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*Working Paper No. 89*

## **POLITICAL SOURCES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN AFRICA**

by Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel  
and Daniel N. Posner

**A comparative series of national public  
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**December 2007**

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## AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Editors: Michael Bratton, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and Robert Mattes

Managing Editor: Carolyn Logan

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## Political Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa\*

### *Abstract*

This paper draws on data from over 33,000 respondents in twenty-two surveys in ten African countries to investigate the political sources of ethnic identification in Africa. We find strong evidence that the strength of ethnic identities in Africa is shaped by political competition. In particular, we find that respondents are more likely to identify in ethnic terms the closer their country is to a competitive presidential election. Exposure to political competition, as well as non-traditional occupations, powerfully affects whether or not people identify themselves in ethnic terms. This finding is consistent with the view that ethnic identities in Africa are not “in the blood” but both malleable and subject to instrumental manipulation by politicians. Taken together the findings provide strong confirmation for what we term “second wave” modernization approaches to ethnicity, and for theories that link the salience of particular social identities to instrumental political mobilization. Beyond their relevance for these academic literatures, the paper’s results also have important implications for policymakers and researchers interested in ethnicity’s effects.

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\* Prepared for the conference on Micro-foundations of Mass Politics in Africa, Michigan State University, 12-13 May 2007. This paper builds on earlier work co-authored with Alicia Bannon. The authors thank members of the Working Group in African Political Economy, seminar participants at the Leitner Political Economy Seminar at Yale University; and the editors of the Afrobarometer Working Paper Series for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

## INTRODUCTION

The instrumental use of ethnic appeals by politicians and the consequent mobilization of populations along ethnic lines are well documented, both in Africa (Bates 1983; Ferree 2006; Posner 2005; Young 1965, 1976) and elsewhere (Gagnon 2004; Horowitz 1985; Mendelberg 2001; Wilkinson 2004).

Politicians want to acquire political power and they know that “playing the ethnic card”—couching their electoral appeals in terms of the need for their ethnic community stick together to safeguard its interests—can help them mobilize the electoral support they need to win, and retain, office.

One well-worn method of studying this phenomenon is to document the appeals that politicians make. Another is to trace the effects of these appeals on the outcomes that they were designed to shape, such as voting patterns, protests, or political violence. A third approach—which we adopt in this paper—is to explore the effects that politicians’ ethnic appeals have on the degree to which the voters at whom the appeals are directed identify in ethnic terms. Innate attachments to culture and language, socioeconomic characteristics and other contextual factors will also affect patterns of self-identification. But to the extent that politicians’ ethnic appeals resonate with voters, we should be able to attribute at least part of the importance that voters attach to their ethnic identities to these mobilizing efforts.

In adopting this approach, we take advantage of two clear implications of the political logic of ethnic mobilization. First, politicians are more likely to mobilize voters at election time. Thus to the extent that they use ethnic appeals as part of their efforts, and to the extent that these appeals resonate with voters, we would expect voters’ ethnic attachments to be stronger during the periods preceding and following national elections than at other times. Second, since the whole purpose of “playing the ethnic card” is to secure a marginal advantage in the competition for office, politicians are more likely to choose to make ethnic appeals, or to make them more strongly, when the election is close. This logic is reinforced by the fact that governing is more difficult in a context of deep ethnic divisions, so politicians who can be confident that they are going to win the election will find it disadvantageous to make ethnically polarizing appeals. Ethnic mobilization could also be costly both in terms of finances, effort and time, so politicians would only engage in these activities when there is a clear electoral payoff, and this is most likely during close elections. We would therefore expect ethnic attachments among voters to be strongest not just when elections are proximate but also when they are close.

We test these expectations using survey data from the Afrobarometer on the primary social identity of more than 33,000 respondents in twenty-two survey rounds across ten African countries. We find strong and robust evidence that the strength of ethnic identification is indeed related to how close in time the survey was to a presidential election and to whether or not this election was closely contested. Specifically, we find that the likelihood that a survey respondent will identify him or herself in ethnic terms falls by nearly 2 percentage points with every month further distant the survey was from the most proximate presidential election. We also find that this effect is conditional on the margin of victory between the election’s winner and his closest challenger. When the margin of victory is very small (near zero), the full 2 percentage point per month effect of electoral proximity is felt. But when the margin of victory grows, the impact of electoral proximity diminishes, reaching zero in landslide elections where the margin of victory exceeds roughly 50 percentage points. These are exactly the patterns we would expect to observe if politicians mobilize voters along ethnic lines at election time and if the importance that voters attach to their ethnic identities is affected by these mobilization efforts. Our results thus offer strong empirical evidence for the political sources of ethnic identification.

Apart from its empirical findings, the paper also makes two important methodological contributions. First, in keeping with the growing literature on the multidimensional nature of social identities (Chandra 2006; Hobsbawm 1996; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999; Young 1976) we define our main dependent variable not just in terms of whether respondents identify themselves in ethnic terms but in terms of the group they feel they belong to first and foremost from among four main

categories of social identity: ethnic, religious, class/occupational, and gender.<sup>1</sup> Then, in analyzing the impact of electoral proximity and competitiveness, we employ a multinomial discrete choice (logit) framework that permits us to generate estimates of the effects of these political factors on all four categories of social identification. Thus while our main interest is in the political sources of *ethnic* identification, the empirical methodology we adopt permits us to make inferences about the impact of political competition on other kinds of social identification as well, and about the kinds of identities that voters *switch out of* when, in response to politicians' ethnic appeals, their attachments to their ethnic groups move to the forefront of their identity repertoires. The empirical techniques that we adopt represent the first attempt (of which we are aware) to operationalize social identification and to generate estimates of the factors associated with their salience that fully embraces the multidimensional nature of social identity.

A second methodological contribution is our use of repeated country-level observations with micro-individual survey data. One of the difficulties with isolating the political sources of ethnic identification is that the importance that an individual attaches to his or her ethnicity may be affected by a great many factors, including both individual-level characteristics (for example, gender, age, urban/rural location, education, or occupation) and characteristics of the broader political and social environment in which he or she lives. For example, it is commonly argued that the weakness of ethnic identity in Tanzania is due to the leadership and nation-building efforts of its founding president, Julius Nyerere (Miguel 2004). It has also been suggested that the salience of ethnic divisions in a country will depend on the relative sizes of ethnic and other identity groups and the incentives this generates for individuals to embrace ethnic (or other) group memberships as a means of securing admission into advantageous political coalitions (Posner 2005). Other factors such as a country's level of economic development (Bates 1983; Melson and Wolpe 1970), its electoral institutions (Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002), its history of communal violence, its ethnic diversity (Collier 2001; Bates 2000), its colonial heritage (Laitin 1986) have also been argued to affect the importance that citizens will attach to their ethnic identities.<sup>2</sup> While it is fairly straightforward to control for many of these individual- and country-level factors, others are either very difficult to operationalize and/or code (for example, "leadership" or the size of a respondent's ethnic group vis-à-vis the sizes of all other groups in the political arena) or are collinear with the country-level political factors whose impact on ethnic identification we seek to estimate.<sup>3</sup> A major advantage of the data we employ is that it has been collected not just across multiple countries but at multiple points in time for the same countries. This permits us to employ country fixed effects that control for country-level features—including unobservable characteristics that we cannot measure—and to focus our attention on the factors, such as the proximity of the survey to the nearest presidential election and the margin of victory in that contest, that vary within a country across survey rounds.<sup>4</sup>

## Data and Methodology

### Data

To investigate the political sources of ethnic identification in Africa, we employ data collected in rounds 1, 1.5 and 2 of the Afrobarometer, a multi-country survey project that employs standardized

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<sup>1</sup> The estimations also include a residual category for "other," which includes the roughly 12 percent of responses that do not fit into these four named categories.

