


Conflict Studies Research Centre



**Chechnya:
Centre of Unabated
Instability & Conflict**

C W Blandy

May 2004

Chechnya: Centre of Unabated Instability & Conflict

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Key Points

- * The recent escalation of terrorist violence is also characterized by a choice of more strategic targets.
- * Terrorist Shamil' Basayev has signalled the extension of his campaign; there are many grievances he can exploit in the North Caucasus.
- * The speedy confirmation of the unpopular Ramzan Kadyrov as Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya signals there will be no major change in Russian policy, simply a hardening of attitudes.
- * Many leading Chechens were killed or injured in the blast, thus depleting available political alternatives.

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The assassination of the Chechen President Akhmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov on 9 May 2004 at the Dynamo Stadium in Groznyy whilst attending a celebration marking the 59th anniversary of Victory Day is a major reverse for President Putin's normalisation process in Chechnya. The process had not visibly improved the situation for the ordinary Chechen. It had not removed the deep fissures in Chechen society, nor neutralised an ever widening tract of terrorist violence inside and outside Chechnya.

"In 2003 some 477 people were abducted, of these: 155 people were set free, the main body as a rule through payment by relatives; 49 bodies were found with signs of a violent death; 273 disappeared without trace ... We know this is not the full story ... on two occasions we observed a sharp drop in the number of abductions ... during the periods of preparation and conduct of the referendum and then the Chechen Presidential elections. This leads onto the thought that the controlling structure is occupied in the abduction of people".¹

It is disturbing to recognise that one of the main enforcement agents of the normalisation process was Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the dead president, who has just been appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya. The Russian government's initial moves thus signal that there will be no major changes in policy to the region, simply a hardening of attitudes.

Dynamics of Power

Sergey Abramov

Prime Minister Sergey Abramov takes over as President under article 76 of the Constitution until the elections which must take place in four months time. Abramov, aged 32, was appointed only in March 2004. He had been head of the Russian public auditing section responsible for Chechnya. It will be remembered that Kadyrov had previously sacked Abramov from the Chechen finance ministry because of neglect.²

Ramzan Kadyrov

Within a few hours of the death of his father Ramzan Kayrov met President Putin behind closed doors in the Kremlin. Ramzan for several months had appeared not merely as head of the republic's security organisation but as a politician who made regular announcements and comments to the media. After the death of his father, Kadyrov junior considers that both his clan and himself will be on their way to a higher position in the political life of the republic.

But his becoming president is by no means a certainty. He is only 27 years old and is therefore too young to stand. However, Moscow hopes to preserve Kadyrov's establishment without having to construct a vertical power structure anew. Therefore Ramzan as Deputy Prime Minister will have the opportunity to put forward his own man as a candidate, or to have the age limit for presidents reduced so he can stand himself.

Candidates

Selecting a favourite for the presidency will not be easy, for he must be well known to the Chechen population as a whole but at the same time a firm Kremlin supporter. As Yelena Lyubarskaya remarked,³ the two are hardly compatible. He must also be able to use and have the support of the power-wielding structures in the republic. Candidates could include: Aslanbek Aslakhanov; Beslan Gantamirov; Ruslan Khasbulatov; Malik Saydulayev and Khuseyn Dzhabrailov.⁴

In Chechnya there is a diversity of groups, forces and interested parties with each one possessing its own separate agenda. Some are diametrically opposed to each other, and even within the ones that supposedly have interests in common there are subtleties in aspiration and extremes of objective which prevent full and open cooperation. On the federal side there are rivalries between different ministries, intelligence directorates and security services.⁵ The Chechen diaspora in Moscow also has its own complex of political and business interests. It is therefore unfortunate that so many leading figures in Chechnya were killed or injured in the explosion on 9 May.

