

# AFRO BAROMETER

*Working Paper No. 81*

## **CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT**

by Daniel Armah-Attoh, E Gyimah-  
Boadi and Annie Barbara Chikwanha

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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**December 2007**

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## AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Editors: Michael Bratton, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and Robert Mattes

Managing Editor: Carolyn Logan

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## Corruption And Institutional Trust In Africa: Implications For Democratic Development

### *Abstract*

This paper addresses the corruption-trust nexus with survey data and statistical methods. Data are drawn from the Afrobarometer, a comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in selected African countries. This paper confirms that corruption is a major, perhaps *the* major, obstacle to building popular trust in state institutions and electoral processes in Africa. The paper also shows that Africans clearly regard all forms of corruption as wrong and that low institutional trust inhibits the development of mass attitudes supportive of democracy. Indeed, the connection between corruption and distrust is so strong that, as well as running “forwards” (from corruption to trust), it may also run “backwards” (by which low trust in state institutions raises popular suspicions that public officials are corrupt). This paper not only confirms the first hypothesis, but also tests the latter.

## Introduction

Interest in governmental probity and accountability has surged in African countries as in the rest of the world. Reflecting growing popular awareness and new opportunities to speak openly, corruption and abuse of office have attracted banner headlines in newspapers in African countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria. Corruption has also become a central issue in election campaigns in Africa's new democracies.

Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged among democracy scholars and advocacy groups that "corruption is corruption" no matter the form it takes. Political (or official) corruption, involving abuse of public office for private ends, has been described as democracy's hidden disease.<sup>1</sup> Among other key negative impacts, corruption is presumed to corrode public trust in state institutions and processes and undermine their effectiveness.<sup>2</sup> But such views are based largely on expert assessments and anecdotal evidence. Can they withstand a systematic test of the presumed effects of corruption on institutional trust and democratic development in Africa?

## The Literature

Other analysts have examined this relationship in various parts of the world. Based on evidence from Italy, France and Germany, della Porta shows that corruption impedes government performance and reduces citizens' trust in government's capability to address their demands (2000). Looking across 16 new advanced democracies in Western and Eastern Europe, Anderson and Tverdova demonstrate that citizens in corrupt countries express lower levels of trust in, and lower evaluations of, political systems (2003). Seligson reports similar findings from four Latin American countries, showing that citizens' corruption experiences reduce their belief in regime legitimacy (2002). Finally, Chang and Chu<sup>3</sup> confirm corruption's corrosive effect on institutional trust even in East Asia, a region that has sometimes been argued to display a political culture forgiving of corruption (2006).

For this emerging empirical generalization to hold true universally, however, we need to know whether corruption undermines institutional trust also in Africa. In so doing, it would also be useful to know whether Africans make distinctions among various types of corruption – like nepotism, extortion, and patronage – and whether they attach equal moral equivalence to of these types, that is, whether they regard each as right or wrong. Finally, it would be important to assess and compare the impact of corruption perceptions and institutional trust on African citizens' attitudes towards the legitimacy of new democratic regimes.

To anticipate results, this paper confirms that corruption is a major, perhaps *the* major, obstacle to building popular trust in state institutions and electoral processes in Africa. The paper also shows that Africans clearly regard all forms of corruption as wrong and that low institutional trust inhibits the development of mass attitudes supportive of democracy. Indeed, the connection between corruption and distrust is so strong that, as well as running "forwards" (from corruption to trust), it may also run "backwards" (by which low trust in state institutions raises popular suspicions that public officials are corrupt). This paper not only confirms the first hypothesis, but also tests the latter. It should therefore be read in conjunction with other recent analyses of the same data that make a case that corruption and trust are linked reciprocally in a vicious circle that is hard to escape (Uslaner 2007, Cho and Kirwin 2007).

## The Afrobarometer

This paper addresses the corruption-trust nexus with survey data and statistical methods. Data are drawn from the Afrobarometer, a comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in selected African countries. The Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) and Michigan State University (MSU). The first round of surveys (denoted "circa

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<sup>1</sup> See Marcin Walescki, *Democracy at Large* vol. 2, no. 4, 2006 pp. 16-19;

<sup>2</sup> See della Porta, Donatella (2000) "Corruption and Trust: The Case of Mexico" "A Paper submitted to *Political Behavior*, February 2006; Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, eds. Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Seligson, Mitchell. (2002a) *The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries.* *Journal of Politics* 64 (2): 408-33.

<sup>3</sup> The summary of the literature in this paragraph is drawn directly from Chang and Chu.

2000”) was conducted from July 1999 to September 2001. The second and third rounds (circa 2002 and 2005) took place between August 2002 to July 2003 and March 2005 to March 2006 respectively (see Appendix, Table 1).

The first round of Afrobarometer survey covered 12 countries. In the second round the coverage increased to 16 countries; and the third round took place in 18 countries.<sup>4</sup> The sample was designed to be nationally representative of the adult population in each country (i.e. those over 18 years old and eligible to vote). Survey respondents are selected using a multistage, stratified, clustered area design that is randomized at every stage with probability proportional to population size<sup>5</sup>. The minimum sample size in any country in any round is 1200, which is sufficient to yield a confidence interval of plus or minus 2.8 percent (approximately 3 percent) at a confidence level of 95 percent.

The Afrobarometer surveys instruments are produced initially in English, and then “indigenized” in each country, after which they are translated into the primary local languages of each country. Trained interviewers then interview respondents in face-to-face sessions in the language of the respondent’s choice. Because a standard questionnaire is used with identical or functionally equivalent items, comparisons are possible, both over time and across countries.

The Afrobarometer countries represent different regions of Africa and thus provide fairly good geographical coverage. The selection of countries is largely based on their having undergone a measure of political and economic reform, which makes it possible to characterize them as among the continent’s most open regimes. However, the inclusion of countries with serious internal conflicts – like Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe – helps to make the country sample somewhat representative of the sub-continent. Nonetheless, considerable caution must be exercised in projecting Afrobarometer results to all “Africans.”

