

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 86

CORRUPTION, INSTITUTIONAL DISCREDIT, AND EXCLUSION OF THE POOR : A POVERTY TRAP

by Mireille Razafindrakoto and Francois
Roubaud

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



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Corruption, Institutional Discredit And Exclusion Of The Poor: A Poverty Trap¹

Abstract

The vast majority of empirical studies focus mainly on the indirect effects of corruption on poverty using cross-section analyses of macroeconomic aggregates (growth, investment, public expenditure, etc.). To date, relatively few studies have set out to explain the logic of individual behaviour in the face of corruption and the direct effects of this scourge on the poor. We use a rich collection of comparable household surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan African countries (*Afrobarometer*) to shed light on a mechanism that links corruption with poverty such that they are locked in a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. Firstly, we show that the poor, who are as sensitive as the rest of the population to the reprehensible nature of corruption, are more often victims of corruption in their routine dealings with the administration and the public services. Secondly, the poorest groups affected by corruption tend to become discouraged and give in to it more easily. Consequently, they lose interest in politics and can even become politically disaffected altogether. This further diminishes their already limited capacity to make their voices heard in decision-making processes. This attitude of resignation in the absence of any prospect of contending with corruption hence contributes to the acceptance and perpetuation of corruption in poor countries.

¹ Draft prepared for the conference on “The Micro-Foundations of Mass Politics in Africa,” MSU, May 2007. We would like to thank Diane Bertrand for the translation of the original French version of this paper into English.

INTRODUCTION

The new international poverty reduction strategies have placed factors previously deemed extra-economic – such as governance, support for democracy and democratic participation – at the heart of the development programmes. The growing interest in the impact of corruption on developing economies is part of this. Yet the analyses look mainly at the negative effects of this curse from a macroeconomic point of view. For example, cross-country studies show that investment levels and GDP growth are lower in countries where corruption is high. To date, relatively few empirical studies have been made of the microeconomic impact of corruption on living conditions and the attitudes of the different population categories. We use a rich collection of comparable household surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan African countries (*Afrobarometer Survey*) to analyse the effect of corruption on the citizens' trust in the public institutions and especially on their participation in their country's political affairs. The idea is to explore, in particular, the political effects of corruption on the populations' attitudes: do victims lose all faith in the public institutions, become disaffected and opt out of society life? What are the characteristics of the individuals most likely to be caught up in this process of marginalisation?


We make a detailed study of the harmful effects of corruption using objective indicators (household victims and non-victims of corruption, political participation, contact with local authority representatives, etc.), subjective evaluations (perception of corruption in the public institutions, etc.) and the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals interviewed. We consider especially possible particularities among the poor populations. Firstly, are they more vulnerable and likely to be more often and harder hit by corruption? Secondly, do the poor – victims of dysfunctional institutions – tend to more easily turn their backs on public affairs and politics? The diversity of political and economic environments found in the countries studied sheds light on the complexity of the links between governance, democracy and poverty.

Although we are starting to see an increasing number of surveys of individuals in developing countries, cross-country analyses based on national aggregates continue to dominate the literature on corruption. The vast majority of studies are based on data regarding the perception of corruption. Few of them concern the actual experiences of the countries' citizens.² Our analysis helps fill these gaps and seeks to proffer an understanding of corruption (experience and perception) at “micro” level based on a large sample of microdata from a wide range of sub-Saharan African countries.

We endeavour here to understand the logic of individual behaviour when faced with corruption. Focusing more especially on bureaucratic corruption, our hypothesis is that two categories of individuals hit by corruption can be identified: the most vulnerable with no means of resistance (the poorest) and those who give in and pay. In both cases, therefore, they are “victims” and not the instigators of deliberate strategies to occasion illicit practices. This creates a vicious cycle in which corruption cultivates a feeling of discouragement in the face of dysfunctional institutions. This feeling firstly reduces the desire to take part in the country's political affairs and the capacity to influence decisions to effectively curb this curse, and secondly undermines the will to resist corruption on a day-to-day basis. This sustains, if not further increases corruption.

² See Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006a) regarding the bias that can be created when using solely data on the perception of corruption.

Diagram On The Logic Of Individual Behaviour In The Face Of Corruption



We hence focus on two major questions, about which little has been written and which are subject to debate, regarding the causes and effects of corruption:

- Are the poor more often “victims” of corruption in their routine dealings? We take account of the fact that those with little contact with the public institutions are less exposed to the risk of being a victim of corruption (which does not mean that they would be spared if they were to conduct administrative formalities). This correlation liable to generate a selection bias must be taken into consideration in the econometric estimates.
- What is the link between corruption (experienced or perceived), the evaluation of the running of the institutions and citizen participation in the country’s political affairs? This approach is in keeping with the analyses of the impact of corruption on the legitimacy of the public institutions. Yet we endeavour to take the observation of discredited institutions a step further and study the extent to which this situation could trigger a phenomenon of exclusion from political matters. To our knowledge, the existing empirical literature has not yet sought to explain this link. We test, in particular, the assumption that the poorest are the most vulnerable and likely to be caught up in this process of marginalisation. This entails demonstrating that a new mechanism exists whereby corruption has an adverse effect on poverty. Corruption aggravates the situation of the poor by strengthening the feeling of inequality and discouraging them from taking part in any decision-making process that could help them remedy their situation.

Bear in mind that, as with most analyses on the causes and effects of corruption, the complexity of the phenomenon means that causal links are hard to establish. The causes and effects of corruption are closely linked. Our analysis does not completely overcome this problem (does corruption provoke a lack of interest in politics and a process of self-exclusion from political life or vice versa?). Nevertheless, our aim is not so much to explain the direction of the causality as to stress the possible existence of a vicious cycle that hinders the ability to remedy the downturn in the situation of the poor: corruption discredits the institutions, which in turn fosters corruption since the population no longer believes that the public authorities can remedy the situation and, more generally, that the phenomenon can be fought.

Although the vast majority of studies have looked at the impact of corruption on poverty, showing mainly its indirect effects by means of macroeconomic variables (growth, investment and allocation of resources), our study identifies a mechanism whereby corruption directly affects the poor at the

microeconomic level. Firstly, we show that the poor are more often victims of this phenomenon in their routine dealings with the administration and the public services. Secondly, the poorest individuals hit by corruption prove less inclined to fight and mobilise the means that could help them speak out against and remedy this form of injustice. Since their discouragement leads to a lack of interest and low level of participation in politics, it marginalises them and consequently locks them in a poverty trap. When they become politically disaffected, their problems and concerns can neither be heard nor taken into consideration in the decision-making processes.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There is a growing body of literature on the causes and effects of corruption. We do not attempt here to fully review these studies since many authors have already done so in detail (Bardhan, 1997; Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2005; Seldayo and de Haan, 2006). It is worth noting, however, that Lambsdorff lists no less than a hundred papers on these issues and that Seldayo and de Haan identify a total of 70 variables used in different analyses as potential determinants of corruption.

Briefly, the different types of analyses made are as follow:

- As regards the effects, the literature concerns the impact of corruption on economic growth or per capita GDP, total private and public investment, public expenditure and its breakdown, international trade, foreign direct investment and capital flows, official development assistance, inequalities and a series of social outputs (education and health).
- As regards the causes, the studies look at the size of the government apparatus and its working methods, especially at decentralised level, wage levels and how civil servants are recruited, public regulations, the quality of the institutions, competition conditions and the organisation of the markets, freedom of the press, the type of political system and democracy, election procedures and the organisation of the political parties, and the cultural determinants of corruption (interpersonal trust, religion and racial fractionalisation). Here too, the list could be extended to other aspects such as the impact of gender, the country's colonial past and the abundance of natural resources, the effects of social interaction, etc.

We are more particularly interested here, firstly, in the relation between corruption and poverty and, secondly, in the links between this phenomenon and the population's attitude toward the public institutions.

Corruption And Poverty: Stylised Facts Established At Macroeconomic Level

The empirical literature sets out to explain different mechanisms by which corruption adversely affects poverty. Yet the effects put forward concern mainly the indirect repercussions of corruption on poverty. Most often mentioned are the effects of corruption on factors that weigh on poverty. Two types of models can be found in the literature: the "economic model" and the "governance model" (Chetwynd *et al.*, 2003). The first model concerns the economic effects of corruption, especially on the downturn in growth and level of investment (Mauro, 1995 and 1998; Wei and Wu, 2001; Kaufman *et al.*, 2005) and on the increase in inequalities (Gupta *et al.*, 1998). The second model points up the adverse effect of corruption on governance and hence on poverty. Some studies emphasise the effect on public expenditure, the allocation of resources and the quality of the public services (Gupta *et al.*, 1998). Others are interested in the way aid is allocated. On this point, the impact works through two channels. Firstly, a certain number of studies take up the work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and endeavour to show that aid is all the more effective when recipient countries are well governed. Secondly, a series of empirical studies show that the countries' quality of governance, wherein the level of corruption is one of the main components, is increasingly a major selectivity criterion in donors' aid allocation decisions (Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 2004; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Dollar and Levine, 2004). Last but not least, a series of studies

looks at the impact of corruption on democracy and, more broadly speaking, on the public institutions (Johnston, 2000).

Despite the wide range of more or less sophisticated analyses, the direction of the causal link between poverty and corruption remains a subject for debate. For example, a certain number of authors insist that poverty is a cause of the poor quality of institutions and especially the high level of corruption, and not vice versa. Sachs *et al.* (2004) are a case in point. They posit that the quality of governance in poor countries is merely the result of their low level of development. Treisman (2000) advances the same type of link in his analyses, i.e. that the low level of development is a factor that fosters corruption. He puts forward two lines of reasoning already argued by different authors to justify this finding: firstly, low-income countries are generally more traditional societies in which hierarchical relations prevail, and secondly, their inhabitants typically have a low level of education. The argument goes that the population therefore finds it harder to define the boundary between the public and private sphere (since there is no clear distinction between a bribe and a thank-you present).

