown, the pre-1989 Services had some form of doctrine, a central idea about their role and way of warfare, albeit not formally written down and not always stimulating much conceptual debate.²⁵¹ They also had institutional bodies

251 A fact particularly pointed out by: Overy, Richard. *What Is Doctrine and Why Does It Evolve?* Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Professor Richard Overy, Department of History, KCL; Sheffield, *Themes in Army Doctrine*, BMDG 1/2002.

concerned with the intellectual dimension of warfare, particularly in the form of the various staff colleges and officers' academies. Their efforts, however, suffered from compartmentalisation and often lacked the vital top-down support to gain momentum. Furthermore, doctrinal understanding was focused on the tactical level of conflict – at the expense of operational doctrine, while military-strategic doctrine was not even a theme.

Against this backdrop, the institutionalisation of doctrine after 1989 entailed a new quality of conceptual innovation, which was connected to the emergence of military doctrine in the modern sense. Advancing for some years, this process reached its temporary conclusion with the creation of the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre in 1999 and its first major outputs in 2001 – the publishing of a *UK Joint Vision* and revised versions of *Joint Operations* and *British Defence Doctrine*.

The institutionalisation of doctrine advanced along three lines, all of them interdependent. First, the organisational bodies tasked with developing doctrine were expanded, restructured and finally put under the overall supervision of the JDCC. Second, a clear and authoritative hierarchy of joint doctrinal publications was set up, ensuring that lower-level doctrinal developments corresponded with the military-strategic level and single-service with joint doctrine. And third, the process of doctrine development itself was harmonised across all three Services. As a result, British doctrinalists from all three Services shared a common understanding and terminology of doctrine and could pursue their work within a community of related institutions.

Doctrinal efforts had started in ad hoc groups of like-minded officers – such as Bagnall's 'Ginger Group' or the Naval Staff's 'Committee of Taste'. In due course the Services restructured their existing research and development bodies to the new importance of operational and military-strategic thinking. By the mid-1990s the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, the Maritime Warfare Centre (MCW) and the Air Warfare Centre (AWC) cooperated closely with their associated Staff Directorates in the MoD for the purpose of designing their Services' high-level doctrine.

A vital step in the institutionalisation of doctrine came with SDR in 1998, which suggested the creation of a joint structure for doctrine development. The review emphasised the importance of joint doctrine: "Doctrine gives guidance on how our Armed Forces should be deployed, employed and subsequently recovered from operations. An accessible

and widely understood joint doctrine is essential for the three Services to be capable of operating together effectively.”²⁵² It went on to link the function of doctrine to the strategic development process carried out in the Ministry of Defence; doctrine was to be one of the key factors steering future force capabilities. On the basis of this understanding, the Secretary of State for Defence commissioned a study to “examine ways of streamlining the current process of developing joint doctrine in order to improve further the effectiveness of our forces”.²⁵³ The idea of a Joint Defence Centre was put forward, which was to bring the development of joint doctrine under a unified authority. Such a centralised authority was to ensure that joint doctrine evolved in tune with technology and lessons learned from operational experience. The doctrine centre would not only improve the process of national force development but also provide a focus for Britain’s contribution to Allied and other multinational doctrine.

In the *Defence White Paper 1999* the proposed doctrine think tank was outlined in more detail and renamed as the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. The JDCC was set up in September 1999 and reached full capability and staffing of around 50 officers in April 2000. The location chosen was Shrivenham, where the centre could benefit from the vicinity to the Royal Military College of Science and the Joint Services Command and Staff College.²⁵⁴ Henceforth the JDCC constituted the focal point and highest authority of Britain’s ‘doctrinal community’. Its mission was to be “a centre of excellence in developing joint doctrine and a future vision for the UK’s Armed Forces” and to ensure the following tasks:

Provide long-term conceptual underpinning for the development of future systems, doctrine and force development and contribute to the MoD’s defence planning process; formulate, develop and review joint doctrine at the military-strategic, operational and joint-tactical level, coordinate single-service tactical doctrine and provide the UK input to Allied and multinational doctrine; lead the UK’s contribution

252 Fact Sheet on Joint Defence Centre. In: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, *Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy, Vol. II*, p. 251.

253 Ibid.

254 *Defence White Paper 1999*, § 36.

in promoting doctrine for Peace Support Operations, in conjunction with OGDs, NGOs and the wider international community.²⁵⁵

The centre's main products, therefore, were considered to be the formulation and revision of joint doctrine, PSO doctrine and long-term conceptual work used for defence policy planning and force development. Doctrine was understood as the set of guidelines for the present and short-term future. Concepts, in contrast, were defined as the prospective analysis of the external environment, concerned with looking 10 to 30 years into the future and exploring the potential strategic, technological and social trends. The result of the concepts process would be a joint vision about future conflict and potential force capabilities required.²⁵⁶

The JDCC received its overall direction from the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board, chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. The Director General of Joint Doctrine and Concepts, the head of the JDCC, would report directly to the Policy Director within the Central Staff. The JDCC was tasked to coordinate and supervise the work of the single Services' doctrine centres – the Maritime Warfare Centre, the Air Warfare Centre and the Directorate Land Warfare. Since each environmental component was regarded to have its distinct possibilities and limitations, the development of high-level single-service doctrine was considered to remain necessary to complement joint doctrine.²⁵⁷ With its status as the 'centre of gravity' of British military doctrine, the JDCC was also to establish and maintain close relationships with the Directorates of Policy Planning and Force Development in the Central Staff, the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the above mentioned warfare centres and the various colleges and research centres of the UK's Defence Academy.²⁵⁸ The PJHQ was in the end the prime customer for joint doctrine, while the policy planners and force developers in the Central Staff were interested in the long-term conceptual work of the JDCC.²⁵⁹

The establishment of the JDCC marked the clear intention of Britain's Armed Forces to assume a leading role in international military doctrine development. The expertise drawn together would not only drive the doctrinal innovation in the national context but also provide an instrument

255 See also *Strategic Trends*. Shrivenham: JDCC/MoD, March 2003, p. 1.2. URL <http://www.mod.uk/jdcc/trends.htm>.

256 Milton, Anthony. *My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts*. In: RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 15–19, p. 16.

to steer Allied doctrine and to influence the doctrinal thinking of partner nations. Since NATO doctrine had a long process of ratification and represented the lowest common denominator of all the member nations' understanding of a particular issue, the British were keen to use their doctrinal expertise as leverage. Major General Milton, the first Director General of Joint Doctrine and Concepts, emphasised this point in an interview in April 2000: "We are key players in the NATO doctrine. We chair a number of doctrine committees ... and we make a major input to the development of NATO doctrine."²⁶⁰

Doctrine became also an integral part of defence diplomacy. It contributed to the aim of creating democratically controlled armed forces. Britain offered conceptual support to countries interested in transforming their security forces and improving their conceptual basis. In this context PSO doctrine was one of Britain's major military export items. Overall, the JDCC and the associated restructuring of the doctrinal community strengthened the relevance of doctrine in Britain's Armed Forces significantly and matched the joint doctrine's centre-stage position with the appropriate institutional authority and brain power.

