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**The European Rapid
Reaction Force:
Implications for
democratic accountability**

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The European Rapid Reaction Force: Implications for democratic accountability

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Abstract

This study aims to provide an overview of democratic accountability aspects of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), taking into account that the development of an operational European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the further fine tuning of the ERRF are part of a dynamic process. In this context, this study examines aspects of the ERRF where a growing gap in democratic accountability is identified and recommends measures of bridging this gap.

Given that the ERRF is still at its initial stages and has not been officially utilized in any international crisis, the author borrows a narrow definition of democratic accountability developed by Robert Behn. According to this definition, a governing body is accountable when it explains and justifies its specific actions or inactions. In this framework, the author addresses the questions of how the European Union (EU) acts; what it has set to accomplish on issues relating to the ERRF; and, who it answers to.

Accordingly, this study looks at the divergent and vague definitions of the Petersberg Tasks that have prevailed among the EU member states as well as within the European Union. The paper concentrates primarily on the role of France and the UK, the leading states in ESDP issues, without which an EU military operation could not take place. It proposes prescribing precise limits to the Petersberg Tasks, both in terms of geographical reach and the intensity of the operations. Another aspect of democratic accountability of the ERRF is assessing EU decision-making processes and coordination mechanisms. In this context, we address such questions as, how do the European Parliament (EP), European Commission and Council of the European Union work together on defense issues? What are relations like between the EP and the newly (trans)formed Interim European Security and Defense Assembly? More importantly, how do EU citizens feel about efforts at militarizing the EU? The last section explores the transparency of the ERRF from an international perspective. It therefore assesses EU-NATO relations; considers the possibility of creating an autonomous EU planning apparatus; looks at relations between the EU and non-EU 'partners'; deals with American concerns regarding EU military capabilities; and, addresses the relevance of a UN mandate in EU military operations.

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The opinions expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and are not necessarily shared by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) or the members of the Research Training Network project on “Bridging the Accountability Gap of the European Security and Defense Policy”. All shortcomings, mistakes, generalizations and omissions in this paper are mine.

Acronyms

CDM	Capability Development Mechanism
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIC	Capabilities Improvement Conference
COSAC	Conference of Community and European Affairs Committee of Parliaments of the European Union
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee in the Council of the European Union
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
SHAPE	NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union

1. Introduction

The European Union 'Headline Goal' was agreed upon by the European Council at Helsinki in December 1999. It was adopted to encourage the development of readily deployable military capabilities, the so-called European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), through voluntary, but coordinated, national and multinational efforts. The ERRF, which was declared operational at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, is a combined task force that must be able to deploy military forces of up to 50.000 to 60.000 persons within sixty days and sustain them for at least one year by 2003. Fourteen out of the fifteen EU member states have signed on, Denmark having opted out. The ERRF should be capable of conducting the full spectrum of the 'Petersberg Tasks', in accordance with Article 17 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU).¹

The 'Petersberg Tasks', originally defined by the Western European Union in June 1992, are described as "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."² At one end of the spectrum an operation could be dealing with the evacuation of people from an area and providing security and assistance to humanitarian organizations in order to help restore order or allow the relevant organizations to provide relief to refugees. Crisis management operations are actions aimed at preventing a horizontal or vertical escalation of a crisis. They must respond to the following six challenges: saving human lives; maintaining basic public order; preventing further escalation; facilitating a return to a peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation; managing adverse effects on EU countries; and co-ordination.³ Accordingly, the definition of the Petersberg Tasks also covers conflict prevention, in the sense that a force may help to prevent a potential conflict situation from escalating and create conditions where the conflict can be peacefully resolved. Finally, at the more militarily demanding end of the spectrum, an operation could help to resolve a crisis between two warring factions. However, the EU purposely avoids the use of the expression peace enforcement or peace restoration.⁴

The European Union is currently facing the challenge of providing military capabilities to its ESDP, as it committed itself to in the Cologne and Helsinki European Council declarations.⁵ A number of factors have contributed to the recent

1 Rutten, Maartje (compiled by). *From Nice to Laeken European defense: core documents*. Chaillot Paper 51. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2002. 198 p.

2 Rutten, Maartje. *From St-Malo to Nice. European defense: core documents*. Chaillot Paper 47. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, 2001. X, 225 p.

3 Braillard, Philippe et al. *The Development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) by the European Union and its POSSIBLE Consequences for Switzerland*. Report mandated by Ressortforschung (DPIII). Geneva Center for Security Policy: Geneva, September 15, 2001, p. 1.

4 Ortega, Martin. *Military Intervention and the European Union*. Chaillot Paper 45, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, March 2001, p. 98 and 122-119.

5 For a historical overview of development in the ESDP, see *Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor: A Strategy for Action*. Prepared by the Venusberg Group/Bertelsmann Foundation (ed.).

realization and need for EU military capabilities. First, the political developments in the 1990s have encouraged the establishment of a European pillar in NATO. It has increasingly become necessary to consider the probability of the United States *not* wishing to be involved in the settlement of a conflict, when European states consider such a settlement essential to their security. The reduction of the American military presence in Europe (from 335,000 forces before 1990 to 150,000 in the mid-1990s and to less than 100,000 in 2000) has encouraged the Europeans to envisage taking up a large part of their security.⁶

The Balkan crisis was also an important catalyst behind the EU's effort to create its own military capabilities. When the US left the Balkans to Europe, Europe failed the test. Yugoslavia's collapse into brutal ethnic conflict brought British, French and Dutch units into Croatia and Bosnia. By 1995, the Europeans found themselves the subject of moral scorn by Washington for failing to prevent ethnic cleansing and under daily harassment by the warring parties. The United States, under enormous pressure, finally acted, and NATO bombed Serb forces in August 1995, leading eventually to the Dayton Agreement. By that time, what started as a local Balkan conflict had nearly metastasized into a NATO crisis. The Kosovo war four years later illustrated the military weakness of the European powers once more. It confirmed that the major European states simply lacked the capacity to project decisive force beyond their borders, and that they had made little progress in changing the situation despite major defense reviews in London and Paris.⁷

Since the events of September 11, Europe has allied itself with the United States on its "war against terrorism". Some EU member states directly participated in the raids against the Taliban in Afghanistan, others offered their financial support. It is clear that Europe, yet again, was not present in a time of crisis as a unified unit and that the military aspects of the ESDP are very much in construction. This turn of events however, and the changing priorities of security provide another reason for enhanced co-operation. The events of September 11 may have changed our vision of strategic policy, but they have not put an end to the crises in the world. Indeed, Europe may find itself again exposed on the Balkan issue and may find it necessary to engage more deeply in the conflicts of Kosovo and Macedonia. An EU force of decisive size, responsive to EU command, and capable of operating without American support seems like the answer.

The European Union's efforts to devise a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) have to date been noteworthy in high-profile organizational and declaratory norms, rather than in terms of generating additional military capabilities

Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000.79 p; Howorth, Jolyon. *European integration and defense: the ultimate challenge?* Chaillot Paper 43. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2001. 114 p; Grant, Charles. "European defense post-Kosovo?" London: Center for European Reform Working Paper, June 1999. 13 p.

6 Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Rapport de réunion no. 32 (en application de l'article 46 du Règlement), 18 avril 2001. Président: M. Paul Quilès.

7 See Kupchan, Charles A. "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective." *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, summer 2000, p. 16-32.

and taking action.⁸ Above all, the European Union needs to formulate and implement concrete policies on the ESDP if it hopes to play a role in the choice of determinants for international security. The development of an operational ESDP and the further fine tuning of the ERRF are obviously part of a dynamic process. This paper aims at examining this on-going process to assess whether it will lead to a democratically accountable ERRF. It seeks to identify the growing gap in democratic accountability in ESDP policies and recommend measures of bridging this gap. Accordingly, the paper deals with the precise delimitation of the Petersberg Tasks; the enhancement of coordination among the EU institutions; the definition of cooperation between the European Union and NATO; an assessment of US reactions to EU militarization; the relevance of a UN mandate for carrying out a military operation; and, the promotion increased effectiveness of EU defense cooperation.

2. Theoretical framework: What do we mean by accountability?

The object of defense, in its restricted sense, is to assure, at all times, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression, the security and integrity of national territory as well as the life of the population. To ensure defense, a state formulates its security policy, which consists of an ensemble of measures that allow it to attain its objectives, possibly after having adapted them to the hostile milieu of international relations. Defense policy is one of its aspects: it is the preparation and the use of military means to attain national objectives. In its broad definition, defense policy is thus not limited to the use of military force to deter, stop or repel any aggression against national territory but also implies the commitment, beyond its frontiers, of military forces to defend universal values, such as human rights or the observance of international law, or national interests.⁹

2.1. *What should be the EU's defense role?*

Foreign and security policy goes right to the heart of what it means to be a nation state. It is argued that at its core, the European Union is an alliance of states, that is, the basic unit of international relations and defender of national interests. In fact, decision-making concerning European defense and the ESDP (Pillar II) takes place at the inter-governmental level. Thus, the democratic and formal legitimacy of the EU still stems indirectly from the member states, which are signatories to the

8 Yost, David. "Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe." *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 2, 2002, p. 292. For a thorough explanation of the institutional developments of the European Union for the ESDP refer to Bono, Giovanna. *European Security and Defense Policy: theoretical approaches, the Nice Summit and hot issues*. University of Bradford, Bradford: Research, Training and Network: Bridging the Accountability Gap in the European Security and Defense Policy/ESDP Democracy: February 2002. Available at http://www.esdpdemocracy.net/7_publications.htm

9 Van Beveren, René. *Military Cooperation: What Structure for the Future?* Chaillot Paper 6. Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 1993, p. 2-5.

European treaties.¹⁰ When it comes to issues of security and defense, the responsibility rests solely with the EU member states, especially concerning their participation in military operations. Patricia Chilton rightly notes that what one must concentrate on is what sort of alliances these states form.¹¹

Like other post-war institutional architectures, the EU is influenced by the transition from a security system based on ‘collective defense’ (territorial) to a vastly expanded concept generally defined as ‘security cooperation’. It is essential to grasp the fact that the word “defense” in the title ESDP is synonymous with military resources placed in the service of security. European security implies the definition of common interests, the setting of a common research and development, investment and procurement policies. Clearly, the ESDP is not about military power *per se*; it contributes more broadly to international security, currently particularly to the ‘soft end of security’. The ESDP must be seen as a complement to the overall effort of the ‘West’ to manage security. The EU, with its member states, is a massive provider of development assistance: it provides about 55 per cent of total international assistance and as much as two-thirds of all grant aid.¹² Whenever it is criticized by the US for not being able to provide adequate air power capabilities, which the United States mainly provided both in Bosnia and Serbia, the EU responds that since the end of the war the European member states have provided 80 percent of the peacekeeping ground forces and more than 70 percent of the funds for civil reconstruction.¹³ If, however, European member states are serious about becoming more active in the defense and security issues, they need to decide how they will do this coherently and in an accountable manner.