### **Structure of the paper**

The paper has four parts. The first part focuses on African opinion on corruption and institutional trust. It begins with a brief discussion of the demographics of the sample surveyed, followed by a review of popular African understanding of corruption in normative terms, trends in popular perception of corruption, experience with corruption as well as popular trust in the Afrobarometer countries, especially the 12 countries for which time series data are available.<sup>6</sup> The second part is devoted to the impact of corruption on trust in democratic institutions and processes. It analyses the effects of popular perceptions of corruption on trust in key democratic institutions (e.g. the presidency, legislature, local government body, election authorities) and the credibility of election processes. Part three attempts to draw implications of corruption and trust on popular support for democracy, as well as satisfaction and patience with democracy, which are three main dimensions of democratic development. The concluding section is devoted to the discussion of the findings and general recommendations for addressing corruption and fostering democratic consolidation in Africa.

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<sup>4</sup> Countries surveyed in the first round are Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi. In the second round, Senegal, Cape Verde, Kenya and Mozambique joined the first 12 countries. Two more countries: Madagascar and Benin were added in the third round survey to the sixteen countries in survey in the second round.

<sup>5</sup> Generally, country samples are self-weighting. In some countries, however, statistical weights were used to adjust for purposive over-sampling of minorities or to correct for inadvertent deviations from the planned sample during fieldwork. Statistics reported in this paper are therefore based on weight sample to ensure that each country has same sample size.

<sup>6</sup> Unless otherwise noted, “don’t know” responses are included, even if they are not shown. However, before computing correlations and regression coefficients, all don’t know and missing data are removed. Except where noted, the share of missing data is small and does not significantly change the sample size or confidence interval. All percentages have been rounded to whole numbers. This occasionally introduces small anomalies in which the sum of total reported responses does not equal 100 percent. An empty cell signifies that a particular question was not asked in a given country in a given year. In many cases, we have combined response categories. For example, “satisfied” and “very satisfied” responses are added together and reported as a single figure. Rounding was applied only after response categories were aggregated. We use Round 3 data to deepen our understanding of the two findings.

## AFRICAN OPINION ON CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

### Demographics of the Sample

Reflecting population distributions in Africa, just over a third of the respondents in the three surveys were resident in urban areas with the rest living in rural areas. The sample is equally split between males and females and almost half reported being heads of households across two time periods. In terms of educational achievement, less than a fifth in the three surveys always reported that they have no formal education. The proportions stating that they had primary or secondary (i.e. a little over a third for each) also remained stable over time (See Table 1).

**Table 1: Sample demographics**

		Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
<b>Location</b>	Urban	41	36	35
	Rural	57	64	65
<b>Head of household</b>	No	-	47	50
	Yes	-	45	50
<b>Gender</b>	Male	49	50	50
	Female	50	50	50
<b>Education status</b>	No formal/informal schooling	19	18	17
	Some primary/primary completed	35	35	37
	Some secondary/secondary completed	36	36	36
	Post-sec., some Univ., Univ. completed & Post ad.	11	10	10
<b>Employment status</b>	Yes (employed)	33	-	-
	No (unemployed)	32	-	-
	No (not looking)	-	40	36
	No (looking)	-	25	32
	Yes, part time (not looking)	-	4	4
	Yes, part time (looking)	-	8	8
	Yes, full time (not looking)	-	13	14
Yes, full time (looking)	-	10	7	

*Note: With the exception of circa 2000 where Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda did not ask questions on employment status, all other proportions are for the 12 Afrobarometer countries included in the study.*

By Round 3 (circa 2005) a total of 68 percent claimed to be unemployed, with 32 percent of all respondents reportedly searching for employment. And of those currently employed, 15 percent are seeking alternative employment.

### The Perceived Immorality of Corruption

As stated earlier, political (or official) corruption is the use of public office for private, sectarian, or partisan benefit, as opposed to the public good. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption operationally as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. It further differentiates between corruption "according to rule" and corruption "against the rule." For instance, payment of bribe for something that a public official is required to do by law (i.e. facilitation payments) constitutes a violation "according to rule." On the other hand, where the bribe receiver is by law forbidden from rendering the said service, that corruption is described as "against the rule."

To understand the moral status of corruption as conceived by Africans, we explored for possible convergence between African opinion and these international standards. Any observed conformity with international standards would call into question the assumptions that Africans are lax about condemning corruption or that corruption is somehow an inherent aspect of African cultures.

How, then, do Africans view corruption in normative terms? In 2005, the Afrobarometer survey asked how ordinary African citizens regard various acts by public officials that are globally regarded as corrupt. Did they think that this conduct "wrong and punishable," "wrong but understandable," or "not wrong at all"? The acts in question involved a government official who (a) gives a job to

someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications; (b) demands favor or an additional payment for some services that is part of his job; and (c) locates development project in an area where his friends and supporters live.” Table 2 presents the country-by-country proportions of respondents that think these acts are “wrong and punishable” and/or “wrong but understandable.”<sup>7</sup>

Overwhelming proportions of Africans express moral disapproval of these acts by public officials. The fact that fewer than one in eight Africans interviewed regards these acts as “not wrong at all” suggests a high level of convergence between African and international opinion. Fully 79 percent of the public across the 12 countries believe that it is wrong for public officials to give a job to an unqualified relative. We can distinguish this type of corruption as *nepotism*, a violation “against the rule”.<sup>8</sup> A slightly smaller but still large proportion (77 percent) feels the same way about public officials requesting favor or extra payment for official services rendered. For purposes of comparison, let us call this type of corruption *extortion*, which is a violation “according to rule.”

A somewhat lower proportion (64 percent) deems it wrong for a public official to locate development projects in areas where friends and supporters live. In other words, we have uncovered a relatively high tolerance among Africans for political *patronage* in the form of the distribution of public goods to political loyalists. Patronage is an informal pattern of official behavior that is common in all political systems that lies at the normative boundary between right and wrong. There are debates about whether patronage is even a form of corruption at all (Theobald 1990). While almost two-thirds of Africans interviewed (64 percent) condemn patronage as a form of corruption (“wrong and punishable”), almost one quarter (23 percent) feel ambiguous (“wrong but understandable”). In other words, the degree of popular moral condemnation depends on the type of corruption. Africans, again like people elsewhere in the world are likely to be much more intolerant of nepotism and extortion than they are of patronage.