<sup>2</sup> For a test of the impact of several of these factors on ethnic identifications, see Bossuroy (2007) and Miguel and Posner (2006).

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of these econometric identification concerns in cross-country regressions, see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).

<sup>4</sup> It also means that we were forced to limit our analysis to countries for which we have more than one survey round, which led us to exclude five surveys that were available. However, the loss of data is more than compensated by the fact that framework we adopt is, for the reasons we explain, the most suitable for our purposes. Unfortunately, the key question from which we construct our dependent variable was dropped in round 3 of the Afrobarometer, so we cannot take advantage of data from that survey round to bring additional countries into the analysis.

questionnaires to probe citizens' attitudes in new African democracies. The surveys we employ were administered between 1999 and 2004. Nationally representative samples were drawn through a multi-stage stratified, clustered sampling procedure, with sample sizes sufficient to yield a margin of sampling error of  $\pm 3$  percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.<sup>5</sup> Our data consist of 33,906 responses from 22 separate survey rounds conducted in ten countries: Botswana, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As noted, we limit our analysis to countries for which more than one survey round is available.

The main dependent variable we employ comes from a standard question designed to gauge the salience for respondents of different group identifications. The question is worded as follows:

We have spoken to many [people in this country, country X] and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being [a citizen of X], which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?

As noted, a major advantage of the way this question was constructed is that it permits us to take seriously the idea that individuals possess repertoires of identities, and to isolate the factors that are associated with attachments to different dimensions of social identity. We group respondents' answers to the "which group do you feel you belong to first and foremost" question into five categories: ethnic, religion, class/occupation, gender, and other.

Before turning to the findings, several qualifications of the analysis bear mention. First, as we have stressed, the salience of any social identification—be it ethnic or otherwise—is necessarily context specific, and the Afrobarometer data only permits us to ascertain the way respondents identified themselves in the specific context in which they were surveyed. Our task is to use what we know about that context—in particular, when the survey was administered, but also the characteristics of the enumerator and the nature of the interview itself, for which we control—to make inferences about the factors that determine when ethnic group memberships become most salient. The context-specificity of respondents' answers is not something we ignore, but is central to the project design.<sup>6</sup>

Second, quite apart from the issue of the reliability of responses across contexts, the use of self-reported identities introduces the possibility of bias. Respondents in societies where the social norm is not to talk openly about ethnicity might be less likely to confess that their most important social affiliation is with their ethnic community, and this would generate a downward bias in measured ethnic salience in that society. This may be particularly likely in a context where open confessions of ethnic solidarity are frowned upon by the regime and/or where survey enumerators are suspected of being affiliated with the government. While this concern cannot be ruled out, it is dampened by the way the Afrobarometer survey was conducted—confidentially and in private by enumerators who are not affiliated with the government or any political party. Also, and quite importantly, the Afrobarometer survey is not primarily about ethnicity or social identity. The question we use to construct our measure of ethnic salience is just one out of more than 175 questions asked in the standard Afrobarometer questionnaire, only a handful of

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<sup>5</sup> Further details of the Afrobarometer project, including the sampling procedures used in collecting the data, are described in Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2004).

<sup>6</sup> While the country fixed-effect framework we adopt automatically controls for many aspects of context, there are some for which we cannot control: for example, the proximity of the survey interview to religious festivals, harvest times, and other events that might cause some identities to become momentarily more salient. In any case, such idiosyncratic situational factors should make it harder for us to find statistically significant relationships, and would only introduce bias into our estimated effects if the timing of these other factors was systematically correlated with proximity to and competitiveness of elections.

which make any mention of ethnicity or social identity. Respondents are thus likely to have treated the “with which group do you identify” question as a background query rather than as the central issue around which the survey revolved—indeed, questions about ethnic background, religious group membership, and language use are standard background questions included in most surveys conducted in Africa. We therefore expect that respondents were probably less guarded in their responses about their ethnic identities than might otherwise have been the case. In addition, to the extent that social norms against confessing the strength of one’s ethnic identification vary by country, the country fixed-effect framework that we adopt in our estimations should control for these differences.

Two additional concerns stem from the way the survey question was structured. A first issue is that the question explicitly bars respondents from describing themselves in terms of nationality: it asks “*besides being [your nationality (e.g., Namibian, Zambian, etc.)], which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?*” We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that respondents might consider national identity as more important to them than all of the identity categories recorded in our data. A second issue is that the question provides information about the salience of the reported group membership in relative, not absolute, terms. All we are able to infer from respondents’ answers is the identity that they rank first among those identity categories explicitly mentioned in the survey question. We have no way of knowing how much importance respondents attach to their first- (or second- or third-) ranked group memberships. Thus to conclude on the basis of our data that ethnicity is more salient in country A than country B because a larger share of survey respondents in country A ranked ethnicity first is not quite right. It is conceivable, though we think unlikely, that ethnicity might be more salient in absolute terms to people in country B, even though a larger share of them rank some other category of identity as even more important than ethnicity.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, legitimate concerns can be raised about the generalizability of our findings. Although broadly representative of Africa as a whole, the ten countries included in our study are not a substitute for a continent-wide sample. Our sample includes just one Francophone country (Mali), no countries that have failed to introduce at least some democratic or market reforms over the last decade (a precondition for a Afrobarometer survey), and, with the exception of Uganda, no countries involved in civil wars at the time the survey data was collected. As Table 1 indicates, per capita income in the ten countries is about 75% higher than the African average (though this is mainly driven by the southern African cases of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa—the other seven countries are actually poorer than the Sub-Saharan Africa average). Along the same lines, rates of under-5 child mortality in our sample are slightly lower than in Africa as a whole. Rates of urbanization are roughly comparable to the regional average. But citizens in the ten sample countries enjoy slightly more extensive political rights than the average African country (note that on the Freedom House scale, which runs from 1 to 7, lower numbers indicate greater rights). Our findings therefore must be interpreted with the caveat that they may not be entirely representative of Africa as a whole.