Latest developments in the ESDP and especially efforts to create a European Rapid Reaction Force are a way of strengthening the European Union’s role in defense issues. States choose to form alliances in order to impose a common political will on a common enemy or to prevent that enemy from imposing his will on members of the alliance that are too weak to oppose it. (This has been the NATO model). The usual features of an alliance are, therefore, that there is an advantage in membership and a common enemy (real, potential or simply hypothetical) to be faced. Alliances are not limited to self-defense accords or operations, but have wider military objectives, including military activities beyond the borders of their member countries. The Maastricht treaty and the Petersberg Declaration of WEU contain at least some elements of such alliances, which Van Beveren classifies as ‘*general defense alliances*’.

10 Horeth, Marcus. “No way out of the beast? The unsolved legitimacy problem of European governance.” *Journal of European Public Policy*, no. 62, June 1999, p. 251.

11 Chilton, Patricia. “Common, Collective, or Combined? Theories of Defense Integration in the European Union.” In *The State of the European Union, Volume 3. Building a European Polity*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 81.

12 Patten, Chris. “Jaw-jaw, not war-war.” *Financial Times*, 14 February 2002. Such statements are part of the debate on ‘burden sharing’, where states contribute to international security according to their own particular strengths. The issue is analyzed by Chalmers, Malcolm, “The Atlantic burden-sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?” *International Affairs* (London), July 2001, Vol.77, No.3, pp.569- 585.

13 Wallace, William. “Europe, the necessary partner.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol.80, no. 3, May/June 2001, p. 22.

For defense to be considered ‘common’, the states concerned must have a centralized military structure, which is ready to assume command of the armed forces involved in each engagement. Van Beveren defines three types of military cooperation within alliances: staff agreements, the placing of military forces under command of a pilot nation and integrated command structures.¹⁴ The emphasis in the EU and among EU member states remains on *ad hoc* coalitions—neither common nor collective security but an advanced mechanism for coalition building. Accordingly, *individual states* will decide whether or not to participate in an EU operation on a case by case basis.

Part of the process of enhancing European defense is the institutionalization of the ESDP. The setting up of EU defense institutions—for example, the new institutions created under the Council (the Political Security Committee, Military Committee, Civilian Management Committee, etc.)—is a crucial element to the creation of a common EU defense culture of which the EU is currently devoid. It is hoped that establishing these institutions will foster the development of such a culture, as has happened in other areas of European integration. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging. Significant and urgent efforts are needed to transform these attitudes, for the sake of the defense initiative, as well as for general improvement of the EU procedures.¹⁵ In this respect, the EU needs to come to a consensus on the arrangements concerning its defense.

2.2. *Defining democratic accountability*

The traditional dictionary definitions of *accountable* are: “1. Subject to giving an account: *answerable*; 2. Capable of being accountable for: *explainable*.” Accountability is also defined as “the quality or state of being accountable, liable or responsible. In *The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics*, Jay Shafritz of the University of Pittsburg defines accountability: “1. The extent to which one must answer to higher authority—legal or organizational—for one’s actions in society at large or within one’s particular organizational position...” and “2. An obligation for keeping accurate records of property, documents or funds.”¹⁶ Overall, dictionaries emphasize the responsibility to answer, to explain and to justify specific actions (or inactions), in part by keeping records for important activities.

It is difficult to assess the democratic accountability of any body given the multiple interpretations of this fundamentally theoretical concept and the different models into which it translates. Important elements used in this assessment include, among others, the power and control of the executive; the role of the bureaucracy; parliamentary oversight; and the influence of civil society and individual citizens. It is especially difficult to assess the accountability of an organization like the

14 For more on this see Van Beveren, René, *op. cit.*

15 Andreani, Gilles. “Why institutions matter.” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, summer 2000, p. 83, 87.

16 Quoted in Behn, Robert D. *Rethinking Democratic Accountability*. Washington, DC: Brookings Foundation Press, 2001, p. 4.

European Union, which is still in the making and whose nature and future are currently being decided, especially through the policies of Enlargement and the Convention. At the very least, democratic accountability is a much wider concept than public accountability, tied to keeping a governing body accountable for its actions. In this respect, the following questions arise: Accountable for what? Accountable to whom? Accountable how? How exactly will the EU be held accountable of ERRF operations?

Accountability for finances and accountability for fairness addresses *how* the government acts. But we also care about *what* the government actually accomplishes. One of the most difficult problems of democracy is how to set policy achievement standards that are measurable in ways that citizens can understand and use to hold elected officials and appointed bureaucrats accountable. To hold a public agency accountable for performance, we have to establish expectations for the outcomes that will be produced by when, the consequences they will create, or the impact they will have.¹⁷ Certainly, government and international bodies have clear responsibilities: EU citizens expect their governments and the European Union to fulfil them, which answers the question *to whom*. EU citizens are concerned about the responsibilities, obligations and duties of public agencies and public officials, who heavily influence EU foreign policy. They are concerned how these agencies and officials at the national and EU levels carry out these responsibilities, obligations and duties. They expect them to earn the public's trust while fulfilling public interests, especially on sensitive issues like security and defense. 'Subsidiarity' in the ESDP is an issue that is not taken into account in the debates of the European Union. Yet, it is important that citizens feel involved in their government whether at the local, regional or European level.

Keeping these three questions on democratic accountability in mind—what, how, and to whom, this study aims to look at the recent developments and setting up of the ERRF.

3. Defining the 'Petersberg Tasks'

In the framework of the Petersberg Tasks, the EU has set an ambitious agenda for the creation of a military capability designed to allow it to react to a variety of international circumstances: failed states, non-combatant evacuations, peace support and humanitarian operations, and regional conflicts within or outside the borders of the European continent.¹⁸ The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, annexed to the Laeken Presidency Conclusions raises a series of questions

¹⁷ Not only does the new public management reject the idea that public servants are passive, scientific implementers of decisions; it also rejects the bureaucratic ideal of separate organizations responsible for implementing separate policies. See Behn, Robert D, *op. cit.*, p. 6, 9, 10, 60-80.

¹⁸ See Lindley-French, Julian. "Boosting Europe's Military Muscle - the Build-up and Future Role of the EU Rapid Reaction Force." Lecture in the Cicero Foundation Great Debate Seminar, Paris, 9-10 March 2000. Available online at <http://www.cicerofoundation.org/p4lindleyfrench.html>

that “should aim [...] to determine whether there needs to be any reorganization of competence” and proposes updating the Petersberg Tasks.”¹⁹

To ensure transparent coordination the EU member states must come to an agreement in defining what ‘common defense’ is and articulating potential enemies. When establishing the ERRF, no limits were set to EU militarization: what tasks are we not going to perform, what missions are we not going to engage in, what geographical limits do we not aim to go beyond? Specific goals are necessary so that we can learn what works and what doesn’t, and improve our performance.

3.1. *Debates among EU member states*

A look to European politics reveals the internal incompatibilities, especially relating to defense issues: each state with different national cultures and historical heritages, each with their own preconceptions and experiences, each with their own slightly different takes on the world. This leads to divergences in the political decisions among EU member states. European voices are often discordant, as governments compete with each other in pursuing their ‘special relationships’. The ultimate test for EU member states will be their ability to produce sound common decisions and establish a single, independent EU voice on burning international issues.²⁰

In this respect, EU member states need to urgently agree on a detailed definition of the Petersberg Tasks, including the scale and intensity of operations envisaged. The report on *Achieving the Headline Goals* prepared by the Center for Defense Studies at King’s College suggests that there is little controversy among the EU member states over the lower level of the Petersberg Tasks. Most of them are neither politically sensitive nor militarily demanding. They are unlikely to open rifts among the EU member states. Rather, it is the upper level Petersberg Tasks that are more controversial.²¹ The St. Malo process can be regarded as a qualitative step towards ESDP and Franco-British security relations.²² Yet, the biggest obstacle of the ESDP has been the inability of Britain and France to agree on the fundamentals.

19 “Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union” in Rutten, Maartje (compiled by). *From Nice to Laeken European defense: core documents, op. cit.*, p. 115.

20 Wallace, William. “Europe, the necessary partner.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol.80, no. 3, May/June 2001, p. 18. For example, due to the lack of a fully developed strategy and of a unified EU policy, the EU has been unable to acquire the diplomatic leverage and political clout commensurate to its substantial financial investment in peace in the Middle East region.

21 *Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals*. Center for Defense Studies, King’s London College. Discussion Paper. November 2001, p. 9.

22 The St. Malo Summit (December 1998) was a bilateral meeting between France and Great Britain, which generated the necessary political will between these two European powers to commit themselves to working actively towards the development of an ESDP. The St. Malo declaration emphasized that the EU needed the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a credible military force, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. The aim was to ensure that the European Union could take decisions and approve military actions where NATO as a whole was not engaged. For more on this issue, see Howorth, Jolyon. *European integration and defense: the ultimate challenge?* Chaillot Paper 43. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2001. 114 p; and Howorth, Jolyon. “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative.” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, summer 2000, p. 33-55.