Many studies have also been published on the effect of the institutions on the extent of corruption. In his analysis of whether democracy is a determinant of corruption, Treisman (2000) finds a relatively weak, but significant effect for historical democracies. He explains this finding by positing that the direction of the causal link is inverse in that corrupt officials are not in favour of the consolidation of democracy and seek to stifle any move in this direction. The relationship between democracy and corruption is a complex one. Olivier de Sardan (1999) shows how establishing democracy in a number of African countries has done nothing to put a brake on corruption. An increase in individual freedoms can have an opposite effect to that expected. Lederman *et al.* (2005) underscore the importance of real democratic accountability and go on to show how political institutions with real control and a balance of powers (democracy, parliamentary system and freedom of the press) lower corruption. Drury (2006) explores another type of link with a cross-country analysis of over one hundred countries and shows that corruption does not affect growth in democracies while it has an adverse effect on growth in non-democratic countries.

The empirical analyses are generally based mainly on cross-sectional data using national (aggregate) indicators taken from leading international databases. Yet although these databases reveal links between corruption and macro variables influencing poverty, confirmed on a large scale across a number of countries, they provide little information on the mechanisms by means of which corruption actually has an impact. For example, the cross-sectional studies endeavouring to show that poverty is one of the causes of corruption develop a theoretical line of reasoning to justify this hypothesis. One of the arguments put forward is that the poor population's low level of education leads them to accept and practise corruption. Yet, at the end of the day, these studies find a macro link between corruption, poverty and the general level of education, concluding by a process of deduction that the theoretical line of reasoning is valid (i.e. that the less educated are more corrupt or corruptible). They do not demonstrate the validity of this argument, which applies to the micro level. It could well be that it is the most highly educated in a given poor country who take advantage of the low general level of education and practise corruption the most.

Empirical Analyses Of Individual Attitudes Toward And Experiences Of Corruption

Studies based on microdata remain relatively rare. Yet such an approach seems more appropriate to understanding the individual reasoning that leads to the practice of corruption and the direct effects of corruption on individuals' living conditions. Note that we are more particularly interested here in bureaucratic corruption (or petty corruption) even though individuals' perceptions are broader based and concern all forms of corruption.

Particular attention is paid to the effects of poor public service quality, due mainly to corruption, and its adverse repercussions on the poor's living conditions (little access, high cost, etc.; World Bank, 2004). Yet it is surprising to find that very few empirical studies look into precisely whether the poor are more

(or less) affected directly by the corruption phenomenon on a day-to-day basis. Two conflicting hypotheses have been developed on this subject. The first posits that the poor are less well equipped to resist corruption (in terms of power, choice, information or education) and are therefore more vulnerable and more often victims of or inclined to accept corruption. In the second, on the contrary, it could be assumed that the most well off, who are more often in contact with the administration, are more targeted by corrupt officials for their financial potential.

Empirical studies on this question are few and far between, save national case studies. Among those who put a case for the first hypothesis are the surveys conducted by Transparency International (2003) based on the *Global Corruption Barometer*. Their findings show that the poor are generally more and harder hit by corruption. However, these surveys concern perceptions. The survey conducted in Kenya (Urban Bribery Index; Transparency International, 2002) shows more clearly that the poor are more often confronted with routine corruption. Yet other studies, such as those by Hunt and Lazlo (2006) on Peru, show that corruption increases with income level. This said, the authors explain this observation mainly by the fact that the most well-off are more regularly in contact with the administration and the public services and, in particular, with the services where corruption is most widespread. An analysis by Gatti *et al.* (2003) also tends to confirm the second hypothesis even though it concerns attitudes toward corruption and not actual first-hand experiences. These authors use microdata on 35 countries (taken from the *World Value Surveys*) to show that the rich are less inclined to criticise the practice of corruption.

Our analyses of eight African capitals (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005) based on household surveys also find that experiences of corruption rise with income, especially in four of the cities studied. Nevertheless, bear in mind the rate of access to public services in that the poor are less often in contact with them. Secondly, despite a lower frequency of corruption and smaller sums paid, corruption makes a greater hole in the poorest individuals' pockets when measured as a percentage of their income.³

Corruption And Attitudes Toward The Institutions

The link between corruption and attitudes toward the institutions has been discussed at length in the theoretical literature (Bardhan, 1997). The debate is essentially between those who consider that corruption “greases the wheels” of the institutions and improves their efficiency and those who support the opposing argument that corruption reduces their performance (“sand-in-the-machine”). The way in which individuals experience and are affected by the experience of corruption could shed light on this debate, but here again empirical analyses are few and far between.

Bratton (2007) finds an ambiguous effect. The perception of corruption has a negative effect on the level of satisfaction with the public services, but the first-hand experience of corruption, on the other hand, would appear to have a positive effect on this evaluation. The author explains this finding by stating that, despite condemnation of corruption and the belief that this phenomenon undermines the institutions' performances, individuals who pay bribes probably gain increased access to services. Hunt and Lazlo (2006) find this same positive effect of corruption for Peru. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006b) do not find any significant links between the first-hand experience of corruption and the individuals' subjective well-being. These findings could find an explanation in the grass-roots observations made by Olivier de Sardan (1999) in African countries. He points out that, although the people clearly condemn corruption, they ultimately help perpetuate it in their everyday practices to facilitate their access to services. The findings by Gatti *et al.* (2003) on the effects of social interaction proffer another explanation. These authors show that the average level of tolerance of corruption in the region in which the individual lives determines individual attitudes. This means that even if corruption is condemned, the fact that it is a widespread practice can ultimately lead individuals to also succumb to it.

³ Among the victims, households in the poorest quartile paid 7.8% of their income to dishonest officials as opposed to 2.2% for the richest quartile.

Empirical analyses have looked at the way in which corruption (experienced or perceived by the individuals) influences the perception of the legitimacy of the institutions. Four studies are of particular interest in this regard: Della Porta (2000) on three European countries, Seligson (2002) on Latin American countries, Lavallée (2006) on Africa, and Chang and Chu (2006) on Asia. All four studies come to the same conclusion that corruption undermines individuals' confidence in the institutions. Nevertheless, the question should be raised here as to which way the causality runs and whether there is a possibility of an endogeneity bias. A low level of confidence in the institutions could also foster corruption.

It is surprising that so few empirical studies look at the effect of corruption on the involvement and participation of individuals – especially the poor – in political affairs to explain a channel by means of which this phenomenon affects poverty. And this despite the fact that the role of the institutions and the participation of the poor (empowerment) have been emphasised as a way of reducing poverty since the mid-1990s and especially since the publication of the *World Development Report* on “Attacking Poverty” (World Bank, 2000). A series of field studies set out to highlight concrete examples of the negative effect of the exclusion of the poor from the decision-making processes and their vulnerability to dysfunctional institutions (Narajan *et al.*, 2000). By way of an example, this collection of studies cites the case of Mexico where the poor have to promise political loyalty to the local authorities to gain access to public services.

The *Development Report on Equity and Development* goes even further by acknowledging the importance of a level political playing field (World Bank, 2005). An entire chapter draws on case studies to show that power is essentially monopolised by the elite, preventing the poor from making their demands heard and taking advantage of economic opportunities that could remedy their situation.⁴ Johnston (2000) emphasises the links between corruption and the power of the wealthy, and explains how this phenomenon leads to the institutionalisation of networks that trade services for votes. These networks subsequently influence the direction taken by public policies. An analysis by Uslaner (2007) comes to the same conclusion by positing that corruption constitutes an inequality trap. He finds a relation between individual perceptions of how efficient the public authorities are at combating corruption and how efficient they are at reducing inequalities. He develops the argument that a high level of inequalities leads to less confidence in the institutions and hence to more corruption, which further reinforces the inequalities.

If political authority inequalities are the main reason for the creation and maintenance of inequitable institutions, then the promotion of democracy becomes an obvious lever for breaking out of “inequality traps”. Since, as already mentioned, democracy should theoretically prompt a better distribution of power, it should help limit corruption phenomena. Yet this calls for an analysis in parallel as to how corruption might affect the democratic consolidation process. On this point, Przeworski *et al.* (2000) stress that it is harder for democracy to take concrete shape in poor countries since the lack of tangible outcomes in terms of the population's economic conditions means that the people have little confidence in the institutions. Corruption can also give rise to less support for the democratisation process. Nevertheless, Bratton (2007) finds, in keeping with the abovementioned findings on the evaluation of the public services, an ambiguous effect on satisfaction with democracy. While the perception of the extent of corruption appears to have a negative effect on the citizens' judgment, first-hand experience of corruption proves to be positively correlated with the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works. These findings make a case for more in-depth analyses to explain the logics and mechanisms via which corruption can influence attitudes toward the institutions.

⁴ “[...] unequal power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status and wealth [...]” (World Bank, 2005; p. 8).

THE DATA AND INDICATORS USED

We use the data from the third round of 2005 *Afrobarometer* surveys of 18 sub-Saharan African countries. Our analysis draws on a number of different indicators built using the variables provided by this survey.

Given that there is no data available on income or consumption levels (monetary poverty), we measure poverty levels based on the question on how often individuals have gone without basic goods and liquid assets (food, water, medicine, fuel and cash income, in particular for school expenses) in the year leading up to the survey. We build a poverty score using a scale of the frequency of difficulties encountered. With this, we define four categories: those who live in “highly disadvantaged”, “fairly disadvantaged”, “fairly well-off” and “well-off” conditions. We class those who have gone without the most often among the poorest. This group represents 36% of the population.⁵ Similarly, an indicator was also built defining five levels of education: no education, some primary school, primary school complete, some secondary school with no qualifications obtained, and secondary school complete & higher education.

Our analysis also considers a current events monitoring indicator: how often individuals get news from the different types of media (radio, television and newspapers): “never”, “once or more a month”, “a few times a week” or “every day”.

Lastly, we have used an interpersonal trust (dummy) indicator to typify individuals’ relationships with their entourage, which can also be an explanatory factor in their behaviour. The indicator differentiates between those who say that they can trust most of their compatriots and those who express distrust.