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<sup>7</sup> We return to the econometric implications of this issue below.



**Table 1.** Economic and Political Characteristics of Sample Countries

| Country and survey round         | Economic characteristics    |                   |         | Political characteristics |                     |                  |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|---------|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                                  | Per capita income, \$ (PPP) | Under-5 mortality | % Urban | Political Rights          | Electoral Proximity | Electoral Margin |
| Botswana, 1999                   | 7,122                       | 101               | 52      | 2                         | -1                  | 0.30             |
| Botswana, 2003                   | 8,725                       | 116               | 56      | 2                         | 16                  | 0.26             |
| Malawi, 1999                     | 594                         | 188               | 15      | 3                         | -5                  | 0.07             |
| Malawi, 2003                     | 569                         | 175               | 16      | 3                         | 12.5                | 0.09             |
| Mali, 2001                       | 894                         | 224               | 27      | 2                         | 15.5                | 0.07             |
| Mali, 2002                       | 913                         | 224               | 28      | 2                         | -6.5                | 0.07             |
| Namibia, 1999                    | 6,074                       | 69                | 32      | 2                         | -2                  | 0.66             |
| Namibia, 2002                    | 6,389                       | 65                | 33      | 2                         | -28                 | 0.66             |
| Namibia, 2003                    | 6,274                       | 64                | 34      | 2                         | 14.5                | 0.69             |
| Nigeria, 2000                    | 882                         | 207               | 44      | 4                         | -11                 | 0.26             |
| Nigeria, 2001                    | 875                         | 205               | 45      | 4                         | 19.5                | 0.30             |
| Nigeria, 2003                    | 1,000                       | 199               | 46      | 4                         | -6                  | 0.30             |
| South Africa, 2000               | 9,488                       | 63                | 57      | 1                         | -13.5               | 0.57             |
| South Africa, 2002               | 9,819                       | 65                | 58      | 1                         | 18.5                | 0.57             |
| Tanzania, 2001                   | 541                         | 137               | 22      | 4                         | -5                  | 0.55             |
| Tanzania, 2003                   | 593                         | 129               | 23      | 4                         | 29                  | 0.69             |
| Uganda, 2000                     | 1,249                       | 145               | 12      | 6                         | 9.5                 | 0.42             |
| Uganda, 2002                     | 1,301                       | 141               | 12      | 6                         | -18.5               | 0.42             |
| Zambia, 1999                     | 764                         | 182               | 35      | 5                         | 25                  | 0.02             |
| Zambia, 2003                     | 823                         | 182               | 35      | 5                         | -16.5               | 0.02             |
| Zimbabwe, 1999                   | 2,759                       | 117               | 35      | 6                         | 8.5                 | 0.02             |
| Zimbabwe, 2004                   | 1,832                       | 129               | 36      | 7                         | -26                 | 0.14             |
| <i>Average, sample countries</i> | 3,185                       | 142               | 34      | 3.5                       | 14.1*               | 0.32             |
| <i>Average, SSA (2004)</i>       | 1,803                       | 168               | 35      | 4.3                       | *                   | 0.34             |

*Notes:* Political rights from Freedom House. Electoral proximity is months to the nearest national election, with negative numbers signaling that nearest election is in the past. Electoral margin is defined as the gap between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up in the most recent presidential election; if no presidential elections within five years (e.g. if president is elected by the legislature), then most recent legislative election used.

\*Average electoral proximity for Afrobarometer countries corresponds to the average of the absolute values. Average for SSA is not meaningful as not all countries are not electoral democracies.

This caveat notwithstanding, the measure of ethnic salience adopted in this paper represents an advance over those employed in earlier studies, almost none of which measure ethnic salience directly.<sup>8</sup> Most studies that deal with this issue rely on inferences based on the presumed effects of ethnic salience. In effect, they reason that, because there is ethnic violence in the country in question or because voting patterns or the distribution of patronage appears to follow ethnic lines, ethnicity must be a salient motivating factor in people's behavior. Others rely on assumptions about what the diversity of ethnic groups in a country implies about the salience of ethnicity in the country's politics—a relationship for which we find no empirical support in our data (regression not shown). Neither approach is as defensible as the one pursued here, which bases its assessment of ethnic salience on the self-reported identities of individuals as collected in nationally representative sample surveys. Also, as noted, no study of which we are aware has treated the salience of ethnicity within a framework that permits the simultaneous treatment

<sup>8</sup> Bossuoy (2007) and Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2004), who also use Afrobarometer data and adopt a methodology similar to our own, are exceptions.

of the salience of other dimensions of social identity as well, or estimates the substitution patterns across these identities.

### **Empirical Methodology**

Our main dependent variable—based on the “with which group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?” question—permitted multiple responses. This makes it a natural fit for a multinomial discrete choice empirical framework. To model respondents’ answers, we conceive of individuals as having multiple dimensions  $j \in J$  to their identities, where in practice the set  $J$  includes ethnic, religious, occupation/class-based, and gender identities, as well as other less common identities (e.g., senior citizen). Each individual respondent  $i$  living in country  $c$  taking part in survey round  $t$  attaches a value (or “salience”)  $V_{jict}$  to each identity dimension  $j$ . Thus respondents who attach high salience to their ethnic identity have large values of  $V_{\text{Ethnic},ict}$ ; those who attach low salience to their gender identity have small values of  $V_{\text{Gender},ict}$ ; and so on. When asked to report the group that they feel they belong to first and foremost, respondents choose the identity dimension  $j$  with the largest value:

$$[1] \quad \text{Identity}_{ict} = \{j : V_{jict} \geq V_{kict} \forall k \neq j\}$$

Using this framework, we can examine empirically the extent to which the identity functions  $V_{jict}$  are systematically related to the observable characteristics of individuals and their countries’ political environments. We also allow individuals to be heterogeneous in their social identity valuations for unobservable reasons. Combining observable and unobservable heterogeneity, we express the strength of social identity category  $j$  for individual  $i$  in country  $c$  during survey round  $t$  as:

$$[2] \quad V_{jict} = \mathbf{Z}_{ct}'\boldsymbol{\gamma}_j + \mathbf{X}_{ict}'\boldsymbol{\beta}_j + \mu_{jict}$$

where the vector  $\mathbf{X}_{ict}$  contains individual-level variables including gender, age, education, occupation and socioeconomic status; the vector  $\mathbf{Z}_{ct}$  contains country-level factors; and  $\mu_{jict}$  is individual  $i$ ’s idiosyncratic level of attachment to social identity  $j$ —that is, the part of  $V_{jict}$  that is unrelated to observables. The coefficients  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$  and  $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_j$  have subscripts to reflect the possibility that the impact of each parameter varies with identity type.<sup>9</sup>