Pro-Russian Chechens & Russians

Over the last six months the late President Kadyrov had managed to secure the removal of the former premier of Chechnya Anatoliy Popov,⁶ "*behind whom stood the military lobby*".⁷ The president also 'composed' a legal opposition, and had once again switched to attacking the military, particularly after the recent strafing of a farmstead which resulted in the death of five children and their mother. The military are meanwhile attempting to destroy the most aggressive enemies of the establishment, but seem unable to counter the movement of the perpetrators of terrorist acts beyond the bounds of Chechnya

Kadyrov had been successful in neutralising a proportion of his rivals, attracting separatists to his side and preserving special relations with Moscow, which is vital in solving the republic's economic and social problems. Moreover, Kadyrov had succeeded in undermining the political position of Maskhadov, who is now experiencing the desertion of some of his closest aides and supporters. It should not be forgotten that Kadyrov fought against federal forces in the first Chechen conflict and the catalyst for him to change sides in the second one was the seeming ascendancy of the Wahhabi movement and radical Islam to the detriment of the traditional forms of worship. Tensions also existed between the Kadyrov government and the Chechen opposition which is loyal to Moscow, exemplified by people such as Bislan Gantamirov and Ruslan Khasbulatov.

Chechen Pro-Russian supporters include President Kadyrov's closest relatives, first and foremost his two sons Ramzan and Zelimkhan, and other members of the large and influential Benoy *teip*. Also within this group are two of the three Yamadayev Brothers (Khalid currently heads a section of the "*Yedinaya Rossiya*" Party, Sulim is Second Deputy Military Commandant).⁸ Khalid and Dzhabrail Yamadayev in October 1999 supported Kadyrov, then Mufti of Chechnya, when he joined the opposition against Maskhadov. These two Yamadayevs were also bitterly opposed

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to Wahhabism, and handed Gudermes over to federal forces in October 1999.⁹ Other politicians were never in the independence camp, such as former members of the Chechen interim council in 1994.¹⁰

There remains a question mark over the late President Kadyrov's personal security protection group under the command of his son Ramzan, based in Tsentoroy. Rumours abound over claims of abductions, interrogations and disappearances.¹¹ It has been said that Ramzan's assiduousness in command of the Chechen President's security bears a certain similarity with "*the epoch of Aleksandr Korzhakov in Moscow, which emphasised the protection of President Yel'tsin so widely that in fact he became the second person in the state*".¹²

In addition to control of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya (see below), there were certainly at least two other major points of friction between Kadyrov and the Federal government. At a meeting in Groznyy in April 2004, the new Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Southern Federal District, Vladimir Yakovlev, sharply criticised the sluggish pace of restoring the social-economic infrastructure of the republic. The performance of the Chechen government has left much to be desired, particularly on the question of compensation payments. Certainly within the Chechen government there have also been strains and pressures: the main task of the seconded Russian Prime Minister was to be Moscow's monitor, controller and guardian of federal funds allocated to Chechnya.¹³ In the opinion of Sergey Abramov, the acting president "*the federal special programme does not reflect today's problems*".¹⁴ Kadyrov aimed to take control of all the financial resources which are directed towards the republic. In this, income from Chechen oil would play a vital part:

"The receipts from the realisation of Chechen oil must remain in the republic's budget. The last Chechen government was an outside observer in the realisation of extracting the republic's oil by Rosneft'. This situation is inapplicable to us now".¹⁵

The intention was to acquire the transfer of a controlling package to the republic through "Grozneftegaz" (for the present 51% of the shares belong to "Rosneft"). Moreover Kadyrov intended to construct in Groznyy an oil processing plant with a capacity of 1 million tonnes for industry and agriculture in Chechnya and neighbouring regions. To undertake such a project would be way beyond the capabilities of the republic itself, but it would make the Chechen president both politically and economically more independent of Moscow and provide a source of employment. Indeed any staunching of the flow of funds from the Federal centre to Chechnya must indeed be a welcome prospect for the Kremlin and the Russian public as a whole.

Chechen Separatists & Extremists

Shortly after the Chechen presidential and government elections in January 1997 Chechen separatism became sidetracked by the more far-reaching objectives of Wahhabism, the increasing presence of Arab mercenaries in a coordinated campaign of global terrorism under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism. The adoption of Sharia Law was intended to provide a point of convergence and solidarity in the quest for independence from Moscow. However, there can be no doubt that the arrival of the proponents of radical Islam acted directly against the established, traditional Sufi Brotherhoods of the mountain peoples and exacerbated the unsettled situation throughout the North Caucasus, particularly in Daghestan, Ingushetia and North Osetia. Confrontation between the Wahhabis and

traditionalists has made itself felt in local Chechen society also by age and generation. Internal religious strife between traditional and radical Muslim is one of the main reasons why Islam is unable to be a consolidating factor in the North Caucasus at the present time. Equally complicated is the relationship between former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, leader of the moderate Chechen separatists and Shamil' Basayev, now funded by the Wahhabi movement.¹⁶

