

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 85

**PERCEIVED CORRUPTION,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND SOCIAL
INFLUENCE IN SENEGAL**

by Carrie Konold

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



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Perceived Corruption, Public Opinion, and Social Influence in Senegal

Abstract

I explore public perceptions of corruption in the Senegalese case using public opinion survey data collected by the Afrobarometer in 2005. The primary questions I ask in this paper are: what can we learn by asking citizens to report their perceptions of corruption in social and political surveys as compared to a sort of ethnographic approach? What do these survey questions tell us about citizens' perceptions and experiences with corruption in the Senegalese case? Finally, how do perceptions of corruption vary between individuals, and within the national state? I suggest that multi-level statistical techniques can help us to move toward new ways of conceptualizing citizens' interactions with the state at levels other than the national. The paper demonstrates that individual-level effects do vary by environment, and that the climate of opinion surrounding an individual may directly affect individual evaluations.

INTRODUCTION

The “contextual” approach to the study of public opinion posits that the worlds in which individuals live, work, socialize, and worship provide opportunities for social interaction. Social interaction in turn provides information and opportunities for discussion about society and politics. Through everyday social interactions, individual political attitudes are either reinforced or challenged. Attitudes may be strengthened, individuals may be persuaded away from a previously held attitude, or social interaction may simply help shape a new preference or evaluation where one did not previously exist. Scholars of American politics have investigated how individual attitudes are shaped by the surrounding attitudes in neighborhoods (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), churches (Wald, Owen et al. 1988; Wald, Owen et al. 1990; Jelen 1992), and workplaces (Mutz and Mondak 2006), while others have looked at communication within social networks (Lazarsfeld, Berelson et al. 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld et al. 1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Yet despite these efforts to incorporate environment into our study of political behavior, the individual as unit of analysis, with aggregation to the level of the national state, remains the dominant framework for scholars of public opinion.

As public opinion research has expanded around the world with such surveys as the global ‘barometers,’ scholars have adopted this focus on the individual as unit of analysis, while aggregating to the national-state for comparative purposes. Yet there are many social contexts between the individual and the national environment that most likely intervene in shaping individual attitudes. Particularly given the countless innovative and informative studies that have emphasized the importance of local context in shaping meanings and attitudes (see Schaffer 1998), I suggest that contextual approaches are well-suited to the study of public opinion in Africa. In this paper, I explore some of the ways that living and interacting with other individuals in one’s district shapes individual perceptions of corruption. The major hypothesis of this paper is that individuals in distinct geographic localities experience life and politics in similar ways, and these shared daily experiences *and* the social communication that occurs about them shapes individual attitudes. Though I do not explore institutional variation at the local level in this paper, this hypothesis is not inconsistent with approaches that focus on the influence of institutions on attitude formation, as institutions and institutional performance most certainly also vary by local context. Given variations in institutional performance and capacity at the local level, citizens in particular places will interact with these institutions and will collectively be shaped by these localized realities. But social and political discussion will occur about these experiences, which also takes place in localized space. I propose that a focus on the social influence occurring within geographic districts complements an institutional approach.

Much discussion of corruption in Africa takes place at a generalized level, with scholarship taking an historical state-level approach and explaining the origins of widespread corruption in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial state or the nature of the African state. In response to recent attempts to examine corruption empirically and at an individual-level by examining experiences with and understandings of corruption (Hasty 2005; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006), I hope to add to these efforts by studying citizens’ perceptions of corruption at the individual and contextual levels in one particular place in West Africa—Senegal. I explore public perceptions of corruption in the Senegalese case using public opinion survey data collected by the Afrobarometer in 2005. Citizens of any particular society will ultimately decide for themselves what constitutes corruption and whether and how to hold elected leaders, public officials, businessmen and women, and fellow citizens accountable for corrupt behavior. So, while taking an institutional approach to the study of corruption is important, I believe that we must also examine the ways that citizens themselves understand and perceive corruption. I begin by first examining the ways that individuals respond to survey questions about corruption, and then by testing hypotheses about the relationships between certain individual and contextual-variables and perceptions of corruption.

Conflicting empirical evidence on levels of corruption in Senegal make it an interesting place to examine perceptions of corruption.¹ Senegal ranks at a respectable seventh place in Transparency International's 2006 list of the most corrupt countries in Africa, and 70th worldwide, which might give the impression that there is less corruption in Senegal than many other countries in Africa.² Furthermore, as anti-corruption campaigns by organizations such as the World Bank and IMF posit that good governance is a means of reducing corruption, and many scholars argue that democratic systems and institutions are better able to provide good governance, Senegal's status as a stable democracy might suggest that state institutions are relatively more accountable to each other and to citizens than in other places in Africa, and that there are fewer opportunities for corruption. Senegal is often called a 'model' democracy in Africa by international journalists (2007; Ba 2007; Callimachi 2007; Paraye 2007), and is celebrated for its stability and peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party in the 2000 presidential elections, which gives the impression that citizens are able to hold government officials accountable through electoral means.³ Glancing at headlines in Senegalese and international newspapers gives the impression that the democratically elected government is making efforts to fight corruption.

However, in the only detailed, comparative anthropological study of everyday corruption in three West African countries, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) argue that everyday corruption pervades most daily interactions between citizens and public officials in Senegal, Benin, and Niger. Rather than focusing on headline-worthy scandals, these anthropologists focused on embedded forms of everyday corruption: commissions paid for illicit services; fees for public services (e.g., at health clinics); gratuities given to public officials who simply perform their job; 'string-pulling' or using connections to access administrative services; levies at customs or police outposts; using the resources or time of one's paid employment to work in side jobs; and misappropriation. Their conclusion is that corruption exists everywhere:

“The fact that everyone believes that they must protect themselves against the dysfunction of public services using favors or corruption means that everyone exploits their personal relationships or indulges in corrupt practices all the time (106).”

On one hand, the national ratings of Transparency International suggest that relative to many countries in Africa, corruption may be less of a problem in Senegal. Intensive fieldwork conducted by a team of researchers in Senegal (and Niger and Benin) suggest that everyday corruption is rampant, however.

The primary questions I ask in this paper are: what can we learn by asking citizens to report their perceptions in corruption in social and political surveys as compared to a sort of ethnographic approach? What do these survey questions tell us about citizens' perceptions and experiences with corruption in the Senegalese case? Finally, how do perceptions of corruption vary between individuals, and within the national state? I suggest that multi-level statistical techniques can help us to move toward new ways of conceptualizing citizens' interactions with the state at levels other than the national. I begin by reviewing some of the literature on the roots of corruption in the African context.

HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES OF CORRUPTION

In African studies, many scholars have looked at the historical roots of corruption in colonial state administration and take a general, state-level and continent-wide approach to the study. Achille Mbembe (2001, 39-41) notes that in the colonial African state, sovereignty rested on violence, and the colonial

¹ In later versions of this paper, I will conduct multilevel comparative analysis across national boundaries.

² http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006/regional_highlights_factsheets

³ Such descriptions in international media must at least shape overseas impressions of Senegal, and transparency International relies on assessments of corruption by overseas analysts in creating their composite scores for the Corruption Perceptions Index.

state had complete authority to decide right action and to use this violence to carry out its ends: “the lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that may be said to have been the distinctive feature of colonial sovereignty. Postcolonial state forms have inherited this unconditionality and the regime of impunity that was its corollary.” Rather than viewing the colonial state as completely imposed from the outside, however, Mbembe stresses that Africans quickly reappropriated forms of the state, economic transactions, and strategies of colonial governance, co-opting any sort of association, trade union, or customary institutions, and controlling populations by allocating salaries, creating jobs in the public services, or directly intervening in the economy in order to ensure that individuals were dependent upon the state. A ‘general regime of privileges and impunity’ developed, as people in positions of authority granted themselves access to material goods, misappropriated public funds, and received petty payments for their official services (46). The administration of the colonial state thus became “indigenized.”

Jean-Francois Médard (2002) argues that corruption in Africa is the rule, rather than the exception, and extends to all sectors of the state. He classifies African states as ‘neo-patrimonial’ rather than patrimonial states because the public and private domains *are* formally differentiated, but systematized corruption stems from the blurring of these realms and the abuse of public resources for private gain. Corruption became entrenched because the African elites who inherited the colonial state resorted to clientelism for political survival. Economic activity was channeled through the state, and the dividing line between politics and economics was blurred:

“The mechanics of patronage and therefore stability are at the heart of a leader’s political stability. The art of governing is not only the art of extracting resources, but also of redistribution: it is the only way of legitimizing power, in the absence of ideological legitimacy. In this way, corruption fits into the logic of the accumulation of the political-economic goods, within the framework of survival strategies where the economy and politics are closely articulated. It is at the heart of the economic, social, and political stratification process and the formation of social classes (383).”