The process of institutionalisation was complemented by the setup of a hierarchy of formal doctrine publications. Although the doctrinal debate was to provide sufficient room for creativity and encourage people to embrace innovation with an open mind, the formal doctrine publications

257 In response to the consolidated joint doctrine, the British Army has decided to streamline its high-level doctrine documents. It is about to replace BMD and the five ADPs in 2003/04 by one single doctrine called *ADP Land Operations*. Interview with Jim Storr. See also Melvin, *Continuity and Change*, p. 39.

258 The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom has been formed on 1 April 2002. Its purpose is to be a national and international centre of excellence, providing civilian and military personnel with post-graduate education and a focus for research in fields related to defence. It has brought together the following organisations: Royal College of Defence Studies; Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC); Defence Leadership Centre; Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC); Defence School of Finance and Management; Acquisition Training Cell; and the Welbeck College. URL <http://www.defenceacademy.mod.uk/>.

259 For the community of British doctrine authorities see also Appendix B of this thesis.

260 Milton, *My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts*, p. 15.

were organised in this binding structure.²⁶¹ All doctrine documents had to correspond with the officially endorsed doctrine of higher levels of warfare, at the top of which stood the military-strategic level of doctrine, embodied in the *British Defence Doctrine*. With the agreed hierarchy came also the distribution of responsibilities, based on the various doctrine centres' specific expertise. While the JDCC conceived high-level joint doctrine and coordinated doctrine development in general, it subcontracted many of the joint operational and joint tactical areas to the Services' warfare centres. Once a doctrine manual was officially promulgated and distributed, it was an authoritative source – though it required common sense and judgement in application.

This clear hierarchisation of national doctrine also facilitated the consistency with Alliance partners, an important precondition for the enhancement of mental interoperability for multinational operations. A principle set out was that British doctrine development had to be consistent with existing or evolving NATO doctrine, “other than in those exceptional cases where the United Kingdom has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine”.²⁶²

Another integral part of institutionalisation was the doctrine development process itself, which was harmonised across all doctrine-related bodies. As stipulated by the JDCC, the overall doctrinal innovation was

261 The UK Joint Doctrine Hierarchy comprises three levels of publications: *Joint Warfare Publications* (JWP) – *Joint Doctrine Pamphlets* (JDP) – *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (JTTP). The overarching doctrine, from which all subsequent doctrine flows, is *British Defence Doctrine* (JWP 0-01); next comes the *UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations* (JWP 0-10) which harmonises with NATO's *Allied Joint Doctrine* (AJP-01); underneath follow all further joint operational and joint tactical doctrine manuals, each of them harmonised with NATO doctrine (if existing) and categorised according to their generic NATO staff function numbering system (J1: Administration and Personnel; J2: Intelligence; J3: Operations; J4: Logistics; J6: Communications and Information Systems; J7 Training. J3 Operations is further divided into J3(M), Maritime; J3(L), Land; J3(A), Air; J3(General); J3(OOTW); J3(FP), Force Protection; J3(Info), Information; and J3/RecceISR, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The single-service high-level doctrines (BR 1806, AP 3000 and BMD) are directly subordinated to *British Defence Doctrine* and linked with *UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations*. For the hierarchy of British doctrine documents see also Appendix C of this thesis.

262 *British Defence Doctrine* (JWP 0-01), 1st Ed., p. 1.7.

divided into the two areas of ‘doctrine’ and ‘concepts’. This distinction was also adopted by the single-service doctrine centres.²⁶³ While ‘doctrinalists’ formulated and revised current doctrine, ‘conceptualists’ focused on the long-term development. Naturally, the two areas interacted closely, since they explored the same issues but from a different temporal perspective.

Furthermore, the process of doctrine development had a direct link to the top military leadership. High-level executive boards – for instance the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board in the case of joint doctrine – set an overall avenue of transformation along which doctrinal and conceptual work aligned. The work of formulating a new, or revising an existing doctrine was conducted by the staffs of the doctrine centres, in close co-operation with representatives from operational and training headquarters, military and academic teaching staffs and other relevant groupings so that the experience from operations and training as well as unorthodox new ideas emerging in the wider defence community could be fed into the process of doctrine development. The nature and scope of cooperation varied according to the level of warfare and issue at hand, the intention being to harness as many ideas as possible. Once doctrine was drafted, it entered a thorough consultation mechanism, at the top of which were high-level doctrine committees. These doctrine committees did not only serve as a platform of consultation but also ensured that doctrine received appropriate backing from the Chiefs of Staff and could in due course be officially endorsed.²⁶⁴ After doctrine was endorsed, the doctrine centres were also responsible for its dissemination.

This well developed institutional network reflects the significance British military doctrine has obtained a decade after its first cautious steps. Doctrine has become the institutional bedrock upon which Britain’s Armed Forces guide current operations, design their future force planning and also communicate their understanding of military force to an external audience. Undoubtedly, this institutionalisation of innovative thinking has its risky side, as it is just a short step to rigidity and conformity. The

263 See for instance: Directorate General of Development and Doctrine. *Shaping the Army of the Future*. Upavon: DGD&D, 2001, p. 23. URL http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/dgdd_brochure.pdf

264 For instance the Army Doctrine Committee, approving or revising Army doctrine.

line between doctrine and indoctrination can be a fine one, and there are those who claim that real innovation only arises from chaos or total freedom of thought, best exploited by unimpeded and unorthodox thinkers.²⁶⁵ The ability to ‘think outside the box’ is a precondition to innovation. In order to avoid the emergence of dogma – the uncritical repetition of conventional wisdoms – doctrine development therefore needs to strike the right balance between the setting of guidelines and the retention of open-mindedness and creativity. British defence analyst Colin McInnes aptly pointed out this inherent danger of committing innovative thinking to a formal framework:

This institutionalisation of doctrine is, I think, by and large a good thing. Of course not all thinking is good and institutionalisation can lead to group think, tunnel vision and narrow-mindedness. Many of the major breakthroughs in strategy, as elsewhere, have come from outsiders, from people not feeling constrained by institutions. There is a clear danger that institutionalisation promotes conformity ... and the Services need to guard against this.²⁶⁶

While this call for caution is justified, there are nevertheless a number of advantages resulting from a coherent, comprehensive and institutionally embedded development of doctrine: it ensures top-down leadership and thus stimulates the use of doctrine; it makes sure that conceptual innovation keeps in touch with the strategic, technological, social and financial realities restraining the military; it extends the conceptual debate beyond the group of military officers tasked with conceiving doctrine and thus widens the pool of expertise that can be tapped; it facilitates the interaction with external experts and the cooperation with other national and international think tanks and thus reduces the risk of conceptual inbreeding; it

265 A critical view on British doctrine and the danger of dogma has been presented by: McInnes, Colin. *Why Bother with Doctrine Anyway?* Paper Presented at the 1st Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 1 February 2002 by Professor Colin McInnes, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth; Hammond, J.W. *Objective Doctrine for the Next Century*. In: *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal – Part One* in Vol. 128, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 203–211; *Part Two* in Vol. 128, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 322–328.