Our particular focus is on the proximity in months between a presidential election in country  $c$  and administration of survey round  $t$ , in absolute values ( $\text{proximity}_{ct}$ ), as well as on the competitiveness of the same election as measured in the vote share margin between the winner and the runner-up ( $\text{margin}_{ct}$ ). This is represented as  $\mathbf{Z}_{ct}'\boldsymbol{\gamma}_j = \gamma_{1j}\text{proximity}_{ct} + \gamma_{2j}\text{margin}_{ct} + \gamma_{3j}(\text{proximity}_{ct} \times \text{margin}_{ct})$ . Thus the hypothesized change in the strength of social identity patterns as elections draw nearer is allowed to depend on the competitiveness of those elections.<sup>10</sup> The assumption that  $\mu_{jict}$  has an i.i.d. extreme value (Type 1) distribution generates a standard multinomial logit model for the choice of social identity in the key survey question.<sup>11</sup> This model can be estimated under the usual assumption that  $E[\mu_{jict} | \mathbf{X}_{ict}, \mathbf{Z}_{ct}] = 0 \forall j$ .<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> To give an example, if university education *univ* strengthens class/occupational identity more than it strengthens ethnic identity, then the coefficient on *univ* in  $V_{\text{Occup},ict}$  is larger than the coefficient on *univ* in the equation for  $V_{\text{Ethnic},ict}$ .

<sup>10</sup> In particular,  $\partial V_{jict} / \partial \text{proximity}_{ct} = \gamma_{1j} + \gamma_{3j}\text{margin}_{ct}$  and  $\partial V_{jict} / \partial \text{margin}_{ct} = \gamma_{2j} + \gamma_{3j}\text{proximity}_{ct}$ .

<sup>11</sup> See Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion of the multinomial logit model. The STATA command for multinomial logit is *mlogit*.

<sup>12</sup> This assumption is potentially problematic for country-level political variables  $\mathbf{Z}_{jc}$  if there are omitted variables (for example, unobserved country characteristics) that are correlated with both political characteristics and individuals’ identity choices. This is particularly worrisome if the unobserved characteristics are correlated with either (or both) of our key independent variables, electoral margin and proximity to elections. In such a situation,

Two important aspects of our econometric specification bear mention. First, the multinomial logit model cannot estimate the level of the coefficients  $\gamma_j$  directly because, as noted above, the choices we observe only contain information about *relative* preferences. We therefore cannot distinguish absolute effects on the level of the identity strengths  $V_{jict}$ , only the degree to which explanatory variables make a respondent more or less likely to say that identity  $j$  is the one that they feel they belong to “first and foremost.” The logit model identifies coefficients of the form  $\gamma_j - \gamma_k$ , or effects on identity  $j$  relative to a reference identity  $k$ . From these coefficients we can calculate our quantities of interest, which are the partial derivatives with respect to the explanatory variables of the probabilities of choosing each dimension of social identity.<sup>13</sup> These marginal effects are the results we report in Table 3 below.

Second, the probabilities that particular social identities are chosen are not independent of one another. As the probability rises that a particular social identity is chosen, the probability of others being chosen necessarily falls since only one identity can be chosen. As we have stressed, a major advantage of our multinomial approach is that, if the salience of one dimension of social identification increases in response to a particular explanatory variable, we can simultaneously estimate which identity dimensions are becoming less salient. That is, our method estimates substitution patterns among social identities in response to changes in the characteristics of individuals and in their political environment.

### **The Salience of Ethnic (and Other) Identities**

Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of responses to the “which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost” question for all twenty-two survey rounds in our sample. Contrary to the stereotype that Africans are intrinsically “ethnic” people, a minority of 31 percent of the respondents identify themselves first and foremost in ethnic terms.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, fewer respondents choose “ethnic” identities than “class/occupation” identities, which are chosen by 36 percent of respondents. In addition, responses vary tremendously across countries and, perhaps even more strikingly, within countries over time. The variation we observe across countries confirms the necessity of adopting an estimation framework that controls for country specific effects. The variation within countries over time, however, is a potential cause for worry: our empirical strategy depends on our ability to attribute within-country variation to changes in the proximity and competitiveness of elections, which requires that we be able to rule out alternative sources of variation within countries across survey rounds which is correlated with variation in the electoral variables.

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the estimated  $\gamma_j$  coefficients will be biased. However, our use of country fixed effects allows us to, at least partly, solve this problem for time-invariant country characteristics.

<sup>13</sup> The STATA command to calculate these marginal effects is *mfx*.

<sup>14</sup> Note that the “average” row weights each survey round equally, so that respondents from countries with larger sample sizes are weighted less. The raw (unweighted) share of respondents identifying in ethnic terms is 29.2 percent and the share when weighting each survey round by country population is 26.7 percent.

**Table 2.** Social Identities Ranked “First and Foremost” in the 22 Survey Rounds

| <i>Country and survey round</i> | <i>Ethnic</i> | <i>Religion</i> | <i>Occupation</i> | <i>Gender</i> | <i>Other</i> | <i>No Answer</i> |
|---------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|--------------|------------------|
| Botswana, 1999                  | 0.44          | 0.05            | 0.09              | 0.00          | 0.35         | 0.07             |
| Botswana, 2003                  | 0.28          | 0.08            | 0.12              | 0.02          | 0.45         | 0.06             |
| Malawi, 1999                    | 0.37          | 0.24            | 0.25              | 0.00          | 0.07         | 0.08             |
| Malawi, 2003                    | 0.20          | 0.08            | 0.58              | 0.04          | 0.08         | 0.02             |
| Mali, 2001                      | 0.40          | 0.23            | 0.23              | 0.04          | 0.11         | 0.00             |
| Mali, 2002                      | 0.37          | 0.24            | 0.36              | 0.03          | 0.01         | 0.00             |
| Namibia, 1999                   | 0.52          | 0.05            | 0.32              | 0.00          | 0.01         | 0.10             |
| Namibia, 2002                   | 0.62          | 0.06            | 0.17              | 0.02          | 0.09         | 0.04             |
| Namibia, 2003                   | 0.25          | 0.03            | 0.24              | 0.29          | 0.17         | 0.03             |
| Nigeria, 2000                   | 0.48          | 0.21            | 0.29              | 0.00          | 0.02         | 0.00             |
| Nigeria, 2001                   | 0.31          | 0.21            | 0.41              | 0.04          | 0.03         | 0.00             |
| Nigeria, 2003                   | 0.49          | 0.19            | 0.20              | 0.03          | 0.07         | 0.01             |
| South Africa, 2000              | 0.42          | 0.18            | 0.15              | 0.00          | 0.24         | 0.02             |
| South Africa, 2002              | 0.22          | 0.06            | 0.42              | 0.05          | 0.23         | 0.01             |
| Tanzania, 2001                  | 0.03          | 0.05            | 0.79              | 0.09          | 0.04         | 0.00             |
| Tanzania, 2003                  | 0.17          | 0.07            | 0.38              | 0.02          | 0.27         | 0.08             |
| Uganda, 2000                    | 0.13          | 0.09            | 0.66              | 0.06          | 0.05         | 0.01             |
| Uganda, 2002                    | 0.18          | 0.08            | 0.59              | 0.06          | 0.07         | 0.01             |
| Zambia, 1999                    | 0.12          | 0.34            | 0.46              | 0.00          | 0.04         | 0.04             |
| Zambia, 2003                    | 0.11          | 0.18            | 0.44              | 0.02          | 0.04         | 0.23             |
| Zimbabwe, 1999                  | 0.47          | 0.08            | 0.37              | 0.00          | 0.06         | 0.02             |
| Zimbabwe, 2004                  | 0.19          | 0.20            | 0.29              | 0.12          | 0.25         | 0.02             |
| <i>Average</i>                  | <i>0.31</i>   | <i>0.14</i>     | <i>0.36</i>       | <i>0.04</i>   | <i>0.12</i>  | <i>0.04</i>      |