For Jean-Francois Bayart (Bayart 1993; Bayart, Ellis et al. 1999), corruption also stems from the appropriation of the colonial state, and state administration works through a “rhizome of personal networks and assures the centralization of power through the agencies of family, alliance, and friendship” (1993, 261). Rather than discussing corruption, he discusses a ‘politics of the belly’ which describes governance and interactions between citizens and administrations in most countries. In the ‘politics of the belly,’ positions of power and accumulation of wealth overlap, and all actors, rich and poor, participate in the world of networks and attempt to accumulate when possible. Focusing more on international networks of trade in illegal goods and organized crime rather than petty administrative corruption, Béatrice Hibou (1999) sees the ‘politics of the belly’ as becoming increasingly predatory and illicit, ultimately leading to the criminalization of the state in Africa: “ever since the start of the colonial period, access to the state has been turned more or less into a source of private benefit. Today, the simultaneous erosion of government and the delegitimation of public authority have led further, to the confiscation of power by private actors” (96).

Though these discussions are general in nature and discuss the ‘African state’, the generalized explanation is that the institutions and practices of the colonial state in Africa shaped early strategies of postcolonial accumulation and governance across the continent. Ultimately, the colonial state was ‘indigenized’, and multiple types of corruption became endemic, both large-scale corruption and embezzlement by elites in government *and* petty corruption in which civil servants demand bribes for routine services. Those who take an historical approach to explaining corruption in Africa might suggest that the patterns of interaction within and between a state’s administration, between government and private industry, and between citizens and the state are so historically conditioned that reforming institutions is not only

extremely difficult, but citizens' and civil servants' survival strategies of accumulation and exchange are unlikely to change even with large-scale reform.

APPROACHES TO CORRUPTION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Early analysis in political science tended to focus on corruption as a product of the creation and consolidation of the national state, and as a byproduct of the pursuit of modernization. Such prominent political scientists such as Samuel P. Huntington (1968, 59-61) suggested that corruption was most prevalent during political, social, and economic modernization because "modernization involves a change in the basic values of the society....Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes." In addition to changing definitions of corruption at the individual level, Huntington argues that modernization also breeds corruption because it creates new sources of wealth and power, and because it involves the expansion of governmental authority.⁴

Joseph S. Nye (1967, 418-419) also saw the development of the modern, centralized state as creating opportunities for corruption and changes at the individual-level in what constitutes corruption:

"...behavior that will be considered corrupt is likely to be more prominent in less developed countries because of a variety of conditions involved in their underdevelopment—great inequality of distribution of wealth; political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between changing moral codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms; and the absence of a strong sense of national community. The weakness of the legitimacy of governmental institutions is also a contributing factor..."

In his account, corruption does not always have negative consequences for development.

More recently, the policy and scholarly focus on corruption takes place under the pursuit of democratic, participatory government, and free-markets.⁵ Scholars posit that democratic institutions that ensure vertical accountability between citizens and governmental institutions and administration, and horizontal accountability between institutions and administrations, are thought to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to improve the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Corruption is argued to hinder the goals of political and economic development and hinders goals of good governance (Ayittey 2000).

Some critics of the hypothesized relationship that building accountable (democratic) institutions reduce corruption argue that the relationship is not empirically justified and is simply a normative one (Szeftel 1998). For example, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) are clear that the analytic focus on democracy, democratic transitions, and the study of democracy's consolidation stems from a motive "that

⁴ Referring to historical periods of intense corruption and political development in the United States and Western Europe, the inevitable path of movement from 'soft' or 'weak' state toward the strong, meritocratic, bureaucratic state is implied. In certain cases, he says, what was deemed corruption actually led to the formation and growth of modern political and economic systems in the West.

⁵ See www.worldbank.org/anticorruption and www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance for statements on the World Bank's anticorruption and good governance activities. The IMF also links good governance and corruption (see <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm>). One UN agency defines good governance as institutions that are accountable, transparent, responsive, inclusive and equitable, consensus orientated, participatory, follow the rule of law, and are effective and efficient (see <http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm>). While the World Bank claims to promote good governance and not democracy, the descriptions of institutions that provide good governance closely mirror those of democratic institutions. See Diamond, L. and L. Morlino (2005). Introduction. Assessing the quality of democracy. L. Diamond and L. Morlino. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press: ix-xliii.

deepening democracy is a moral good, if not an imperative.” Because of this normative pursuit of democracy, it is unclear whether statements about democracy and corruption rest on empirical claims, or simply propose hypotheses that must be tested across institutions and cases. A case in point may be Transparency International’s statement about regime types:

In dictatorial systems...administrative and political institutions are nothing but an extension of the usurper's corrupt practices.In a modern democracy, the power of governing bodies is inherent in the political mandate given by the people. Power is entrusted and it is supposed to be used for the benefit of society at large, and not for the personal benefit of the individual that holds it. Thus corruption - misusing publicly entrusted power for private gain - is inherently contradictory and irreconcilable with democracy. That does not mean, unfortunately, that corruption cannot be found in democratic systems.⁶

Similarly, the World Bank’s anti-corruption strategy includes the pursuit of good governance, whose goals sound similar to democracy activists. The Bank identifies five strategies for reducing corruption: (1) increasing political accountability; (2) strengthening civil society participation; (3) creating a competitive private sector; (4) institutional restraints on power; and (5) improving public sector management.⁷

Others suggest that electoral democracy in many African countries has not reduced levels of corruption, which implies that electoral accountability and regime type alone do not reduce the levels of corruption. Médard (2002, 385) argues that the nature of the political regime in Africa—pluralist or authoritarian, civilian or military—does not seem to have had any clear cut-consequences on corruption. Military regimes have often justified their seizure of power with claims to rid the government of corruption, and while some simply repeated the practices of their predecessors, others are associated with reduced corruption, such as that of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (Médard 2002, 385; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006, 52). According to some accounts, both democratic and authoritarian regimes alike have charged political opponents with corruption and waged anti-corruption campaigns.⁸

Several authors argue that corruption may actually have increased since the period of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006, 53-60). Médard (2002, 397) sees an increasing seriousness of corruption during this period, and argues that corruption is unlikely to be reduced without a “radical transformation of society, the elite, the social, economic, and political system which is not likely to happen.” Morris Szeftel (1998, 226-227) disputes claims that democratic accountability reduces corruption: “alongside the proposition that democracy and the market can combat corruption effectively, is placed another hypothesis, its seeming opposite: unless corruption can be tackled effectively, it will inevitably threaten the consolidation, even survival, of reform and democracy.” The causal direction of the relationship, then, is ambiguous.

Some scholars suggest that different regime types simply change the visibility and forms of corruption. For example, Antoine Socpa’s study of democratic elections in Cameroon (2000) demonstrates that

⁶ http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq

⁷ See www.worldbank.org/anticorruption and www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

⁸ In Senegal, shortly after winning re-election in the February 2007 presidential election, President Abdoulaye Wade announced that most of the opposition candidates were involved in corruption scandals and that he will uphold the country’s anti-corruption laws Jallow, A. (2007). Senegal: Wade Accuses Political Opponents of Corruption. The Gambia Echo, Presse, A. F. (2007). "Senegal opposition figures face corruption charges." Some contend that this is no more than an attempt to minimize the power of political opposition. The opposition, for their part, recently vowed to boycott June’s legislative elections after accusing the president of buying votes Reuters (2007). Senegal: Opposition to boycott June elections The New York Times. New York.. As such, it is difficult to discern when the fight against corruption is merely a political weapon.

candidates for democratic elections distribute gifts and payments to voters during electoral campaigns, and voters have learned to simply accept payments from all candidates rather than pledging support in exchange for payment. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006, 7) argue that even in democratic countries, anti-corruption campaigns may simply be directed toward foreign donors and aimed at political opponents:

“...political elites are past masters in terms of their capacity to produce an official discourse that fulfils the expectations and conditions of their donors and is extremely far removed from the realities that remain largely inaccessible to the donors—that is, the very people who wish to inspire or impose the ‘war against corruption’ as a condition for the granting of their support. These discourses, though, also constitute a response to ‘internal’ political issues (i.e., elimination of political competitors, the elimination of political groups that were defeated in the polls, the creation of scapegoats to satisfy public expectations etc.) involving the settling of old scores and not the real improvement of governance.”

Similarly, Harsh (1993) points to the trend in democratic politics to charge rival political factions with corruption, which hinders their ability to compete in the democratic process.