266 Colin McInnes, in: *Naval Capabilities: The Launch of the British Maritime Doctrine*, p. 69.

strengthens the institutional memory, thereby enhancing the analysis of past experience; and it provides a common starting ground and a common terminology – an ‘interoperability of the mind’ – for any individual intent on contributing to the process of conceptual innovation.²⁶⁷ As McInnes also acknowledges, the determination to institutionalise doctrine has reinforced “its status and significance while committing all three Services to thinking about the changing nature of military power and its application”.²⁶⁸ After all, doctrine has become a key weapon at the disposal of the British Armed Forces’ leadership to steer their organisation through an era of uncertainty and sustained change.

267 The term ‘interoperability of the mind’ was used by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce. See Boyce, *UK Strategic Choices Following the Strategic Defence Review and 11 September*, p. 7.

268 Colin McInnes, in: *Naval Capabilities: The Launch of the British Maritime Doctrine*, p. 69.

Conclusion

“A nation’s doctrine, a nation’s way in war, tells you a lot about how it perceives the world and its security threats.”

This statement is significant for two reasons. First, for its obvious message: doctrine is a mirror of the military’s conceptual state of mind and also reflects the country’s overall security perception. Second, for its underlying, institutional message: it was made by Major General Milton, Director General of Joint Doctrine and Concepts in 2001. His statement illustrates the way Britain’s Armed Forces understand doctrine – as an integral part of the nation’s view of the world, of its strategic culture. Such doctrine cannot be the product of some isolated warfare eccentrics, whose devotion to a peculiar subject alienates them from a largely disinterested society. Such doctrine can only evolve in a climate of open-mindedness, conceived by soldier-scholars firmly embedded in their institution’s mainstream culture and fully interacting with their intellectual environment.

The UK’s traditional strategic culture, grown over centuries of great power politics, developed a specific pattern of security: in times of relative peace it relied mainly on the preponderance of its sea power, in times of major war it resorted to a combination of naval blockade and a limited continental commitment. The balance between sea and land power remained the enduring theme of strategic debate but was altered flexibly by the circumstances – an attitude that led some historians to characterise Britain’s way of security as a ‘muddling through’ approach. Hand in hand with this went the preference for pragmatism and gradual adjustment over absolute patterns and revolutionary revisions, a bias towards continuity and tradition rather than innovation and grand designs. The military’s notorious distaste of formal doctrine was symptomatic of this attitude. Until the end of the Cold War this pragmatism of British policy-makers and soldiers seemed to work well. Then the geopolitical change of 1989 and the turbulences of a fluid strategic environment, coinciding with a step change in technological advance and major shifts in society at large, called for something more.

The evolution of British military-strategic doctrine during the 1990s has to be viewed in this broader context. It is part of two larger historical processes: the unfolding post-Cold War security transformation in the Euro-Atlantic region and, resulting from this, the country’s changing

strategic culture. The profound shifts in the overall strategic setting compelled the United Kingdom to redefine its place in the world and in Europe. As the fixed setting of the East-West conflict came to an end and left behind the confusion of a transitional phase, security policy and military strategy required a more systematic design.

This background offers a first answer to the key question of this thesis as it describes the underlying reason for the changing attitude towards doctrine. Britain's Armed Forces realised that, facing fundamental strategic, technological and social changes, reliance on traditional patterns of thinking might no longer be sufficient. The embracing of conceptual debate and formal doctrine reflects this awareness. A more specific explanation – which displays the relevant events, perceptions and debates in detail – has to be based on the two main tracks set out at the beginning of the analysis: the institutional dimension of doctrine and the characteristics of the new military strategy emerging.

The first track focused on the question of why doctrine gained such relevance in Britain's Armed Forces during the 1990s. While change is a natural and continuous force to which organisations must respond if they are to survive, its dimension can vary over time. The implications of the cumulating changes at the outset of the 1990s were enormous and unprecedented in pace, volume and extent. A rapidly developing international arena, dramatic breakthroughs in information and communications technologies and a redefinition of the civil-military relationship confronted Britain's military with great uncertainty and the need for fundamental reform. In which direction the reform should be headed and on the basis of what yardsticks, however, remained unclear. In the context of such pressures, doctrine became both the carrier of institutional interests and the instrument to manage change. As the carrier of institutional interests, doctrine assisted in explaining the redefinition of the military's own role-understanding, and in justifying those continuities the military deemed necessary to preserve. This was instrumental to maintaining institutional health, particularly in the period immediately following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, when the paradigm of the Cold War disappeared and the continued need for containment and nuclear deterrence was called into question. Parallel to NATO, which had determined Britain's military-strategic thinking for several decades, the UK Armed Forces felt the necessity to adjust their *raison d'être* to the circumstances of this newly emerging era, widen the approach to security and argue more comprehensively

for the retention of warfighting capabilities. The abundant publishing of high-level doctrine, directed at an external audience, has to be viewed against this backdrop.

As the instrument of change management, doctrine enabled Britain's military to approach the challenges at hand in a rational, calculated and structured fashion. It was an attempt to restore order and linearity in a situation characterised by complexity, uncertainty and change. In some respect, the doctrinal debate served as the conceptual training ground for exploring new ways, while formal doctrine became the compass to stay on track. In its institutional dimension, doctrine assumed a vital role as a guideline for military transformation, as a tool to identify those areas where important continuities had to be retained and those where indispensable changes had to be adopted or new opportunities to be seized. In this context, doctrine was largely directed at an internal audience – the key officials, senior commanders and staff officers involved in the remodelling of concepts, structures and capabilities. While these two basic functions of post-Cold War military-strategic doctrine – communicating institutional interests and providing a guideline for change management – overlapped, there was some temporal shift of emphasis from the first to the second function. In the beginning of the 1990s doctrine was pre-occupied with preserving the Services' balance and explaining the present environment of military affairs. Towards the end of the decade, the prospective, innovative dimension of doctrine grew stronger.

Another manifestation of this vital role of doctrine was its institutionalisation. The systematic cycle of doctrine development – which defined its formulation, validation, distribution and revision – was to ensure the optimal use of doctrine. Within a decade, Britain's Armed Forces established a finely tuned network of doctrine development authorities, which placed the idea of conceptual progress into the core of military transformation. The process was delayed, but not obstructed, by the traditional dominance of single-service interests in British military affairs. By the mid-1990s the need for a culture of jointery and the associated joint doctrine development process was widely accepted. With the setting up of the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre as the overarching conceptual body, British doctrine found its current institutional form.