**Table 2: Defining Corruption (Circa 2005)**

	JOB TO UNQUALIFIED RELATIVE		FAVOUR FOR OFFICIAL SERVICE		DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN SUPPORT BASE	
	Wrong, but Understandable	Wrong and Punishable	Wrong, but Understandable	Wrong and Punishable	Wrong, but Understandable	Wrong and Punishable
	Botswana	4	93	11	79	13
Ghana	12	85	9	87	18	70
Lesotho	9	88	8	89	18	75
Malawi	8	87	5	88	9	88
Mali	16	74	20	72	27	54
Namibia	20	73	30	58	30	52
Nigeria	25	68	25	66	33	51
South Africa	6	91	8	88	12	82
Tanzania	23	70	21	73	34	55
Uganda	29	63	29	62	35	34
Zambia	26	71	22	69	33	54
Zimbabwe	8	92	4	95	19	76
<b>AFRO MEAN</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>64</b>

*Note:* Proportions are for the 12 Afrobarometer countries included in the study. *Question wording:* For each of the following, please indicate whether you think that act is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable or wrong and punishable. (a) A government official gives job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications (b) A government official demands a favor or an additional payment for some services that is part of his job (c) A public official decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters live.

Despite the generally high levels of disapproval for all types of corruption, some countries registered higher levels of tolerance than others. Ugandans, Zambians and Nigerians appear to be relatively more tolerant of all three practices. Compared to other Africans, the adult populations of these three

<sup>7</sup> Afrobarometer did not ask these questions in circa 2000 and circa 2002.

<sup>8</sup> The Afro mean is the 12-country average for any under consideration.



countries contained sizeable minorities (up to one-third) who regard it as “understandable” that government officials engage in corruption. Indeed, only one third of Ugandans think that public officials should be punished for distributing patronage. By contrast, South Africans, Botswanans, Malawians and Zimbabweans are least tolerant of corruption, especially when it takes the forms of nepotism and extortion, but even with regards to patronage.

### The Perceived Extent of Corruption

How much corruption do Africans perceive among the public officials who occupy positions in state institutions? Afrobarometer data show widespread popular perception of public official corruption (Table 3<sup>A</sup>).

Appreciable proportions of Africans perceive corruption across all eleven institutions covered in three rounds of surveys. The police service is consistently seen as the most corrupt in the 12 countries and across time. On average, eight in every ten respondents (i.e. 81 percent each) in both circa 2002 and circa 2005 see the police as corrupt. The proportions who see “some” or “most” officials as corrupt tend to drive these rather high estimates (see Appendix, Table 2).

**Table 3<sup>A</sup>: Trends in African perceptions of corruption among selected public officials over time**

	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians	69	68	64	-5
[National] Govt. Officials/Civil servants	76	76	69	-7
President & his officials	-	76	60	-16
Police	-	81	81	0
Judges & Magistrates	-	69	67	-2
Teachers & School Administrators	-	62	58	-4
Border Officials	-	66	-	-
Local Govt. officials	-	-	70	-
Local Councilors	-	-	67	-
Tax Officials	-	-	68	-
Health workers	-	-	63	-

*Note: The proportions are the cumulative “some/most/all of them” responses. Since two countries (i.e. Ghana and Nigeria) did not ask questions on perceived corruption among Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians and [National] Govt. Officials/Civil servants in circa 2000, the proportions for these public officials in circa 2002 and circa 2005 exclude Ghana and Nigeria (i.e. Afro means are based on 10 countries). Also in circa 2002, Zimbabwe did not solicit opinion on border official’s corruption. With these exceptions, all other proportions are the afro means for 12 countries. **Question wording (2000):** Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers. Just tell me what you think. (a) Most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themselves (b) How often, if ever has a public official asked you for a bribe or favor in return for getting something you were entitled to? **Question wording (2002 and 2005):** How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t heard enough about them to say? (a) President and officials in his office (b) Elected leaders (e.g. Members of Parliament) (c) Local Councilors (d) National government officials (e) Local Government Officials (f) The Police (g) Tax/Border Officials (h) Judges and Magistrates.*

Though popular perceptions of official corruption may appear to be declining over time, most such trends remain within the cumulative margin of sampling errors across surveys.<sup>9</sup> With existing data, and in the aggregate (i.e. for 12 African countries pooled together), we can be most certain about the following. First, popular perceptions of corruption regarding the police have remained stable at high levels in recent years. Second, over the same period, popular perceptions of corruption in the presidency -- meaning the President himself and the entourage of advisors and appointees in the Office of the President -- have tended to decline.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Any given survey has a margin of sampling error of  $\pm 3$  percent margin of error. Thus for any comparison across two or more surveys, we require a difference of at least 6 percent points to imply a trend. Generally, however, we also prefer to infer trends only where we have three data points. To determine the significance of cross-tabulations, irrespective of whether the differences are real or otherwise, we apply the Pearson chi-square statistic and its corresponding p-values.

<sup>10</sup> We ensured uniformity and comparability by excluding information on Ghana and Nigeria from circa 2002 and circa 2005 because they did not ask questions on perceived corruption among government officials/civil servants and elected leaders in circa 2000. With the inclusion of these countries in circa 2002 and circa 2005 analysis, corruption perception proportions regarding elected leaders/parliamentarians would be 58 percent and 66 percent respectively and the accompanying change

Across countries, the general public sees corruption as more rampant in some places than in others. The following countries had national averages above the Afrobarometer mean for perceived corruption among parliamentarians and civil servants: Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa and Botswana (Table 3<sup>B</sup>). But trends were nationally distinctive. In Zambia, for example, people saw rising corruption among parliamentarians whereas, in South Africa, the same public attitude was in decline. Yet in both these countries, perceptions of corruption among civil servants essentially held steady, whereas in Zimbabwe, such perceptions increased over time. For this reason, as well as others discussed above, it is inadvisable to proclaim any general trend in perceived official corruption in Africa since much depends on developments in particular countries.