As regards the variables on corruption, a number of variables have been included in the analysis:

- First-hand experience of bureaucratic corruption (payment of a bribe): we have included all experiences in the public services (administrative formalities, enrolling a child in school, water and electricity supply services, telephone connection, health services, and problems with the police). We have built a dummy variable to differentiate those who have been directly confronted with corruption (and have had to pay) at least once by one of the abovementioned services from those who have never paid a bribe (in the year preceding the survey).⁶
- The data from the third round of the *Afrobarometer* survey are used to isolate the individuals who have had no contact with the administration or the public services mentioned.⁷
- The perception of the extent of corruption: the survey distinguishes different government officials or public service staff. Given that we cannot use all the variables on the perception of the extent of corruption in the different government services, and that a correlation exists between them, we have chosen to use just one single indicator that reports on the extent to which corruption is perceived as widespread. For each type of government or public official, we have differentiated between those who feel that “it’s true for most or all of them” from those who state that “none or few of them are corrupt”. We have aggregated the results to build a score that takes the maximum value if the individual considers that corruption pervades all government levels and the minimum

⁵ Note that different types of poverty indicators (especially regarding individuals’ perceptions of their economic situation) were tested to check the reliability and robustness of the findings. We chose this indicator since it appears to be the most objective and ultimately the best correlated with the different variables on individuals’ living conditions (perception of one’s own living conditions, evaluation of one’s own situation compared with the country’s other inhabitants, and objects owned or assets).

⁶ Note that, in general, non-responses have been systematically excluded from the analysis even though we are aware of the potential particularities of individuals who respond with “don’t know”. In certain cases, it would be worth making a detailed analysis of the characteristics of these individuals.

⁷ The two previous rounds of the *Afrobarometer* survey do not contain the response option “have had no contact with the administration” in the question put to identify those who have paid bribes.

value if the individual considers that only a small minority of officials are corrupt regardless of the levels observed.

As regards attitudes toward corruption, we have built the following (dummy) indicators:

- Condemnation of corruption: given that we are interested mainly in bureaucratic corruption, we have isolated those who deem it “wrong and punishable” that an official should ask for a favour or payment for a service that is normally part of his job.
- Propensity to practise corruption when faced with problems obtaining administrative papers or documents.
- Tolerance of illegality: those who more generally say that it is sometimes better to disregard the law to quickly solve problems.

The variables chosen for participation in political life are:

- Interest in public affairs with four response options: “very interested”, “somewhat interested”, “not very interested” and “not at all interested”.
- Participation in discussions on political matters with three response options: “never”, “occasionally” and “frequently”.
- Participation in collective actions (community meetings, collective discussions on an issue and demonstrations): frequency of participation in all of these types of actions.
- Contact with local government representatives: frequency of contacts in the past year regarding a problem or to give a point of view: “never”, “only once”, “a few times” and “often”.
- Propensity to fight against the administration’s dysfunctions: in keeping with Logan *et al.* (2006) in their analysis of relations between citizens and the State, we have isolated the individuals the most inclined to fight and embark on actions that could remedy the institutions’ dysfunctions (lodging complaints and public protest) from those who rather tend to accept the situations (either by adopting a wait-and-see attitude and doing nothing or by using illicit means by offering a bribe or using influential contacts). Given that we are interested here in individuals’ desires to participate in political affairs, we have chosen in particular the reactions of those individuals whom government officials have not registered to vote.

Lastly, three types of indicators have been chosen for the evaluation of how the institutions are run:

- Individuals’ appraisals of how injustices (inequality of treatment) have developed in recent years: “much worse”, “worse”, “same”, “less injustice” and “much less injustice”.
- Individuals’ perceptions of how the ability of ordinary people to influence government decisions has changed: “much worse”, “worse”, “same”, “better” and “much better”.
- The level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country, with four response options: “very satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”.

A PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH

Our aim here is to analyse the extent to which the findings based on the survey data on individual behaviour tie in with the theoretical argument that corruption in poor countries is due to less of an ability to differentiate between the public and private sphere owing to the population’s low level of education and the predominance of hierarchical relations in the more traditional societies. The idea is therefore to study whether there is a clear distinction between behaviour, as expected, depending on the individual’s level of education and level of poverty. Logically speaking, poverty (frequency of going without basic goods) is correlated with level of education. However, the two variables far from tally perfectly (Table 2).

In the first place, the level of education does not spare an individual from corruption. In fact, relatively more of the more highly educated appear to have paid bribes in their routine dealings with the public services. At the same time, the less educated are not significantly differentiated from the rest of the

population by a lower level of condemnation of corruption or by a greater inclination to resort to corruption in the event of a problem (Table 1).

Nevertheless, the more educated do prove to be more critical of the performance of the institutions. Relatively more of them say corruption is widespread, that they are dissatisfied with the way democracy works, and that the situation has deteriorated in terms of injustice (inequality of treatment of citizens) and in terms of the ability of ordinary people to influence government decisions (Table 3). The more educated are also relatively more involved in political affairs. Interest in public affairs and participation in political discussions increase with the level of education (Table 4). Lastly, support for democratic principles is found to be positively correlated with the level of education (Table 3). The same holds true for the propensity to mobilise the means to fight the institutions' dysfunctions (lodging complaints or taking part in public protests rather than accepting the situation as it is; Table 4).

Table 1: First-Hand Experience Of, Perception Of And Attitude Toward Corruption By Level Of Education

	Victim/ experience corruption	No contact with public sector/ admin.	Perception that corruption widespread among gov. officials	Condem- nation: corruption wrong & punishable	Would bribe in the event of a problem	Sometimes it's better to disregard the law
No education	21.8%	14.1%	20.6%	75.2%	9.1%	13.5%
Some primary school	23.0%	12.0%	17.9%	77.6%	8.6%	17.9%
Primary school complete	26.0%	12.4%	17.6%	75.7%	6.5%	14.6%
Some secondary school	27.1%	14.0%	23.6%	77.5%	8.8%	19.0%
Secondary school complete & higher education	31.9%	13.3%	32.6%	77.3%	8.3%	18.0%
Total	26.0%	13.2%	22.8%	76.7%	8.3%	16.7%

Table 2: Poverty And Confidence By Level Of Education

	Most people can be trusted	Very poor (have often had to go without)	Get news at least once a week
No education	23.4%	47.5%	69.5%
Some primary school	18.7%	43.5%	72.3%
Primary school complete	14.6%	34.7%	81.9%
Some secondary school	14.9%	30.2%	87.6%
Secondary school complete & higher education	12.2%	23.1%	94.2%
Total	16.9%	35.8%	81.1%

Table 3: Evaluation Of The Running Of The Institutions By Level Of Education

	Satisfaction with democracy	More unequal and unfair treatment	Less ability to influence government decisions	Preference for democracy	Members Parliament listen to the people	Local government officials listen to the people
No education	44.7%	22.4%	15.6%	69.2%	21.7%	36.2%
Some primary school	45.2%	23.8%	18.5%	68.3%	22.6%	33.1%
Primary school complete	50.1%	22.4%	21.8%	74.3%	28.6%	37.1%
Some secondary school	57.9%	25.4%	21.3%	77.0%	23.3%	29.4%
Secondary school complete & higher education	53.6%	32.9%	28.3%	80.6%	21.2%	26.8%
Total	50.2%	25.6%	21.1%	74.2%	23.2%	32.3%

Table 4: Participation And Involvement In Political Affairs By Level Of Education

	Interested in public affairs	Discussion of political matters with relatives, friends	Participation in meetings, collective discussions, demonstrations	Have contacted local authority about problems or to give views	Would fight (lodge complaint, join public protest) if name left off the electoral roll
No education	61.0%	32.7%	69.6%	20.2%	44.2%
Some primary school	64.4%	36.6%	78.3%	25.6%	54.1%
Primary school complete	71.3%	40.8%	78.7%	26.4%	63.0%
Some secondary school	67.3%	43.3%	73.4%	23.5%	61.3%
Secondary school complete & higher education	73.0%	43.5%	71.8%	25.2%	65.3%
Total	67.3%	39.3%	74.1%	24.1%	57.3%

The descriptive analyses by poverty level show that the poorest are relatively harder hit by corruption. Yet relatively fewer of them have had contacts with the administration. This finding cannot be explained by a lesser aversion to corruption among the poor, as suggested by the theoretical argument put forward by many authors regarding the correlation between level of corruption and poverty. In fact, the poorest do not significantly differ from the rest of the population, either in their propensity to condemn corruption or in their potential inclination to resort to corruption in the event of a problem (Table 5). Admittedly, a few more of the poorest individuals say that it can sometimes be better to disregard the law. Yet those who say this do so less out of a problem with identifying the bounds of illegality than out of constraint in the absence of alternatives when faced with problems.

The poor prove to be much less critical of how democracy works in their country (Table 7). Yet, at the same time, they are relatively more inclined to say that injustice and discrimination have risen and the population's ability to influence government decisions has fallen. Logically, relatively more of the poorest individuals feel that the Members of Parliament do not make much of an effort to listen to the people.

The assumption could be made that these findings explain why the poorest are slightly less interested in public affairs and less inclined to fight against the institutions' dysfunctions. For example, the poor less frequently state that they would lodge a complaint or would join a public protest if their name were withdrawn from the electoral roll (Table 8).

However, the poor appear to be more integrated locally than the rich. They take part relatively more often in community meetings and collective discussions in their area of residence. They also have more frequent contacts with the local authorities (to solve problems or give a point of view; Table 8).