These debates tend to center around regime-types, institutions, and institutional reform, which I do not treat in detail in this paper. What emerges from this discussion, however, is that while democratic elections and accountable institutions may increase citizen participation in politics, strengthen autonomous spaces of organization and civic life outside state spheres, increase checks and balances on political actors and institutions, there is not necessarily clear evidence that corruption has been reduced in African countries where democratization has taken root. Of course, electoral democracy alone is no sign of the quality of democratic institutions or good governance, and reforming institutions, creating vertical and horizontal accountability, and promoting transparency may indeed reduce corruption. As yet, however, it seems that recommendations are based on hypothesized relationships and prescriptions rather than detailed empirical case studies in Africa. Part of our lack of empirical evidence may stem from the difficulty of reforming institutions and incentive structures for public servants, in addition to the sensitive nature of studying corruption and the empirical difficulty of measuring it.

Beginning with this hypothesized institutional association between transparent and accountable institutions that may exist more readily in democracy and reduced levels of corruption, I suggest that citizens’ own perceptions and attitudes can help us to learn about this hypothesized relationship. If accountable institutions and good governance is thought to provide state officials with fewer opportunities for personal accumulation, and if democratic systems offer citizens mechanisms for punishing corruption by voting out of office corrupt politicians, do citizens who are more satisfied with their democratic system also perceive less corruption? Before I can explore this question, however, we must first ask what corruption is and how we can measure it.

DEFINING AND MEASURING CORRUPTION

Despite attempts to study corruption in an objective and value-free manner, the concept itself requires scholars, citizens, and policy makers to employ judgments of right and wrong, and of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, even in defining corruption and theorizing its consequences. Part of what makes corruption morally wrong, according to most definitions, is a violation of the boundaries between public and private resources and interest.

Nye offers the following, oft-cited, definition of corruption which still tends to capture the current use of the concept by many practitioners and scholars:

“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior

as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).”

Huntington (1968, 60) also makes this clear: “Only when such a [public/private] distinction becomes accepted by dominant groups within the society does it become possible to define such behavior [i.e., providing rewards and employment to family members] as nepotism and hence corruption.” More recently, anthropologist Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (1999, 27) writes of a ‘corruption complex’ of nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider trading, and abuse of the public purse. All “contradict the official ethics of ‘public property’ or ‘public service’, and likewise offer the possibility of illegal enrichment, and the use and abuse to this end of positions of authority.” Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou (Bayart, Ellis et al. 1999) see corruption as “the combination of positions of public office with positions of accumulation.” Anti-corruption NGO Transparency International also implies some distinction between private and public: “Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.”⁹ Still, this concept of what is public and what is private allows much leeway for determining what individuals actually see as corrupt behavior.

Peter Ekeh (1975) complicates the notion of the public-private distinction in post-colonial Africa. In the West, politics refers to the public realm, and “what is considered morally wrong in the private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public realm” (92). However, “there are two public realms in post-colonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm” (92). One level—the primordial public—holds ethnic, kin, or religious sentiments and activities, and is a moral public sharing the same ‘moral imperatives’ as the private realm. The second public—the civic public—is the amoral political realm of the military, the civil service, and police. The civic public is historically associated with the colonial administration, and during the anti-colonial struggle, nationalist leaders encouraged ordinary people to evade what would later be considered ‘citizenship duties’ (e.g., payment of taxes, shirking work duties). Once the new African bourgeoisie¹⁰ took control of the state, with their legitimacy based on Western (colonial) education and ideas, these elites often adopted the same justifications and strategies as the European colonists. Citizens responded to the postcolonial state by employing the same strategies of resistance.¹¹ Corruption (i.e., embezzlement of funds and the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by the civil administration) thus “...arises directly from the amorality of the civic public and the legitimation of the need to seize largesse from the civic public in order to benefit the primordial public” (110).

Africanist political scientists frequently cite Ekeh’s notion of multiple publics with competing norms of morality (Hayden 2001), yet it may be best thought of as a description of a particular historical moment rather than as representing an essentially African orientation toward public space and the civil administration. What constitutes public space and morality is constantly open to reexamination and redefinition in any society, norms and expectations change over time, and global discourses of governance and corruption have no doubt shaped how citizens judge public servants. The scholars cited above also note that anti-corruption campaigns have been waged by numerous regime-types across Africa since independence, so we would be wrong to think that discourses on corruption are new and simply come from the outside, or that corruption does not exist unproblematically in the civic public.

⁹ http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq

¹⁰ Ekeh uses the term bourgeoisie to “connote the newness of a privileged class which may wield much power, but have little authority; which may have a lot of economic influence, but enjoy little political acceptance” (93).

¹¹ Similarly, Hasty (2005) notes that in Ghana, as Nkrumah’s government justified its authoritarianism and distributed resources to secure political support, “...practices of corruption (bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement) were politically constructed as indigenous forms of “African” resistance to the abstract formalism of the state.”

In this paper, I also assume that some notion of a public-private distinction and moral orientations toward the two spheres helps individuals to define corruption behavior. I include the possibility that some citizens may only envision large-scale, elite-level scandals as corruption, while others may focus on petty, everyday corruption such as the need to pay a nurse in a hospital for decent treatment, or tipping a state bureaucrat for simply doing his/her job rather than delaying the processing of a document. By investigating public perceptions of corruption, we should get closer to understanding the kinds of behavior that citizens deem improper and immoral in Senegal, at least as they answer questions about such behavior in an interview.

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION, THE CASE OF SENEGAL

Obviously no correct or objective measures exist on the actual levels of corruption in any society, regardless of whether closed-ended surveys or ethnographic techniques are used. Given this point, rather than simply taking survey questions about corruption as unproblematic representations of citizens' evaluations of corruption and predicting other attitudes and evaluations with reported levels of corruption, I focus instead on beginning to explain *perceptions* of corruption in this paper. As Jennifer Hochschild (2001, 327) wrote: "where you stand depends on what you see," and sometimes "what you see sometimes depends on who you are." While Hochschild studies perceptions of social facts, I suggest that questions about corruption are perceptions of an objective reality, even if the facts/objective measures are not known. Perceptions of corruption depend on where individuals are (where are they located both socially and spatially) and who they are. Questions about corruption ask respondents to provide their best guess of the level of illegal activity taking place in the state. Since corruption entails both petty corruption, with which citizens probably have some direct experience, and elite-level scandals, which most citizens are unlikely to have any direct experience with, citizens may rely on discussion with other citizens, news reports, and rumor to make their judgments. Moreover, I suggest that because citizens are most likely far removed from elite-level corruption, perceptions of corruption are probably highly associated with other general evaluations of government, such as trust of state institutions and democratic satisfaction.

The Afrobarometer social surveys provide an opportunity to investigate citizens' perceptions, judgments, and definitions of corruption, and the kinds of individuals who are more likely to report higher levels of corruption. The data in this paper comes from the 2005 survey in Senegal, in which 1200 individuals were interviewed in a national sample that represents the basic gender, ethnic, religious, and age distributions of the country.¹² My interest in examining the determinants of reported corruption stems from my own fieldwork experiences and discussions with citizens across fifteen neighborhoods where I conducted research in Dakar, Senegal in 2004-2005.¹³

As previously noted, one study using qualitative methods saw petty corruption as nearly universal, and so I start by asking if surveys compliment or contradict this conclusion? Individuals were asked the following question: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?"¹⁴ A list of state institutions was then read along with the available responses (none of them; some of the them; most of them; all of them; or I don't know). The results are displayed in Table 1.

¹² The questions are written in French, but interviewers were trained to offer translations in the respondent's preferred language.

¹³ In my everyday discussions and in-depth interviews with citizens, I found that people talked quite openly about their experiences with such petty, quotidian events and condemned widespread corruption. Yet I also included this same battery of questions in a survey I conducted, and began to notice that there may be differences between the official condemnation of corruption, which is sincerely held, and hesitation to report personal experiences with corruption in a formal survey interview. Therefore, this investigation of corruption informs my own survey results as well.

¹⁴ Q56a-j: Combien pensez-vous que les personnalités suivantes sont impliquées dans la corruption, ou vous n'en avez pas suffisamment entendu pour en parler à votre tour ?

Table 1: Perceptions of corruption—how many of the following do you think are involved in corruption?