The interpretation of the range of the Petersberg Tasks is especially acute with regards to the tasks involving combat forces. France has consistently spoken of a 'Defense Europe' while other EU member states have chosen to put more emphasis on the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks quietly dealing with crisis management and peacekeeping. France appears to have the most expansive and ambitious of interpretations of the Petersberg Tasks of all the EU member states. From a French perspective, the EU is aiming at putting together a common capability to lead peace operation in Europe and its neighboring region, to support the United Nations in operations where France agrees with. It does not rule out major operations to restore order in a region, such as the Desert Storm operation in the Gulf or operation Deliberate Force in Former Yugoslavia, acknowledging however that they would most probably be conducted under the auspices of NATO.²³

Former Defense Minister Alain Richard points out that it is the goal of France to ensure that the EU also participates in "crises of high intensity". He has stated that for the moment, the Petersberg Tasks on the high end of the spectrum (similar for example to Operation Allied Force) would require some capabilities that the Europeans do not have, but that they have nevertheless decided to acquire. "In the short term this option [participation in 'high intensity operations'] will therefore be available only for more limited military operations."²⁴ Giving the EU the resources to have a defense means that the EU will be able to act in regional crises, but "not limit [its] interests and action solely to our continent. The events in East Timor have demonstrated that we should be able to rapidly deploy our military capabilities of a humanitarian character to impose the respect of UN Resolutions, even if these crises are very far away."²⁵ As the French have made clear though, the ERRF does not imply the creation of a European army.²⁶

The UK government however is more cautious in its assessment of the upper limit, but acknowledges that some element of real combat power is required. It is inclined to regard crisis management as the logical upper level of the Petersberg Tasks, although some intervention capacities might be required as they were for the Operation Allied Force in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. War-fighting however, such as Desert Storm, would clearly lie outside the Petersberg definition.²⁷ From a British perspective, "the Petersberg Tasks were [...] deliberately framed in such a vague way that they are all things to all people. What they are not is collective self-defense,

23 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, op. cit., p. 11.

24 Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. European Defense and the Transatlantic Link. Georgetown University, 23 February, 2000

25 Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. Entretien avec France Inter, 17/07/00; Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. Entretien avec Le Figaro, 03/07/00; Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. Entretien avec Europe 1, 14/07/00; Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. Point presse au salon Euronaval, 24/10/00; Richard, Alain, French Ministry of Defense. Discours pour la présentation du projet de loi de finances pour 2001 à l'Assemblée nationale, 06/11/00; Richard, Alain, French Minister of Defense. Speech at a EURODEFENSE event, 16 June 2000.

26 Rapport de la Présidence sur la Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense, 17 July 2001, p. 1. Available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/europe/pesc/declarations/rapportnice.pdf>

27 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, op. cit., p.11.

clearly. What they are not is bombing Serbia, and what they are not is hunting for al Qaeda in the hills of Afghanistan. But many people say that the Petersberg Tasks are peacemaking.”²⁸

Recent debates in the House of Lords leave room for much confusion. When Ben Bradshaw MP, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was asked by the Select Committee on the European Union, House of Lords, to define the recent crises which might have come within the scope of the Petersberg Tasks, he replied that “crises do not lend themselves to such precise definition” and set out a number of tests for deploying troops under the tasks. This implied that no geographical limits had been devised. The Secretary of State for Defense, Geoff Hoon MP, supported this statement, mentioning UN-led missions in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and East Timor as possibilities and saying that “the world is a much less predictable place and [...] we are likely to have to use our armed forces in a number of theatres that we would never have anticipated before.” He was also widely reported to have said “the EU must develop a full military force able to project power around the world” and that “attacks since September 11 made it imperative to upgrade the EU’s emerging rapid reaction force.” Simultaneously however, there seems to be some recognition of the dangers of not delimiting ERRF operations more concretely. “The lack of geographical limits has implications for training, deployment, force protection and sustainability, implying that troops might be required to fight in all climates, and that lines of supply and communication need to be capable of servicing them far beyond Europe. The size of the EU force of 60,000 troops—a corps sized unit—implies at least some limits on what the EU can do at any one time.”²⁹

Almost all EU member states have made it clear that the ERRF does not have a self-defense character, since, it is argued, Europe does not have to face any external threat. Views in Greece differ on this issue, where the ERRF is referred to in the media and the political arena as the “Euroarmy”. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou publicly stated:

“Greece has always been one of the leaders in the very important new efforts on the creation of a *European army*, which was decided in Laeken. [...It is] not *yet* for the defense of Europe, but for common peace and humanitarian missions in different areas of Europe and the world. [...] These important European developments, where Greece participated as an equal partner, have also given us important new tools: new tools for our own particular Balkan region, but also for the Mediterranean. [...] Therefore, regardless of whether it is Albania, the FYR of Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, or Cyprus, in all cases we insist on the implementation of fundamental values. That means that, in the European context, human rights must be respected; borders

28 Eleventh Report: The European Policy on Security and Defense, Volume 1: Report, HL 71(I) ISBN 0 10 442032 4, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 7 February 2002.

29 *Ibid.*

must not move; the territorial integrity of states must be respected; democratic procedures must be implemented; and political disputes should be solved by peaceful means, not threats or the use of threats.”³⁰

Such statements clearly indicate that Greece perceives itself as being situated in a crisis region, facing ‘enemies’—most notably Turkey—and is obligated to defend itself. Speaking during a closed-door meeting of the Greek Parliament, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou clarified that the target of Greek diplomacy is to remove any “shadow of exceptions in the region of action of the European army”. He insists that full consolidation of Greece’s sovereign rights be taken into account and decisions be taken in the European Union, independently from NATO and, of course, without the suspicion of a “veto” by countries outside the EU, a right sought by Turkey.³¹ These perceptions are more pertinent in view of the fact that Denmark, which took over the six-month Presidency in July 2002, has an opt-out from the ESDP. This means that Greece, otherwise in the Presidency only after Denmark, will chair all matters related to the ESDP for a whole year, from 1 July 2002 until 30 June 2003.

The brief discussion of the discourse on the EU military capabilities in the French, British and Greek governments and administrations demonstrates the extent of discordance among EU member states on the sensitive issue of what the European Rapid Reaction Force is for. Common requirements must be formulated, which suggests the need for a rapprochement of military doctrines and national cultural factors. It also suggests that EU member states must build stronger cooperation between them, therefore, reconciling very different strategic cultures.

3.2. The debate at the EU level

Many of the difficult issues in the European Union have been postponed, as for example, the difficult issues concerning institutional reform were postponed to the next intergovernmental conference scheduled for 2004. The EU has similarly limited itself to keeping NATO and the United States appeased that the European Rapid Reaction Force will not constitute a threat to them, rather than clarifying the role of EU military capabilities.

European Union officials have emphasized that the ERRF must not and does not compete with US military capacities. “The US military power is clearly pre-eminent in the world and,” according to European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten, “the EU has no intention to compete with the Americans in

30 The italics in the text are my own and have been used for emphasis. “*Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική στο Νέο Παγκόσμιο Περιβάλλον*” (“The Greek foreign policy in the new global environment”). Speech given by the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. George A. Papandreou at an event organized by the University of Ioannina on 25 April 2002. Available in Greek at http://www.mfa.gr/greek/news/speeches_interviews/2002/0425_p.html

31 “FM and PASOK’s Parliamentary Control Group discuss Euroarmy.” Athens, 13/12/2001 (ANA). Issued on the website of the Embassy of Greece Press Office, Washington DC, USA. Available at <http://www.greekembassy.org/press/newsflash/2001/december/nflash1213d.html>

this field.”³² Consequently, it seems that the EU is not concentrating on the upper end of the Petersberg Tasks involving military intervention. “[I]f you mark the significance of Europe’s relations with America by how much we’re prepared to spend on defense, forget it! We can’t even pay the entrance fee!” If the US measures seriousness by that standard, Mr. Patten concedes, then Europe does not count: “there is not a political party in Europe that would campaign for a 14% increase in defense spending, which is what it would take for the EU to match Mr. Bush.”³³ Clearly, US emphasis is on hi-tech war-fighting, while European emphasis is more peacekeeping and crisis management. Along with the 60,000 European troops currently being assembled for the ERRF, the EU is also working on a reserve force of military and civilian police to take over the task of re-establishing domestic order in fragile societies as the front-line troops withdraw. In this context, Chris Patten has written:

The EU’s foreign and security policy has been described as being “without practical content.” But look at what we are doing in the Balkans, where not only does the EU provide the political context for a return to normality, but we have taken overwhelmingly the lion’s share of the reconstruction effort, and Europe provides tens of thousands of troops. Or look at the EU’s own enlargement, and the contribution this has made to peace and stability in Central Europe.³⁴

As to the parameters within which the Petersberg Tasks would be implemented, European officials do not rule out any given geographical location (with East Timor being cited here) and Petersberg operations can be of a much higher-risk intensity and tempo than NATO’s UN-style collection of arms in Macedonia.³⁵

The EU presidencies have also played an important role in strengthening the ESDP. In the case of the Swedish presidency was the primary actor in the development of EU crisis management capabilities; the Belgian presidency called the ERRF operational; and the Spanish presidency adopted a regional approach. Greece, who has assumed the next presidency on the military aspects of the ESDP, is already making its own public statements on the issue. “In general, when seeking to achieve security for citizens, the Greek Presidency must succeed in implementing the General Military Goal and [EU] goals to develop the potential for a political settlement to crises. The strengthening of the security and defense of the European Union is a primary objective.”³⁶

32 Petteri Tuohinen. “The EU’s role grows in world politics. – Interview with C. Patten.” *Helsingin Sanomat*, 5 March 2002.

33 Freedland, Jonathan. “Breaking the silence.” *The Guardian*, Feb. 9, 2002.

34 Patten, Chris. “No, the Fact Is the European Union Stands United.” *International Herald Tribune*, 2 January 2002.

35 Heisbourg, François. “Foreword.” *The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capability*. ESF Working Paper no. 4. Center for European Policy Studies and the International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, October 2001, p. 3.

36 Greek Presidency of the EU 2003. Available in Greek at http://www.mfa.gr/greek/foreign_policy/eu/the_presidency.html

However, press releases, speeches and articles issued by the European Commission are sending contradictory messages to the general public. On the one hand, Mr. Patten is quoted as saying:

“The recent history of Bosnia, the recent history of Kosovo, underlines the importance of Europe doing more for itself. Now we are trying to do it, and frankly it is daft—and malicious—to suggest that this is the creation of a European Army or an attempt to kick the Americans out of Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth.”³⁷

On the other hand, Mr. Prodi has made strong statements in favor of the creation of an EU army:

“When I was talking about the European army I was not joking. If you don’t want to call it a European army, don’t call it a European army. You can call it ‘Margaret’, you can call it ‘Mary-Ann’, you can find any name, but it is a joint effort for peace-keeping missions—the first time you have a joint, not bilateral, effort at a European level.”³⁸

He would ‘rectify’ the situation at a later date by saying “there is no intention of turning the Rapid Reaction Force into an EU army.”³⁹ So, what is the ERRF after all, in the eyes of the European Commission?