Table 5: First-Hand Experience Of, Perception Of And Attitude Toward Corruption By Poverty Level

	Victim/ experience corruption	No contact with public sector/ admin.	Perception that corruption widespread among gov. officials	Condem- nation: corruption wrong & punishable	Would bribe in the event of a problem	Sometimes it's better to disregard the law
Very poor (often go without)	29.9%	11.9%	26.7%	77.3%	8.8%	18.6%
Poor living conditions	28.0%	12.2%	21.8%	75.9%	10.3%	17.9%
Fairly good conditions	25.4%	12.3%	21.0%	76.0%	8.1%	16.7%
Rich: good conditions	19.6%	16.5%	19.5%	77.1%	6.8%	13.0%
Total	26.0%	13.2%	22.8%	76.7%	8.4%	16.6%

Table 6: Confidence And Interest In The News By Poverty Level

	Most people can be trusted	Get news at least once a week
Very poor (often go without)	18.6%	73.3%
Poor living conditions	16.8%	79.3%
Fairly good conditions	16.8%	84.9%
Rich: good conditions	15.2%	90.5%
Total	17.0%	81.1%

Table 7: Evaluation Of The Running Of The Institutions By Poverty Level

	Satisfaction with democracy	More unequal and unfair treatment	Less ability to influence government decisions	Preference for democracy	Members Parliament listen to the people	Local government officials listen to the people
Very poor (often go without)	40.8%	31.4%	26.5%	72.8%	20.7%	31.1%
Poor living conditions	48.5%	25.8%	20.9%	72.2%	23.0%	33.5%
Fairly good conditions	54.8%	22.5%	18.7%	74.5%	25.8%	35.7%
Rich: good conditions	61.0%	19.7%	16.0%	77.4%	25.2%	31.1%
Total	50.2%	25.6%	21.2%	74.3%	23.2%	32.4%

Table 8: Participation And Involvement In Political Life By Poverty Level

	Interested in Public affairs	Discussion of political matters with relatives, friends	Participation in meetings, collective discussions, demonstrations	Have contacted local authority about problems or to give views	Would fight (lodge complaint, join public protest) if name left off the electoral roll
Very poor (often go without)	65.2%	39.2%	77.3%	26.8%	55.3%
Poor living conditions	68.3%	40.1%	76.9%	25.1%	56.6%
Fairly good conditions	69.1%	38.9%	75.5%	24.8%	57.8%
Rich: good conditions	68.6%	39.3%	67.1%	20.0%	61.3%
Total	67.4%	39.3%	74.2%	24.2%	57.6%

THE MICRO DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION

As already mentioned, our analysis concerns petty bureaucratic corruption. This involves two types of players: the staff of the services in question (civil servants in the case of the public services) and the population as users of the services. The objective is to determine the factors that increase the population's risk of being confronted with and succumbing to corruption (by offering or agreeing to pay a bribe).

Note that the categories of individuals who have no contact with the administration are not likely to be affected by corruption. However, they could well have been faced with the phenomenon if they had conducted any administrative formalities. They might well steer clear of the administration precisely because they are afraid of falling victim to corruption. In our analysis, we endeavour to control for and correct this selection bias by using the Heckman procedure to estimate the risk of being a "victim" of corruption. This approach consists of determining, in a first step, the factors involved in the probability of being in contact with the public services by identifying at least one variable that affects this prospect, but that has no influence on the probability of being affected by corruption (identifying variable). The variable of "having children at school" fulfils these criteria in that, normally, the individuals with this characteristic are in contact with the public education services. At the same time, it could be assumed that "having children" also increases the probability of using the health services. The results of the estimates by and large confirm this hypothesis (see the second part of Table 9 for the estimation of the factors determining the probability of being in contact with the administration). The findings of the tests at aggregate level (first column) show the significance of the relationship between the probability of being confronted with corruption and the probability of being in contact with the administration. This confirms the existence of a selection bias.

We have also endeavoured to differentiate the people who systematically see corruption as a way of solving problems (those who "offer" bribes without necessarily having to) from the people who have really been forced to submit to corruption (who can be more easily identified as "victims" of corruption at this stage in the analysis).⁸ We have therefore introduced control variables concerning the individuals' aversion to the phenomenon of corruption.⁹ It turns out that those who condemn corruption are in effect less inclined to resort to it (Table 9, first column for total findings). At the same time, those who immediately say they would resort to corruption to solve any problems they encountered more have first-

⁸ We will see later in the analysis that the individuals in the first category who can be identified more as the real "bribers" can also be considered to be victims.

⁹ Note, however, that the introduction of these variables changes neither the sign nor the significance of the coefficients on the other variables considered to be determinants of corruption.

hand experience of corruption in which they have paid bribes.¹⁰ Lastly, the fact of considering that it is sometimes better to disregard the law increases the probability of first-hand experience of corruption while conducting administrative formalities.

The overall estimates for the countries studied¹¹ reveal a certain number of major facts. However, it should be noted, as a preliminary observation, that the overall findings (for all the countries) are not systematically borne out in each of the countries studied. In certain cases, even the sign of the coefficients changes from country to country.

Firstly, we can analyse the extent to which certain socio-demographic factors typically put forward by the literature are determinant in explaining the practice of corruption in the countries studied here. If we look at gender, other things being equal, women are found to be less often at risk of being faced with situations of corruption. This finding has already been reported by previous analyses (Gatti *et al.*, 2003). Yet although this finding is obtained systematically in the West African countries, in Kenya and Madagascar, it does not hold in the Southern African countries, with the exception of South Africa.

Religion is another factor put forward by the literature, with the hypothesis that the less hierarchical and more egalitarian Protestant tradition adversely affects corruption (Treisman, 2000). Our analysis does not support this argument since estimation shows no significant link.¹²

The theoretical arguments generally contend that trust between individuals in a given society has a negative effect on the level of corruption, even though the causal link between trust and corruption is actually more complicated (Uslaner, 2007). Basically, it also entails a particular relationship based on mutual trust between the “briber” and the “corrupt official”. Our analysis confirms that the correlation between corruption and trust is far from clear-cut. At the aggregate level, our estimation finds no significant link. However, although interpersonal trust tends to reduce the probability of being confronted with corruption in certain countries (such as Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda), the inverse correlation is observed in other countries (Mali and Tanzania).

Secondly, if we look at the factors of particular interest to us in this paper to analyse the link between corruption and poverty, the findings tend by and large to invalidate the theoretical arguments most often championed in the literature.

The low level of education in poor countries is regularly put forward to explain the significance of corruption. So we need to test the validity of the theory that the level of education or information lowers the level of corruption by making individuals more aware of the distinction between the public and private spheres and by fostering more depersonalised relationships (Treisman, 2000). Our findings reveal an inverse relation. The level of information (regularly keeping up with the news), and the level of education in certain countries, increases the probability of being faced with corruption. Two types of argument could be put forward to explain this finding. On the one hand, the more educated are more

¹⁰ Note here, however, that the direction of the causality is not necessarily obvious. This finding could reflect an acclimatisation effect. The fact of having been confronted with a situation of corruption and having had to pay a bribe could lead individuals to more easily envisage this possibility to solve their problems.

¹¹ Zimbabwe and Benin have been excluded from the estimates due to data problems. In Benin, the virtual non-existence of individuals who have not been in contact with the administration is surprising and it was felt that the information was probably not collected on this variable. In Zimbabwe, certain questions, such as interpersonal trust, were not included in the survey.

¹² The case of South Africa seems to be an exception (with a significant coefficient with the expected negative sign). But the results must be interpreted with caution. We consider only the Protestant mainstream and evangelical/Pentecostal in the estimation model. For some countries, other religion could have been added to this category.

integrated into society life and hence have more frequent contacts with the administration.¹³ On the other hand, this finding could reflect a social interaction effect. The most informed and integrated could be more easily persuaded to envisage or comply with a practice mentioned in the media or in discussions with friends and family.

Another striking finding is the positive and significant correlation (at aggregate level and holding for nine of the 16 countries studied) between the level of poverty and first-hand experience of corruption. This finding can be explained neither by the level of education nor by a lesser aversion to corruption (factors controlled for in the estimates). We interpret this finding as proving that the poorest are more vulnerable and less able to avoid or resist bureaucratic corruption. This argument is upheld by the fact that the individuals who work in the informal sector, and are typified by their insecure situation, are also most often affected by this phenomenon. We hence identify the poor as real “victims” of this curse in their everyday contacts with the public services.

¹³ The estimation procedure used controls for whether or not the individual has been in contact with the public services in the past year, but does not check for the frequency of contacts.

Table 9: Who Is Affected By Petty Corruption?