This process was accompanied by the growing interaction between the military and the academic communities. In a world order characterised by a wider understanding of security, military doctrine was no longer confined

to the two themes dominating during the Cold War – nuclear deterrence and battlefield tactics. There was a growing field of operational and military-strategic subjects that were derived from the specific post-Cold War circumstances – like for instance new forms of peacekeeping, the changing relationship between the military and the media or the emergence of coercion theory. This interdisciplinary dimension of doctrine attracted practitioners and scholars alike, providing a common platform for military officers, humanitarians, historians, political scientists, defence analysts and military sociologists to discuss the nature of military transformation. This widening discourse has itself become a demonstration of the new relevance of doctrine. The military-academic cooperation, however, was not limited to the doctrinal debate but also stretched to formal doctrine; from the mid-1990s onwards scholars formed part of the editorial boards of most British high-level doctrine publications. The fruitful intimacy that has grown between Britain's military and academic communities is also incorporated in the establishment of the British Military Doctrine Group, the discussions of which have been crucial to this very thesis.

Britain's post-Cold War doctrinal evolution also displays a strong imprint of US thinking and underlines the many parallels existing between the US and British military establishments. This is undoubtedly the result of the 'special relationship' between the two countries, based on their shared interests and similar views of the world for the major part of the 20th century. The parallels, however, go beyond this cooperation on the strategic level; they are rooted in the similar cultural heritage of their military organisations. Historically, both countries were primarily sea powers, developing a strong naval tradition and viewing their land forces largely as frontier constabularies. Both placed a premium on volunteer regulars and only resorted to conscription in times of national emergency. And both became involved in major continental warfighting during the two world wars and then as part of NATO's forward defence. When the developments in modern warfare and the implications of the strategy of flexible response required the improvement of conventional capabilities, the US Armed Forces turned out to be the trendsetters. The major conceptual achievements of the 1980s – like the *AirLand Battle*, the new *Maritime Strategy* and the renewal of strategic offensive air power – were all US-inspired.

Apart from the obvious preponderance of US resources for research and development, it was, arguably, the distinct experience of their most

recent past that caused the US to be more innovative than their Allied partners: The US military withdrew from Vietnam with a traumatised psyche and a sense of failure that mobilised sufficient motivation for fundamental change. The British Forces of the 1980s, on the other hand, gained great self-confidence from their victorious Falklands War. As a result, the US went at great lengths to reconfigure their conceptual bedrock and spoke of a doctrinal renaissance, while the British initially viewed the adjustments brought about by the Bagnall Reforms – such as the rediscovery of the operational level of war and the formulation of the manoeuvre warfare concept – as a compensation for the material shortcomings of their NATO-committed forces, very much in the sense of the traditional attitude to adjust gradually and pragmatically instead of designing far-reaching revolutionary ideas. The doctrinal dimension of the 1980s developments only gathered momentum in Britain's Armed Forces when the end of the Cold War built up additional pressure of change.

The second track of analysis focused on the question of what military-strategic key strands emerged in British doctrine between 1989 and 2002. It was an attempt to reveal the overarching lines of development. In an address to RUSI in June 2003 Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon gave his view on the major forces of change impacting on the military: "As the strategic environment, technology and society change, so the Armed Forces must respond." The very purpose of the framework of doctrinal evolution, as suggested at the outset of this thesis, was to underline this overall context – at the expense of scratching only the surface of many issues introduced in the course of analysis. This thesis does therefore not claim to have analysed all doctrinal strands in depth. Viewed from this broad perspective, Britain's post-Cold War military transformation appears to be the product of the interaction between simultaneous strategic, technological and social changes. Each of these three drivers shaped particular perceptions and debates.

The new international security environment was undoubtedly the main driver of military transformation. The changing strategic landscape and the new threat assessment resulted in four associated doctrinal shifts. First, the spectrum of conflict underlying military tasks was viewed in a more differentiated but simultaneously more blurred way. With new types of transnational security risks emerging and a variety of non-state actors involved in international affairs, the differentiation between peace, crisis and war became less apparent. Britain's Armed Forces could no longer

expect to be engaged against a clearly defined opponent on a symmetric battlefield. Instead they had to prepare for a multidimensional battlespace that was populated by various military and civilian actors and included the possibility of asymmetric struggles. Secondly, on the basis of this blurred spectrum of conflict, the traditional, threat-driven modelling of military capabilities and structures was replaced by a capability-based rationale. With the disappearance of the monolithic Soviet threat, which had been expressed in a well-known order of battle against which one could match one's own, the doctrinal analysis of potential operational environments and associated contingencies came to play an important role for force development. Thirdly, the military-strategic focus shifted from territorial defence and sea control to rapid reaction and power projection. This was a consequence of the changing strategic priorities in the Euro-Atlantic area, where the main purpose of military force became the intervention in, and stabilisation of regional crises. In a national context, Britain possessed vast experience in limited intervention operations abroad. In the framework of the ARRC and the widening of UN-mandated peace operations, however, crisis reaction became multinational in its nature. Britain's military needed to accommodate new levels of multinationality and interoperability. Fourthly, no longer restrained by the imperatives of East-West nuclear deterrence, conventional military power resurfaced as a means to shape international affairs. Nuclear deterrence was maintained as the ultimate guarantee of the UK's security, insuring against the potential re-emergence of a major strategic military threat and preventing nuclear coercion from the side of any rogue state. But for the purpose of addressing the new post-Cold War instabilities, it was conventional power that assumed centre-stage importance, as it offered the possibility to prevent, contain or stabilise crises that involved limited national stakes.

In line with the retention of certain strategic settings – as for instance the unchanged centrality of NATO for British security – military-strategic continuities also remained. One of them was the emphasis on the warfighting capability. From the outset the British understanding of power projection embraced the continuing need for balanced forces capable of high-intensity warfare. This attitude was based on the Gulf War experience and firmly backed by the doctrinal concepts of the manoeuvrist approach and offensive air power. While aiming at more agility and deployability, Britain's Armed Forces remained committed to the warfighting capabilities acquired during the Cold War. The resulting forces were designed to

be significantly more versatile and more projectable but to preserve the combat-oriented posture of their predecessors. A further continuity was the conceptual link established between the new type of peacekeeping and the country's traditional strengths in counter-insurgency. The well-proven counter-insurgency principles gained relevance in the context of the new Peace Support Operations doctrine. Building on the retention of existing strengths and the adoption of new concepts, British doctrine became sufficiently versatile to cover the entire range of military tasks arising from a blurred spectrum of conflict. This conceptual robustness proved to be a key element in the ability to operate under highly-volatile circumstances, a quality demonstrated in various PSOs and the intervention in Afghanistan.