	<i>The President and his functionaries</i>	<i>Members of the National Assembly</i>	<i>Local elected officials</i>	<i>Members of the government</i>	<i>Local representatives of the state</i>	<i>The police</i>	<i>Customs and tax agents</i>	<i>Judges and Magistrates</i>	<i>Health workers</i>	<i>Teachers and school admin</i>
Don't know	401 (n) 33.4%	423 35.3%	387 32.3%	404 33.7%	438 29.4%	353 30.4%	365 30.3%	388 32.3%	326 27.2%	354 29.5%
None	237 19.8%	193 16.1%	211 17.6%	185 15.4%	218 18.5%	222 16.3%	196 23.5%	229 19.1%	366 30.5%	415 34.6%
Some	338 28.2%	346 28.8%	343 28.6%	352 29.3%	314 24.8%	297 23.4%	284 34.0%	314 26.2%	308 25.7%	290 24.2%
Most	168 14.0%	177 14.8%	181 15.1%	191 15.9%	161 17.2%	206 18.4%	221 26.5%	183 15.3%	145 12.1%	100 8.3%
All	56 4.7%	61 5.1%	78 6.5%	68 5.7%	69 10.2%	122 11.2%	134 16.1%	86 7.2%	55 4.6%	41 3.4%
Total	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200

Reliability coefficient = .9433

Only a small percentage of the population reports that ‘all’ of the individuals in these state institutions are involved in corruption. Taking all of these responses together, only 6.4% of respondents believe all are corrupt, 14.4% believe most are corrupt, 26.6% believe some are corrupt, while 20.6% answer that there is no corruption and 32% claim not to know. Some branches of the state elicit higher levels of reported corruption: 42.6% of respondents believe at least ‘most’ customs and tax agents are involved in corruption; 29.6% report that at least ‘most’ police are corrupt; and 27.4% report that at least most local representatives of the state are corrupt. Overall levels of reported corruption are high, as 20% of individuals implicate that at least ‘most’ of these state agents are corrupt. Yet approximately half of respondents report no corruption or ‘don’t know.’ To what extent do these reported levels of corruption capture the true judgments of respondents, particularly given that one third of the sample was uncomfortable providing a response?

One obvious point is respondents (and researchers) may be unclear as to what constitutes corruption. Even scholars of corruption provide somewhat vague definitions based on the abuse of public power for private gain. It is unclear whether respondents envision sizeable bribes between government employees and industry, embezzlement of large sums of public funds, or illicit economic activities such as trade in drugs, as described by Hibou (1999). We should theoretically receive different responses depending on the kind of activity respondents envision when they hear the term ‘corruption.’ If respondents are envisioning large-scale corruption taking place at the highest levels each of these government agencies, then the smaller percentage of respondents reporting that ‘all’ or ‘most’ officials are corruption might make sense. However, it is also possible that respondents are envisioning everyday, petty corruption such as small bills passed to public officials to receive a birth certificate or to secure a hospital bed. Any interpretation depends on the assumptions of the analyst, and respondents may not even envision the same kinds of corruption as they move across different branches of the state.

The benefits of asking respondents simply about ‘corruption’ is that it allows respondents to think of whatever corruption means to them. The downside seems to outweigh the benefits, however, as we cannot be sure what kinds of corruption respondents envision, nor can know that the variations between

individuals and across questions are due solely to individual-level variations rather than to definitional differences. One solution to this problem is to simply provide a definition for the respondents, so that we can be sure we are capturing the kind of corruption researchers care about (high-level elites, or petty small-scale payments for services?). Perhaps the best solution to this problem may lie in employing the concept of “anchoring vignettes” (King, Murray et al. 2004). In the case of corruption, interviewers might read several examples with hypothetical individuals and scenarios to respondents, who would then designate whether this behavior constitutes corruption. Then, respondents might be read a follow up series of questions such as the questions asked here. Providing an anchoring vignette or definition would allow more precise and comparable measurements across the sample of respondents, and we might reduce the number of individuals claiming no to know. This seems particularly important given the sensitivity of asking respondents to make judgments about the frequency of illegal behaviors.

In response to studies taking a cultural approach to corruption, which charge that so-called corrupt behaviors are simply not deemed corruption in African contexts due to different cultural norms, the Afrobarometer does ask a series of questions later in the survey to attempt to gauge what individuals deem to be acceptable behavior:¹⁵

For each of the following, please indicate whether you think the act is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable: (1) a government official gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications; (2) a government official demands a favor or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job; (3) a public official decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters live. (not wrong at all; wrong but understandable; wrong and punishable; don't know)

Table 2: Acceptable behavior of public officials

	<i>Right or wrong for a govt. official to give a job to a family member</i>	<i>Right or wrong for a govt. official to demand payment for a service that is part of his job</i>	<i>Right or wrong for a state official to locate a development project in home region, where supporters are</i>
Not wrong at all			
N	33	16	101
	2.8%	1.4%	8.7%
Wrong but understandable			
	142	95	213
	12.2%	8.2%	18.3%
Wrong and punishable			
	993	1055	852
	85.0%	90.5%	73.1%
Total	1168	1,166	1166
DK	32	34	34

¹⁵ Q58a-c: Pour chacun des actes suivants, indiquez s'il vous plaît si vous pensez qu'il n'est pas du tout répréhensible, répréhensible mais compréhensible, ou s'il est répréhensible et condamnable. (1) un fonctionnaire offre un emploi à quelqu'un de sa famille qui n'en pas les qualifications requises ; (2) un fonctionnaire demande une faveur ou un paiement extra pour un service qu'il est sensé rendre dans le cadre de son travail ; (3) un agent de l'Etat décide de domicilier un project de développement dans une zone où vivent ses amis et ses supporters.

Eighty-five percent of respondents find the practice of giving a job to an unqualified family member wrong and punishable. An even larger share—91%—report that it is wrong and punishable for a government official to demand a favor or payment for a service that is part of his job. When it comes to locating a development project in an area where a public official’s supporters live, however, a large majority (71%) find this wrong and punishable, but more citizens find this behavior both wrong but understandable, and acceptable. The extent to which this last question truly captures corruption is unclear, however, as the means by which projects are located in any district need not be illegal and may simply be a product of effective citizen mobilization.¹⁶ Overall, these responses leave little doubt as to what constitutes unacceptable behavior in the eyes of respondents, and certainly challenge notions that definitions of unacceptable behavior are drastically different in African contexts.

However, I suggest that this series does not shed light on how respondents define corruption in the prior question, both due to the question ordering (this question comes several questions after the series about perceived corruption, and so respondents are not primed to think of these examples), and due to the general de-contextualized language of the questions. For example, while respondents condemn these practices in the abstract, evidence from other studies suggest that citizens do not judge behavior as harshly if the reasons for the behavior are justifiable. In a study of public perceptions of corruption in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, Michael Johnston (2002) found that judgments of corruption depended on the identities of the perpetrator and the victim, and tended to be less harsh when the perpetrator of the corrupt act had a justifiable reason (i.e., taking a cut of a contract was seen as less corrupt if the official did so to pay his sick child’s hospital bills). In the Afrobarometer surveys, descriptions of various circumstances surrounding a particular behavior in “anchoring vignettes,” or even providing alternative identities for the perpetrator, may provide more meaningful responses and help us to understand the circumstances and definitions of corruption in the eyes of citizens.

Given that half of our sample reported either no corruption or claimed not to know the levels of corruption at various levels of the state in Table 1, how many respondents actually report experiencing corruption? Individuals were asked the following series of questions immediately following the question about the frequency of corruption:

In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to: get a document or permit; get a child into school; get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone); get medicine or medical attention from a health worker; avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)?¹⁷

The available responses ranged from: “I have never done this; not in the past year; once or twice; sometimes; often.”

These survey results contradict the ethnographic results of Blundo and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) study of petty corruption in Senegal, in which corruption pervades everyday interactions between citizens and public officials. Taking all of these questions together, an astounding number of individuals—two-

¹⁶ The majority of men and women reacted to this last practice with strong verbal condemnation, yet I question how this practice may differ from elected representatives fighting to bring resources to their home districts in a variety of countries. There may be a social desirability effect given this series, such that respondents know that these behaviors are supposed to be condemned.

¹⁷ Q57a-e: Au cours de l’année écoulée, combien de fois (si jamais) avez-vous eu à payer un pot de vin, à offrir un cadeau ou à accorder une faveur à des agents de l’Etat pour : obtenir un document ou une autorisation ; inscrire un enfant à l’école ; obtenir un service domestique (e.g. eau, électricité, ou téléphone) ; obtenir des médicaments ou une assistance médicale d’un agent de santé ; éviter un problème avec la police (e.g., passer un poste de contrôle ou éviter une amende ou une arrestation ?

thirds—claim *never* to have had to offer a gift or cash for any service, while another quarter claim not to have done so in the last year. Only nine percent of respondents admit to having had to make some kind of payment for a service. In all cases, less than five percent of men and women report having to engage in such activities often. Contrary to the prior question about the level of corruption in the state, only 1.6% of respondents report that they “don’t know” for this particular question.