Not only is Maskhadov the poor relation in comparison to the amount of funding that Basayev and other Wahhabi commanders receive, but the last few weeks have seen some spectacular inroads into Maskhadov's organisation. Specific operations vectored onto senior members of the official separatist core by Ramzan Kadyrov made use of the principle of setting Chechens commanded by a Chechen to flush out Chechen separatists. Negotiation by various means occurred between the hapless, targeted separatist and Ramzan. The rationale he put about was that voluntary surrender to a Chechen is better than being arrested by federal forces, particularly when an amnesty is offered in exchange for information about "*active separatist operators and information which might be of serious interest*,"¹⁷ as in the case of Magomed Khambiyev.

Box 1 - The Surrender of Magomed Khambiyev¹⁸

According to [his elder brother] Umar Khambiyev, ... Magomed Khambiyev was forced to disarm and surrender to the authorities on account of the fact that the Chechen law enforcement organs threatened reprisals against his relatives.

... the security service of the President of Chechnya Akhmad Kadyrov had been victimising his family for a long time. Khambiyev senior confirmed that 18 months ago his brother Ali who worked as a doctor in the village hospital had been arrested, and a week before the surrender of Magomed Khambiyev to the authorities, Ali's son was arrested. [Khambiyev senior] maintains that in all more than 30 relatives and acquaintances of the Ichkerian Minister of Defence were arrested. He added that nothing about the fate of Ali Khambiyev had been made known up until now.

Another recent departure from the Maskhadov camp was that of Shaa Turlayev, head of Maskhadov's personal security organisation during both Russo-Chechen conflicts, which took place in Nozhay-Yurt rayon on 2 April 2004. Again, this led to a renewal of claims that Maskhadov was losing authority. But as in the case of Khambiyev special circumstances pertained. Turlayev was suffering from an old wound which had turned gangrenous. He was delivered to the hospital in Gudermes and underwent an operation to remove his left leg, leaving him in no state to continue active operations with the separatists.

The Counter Terrorist Operation

The Interior Ministry (MVD) assumed responsibility for the counter-terrorist operation in September 2003 following the decline of large scale bandit formations. Lieutenant General Valeriy Baranov, Commander of federal forces in Chechnya gave his views on the continuing operation at the beginning of January 2004.

Box 2 - Assessment of Counter Terrorist Operation¹⁹

Fefelov: Valeriy Petrovich, talk about the situation in the republic. What about the enemy? What tactics does he use? What is the strength of the bandit formations?

Baranov: I won't start to use the term 'bandit formations'. The question is about bandit groups formed around foreign mercenaries, through which financial support flows to the *boyeviki*. It's not possible to establish the number of bandits today, because it's not constant. Everything depends on the supply of money from abroad. The number of mercenaries is known: varying between 200 and 300 people. They are professionals of a high class. The population has moved away from the struggle.

With regard to tactics. Tactics are simple: the conducting of sabotage against federal forces and peaceful citizens. In truth one of the terrorists' tasks is to take out those who decide the questions of local life: heads of administration, teachers, the local intelligentsia, mullahs and the elders. In essence terror is carried out by the *boyeviki* against their own people.

It's possible to maintain that the so-called "Chechen resistance" are today experiencing a moral and economic crisis. Money has become scarce. On the territory of Ingushetia false dollar notes are being printed with which bandit commanders pay their subordinates and thus economise the main means.

Fefelov: What are the specifics of our troops actions in the mountains and in the Chechen flatlands?

Baranov: In the mountains our subunits work mainly on the basis of searching for bandit bases and dumps. Bandit groups strive not to participate in open clashes with our special forces, but put the main stress on working with explosives in different territories. Mainly in Grozny, Gudermes, Argun. They strive not to fight in the mountains. Politically the state of affairs is such that the bandits achieve the greatest effect on the plains where the use of controlled fougasses on roads has more value. Today the basic task of troop subunits in Chechnya is reconnaissance and mine clearance of transport communications. Troop protection of roads in the republic.