Since the surveys are repeated cross-sections rather than panels of individuals, we cannot reject completely the possibility that sampling variation is behind some of the changes that we observe within countries across survey rounds. However, since the same sampling methodology was employed in all survey rounds, and given the large, nationally representative sample of individuals included in each survey, we can be fairly certain that sampling variation is not primarily behind these shifts. Another concern is that changes in survey implementation—for example, modifications in enumerator training and/or the protocols used for the post-coding of data—might have generated changes in reported levels of ethnic (and other kinds of) identification across survey rounds. Yet another concern is that changes in the timing of the surveys (born from what appears to have been a conscious decision by Afrobarometer organizers after round 1 not to schedule surveys right near election time) might have combined with secular changes in the salience of particular social identities to produce a spurious correlation between electoral proximity and ethnic identity salience. We attempt to deal with these issues in the regressions by always including fixed effects for each survey round (1, 1.5, 2) as well as a linear time trend.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Political Sources of Ethnic Identity**

The multinomial logit regression allows us to characterize the relationship between political variables and the strength of ethnic, religious, occupational/class, and gender identification. The estimated marginal effects and standard errors in Table 3a are all from a single multinomial logit model, which jointly

<sup>15</sup> In Botswana and Zimbabwe, the electoral proximity variable is calculated in terms of the number of months before/after the most proximate *parliamentary* election. In the case of Botswana this is because the country does not hold presidential contests; in the case of Zimbabwe it is because presidential and parliamentary elections are not held concurrently, and the most proximate national election to the Afrobarometer survey we use was the parliamentary contest of June 2000.

estimates these effects. This specification focuses on the country-level variables while the next table (Table 3b) adds detailed individual-level controls. In all specifications, we include country fixed-effects, cluster regression disturbance terms at the country level, and weight each observation by 1/(number of observations from that country) in order to weight each country survey round equally. All results also include controls for the characteristics of the interviews and enumerators, as well as the survey round controls and time trend discussed above.<sup>16</sup> Descriptive statistics are provided in appendix Table 1.

**Table 3a.** Multinomial Logit Models with National Political Variables

| Variable category                               | Variable         | Ethnicity                         | Religion                          | Occupation & Class                | Gender                           | Other                             |
|---|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| National politics                               | Proximity        | <b>-0.019</b><br>( <b>0.004</b> ) | 0.001<br>(0.003)                  | 0.010<br>(0.007)                  | 0.002<br>(0.002)                 | <b>0.006</b><br>( <b>0.003</b> )  |
|   | Margin           | 0.831<br>(0.881)                  | <b>2.199</b><br>( <b>0.597</b> )  | <b>-2.726</b><br>( <b>1.446</b> ) | -0.353<br>(0.256)                | 0.049<br>(0.695)                  |
|   | Proximity*Margin | <b>0.041</b><br>( <b>0.010</b> )  | -0.014<br>(0.008)                 | <b>-0.030</b><br>( <b>0.009</b> ) | -0.004<br>(0.003)                | 0.006<br>(0.006)                  |
|   | Trend            | -0.027<br>(0.019)                 | <b>-0.042</b><br>( <b>0.012</b> ) | 0.021<br>(0.039)                  | <b>0.025</b><br>( <b>0.005</b> ) | 0.023<br>(0.017)                  |
| Time controls                                   | Round 1.5        | <b>-0.135</b><br>( <b>0.049</b> ) | 0.021<br>(0.053)                  | <b>0.201</b><br>( <b>0.097</b> )  | 0.015<br>(0.017)                 | <b>-0.103</b><br>( <b>0.009</b> ) |
|   | Round 2          | -0.053<br>(0.067)                 | 0.070<br>(0.042)                  | 0.105<br>(0.136)                  | -0.024<br>(0.023)                | -0.098<br>(0.059)                 |
| Predicted identity share                        |                  | 0.30                              | 0.15                              | 0.42                              | 0.02                             | 0.11                              |
| Country fixed effects                           |                  |                                   |                                   | yes                               |                                  |                                   |
| Observations                                    |                  |                                   |                                   | 33906                             |                                  |                                   |
| R <sup>2</sup>                                  |                  |                                   |                                   | 0.11                              |                                  |                                   |
| Wald statistic for national political variables |                  |                                   |                                   | 166                               |                                  |                                   |

*Notes:* Coefficients reported are marginal effects. Standard errors in (parentheses). Statistical significance at the 5% level or better indicated by bolding.

There is a strong negative relationship between the proximity (in months, absolute value) between the Afrobarometer survey administration and the country's closest presidential election: the marginal effect is -0.019 (standard error 0.004, statistically significant at over 99% confidence). The interpretation of this coefficient is that the likelihood that the ethnic dimension of identity is most salient falls by nearly 2 percentage points for each month farther away from an election that the survey is administered, a large effect.

Reading across this first row of the table allows us to discover which identity dimensions lose salience closer to elections. More than half of the increased ethnic salience effect comes from substitution away from occupation and class identities (point estimate 0.010), although the effect is not statistically

<sup>16</sup> In our robustness checks we also use controls for interview characteristics based on data collected in the Afrobarometer surveys on whether people other than the respondent were present, whether the respondent consulted other people while answering, whether other people influenced the respondent's answers, and whether the respondent seemed engaged, at ease, suspicious, or threatening, and so on. Controls for enumerator characteristics are based on demographic information on the enumerator carrying out each interview, including age, gender, urban-rural background, and education. These sets of variables can be thought of as data quality controls. The vast majority of these controls have little predictive power, which reassures us about the aspect of data quality related to consistent survey administration.

significant at traditional confidence levels. Effects for religious and gender identity go in the same direction (substitutes for ethnic identity) but the effects are much smaller in magnitude.