**Table 3<sup>B</sup>: Perceptions of corruption by country**

	Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians			National Government officials		
	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Botswana	59	59	68	58	67	76
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	62	44	47	74	68	52
Malawi	66	65	51	78	70	55
Mali	66	70	61	76	80	65
Namibia	56	72	59	64	77	72
Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	84	75	71	85	79	82
Tanzania	70	58	38	83	67	42
Uganda	78	82	69	80	88	77
Zambia	68	80	85	79	84	82
Zimbabwe	78	72	87	81	77	89
<b>AFRO MEAN</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>69</b>

*Note: Afro means are based on 10 countries' data.*

### Experiences with Corruption

How reliable are the generally high levels of perceived official corruption in African countries? Much depends on the choice of measurement instrument. Lower levels of perceived corruption would be registered, for example, if we chose to consider only those who see “most” or “all” officials as corrupt, rather than also including those who just see “some.” More importantly, we need to qualify subjective perceptions with objective experiences. It is quite likely, for example that some Africans form their impressions about the pervasiveness of corruption on the basis of what they hear from friends and associates (whether fact or rumor) and what they read in the press (whether accurate or not). Is it not therefore desirable to qualify perceptions with actual experiences?

In practice, only around one-tenth of the Africans interviewed admit to “paying a bribe,” “giving a gift,” or “doing a favor” in order to obtain an official service. We asked about the following services: securing an official document or permit, gaining an admission to school for child, obtain household services (like piped water, electricity, or telephone), getting medical attention, avoiding problems with the police, and crossing an international border (Table 4<sup>A</sup>).

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over time will be -3 percent points. Similarly, that for government officials/civil servants the proportions will be 68 percent and 71 percent respectively with a resultant -5 percent points change over time. Despite the large decline in perceived corruption within the presidency, we are still cautious about inferring a trend from only two data points.

**Table 4<sup>A</sup>: African experiences with corruption over time**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
Bribe for a document or permit	10	11	+1
Bribe for school placement for a child	7	7	0
Bribe for household services	7	7	0
Bribery to avoid problem with the police	10	11	+1
Cross a border	8	-	-
Bribe for medicines/medical treatment	-	12	-

*Note: Percentages are the Afro mean for the 12 countries used in the study (i.e. aggregate percent for “once/twice/a few times/often” responses). Change is the difference between the latest and past period Afro means. Question wording (2002 and 2005): In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favor to government officials in order to (a) Get a document or Permit (b) Get a child into school (c) Get household services like piped water, electricity or telephone (d) Get medicine or medical attention from a health worker (e) Avoid a problem with the police (f) Cross a border.*

Again, it is advisable to disaggregate corruption experiences by country, since these events are far more common in some places than others. In 2005, Nigerians were twice as likely as other Africans to report having engaged in offering illegal inducements to public officials, with around one-fifth reporting having done so. Ugandans appear to have to resort to such unusually high levels of bribery in order to gain access to medical services. And many Zimbabweans report that bribery is required in order to negotiate service from police officers. In Botswana, Malawi and Lesotho, however, the involvement of citizens in bribery for public services is reportedly virtually non-existent (Table 4<sup>B</sup>).

**Table 4<sup>B</sup>: African experiences with corruption by country (Circa 2005)**

	Identity document	School placement	Household services	Avoid Police	Medical care
Botswana	2	1	1	2	1
Ghana	15	11	13	14	11
Lesotho	7	1	1	3	2
Malawi	3	3	3	2	5
Mali	10	6	4	6	12
Namibia	12	14	16	12	18
Nigeria	20	17	22	22	22
South Africa	7	5	7	10	7
Tanzania	6	5	4	9	15
Uganda	16	9	5	18	28
Zambia	14	8	4	13	11
Zimbabwe	17	6	7	22	13
<b>AFRO MEAN</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>

Just as popular perceptions of corruption may be inflated by hearsay, reports of actual corruption experiences may be deflated by the unwillingness of survey respondents to implicate themselves in illegal activity. The real level of corruption in African countries therefore probably lies somewhere between overestimated perceptions and underreported experiences. If we use a more modest estimate of perceptions (that refers only to “most” or all” officials), then we can conclude that the real proportion of corrupt officials lies in the interval between 11 percent (experienced) and 30 percent (perceived).

### Demographic Considerations

While our main goal is to use corruption to predict institutional trust, it is instructive to first explore which Africans see and encounter corruption. To this end, we use 2005 Afrobarometer data to analyze the impact, if any, of demographic factors on perceptions and experiences of corruption. We anticipate that rural inhabitants will perceive and experience less corruption because of limited exposure to information and operations of state institutions, which are concentrated in urban locations. We also expect males to see and feel more corruption because they are relatively better-educated and more mobile than females. And because youth, especially school-leavers, tend to be critical about official conduct, we expected them to recognize more corruption than older people. This last hypothesis is anticipated to hold true even if youth have less direct personal experience with bribery than their elders.

Consistent with expectations, urban location, age<sup>11</sup> and gender have positive influences on the frequency of corruption perceptions (see Tables 3C and 3 D). All relationships are also statistically significant (Appendix, Table 3).

**Table 3<sup>C</sup>: Perceptions of corruption by location and gender (Circa 2005)**

		Urban	Rural	Diff.	Male	Female	Diff.
<b>President</b>	None of them	17	22	<b>-5</b>	20	20	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	67	57	<b>+10</b>	62	58	<b>+4</b>
<b>Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians</b>	None of them	13	17	<b>-5</b>	16	16	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	72	62	<b>+10</b>	68	63	<b>+5</b>
<b>National govt. officials</b>	None of them	9	14	<b>-5</b>	12	12	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	78	67	<b>+11</b>	73	68	<b>+5</b>
<b>Local govt. councilors</b>	None of them	12	19	<b>-7</b>	17	16	<b>+1</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	73	64	<b>+9</b>	69	65	<b>+4</b>
<b>Local govt. officials</b>	None of them	10	14	<b>-4</b>	13	13	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	76	67	<b>+10</b>	73	67	<b>+6</b>
<b>Police</b>	None of them	6	10	<b>-4</b>	9	9	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	88	78	<b>+10</b>	83	79	<b>+4</b>
<b>Tax officials</b>	None of them	10	13	<b>-3</b>	12	12	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	74	64	<b>+10</b>	70	65	<b>+5</b>
<b>Judges and magistrates</b>	None of them	15	18	<b>-3</b>	17	17	<b>0</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	73	63	<b>+10</b>	70	64	<b>+14</b>
<b>Health workers</b>	None of them	21	28	<b>-7</b>	25	26	<b>-1</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	69	60	<b>+9</b>	65	61	<b>+4</b>
<b>Teachers &amp; school administrators</b>	None of them	24	34	<b>-10</b>	31	30	<b>+1</b>
	Some/Most /All of them	65	54	<b>+11</b>	59	56	<b>+3</b>