"Victim" of corruption	(1)=all	Madagascar	Mali	Senegal	Ghana	Nigeria	Kenya
Age	0.012** (2.27)	0.004 (0.29)	-0.011 (0.75)	0.008 (0.53)	0.008 (0.50)	0.019* (1.85)	0.006 (0.62)
Age ²	-0.000*** (4.22)	-0.000 (0.57)	0.000 (0.16)	-0.000 (0.94)	-0.000 (0.67)	-0.000* (1.65)	-0.000 (1.51)
Women	-0.167*** (3.78)	-0.193** (2.24)	-0.399*** (3.59)	-0.282*** (2.87)	-0.358*** (3.71)	-0.152** (2.41)	-0.383*** (4.80)
Head of household	0.022 (0.32)	-0.080 (0.95)	-0.231** (2.07)	-0.072 (0.80)	0.022 (0.21)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.196** (2.27)
Rural	-0.092 (1.57)	0.095 (1.03)	-0.247** (2.37)	-0.081 (0.74)	-0.234** (2.48)	-0.086 (1.47)	-0.311*** (3.57)
Protestant	0.107 (1.46)	-0.013 (0.19)	-5.957 (0.00)	6.666 (0.00)	0.067 (0.75)	0.038 (0.69)	-0.103 (1.39)
Interpersonal trust	-0.008 (0.11)	-0.040 (0.60)	0.207** (2.02)	-0.102 (1.15)	-0.182 (1.43)	-0.147** (2.15)	-0.338*** (3.00)
No education	-0.115 (1.61)	-0.109 (0.91)	0.178 (1.29)	0.059 (0.56)	-0.086 (0.72)	-0.277*** (3.47)	-0.015 (0.11)
Some primary school	-0.128 (1.57)	-0.103 (1.35)	0.155 (1.07)	-0.042 (0.34)	0.039 (0.30)	-0.180 (1.32)	-0.064 (0.66)
Get news once/week	0.114** (2.51)	0.053 (0.62)	0.167 (1.06)	0.238 (1.43)	0.204 (1.17)	0.076 (0.93)	-0.037 (0.25)
News every day	0.239*** (4.21)	0.061 (0.75)	0.278** (1.98)	0.086 (0.61)	0.287* (1.87)	0.183** (2.36)	-0.040 (0.33)
Very poor (often go without)	0.345*** (7.32)	0.115 (1.29)	0.432*** (4.20)	0.276** (2.56)	0.270** (1.97)	0.235*** (3.62)	0.436*** (5.08)
Poor (occasionally go without)	0.230*** (6.20)	0.006 (0.07)	0.405*** (3.62)	0.130 (1.15)	0.175 (1.47)	0.385*** (5.15)	0.311*** (3.18)
Informal work	0.105** (2.07)	-0.143 (1.14)	0.193 (1.28)	0.424** (2.39)	-0.114 (0.94)	0.029 (0.36)	0.074 (0.76)
Would bribe if problem	0.685*** (10.78)	0.641*** (6.75)	0.406*** (2.79)	0.523*** (4.14)	0.646*** (4.32)	0.708*** (5.59)	0.614*** (4.28)
Sometimes better ignore law	0.196*** (5.22)	0.310*** (4.35)	0.176 (1.18)	0.077 (0.68)	0.110 (0.70)	0.164*** (2.65)	0.311*** (2.73)
Condemn corruption	-0.140*** (2.74)	-0.086 (1.31)	-0.246** (2.54)	-0.219* (1.94)	0.061 (0.48)	0.027 (0.50)	-0.047 (0.46)
Constant	-0.958*** (5.87)	-0.458 (1.58)	-0.158 (0.45)	-0.212 (0.56)	-0.646 (1.33)	-0.116 (0.55)	0.547* (1.88)
Contact with admin/public sector		Madagascar	Mali	Senegal	Ghana	Nigeria	Kenya
Women	-0.049* (1.93)	0.027 (0.28)	-0.298*** (2.65)	0.051 (0.51)	-0.105 (1.21)	-0.050 (0.84)	-0.164 (1.56)
Rural	-0.035 (0.52)	-0.548*** (4.09)	-0.112 (0.96)	-0.335*** (3.19)	-0.011 (0.12)	-0.046 (0.78)	0.131 (1.18)
Very poor (often go without)	0.019 (0.25)	0.107 (0.94)	0.041 (0.39)	0.131 (1.35)	0.487*** (4.34)	0.179*** (2.77)	-0.108 (1.02)
No education	-0.124** (2.21)	-0.139 (1.02)	-0.314*** (2.76)	-0.254** (2.53)	-0.104 (1.03)	-0.081 (1.03)	0.104 (0.90)
With children	0.282*** (4.08)	0.411*** (4.95)	0.734*** (6.91)	0.187 (1.48)	0.367*** (2.99)	-0.025 (0.34)	0.528*** (5.03)
Civil servant	0.168** (2.41)	-0.392*** (2.69)	-0.042 (0.17)	0.212 (0.94)	0.293 (1.51)	0.277** (2.21)	-0.077 (0.35)
Inactive	-0.045 (1.14)	-0.164 (1.11)	0.090 (0.74)	-0.247** (2.44)	-0.104 (0.81)	-0.145** (2.57)	-0.156 (1.36)
Constant	1.254*** (12.31)	1.505*** (10.78)	1.009*** (6.17)	1.128*** (8.18)	0.452*** (3.50)	0.727*** (8.62)	1.044*** (8.44)
Observations	21995	1312	1200	1118	1133	2229	1233

Log pseudo-likelihood	-20034.74	-1057.27	-1003.15	-1021.42	-1139.09	-2319.50	-1057.16
Wald chi2		90.56	64.36	40.91	66.07	119.22	771.10
Prob > chi2		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Controlled for selection bias (Heckman procedure)							
Rho	0.91	-1.00	-0.37	-0.86	0.41	-1.00	-1.00
Wald test chi2	17.57	5.46	0.86	3.03	0.44	2.12	5.75
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.02	0.35	0.08	0.51	0.14	0.02

*Note: For Equation (1) = all, with dummy country for "contact", but coefficients are not reproduced. For Equation (1) Robust z statistics in brackets; for the others, absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*

Who Is Affected By Petty Corruption? (Continued)

"Victim" of corruption	Cape Verde	Mozambique	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Lesotho	Namibia	South Afr
Age	-0.013 (0.57)	-0.023 (1.44)	-0.006 (0.31)	0.005 (0.42)	0.062** (2.40)	-0.019 (1.10)	-0.019 (1.12)	0.004 (0.47)
Age ²	0.000 (0.25)	0.000 (1.45)	-0.000 (0.55)	-0.000 (0.78)	-0.001** (2.39)	0.000 (0.30)	0.000 (1.32)	-0.000 (0.76)
Women	-0.077 (0.56)	-0.043 (0.40)	-0.078 (0.84)	0.031 (0.49)	-0.087 (1.08)	0.028 (0.25)	0.043 (0.47)	-0.147** (2.51)
Head of household	0.297* (1.82)	-0.036 (0.38)	0.232** (2.32)	0.293*** (4.26)	-0.104 (1.03)	0.294** (2.17)	0.061 (0.53)	-0.040 (0.82)
Rural	0.137 (0.76)	-0.287*** (3.16)	-0.179* (1.80)	-0.238*** (3.54)	-0.071 (0.79)	0.105 (0.91)	0.134 (1.41)	-0.136** (2.29)
Protestant	0.228 (0.79)	0.223** (2.12)	-0.058 (0.58)	0.052 (0.92)	-0.101 (1.23)	-0.127 (1.21)	-0.010 (0.11)	-0.195** (2.03)
Interpersonal trust	0.163 (0.50)	0.096 (1.00)	0.236* (1.95)	-0.200** (2.55)	0.074 (0.55)	-0.077 (0.52)	0.125 (1.32)	-0.092 (1.16)
No education	-0.548** (2.12)	0.064 (0.50)	-0.134 (0.88)	-0.111 (0.80)	-0.527* (1.90)	-0.254 (1.23)	0.293 (1.62)	0.042 (0.35)
Some primary school	-0.127 (0.80)	-0.215** (2.04)	-0.052 (0.45)	0.022 (0.32)	-0.119 (0.95)	-0.127 (0.99)	0.291** (1.98)	-0.103* (1.68)
Get news once/week	0.203 (0.89)	0.077 (0.59)	0.043 (0.32)	0.058 (0.55)	0.375*** (2.59)	0.045 (0.33)	-0.601** (2.19)	0.110 (0.89)
News every day	0.408* (1.84)	0.052 (0.48)	0.081 (0.68)	0.222** (2.39)	0.291** (2.38)	0.107 (0.82)	0.177 (0.77)	0.083 (0.85)
Very poor (often go without)	0.455** (2.53)	0.239** (2.17)	0.299*** (3.06)	0.389*** (3.83)	0.063 (0.65)	0.121 (0.92)	0.119 (1.06)	0.106 (1.49)
Poor (occasionally go without)	-0.236 (0.96)	0.171 (1.39)	0.278*** (2.62)	0.150* (1.84)	0.173 (1.56)	0.092 (0.73)	0.066 (0.56)	0.103 (1.62)
Informal work	0.367* (1.93)	0.157 (0.68)	0.365** (2.16)	0.273*** (2.70)	-0.014 (0.09)	0.046 (0.30)	-0.203 (0.86)	-0.087 (1.06)
Would bribe if problem	0.643* (1.67)	0.765*** (3.39)	0.734*** (4.86)	0.524*** (6.41)	0.643*** (3.45)	0.872*** (6.51)	0.517*** (2.70)	1.175*** (4.13)
Sometimes better ignore law	0.212 (1.00)	0.379*** (2.96)	0.228** (1.97)	0.274*** (3.04)	0.181* (1.88)	-0.050 (0.30)	0.430*** (4.67)	0.020 (0.34)
Condemn corruption	-0.375*** (2.70)	-0.230** (2.45)	0.172* (1.75)	0.085 (1.44)	0.069 (0.81)	-0.087 (0.54)	-0.395*** (4.39)	-0.184*** (2.92)
Constant	-1.285** (2.01)	0.531 (1.61)	-0.828** (2.20)	-0.669*** (2.58)	-1.746*** (3.17)	-0.807** (2.00)	-0.565 (1.36)	0.056 (0.30)
Contact with public sector								
Women	-0.009 (0.09)	-0.223* (1.94)	-0.024 (0.27)	0.032 (0.45)	0.075 (0.64)	-0.206 (1.57)	-0.193** (2.23)	-0.003 (0.06)
Rural	-0.484*** (5.06)	0.148 (1.34)	-0.119 (1.06)	-0.228*** (2.67)	-0.139 (1.15)	0.138 (1.19)	0.176** (1.97)	0.265*** (4.44)
Very poor (often go without)	0.151 (1.31)	0.066 (0.60)	-0.089 (0.95)	-0.553*** (7.58)	-0.053 (0.46)	0.672*** (4.26)	-0.150 (1.51)	0.127* (1.78)

No education	0.166 (1.31)	-0.226* (1.81)	-0.104 (0.75)	-0.483*** (4.70)	-0.191 (0.74)	0.031 (0.16)	-0.077 (0.49)	0.098 (0.80)
With children	0.551*** (5.15)	0.188 (1.20)	0.490*** (4.94)	0.176* (1.90)	0.259* (1.67)	0.284** (2.50)	1.009*** (8.52)	0.210*** (3.55)
Civil servant	-0.004 (0.02)	0.447 (1.59)	0.377 (1.39)	0.367** (2.12)	0.080 (0.36)	0.302 (1.10)	-0.065 (0.53)	0.351*** (3.53)
Inactive	-0.144 (1.36)	-0.179 (1.44)	0.128 (0.85)	-0.248*** (2.87)	-0.324*** (2.63)	0.358*** (2.63)	0.214** (2.26)	-0.065 (1.35)
Constant	0.925*** (8.06)	1.101*** (6.20)	0.737*** (5.48)	1.559*** (14.12)	1.415*** (8.03)	0.933*** (7.12)	-0.139 (1.00)	0.231*** (3.38)
Observations	1203	939	1236	2376	1162	1146	1156	2265
Log pseudo-likelihood	-697.21	-866.91	-1077.40	-2177.82	-944.61	-657.43	-1108.99	-2143.63
Wald chi2	40.99	48.93	82.16	153.53	26.74	73.55	79.41	50.04
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00
Controlled for selection bias (Heckman procedure)								
Rho	-0.47	-0.85	1.00	0.22	-0.69	0.97	0.37	-0.99
Wald test chi2	0.35	0.13	1.51	0.28	1.12	1.61	0.96	7.87
Prob > chi2	0.55	0.72	0.22	0.59	0.29	0.20	0.33	0.01

*Note: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*
Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, Third Round, 2005, our own calculations

THE LINKS BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND THE EVALUATION OF THE RUNNING OF THE INSTITUTIONS

The next step in our approach consists of analysing how the population sees corruption and what repercussions this has on their attitude toward the public institutions. To do this, we first of all analyse the impact of first-hand experience and the perception of corruption on the evaluation of the running and efficiency of the institutions.