We often hear that the nature of the ESDP is misunderstood; that it represents a *common* policy rather than a *single* one. Yet, if the EU institutions hope to gain public support, they must present their common policies on the ERRF to the general public more convincingly. To achieve this, it is imperative that the EU and the EU member states determine whether the goals set in the Petersberg Tasks make sense. Beyond controlling a process, accountability is also designed to avoid or deter wrongdoing. Accordingly, the EU should analyze the goals, consider alternatives and assess the process employed to choose the goals. This cannot be done solely with rules, procedures and standards. To measure performance we need a collective aim, objective or target—a clear benchmark for performance.

4. Discrepancies in EU decision-making processes

The fundamental question of accountability becomes blurred when states pursue their national interests through multinational organizations. Who will be held accountable for an operation that is mandated by the UN, commanded by the EU, staffed by the militaries of the EU member states (perhaps also NATO members/

37 Patten, Chris, Commissioner for External Relations. *Debate on CFSP and ESDP European Parliament Brussels*, 29 November 2000.

38 Castle, Stephen and Andrew Grice. “EU is becoming the ‘European government’, says bullish Prodi.” Interview with Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission. *The Independent* (London) 4 February 2000.

39 Deaglán de Bréadún and Mark Hennessy. “Prodi says Nice Treaty will fall if 2nd poll is rejected.” *The Irish Times*, 23 June 2001.

non-EU member states), equipped from national assets assigned to the ERRF and/or NATO, and politically controlled by the supply of military information gathered by EU member states, NATO member states (mainly the United States) and/ or EU candidate countries?

According to the latest *European Commission Eurobarometer*, public opinion is divided on this issue. While forty-two percent of EU citizens believe decisions concerning European defense policy should be taken by the European Union, 24% believe these should be taken by the national governments and 20% believe NATO should take these decisions.⁴⁰

4.1. *Parliamentary scrutiny of EU defense issues*

It is still not clear who in the European Union has responsibility for the ERRF. First, specific steps need to be taken to clarify the relationship of the offices of the High Representative for the CFSP (currently Javier Solana) and that of the External Relations Commissioner (currently Chris Patten). There must be greater coherence between the EU's aid, trade, diplomatic and crisis management instruments. At present, the foreign policy chief is responsible for planning the ERRF's involvement in military operations, while the External Relations Commissioner is in charge of the ERRF when it is deployed in a non-military operation.⁴¹

More importantly, the issue of who should have parliamentary control of the ESDP must be urgently addressed. Following a report by the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU Assembly) at their Lisbon meeting on 20 March 2000, the WEU Assembly was transformed into an Interim European Security and Defense Assembly without delay. This Assembly would include representatives of the EU national parliaments, plus all those countries that aim to participate in the ESDP—namely the non-EU European NATO members and the candidate countries for accession to the EU—totaling 28 different nations represented (See Appendix I). In support of its claim of unique competence in the oversight of ESDP, the WEU Assembly argues that it is the only parliamentary body with sufficient expertise to fulfil this role and provides a valuable forum for consulting non-EU European countries on European security. It also supports the notion that national parliamentarians must undertake the parliamentary scrutiny of ESDP, reflecting the intergovernmental nature of the second pillar.⁴² In arguing its case, the Interim European Security and Defense Assembly claims: “Despite all the institutional changes in Europe, it still is the only European parliamentary assembly that monitors security and defense issues. Following the transfer of WEU's operational activities to the EU, the Assembly also [provides] a forum for political

40 *European Commission Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union, Report Number 56*. April 2002. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb56/eb56_en.pdf

41 *EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update, op. cit.*, p. 14; Cronin, David. “Sole overall control ‘essential’ for EUJ's rapid reaction force,” *op. cit.*

42 Jensen, Frederik. “Filling the accountability gap in CESDP: The parliamentary dimension.” *ISIS European Security Review*, no. 2, October 2000, p. 4.

discussion and reflection on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁴³ From its point of view, the new Assembly would represent the collective will of nations, while the EP would represent community interests.

Consequently, this position has caused much animosity between the European Parliament and the new EU Interim European Security and Defense Assembly. The European Parliament also had aspirations to take over the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly and be in charge of scrutinizing collective decisions of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the proposal of the Interim European Security and Defense Assembly is perceived as a threat by the European Parliament. In fact, some MEPs claim that representatives of national parliaments would not be the best representatives of the citizens of the EU, since, as officials answerable to national parliaments, they would be duty-bound to follow the official line.⁴⁴ The European Parliament has proposed that, within the framework of the ESDP and on the basis of the COSAC's experience, a 'European interparliamentary forum on security and defense' should be set up, comprising European and national MPs responsible for security and defense issues, as well as possibly representatives from the parliaments of the applicant countries and the WEU associate countries.⁴⁵

To manage the transformation into the "Assembly of Western European Union—the Interim European Security and Defense Assembly" a steering committee was created that will include a representative of the European Parliament. It is worth noting that, until now, neither the Assembly nor the European Parliament has been given the remit necessary to ensure the same level of parliamentary scrutiny for the EU's ESDP activities as is provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty. This includes the vital obligation on the part of the Council to provide a written annual report on its activities and to reply to parliamentary recommendations and questions.

How is parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP perceived at the national level? The French government recognizes that even though it still is a very blurry domain, rarely mentioned at a ministerial level, it is now clear that the ESDP will be essentially financed at the intergovernmental level. Therefore it would also prefer that it be controlled at an intergovernmental level in liaison with the European Parliament, which expresses its opinion on the common financing of the Council budget.⁴⁶ The UK government has made it clear that it considers that parliamentary oversight of the ESDP remains the primary responsibility of national parliaments.

43 See webpage of the WEU Assembly/Interim European and Security and Defense Assembly <http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/presentation/presentation.html>

44 Lucas, Caroline, Member of the European Parliament (Green Party) for the South East Region and member of the Green/European Free Alliance Group of the European Parliament. "European Security Defense". Speech for Conscience Annual Meeting, Oxford, 14 October 2000. Available at www.greenparty.org.uk/reorts/2000/meps/europeanarmyspeech.htm

45 *Sixth Report: Developments at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000*. Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, 18 July 2000. Available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmaff/384/38402.htm>

46 Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Rapport de réunion no. 32, *op. cit.*

Any decisions on military deployments will be decisions for national governments, and subject to national arrangements for democratic accountability.⁴⁷ On the same note, the Foreign Secretary holds that “it is difficult to see how the European Parliament could properly become involved in this in circumstances in which the Commission has no immediate role” and stressed the role of national parliaments in holding national ministers accountable. It is not clear at this stage if any arrangements will be made, for example, for national parliaments to require evidence in a formal manner from Mr. Solana, as the High Representative of the European Council.⁴⁸

The UK government does not believe that the WEU Assembly should take on a ‘scrutinizing role’ exclusively and it has threatened to block attempts by the Assembly to take on the formal role of parliamentary oversight of the ESDP. Instead, it has suggested that in the interim period before the Inter-Governmental Council in 2004, the work of parliamentary scrutiny be carried out by the existing international parliamentary bodies: the NATO Assembly, the WEU Assembly and the OSCE Assembly. The House of Lords in its deliberations has supported this view and recommends that each of these bodies establish working groups together with a representative from the European Parliament to carry out this work. There have been competing proposals to create a European defense assembly and plans to improve national parliamentary contributions to EU decision making. “We believe this is unnecessary in view of the existence already of a number of informed parliamentary assemblies. However, democratic accountability is inadequate and the matter must be addressed at both national and European levels if ESDP is to have widespread support of EU citizens.”⁴⁹

4.2. *Coordination between the EU institutions on defense issues*

Transparency is defined as “legal, political and institutional structures that make information about the internal characteristics of a government and society available to actors both inside and outside of the domestic political system.”⁵⁰ While this refers to a mechanism that leads to the public disclosure of information such as a free press, open hearings, and the existence of non-governmental organizations, it also implies open cooperation between the different government agencies. At the EU level, this translates into the EU institutions having a constructive and open working relationship.

47 *Developments at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000*. Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999–2000. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, October 2000, p. 8. Available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FACresponse069900,0.pdf>

48 *Sixth Report: Developments at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000*, *op. cit.*

49 European Union—Eleventh Report, *op. cit.*

50 Finel, Bernard I. and Kristin M. Lord. “The Surprising Logic of Transparency.” *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 43, 1999, p. 316.

The new EU institutional arrangements concerning the ESDP are firmly entrenched at the level of the European Council. The British, among others, were adamant that while the Commission could be associated with EU action, neither the Commission nor any other EU institution would be involved in military action. The UK's Political Director declared:

The British Government is not embarking on this particular initiative to bring common foreign and security policy, still less anything pertaining to defense implications, under the control or purview of either the Commission or the European Parliament. What is more, I do not believe that the other member states want that either. There is at the margin a limited role for both institutions in terms of the powers they currently enjoy and in terms of where the interface is between humanitarian intervention, developing aid and so on and what might be done in a security dimension. That is it. We are not going to cross that threshold, it is very much one of our red lines.⁵¹

The European Parliament was worried that providing the Council with defense staff and security costs—51 staff and other expenses that the EU member states claimed were crucial to set up the ERRF—would result in the Council having operational responsibilities normally reserved to the European Commission. The European Parliament claimed that officials would have the power to devise and implement EU defense policy without scrutiny from the European Parliament or any other EU institution. On the other hand, the EU member states insisted that the posts were purely administrative and that military personnel would do the operational work.⁵²

Differences between the EU Council and the European Parliament have also extended themselves to other issues related to transparency. The European Parliament, especially the Greens, have been complaining of much secrecy and mouthed rhetoric when it comes to the ERRF. The flow of information and access to documents relating to EU military affairs have been blocked by the Council, therefore violating the co-decision procedure, according to the European Parliament. In July 2000, Javier Solana, the High Representative of the ESDP, had proposed to exclude sensitive documents covering security and defense from the normal handling procedures providing for openness and transparency. The new classification of documents as top secret, secret, or confidential means that some information on EU military issues would no longer be available to all EU member states.⁵³ This new regulation relates to the demands of NATO to limit the number of eyes that have access to some military secrets to less than fifteen. This rule clearly

51 Emyr Jones Parry to the House of Lords Select Committee quoted in Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture." *International Affairs*, 2001, vol. 77, no. 3, p. 594.

52 Shelley, John. "MEPs in threat to shoot down EU defense force." *European Voice*, vol. 7, no. 9, 1 March 2001.

53 "EU transparency in security and defense policy, 17 October 2000, 13.00-15.00, European Parliament." *ISIS CFSP Reports*, no. 15.

violates European citizens' right to information with regards to public access to documents and will render the EU institutions more opaque.