Colonel Ilya Shabalkin, from the regional headquarters of the North Caucasus counter-terrorist operation, estimated that there were 2,500 *boyeviki* in 2002, reducing to approximately 1,500 in 2003, but their operations were dependent on their foreign paymasters. Shabalkin stated that there were always some 200 fighters ready to attack federal troops at any time with the remainder lying up in forests or in mountains waiting to receive further funding. *Boyeviki* tend to operate in small splinter groups of three to seven men.²⁰

General Baranov considered that the most important achievement was the improvement in conditions for service personnel and officers in Chechnya, for "*officers will come here with their families. Schools and kindergartens are being built in garrisons*"²¹ – a concrete and open indicator that in Russian military eyes the conflict is nearly over. Perhaps, though a rather thoughtless announcement when Chechen families are trying to cope with lack of proper housing within an environment of utter desolation and destruction. Furthermore, it highlighted the intention of the federal military to continue to base formations and units in Chechnya, which ran directly counter to the wishes of President Kadyrov.

Federal casualty figures in February 2004 showed a decline since 2002.²² General Baranov attributed the lower losses to the fact that federal forces are operating in

the mountains with fewer men, “*professionals from the airborne troops and furthermore the skilful treatment by aviation of forest tracts which give effective results*”.²³ Additionally, these teams were backed up by the FSB, Kadyrov’s security organisation under his son Ramzan: in many cases the latter negotiated surrender terms with separatist field commanders.

In 2003 for instance in Chechnya some 360 soldiers, officers and *praporshchiki* were killed. In contrast to the decline in losses amongst federal personnel, the Chechen MVD and militia were losing 13 men per month, some 156 in 2003. Under the partial ‘Chechenisation’ programme it is members of the Chechen MVD who are beginning to bear the brunt of attacks.

The late President Kadyrov believed emphatically that command of the counter-terrorist operation should be transferred to the Chechen government because operations against separatists and extremists would become more effective by being under the control of one person, a Chechen, none other than himself. Army General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, Commander of Internal Troops considered

“such a radical step is premature. From September 2003 Internal Troops assumed command of the Combined Group of Forces (OGV) in the North Caucasus. This is an indicator of the fact that in Chechnya large bandit formations have been destroyed, and constitutional order has been restored by law-enforcement methods. However, due to the situation in the republic, the level of professionalism of the Chechen militia, I consider it premature to transfer the command of the counter-terrorist operation to the republic’s MVD. It is necessary from the outset to create the necessary material base, to train personnel, but only then widen the competence of the MVD of the Chechen republic”.²⁴

Box 3 - Relationship between FSB and GRU in Chechnya²⁵

“If in the republic there is a ‘West Chechnya’, there must be an ‘East’. Here the second deputy military commandant is Sulim Yamadayev. He has been given control of ‘East Chechnya’ (the mountain rayony, Gudermes, Kurchaloy, Shali etc). Of course this is in opposition to Kokiyeu [GRU]. The fact of the matter is that Sulim Yamadayev - and he is of one the Gudermes Yamadayev scallywags - is a ‘*Kadyrovets*’. In that sense, he now is in an alliance with Kadyrov. And *Kadyrovetsy* are FSB people. In that sense they operate under the patronage and sponsorship of the FSB and strictly speaking is no secret.

Since Kokiyeu works with the GRU, he has no chance of over-stepping the mark, Sulim Yamadayev with his people have half Chechnya. Behind the back of one is the FSB, behind the back of the other is the GRU. As supervisors and puppetmasters. Excuse me, commanders. Both ‘firms’ are the real combat forces in the zone, which is divided fifty – fifty between them. The policy contained and counterbalanced? Or a game of cat and mice the price of a new war?

Deficiencies in Current Federal Approach to Chechnya

In the present climate of international action against global terrorism, it is easy to combine the comparatively limited efforts of the Chechen separatist with the Wahhabi camp, and to forget that in Chechen eyes: “*Three times over the last one hundred years or so Chechnya has been on the brink of physical destruction: in the period of colonisation, deportation and in the course of the last war with Russia*”.²⁶

It should also be borne in mind that it is not only people in the West who believe that every conceivable resource should have been used to terminate the conflict. Dmitriy Trenin made the following points:

*“Terrorism is only a method of conducting the struggle including the political. Defence against terrorism with the assistance of special forces is a tactical task. The strategic is the removal of conditions which cause it to arise. Not negotiations with Maskhadov, but a consultation of the influential parts of Chechen society on the methods to bring about the rehabilitation of the republic. Just simply transferring additional authority to Kadyrov and experiencing some ephemeral relief because it’s on his shoulders to sort this mess out, is, I think is shortsighted”.*²⁷

Trenin went on to advocate a concept along the lines of the Loya-Jirga in Afghanistan, comprising representatives of different clans. They have a collective responsibility and no money can be received unless a collective decision is achieved. There is much in this approach which is applicable to the traditional Chechen way of life.