With respect to the major technological change embracing military affairs in the 1990s, doctrine reflects the emergence of a distinctly British approach. Leaving aside the academic debate on whether or not a revolution was underway, Britain's Armed Forces accepted the fact that the appropriate exploitation of the new technologies would lead to significant improvements in the use of military power. They consequently responded to the US-led RMA debate, which gathered considerable momentum in the wake of the Gulf War 1991, by acquiring precision-attack and network-centric capabilities. The intention was not to let the transatlantic technology gap grow too wide but instead to maintain the ability to operate closely with the US Armed Forces throughout the spectrum of potential coalition operations.

The British, however, developed one specific reservation in their approach to RMA thinking. While their doctrine explored ways of how to maximise the impact of technological superiority, it also pointed out the inherent limitations. Accepting the Clausewitzian understanding of conflict, the British insisted that despite all the discussions about the RMA, war, in the end, remained an act of human intercourse, a contest between people. The human dynamic of conflict – the morale of friendly troops, the psychological effect of military force on the opposition, the interpretation of the events in the public eye – ultimately could not be steered by technology itself. Flowing from this, even the most advanced network-centric system of systems could neither achieve full clarity of the battlespace nor control the events on the ground completely. This conception stemmed from the experience of traditional low-intensity conflicts and was reconfirmed by various post-Cold War interventions,

above all Operation Allied Force. British doctrine therefore emphasised the importance of striking the right balance: to fully exploit the possibilities of technology while not being deluded by its sheer attraction and keeping an eye on the conceptual and moral aspects of warfare.

British doctrine also reflects the shifts occurring in the civil-military relationship. The changing values in postmodern society – trends like individualism, egalitarianism, risk adversity, media and entertainment culture or transparency of government – had a direct impact on the military's distinct set of values. With regard to military strategy, they generated rising expectations in and new constraints on the conduct of operations. The benchmark of success for crisis intervention, as judged by the public of the open and democratic information age society, rose to an unprecedented level. A growing body of public opinion assumed that modern military forces were capable of waging war without major political, economic and human costs. British doctrine reflects the duality of the military's response to these trends. On the one hand, they attempted to ward off, or at least reduce, their impact on military norms. Military-strategic doctrine itself, being part of the debate on the complex nature of conflict, was a means to keep political and public expectations at a realistic level. The explicit adoption of the warfighting ethos had a similar purpose. On the other hand, Britain's Armed Forces also responded by adjusting their *modus operandi* to the postmodern *zeitgeist*. The risk and damage adversity was met by a new emphasis on force protection and a doctrine based on maximising the use of high-precision technology for keeping collateral injuries and damage at a minimum. As a consequence of the omnipresence of the media, press and public relations became a vital component of military thinking. The growing public scrutiny on the conduct of military operations and the potential impact of domestic public opinion on strategic decisions made the media become part of the battlespace as never before.

In the course of one decade Britain's Armed Forces absorbed all these major developments. They managed to incorporate them into their conceptual underpinning. The sound conceptual bedrock contributed to a successful transformation of organisational and operational capabilities. The two main responses to the increasingly blurred and non-linear strategic and operational environments could be summed up under the two headings of integration and versatility. Integration became vital with respect to operational concepts. An integrated approach provided the

flexibility to conduct combat, peace support and humanitarian operations simultaneously within the same area, backed up by the necessary media and psychological operations as well as enabling capabilities. The shift towards integration further included the ability to interact closely with all other means of power present in a theatre of operations, whether diplomatic, economic or humanitarian. Versatility was sought in order to achieve various effects. Military power had to be capable of covering the entire spectrum of effects and switching the focus rapidly between prevention, deterrence, coercion, disruption or destruction. The new military-strategic rationale was based on the amalgamation of existing ideas on the use of military power like conventional warfighting, peace-keeping and counter-insurgency. But it also embraced new schools of thought, particularly the concepts of peace enforcement and coercive air power, both forged during several years of Balkan involvement, the peak of which was the stabilisation of Kosovo.

The most recent term in the discussion of British military transformation, the concept of ‘effects-based operations’, provides further illustration of this post-Cold War understanding of military power as a selection of capabilities from which one can choose the most appropriate mix of ways and means, tailored to the desired end-state, or effect, and the specific circumstances of the crisis at hand. The underlying idea of effects-based operations is nothing new. Its emphasis on the need to shape the opponent’s psychological frame of mind rather than destroy his physical means easily reveals its origin from the manoeuvrist approach. What is new is the attempt to develop a better understanding of military capabilities and their effects.

The process of post-Cold War military transformation seems far from its conclusion. The experience from Afghanistan and – most recently – Iraq implies that the next phase of transformation, the move towards a post-9/11 military geared up to an era of asymmetric conflict, has just begun. British doctrinal debate discloses a number of subjects that are currently being discussed. In terms of military strategy, the issues at the fore are the conceptualising of effects-based operations, the incorporation of network-centric capabilities, the challenge of concurrent operations, the improvement of strategic deployability and, connected to the latter, the proper balancing of light, medium and heavy forces. At the bottom line of all these developments stands the fundamental question of how Britain’s Armed Forces can enhance their contribution in the fight against

asymmetric threats – a question that will determine whether the next phase of British military transformation will be considered successful or not.

Although Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 is not included in the scope of this thesis, it would not be appropriate to conclude an examination of post-Cold War military transformation without touching on the UK's largest and most intensive military commitment since the Gulf War more than a decade ago. The debate over the Iraq War's military lessons is up and running. One of the main questions intensely debated is whether 'Iraq' constitutes a new or an old type of war, whether it gives evidence of another defining moment of Western military-technological dominance or serves as a reminder of the ageless complexities of armed conflict. It is – once again – the dispute between RMA proponents promising a revolutionary change in warfare and the more cautious advocates of an evolutionary course, arguing for an appropriate consideration of the non-technological aspects of conflict. As the previous chapters have revealed, the collective consensus within Britain's Armed Forces tends to favour the latter view.

It is early days for conclusive assessments, but a preliminary evaluation nevertheless suggests that the Iraq War has largely confirmed the direction taken by Britain's military transformation. While the campaign has once again demonstrated the unrivalled technological predominance of the US, the significant role played by Britain's Armed Forces should not be underestimated. They made substantial contributions to a combined and joint high-intensity operation, providing capabilities in all components and across the entire range of military tasks. They proved to be a serious and technologically able partner for the US military. The RAF took part in an air campaign characterised by effects-based targeting and employed a high percentage of PGMs, being in no way inferior to US precision-capabilities other than in numbers. British Army formations played an equally vital role as part of the ground offensive, by covering the Southern flanks of the US thrust towards Baghdad. The Royal Navy meanwhile provided crucial maritime-based power projection capabilities in support of all operations. Although there are no details publicly available yet, Britain undoubtedly contributed a large element of its Special Forces to the campaign. Particularly in interventions where asymmetric reactions by the opposition are likely and have to be neutralised in an early stage, the use of Special Forces has become crucial. The rapid force deployment to the Gulf region and the effective conduct of high-intensity operations

demonstrated that Britain's joint expeditionary military strategy has come of age. Compared to Operation Granby in 1990/91, the deployment for Operation Telic in 2003 was much more compressed, as was the in-theatre training prior to the commencement of hostilities.