<sup>11</sup> We grouped respondents into three age cohorts, namely the youth (i.e. 18-35 years), the middle aged (i.e. 36-50 years) and the elderly (i.e. 51+ years)

**Table 3<sup>D</sup>: Perceptions of corruption by age (Circa 2005)**

				Youth	Middle Age	Elderly	Youth– Middle Age Difference	Youth–Elderly Difference
<b>President</b>	None			18	21	24	-3	-6
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	64	58	52	+6	+12
<b>Parliamentarians</b>	None			14	17	19	-3	-5
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	70	64	57	+6	+23
<b>National govt. officials</b>	None			11	13	15	-2	-4
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	75	69	63	+6	+12
<b>Local govt. councilors</b>	None			14	18	20	-4	-6
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	71	66	59	+5	+12
<b>Local govt. officials</b>	None			12	13	16	-1	-4
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	74	69	61	+5	+13
<b>Police</b>	None			8	9	12	-1	-4
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	84	81	74	+3	+10
<b>Tax officials</b>	None			11	12	15	-1	-4
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	72	67	58	+5	+12
<b>Judges and magistrates</b>	None			17	17	19	0	-2
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	69	66	60	+3	+9
<b>Health workers</b>	None			24	26	29	-2	-5
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	66	62	57	+4	+9
<b>Teachers &amp; administrators</b>	None			28	32	34	-4	-6
	Some/Most of them	/All	of	62	56	50	+6	+12

*Difference is calculated as the proportion for the more youthful population less that for the middle aged and/or the elderly.*

Similar patterns are reproduced for experiences with corruption (see Table 4C and Appendix, Table 4).

**Table 4<sup>C</sup>: African experiences with corruption by geographical location, gender and age (Circa 2005)**

		Urban	Rural	Diff.	Male	Female	Diff.	Youth	Elderly	Diff.
<b>Identity document</b>	Never	58	62	-4	60	61	-1	59	61	-1
	Paid bribe	13	9	+5	13	9	+5	11	8	+3
<b>School placement</b>	Never	63	68	-5	61	66	-5	63	69	-6
	Paid bribe	8	7	+1	8	7	+1	7	7	0
<b>Household services</b>	Never	61	62	-1	61	61	0	61	60	+1
	Paid bribe	11	6	+5	8	6	+2	8	6	+2
<b>Medical attention</b>	Never	67	70	-3	69	69	0	67	72	-5
	Paid bribe	12	12	0	12	12	0	13	8	+5
<b>Avoid problems with police</b>	Never	60	63	-3	62	63	-1	61	64	-3
	Paid bribe	14	10	+4	14	9	+5	12	8	+4

*Differences in proportions are calculated as follows: Urban – Rural; Male – Female and Youth – Elderly.*

To facilitate further analysis, we first constructed indices for perceived corruption and corruption experiences.<sup>12</sup> Because, as expected, these indices are significantly correlated (Pearson's  $r = .153$ ,  $\text{sig.} = < .001$ ), we infer that corruption experiences help to shape corruption perceptions. These effects are also revealed in the cross-tabulation table below, which shows, among other things, that persons who have paid a bribe for an identity document are ten percentage points more likely to think that public officials are corrupt (see Table 4<sup>D</sup> and Appendix, Table 5).

**Table 4<sup>D</sup>: Cross-tabulation: Experience with corruption and perceived corruption index (Circa 2005)**

		Corrupt	Not corrupt	Difference
<b>Identity document/permit</b>	Never	60	64	-4
	Paid bribe	12	2	10
<b>School placement</b>	Never	66	72	-6
	Paid bribe	8	2	6
<b>Household services</b>	Never	61	63	-2
	Paid bribe	8	3	5
<b>Medical treatment</b>	Never	68	78	-10
	Paid bribe	13	2	11
<b>Avoid problems with police</b>	Never	61	65	-3
	Paid bribe	12	2	10

*The differences are calculated as the proportions for corrupt less those of the not corrupt for each of the experience with corruption response code.*

### Popular Trust in Institutions

As a final step before turning to the core analysis of this paper – does corruption undermine institutional trust? – we find it necessary to first describe the main object of analysis: popular trust in state institutions. Four key executive and legislative bodies are considered: the presidency, electoral commission, parliament and local government council. A related item – confidence that the last national election was free and fair – is included as an alternative object.

Generally, Africans express growing popular trust in state institutions over time. From 45 percent in circa 2000, the average trust rating for African presidents improved to 52 percent and 62 percent circa 2002 and 2005 respectively. Even though trust in electoral commissions slumped from 54 percent circa 2000 to 35 percent in circa 2002, it recovered to 54 percent circa 2005. And the 15 and 16

<sup>12</sup> For detail statistics regarding all indices, see Appendix Tables 7<sup>A</sup> to 7<sup>D</sup>. We use factor analysis (based on the principal component extraction with direct oblimin rotation) to verify validity and reliability analysis to verify reliability of all indices. Following convention, we accept a Cronbach Alpha value of 0.6 and above as an indication of good reliability. Circa 2005, the Cronbach Alpha values for the perceived corruption and corruption experiences indices are 0.910 and .807 respectively.

percentage point increases in trust ratings for parliaments and local councils are indicative of rising trends (Table 5<sup>A</sup>).

**Table 5<sup>A</sup>: Trends in African trust in democratic institutions and processes**

	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
President	45	52	62	+17
The Electoral Commission	54	35	54	0
Parliament	-	43	58	+15
Local Councilors/Government Body	-	37	53	+16
Elections free and fair	67	-	62	-5

*Note:* Since two countries (i.e. Ghana and Uganda) did not ask questions on trust in the President in circa 2000, the trust ratings for the President in circa 2002 and circa 2005 exclude Ghana and Uganda. Percentages are the Afro means (aggregate percent for “somewhat/a lot of” responses). Change is the difference between the latest and past period Afro means (i.e. either circa 2000 or 2002). **Trust question wording (2000):** I am going to read you a list of people. I would like to know whether, generally speaking, you trust them to do what is right all or most of the time. How much do you trust the following institutions? (a) The President (b) The Electoral Commission. **Trust question wording (2002 and 2005):** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t heard enough about them to say? (a) President (b) The Electoral Commission (c) The Parliament (d) Local Government councilors. **Election question wording (2000):** In your opinion, were the last elections generally honest, or did some candidates have an unfair advantage? **Election question wording (2005):** On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national elections?