The Netherlands and Sweden have voiced their opposition, as did the European Parliament. In October 2000, the EP Conference of Presidents decided to challenge the Council's decision in the European Court of Justice asking that the principles of openness and transparency of Article 255 of the Treaty establishing the European Community be upheld. The government of Finland also decided to intervene in support of the Dutch government's case against the Council in November 2000.⁵⁴ This pending issue may significantly compromise the further development of the ERRF and ESDP.

4.3. *Public support for EU military capabilities*

Foreign Affairs European Commissioner Chris Patten maintains: "We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiqués and declarations—full of strong nouns and weak verbs—to something more substantive, more muscular, more focused, that can have more impact."⁵⁵ To accomplish this, it is claimed that higher military expenditures is a *sine qua non*, which points to the democratic foundation of the project: will European taxpayers be automatically prepared to put their money behind the EU declarations? Or will they only do so if told that the world is an increasingly dangerous place, even more dangerous than it was during the old Cold War?

The *Special Eurobarometer 54.1* conducted by the European Commission in the fall of 2000 revealed that there are significant differences in national attitudes in Europe and that there is widespread confusion as to what the ESDP is intended for. As far as the roles of a European army are concerned, more than seven Europeans out of ten (71%) consider that it should be used for defending the European Union's territory, their country included. In second position with 63% of the votes comes the proposal "guaranteeing peace in the EU", followed by "intervening in case of natural, ecological or nuclear disaster in Europe" (58%). The Petersberg Tasks are mentioned by less than one European out of two. In other words, the EU governments still have a long way to go to convince their citizens of the importance of these new missions for the European Union in order to increase the legitimacy of these missions. Respondents make a rather clear distinction (twice the percentage) between taking part in peace-keeping missions outside the European Union, without a UN mandate on the one hand (15%) and those decided by the UN (blue helmets) on the other hand (34%). Three Petersberg missions are most often mentioned by Europeans as being part of the roles of a European army: carrying out humanitarian missions; intervening in conflicts at the borders of the European Union; and repatriating Europeans who are in areas where there is a conflict. The

54 Jensen, Frederik. *op. cit.*

55 "Middle East debacle leaves EU with trading and funding threats as only real weapons." *European Voice*, 17 April 2002.

legitimacy of these missions is clearly greater in the six founder countries, with percentages above the European average, except for Germany as far as the intervention in conflicts at the European Union's borders is concerned, a subject still very sensitive to this country.⁵⁶

Given these statistics, EU leaders will be caught in the dilemma between arguing that building EU military capabilities is a project for noble aims like mine-sweeping, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid and economically burdening the citizenry with higher military expenditures to make a militarized superpower dream come true. So far, European leaders have preferred to shift their attention from fixing national military deficiencies to the less expensive and far more satisfying task of developing a European framework for deploying their imagined forces. A RAND study carried out in 1993 estimated that a force of 50,000 would cost between 18 and 49 billion US dollars to equip in over twenty-five years, with an additional bill of 9 to 25 billion dollars for the creation of a satellite intelligence capability.⁵⁷ However, in the absence of a serious threat of war, it is unlikely that the EU member states will be able to sanction the enormous burden of taxes that would be needed for European defense budgets to match American military superiority, particularly when pensions and social welfare payments are put under remorseless downward pressure. In addition, the emotion created by the September 11 events in the US has led to important increases in the American defense budget, which are not foreseen to follow in European member states.

The comparison between EU member states' defense budgets is only one sign of the lack of European cohesion. Sustaining the 60,000-strong force with air and naval support outlined at the Helsinki European Council requires a pool of roughly 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 naval vessels. While French spending remained higher than the NATO average in the 1990s, it fell below that necessary to implement plans set out in Paris' own 1994 defense review. Along with Britain and the U.S., France emphasized military reform more than the other allies, especially Germany. German leaders, still burdened by the costs of reunification with its eastern Länder, have little revenue for defense initiatives. Along with other NATO members, Germany also faces strict limits on deficit spending and government debt imposed by the EU's 1991 agreement on monetary union. Slow economic growth imposed yet another barrier.⁵⁸ Defense spending has been cut in all EU member states, aside from Ireland and Greece. Despite EU leaders' pledge at the European Council in Laeken, EU member states will probably not be able to meet the latest quest of assembling the necessary capabilities for the ERRF by 2003. Klaus Naumann, former chairman of the NATO Military Committee and former head of

56 *Special Eurobarometer 54.1: Europe of Defense*. European Commission: Brussels, April 2001.

57 See Wolf, Charles Jr. and Benjamin Zycher. *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints and the Rapid Reaction Force*. Monterey, CA: RAND Publications, 2001. Available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1416/>

58 Hay, William Anthony and Harvey Sicherman, *Europe's Rapid Reaction Force: What, Why and How?* Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2001 Available at <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/emu/FPRI0201.html>

Germany's armed forces, believes that the European Union will not be able to meet its stated military 'Headline Goal' for at least five years.⁵⁹

European Union Defense Expenditure

Country	Currency	1999	2000	Estimated 2001
Austria	shilling	23.363	23.000	22.061
Belgium	franc	139.009	140.256	141.814
Denmark	kroner	19.821	19.349	19.639
Finland	markka	9.794	10.159	9.655
France	franc	248.427	242.800	239.074
Germany	deutschmark	61.065	59.617	56.657
Greece	drachma	1.890.690	1.981.884	2.174.886
Ireland	pound	588	602	696
Italy	lira	43.933.406	43.002.000	43.893.117
Luxembourg	franc	5.438	5.468	5.500
Netherlands	guilder	14.828	14.192	13.766
Portugal	escudo	462.007	475.178	510.453
Spain	peseta	1.203.954	1.266.429	1.308.955
Sweden	kronor	47.302	47.268	49.923
United Kingdom	pound	23.004	22.823	22.740

Source: Adapted from: *The Military Balance 2001/2002*. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press: London, 2001.

Despite a number of changes to the TEU (1997), the European Commission's role in determining the financial, legal and operational arrangements in CFSP/ESDP matters is still not clear. Depending on the action, either the Commission or the Council defines the arrangements for its implementation. In practice, this complicates day-to-day management both in the field and at headquarters level. Only limited information is available on contributions in kind made available by the EU institutions and on the amounts contributed by different member states. The basis for sharing the costs between other donors and the Union has not been adequately laid down.⁶⁰

Eight countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the UK—have signed up to a 18 billion Euro contract to buy 196 of the new planes in total. Apparently, acquiring these planes is imperative to remedy Europe's lack of strategic airlift capacity, which was made clear during NATO's bombing of Kosovo in 1999. Airbus hopes to start delivering the planes to its

59 Abbott, Dennis. "EU's 2003 military goal is still five years away, says Naumann." *European Voice*, 21 Feb. 2002.

60 "Information note of the European Court of Auditors regarding Special Report no. 13/2001 on the management of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)." *Court of Auditors' report on the management of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)*. IP/01/1411. European Court of Auditors, Brussels, 12 October 2001.

customers by 2006 and start delivering the first squadrons by 2008. Other 'successful' projects include the creation of an Airlift Coordination Cell, the European Amphibious Initiative, the A400M (despite the current lack of funds), increased cooperation among France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland *inter alia*, air-to-air refueling, Search and Rescue (SAR) as well as British, German, French and Italian cooperation on Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capabilities.⁶¹

The key constraint of the European ability to deploy its forces is its inability to lift by air, rail, road or sea. Precise capabilities lacking include battlefield mobility and fire support assets; large multi-service naval air platforms; precision-guided munitions; suppression of enemy air defenses; air-to-air refueling.⁶² Furthermore, there are weaknesses in operational and support capabilities: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; satellite imagery; battle management capabilities; strategic sea and air lift capabilities. The EU has set up a reviewing process whereby at the end of the year it assesses whether goals have been implemented and whether the results have been positive: this is done in the Capabilities Improvement Conferences (CIC). Regardless of the above-mentioned military constraints, the Action Plan released at the Capabilities Improvement Conference held in Brussels in November 2001 the only 'action' foreseen was further monitoring.⁶³

Other scholars support that formulating a sensible *division of labor* among EU member states will not only make it possible for Europeans to build up their capabilities, but will also enhance accountability. In Europe the necessity to better use the limited resources will encourage EU member states to find a consensus on operational needs and to better share capabilities among them.⁶⁴ Although EU member states spend \$140 billion a year on defense, compared with the United States' \$290 billion, member states possess about ten percent of American capacity to deploy and sustain troops outside the NATO area. It is more important to boost the effectiveness of Europe's armed forces and, through economies of scale, save money. This would be possible if the EU member states each specialized in the military roles, missions and capabilities at which they excel. Therefore, in an ideal world, the British would focus on special forces, nuclear-powered submarines, and fighter squadrons. Germany would concentrate on tanks, engineers and diesel submarines, while France would specialize in space warfare, attack helicopters and aircraft carriers. The Dutch would concentrate on mine-sweeping and amphibious warfare and the Czechs on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, and so on.

61 Strategic airlift concerns the ability to move troops and equipment quickly to or from a battle zone. Cronin, David. "German row threatens 'vital' military air transport project." *European Voice*, vol. 8, no. 10, 14 March 2002.

62 Rutten, Maartje. "Stagnation of the ESDP". *Institute for Security Studies Newsletter*, no. 1, February 2002.

63 EU countries began the process of identifying what resources the EU had and what extra it needed to fulfil its CESDP aspirations during the November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference. Also see Missiroli, Antonio. *Defense Spending in Europe: Is Europe Prepared to Pay for Improved Capabilities?* Paper given at the Conference on ESDP organized in Paris on 13-15 December 2001 by the Cicero Foundation.