The terms used to characterise the coalition's military strategy were 'rapid dominance' and 'shock and awe'. In essence, these are alternative ways of describing the manoeuvrist approach: to overburden the opponent's decision-making ability, to shatter his will and cohesion and focus on systemic rather than cumulative destruction – a core tenet of current Anglo-American doctrine. The Iraq War was a textbook application of manoeuvrist warfare: the air and land offensives were launched simultaneously and carried forward at an exceptionally high tempo causing unpredictability, surprise and early paralysis of the regime's command and control capability, while the focus of destructive power was put against the regime's strategic and operational centres of gravity, its political and military pillars. Considering the vastness of the campaign, the amount of unwanted casualties and damage was relatively small. Overall, this military strategy represents the improvement of existing operational concepts rather than the birth of a new form of warfare.

The close cooperation and common effort of the US-British coalition notwithstanding, some aspects of the Iraq War give the impression that the British rationale for postmodern military interventions has proved particularly apt. Three observations are set out below in order to underline this statement. Firstly, the British managed the transition from warfighting to stabilisation comparatively better than US troops. In the British sector the dangerous vacuum of power following the collapse of the regime was filled within days rather than weeks. The situation confronting the military in the transitional phase between combat and peace support operations resembles very much the image of the 'three-block war' being fought in the increasingly blurred environment of military interventions, where different military roles overlap. While the units of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division were still engaging Iraqi regular forces in the outskirts of Basra, light infantry patrols started to restore basic law and order in the city centre and secure the vital infrastructure, at the same time as soldiers from the same formation were busy with distributing humanitarian emergency aid to the city's population 'around the block' – thus combat, counter-insurgency, stabilisation and humanitarian tasks were taking place simultaneously, within the same area of

operations and, another phenomenon of the postmodern era, in front of ‘embedded journalists’ reporting live. This is a vivid example of what is required of the post-Cold War military. While British soldiers were, to some extent, mentally prepared for the complexity of such fluid situations, the complications initially observed in some US controlled areas seemed to reveal some lack of flexibility – the US Army was slower to change from warfighting to peace support.

Secondly, the mid-term stabilisation of post-war Iraq has again underlined the British expertise in counter-insurgency and Peace Support Operations. During the first couple of months, US occupation forces have lacked sufficient ‘boots on the grounds’ and specialist capabilities in counter-insurgency to address the sustained guerrilla war in a decisive way but without alienating the Iraqi population. This has contributed to the difficulty of capitalising on the initial success of the offensive campaign, which led to the swift removal of Saddam’s regime. A comparison between British and American behaviour suggests that the British conduct of Operations Other Than War is more subtle and thus more effective. It needs to be said, however, that the US Army’s area of responsibility is much larger and contains the ‘Sunni triangle’, whose inhabitants are arguably more opposed to the thought of Western occupation than the Shiite population in the regions further South, controlled by the US Marine Corps and the British Forces. Furthermore, US troops have gradually adjusted their modus operandi to a more discriminate behaviour. The British have focused on gaining the trust – the ‘hearts and minds’ so to speak – of the local population from the very outset. They have used robust but minimum force in their response to residual pockets of resistance. They have been prepared for addressing basic humanitarian needs. And they have sought the early involvement of local authorities in the restoration of law and order.

Thirdly, the frictions nevertheless encountered during combat operations in Iraq emphasise that the human element of conflict remains decisive. Technology alone can never lift the fog of war completely. Undoubtedly, technological superiority opens new possibilities and allows applying military force more effectively and more selectively. In this respect, Operation Iraqi Freedom may have been a demonstration of a quick, efficient and relatively ‘clean war’. But at the same time, technological superiority has also fuelled unrealistic expectations of cost-free warfare, and by doing so it has generated new limitations in the conduct of operations.

The postmodern soldier of Western democratic societies is accountable for his way of waging war as in no other age before, the outcome of his decisions and actions are the subject of immediate media coverage. In such an environment, no matter how overwhelming the technology, minor frictions – the inevitable casualties of combat, the one missile gone astray into a residential area, the one soldier mistakenly killing civilians at a checkpoint or the one unfortunate incident of friendly fire – can have a disproportionate impact on the course of action by shaping domestic and international public opinion and influencing political reactions. While the accountability of and restriction on the use of military force is undoubtedly a significant accomplishment of liberal democracies, underlining the democratic control of armed forces, Western society must stay clear from the illusion that wars can be fought without unwanted negative consequences. By definition, armed conflict will always cause harm and damage.

Without claiming that Britain's Armed Forces have discovered the panacea to address the dilemmas of armed conflict, this thesis argues that their general mindset – the refusal to regard technological superiority as the acme of military transformation, the emphasis on the human and psychological factors of war and the deliberate sense of pragmatism and adaptability – provides a promising starting point. After all, this creed is enshrined in British doctrine as the 'concept of fighting power', which underlines the equality of the physical, moral and conceptual components of warfare. While the events in Iraq have activated another intensive phase of doctrinal debate on modern-day military power that will undoubtedly lead to doctrinal refinements, they have also provided a general reconfirmation of the soundness of Britain's current intellectual approach to conflict.

Viewed from this perspective, it seems that current British doctrine is effective. Its main purpose is to provide guidance for the conduct of military operations and to influence the process of force development. It is the glue of common understanding and common practice, formed in an organisational culture that encourages intellectual debate, and endorsed by formal doctrine. Military-strategic doctrine, as its highest level, provides the conceptual bridge between national security strategy and the military instrument. It has a crucial function at the crossroads of the political and the military levels of state power: to explain the role of the British Armed Forces to the wider public; to advise political deci-

sion-makers on the possibilities and limitations of the use of military power; to inform defence planners about the desired direction of future force structures and capabilities; to ensure that senior military officials plan and conduct operations in line with overall security and defence policy objectives as well as with the relevant legal and moral constraints; to educate officers on how to think about the nature of conflict and the use of force; to inform allies and coalition partners about the British way of warfare; and, last but not least, to contribute to deterrence by communicating to potential opponents the strong resolve, conceptual strength and effective capabilities inherent in British military power.