We clearly find that the fact of having been a victim of corruption along with the perception of this curse as widespread leads to negative judgments of the performance of the institutions (Table 10). These two factors foster the feeling of a downturn in the situation in terms of injustice in the country (Model 1). Those who are victims of corruption, despite their clear condemnation of this phenomenon, are more inclined to say that things have got worse in this area. The correlation between considering that “it is sometimes better to disregard the law” and having a negative assessment of the development of injustice in the country would also suggest that such a position, in favour of illegal practices, is adopted as the only alternative when faced with injustice and the public authorities’ lack of ability to control it.

First-hand experience of corruption and the perception that it is widespread also tend to reinforce the feeling that ordinary people have less and less power to influence government decisions (Model 2). Firstly, when corruption is widespread, public decisions are dictated by private interests and have little to do with the concerns of the people as a whole. Secondly, first-hand experience of corruption can lead individuals to feel like victims of an institutionalised system that they cannot fight and that only the public authorities can correct. The individual’s incapacity to remedy the situation hence triggers a realisation of how little power the people have to influence the decision-making processes. Here again, the positive correlation between the feeling of gradually losing latitude to influence decisions and the fact of considering that “it is sometimes better to disregard the law” or that corruption is the only way of solving problems with administrative formalities show that these positions stem from an attitude of resignation.

More generally, experienced and perceived corruption has an adverse effect on the level of satisfaction with how democracy works (Model 3). This negative appraisal even leads individuals to have reservations about their support for democratic principles (Model 4).

Note that, other things being equal, the poor are generally more inclined to say that the situation has deteriorated, whether in terms of injustice or in terms of capacity to influence public decisions. The results of the estimates also show that they are relatively more critical of how democracy works and tend more not to support the principles of a democratic system. Given that the poor are also more often victims of corruption, which in turn reinforces these trends, we show the extent to which this phenomenon adversely affects the poor.

THE LINKS BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND EXCLUSION FROM POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The aim of this last step in our approach is to evaluate how much of an impact corruption can have on individual participation in the country’s political affairs. We have chosen four different criteria to take account of the different types of participation in political affairs.¹⁴ These are the interest expressed in public affairs; participation in political discussions with friends and family; participation in community

¹⁴ Voting in elections could have been a relevant indicator for this approach. However, our data rule out consideration of this variable in studying the direction of the causality tested. Given that in most of the countries, the last elections (on which participation is covered by the surveys) date back more than two years before the survey, they pertain to a period prior to the experience of corruption and the opinions expressed by the individuals.

meetings, gatherings and demonstrations; and the propensity to speak out, lodge complaints or take part in marches to protest against being left off the electoral rolls (Table 11).

Table 10: Links Between Corruption And Perception Of The Running Of The Institutions

	(1a) More unequal and unfair treatment	(1b) More unequal and unfair treatment	(2a) Less ability to influence govt decisions	(2b) Less ability to influence govt decisions	(3a) Satisfaction with democracy	(3b) Satisfaction with democracy	(4a) Preference for democracy	(4b) Preference for democracy
No education	-0.157** (2.12)	-0.164** (2.24)	-0.142* (1.94)	-0.151** (2.08)	0.224*** (3.65)	0.233*** (3.83)	-0.390*** (6.43)	-0.369*** (6.13)
Some primary school	-0.194*** (2.85)	-0.200*** (3.02)	-0.185*** (2.78)	-0.194*** (2.92)	0.206** (2.49)	0.217*** (2.64)	-0.271*** (3.40)	-0.256*** (3.22)
Primary school complete	-0.130*** (4.33)	-0.129*** (4.28)	-0.086** (2.14)	-0.085** (2.06)	0.145*** (2.99)	0.148*** (3.08)	-0.168** (2.44)	-0.169** (2.39)
Some secondary school	-0.119** (2.51)	-0.124*** (2.64)	-0.073 (1.32)	-0.080 (1.44)	0.084* (1.73)	0.091* (1.93)	-0.093 (1.62)	-0.085 (1.53)
Get news once/week	-0.034 (0.84)	-0.032 (0.81)	-0.056 (1.35)	-0.057 (1.35)	-0.022 (0.51)	-0.021 (0.48)	0.101** (2.05)	0.091* (1.92)
News every day	-0.093* (1.84)	-0.087* (1.81)	-0.113* (1.95)	-0.111* (1.95)	0.068*** (2.62)	0.067** (2.53)	0.187*** (3.93)	0.172*** (3.53)
Women	-0.013 (0.57)	-0.008 (0.37)	-0.020 (0.70)	-0.016 (0.58)	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.18)	-0.114*** (3.85)	-0.118*** (4.01)
Head of household	-0.015 (0.55)	-0.015 (0.52)	-0.016 (0.43)	-0.015 (0.42)	0.006 (0.24)	0.005 (0.19)	0.043 (1.45)	0.038 (1.41)
Rural	-0.124*** (3.20)	-0.123*** (3.21)	-0.104*** (3.03)	-0.102*** (3.07)	0.131*** (5.04)	0.129*** (5.04)	0.021 (0.50)	0.018 (0.44)
Age	-0.003 (0.83)	-0.003 (0.78)	-0.005 (1.00)	-0.005 (0.90)	0.009 (1.34)	0.009 (1.27)	0.023*** (3.89)	0.023*** (3.84)
Age ²	0.000 (1.23)	0.000 (1.21)	0.000 (0.93)	0.000 (0.86)	-0.000* (1.94)	-0.000* (1.88)	-0.000*** (3.44)	-0.000*** (3.43)
Interpersonal trust	-0.186*** (3.16)	-0.182*** (3.15)	-0.102** (2.25)	-0.099** (2.22)	0.161*** (5.59)	0.157*** (5.37)	0.053 (1.10)	0.054 (1.16)
No contact/admin.	0.035 (0.53)	0.035 (0.54)	-0.007 (0.14)	-0.008 (0.15)	-0.047 (1.01)	-0.048 (1.01)	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.08)
Very poor	0.187*** (3.35)	0.174*** (2.61)	0.135*** (3.00)	0.133** (2.03)	-0.163*** (5.18)	-0.159*** (5.13)	-0.067** (2.45)	-0.108** (2.26)
Perception govt corrupt	0.117*** (10.92)	0.115*** (11.23)	0.090*** (6.77)	0.087*** (6.42)	-0.108*** (13.71)	-0.104*** (12.74)	-0.039*** (3.55)	-0.035*** (3.36)
Corruption "victim"	0.195*** (4.21)	0.075 (1.32)	0.177*** (5.74)	0.178*** (3.18)	-0.097*** (3.18)	-0.026 (0.36)	-0.177*** (4.54)	-0.166** (2.02)
Corruption * Poor		0.039 (0.75)		0.008 (0.10)		-0.011 (0.19)		0.115 (1.50)
Condemn corruption		-0.029 (0.47)		0.049 (1.07)		-0.058 (1.30)		0.100** (2.24)
Sometimes better ignore law		0.148*** (2.92)		0.161*** (3.12)		-0.187*** (2.81)		-0.351*** (7.62)
Would bribe if problem		0.108* (1.71)		0.125*** (3.23)		-0.071** (2.32)		-0.098* (1.86)
Condemn * victim corrupt.		0.123** (1.97)		-0.032 (0.67)		-0.071 (0.99)		-0.022 (0.40)
Observations	15649	15649	15649	15649	13691	13691	13935	13935
Log pseudo-likelihood	-8178.56	-8159.74	-7425.38	-7406.28	-15813.88	-15777.92	-7467.20	-7388.91
Pseudo-R squared	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.07

Note: ordered probit model; Robust z statistics in brackets

** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*

Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, Third Round, 2005, our own calculations

Firstly, the perception of the extent and widespread nature of corruption prompts individuals to lose interest in public affairs (Table 11, Model 1). First-hand experience of corruption does not come into play here. Nevertheless, the estimates find a cross effect between poverty and experience of corruption: the poor who are victims of corruption tend to lose interest in public affairs. More generally, the perception of a worsening of injustice also has this same adverse effect. However, the fact of condemning corruption, but nonetheless being a victim of it, gives rise to a more positive reaction to involvement in political affairs (increased interest), probably due to a resolve to fight this curse.

Secondly, experience of corruption is positively correlated with participation in political discussions with friends and family (Model 2). We can assume that this is the most easily accessible way for all the victims to speak out and protest against an injustice they have suffered. Those who state that they condemn corruption are also more inclined to discuss politics with friends and family. Yet here again, the poor who have been direct victims of corruption in their administrative dealings react differently and tend to turn their backs on politics by excluding the subject from their everyday conversations.