An approach which builds on the reinforcement of the power of one man and his associates might conceivably be justified in dealing with the Wahhabi extremists in the short term. However, the problem with the present approach is that members of other clans will band together against the power of Kadyrov and his associates, which could lead to the development of a more pronounced and bitter civil war.

Escalation of Terrorist Campaign

Very little effective action seems to be devoted towards curtailing the increasing acts of terrorism stemming from Chechnya into other North Caucasus republics. Since the major bomb attack on the May anniversary in 2003 in Daghestan, there have been indicators of a renewed escalation of terrorist acts in the North Caucasus over and above the normal cycle of violence there, with a major attempt against economic targets in Daghestan and an assassination attempt against the President of Ingushetia.

One must be aware of the close connection between the North Caucasus mountains, the foothill areas and the hinterland further to the north. Invariably, Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts as well as the Republic of Kalmykia are regarded as having some connection with the Caucasus lower foothill area. Traditionally, the cities of Stavropol’, Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd and Astrakhan have beckoned people from the North Caucasus or moving to Central Asia and beyond.

Consideration must also be extended to the problems of border security between Georgia and the Russian Federation, particularly in relation to the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. The serious excursion in December 2003 by Gelayev’s separatist band in the vicinity of the Daghestani villages of Mokok and Shayri near the Georgian border also added weight to Moscow’s concerns with regard to the resident and transient population of Pankisi.²⁸

It can be argued that the Kremlin’s approach has left itself open to the serious charge of not controlling the situation. It must be particularly galling that Moscow seems to pay more attention to events in Georgia than to the situation in

Daghestan. As Ramazan Abdulatipov, an Avar, Chairman of the Peoples Assembly of Russia and member of the Federation Council remarked in December 2003:

*“I have been repeating for a decade: we are not in control of the situation in Chechnya which is explainable, but we claim to be in control of the situation surrounding Chechnya! In fact, the situation around Chechnya is no better than inside the republic. In some directions, including the Daghestani problem, the authorities are unaware of the actual situation”.*²⁹

Shamil' Abu-Idris (alias Shamil' Basayev) recently warned:

*“Praise to Allah, this year will be commemorated with the widening of the zone of combat operations and territories, where the Jihad will be conducted against the aggressor, and the creation of new military sectors. In particular, the Ingush sector, the Osetian sector, the Aukhovskiy sector [and] the Stavropol' sector have been formed and the Daghestan operational direction has also been activated.”*³⁰

All these 'sectors' have grievances of long standing which are ripe for exploitation by an outside party intent on fostering discord, instability and conflict.

Ingushetia

The dispute over Prigorodnyy rayon between the Ingush and North Osetians resulting from deportation of the Ingush in February 1944 and their return in 1957 is still ongoing. Despite the agreement of 11 October 2002, the process of reconciliation could be disrupted by the continued presence of some 70,000 Chechen refugees and President Kadyrov's designs on the “four Chechen rayony”³¹ which comprise Ingushetia.

A disturbing trend in the increasing talk from Grozny about forming a Vaynakh territory is the intemperate language from the Chechen side. Rizvan Kadyrov, another son of Akhmad Kadyrov,³² in a fit of temper said “*the best place for the Ingush is three metres under the ground*”.³³ He promised “*to speedily resolve all the problems with the Ingush when we win*” the then forthcoming Chechen presidential elections.³⁴ As one observer noted, “*Today Chechen fights with the Ingush are more [frequent] than weddings*”.³⁵

North Osetia & Stavropol' Kray

The return of Ingush families to Prigorodnyy rayon in 1957 still remains problematic, marked by outbreaks of violence between North Osetian and Ingush in 1958, 1970, 1972, 1980, 1992 and 1997.³⁶ Three more parties have an interest in the problem, namely the Russian government, the Terek-Sunzha Cossacks and of course the Chechen Republic.