On the other hand, the proportions of adults who thought election results were free and fair slumped by 5 percentage points, though this difference falls within the margin of sampling error for survey comparisons. As evidence that this last item is a useful adjunct measure of institutional trust, we note that, at the country level, assessments of the freeness of fairness of elections are strongly and positively correlated to trust in electoral commissions.<sup>13</sup>

Once again, however, cross-country differences are important. In Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Zambia (in that order) citizens have the least trust in democratic institutions and processes (Table 5<sup>B</sup>). Since these are countries in which corruption perceptions (Zambia and Zimbabwe, see Table 3B) and corruption experiences (Nigeria, see Table 4B) were especially high, there is *prima facie* reason to suspect a connection between corruption and trust. It is to an exploration of this expected relationship at the level of the individual African citizen that this paper now turns.

**Table 5<sup>B</sup>: Popular Trust in Institutions by country (Circa 2005)**

	President	Electoral Commission	Parliament	Local Govt. Body	Elections free and fair
Botswana	66	55	64	62	84
Ghana	75	75	68	54	77
Lesotho	79	68	62	47	79
Malawi	60	50	51	54	43
Mali	81	53	70	74	64
Namibia	80	56	70	56	77
Nigeria	26	21	22	23	32
South Africa	67	56	54	41	74
Tanzania	94	87	88	80	79
Uganda	78	64	70	76	67
Zambia	39	33	40	32	29
Zimbabwe	31	29	35	33	36
<b>AFRO MEAN</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>62</b>

*Note:* Afro means are based on 12 countries’ data.

## IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON POPULAR TRUST IN STATE INSTITUTIONS

The preceding descriptions established that most Africans think that at least some public officials are corrupt. Nonetheless, Africans harbor considerable trust, confidence and goodwill for core institutions of the state. Key questions therefore naturally arise: What accounts for popular trust in state institutions in Africa? How important is corruption in shaping (probably by undermining) institutional trust?

<sup>13</sup> The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.374, sig.=<0.001.

### Estimating Corruption Impact on Trust

To answer these questions, we began by constructing specific indices<sup>14</sup> and recoding specific variables that other, theoretically based studies have found to significantly influence institutional trust. We classified these indices and variables into four broad categories: political factors, economic factors, performance considerations, and demographic background factors.

Perceived corruption and civil liberties are the key political factors. The main economic factors consist of popular assessments of the general economic and personal living conditions respectively. Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that citizens are able to clearly distinguish between economic goods (like material welfare) and political goods (like political rights and freedoms) (see also Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Performance considerations include the government's record at delivering key social services. If the delivery of political, economic and social goods is deemed unfavorable, then impacts on institutional trust are expected to be negative. The standard demographic background factors are expected to perform as before (see section 1.4 above). But in the comprehensive models of institutional trust that follow, we add education, which is expected to be negative for trust since education tends to breed skeptical thinking and critical citizenship.

To establish *a priori* relationships, we ran basic correlation analysis. As Table 6A shows, almost all coefficients assumed anticipated signs in both 2002 and 2005. But improved civil liberties took on a sign contrary to expectation circa 2005 and gender turned out to be statistically insignificant in both periods.

**Table 6<sup>A</sup>: Pearson correlation between trust in democratic institutions/processes and selected political, economic factors, performance and social background factors**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Perceived corruption index	-0.217**	-0.288**
Unfavourable general economic performance Index	-0.373**	-0.435**
Unfavourable personal living conditions Index	-0.063**	-0.135**
Unfavourable social policy performance Index	-0.345**	-0.413**
Improved civil liberties Index	0.234**	-0.391**
Age	0.102**	0.107**
Urban population	-0.157**	-0.106**
Education	-0.131**	-0.109**
Gender (Female)	-0.011	-0.008

\*\* Pearson Correlation coefficient significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test).

Given the favourable correlation results, we proceeded to a single multivariate regression equation to test the hypothesis that corruption exerts a corrosive effect on trust in state institutions while controlling for the influences of the other political, economic, performance and social background factors.<sup>15</sup> In estimating this equation, we first tested for possible dual causality (or a mutually reinforcing relationship) between corruption and institutional trust by applying the Hausman test. This involves regressing perceived corruption on all exogenous factors in the institutional trust equation and estimating the residuals using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Next, we estimated the institutional trust equation with the residuals as one of the independent variables using OLS. The coefficient of the residuals turned out to be highly significant ( $p = >.001$ ) in both 2002 and 2005 datasets, thereby confirming the presence of endogeneity bias (Mukherjee, White and Wuyt, 1998, 419-21). Consequently, we developed a second equation for perceived corruption to create a simultaneous system of two equations.

The specification of the perceived corruption equation allowed for controls by selected political, performance and cognitive factors. The political factors included institutional trust, experience with corruption (i.e. payment of bribe) and indirect vote buying (i.e. an offer of gifts during campaign).

<sup>14</sup> For detail statistics regarding all the scales, see Appendix Tables 7<sup>A</sup> and 7<sup>D</sup>. We use Factor analysis (based on the Principal Component extraction with Direct Oblimin) and Reliability analysis to verify the reliability of all scales in this paper. Also, we conventionally accepted any scale to be very reliable if the Cronbach Alpha value is greater or equal to 0.600. All the scales had Alpha values higher than the conventional level.

<sup>15</sup> In conducting the regression analysis, we used only data circa 2002 and circa 2005 data because circa 2000 lacked information on some variables.



The performance and cognitive factors are official tolerance for criminal conduct and media consumption<sup>16</sup> respectively. Based on the Hausman test results, we contemplate negative impacts from trust in institutions on perceived corruption. On the other hand, experience with corruption, indirect vote buying by politicians, official tolerance for criminal conducts and media consumption are likely to fuel the perception of corruption (i.e. to have positive impacts).