We observe the same kind of findings as those found previously (Model 3) when it comes to participation in collective community-level actions (meetings, gatherings for discussions and debates, and demonstrations). Other things being equal, first-hand experience of corruption increases the probability of becoming involved in these forms of civic action. In general, the poor are less inclined to take part in them. The poor who are victims of corruption tend to opt out even more of community life and avoid collective action. These findings can be explained by the effect of corruption on the loss of interest in public affairs.

Lastly, when individuals are asked for their reactions if their names were omitted from the electoral roll (when they had registered to vote), the impact of corruption on attitudes is again clearly demonstrated. The perception that corruption is widespread prompts an acceptance of the dysfunctions (by being passive or resorting to corruption) rather than a will to fight them by envisaging lodging complaints or joining protest marches (Model 4). In fact, the higher the level of corruption, the less the individuals feel they are able to resist and fight the phenomenon.

These findings highlight the adverse effect of corruption on the population's attitude and their involvement in political actions. The feeling of discouragement and resignation that this phenomenon tends to induce is all the more detrimental in that it reduces people's latitude to fight and resist corruption to remedy the deterioration in their living conditions.

The impact is even more marked among the poorest. These individuals, already generally thin on the ground on the political scene, become completely disaffected following a first-hand experience of corruption. They hence suffer a double setback and find themselves stuck in a poverty trap. In effect, they have no means left with which to influence the decision-making processes and make their voices heard.

Table 11: Links Between Corruption And Exclusion From The Political Sphere

	(1a) Interest in public affairs	(1b) Interest in public affairs	(1c) Interest in public affairs	(2a) Discuss political matters	(2b) Discuss political matters	(2c) Discuss political matters
No education	-0.319*** (5.73)	-0.319*** (5.77)	-0.323*** (6.17)	-0.421*** (6.51)	-0.420*** (6.48)	-0.413*** (6.65)
Some primary school	-0.231*** (4.12)	-0.229*** (4.13)	-0.236*** (4.65)	-0.294*** (4.82)	-0.295*** (4.84)	-0.293*** (5.20)
Primary school complete	-0.163*** (3.95)	-0.161*** (3.88)	-0.166*** (4.15)	-0.182*** (4.28)	-0.182*** (4.21)	-0.180*** (4.31)
Some secondary school	-0.108*** (2.67)	-0.106*** (2.61)	-0.110*** (2.83)	-0.080** (2.34)	-0.079** (2.34)	-0.079** (2.41)
Get news once/week	0.195*** (4.98)	0.196*** (4.96)	0.195*** (4.88)	0.201*** (3.74)	0.198*** (3.67)	0.197*** (3.63)
News every day	0.482*** (13.43)	0.481*** (13.29)	0.479*** (13.33)	0.459*** (7.82)	0.453*** (7.78)	0.450*** (7.74)
Women	-0.213*** (7.46)	-0.213*** (7.46)	-0.212*** (7.62)	-0.321*** (10.57)	-0.321*** (10.48)	-0.319*** (10.43)
Head of household	0.139*** (5.75)	0.139*** (5.86)	0.138*** (5.86)	0.057** (2.18)	0.056** (2.19)	0.055** (2.17)
Rural	0.090** (2.19)	0.090** (2.17)	0.083* (1.95)	0.001 (0.03)	0.002 (0.05)	-0.000 (0.01)
Age	0.013*** (3.75)	0.013*** (3.59)	0.012*** (3.32)	0.024*** (5.60)	0.024*** (5.50)	0.024*** (5.31)
Age ²	-0.000*** (3.19)	-0.000*** (3.07)	-0.000*** (2.79)	-0.000*** (4.86)	-0.000*** (4.81)	-0.000*** (4.68)
Interpersonal trust	0.073 (1.57)	0.074 (1.58)	0.066 (1.45)	0.075 (1.50)	0.077 (1.54)	0.074 (1.51)
No contact/admin.	-0.037 (0.71)	-0.037 (0.72)	-0.035 (0.67)	0.011 (0.18)	0.012 (0.19)	0.012 (0.18)
Very poor	0.007 (0.21)	0.053 (1.11)	0.036 (0.81)	0.026 (0.85)	0.060* (1.86)	0.031 (0.98)
Perception govt corrupt	-0.025** (2.48)	-0.026*** (2.59)	-0.019** (2.14)	-0.004 (0.38)	-0.005 (0.40)	-0.003 (0.28)
Corruption "victim"	0.053 (1.24)	0.040 (0.53)	0.049 (0.65)	0.101*** (3.69)	0.191*** (3.26)	0.200*** (3.29)
Corruption*Poor		-0.133* (1.74)	-0.139* (1.80)		-0.103** (2.11)	-0.111** (2.30)
Condemns corruption		-0.015 (0.45)	-0.016 (0.48)		0.090*** (3.04)	0.088*** (2.96)
Sometimes better ignore law		-0.030 (0.90)	-0.015 (0.50)		-0.040 (1.63)	-0.030 (1.33)
Would bribe if problem		0.018 (0.32)	0.025 (0.43)		0.006 (0.17)	0.010 (0.28)
Condemn * victim corruption		0.087* (1.93)	0.091** (2.07)		-0.069 (1.01)	-0.068 (1.00)
Dissatisfied with democracy			-0.073** (2.06)			-0.020 (0.60)
Poor*Dissatisfied/ democracy			0.074* (1.88)			0.094** (2.03)
More unequal and unfair treatment			-0.096** (2.34)			-0.036 (0.96)
Democracy not preferable			-0.075** (2.30)			-0.091** (2.55)
Observations	15542	15542	15542	15530	15530	15530

Log pseudo-likelihood	-19425.24	-19416.46	-19393.11	-15459.41	-15448.77	-15436.04
Pseudo-R squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05

*Note: Robust z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*

Table 12: Links Between Corruption And Exclusion From The Political Sphere (Continued)

	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)
	Collective action	Collective action	Collective action	Would fight (complaint, protest) if pb/ electoral roll	Would fight (complaint, protest) if pb/ electoral roll	Would fight (complaint, protest) if pb/ electoral roll
No education	-0.204*** (2.71)	-0.206*** (2.86)	-0.199*** (2.71)	-0.365*** (4.74)	-0.350*** (4.53)	-0.347*** (4.68)
Some primary school	-0.140** (2.28)	-0.142** (2.44)	-0.138** (2.45)	-0.313*** (5.82)	-0.302*** (5.78)	-0.304*** (5.62)
Primary school complete	-0.093* (1.80)	-0.093* (1.84)	-0.091* (1.81)	-0.153*** (3.57)	-0.155*** (3.67)	-0.156*** (3.46)
Some secondary school	-0.020 (0.38)	-0.020 (0.39)	-0.020 (0.39)	-0.072** (2.47)	-0.067** (2.50)	-0.068*** (2.59)
Get news once/week	0.145*** (3.95)	0.144*** (3.82)	0.142*** (3.81)	0.167*** (3.96)	0.163*** (3.96)	0.163*** (3.86)
News every day	0.301*** (7.12)	0.296*** (6.99)	0.293*** (7.00)	0.232*** (5.15)	0.221*** (5.14)	0.218*** (5.01)
Women	-0.252*** (5.14)	-0.253*** (5.21)	-0.252*** (5.13)	-0.103*** (3.56)	-0.110*** (3.84)	-0.108*** (3.85)
Head of household	0.152*** (7.04)	0.151*** (7.09)	0.151*** (7.09)	0.022 (0.80)	0.018 (0.66)	0.017 (0.61)
Rural	0.302*** (11.30)	0.303*** (11.48)	0.304*** (11.98)	0.006 (0.17)	0.002 (0.06)	-0.003 (0.07)
Age	0.046*** (9.08)	0.046*** (8.97)	0.046*** (8.93)	0.016*** (3.26)	0.015*** (3.10)	0.014*** (2.83)
Age ²	-0.000*** (7.70)	-0.000*** (7.70)	-0.000*** (7.78)	-0.000*** (3.18)	-0.000*** (3.06)	-0.000*** (2.70)
Interpersonal trust	-0.015 (0.32)	-0.015 (0.32)	-0.014 (0.30)	-0.132*** (2.85)	-0.137*** (2.91)	-0.143*** (3.02)
No contact/admin.	-0.156*** (4.33)	-0.154*** (4.44)	-0.155*** (4.48)	-0.136* (1.89)	-0.139* (1.90)	-0.139* (1.87)
Very poor	0.101*** (3.39)	0.157*** (4.70)	0.119*** (3.97)	0.011 (0.32)	-0.031 (0.66)	-0.016 (0.31)
Perception govt corrupt	-0.007 (0.85)	-0.007 (0.84)	-0.008 (1.07)	-0.043*** (4.18)	-0.038*** (3.66)	-0.034*** (3.59)
Corruption "victim"	0.169*** (3.96)	0.311*** (4.03)	0.312*** (4.08)	-0.098** (2.12)	-0.126 (1.37)	-0.115 (1.29)
Corruption*Poor		-0.169** (2.47)	-0.176** (2.57)		0.107 (1.40)	0.104 (1.41)
Condemn corruption		0.097* (1.92)	0.096* (1.89)		0.113** (2.00)	0.111** (1.97)
Sometimes better ignore law		-0.004 (0.11)	-0.008 (0.18)		-0.211*** (4.05)	-0.191*** (3.90)
Would bribe if problem		-0.053 (1.42)	-0.053 (1.39)		-0.346*** (4.32)	-0.341*** (4.27)
Condemn * victim corruption		-0.103* (1.67)	-0.102* (1.68)		0.047 (0.63)	0.047 (0.64)
Dissatisfied with democracy			0.024 (0.61)			-0.032 (0.59)
Poor*Dissatisfied/ democracy			0.107** (2.16)			-0.018 (0.38)
More unequal and unfair treatment			-0.030 (0.78)			-0.043 (1.23)
Democracy not preferable			-0.006			-0.150***

			(0.13)			(2.93)
Observations	15649	15649	15649	15649	15649	15649
Log pseudo-likelihood	-18574.96	-18557.10	-18548.33	-9912.54	-9823.66	-9801.99
Pseudo-R squared	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07

*Note: Robust z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*

CONCLUSION

Our analysis finds a mechanism by means of which corruption and poverty are interlinked and could reinforce one another in a vicious cycle. The poor, more often affected by corruption, are also the most vulnerable. They are more inclined to become discouraged in the face of the scale of this phenomenon and its associated injustices. Their latitude to influence decisions is all the more reduced in that their political power is already limited and that they also more often tend to give in to and accept it, and even become politically disaffected, rather than use existing means to speak out against and fight corruption.