However, over 11 years after the most serious outbreak of violence in October/November 1992, there are grounds for a degree of cautious optimism. On 11 October 2002 the presidents of Ingushetia and North Osetia, Murat Zyazikov and Alexander Dzasokhov in separate ceremonies in Magas and Vladikavkaz signed two documents to mark the beginning of a new stage in bilateral relations. Whilst meetings have taken place between the Presidents, animosity remains at the grass roots level, particularly from the Osetian side, and there is a danger that Wahhabism could fuel further tension.

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As in Pliyevo in Ingushetia, the mosque in the settlement of Mayskoye in Prigorodnyy rayon was closed for fear of increasing Wahhabi influence and the breakdown of law and order. Moreover, Mozdok is a key military base and will continue to be vulnerable to terrorist action. The vehicle bomb attack on the military hospital there on 3 August 2002 widened the scope of terrorist activity outside Chechnya, as indeed the bomb attack on the commuter train at Yessentuki in Stavropol' kray on 5 December 2003.

Mention must also be made of the tenuous position of the Terek Cossacks in Chechnya and in territory bordering Stavropol' kray: proud, former defenders of Russia are facing a decline in numbers, loss of influence and ongoing complicated relationships with Chechen and Ingush alike.³⁷ It is ironic that during the 19th Century the indigenous peoples were forced out of their lands by the tsarist land policy in favour of Cossacks, but now the situation is being reversed in Chechnya. Continued persecution of Cossacks has already provoked a mood of increased militancy amongst the Terek and the Kuban' Hosts.

Daghestan

Undoubtedly, in Novolakskiy rayon of Daghestan which was Aukhovskiy rayon of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR before 1944, "*the situation today ... remains complicated*".³⁸ Some 70,000 to 100,000 Chechen-Akkin wish to be part of Chechnya again, away from the manipulations of Daghestani Makhachkala and Khasavyurt. Moreover, with the continuing campaign of assassination against political leaders and heads of law enforcement organs in Daghestan, the concerns of the political elites are focussed only on elections and funerals.

Basayev's External Campaigns


Basayev considered the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre siege and hostage taking in October 2002 as one of his most successful operations. Possibly Basayev's hand can be seen behind the two explosions in North Osetia in 2003, the bombed bus transporting helicopter pilots and the heavy goods vehicle laden with explosive at the military hospital at Mozdok. Maybe as well, the female suicide bombers at the Tushino rock-festival and at Tverskaya street, the explosions at the National Hotel and the Metro were all part of his programme of terror against Russians in Moscow, both military and civilian.

The most recent reason given by Basayev for the upsurge in his "*Operation Boomerang*" and his activities against Russia was the assassination of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev allegedly by Russian agents in Doha, Qatar on 13 February 2004.

An example of the new focus is the recent bomb attacks against strategic economic targets in Daghestan on 2 April 2004.

Its vulnerability is obvious: "*The railway, the federal highway, the main electricity power lines, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, along which Azerbaijan oil flows to the Black Sea port, the gas pipeline Mozdok - Kazi-Magomed along which Russian gas goes to Azerbaijan*"³⁹ are all concentrated in parallel, and the railway station at Manas was used as one of the off-loading points in August 1999 for federal operations against Basayev and Khattab's 'invasion' of Daghestan.

Map 1 - Location of Strategic Targets Attacked by Terrorist Actions on 2 April 2004⁴⁰



The ability of saboteurs to show a greater sophistication in target selection with the aim of inflicting the maximum amount of economic damage on a combination of economic systems is a new departure. They previously sought arresting headlines based on sheer horror and terror. No doubt this could add to the concerns over the possibility of sabotage to the Main Export Pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and other strategic road and rail communication links in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Since January 2004 there has been an upsurge in sabotage attempts against pipelines in Russia, allegedly by Chechen extremists.

Whilst the general public receives regular reassurances from the power-wielding structures that the war is over in Chechnya, Colonel General Vladimir Kulakov, a member of the Federation Council, admitted on 16 January 2004 that regrettably terrorism was ahead of the power structures.⁴¹ *“It is evident that the authorities are unable to cope with the spread of radical Islamic ideology, the growth of terror in the region and neither are they in a position to prevent regular sorties by fighters a long way from the bounds of Chechnya.”*⁴²

The second example of an upsurge in terrorist violence and new-style target selection was the attempted assassination of Murat Zyazikov, President of Ingushetia and former FSB general, on the road between Nazran’ and Magas on 6 April 2004. President Zyazikov suffered only minor injuries thanks to the protection afforded by the armour plating of his Mercedes and the presence of mind