In terms of electoral margin effects, the estimated effect of ethnicity is positive although not close to statistically significant (point estimate 0.831, standard error 0.881). However, the interaction between the proximity and margin terms is positive and strongly statistically significant at over 99% confidence, 0.041 (standard error 0.010). The interpretation of a positive coefficient estimate here is that a smaller electoral margin (closer to zero) nearer in time to an election (a drop in the proximity variable) together produce stronger ethnic identification. The magnitude is quite large taking into account the coefficient estimates for these three terms (proximity, margin, and proximity  $\times$  margin) jointly.<sup>17</sup> For example, for a very close election (margin=0), the effect of one month closer proximity to an election on ethnic identification is 1.9 percentage points. This effect falls as the electoral margin grows, dropping all the way down to zero for landslide elections with a margin between the winner and runner-up of roughly 50 percentage points.

The identity dimension that substitutes most clearly for ethnicity is once again occupation and class: the point estimate on the proximity  $\times$  margin term for occupation and class is -0.030 (standard error 0.009, significant at over 99% confidence), which can account for roughly three quarters of the positive effect on the ethnicity dimension. The remaining substitution away from ethnicity appears to be accounted for by religious identity, although this effect is not statistically significant.<sup>18</sup>

The survey round effects and time trend also come through as statistically significant for several identity dimensions, suggesting either the existence of actual underlying social identity time trends in the sample, or systematic changes in the way the key Afrobarometer question was asked across survey rounds.


The main results are presented graphically in Figure 1, where the proximity to the closest country election is presented on the x-axis (de-measured by country, which is equivalent to our standard country fixed effects regression specification), and the extent of ethnic identification is on the y-axis (also de-measured by country). Two plots are presented: one pattern for relatively competitive elections (cases where the electoral margin is less than the sample median), and one for landslide elections (when the margin is greater than the median). The relationships come through clearly: the plot is strongly negative for competitive elections – meaning that ethnic identification falls sharply when surveys are conducted farther away in time from competitive elections – but is nearly flat for landslide elections where the returns to politicians of “playing the ethnic card” are lower.

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of interpreting interaction terms, see Braumoeller (2004).

<sup>18</sup> We cannot readily explain the positive and statistically significant point estimate on the margin variable for religious identity. Religious identities would appear to be driven by a set of factors that lie outside our present explanatory framework, and would be a useful area for future research.

**Figure 1.** Ethnic identification and electoral proximity, by competitiveness of national elections



Note: competitive election here as defined as electoral margin < 29.5%, the median in our sample

This basic finding is also robust to an alternative methodology, using a linear seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) specification with data aggregated to the country-round level and the dependent variables as the percent of individuals choosing each identity (see appendix Table 2). This method also allows the error terms across dependent variables (the different identity dimensions) to be correlated in arbitrary ways. For the ethnic identity dimension, the point estimate on proximity is similar at -0.015 (standard error 0.008), as is the proximity  $\times$  margin coefficient (0.036, standard error 0.015). Importantly given the relatively small number of countries in the analysis, our main results are robust to the exclusion of the country population weights, to replicating the analysis using an alternative definition of ethnicity and to dropping countries one at a time (regressions not shown).<sup>19</sup>

The empirical results are also robust to the inclusion of a wide range of individual characteristics as regression controls (Table 3b). Even in the presence of controls for gender, age, urban/rural location, education level, and occupation, the coefficient estimates on the proximity, margin, and proximity  $\times$  margin terms are nearly unchanged from Table 3a, and levels of statistical significance are generally even higher, since the inclusion of additional regression controls improves statistical precision, reducing standard errors.

<sup>19</sup> The main specification defines ethnic identities as tribe or language. The alternative definition also includes such non-tribal and non-linguistic identities as race in the former settler colonies of Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; region in Malawi and Nigeria; and religion in Nigeria. The robustness of our results to dropping countries one at a time is particularly important given reported problems with a handful of the Afrobarometer survey rounds (e.g., Zimbabwe 2004).

**Table 3b. Multinomial Logit Models with All Covariates**

| Variable category                               | Variable             | Ethnicity                          | Religion                          | Occupation & Class                  | Gender                            | Other                              |
|---|----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| National politics                               | Proximity            | <b>-0.019</b><br>( <b>0.003</b> )  | 0.001<br>(0.002)                  | <b>0.010</b><br>( <b>0.005</b> )    | 0.002<br>(0.001)                  | <b>0.007</b><br>( <b>0.002</b> )   |
|   | Margin               | 0.829<br>(0.592)                   | <b>2.231</b><br>( <b>0.417</b> )  | <b>-2.779</b><br>( <b>1.018</b> )   | -0.348<br>(0.211)                 | 0.067<br>(0.516)                   |
|   | Proximity*Margin     | <b>0.042</b><br>( <b>0.007</b> )   | <b>-0.014</b><br>( <b>0.006</b> ) | <b>-0.030</b><br>( <b>0.007</b> )   | -0.004<br>(0.003)                 | 0.005<br>(0.004)                   |
| Demographics                                    | Male                 | -0.002<br>(0.009)                  | <b>-0.029</b><br>( <b>0.009</b> ) | <b>0.038</b><br>( <b>0.008</b> )    | <b>-0.010</b><br>( <b>0.003</b> ) | 0.002<br>(0.006)                   |
|   | Age                  | <b>0.0009</b><br>( <b>0.0004</b> ) | -0.0001<br>(0.0003)               | <b>-0.0015</b><br>( <b>0.0004</b> ) | -0.0001<br>(0.0001)               | <b>0.0009</b><br>( <b>0.0003</b> ) |
|   | Urban                | -0.009<br>(0.017)                  | -0.009<br>(0.012)                 | 0.009<br>(0.015)                    | 0.005<br>(0.004)                  | 0.004<br>(0.005)                   |
| Education                                       | Primary              | 0.018<br>(0.027)                   | -0.015<br>(0.012)                 | -0.017<br>(0.025)                   | -0.001<br>(0.002)                 | 0.014<br>(0.012)                   |
|   | Secondary            | 0.038<br>(0.032)                   | -0.019<br>(0.016)                 | -0.026<br>(0.026)                   | -0.001<br>(0.003)                 | 0.008<br>(0.013)                   |
|   | Post-secondary       | -0.006<br>(0.034)                  | <b>-0.048</b><br>( <b>0.015</b> ) | <b>0.063</b><br>( <b>0.030</b> )    | 0.000<br>(0.004)                  | -0.009<br>(0.011)                  |
| Occupation                                      | Trader / businessman | 0.026<br>(0.016)                   | <b>0.038</b><br>( <b>0.012</b> )  | <b>-0.075</b><br>( <b>0.021</b> )   | -0.001<br>(0.002)                 | 0.013<br>(0.013)                   |
|   | White collar         | 0.016<br>(0.022)                   | 0.018<br>(0.010)                  | <b>-0.066</b><br>( <b>0.021</b> )   | 0.001<br>(0.003)                  | <b>0.031</b><br>( <b>0.010</b> )   |
|   | Blue collar          | <b>0.062</b><br>( <b>0.012</b> )   | <b>0.030</b><br>( <b>0.011</b> )  | <b>-0.141</b><br>( <b>0.016</b> )   | 0.003<br>(0.002)                  | <b>0.046</b><br>( <b>0.011</b> )   |
|   | Unemployed           | <b>0.063</b><br>( <b>0.022</b> )   | <b>0.051</b><br>( <b>0.017</b> )  | <b>-0.173</b><br>( <b>0.035</b> )   | 0.019<br>(0.018)                  | <b>0.040</b><br>( <b>0.021</b> )   |
|   | Student              | <b>0.044</b><br>( <b>0.022</b> )   | 0.025<br>(0.018)                  | <b>-0.154</b><br>( <b>0.023</b> )   | -0.004<br>(0.003)                 | <b>0.089</b><br>( <b>0.017</b> )   |
|   | Other occupation     | <b>0.060</b><br>( <b>0.020</b> )   | <b>0.031</b><br>( <b>0.012</b> )  | <b>-0.156</b><br>( <b>0.026</b> )   | <b>0.004</b><br>( <b>0.002</b> )  | <b>0.061</b><br>( <b>0.011</b> )   |
| Time controls                                   | Trend                | <b>-0.027</b><br>( <b>0.013</b> )  | <b>-0.042</b><br>( <b>0.009</b> ) | 0.022<br>(0.028)                    | <b>0.024</b><br>( <b>0.005</b> )  | 0.023<br>(0.013)                   |
|   | Round 1.5            | <b>-0.145</b><br>( <b>0.037</b> )  | 0.026<br>(0.046)                  | <b>0.199</b><br>( <b>0.093</b> )    | 0.023<br>(0.019)                  | <b>-0.103</b><br>( <b>0.014</b> )  |
|   | Round 2              | -0.056<br>(0.040)                  | <b>0.081</b><br>( <b>0.034</b> )  | 0.090<br>(0.095)                    | -0.020<br>(0.018)                 | <b>-0.095</b><br>( <b>0.043</b> )  |
| Predicted identity share                        |                      | 0.30                               | 0.15                              | 0.42                                | 0.02                              | 0.11                               |
| Country fixed effects                           |                      |                                    |                                   | yes                                 |                                   |                                    |
| Observations                                    |                      |                                    |                                   | 33906                               |                                   |                                    |
| R <sup>2</sup>                                  |                      |                                    |                                   | 0.14                                |                                   |                                    |
| Wald statistic for national political variables |                      |                                    |                                   | 513                                 |                                   |                                    |

Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects. Standard errors in (parentheses). Statistical significance at the 5% level or better indicated by bolding.



Although our main purpose in introducing these individual-level controls in Table 3b is as a robustness check, several of the coefficient estimates are worthy of note in and of themselves. For example, older respondents are significantly more likely to identify in ethnic terms, although the size of this effect is small (the coefficient estimate on age in years is only 0.0009, Table 3b). While gender has no significant effect on ethnic identification, females are approximately one percentage point more likely to identify in terms of gender than are males.

The urban/rural location, education and occupation controls are also potentially interesting, as they put us in a position to test competing theories about the impact of “modernization” on ethnic identification. Whereas Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons, all predicted that “modernization” would lead to the displacement of ethnicity by class, such later researchers as Young (1965), Melson and Wolpe (1970), and Bates (1983) argued that the processes of urbanization, industrialization, education, political mobilization, and competition for jobs that “modernization” entailed would *deepen* ethnic identities as individuals exploited their ethnic group memberships as tools for political, economic, and social advancement. While our findings with respect to the effects of electoral competition are in keeping with the expectations of the “second wave modernization” researchers, the estimates reported in Table 3b provide a broader test of these rival theories.

Several of our findings provide little support for either position. Our indicator variable for whether or not a respondent is located in a rural location is small and not statistically significant.<sup>20</sup> Educational attainment also does not have a statistically significant effect on ethnic identification, although those with higher levels of schooling – at the post-secondary level – are significantly more likely to identify in occupation and class terms than other respondents (the omitted education category here is those with no primary schooling).

The salience of ethnicity does, however, vary strongly with individual occupation. Compared to farmers and fishermen (the omitted occupational category in the regression), workers in the modern sector – be they white collar workers, blue collar workers, miners, students, business people, or the unemployed – are more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms. Respondents in all of these occupational categories were between 2 and 6 percentage points more likely than those in the traditional sector (farmers and fishermen) to volunteer an ethnic membership when asked to specify the group with which they identify first and foremost. Relative to farmers and fisherman, blue collar workers are 6.2 percentage points more likely to identify ethnic terms, the unemployed are 6.3 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms, and similarly for students (4.4 percentage points) and other occupations (6.0), and all of these differences are statistically significant at over 95 percent confidence (Table 3b). The bulk of the substitution across identity categories comes from occupational and class identification: individuals with non-farming/fishing occupations are significantly less likely to identify in occupation or class terms than farmers and fisherman, and these effects are particularly large for unemployed respondents.

These results are consistent with the expectations of the “second wave modernization” theorists. In keeping with the arguments they advance, our interpretation of this pattern is that stronger ethnic identification among respondents in the modern sector stems from the competition that such individuals face for scarce jobs and contracts and the role that ethnic connections commonly play in securing advantages in this competition. The impact of competition in the economic sphere is analogous to the

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<sup>20</sup> We speculate that this may be due to the fact that rural location is only a rough proxy for participation in non-traditional economic sectors (teachers, factory workers, and government officials, and people with a range of educational attainment are well-represented in both rural and urban areas). The variable remains insignificant if we drop the occupation indicator variables, so this finding does not appear to be due to the collinearity of occupation and urbanization.

demonstrated impact of competition in the political sphere, which we argue is driving our main results with respect to electoral proximity and margin.

A related issue is the identity reaction of different types of individuals to changes in local political conditions, in particular the electoral proximity and margin variables that are central to this study. These issues are explored in a multinomial regression (similar to that presented in Table 3b) by including interaction terms between individual demographic, education, and occupation characteristics with the electoral proximity and margin terms. Few of these interaction terms yield statistically significant coefficient estimates (regression not shown), in part because (as expected) statistical precision falls when multiple interactions are included in this framework. However, the interaction term between respondent unemployment and electoral proximity does emerge as large, statistically significant, and robust across several specifications. Unemployed individuals are significantly more likely to respond in ethnic identity terms closer to elections: the coefficient estimate on this interaction term is -0.014 (standard error 0.003), while their occupation / class identity attachment falls by nearly identical magnitude (estimate 0.016, standard error 0.004), indicating nearly one-for-one substitution across these categories. One obvious interpretation of this finding is that the unemployed are either specifically targeted by politicians with ethnic appeals, or that they are particularly susceptible to such appeals around election time. Both interpretations are consistent with the patterns of political mobilization we observe in contemporary African elections.