This highlights the importance of the role and credibility of the institutions. Given that the vast majority of the population condemns corruption, changes in individual behaviour with regard to this phenomenon can only come about if there is a strong signal from the public authorities. Two conditions are essential to prevent an attitude of resignation among the population: firstly, efficiency from the institutions, especially the democratic institutions, to give the people the wherewithal to make their concerns heard and influence public decisions; and secondly, the will of the public authorities and their ability to repress or at least limit corruption.

These findings call for a certain number of more detailed and expanded studies. Among the possible avenues of research, we would mention three:

- Firstly, a more in-depth look at national particularities and a more detailed study of the characteristics of the different countries. This is because, although this study shows that general trends can be singled out, these trends do not systematically apply to all the countries studied.
- Secondly, and to take proper account of national environments, the effects of social interactions should be considered. The contexts, and especially the predominant opinions and attitudes in a given society, influence individual reactions to corruption. For example, among the explanatory factors, macro characteristics (findings per country) should be considered using the survey data themselves (level of trust between individuals or percentage of those who trust their fellow citizens, level of condemnation of corruption, extent of corruption, level of development, and general evaluation of the quality and performance of the institutions). Some of this study's findings regarding the impact of the perception of the level of corruption, the effect of keeping up with the news/being informed, and the level of trust in fellow citizens suggest that a society's social interaction variables influence individual behaviour.
- Lastly, more detailed analyses could be made to clarify causal link direction and to elucidate the mechanisms that lead people to condemn corruption as well as those that prompt people to consider the possibility of resorting to corruption in the event of a problem.

APPENDICES

First-Hand Experience Of, Perception Of And Attitude Toward Corruption

	Victim/ experience corruption	No contact with public sector/ admin.	Perception that corruption widespread among gov. officials	Condemnation: corruption wrong & punishable	Would bribe in the event of a problem	Sometimes it's better to disregard the law
Benin	32.5%	0.3%	37.8%	82.2%	26.0%	13.2%
Botswana	3.7%	10.4%	16.8%	79.1%	0.6%	11.0%
Cape Verde	7.0%	10.9%	6.6%	70.8%	1.7%	8.3%
Ghana	31.7%	21.5%	16.3%	86.9%	9.7%	7.4%
Kenya	48.1%	8.4%	30.3%	83.9%	9.1%	12.4%
Lesotho	11.3%	7.9%	3.7%	89.4%	10.3%	10.6%
Madagascar	26.3%	10.7%	8.0%	58.3%	13.3%	30.9%
Malawi	9.8%	15.7%	16.8%	87.5%	1.8%	25.5%
Mali	23.9%	12.7%	27.3%	71.9%	8.6%	8.0%
Mozambique	38.7%	10.2%	8.8%	70.3%	4.5%	13.9%
Namibia	26.8%	22.3%	26.6%	57.8%	4.0%	35.9%
Nigeria	41.5%	24.1%	56.7%	66.2%	6.4%	22.0%
Senegal	25.1%	16.8%	16.5%	87.9%	11.0%	10.5%
South Africa	16.9%	27.1%	29.9%	87.7%	1.2%	16.6%
Tanzania	21.9%	15.8%	5.9%	72.7%	6.1%	11.2%
Uganda	40.6%	12.8%	25.5%	62.1%	12.9%	10.2%
Zambia	28.8%	7.5%	30.6%	69.2%	4.2%	19.4%
Zimbabwe	33.0%	3.1%	45.8%	95.1%	18.7%	32.6%
Total	26.0%	13.2%	22.8%	76.6%	8.3%	16.7%

Poverty, Trust And Keeping Up With The News By Poverty Level

Country	Most people can be trusted	Get news at least once a week	Very poor
Benin	27.4%	79.3%	41.5%
Botswana	5.9%	82.5%	20.9%
Cape Verde	3.4%	83.1%	25.3%
Ghana	15.7%	87.2%	24.0%
Kenya	9.8%	87.3%	39.2%
Lesotho	16.6%	55.6%	29.5%
Madagascar	32.8%	66.5%	24.7%
Malawi	6.9%	80.6%	52.8%
Mali	22.8%	84.6%	28.8%
Mozambique	25.2%	72.5%	43.9%
Namibia	28.2%	96.2%	25.3%
Nigeria	12.6%	86.1%	33.3%
Senegal	26.8%	91.5%	44.5%
South Africa	15.5%	95.5%	20.3%
Tanzania	12.6%	80.3%	32.0%
Uganda	17.3%	84.7%	47.9%

Zambia	9.9%	81.4%	44.8%
Zimbabwe		63.0%	66.2%
Total	17.0%	81.0%	35.8%

Participation And Involvement In Political Affairs

Country	Interested in public affairs	Discussion of political matters with relatives, friends	Participation in meetings, collective discussions, demonstrations	Have contacted local authority about problems or to give views	Would fight (lodge complaint, join public protest) if name left off the electoral roll
Benin	61.9%	32.8%	62.3%	20.9%	39.1%
Botswana	74.1%	36.4%	80.3%	25.9%	77.4%
Cape Verde	50.6%	31.5%	48.7%	15.8%	63.7%
Ghana	71.8%	43.8%	68.0%	14.1%	70.1%
Kenya	66.9%	41.2%	78.6%	34.8%	67.8%
Lesotho	82.5%	30.0%	87.6%	28.1%	56.3%
Madagascar	49.6%	43.2%	94.8%	18.1%	54.7%
Malawi	75.4%	30.6%	82.3%	18.1%	69.3%
Mali	69.0%	35.3%	67.0%	29.5%	37.0%
Mozambique	69.4%	39.7%	84.1%	8.9%	49.4%
Namibia	77.6%	34.2%	64.0%	16.6%	40.1%
Nigeria	59.7%	43.5%	59.9%	19.1%	51.6%
Senegal	71.9%	44.3%	71.7%	24.7%	47.5%
South Africa	61.7%	38.3%	67.3%	22.5%	61.4%
Tanzania	82.2%	47.6%	87.0%	29.2%	68.9%
Uganda	73.9%	43.9%	83.7%	61.8%	59.5%
Zambia	56.4%	43.1%	71.2%	19.7%	58.6%
Zimbabwe	56.8%	47.4%	74.8%		57.6%
Total	67.3%	39.3%	74.1%	24.0%	57.2%

Evaluation Of The Running Of The Institutions

Country	Satisfaction with democracy	More unequal and unfair treatment	Less ability to influence government decisions	Preference for democracy	Members of Parliament listen to the people	Local government officials listen to the people
Benin	53.8%	21.9%	10.9%	82.8%	16.9%	34.8%
Botswana	72.5%	19.9%	11.8%	77.5%	30.3%	35.5%
Cape Verde	54.5%	22.0%	13.4%	83.8%	12.6%	14.6%
Ghana	71.3%	17.6%	13.7%	84.1%	26.0%	36.2%
Kenya	52.2%	26.1%	21.7%	85.5%	12.8%	21.7%
Lesotho	43.8%	27.8%	10.7%	54.1%	16.5%	27.1%
Madagascar	49.4%	15.1%	16.5%	52.3%	16.9%	34.2%
Malawi	27.8%	30.3%	24.8%	58.2%	23.4%	27.3%
Mali	57.3%	20.5%	12.4%	69.3%	27.2%	53.3%
Mozambique	63.5%	17.9%	11.6%	73.8%	28.4%	31.9%
Namibia	72.8%	12.6%	9.4%	65.8%	46.4%	43.9%
Nigeria	27.6%	51.3%	51.8%	68.5%	15.6%	20.6%

Senegal	59.3%	20.8%	10.8%	84.8%	18.9%	30.8%
South Africa	64.5%	18.1%	13.6%	71.2%	22.5%	20.2%
Tanzania	38.7%	9.5%	27.4%	91.0%	52.9%	67.6%
Uganda	48.3%	28.1%	22.4%	84.9%	19.4%	40.0%
Zambia	31.3%	35.3%	31.8%	74.0%	9.6%	14.5%
Zimbabwe	14.1%	65.4%	65.0%	91.1%	21.5%	26.9%
Total	50.2%	25.6%	21.1%	74.2%	23.2%	32.3%

Religion

Country	PROTESTANT (mainstream; evangelical/Pentecostal)	MUSLIM	CATHOLIC & OTHER CHRISTIAN
Benin	10.5%	22.8%	42.7%
Botswana	10.1%	0.1%	32.5%
Cape Verde	3.6%	0.1%	81.1%
Ghana	38.8%	15.9%	31.7%
Kenya	39.4%	9.0%	35.6%
Lesotho	48.5%	0.1%	45.7%
Madagascar	40.4%	1.8%	40.3%
Malawi	44.2%	13.1%	24.6%
Mali	0.4%	94.9%	2.3%
Mozambique	18.6%	18.9%	42.3%
Namibia	50.3%	0.1%	38.1%
Nigeria	29.8%	44.1%	21.2%
Senegal	0.2%	95.9%	3.0%
South Africa	4.5%	1.6%	68.3%
Tanzania	21.5%	25.0%	41.8%
Uganda	42.9%	10.6%	43.5%
Zambia	36.6%	0.3%	38.9%
Zimbabwe	15.1%	0.7%	53.0%
Total	25.3%	19.7%	38.1%

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