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of his driver. Shamil' Basayev claimed responsibility for the attempt as a result of Zyazikov's contribution to the genocide of the Chechen and Ingush nations.⁴³

"This assassination attempt again contradicts all the talk about 'stabilisation of the situation' in the North Caucasus. Besides, Chechnya has stopped being the single hot spot of tension in the South of Russia. The terror which recalls combat operations is spreading into neighbouring regions, threatening the security of the country as a whole".⁴⁴

With the bombing in Grozny these words have increased resonance.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 27 February 2004 and 28 February 2004, p10, "Oleg Orlov: *Shakhidok porodila vlast*" by Andrey Riskin.
- ² Jamestown Foundation, Vol 5, Issue 12, 24 March 2004, "New Prime Minister seen as no match for Kadyrov" by Lawrence Uzzell.
- ³ <http://vip.lenta.ru/fullstory/2004/05/10/kadirov>, "Na kogo on nas pokinul" by Yelena Lyubarskaya.
- ⁴ For details of these and other contenders see C W Blandy "Chechnya: Normalisation" P40, CSRC, June 2003, p61.
- ⁵ The Combined Operational Group of Federal Forces (OGV) consists of 46th MVD Brigade, MOD 42nd Motor Rifle Division and border service units situated in Chechnya on a permanent basis, in turn reinforced by the deployment of battalion groups from airborne formations such as 76 (Pskov) Airborne Division for operations in mountainous terrain, the Russo-Georgian border and Eastern Chechnya (Ichkeria), the GRU and FSB. In addition, Colonel General Baranov has the right to direct the activities of the Chechen militia through the subordination of the Chechen MVD to his Deputy Commander.
- ⁶ <http://www.politcom.ru/2004/gvozd359.php>, "Chechnya bez Vakhkhabitov i Russkikh" by Natal'ya Serova.
- ⁷ *NG Regiony*, 26 April 2002, p9.
- ⁸ <http://www.strana.ru/stories/02/12/30/3248/209496.html>, 9 March 2004, "Bez sdach" by Fedor Chekhoyev. Dzhabrail was killed in 2003 and awarded the Order of Hero of Russia posthumously.
- ⁹ Gennadiy Troshev "Moya Voyna", Moscow, Vagrius, 2002, p281.
- ¹⁰ See C W Blandy "The Minefield of Chechnya", CSRC, OB32, 7 December 1994, p2.
- ¹¹ Blandy "Chechnya: Normalisation", CSRC, P40, June 2003, p57.
- ¹² *Novaya Gazeta*, 25 August 2003, "Izбирatel'nyye urny stanut pogrebal'nyim" by Anna Politkovskaya.
- ¹³ *NG Regiony*, 26 April 2002, p9, "Cherno zoloto Akhmada-Khadzhi" by Andrey Riskin.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ *Gazeta*, 25 March 2004, p6. According to the FSB Chechen extremists usually receive money from the Islamic Brotherhood which maintains contact with other terrorist organisations such as Hamas whose annual turnover is US\$ 30 million. Al Haramein, a subdivision of the Islamic Brotherhood, also invests in extremism in the Caucasus. The FSB believe that when Khattab was alive the Chechen separatists were receiving between US \$200,000 and US\$ 1 million every month.
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- ¹⁸ <http://lenta.ru/vojna/2004/03/11/hambiev>, "Khambiyev sdalsya vlastyam pod ugrozoy raspravly s sem'ye".
- ¹⁹ *Zavtra*, January 2004, "Chechnya trevogi nashey" by Andrey Fefelov.
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- ³¹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 16 October 2003, p2. The four ‘Chechen rayony’ are Nazran’, Malgobek, Sunzha and Dzhayra.
- ³² The Jamestown Foundation, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 4, Issue 36, 9 October 2003, “*On the eve of the elections in Chechnya: An eyewitness account*” by Zaindi Choltaev, former deputy foreign minister of Chechnya’s separatist government “‘They’re Kadyrovtsy,’ said the driver of the old Volga, a woman with a baby on the back seat. He and many others expect only the worst from a future with Akhmad Kadyrov and his murderous and predatory sons.”
- ³³ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 16 October 2003, p2.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Charles Blandy, “*Prigorodnyy Rayon: The Continuing Dispute*”, CSRC, P26, September 1997, p12.
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Want to Know More ...?

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