64 Neu, Jean-Pierre. "Interview du délégué général pour l'armement, Yves Gleizes." *Les Echos*, 28 January 2002.

Evidently, such a scenario implies that EU member states trust each other to provide whatever is needed in a crisis.⁶⁵ Furthermore, given that only the UK and France have the necessary Permanent Joint Headquarters capabilities to act as coalition leaders in the absence of the United States, it seems that the ‘coalition of the willing’ will have to be built around and lead by the UK and France.⁶⁶

Overall, the EU is going to have to think more cost-effectively about sufficient and sustainable ways of providing capabilities. Although this will probably be a painful transition, involving relinquishing comfortable ways of doing business that produce jobs and status symbols, it is perhaps the only way of gaining the EU a substantial increase in military capabilities in the near term. In this framework, it is recommended that instead of pursuing the A-400 project in order to improve its strategic lift, the EU should look into a compromising combination of leased governmental lift from countries like Ukraine and Russia, creating a civilian reserve air and sea fleet program to enlist the commercial lift of EU states for crisis deployments, and pooling funding to purchase existing aircraft. Similar solutions could be adopted for strategic intelligence, theatre reconnaissance, strike forces, and research/development/procurement.⁶⁷

If the EU is serious about building its military capabilities, it must oversee the coordination and integration of national defense programs, seeking to map out a collective basis the new force structures and procurement programs required to give Europe the capable forces it needs. Europe must build public support for the implementation of its new defense programs. Professionalizing and upgrading forces, merging the planning and procurement processes of individual states, increasing defense expenditure would all require public understanding and a new level of collective will.⁶⁸

5. Coordination with the international community

In the context of international crises, EU co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance continues to be of decisive importance for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. Europeans agree that complementarity and symbiosis with NATO are integral to the development of the ERRF. The EU treaties constantly reaffirm the need for a strong and clear transatlantic bond, declaring the importance of compatibility between the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and NATO. While Paris asserts that the emergence of an ESDP with teeth would consolidate and enhance a more balanced—and therefore stronger—Atlantic Alliance, the UK government fears that the opposite would be the case: that if

65 Grant, Charles. “European defense post-Kosovo?,” *op. cit.*, p. 2, 9, 10.

66 Lindley-French, Julian. *European Defense: Visions and Realities?* DUPI Working Paper no. 20001/04, p. 3.

67 Schake, Kori. “Managing Divergence.” *The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capability*. ESF Working Paper no. 4. Center for European Policy Studies and the International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, October 2001, p. 16.

68 Kupchan, Charles A., *op. cit.*, p. 28, 29.

Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, Washington would retreat into isolationism and NATO would collapse.⁶⁹

Guido Lenzi argues that, today more than ever, is the time to render NATO and the European Union complementary organizations in the pursuit for stability and security in crises: NATO (and the United States) in the domain of “hard” security relating to the consequences of conflict, while the European Union in “soft” security areas addressing the causes of tension and conflict. A tacit understanding would be created whereby the EU (with the help of the ERRF) would intervene in the prevention of conflict and undertake crisis management tasks or in the case of civilian rehabilitation after a conflict. NATO would be responsible for dissuading, containing and dealing with the conflict phase.⁷⁰ This co-operation would lead NATO to become a more flexible military organization capable of undertaking ‘peace-enforcement’ operations, and allow at the same time EU member states to have more control over their own multilateral forces and the conduct of military operations.⁷¹

The link between NATO and the EU needs to be more clearly defined. Without clear links there is “a danger that the two institutions will get bogged down in bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction while a crisis escalates out of control.”⁷² EU-NATO relations must ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in determining the appropriate military response to crises, and to guarantee effective crisis management. To facilitate this aim a permanent and effective relationship between the two organizations must be established, which will include consultations and cooperation on issues of security, defense and crisis management of common interest.⁷³ Accordingly, several NATO-EU *ad hoc* working groups were established at the Feira European Council to examine how NATO could support the EU operationally when the EU deals with crises as well as how their capabilities would develop in a coherent and complementary fashion. These deal with security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements. Any consultation and cooperation though, must recognize the different nature of the EU and NATO

69 Howorth, Jolyon. “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative.” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, summer 2000, p. 33.

70 Lenzi, Guido, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

71 This idea is developed in Bono, Giovanna, *op. cit.*

72 Larrabee, F. Stephan. *The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American Interests*. Monterey, CA: Rand Publications, 2000. CT-168, p. 2.

73 See EU Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration.” 20 November 2000; Riggle, Sharon. *EU Officially Adopts Military Tasks: A summary of the Nice Conclusions*. Center for European Security and Disarmament – Briefing Paper, 18 December 2000. Available at <http://www.cesd.org/eu/nicebrief.htm>; Mann, Erica (Draftsman). *Working Document on a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership for the Third Millennium*. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy. Rapporteur: James E.M. Elles, 28 January 2002. Document no. PE 309.647, p. 3. Available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/20020219/afet/third_millennium_en.pdf

and “must take place in full respect for the autonomy of EU decision-making,” to France’s satisfaction.⁷⁴

Beyond the frustrations at a national level, one must also consider the important complications that inevitably follow when decisions and assets are shared between two institutions—in this case, the European Union and NATO. It has become a mantra that all this new security architecture is open, inviting, overlapping, networking, and based on shifting groups or alliances, representations in different bodies and *ad hoc* arrangements that later become permanent bodies. EU-NATO relations are clearly less than transparent, since their roles on the international scene are very much in the making. The creation of the ESDP institutions has created a fear of generating another layer of bureaucracy that would lead to more confusion, more lack of transparency, the duplication of NATO resources and a move away from NATO, an especially problematic dilemma for the UK.

5.1. *The issue of EU autonomy*

The issue of autonomy stimulates much debate, especially between France and Britain. Clearly, EU decision-making processes are autonomous when it comes to whether or not EU member states will contribute to the operations in which the ERRF is involved. The situation resembles NATO arrangements where NATO military planning unit for peace operations makes decisions of whether it should participate in the operation on a case-by-case basis and recognizes that national participation in such peace operation is subject to national decisions.⁷⁵

Planning is the most contentious area of the ERRF, as there is no explicit operational planning function in the Headline Goal, although a force-planning framework exists. France favors an autonomous planning capacity and is adamant that the ERRF should be able to take on crisis-management duties without NATO having a veto while the majority of the rest of the EU member states would prefer NATO’s SHAPE to carry out this task. Most of its EU partners, led by the UK, disagree with Paris that the operational planning should be carried out independently of NATO’s US-dominated military staff. As discussed in the French National Assembly, although European states accept that EU military capabilities cannot compete with NATO, they have all insisted on developing autonomous capacities. “For even though the European Union and NATO are condemned to cooperate, recent events in the Balkans as well as American preference to reduce its military engagement in the region underline the current European approach.”⁷⁶

74 Appendix 2 of the Portuguese Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000.

75 Chilton, Patricia. “Common, Collective, or Combined? Theories of Defense Integration in the European Union.” In *The State of the European Union, Volume 3. Building a European Polity*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 90.

76 Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées; Rapport de réunion no. 32, *op. cit.*

French President Jacques Chirac also favors independent EU operations but in coordination with NATO. Some in the French military milieu claim that in the future, when all the institutions for European defense are set up, there will be parallel coordination and exchanges between the EU and NATO concerning emerging situations in Europe. At that stage, EU member states will be in a better position to assess whether they are able to intervene without NATO assets.⁷⁷

The St. Malo process reflects a major shift in British security policy, which seems to assume that the US will no longer automatically underwrite European security. Nevertheless, the UK government has maintained that the new force would not have its own planning capability but would rely on NATO.⁷⁸ This way of thinking is revealed in a public statement made by Richard Hathfield, the MoD Policy Director. As he explained:

The key thing that is autonomous is the ability to take political decisions. The only independent input that the EU will have in terms of machinery is a small-ish military staff, about the same size the WEU had which has been abolished, which can frame the questions that will be sent off to the NATO planning staffs for preparing options for them to consider. Beyond that, it will depend on drawing on capabilities either from NATO or from the EU nations, so there will not be anything else independent being created for the EU as such.⁷⁹

In fact, Mr. Tony Blair went to great lengths “to make it absolutely clear” that “whatever we do in Europe, the UK is in no doubt that NATO is and must remain the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defense. The EU has been quite explicit that it will act only ‘where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.’”⁸⁰ The House of Lords has made it clear that it is important that there is proper co-ordination between EU and NATO planning staff, to ensure transparency and coherence in their respective activities. It regretted that EU governments had not fully located the ESDP within NATO structures and feared competition between rival organizations in times of crisis. Sir John Keegan pointed to the need for “absolutely agreed interoperable staff systems and operational procedures and communication systems.”

Questions also arise as to the coordination of the European forces once they are in the crisis region. What will matter eventually in the European context will be the *ad hoc* decisions on participation in particular operations, and who can most successfully control those decision-making processes. The EU could eventually have the ability to provide the 60,000 soldiers it needs for the operability of the ERRF. It could however subsequently fail to produce the necessary assets to implement it case-by-case as necessary. As Chilton argues,

77 Interview of General Jean-Pierre Kelche of the CEMA in “Armées d’aujourd’hui”, April 2000.

78 “MPs query role of Euro force.” *BBC News*, 11 April 2001.

79 Quoted in: Oakes, Mark (2 May 2001) *European security and Defense Policy: Nice and Beyond*. London: House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defense Section. Research Paper 01/50.

80 *European Defense*. The Ministry of Defense Policy Papers Paper no. 3. November 2001. From the site of the British Ministry of Defense at <http://www.mod.uk/issues/eurodefence.htm>

Such a scenario is not unknown in the UN for example. Decision-making procedures about peace support operations and force-package deployments do not foster cohesion. [...] In addition, decisions about crisis management may be made under crisis-typical time constraints. In such circumstances it may not be possible to avoid damaging the national interests of some members.⁸¹

Germany, for example, is particularly sensitive to the possibility of being pressured to participate in military operations that would meet fierce domestic resistance. Unless full transparency and formalized institutional links are established between the EU and NATO a situation could arise in which forces that are dual-hatted could face conflicting guidance from EU and NATO defense planners.⁸² In this context, one also has to wonder who will ensure that all elements of the ERRF are trained to common standards. The Göteborg European Council established a monitoring and evaluation system, the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), which is certainly a step in the right direction.⁸³ Joint civil-military exercises, like the one the Spanish EU Presidency carried out in cooperation with NATO in May 2003 to test ESDP procedures and ensure that the various parts can work together effectively, will also help develop an assessment capability. However, training and assessment systems will possibly take years to develop and implement.⁸⁴

5.2. *Non-EU member states*

A more serious difference of opinions emerged over the participation on non-EU 'partners' in decisions concerning EU military action. In dealing with crises efficiently, the European Union realizes that it would benefit from contributions from the European non-EU members of NATO as well as the EU candidate states, especially those that are willing and have the capabilities to significantly participate in the Petersberg Tasks. This approach is based on full transparency between the EU and NATO.