To test the relevance of the selected factors and the efficacy of their hypothesized relationships with perceived corruption, we first ran correlation analysis. As Table 6<sup>B</sup> shows, the correlation coefficients confirmed our expectations. All coefficients assumed hypothesized signs. The only insignificant correlation coefficient is for official tolerance for criminal conduct circa 2002. Thus, overall, we find that these factors are relevant determinants of perceived corruption.

**Table 6<sup>B</sup>: Pearson correlation analysis between perceived corruption and selected political, performance and cognitive factors**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Trust in democratic institutions/processes index	-0.217**	-0.288**
Experience with corruption index	0.153**	0.207**
Media consumption index	0.158**	0.220**
Official tolerance for criminal acts index	0.002	0.166**
Indirect vote buying dummy	-	0.191**

\*\* Pearson Correlation coefficient significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test).

With the reciprocal relationship between trust and corruption confirmed, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to run individual estimates of the trust and corruption equations would yield biased coefficients.<sup>17</sup> We therefore estimated the simultaneous model using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), which in this context yields more robust and efficient results.

In applying this technique to estimate the simultaneous system of trust and corruption equations, we substituted instrumental variables for the two endogenous variables (i.e. trust and corruption). An instrumental variable must be exogenous, strongly correlated with the variable it replaces, but not correlated with the error term. Finding an instrumental variable with all these qualities is usually difficult. In practice, most analysts have made use of the lagged form of the endogenous independent variable because it is able to take care of the problem emanating from the inherent non-recursive relationship. Also, we estimated the trust model with one of the economic factors (i.e. unfavourable assessments of the general economic and personal living conditions respectively) at the time because we observed significant correlation between the two (i.e. 0.444 in circa 2002 and 0.508 in circa 2005 with p-values of 0.000).

The results in Table 6<sup>C</sup> reaffirm a dual causality between corruption and trust. Trust recorded negative impacts in the corruption models in both 2002 and 2005. In tandem, corruption recorded negative influences in the trust models in both periods. Indeed, both corruption and trust impacts are highly significant predictors in their respective models. *Thus, even after taking into account the endogeneity issue, perceived corruption still maintained its trust-eroding effect.* With the exception of improved civil liberties, which assumed unexpected sign in circa 2005, all the other factors carried expected signs.<sup>18</sup> And unfavorable assessment of general economic conditions had relatively larger impacts in both periods than the unfavourable assessment of personal living conditions.

<sup>16</sup> Though the Cronbach Alpha values for the media consumption indices in both periods are lower than the convention of 0.6, we still used them because they were quite close ( 0.596 and 0.586). Those of experience with corruption and official tolerance for criminal acts in both periods are quite high ranging from a low of 0.6374 to a high of 0.8067.

<sup>17</sup> Given the endogeneity problem, the OLS coefficient estimates tend to be biased because the endogenous factor, which is treated as one of the exogenous independent factors, will correlate with the error term.

<sup>18</sup> Coefficients with unexpected signs are assumed to be insignificant in the discussions and rankings.

**Table 6<sup>C</sup>: 2SLS regression results of the simultaneous system of equations**

	Circa 2002			Circa 2005		
	Corruption Model	Trust Model (1)	Trust Model (2)	Corruption n Model	Trust Model (1)	Trust Model (2)
CONSTANT	5.468***	3.954***	3.606***	7.176***	6.192***	5.872***
<b>Political factors</b>						
Perceived Corruption	-	-	-	-	-	-
		0.247***	0.294***		0.426***	0.460***
Trust in Democratic Institutions/Processes	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.276***			0.341***		
Experience with Corruption	0.107***	-	-	0.111***	-	-
Indirect Vote Buying	-	-	-	0.117***	-	-
Improved Civil Liberties	-	0.121***	0.145***	-	-	-
					0.176***	0.215***
<b>Economic factors</b>						
Unfavourable Assessment of General Economy	-	-	-	-	-	-
		0.222***			0.227***	
Unfavourable Assessment of Living Conditions	-	-	-	-	-	-
			0.025***			0.057***
<b>Performance factors</b>						
Official Tolerance for Criminal Acts	-0.022**	-	-	0.059***	-	-
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance	-	-	-	-	-	-
		0.164***	0.261***		0.151***	0.236***
<b>Cognitive factors</b>						
Media Consumption	0.109***	-	-	0.173***	-	-
<b>Social Background Factors</b>						
Education	-	-	-	-	-0.015	-0.007
		0.043***	0.043***			
Age	-	0.047***	0.040***	-	0.011	0.010
Gender (Female)	-	-	-	-	-0.019**	-0.019**
		0.027***	0.025***			
Urban Population	-	-	-	-	-	-
		0.107***	0.111***		0.045***	0.048***
<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>1.964</b>	<b>1.576</b>	<b>1.622</b>	<b>2.786</b>	<b>1.535</b>	<b>1.583</b>
<b>Multiple R</b>	<b>0.224</b>	<b>0.481</b>	<b>0.431</b>	<b>0.378</b>	<b>0.558</b>	<b>0.519</b>
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.050</b>	<b>0.231</b>	<b>0.186</b>	<b>0.143</b>	<b>0.311</b>	<b>0.269</b>
<b>F-statistics</b>	<b>201.6***</b>	<b>562.0***</b>	<b>418.9***</b>	<b>444.9***</b>	<b>848.2***</b>	<b>674.9***</b>

Note: All coefficients are rounded off to 3 decimal places. With the exception of the constants, all other coefficients are the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). Significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ . All wrongly signed coefficients are assumed to be insignificant and are therefore not considered in the ranking of coefficients.

Given the absolute magnitude of the coefficient estimates of the four trust models, we conclude that political, performance and economic factors (i.e. corruption, unfavourable social policy performance, and unfavorable assessments of the general economic and personal living conditions) are the main drivers of institutional trust ratings.

Without doubt, *corruption has the largest impact* across the four trust models. This impact is stronger in circa 2005, when a unit increase in corruption decreases institutional trust by 0.426 to 0.460 compared to the 0.247 to 0.294 reductions in trust as a result of similar unit increase circa 2002 (all other predictor variables being zero). But unfavorable social policies have a stronger impact circa 2002 compared to circa 2005. The impact of unfavourable assessment of the general economic conditions is relatively stable across trust models in both 2002 and 2005. By contrast, personal living conditions exhibits variable effects (i.e. -0.025 to -0.057) over time. Clearly, popular assessments of

the condition of the macro economy have larger effects on trust in democratic institutions than micro level assessments of personal living conditions.