Table 3: Reported experiences with corruption in the past year, payments or bribes made to state officials

	<i>To obtain a document or permit</i>	<i>To enroll a child at school</i>	<i>To get a household service (e.g., water, electric, phone)</i>	<i>To receive medical care/medicine from a health care worker</i>	<i>To avoid a problem with the police</i>
Have never done this	707 (n) 59.8%	802 67.9%	772 65.5%	853 72.2%	764 64.7%
Not in past year	260 22.0%	314 26.6%	319 27.1%	245 20.8%	352 29.8%
Once or twice	106 9.0%	41 3.5%	44 3.7%	29 2.5%	18 1.5%
A few times	61 5.2%	12 1.0%	29 2.5%	38 3.2%	29 2.5%
Often	49 4.1%	13 1.1%	14 1.2%	16 1.4%	18 1.5%
Total	1183	1182	1178	1181	1181
Don't know	17	18	22	19	19

Reliability coefficient = .78

Rather than concluding that individuals have little direct experience with petty corruption, however, I turn to another question to help interpret these results. Respondents were asked the following two questions:

During the 2000 Presidential Election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something (like food or a gift) in exchange for your vote? (never; once or twice; a few times; often)¹⁸

In your view, how often do you think politicians offer gifts to voters during election campaigns? (always, sometimes, rarely never)¹⁹

¹⁸ Q57f Au cours des dernières élections présidentielles de 2000, combien souvent (si jamais) un candidat ou quelqu'un d'un parti politique vous a-t-il offert quelque chose (e.g., nourriture ou cadeau) en échange de votre vote ?

¹⁹ Q78b Selon vous, combien souvent les politiciens offrent-ils des cadeaux aux électeurs pendant les campagnes électorales?

Table 4: Payments during 2000 presidential elections

	<i>How often in the 2000 Presidential Election did a candidate or party offer something (e.g., food, gift) in exchange for your vote</i>		<i>How often do you think politicians offer gifts to voters during electoral campaigns?</i>
Never	1096 (n) 93.2%	Never	73 6.5%
Once or twice	26 2.2%	Rarely	90 8.1%
A few times	17 1.5%	Often	443 39.7%
Often	37 3.2%	Always	510 45.7%
Total	1,176		1116
Don't know	24		84

While only 6.5% of respondents reported that politicians never offer a gift or money in exchange for votes, 45.7% of men and women reported that they always do. Yet only 3.2% report that a politician *actually* offered them something in the 2000 campaign, and 93.2% said that no politician ever offered them anything in the 2000 election. What seems clear is that directly asking individuals if they have had personal experiences with corruption yields dramatic underreports. Individuals are very reluctant to admit to having engaged in practices that they deem either illicit or corrupt. These sorts of direct questions ask individuals to implicate themselves into the complex of corruption and are quite sensitive.

A better approach would again be to provide an anchoring vignette in which a hypothetical individual is in a scenario where he/she is asked to make a bribe in a hospital, to secure a child's place in school, or is offered a gift when a politician passes through town. Then, interviewers would ask respondents to report how often someone they know has had the same experience. When it comes to behavior that carries illegal or moral implications, interviewers must provide a level of distance between the respondents and the activity. Like the majority of respondents who readily admit that politicians offer anonymous 'others' gifts during campaigns, but deny that they themselves have been offered a gift, the only conclusion we can draw is *not* that individuals rarely have experiences with corruption, but that they will *not report* these experiences with an unknown interviewer.²⁰

This quick examination of reported levels of corruption in the state, in addition to experiences with corruption, suggest that to understand perceptions of corruption at the individual level, we must also understand who reports corruption (or reports no corruption), as compared to who abstains from even making a judgment. We should continue to ask what corruption means to the respondents in our sample and to make our survey questions more precise, and we can also predict based on these frequencies that

²⁰ Again, in my own fieldwork, I found that people readily told stories of having to make payments for services and lamented this practice, and yet I have also found that in the context of a formal survey interview, very few respondents report experiences with corruption.

reported experiences with corruption will not have much power in explaining perceptions of corruption due to underreporting. Yet given the available data, we can still investigate the differences between individuals who did report corruption in the state and can learn something about associations between corruption and other evaluations of the state, and individual differences in who reports corruption.

INDIVIDUAL AND MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS

In this section, I test several hypotheses about which individuals are more likely to report higher levels of corruption at the level of the state. As Michael Johnston suggested: “social conceptions of corruption and misconduct in politics are of interest...[because] they have much to do with popular trust (or distrust) of elites and institutions” (Johnston 2002). In this paper, I hypothesize that citizens’ perceptions of corruption are highly associated with other evaluations of the state and government. For example, citizens who are more satisfied with Senegal’s democracy, and who have more trust in the state, should also report less corruption. These variables may be endogenously related, and while some studies use reported levels of corruption to explain trust, or to explain satisfaction with governmental performance or democracy, I do not think the theoretical causal relationship is clear in all cases. In the case of Senegal, which has been functioning as a democracy with regular elections for several decades (even if party alternance only occurred in 2000), it is theoretically possible to argue that as satisfaction with democracy improves, and as trust in state institutions improves (which itself may improve as satisfaction with democracy improves), respondents perceive less corruption. Assuming that elite-level corruption informs citizens’ judgments of the levels of corruption in the state, if most knowledge of elite-level corruption comes from other citizens, media reports, and the public officials who wage anti-corruption campaigns rather than from direct experience, then citizens may have more direct experience with democratic elections and with interacting with local branches of the administration (where trust may be formed) than with ‘corruption.’ I propose that citizens’ perceptions of corruption are shaped first by political and social experiences, and the other evaluations that form from them. However, I cannot deny the reciprocal nature of these evaluations: as citizens perceive less corruption, they should also evaluate government, democracy, and the state more positively. Therefore, while I place perceived corruption on the left-hand-side of this analysis for theoretical reasons, I can only demonstrate a statistical association.²¹ I begin by testing several individual-level variables that explain who perceives higher levels of corruption.

After running individual-level analyses, I argue that we should not focus exclusively on a single statistical relationship for each variable that applies across the level of the nation. In any polity, citizens’ interactions with local state institutions will result in different levels of trust, different experiences with democracy, and different evaluations of local leaders. Structural and institutional-level differences may help to explain why citizens in one district are more or less satisfied, trusting, or perceive more or less corruption, than citizens in another, for example. We miss too much local context by not modeling spatial differences or allowing statistical relationships to vary across regions.

However, I make the argument here that in addition to different institutional capacities and performance at the local level, public opinion is also shaped by the available opinions and perceptions surrounding any individual. Individuals discuss politics in local settings, and even national-level politics is filtered through knowledge and experiences gained in one’s hometown. But social surroundings also limit the range of opinions available to citizens, and so we should see attitudes clustering by geographic region as they are exposed to a certain range of opinion. Men and women receive political and social information through media and education, but this information is discussed, rearranged, reinforced, or challenged in a particular social environment. In this analysis, I am limited to exploring district-level variations rather than neighborhood or other context effects, yet I believe that social influence occurs and can be captured even in geographic districts that share similar ethnic, religious, institutional, linguistic, and

²¹ In the “next steps” of this paper, I will attempt to deal with this endogeneity through structural equation modeling, and will test if my hypothesis holds.

socioeconomic characteristics, and shared historical memories that shape political understandings.²² In the analysis below, I offer a two-level model that tests whether the estimated individual-level coefficients explaining perceived corruption vary randomly by geographical context.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

To explain perceptions of corruption, I created an index variable in which I sum all of the responses for the perceived levels of corruption in Table 1. Given the extremely high number of respondents reporting that they do not know how many individuals are involved in corruption, I exclude these individuals from the analysis.²³ 604 respondents (50.3%) responded to all of the corruption questions, while 596 (49.7%) did not offer a complete set of responses.

I include various control variables in the equation predicting perceived levels of corruption. For basic demographic controls, I include gender and age, but have no hypothesized direction for either variable after we filter out the impact of education and other controls. I include an index variable capturing standard of living, and those who report fewer shortages of basic necessities might perceive less corruption given that their basic needs are met.²⁴ The direction of education is less clear; those with more education may simply be more able to make a judgment about corruption, but if all citizens have opportunities to experience and hear about corruption given their interactions with state officials, access to radio reports, and discussions about politics and government, the independent effect of education may not be significant.

Individuals who are more engagement with politics may be more likely to report corruption, interest and participation in politics may expose one to more discussions about politics and corruption. Several variables capture different aspects of engagement:²⁵ participation, number of associations of active membership, frequency of talking about politics, interest in politics, and political knowledge. Corruption is often debated in the press, and knowledge about large-scale scandals should occur first through media reports before it is commented on, discussed, and spread through social circles. Therefore, listening to radio news and reading newspapers more frequently should increase information about corruption and would induce individuals to report corruption more frequently. The effect of television news is less clear,

²² Individuals were sampled at an even smaller geographic unit, but the small number of observations per Commune or Arrondissement mean that estimates per unit would be unstable.