From the French perspective, such partners can be divided into three groups: candidates for EU accession who are also NATO members; candidates for EU accession not (yet) NATO members; and NATO members who are not candidates for EU accession. French logic suggests that discussions with these different groups should prioritize the EU candidates. It is difficult for France to imagine why members of the third category would be given priority over members of the second.

81 Chilton, *op. cit.*, p. 90-2.

82 Larrabee, F. Stephan. *The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American Interests*. Monterrey, CA: Rand Publications, 2000. CT-168, p. 3.

83 "Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals." Summary of the EU-NGO CFSP Contact Group Meeting. International Security Information Service, Europe, 10 January 2002. Available at http://www.isiseurope.org/isiseu/cfsp_reports/report20.html, 1 March 2002.

84 *EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update*. Issues Briefing, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 29 April 2002, p. 7.

The UK position only sees two groups: NATO members and non-NATO members and the British logic gives priority to the first group.⁸⁵

The EU procedures relating to this issue remain ill-defined. As stated in the Feira European Council Conclusions, in the ‘routine phase’, the non-EU European NATO members are offered at least two exchanges with the EU Presidency, i.e., twice every six months. There are regular exchanges in the ‘15+15’ format, that is, the fifteen EU member states plus the six non-EU European NATO members and the nine candidate countries for accession to the EU. The ‘15+6’ format, which includes the fifteen EU member states and the non-EU European NATO members, was set up to encourage further dialogue independently of the accession countries on such questions as the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (See Appendix I).⁸⁶

In December 2000, the Nice European Council agreed on a framework for the participation of non-EU member states while simultaneously maintaining an autonomous EU decision-making process. In the pre-operational phase, that is, the run-up to a possible deployment decision, consultations at all levels are intensified. This gives the opportunity to non-EU members to assess the situation, discuss their concerns in terms of their security and be informed of EU intentions. Special consultations with the six non-EU European NATO members will take place when NATO assets are used. In the operational phase itself, non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they wish, in an operation involving NATO assets and capabilities, but will have to wait to be invited to join by the EU Council when NATO assets and capabilities are not being used. They will have the same rights and obligations in the day-to-day conduct of the operations, if they are contributing, but will have no voice in the overall political control and strategic direction.⁸⁷ This arrangement was met with mixed feelings by the six European non-EU NATO members, notably Turkey, which is most vociferous on insisting on being included in the EU arrangements. Candidate countries can only take part if they are formally invited by the EU Council. Additionally, if NATO resources are being utilized, operational planning is carried out according to NATO procedures.⁸⁸

Specific liaison arrangements also exist during NATO/EU exercises for involving non-EU member states in the development of military capabilities. Accordingly, the non-EU NATO Allies and other EU accession candidates attended the Capability Commitment Conference in November 2000 to offer their additional contributions to possible EU led operations, which were warmly welcomed by the EU. Non-EU member states were also consulted during the joint EU-NATO civil-military exercise that took place in May 2003, mentioned above. States from outside the EU that decided to participate by deploying significant military forces would

85 Howorth, Jolyon. “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative,” *op. cit.*, p. 40-41.

86 See Baumgartner, Kelly. *Widening participation in EU crisis management*. ISIS Briefing Paper no. 6. May 2002. 14 p.

87 Bollinghaus, Christopher. “Participation in Crisis Management—Who’s managing whom?” *ISIS European Security Review*, no. 1, July 2000, p. 6.

88 Baumgartner, Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

acquire the same rights and obligations as those incurred by participating EU member states, in the conduct of the operations in which they became engaged. An *ad hoc* committee of contributors would oversee the conduct of each operation. Non-participating member states would be entitled to attend this committee. The decision to end an operation would be taken by the Council, after consultation with the participants.

According to this arrangement, non-EU member states are presented with EU strategic decisions as a *fait accompli* on the basis of which they decide whether or not to contribute. Their contributions are debated in the operational phase only once the decision to launch an operation has been taken. Therefore, besides discouraging non-EU member states from participating in EU military operations, this procedure does not allow them to react quickly enough when identifying and integrating their contributions to the EU forces. A substantive process for routine information exchange and an overt decision-shaping role for non-EU member states are not in place. Besides, their participation in EU decision-shaping on potential military operations is complex, unclear and cumbersome. In addition, non-EU member states are not informed enough in advance to properly prepare for meetings to have input in the agenda.

Russia, Ukraine and other European states involved in a dialogue with the European Union could be invited to participate in EU-led operations. Norway and Iceland have accepted an associate status to the ESDP, while Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic may soon be members of the EU. However, Turkey, an important member of NATO and the longest standing applicant for EU membership, is not convinced that developing a military capability through the EU rather than NATO will not disadvantage Turkish interests. The ‘Ankara Compromise’, a deal concluded in December 2001 between the United States and Britain with Turkey, whereby Turkey would be consulted on the deployment of the fledgling force, was vetoed by Greece at the European Council at Laeken.⁸⁹ The Spanish Presidency was frustrated that this issue was not resolved in time for the Seville European Council, despite a common EU position on the issue having been agreed upon shortly before the summit. The EU agreement is not very different in substance from the ‘Ankara Compromise’, giving Turkey assurances that the ESDP would not be used against the security interests of any NATO member, as Turkey had insisted on, and simply making this commitment reciprocal.

A resolution to this problem is important since the ERRF needs NATO’s consent to use its equipment, which requires negotiations with NATO members, including EU candidate member Turkey. It has significant strategic interests in most of the geographical areas where it is envisaged that an EU force might be deployed, and it is anxious that the Turkish government be allowed the opportunity to contribute fully and be consulted. Second, as the longest standing candidate for membership of the EU, Turkey is not inclined to cede any power to an organization

⁸⁹ Chalmers, J. ‘EU presses on with force despite NATO hitch’, *Reuters*, 15 December 2001; ‘The elusive EU-NATO agreement.’ *ESR News in Brief. European Security Review*, no. 13, July 2002, p. 8.

that includes Greece (and potentially, Cyprus) but not itself. Third, the Turkish government wants permanent involvement in all EU ESDP-related decision-making and to have a guaranteed right to participate in all operations, whether autonomous or using NATO assets and capabilities, in pre-designated crisis areas which directly affect its national security. Fourth, Turkey has pledged a substantial number of troops to the ERRF and is one of the biggest contributors to NATO. As a result, it feels it should have a greater role in the decision-making process both in the pre-operational and operational phases. The resolution of this dispute is essential, especially since the EU will be taking over the current missions in Macedonia and Bosnia, and access to NATO planning assets would be necessary.⁹⁰

5.3. American reactions to EU militarization

While US officials welcome anything Europe might do to improve its military capabilities, they also caution against EU steps that could undermine NATO. The European Union has received fair warning from US officials that the ESDP should not render NATO obsolete.⁹¹

Recent US administrations have consistently called for the strengthening of EU-US relations, the creation of a reinforced partnership whereby the United States, as the alliance's agenda-setter and leader, calls on Europe to shoulder a greater share of the common (US-defined) burden.⁹² Inadvertently, European allies have seen this not as a partnership, but as 'alliance leadership' with strong unilateralist tendencies. Contrary to past US administrations however, the Bush administration is less interested in the use of military force for conflict management either within or outside Europe. In fact, an EU reaction force optimized for peacekeeping would facilitate the US administration's "à la carte multilateralism", reducing the pressure on the US to become involved by filling the gap between NATO operations and the less capable standards of the United Nations.⁹³ Nevertheless, the ambivalence in the relations between American and European governments regarding EU military capabilities remains and is best demonstrated in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's formula that was summed up as the 'three D's': no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination.⁹⁴

'No decoupling' expresses the fear that Europeans might become autonomous, and seek to act together in ways that might undermine American interests. Or they might lose interest in NATO, pursuing their own priorities: they might form a

90 EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update, op. cit., p. 10.

91 In 1998, Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had warned against the Franco-British defense initiative and former Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, in his speech to the NATO defense ministers' meeting in October 2000, advised that the alliance should not become a "relic".

92 Wallace, William. "Europe, the necessary partner." *Foreign Affairs*, vol.80, no. 3, May/June 2001, p. 19.

93 Schake, Kori. "Managing Divergence." op. cit., p. 13.

94 Secretary General of NATO; George Robertson suggested a set of guiding principles for a European Security and Defense Policy evolving in harmony with NATO, replacing Albright's 'three D's' with his more positive 'three P's': indivisibility of the Alliance; improved European capabilities; inclusiveness of all partners.

factional bloc to try to challenge American hegemony. The United States is also worried that EU member states would not respect NATO's 'first-right of refusal', that is, NATO's right to have first say on whether or not it will engage itself militarily in a crisis region. Multilateral and simultaneous consultations with all parties concerned (most notably the US) would be a normal response to a crisis situation in the European theatre, and would clearly demonstrate whether a given situation required NATO or simply EU intervention. It is thought that the one geographic area where the EU might get involved in militarily and the United States (and hence NATO) might stand aloof is North Africa and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, especially francophone countries. However, even the most Europe-focused of French officials would not imagine that the EU could successfully embark on a mission 'condemned' by the US.⁹⁵

'No duplication' was directed mainly at preventing the emergence of a separate military planning body resembling the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), or at least, as the argument goes, to inhibit the replication of such functions. The real fear was that the French and Germans might succeed in triggering a European duplication of intelligence gathering, reconnaissance satellites, and mechanisms for controlling military initiatives. The structures that the EU has set up are only those that are required to support military decision-making and to take political control of, and give strategic direction to, crisis management operations. The US is particularly concerned about French insistence that the EU should have an independent military planning apparatus, which could draw on military resources presently at the disposal of NATO. Accordingly, Americans want to know exactly what EU *coordination* with NATO entails. This dispute has focused on what appears at first glance to be an obscure bureaucratic point: whether or not the EU force and NATO would share the NATO planning staff. If it did, then a US veto would be implicit. If it did not, then the resulting duplication might leave both diminished to a dangerous degree.⁹⁶

'Discrimination' largely referred to the problem of Turkey. US administrations (both of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) have favored the inclusion of Turkey in the ERRF. Clearly, a discrimination against Turkey would block EU access to NATO assets (as explained above), including intelligence, which is significant for the successful conduct of military operations.⁹⁷ It is important to note that, as in the case of other important military assets, intelligence assets at the disposal of NATO

95 Hunter, Robert E. *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor?* Monterey, CA: Rand Publications, 2002. MR-1463, p. 45; Howorth, Jolyon. "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative," *op. cit.*, p. 43.