Such a doctrine requires more than the publication of a one-off high-level document. It has to be based on a doctrinal culture: a doctrine development process that is part of the military's organisational culture. Innovation can only succeed in an organisation that favours conceptual debate, encourages critical review and promotes imaginative thinking. It includes the existence of a thorough 'lessons learned' process that links conceptual thinking with feedbacks from training, exercises and operations. The validity of principles of action, distilled from the study of military history and past experience, have to be periodically measured against the yardstick of current operations – or as one doctrinalist put it: "Doctrine is a dialogue between the past and the present for the benefit of the future." To identify the right lessons requires a genuine interaction between doctrine, training, education and operational command. The ideal doctrine therefore combines well-proven experience with imaginative thinking. In this context, it is of paramount importance that the study of past operations is carried out carefully and as objectively as possible so that historical observations are not misused for merely justifying a specific line of thought. At the same time, doctrine must not be rigid but allow sufficient room for flexibility and adaptation, since each conflict brings distinct circumstances. Pragmatic solutions for current military problems and creativity for future scenarios can only flourish in the absence of rigidity. A military organisation with such an open intellectual attitude is less likely to fall for the trap most often quoted by historians – the observation that the military usually prepares for the last war instead of the next one.

Doctrine is also about maintaining the balance of its own form. The line between institutionalised innovation and conformity of thought is

a thin one. While doctrine has to be developed along certain guidelines to remain relevant for practitioners, it should not impair the inclusion of unorthodox thinking. While doctrine needs to be authoritative to be useful, it should remain flexible enough to provide freedom of action. While doctrine must be general to correspond with changing circumstances, it should be specific enough to be relevant and not to merely state the obvious. While doctrine has to be regularly reviewed, it should guard against its own 'overdrive': an endless stream of doctrinal publications, constantly reformulating the existing principles for its own sake would cause confusion rather than a sense of general direction. That's where the differentiation between doctrinal debate and formal doctrine becomes significant: the first is the realm of unhindered and unlimited thinking about the nature of conflict and military force, and the latter constitutes formally accepted, authoritative guidelines to help maintain clarity of thought in crisis and war. These are important balances doctrine development has to consider continuously. Whether British doctrine will remain as relevant in the future as it has become in 2002 will depend on keeping this sensitive balance.

Ultimately, doctrine is more than publishing and teaching. It is about a military organisation's attitude of mind, its way of managing change and guiding institutional progress. Doctrine itself does not provide the answers or solutions to the riddles of conflict but displays possible ways to find them. The evolution of Britain's military-strategic doctrine after 1989 suggests that Britain's Armed Forces have placed doctrine at the core of their transformation. They have come to understand the process of doctrine in its fundamental meaning – as a never-ending pursuit of conceptual excellence.

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Oral History

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“*Themes in British Doctrine 1945–80*” – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 1/2002.
“*Plenary Session – What Is Doctrine*” – Panel Discussion 3, BMDG 1/2002.
- 2nd Meeting of the British Military Doctrine Group at Shrivenham on 17 October 2002 (BMDG 2/2002):
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“*Navy Doctrine in the 1980s*” – Panel Discussion 2, BMDG 2/2002.
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Personal Interviews

- Codner, Michael. Director of Military Sciences, RUSI; Commander (RN, Ret.), served in the Royal Navy until 1995, principal author of *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* (BR 1806, 1st Ed.).
- Daddow, Oliver. Dr., Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, KCL; Coordinator of the British Military Doctrine Group, researches on the historiography of British military doctrine.
- Mackinlay, John. Dr., Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at the War Studies Department and Centre for Defence Studies, KCL; Colonel (British Army, Ret.), served in the British Army until 1991, taught at the JSCSC in 1997/98 and participated in the consultation process of British PSO doctrine.
- Storr, Jim. Lieutenant Colonel; 1st Grade Staff Officer, Land Operations, Doctrine Branch, Directorate General of Development & Doctrine.
- Tyack, Bill. Director, MoD Business, Future Systems Technology, Qinetiq; Air Commodore (RAF, Ret.), served in the Royal Air Force until 1999, principal author of *British Defence Doctrine* (JWP 0-01 BDD, 1st Ed.).

Literature

Literature contains the remaining writings on wider British security and defence issues, as well as academic papers not published in a direct context of the military's doctrine development process. Since doctrinalists form their views on strategic, technological and social issues within the wider defence debate, many of the writings listed below have equally contributed to an informed doctrine development. Due to the contemporary nature of this thesis, the categorisation of secondary sources and literature is blurred and, the more as the doctrine community has grown beyond the official circles, superficial. Some authors consequently figure in both categories: under secondary sources when they were holding an official position or were directly affiliated to the doctrinal development at the time of writing, and as part of the literature when they published independently.

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Appendices

A Chronology – Major Events in British Defence and Doctrinal Evolution

This chronology aims at listing the most important steps of British doctrinal evolution as well as events of British defence policy in the last quarter of the 20th century. It includes the official military-strategic doctrines published by Britain's Armed Forces and the key literature influencing doctrinalists. In addition, the list contains those security- and defence-related events and military operations which saw a substantial British deployment or otherwise affected the conceptual debate. The main focus lies between 1989 and 2002. This chronology does not claim to be complete.

1969	Start of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, leading to a permanent presence of British Forces in the Province for the purpose of supporting the civil authorities (Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, MACA)
1980–1988	Armillar Patrol, Royal Navy presence in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War for the purpose of contributing to the protection of the international oil routes
1982, April–June	Falklands War
1983	Publication of the US <i>AirLand Battle</i> doctrine, reflecting the US Armed Forces' conceptual renaissance in the wake of their Vietnam War trauma
1985	Publication of Robert Simpkins' <i>Race to the Swift</i> , reflecting early British ideas of manoeuvre warfare

1986	Publication of the US <i>Maritime Strategy</i> , reflecting the US Navy's idea of a more offensive approach to the use of maritime power
1988, January–March	First Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) at the Army Command and Staff College, Camberley, reflecting the rediscovery of the operational level of warfare
1989	Publication of <i>Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine</i> (BMD, 1 st Ed.), presenting British Army's approach to manoeuvre warfare
November	Fall of the Berlin Wall, symbolising the end of the Cold War in Europe
1990, July	<i>Options for Change</i> statement to the House of Commons, initiating the Government's plan for downsizing the British Armed Forces
1990/91	Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, calls for a 'peace dividend' dominating Western security and defence policy Operation Granby, Britain's contribution to the US-led coalition Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
1991	Disintegration of Yugoslavia, triggering several years of civil war in the Balkans and setting the stage for a new generation of peacekeeping interventions
April	Publication of <i>Air Power Doctrine</i> (AP 3000, 1 st Ed.), the RAF's first high-level doctrine document since 1957
April–July	Operation Haven, the multinational humanitarian support and protection of the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq with Britain as a lead nation