²³ Cronbach's alpha = .94. Zero means the respondent reported no corruption, while 30 means they thought 'all' individuals were corrupt in all institutions. Given the high levels of respondents reporting 'don't know' across these questions, and because I wanted to incorporate perceived corruption across all branches of the state, I dropped respondents who did not respond to at least one question. I later ran the analyses after substituting the mean value of corruption by Department for each respondent who was dropped from this analysis. Variables with significant coefficients remain significant in both analyses, though the substantive size and the standard errors differ. I do not show the results here, but in further analysis I examine the reasons individuals respond 'don't know.'

²⁴ Standard of living represents the sum of the frequency of having to go without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, and a cash income. Responses on this scale range from zero (never going without enough) to 20 (always going without enough on all five questions). Cronbach's alpha is .82. For education, I create a dummy variable for whether a respondent had attended some high school.

²⁵ Participation is an index variable measuring the frequency of reports of coming together to raise an issue, attending community meetings, and protesting or demonstrating, where 0 (never) and 9 (often) for all activities. Active membership ranges from 0 (none) to four. Interest in public affairs ranges from 0 (not at all interested) to 3 (very interested). Frequency of talking about politics ranges from 0 (never) to 2 (frequently). Note that in my own survey and fieldwork, I believe people underreport talking about politics due to negative associations with politics, and that actual discussions take place with far greater frequency. Knowledge is an index variable summing the number of correct answers for the name of one's National Assembly deputy, the name of one's mayor, the party with the most seats in the Assembly, the name of the President of the National Assembly, the number of terms the President of the Republic can serve, and knowing who has responsibility for determining if a law conforms to the constitution. 0 (all questions are wrong) and 6 (all are right).

as free, nationally available television is state-run and tends to focus on official business rather than investigative reporting. Corruption scandals most likely focus on official targets of the government or political opponents, and it is unclear whether this coverage will mirror the diversity and discussion found in radio or newspaper reports.

The true variables of interest in this analysis include a dummy variable for whether the respondent supports the President's party, the PDS. If one is a partisan of the ruling party, they should be less likely to report corruption, as partisanship may mean individuals hold feelings toward government and state institutions controlled by the current government. I include a variable for urban residence to capture environmental effects; in Senegal, urban residents are described as more politically engaged and as holding more democratic orientations, particularly given the historical configuration of the four communes and their ability to elect a representative in the French parliament. While urban centers no longer include only these four Departments, some scholars have argued that urban residency in general may shape evaluations toward government and notions of democracy. As individuals have access to more media outlets and interact with others of more diverse backgrounds than in many rural regions, different discourses on democracy and governance may exist, and expectations may differ (Schaffer 1998). Urban residents may be exposed to more information about corruption and may judge the government more severely as a result

Though our measures of personal experiences with corruption probably do not represent actual experiences with corruption, I include an index variable for frequency of bribes paid. Those who are willing to report such sensitive activity in an interview are also more likely to report higher levels of corruption and to judge it more harshly in the context of a survey interview.²⁶ I also include respondents' reports of how frequently politicians offer money or gifts in exchange for votes. Citizens were more likely to answer this question rather than direct personal questions about experiences with corruption, so I include this as a measure of the extent to which everyday people experience some form of corruption. This also serves as a proxy for how frequently politicians are engaged in corruption practices, so it may help to predict general perceptions of corruption across the state. Whether respondents believed the government or a private agency implemented this survey may also be a factor in respondents' willingness to report corruption. Those who believe the government commissioned this survey rather than a private agency may be less likely to implicate the government if they fear that the survey is not confidential. On the flip side, given that this analysis only includes citizens who were willing to respond to all questions, those who report higher levels of corruption may be particularly likely to perceive corruption as a major problem, and may want to send the government a message. Finally, as previously discussed, perceived corruption may be a consequence of general evaluations of the political system and state. Citizens who are more satisfied with the way democracy functions in Senegal may also perceive that corruption is less of a problem.²⁷ Similarly, men and women who report higher levels of trust in government institutions may also report less corruption.²⁸ Though I argue that these variables originally should be on the right-hand-side of this equation, I can only show statistical associations and cannot demonstrate causal direction in a simple OLS model. Over time, the relationship becomes circular.²⁹

²⁶ This index variable ranges from 0 (never paid a bribe to any of the following officials) to 20 (often paid bribes for all events).

²⁷ This is a single item: 1 (Senegal is not a democracy); 2 (not at all satisfied); 3 (not very satisfied); 4 (fairly satisfied); 5 (very satisfied).

²⁸ Trust is an index variable summing the responses of trust in the presidency, National Assembly, Electoral Commission, local elected council, the ruling party, opposition parties, the army, police, and courts. Zero trust means the respondent did not trust any institution at all, while 27 means they trust all institutions a lot. Cronbach's alpha = .85.

²⁹ Bivariate correlations between the index of perceived corruption, the index of trust in government, and satisfaction with democracy range between .42 and .52. For many individuals, trust, satisfaction with democracy,

I show the results of two separate OLS regression models in the following analysis. Model 1 excludes the variables of democratic satisfaction and the index of trust in the state, since I expect that they will overpower other individual-level predictors given their higher bivariate correlations. Model 2 includes these variables for comparison. I show the results of both models, since I believe that my variables of interest in Model 1 may have context-level effects in the multi-level analysis that follows.

Table 5: Dependent Variable Perceived corruption index

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	0.000 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.023)
Gender (1=female, 0=male)	-0.972 (0.671)	-0.422 (0.642)
Standard of living	0.001 (0.064)	0.028 (0.062)
Some high school (1=some high school, 0=no high school)	0.525 (0.795)	-0.404 (0.752)
Knowledge index	-0.001 (0.216)	0.001 (0.204)
Participation index	0.029 (0.135)	0.120 (0.129)
Number of associations	-0.100 (0.335)	-0.069 (0.319)
Frequency talk politics	0.405 (0.450)	0.161 (0.432)
Interest in politics	-0.529 (0.297)	-0.254 (0.288)
Frequency of radio news	0.146 (0.338)	-0.039 (0.325)
Frequency of television news	0.111 (0.228)	0.115 (0.219)
Frequency of reading newspapers	-0.303 (0.259)	-0.457 (0.246)
Support PDS (party in power: 1=yes, 0=no)	-2.580*** (0.656)	-0.578 (0.653)
Urban residence (1=urban, 0=rural)	1.881* (0.805)	0.981 (0.771)
Frequency of paying bribes (index variable)	0.238* (0.097)	0.074 (0.094)
Frequency politicians pay for votes	1.402*** (0.380)	0.854* (0.385)
Government conducted this survey (1=govt., 0=private agency)	-1.532* (0.626)	-1.155 (0.596)
Index of trust in government		-0.343*** 0.054
Satisfaction with democracy		-1.379*** (0.310)
Constant	6.844*** (2.154)	20.454*** (2.59)
	N=545 Adj. R2 = 12.9	N=510 Adj. R2 = 25.4

legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

and perceived levels of corruption probably move together and represent different aspects of general orientations toward politics and the state.

In Model 1, only support for the PDS, urban residence, frequency of paying bribes, reported frequency of vote buying by politicians, and beliefs about who conducted the survey are substantively and statistically significant individual-level explanatory variables. None of the other variables that I thought would be significantly associated with perceived corruption—participation, socioeconomic status, media consumption, or political interest—are significantly associated with perceived corruption.

Supporting the ruling party does reduce the likelihood of reporting higher levels of corruption; PDS supporters will move from reporting that all individuals are involved in corruption to reporting that no individuals are involved in corruption on any one question. Urban residents are more likely to report higher levels of corruption. Substantively, the effect of admitting to paying bribes is small, but the coefficient is significant. Those who report one higher response category on the reported frequency of vote buying will implicate more public officials in corruption (by 1.4 units). The effect of whether the individual believed the government conducted this survey is also substantively and statistically significant, but the direction confirms that those who believe the government was collecting this data reported less corruption. This suggests that corruption is a sensitive topic, and may help to explain why many respondents reported no corruption in any branch of the state.

Model 2 adds measures of democratic satisfaction and trust in the state. As expected, adding these variables erases the significance of the other individual-level variables except for reports of vote buying. Though trust is highly significantly associated with perceived corruption, the substantive size of the coefficient is relatively small. Satisfaction with democracy is also highly significant and carries the most substantive coefficient. The adjusted R-squared improves substantially in Model 2 by adding these two additional variables. There is clearly a significant association between these perceptions of corruption, democratic satisfaction, and trust. In further analysis, I will attempt to determine if the relationships are statistically endogenous through structural equation modeling.

MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Nye pointed out in 1967 that attitudes toward corruption, including tolerance of these practices, vary greatly across national boundaries. However, "...variations of attitude within a country can be as important (or more so) than differences between countries" (1967, 423). Yet in most studies of corruption we bind ourselves to the spatial outline of the national state.³⁰ Present-day focus on corruption at the national level is typified by the yearly global country ratings by Transparency International. Based on the color-coded designations, there are variations *between* countries in terms of the level of corruption, but we have no sense of within-country differences. Being Senegalese, or Nigerian, or Kenyan is identified as the primary determination of one's experience with corruption, the state, institutions, democracy, etc.

However, when we fill in the map of Senegal even at the most basic level of administrative geographic units (*Départements*) in Figure 2, we can begin to visualize the many possible geographic, institutional, and social realities that may exist across Departments.

³⁰ Or, we conduct a localized case-study analysis and then generalize to national borders to appeal to broader interests.

Figure 1: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 World Map



Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 World Map

Figure 2: Senegal's Regions shown by administrative Departments, as of 1995



Source: Population Dynamics of Senegal (1995: 11)
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education³¹

³¹ The Government of Senegal [Decree 2002-172](#) changed several Regions and Departments on this map. Matam became a Region of its own in 2002, made up of the three Departments of Matam, Kanel, and Ranérou Ferlo. The

In the study of survey methods, scholars call for analysts to take account of sample design effects due to stratification and clustering rather than assuming simple random sampling in final statistical analyses (Lee and Forthofer 2006). Sampling within geographic clusters means that individual units are not independent of one another and that individuals in clusters tend to share similar social, psychological, attitudinal, and demographic traits and orientations. Either survey weights or model-based approaches can help account for the effects of clustering. If, however, we ignore these effects and assume simple random sampling in our analyses, then we incorrectly calculate standard errors for our regression coefficient estimates and for simple means and proportions. Accounting for complex sampling generally results in less precise estimates of standard errors, and therefore more conservative (less significant) results than if wrongly assume simple random sampling. In this paper, I use a two-level model to model the variances between geographic districts both for methodological reasons and for theoretical ones. We *should* expect orientations, institutions, and attitudes to vary depending on one's environment, and regression coefficients may not necessarily be the same across contexts. In a fixed-effect OLS model, we attribute all variation in the model to individual-level explanatory factors. However, in a multi-level model, we break random variation into individual and context-level components. Furthermore, by exploring interactive effects between the surrounding attitudes of one's context and one's own attitude, we can learn more about the effects of social and contextual influences on shaping individual attitudes.

Table 6 displays the Afrobarometer sample broken into the geographic locations of respondents, and shows the mean standard of living and the percentage of individuals with at least some high school education in each Department. Table 7 shows the mean responses of perceptions of corruption, trust in state institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and support for the PDS by Departments. There is obvious between-Department variation and possibly some similarities between Departments within the same Region. Of course, means are only central tendencies, and there is always variation within environments that stem from individual-level differences and individual responses to the same environmental factors. However, some combination of contextual factors, in addition to individual characteristics, are likely to explain variance in perceived levels of corruption.

new Department of Matam includes part of the former Linguere Department from the Louga Region (region 12 on this map). The reformulated Region of Saint-Louis now includes three Departments—Dagana, Podor, and the new Department of St. Louis. Finally, the Region of Dakar has added a new Department of Guediawaye.

Table 6: The Afrobarometer's national sample in Senegal, by Region and Department

Region	Department	Sample size	N (% of total)	Mean standard of living	Percentage with some high school
Dakar	Dakar	128 (10.7%)		4.2	69.5%
	Guediawaye	24 (2.0%)		5.4	62.5%
	Pikine	112 (9.3%)		5.5	52.7%
	Rufisque	32 (2.7%)		6.3	40.6%
			296 (24.7%)		
Thiès	Thies	72 (6.0%)		6.3	31.9%
	Tivaoune	48 (4.0%)		7.4	23.4%
	Mbour	48 (4.0%)		6.1	35.4%
			168 (14.0%)		
Diourbel	Bambey	24 (2.0%)		9.4	8.3%
	Diourbel	40 (3.3%)		6.5	12.5%
	Mbacke	56 (4.7%)		5.5	8.9%
			120 (10.0%)		
Tambacounda	Bakel	24 (2.0%)		8.7	20.8%
	Tambacounda	32 (2.7%)		11.9	6.3%
	Kedougou	8 (0.7%)		13.5	25.0%
			64 (5.4%)		
Ziguinchor	Ziguinchor	16 (1.3%)		7.6	37.5%
	Bignona	32 (2.7%)		8.7	40.6%
			48 (4.0%)		
Kolda	Kolda	24 (2.0%)		11.2	20.8%
	Velingara	24 (2.0%)		11.5	33.3%
	Sedhiou	40 (3.3%)		10.4	15.0%
			88 (7.3%)		
Fatick	Fatick	32 (2.7%)		8.5	18.8%
	Foundiougne	16 (1.3%)		7.1	25.0%
	Gossas	16 (1.3%)		12.6	31.3%
			64 (5.3%)		
Kaolack	Kaolack	40 (3.3%)		5.4	27.5%
	Kaffrine	72 (6.0%)		10.8	1.4%
	Nioro	32 (2.7%)		9.8	6.3%
			144 (12.0%)		
Louga	Linguere	8 (0.7%)		7.1	12.5%
	Louga	72 (6.0%)		8.3	12.9%
			80 (6.7%)		
Matam	Matam	32 (2.7%)		10.2	21.9%
	Kanel	16 (1.3%)		12.8	0%
			48 (4.0%)		
Saint-Louis	Podor	32 (2.7%)		11.3	18.8%
	St. Louis	24 (2.0%)		6.6	27.8%
	Dagana	24 (2.0%)		10.8	4.4%
			80 (6.7%)		
			1200 (100%)		

Table 7: Mean responses by department—perceived corruption, trust in state, satisfaction with democracy, and percentage of respondents supporting the PDS

Region	Department	Perceptions of corruption	Trust in government	Satisfaction with democracy	Percentage supporting the PDS
Dakar	Dakar	13.5	14.2	3.1	20.3%
	Guediawaye	15.3	14.4	2.8	16.7%
	Pikine	13.4	15.5	3.3	17.9%
	Rufisque	13.2	16.1	3.5	18.8%
Thiès	Thies	10.2	17.1	3.2	30.6%
	Tivaoune	11.2	16.1	3.7	45.8%
	Mbour	12.2	16.9	3.8	43.8%
Diourbel	Bambey	11.4	19.13	3.6	25.0%
	Diourbel	11.5	20.0	4.1	37.5%
	Mbacke	11.1	16.3	3.8	21.4%
Tambacounda	Bakel	5.1	21.7	4.6	66.7%
	Tambacounda	6.8	21.9	4.2	71.9%
	Kedougou	5.2	19.3	4.4	62.5%
Ziguinchor	Ziguinchor	10.9	19.6	4.1	25.0%
	Bignona	7.1	20.8	4.7	56.3%
Kolda	Kolda	4.9	22.5	4.7	75.0%
	Velingara	4.4	23.2	4.6	54.2%
	Sedhiou	7.1	21.7	4.6	72.5%
Fatick	Fatick	10.2	20.2	3.9	46.9%
	Foundiougne	9.1	17.8	3.2	37.5%
	Gossas	7.3	22.2	3.8	56.3%
Kaolack	Kaolack	11.7	18.6	3.8	37.5%
	Kaffrine	9.9	19.3	4.0	50.0%
	Nioro	7.3	20.0	4.0	50.0%
Louga	Linguere	8.8	14.0	4.8	25.0%
	Louga	12.8	15.3	3.7	40.3%
Matam	Matam	7.4	17.2	3.9	37.5%
	Kanel	5.2	15.5	3.9	50.0%
Saint-Louis	Podor	12.8	16.1	3.9	40.6%
	St Louis	8.5	13.0	3.4	33.3%
	Dagana	16.6	10.3	3.5	50.0%

The independent variables in my two-level model come from the final individual-level results of Model 2. Individuals' trust in the state, satisfaction with democracy, and the frequency of vote buying are the three

individual-level explanatory variables. In the remaining analysis, I test if there is statistical evidence for the hypothesis that these individual-level effects vary by geographic context. I allow the effects of each of the individual-level variables to vary by Department in order to test this hypothesis, rather than assuming that the effect of each estimated coefficient is the same everywhere in the country and simply ending with an OLS estimated model. The direction of these individual-level effects should remain the same even after adding random effects

I also test the effects of several contextual-level variables on the mean value of perceived corruption and as interactions with the individual-level independent variables.³² Support for the ruling party was one of the most substantively and statistically significant individual-level variables prior to adding democratic satisfaction and trust, and I suggest that the climate of partisanship in a district will affect individual-level variables, even if the individual-level effects of being a PDS supporter were erased by the addition of democratic satisfaction and trust. Furthermore, if higher levels of individual trust in the state and satisfaction with democracy reduces the levels of corruption one reports, then this effect should become even stronger in areas where support for the ruling party is higher. I add the percentage of individuals supporting the PDS by Department as a level-two variable.