## **Conclusion**

The findings of this study challenge two persistent conventional wisdoms about Africa: that Africans are uniformly and uni-dimensionally ethnic, and that the salience of ethnicity is a product of the region's low levels of political and economic development. The study's central result is that exposure to political competition, as well as non-traditional occupations, powerfully affects whether or not people identify themselves in ethnic terms. Taken together the findings provide strong confirmation for what we term "second wave" modernization approaches to ethnicity, and for theories that link the salience of particular social identities to instrumental political mobilization. Beyond their relevance for these academic literatures, the paper's results also have important implications for policymakers and researchers interested in ethnicity's effects.

Political scientists and economists use the concept of ethnic salience to help explain everything from economic growth to civil conflict and the effectiveness of foreign aid. When they do so, they frequently employ (lagged) measures of ethnic diversity as indicators of current ethnic salience, the assumption being that greater diversity translates directly into greater ethnic salience. Yet we find evidence that the salience of ethnicity can change – not just over the course of years, but even over the course of a few months, particularly near election time. This result, which is consistent with situational approaches to ethnicity, challenges empirical work that takes ethnic identities as static and historically determined. Particularly for researchers undertaking survey work, it provides a caution that the timing of data collection – particularly the proximity of the survey exercise to large-scale political events such as national elections – can have significant effect on the answers respondents provide about their ethnic identifications.

The strong relationship we find between the intensity of political (and economic) competition on the one hand and the salience of ethnicity on the other also makes it clear that as African countries institute democratic and market reforms it will become more urgent – not less – for African governments to develop policies and institutional mechanisms that are capable of dealing with ethnic divisions. Kenya's recent political developments are informative. After the reintroduction of competitive multi-party politics in the early 1990s, Kenya's reform efforts have increasingly become mired in tribal politics, including violent ethnic clashes that have left hundreds dead. Policies and institutions such as those in place in neighboring Tanzania – a country known for its efforts at nation-building through the promotion of

Swahili as a national language, civic education, and institutional reforms like the abolition of chiefs, as described by Miguel (2004) – might serve as a model for how Kenya and other African countries might dampen destructive ethnic divisions. Perhaps due in part to these reforms, Tanzania has among the lowest degree of ethnic identity salience in one of the Afrobarometer survey rounds, at just 3 percent.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, our work brings new evidence to bear on the stubbornly persistent popular misconception that ethnicity in Africa is an atavism that can be “solved” by political and economic development. Scholarly consensus has long disputed this position, but the popular view remains firmly entrenched. Part of this disconnect may lie in lingering racism, which leads some to uncritically accept representations of Africans as backward and tribe-bound. But another part of the answer may lie in the fact that nearly all of the research that documents the positive association between modernization and deepening ethnic identification is either anecdotal or based on analyses of single country cases. Absent systematic, cross-national analyses of the sort presented in this paper, old stereotypes and media-reinforced misperceptions are frustratingly difficult to break. The results of this paper, based on precisely the kind of cross-national data that has hitherto been lacking but using individual-level survey responses, provide new support for the claim that ethnicity is salient in Africa because political competition on the continent is increasing, not diminishing, and as people are becoming more “modern” not less.

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<sup>21</sup> Tanzania’s outlier status in this regard is reflected in Figure 1, where it is clear that the close proximity between the country’s 2001 Afrobarometer survey and its 2000 presidential election has little impact on the share of the population that identifies itself in ethnic terms.

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**Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics**

| Block                   | Variable  | Mean | SD    | N     |
|-------------------------|---|------|-------|-------|
| National, economic      | Log per capita income                             | 7.4  | 1.01  | 33906 |
| National, politics      | Proximity to closest election, months (abs. val.) | 14.1 | 6.77  | 33906 |
|                         | Electoral margin in most recent election *        | 0.31 | 0.21  | 33906 |
| Individual, demographic | Urban   | 0.54 | 0.50  | 33906 |
|                         | Male  | 0.50 | 0.50  | 33906 |
|                         | Age   | 35.6 | 14.01 | 33906 |
| Individual, education   | No education                                      | 0.20 | 0.39  | 33906 |
|                         | Primary education                                 | 0.32 | 0.46  | 33906 |
|                         | Secondary education                               | 0.37 | 0.49  | 33906 |
|                         | Post-secondary education                          | 0.11 | 0.33  | 33906 |
|                         | Farmer / fisherman                                | 0.29 | 0.45  | 33906 |
| Individual, occupation  | Trader / businessman                              | 0.12 | 0.33  | 33906 |
|                         | White collar                                      | 0.12 | 0.33  | 33906 |
|                         | Blue collar                                       | 0.14 | 0.35  | 33906 |
|                         | Student   | 0.08 | 0.28  | 33906 |
|                         | Security (police, military, guard)                | 0.01 | 0.10  | 33906 |
|                         | Unemployed  | 0.05 | 0.24  | 33906 |
|                         | Other occupation                                  | 0.20 | 0.39  | 33906 |

**Appendix Table 2. Linear System (SUR), Country Aggregates**

| Category                         | Variable         | Ethnicity                       | Religion                        | Occupation & Class              | Gender            | Other                           |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| National politics                | Proximity        | <b>-0.015</b><br><b>(0.008)</b> | 0.003<br>(0.003)                | 0.008<br>(0.008)                | 0.005<br>(0.005)  | 0.005<br>(0.003)                |
|                                  | Margin           | -0.339<br>(1.282)               | <b>1.663</b><br><b>(0.564)</b>  | -1.545<br>(1.281)               | -0.459<br>(0.862) | 0.541<br>(0.407)                |
|                                  | Proximity*Margin | <b>0.036</b><br><b>(0.015)</b>  | <b>-0.013</b><br><b>(0.006)</b> | <b>-0.033</b><br><b>(0.015)</b> | -0.006<br>(0.010) | 0.003<br>(0.005)                |
| Time controls                    | Trend            | -0.061<br>(0.178)               | <b>0.214</b><br><b>(0.078)</b>  | 0.196<br>(0.178)                | -0.131<br>(0.120) | <b>-0.143</b><br><b>(0.056)</b> |
|                                  | Round 1.5        | -0.085<br>(0.114)               | 0.051<br>(0.050)                | 0.070<br>(0.114)                | -0.028<br>(0.077) | -0.015<br>(0.036)               |
|                                  | Round 2          | 0.013<br>(0.033)                | <b>-0.061</b><br><b>(0.014)</b> | 0.016<br>(0.033)                | 0.026<br>(0.022)  | 0.006<br>(0.010)                |
| Predicted identity share         |                  | 0.30                            | 0.15                            | 0.42                            | 0.02              | 0.11                            |
| Country fixed effects            |                  |                                 |                                 | yes                             |                   |                                 |
| Observations                     |                  |                                 |                                 | 22                              |                   |                                 |
| Chi-square (political variables) |                  |                                 |                                 | 5.24*                           |                   |                                 |

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