April, onwards	Introduction of 'no fly zones' over Northern and Southern Iraq, start of US-British air patrolling with permanent contribution of RAF (UK designation: Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch)
July	Publication of an Army White Paper <i>Britain's Army for the 90s</i> , outlining the details of the <i>Options for Change</i> downsizing of the British Army
November	NATO summit in Rome, presentation of NATO's <i>New Strategic Concept</i> outlining the Alliance's widening security agenda of stability projection and crisis management
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1992 , February	EU Treaty of Maastricht, demonstrating the first step towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
June	WEU Petersberg Declaration, presenting the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks' (humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking)
August, onwards	Operation Grapple, first deployment of British Forces to Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR, reflecting the complexity and difficulties of post-Cold War peace-keeping
October	Establishment of NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), with Britain as the framework nation and the contribution of two British divisions
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1992–95	UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), without British contribution, indicating overstretched status of British Services at the time
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1993 , April	Establishment of the Inspectorate General of Doctrine and Training at Upavon; one year later reorganisation into the Army Training and Recruiting Agency (ATRA) and the Directorate General

	of Development and Doctrine (DGD&D); new post of Director Land Warfare, responsible for the Army's doctrine development
August	Publication of <i>Air Power Doctrine</i> (AP 3000, 2 nd Ed.), outlining the role of air power in the post-Cold War security environment
October	Failed raid of US TF Ranger in Mogadishu ('Blackhawk Down'), demonstrating the 'fog of war' in OOTW, leading to the withdrawal of US Forces from Somalia
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1993–1995	Operation Deny Flight, NATO-led air operations in support of UNPROFOR with RAF and Royal Navy contributions
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1994, January	Launch of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), institutionalising the growing security and defence cooperation across the Euro-Atlantic region
January	Presentation of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, aiming to improve NATO's operational capabilities with respect to crisis interventions
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1995, January	Publication of <i>Wider Peacekeeping</i> (AFM, Vol. 5), presenting British Army's first post-Cold War peacekeeping concept
July	Fall of 'safe area' Srebrenica, leading to a Bosnian Serb massacre in the Muslim enclave, becomes a symbol of UNPROFOR's failure to prevent 'ethnic cleansing'
August/Sept	Operation Deliberate Force, NATO-led air operations against Bosnian Serb Army
November	Publication of <i>The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine</i> (BR 1806, 1 st Ed.), presenting Royal Navy's approach to post-Cold War maritime power
November	'Tri-Service Conference on Defence', demonstrating efforts for enhancing 'jointery' in Britain's Armed Forces


December	Change of Bosnia operations from UNPROFOR to NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) after the Dayton Agreement
1996 , January	Publication of US Admiral William Owens' article on <i>System of Systems</i> , reflecting the intensifying RMA debate Publication of <i>Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine</i> (BMD, 2 nd Ed.), adjusting land power to post-Cold War circumstances
August	Establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF), enhancing the command and control as well as the force structure of Britain's rapid reaction capability
1997 , January	Establishment of the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), demonstrating the need to train and educate officers in jointery
January	Publication of <i>British Defence Doctrine</i> (JWP 0-01, 1 st Ed. / BDD 1), presenting the first joint military-strategic doctrine of Britain's Armed Forces
May	Launch of NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), replacing North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
May	New Labour Government, start of a comprehensive defence review
June	NATO summit in Madrid, invitations for NATO enlargement
July	British withdrawal from Hong Kong
1998 , January	Publication of <i>Peace Support Operations</i> (JWP 3-50 / PSO Doctrine), consolidating the British approach to post-Cold War joint Peace Support Operations
April	Signing of the 'Good Friday Peace Agreement' between long-warring Catholic and Protestant factions in Northern Ireland; no significant troop re-

	duction possible yet, around 15,000 British troops remaining deployed in the Province
July	Publication of Labour's <i>Strategic Defence Review- Modern Forces for the Modern World</i> (SDR) consolidating British post-Cold War security and defence policy
August	Operation Infinite Reach, the US cruise missile attacks against terrorist related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
December	Operation Desert Fox, the US-led air attack against the Iraqi regime after Saddam's refusal to cooperate with the UN weapons inspections; British involvement
December	British-French Meeting at St. Malo, change of Britain's attitude towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), announcement of the idea of an EU Rapid Reaction Corps
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1999, March–June	Operation Allied Force, NATO-led air campaign against Milosevic regime with contribution of RAF and Royal Navy
April	NATO summit in Washington, presentation of NATO's <i>New Strategic Concept</i> , consolidating NATO's post-Cold War transformation
April	Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) fully operational, reflecting further enhancement of Britain's rapid reaction capability
May	Publication of <i>British Maritime Doctrine</i> (BR 1806, 2 nd Ed.), updating Royal Navy's post-Cold War maritime doctrine
June, onwards	Operation Joint Guardian, start of KFOR Peace Support Operation in Kosovo with substantial contribution of Britain's Armed Forces
June	EU summit in Cologne, establishing the ESDP
August	Publication of <i>Air Power Doctrine</i> (AP 3000, 3 rd Ed.), formulating the concept of effects-based targeting

September	Deployment of Australian-led international intervention forces in East Timor (INTERFET) in support of UNTAET, with contribution of British Forces
December	EU summit in Helsinki, presenting headline goals for EU Rapid Reaction Corps
2000 , May	Operation Palliser, largest unilateral British deployment since 1982 (Falklands War) in support of UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
October	Establishment of the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), first joint organisation for doctrine development
December	EU summit in Nice, presenting the structure and instruments of the new ESDP
2001 , September	'11 September' terror attacks on New York and Washington, reflecting the growing threat of internationally linked terrorism aimed at mass effect
September	NATO-led Operation TF Harvest in support of international efforts to stabilise the Macedonian civil war, with contribution of the British Army
October	Exercise Saif Sareea, a joint exercise of British Forces in Gulf region to assess the effectiveness of the JRRF concept
October	Publication of <i>British Defence Doctrine</i> (JWP 0-01, 2 nd Ed. / BDD 2), presenting an updated joint military-strategic doctrine
2001/02 , onwards	Operations Veritas and Oracle, the British contribution to the US-led coalition war against terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom)
2002 , January, onwards	Operation Fingal, the British contribution to the international Peace Support Operation for the stabilisation of Kabul (ISAF)


February–July	Deployment of Royal Marines battlegroup (TF Jacana) for combat operations against Taliban/al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan
July	Publication of the <i>Strategic Defence Review – A New Chapter</i> , outlining Britain’s response to 9/11
November	NATO summit in Prague, presenting plans for a NATO Rapid Response Force
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2003	Operation Telic, British contribution to US-led coalition operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm and remove the Saddam regime in Iraq
March–May	
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B British Doctrine Community



Sources: adapted from organisational charts of the JDCC, DGD&D and MoD Homepages

C Hierarchy of British Doctrinal Documents



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In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence

The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold
War Era, 1989-2002

Markus Mäder

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