I do not include urban residency, since I am already modeling between-district variance, including urban districts. I have no reason to include perceptions of who carried out the survey as a context-level variable, so I exclude this from the final model as well.

Finally, I test whether the surrounding levels of trust, democratic satisfaction with democracy, and vote buying moderate the effects of their respective individual-level variables. For example, being surrounded by individuals who report greater frequency of vote buying should magnify the individual-level effect of vote buying on perceived corruption. While politicians may offer gifts or money for votes more frequently in some districts more than others, citizens will also communicate about these events, and so one is simply more likely to believe that vote buying is more pervasive if those around you believe so and communicate about their perceptions. The mean attitude of the district may have a magnifying effect on the individual's attitude. In fact, this hypothesis was only confirmed for the district-level reports of vote buying, as described below. In the results below, I exclude mean democratic satisfaction and trust, as neither significant. The mean level of democratic satisfaction does not moderate the individual effect of satisfaction with democracy on corruption, and district-level trust does not moderate the effects of individual-level trust.³³ Figure 3 shows the final estimation of the model, and Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients.

³² I do not add any of the other control variables, as these were not significant at the individual-level and adding them would reduce the degrees of freedom to an unacceptable degree given that we have 31 Departments.

³³ I do not feel comfortable concluding that living in a high trust district has no effect on my own level of trust and therefore the individual effect trust on corruption. After looking at scatter-plots of mean trust and individual trust in each Department, I concluded that there is not enough variation to find a moderating effect. In high trust districts, there is little variation in levels of trust, and I think this may account for the lack of statistical relationship. The same is true in districts with high democratic satisfaction, such that there is little variation in individual-level democratic satisfaction and no significant relationship. However, given that these moderating effects were not significant, I do not include these context-level variables in the intercept term so that I use fewer degrees of freedom in estimating the other variables of interest.

Figure 3: Perceptions of corruption allowing for random and fixed effects

LEVEL 1 MODEL

(bold: group-mean centering; bold italic: grand-mean centering)

$$\text{SUMCORR} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{DEMSATIS}) + \beta_2(\text{ELECGIFT}) + \beta_3(\text{SUMTRUST}) + r$$

LEVEL 2 MODEL

(bold italic: grand-mean centering)

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{ELECGIFT}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{PERPDS}) + u_0$$

$$\beta_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{PERPDS}) + u_1$$

$$\beta_2 = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}(\text{ELECGIFT}) + u_2$$

$$\beta_3 = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31}(\text{PERPDS}) + u_3$$

Table 8: Final estimation of fixed and random effects (with robust standard errors)

Fixed effects	Coefficient	Standard Error	d.f.	
<i>For Intercept1, B0</i>				
Intercept 2, G00	9.93***	0.29	28	
Election gifts, G01	3.02*	1.30	28	
Percentage of support for PDS	-0.08***	0.02	28	
<i>For Democratic satisfaction, slope B1</i>				
Intercept 2, G10	-1.00*	0.44	29	
Percentage of support for PDS, G11	0.02	0.02	29	
<i>For Election Gifts, slope B2</i>				
Intercept 2, G20	0.49	0.35	29	
Mean Election Gift, G21	2.87***	0.84	29	
<i>For Trust, slope B3</i>				
Intercept 2, G30	-0.39***	0.06	29	
Percentage of support for PDS, G31	-0.01*	0.00	29	
Final estimation of variance components:				
	Standard deviation	Variance component (unexplained variance)	d.f.	Chi-square
<i>Random Effect</i>				
Intercept 1, U0	0.52	0.27	26	32.70
Democratic satisfaction, U1	1.57	2.46	27	53.44***
Election Gifts, U2	1.02	1.04	27	29.47
Trust, U3	0.19	0.34	27	43.80*
Level-1, Individual variance	5.9	35.30		

legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Interpreting the variance components shows adding two context-level variables—the mean vote buying of districts and the percentage of the population supporting the PDS—explained the between-Department variance in the expected value of reported corruption. The individual-level coefficient for vote buying did

not vary by Department in the simple level-one model prior to adding context-level effects, but I left this random effect in the model to show that its effect is constant across regions. We could reestimate the model by removing this random effect in order to gain additional degrees of freedom. The coefficients for the effects of democratic satisfaction and trust on perceived corruption do indeed vary by district, even after adding the percentage of PDS supporters in the district. While there is comparatively little unexplained between-district variance compared to the unexplained individual-level variance in perceived corruption, ignoring these significant random effects and assuming a constant effect across Departments would result in a model misspecification.

Moving to the fixed effects, the individual-level variables are all in the expected direction, as in the original OLS model. However, the percentage of support for the PDS does not moderate the individual-level effect of satisfaction with democracy. The effect of satisfaction with democracy in Senegal on perceived corruption does vary by district, but the level of support for the ruling party does not explain this variation.

An individual's trust in the state does significantly affect his/her perception of corruption, and this relationship is moderated by the support of the PDS in the individual's district. The substantive significance of both the individual- and context-level effects are small (as was the individual-level effect in the original OLS model), but an individual in a district with the average level of PDS support will report lower corruption. Increasing the percentage of support for the PDS would make this relationship even more negative. The effect of trust is not uniform across regions, and other district-level variables may also explain how trust affects perceived corruption.

The individual-level effect of reporting vote buying is no longer statistically significant for individuals in districts with an average level of reported vote buying. However, the surrounding perceptions of vote buying significantly interact with an individual's own report. A man or woman living in a district where vote buying is reportedly more severe does perceive significantly more corruption.

Finally, both the levels of support of the PDS by district and the levels of reported vote buying significantly affect perceived levels of corruption through the intercept. Being surrounded by others who perceive more vote buying increases the expected value of reported corruption, while an increase in the percentage of respondents who support the PDS reduces the expected value of corruption. These effects through the intercept do not moderate individual-level explanatory variables, but simply suggest that certain attitudes and evaluations at the larger societal level do have direct effects on an individual's average perception of corruption.

CONCLUSION

This paper has tried to make several contributions. First, I questioned the ways that respondents understand and define corruption in the Afrobarometer surveys. While this data provides a rich opportunity for exploring the foundations of public opinion in Africa, survey measurement and comparability are ongoing issues of concern around the world. I suggested that we cannot assume that individuals define corruption in comparable ways across questions, and that individual-level differences may also be due to differences in definitions across individuals. Anchoring vignettes could ensure that we are comparing comparable concepts, and can help us to understand the causes and effects of perceived corruption with greater precision. Furthermore, question framing currently invites respondents to offer a 'don't know' response, and we lose many observations as a result. We could reduce the number of respondents who do not know the level of corruption by providing vignettes that supply clearer images of what is meant by corruption, and we would know with greater clarity if the tendency toward not answering the question is due to sensitivity, clarity, or definitional confusion. Finally, asking respondents to implicate themselves in corruption by asking for direct experiences with bribes is not an effective way

to gauge experiences with corruption, and more distance is needed between the respondent and the illegal behavior.

In this analysis, I only included respondents who answered all of the questions about corruption at various levels of the state, so further analysis requires studying which respondents were unwilling to answer. Among respondents who answered all of the questions about the levels of corruption in the state, I have made the argument here that in addition to different institutional capacities and performance at a local level, public opinion is shaped by the available opinions and perceptions surrounding any individual in his/her local environment. Social influence plays a role in the formation of a variety of attitudes, and we should test hypotheses about the individual-level explanations, but also the contextual, social influences of individual attitudes. In particular, the relationship between democracy, trust, and perceived corruption do vary across different geographic contexts. Furthermore, individual perceptions of corruption are significantly shaped by the several surrounding attitudes in one's district. Individuals living in districts with higher reported vote buying report more corruption, while the influence of living in a district with more support for the ruling party counteracts this and reduces the perceived level of corruption slightly. I have made the case that in Senegal, individuals who are more satisfied with democracy and who report higher levels of trust should also report less corruption, and these results do hold in both individual-level and multi-level models. Furthermore, the effects of these evaluations on corruption vary by Department. However, the causal nature of these relationships cannot be determined in this paper, and the next steps are to explore the pathways between corruption, satisfaction with democracy, and trust.

This analysis by no means exhausts explanations for perceived levels of corruption. I have tried to demonstrate that individual-level effects do vary by environment, and that the climate of opinion surrounding an individual may directly affect individual evaluations. The ways that contextual-level variables interact with individual-level variables is not uniform, as the results here have shown.

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