96 William Anthony Hay and Harvey Sicherman, *op. cit.*

97 It is worth distinguishing between political intelligence that regards decision-making at the highest levels of government, and military intelligence. The latter can be 'strategic' therefore concerned for example with a country's weapons programs or its defense industrial base. It can also be 'tactical', i.e., information that is relevant to military operations. Governments are more likely to share tactical intelligence than political or strategic one, particularly with allies who are engaged in a common military operation. In Grant, Charles. *Intimate relations. Can Britain play a leading role in European defense—and keep its special links to US intelligence?* Brussels: Center for European Reform Working Paper, April 2000, p. 9.

are mainly national assets, the most important ones belonging to the United States. Therefore, NATO's sharing of intelligence assets depends directly on US national decisions.

The debate on whether or not the EU should develop its own intelligence and planning facilities if it wants to be operational is divided. Schake argues that duplication is "a risk worth accepting because the current distribution of power in NATO on intelligence issues is not conducive to cooperative policies or beneficial to either European or American interests." On this matter, France argues that Europe should develop its own network of military intelligence satellites for autonomous missions, requiring an "EU intelligence capability". The UK, on the contrary, claims that the phrase "sources of intelligence"—as stated in the St. Malo declaration—refers to access to intelligence, which could come from the US or from intra-European sharing. Britain's intimate connections to the US however, may make it harder for the Europeans to share intelligence among themselves—because Britain may be less interested in intra-European sharing, and because its EU partners may trust Britain less.⁹⁸ General Lieutenant Wiesmann, former German Military Representative in the NATO Military Council, the WEU and EU claims that the potential of NATO to support the military command capabilities of the EU is superior to the national and multinational potential of EU member states. By relying on European elements of the NATO command structure and its collective means, he argues, the EU significantly increases its capability to lead operations, particularly those in the upper spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks.⁹⁹

For the EU to be able to have a fruitful relationship with NATO, whereby the two organizations have complementary roles and reinforce each other, it will be imperative for the EU member states to accept US supremacy in NATO and for the US government and administration to take a clear position on the ERRF.

5.4. *What about a UN mandate?*

Whereas there are working groups for EU-NATO coordination in ESDP-related issues, there seem to be no parallel bodies for co-ordination between the EU on the one hand and organizations like the UN, OSCE, OAU and other regional governmental bodies and potential conflict-managers on the other. The case of the United Nations is especially interesting because in some circles it is believed that the EU could assist the UN in coping with security crises in places other than Europe. To quote one senior British official, speaking in a personal capacity: "Could the EU give the UN the Rapid Reaction Capability it needs?" The UN can usually raise enough peacekeepers for forces in places such as Eritrea. What it cannot easily do is

98 See Schake, Kori. *Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU reliance on US military assets*. London: Center for European Reform, January 2002., p. 1; Grant, Charles. *Intimate relations. Can Britain play a leading role, op. cit.*, p. 9.

99 Wiesmann, Klaus. *Die Militärische Einsatzführung im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP)*. SWP-Studien, S 39/01, November 2001, 48 p.

find the troops for an intervention force, such as that which was required to stop the bloodshed in East Timor.¹⁰⁰

Despite this possible scenario, EU member states do not agree on whether an EU military mission or intervention should require a UN mandate. Indeed, much of the debate about intervention argues that countries shall not be prevented from intervening because the UN Security Council has not given the green light. Sweden, for example, has maintained that a UN mandate would be required, each time, to participate or to conduct military peace-enforcing operations. Finland, Ireland and France, among others, also believe that an autonomous EU operation must be subject to a UN mandate.¹⁰¹ The British have held a contrary view. Russian officials insist that Russia's position on the necessity of a specific UN Security Council mandate prior to the deployment of any NATO or ESDP out-of-area mission remains unchanged. They are, therefore, somewhat concerned that the EU has pledged to act within the spirit of the UN Charter, but has not committed to seek authorization from the UN Security Council prior to each prospective operation.¹⁰²

The EU's various documents on its new defense policy have deliberately left this matter ambiguous. As reflected in the Göteborg European Council Conclusions and its Annexes "the development of the ESDP strengthens the Union's capacity to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognizes the United Nations Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." In the Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities issued by the Conference on EU Capability Improvement that took place in Brussels on 19 November 2001 it was noted that,

In connection with the pursuit of the objectives of the CFSP, the efforts which have been undertaken since the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Göteborg European Councils aim to give the European Union the means to play a full part at international level in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and to face up to its responsibilities to cope with crises by developing the range of instruments at its disposal and adding a military capability to carry out all the conflict-prevention and crisis-management tasks as defined in the Treaty on the European Union ("Petersberg Tasks").¹⁰³

When it comes to its action and campaign against terrorism, the EU discourse is quite different. In such cases, the European Union has repeatedly called for the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism, under the aegis of the United

100 Grant, Charles. "A European view of ESDP". Presented at a CEPS-IISS meeting in Brussels, 10 September 2001. 6 p.

101 It is interesting to note that many of these countries decided to participate in the NATO operation in Kosovo without having secured a mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter).

102 Rontoyanni, Clelia. "Russian and Ukrainian views of the European Security and Defense Policy." Paper presented at the conference "Russia, Ukraine, Belarus: Political leadership and public opinion," 1 July 2002, CERI-FNSP, Paris, p. 3.

103 See Rutten, Maartje (compiled by). *From Nice to Laeken European defense: core documents*. Chaillot Paper 51. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2002, p. 30, 95.

Nations. For example, in its Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the CFSP, Strasbourg, 25 October 2001, the European Parliament emphasized the need be in close alliance with the United Nations and its Security Council when combating international terrorism—a central component of the ESDP. It also adopted UN Security Council Resolution no. 1373(2001), including a common definition of terrorist crimes, lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations, groups and bodies, the enhancement of cooperation between specialist services as well as provisions concerning the freezing of assets. Similarly, in the Laeken Summit Conclusions, the European Council clearly states that it undertakes to participate in international efforts aiming at restoring stability in Afghanistan on the basis of the outcome at the Bonn Conference and relevant resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.¹⁰⁴

6. Conclusion

As an established civilian power, the European Union has contributed to the creation of a sustainable and peaceful world in the form of trade agreements, economic assistance and international development. European member states now talk of ‘failed states’ and reconstruction and, through various EU declarations, have expressed their willingness to strengthen the ESDP, create an ERRF and play an increasingly important role on the international arena. This paper has argued that in order to ensure that the ESDP and ERRF missions are implemented in an accountable manner, we must be able to answer three question: What is the ERRF for? How is it accountable? To whom is it accountable?

Inter-governmentalism, which translates into the lowest common denominator of fifteen different national positions, is a recipe for continuing weakness and mediocrity. This is not to suggest that the EU should form a single policy, but rather that the EU member states should selectively pool their sovereignty to exercise political weight more sensibly and more influentially. This is most important when defining the Petersberg Tasks and setting required limits on the European Union’s region and scope of action. September 11, 2001 caused an extraordinary upsurge in transatlantic solidarity. It created an unprecedented coalition against terrorism, with the transatlantic nations at its core. But it also posed fundamental questions about how we are to ensure our future security. Consequently, it is also necessary to reach consensus on a tighter definition of the Petersberg Tasks in the post-September 11 context. Does, for example, counter-terrorism fall under this heading and, if so, how are possible terrorist threats to be countered?

Also at stake is the control of adequate means for the implementation of objectives: limiting ourselves solely to a budgetary control makes no sense and must be connected to the global political objectives of the ESDP. Recent experiences in peace operations—Somalia, Bosnia, Albania—have demonstrated that for “security cooperation” to be efficient, the EU must primarily be credible and legitimate on

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 150, 88, 111, 112.

the institutional and political front. The eternal issue of “burden sharing” must not be limited to the question of contributions to the defense budget—in the European member states they are decreasing—but extend itself to the distribution of differentiated political responsibilities and operational roles demanded by the complexities of today’s crises. This issue leads to the idea of a White Paper or a “strategic concept” for the ESDP. In fact, two elements are missing to this day from the ESDP which is currently being formulated: an analysis of means—material, human and financial resources—that goes beyond a catalogue of capabilities and armed forces as well as an analysis of threats and risks.¹⁰⁵

The creation of an ERRF has prompted a sharp debate crossing the Atlantic and generated anxious talk about NATO’s future. A European force capable of acting in situations where NATO should not become formally committed as an alliance serves, according to some, a valuable purpose. Also, updating the Cold War formula for dealing with “out of area” contingencies would solve the potential problem created by the force. Therefore, NATO members able to intervene where key interests are at stake should act, while those unable to do so should either support their allies or maintain a dignified silence. The European Union must find efficient channels of communication with countries that are in NATO but not EU member states and vice versa. Turkey’s opposition to the ERRF is the most obvious and recent example of how the lack of dialogue might prove troublesome. In addition, the EU must inspire a shift towards a culture that is different from that of NATO, not based on defense, the fundamental rationale of NATO, but on the strategic ability to make a difference in crisis and conflicts.¹⁰⁶ In this context, the European Union should be forging a defense strategy based more on common European interests and less on the transatlantic connection.

More than anything however, EU member states must ensure that they have the EU citizens’ support if they want this process to be democratically accountable. The *Eurobarometer* opinion survey of spring 2001 demonstrated a 73% support from EU citizens for the ESDP, a 65% support for a common foreign policy.¹⁰⁷ It is the role of national parliaments to question their governments and organize debates, as they did for example on the issue of Kosovo. The European Union should also hold hearings and consultations to learn whether the stakeholders and the general public are satisfied with the chosen goals and are making good use of public money and resources.

The issues raised in this study explain how we can create a European Rapid Reaction Force that is democratically accountable and transparent. A more important question perhaps to ask is: Should we be building a Rapid Reaction Force at all?

105 Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées; Rapport de réunion no. 32, *op. cit.*

106 Chalmers, Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 596.

107 Eurobarometer Spring 2001: Initial Results. *Eurobarometer 55. European Commission: Brussels*, 17 July 2001. Document no. IP/01/1005.

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
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
APPENDIX I: Overlapping memberships in international organizations dealing with defense



Format "15+6": The fifteen EU member states plus the six non-EU European NATO members, that is, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Norway and Iceland.

Format "15+15": The fifteen EU member states, the six non-EU European NATO members (as above) and the nine EU candidate countries, that is, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

APPENDIX II: Map of competencies of the European institutions in European defense



Source: *EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update*. Issues Briefing. International Crisis Group, Brussels, 29 April 2002, p. 15.