Although age and education were insignificant circa 2005, social background factors also performed creditably overall, especially circa 2002. As conjectured, the socio-economic disparities between males and females and urban versus rural residents are crucial elements that repeatedly erode trust ratings for democratic institutions.

To be certain that no one country (or group of countries) is responsible for the observed corrosive impact of corruption; we conducted a ‘jack-knife’ analysis.<sup>19</sup> This involves estimating the trust model repeatedly by excluding one country at every run. Corruption in all such estimates is negative and highly significant. To further reinforce our confidence in the impact of corruption, we ran country-specific models for each of the 12 countries. Again, we found corruption to be corrosive in nearly all of these estimates (9 in circa 2002 and all 12 in circa 2005). The country-specific estimates further confirm the observation that *the corrosive effect of corruption is real* (see Appendix Table 8).

## **IMPLICATIONS OF CORRUPTION AND TRUST FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT**

### **Corruption, Trust and Democratic Development**

The preceding analysis established that corruption corrodes popular trust in democratic institutions. In this section we attempt to draw out the implications of this worrisome relationship for the overall development of democracy on the African continent.

The Afrobarometer gauges levels of popular commitment to democracy in Africa in four major ways. It asks respondents to indicate whether they (a) prefer democracy to all other forms of government, (b) reject several forms of authoritarian rule, (c) are satisfied with the daily operations of democracy in their countries; and (d) are willing to allow the present democratic system more time to deal with the country’s problems. In short, the surveys assess popular support for various regime types, as well as satisfaction and patience with democracy.


### **Support for Democracy**

Most Africans prefer democracy to any other form of government. On average, at least six in every ten Africans (i.e. 68 percent circa 2000; 62 percent circa 2002; and 61 percent circa 2005) want to see their countries governed democratically. The flip-side of support for democracy – a general repugnance for authoritarian forms of government – could be attributed to the unpleasant experiences many Africans have had with one-man rule (i.e. presidential dictatorship) or military and one-party rule at some point in their lives. Indeed, over the three rounds of surveys, Africans roundly rejected all three non-democratic forms of government (Figure 1).

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<sup>19</sup> See Chang, Eric C.C. and Yun-han Chu, ‘Political Corruption and Institutional Trust in East Asian Democracies.’ In conducting the “jack-knife” analysis, we used only one of the economic factors (i.e. unfavourable assessment of the general economic conditions).

**Figure 1: Preference for democracy and rejection of non-democratic forms of government**



For notes to Figure 1, see over.

**Preference for democracy question wording (2000, 2002 and 2005):** Which of the three statements is a closest to your own opinion? (a) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government (b) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable (c) For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have. **Rejection of non-democratic governments question wording (2000):** Some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options: (a) We should have only one political party (b) The army should come in to govern the country (c) We should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything. **Rejection of non-democratic governments question wording (2002 and 2005):** There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? (a) Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office (b) The army comes in to govern the country (c) Election and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.

Despite encouraging levels of support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian rule, some key such indicators are falling over time. On average, support for democracy fell by 7 percentage points in 12 African countries between 2000 and 2005. At the same time, rejection of military rule was down 8 percentage points. The implication is that some early supporters of democracy are reappraising their regime preferences and discovering a nostalgic yearning for the return of soldiers to politics. Alternatively, younger people, especially those with no direct experience with military rule, are tending to take democracy for granted and to find appeal in the notion of a strongman on horseback. Offsetting this evidence of shallow democratic commitments are mass trends in rejection of presidential dictatorship (down only 1 percentage point) and one-party rule (up 1 percentage point). Since both these small changes fall within the margin of sampling error for more than one survey, we reach the general conclusion that popular attachments to one-man and one-party rule are essentially staying flat over time.

**Table 7<sup>A</sup>: Support for Democracy, by country**

	Preference for democracy			
	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
Botswana	82	66	69	-13
Ghana	76	52	75	-1
Lesotho	39	50	50	+12
Malawi	66	64	56	-9
Mali	60	71	68	+8
Namibia	57	54	57	-1
Nigeria	81	68	65	-16
South Africa	60	57	66	+6
Tanzania	84	65	38	-46
Uganda	67	75	61	-6
Zambia	74	70	64	-10
Zimbabwe	71	48	66	-5

*Note: Change is the difference between 2005 and 2000 proportions.*

Moreover, declining commitments to democracy are concentrated in select countries. Four such countries – Tanzania, Nigerian, Botswana and Zambia – are the main culprits. Support for democracy nosedived by 46 percentage points in Tanzania, and in Nigeria, Botswana and Zambia it fell by between 10 and 16 percentage points (Table 7<sup>A</sup>). Similarly, Tanzania and Nigeria (together with Malawi, Namibia and Uganda) are responsible for the 8-point reduction over time in the mean disapproval rating for military rule. The rejection ratings for these countries dropped by 11 to 31 percentage points between 2000 and 2005 (Table 7<sup>B</sup>).

**Table 7<sup>B</sup>: Rejection of Authoritarian Rule, by country**

	One-party rule				Military rule				Presidential dictatorship			
	Circa	Circa	Circa	Change	Circa	Circa	Circa	Change	Circa	Circa	Circa	Change
	2000	2002	2005		2000	2002	2005		2000	2002	2005	
Botswana	78	68	82	+4	85	79	80	-5	86	85	89	+3
Ghana	78	79	82	+4	88	83	83	-5	86	82	85	-1
Lesotho	51	61	70	+19	70	85	83	+13	69	82	86	+17
Malawi	76	66	56	-20	82	84	51	-31	87	78	66	-21
Mali	73	71	73	0	70	65	66	-4	73	66	73	0
Namibia	63	55	59	-4	58	51	40	-18	56	58	45	-11
Nigeria	88	80	82	-6	90	69	72	-18	83	72	75	-8
South Africa	56	67	66	+10	75	77	72	-3	67	73	65	-2
Tanzania	60	62	44	-16	96	86	82	-14	92	86	82	-10
Uganda	52	54	57	+5	87	85	76	-11	83	90	91	+8
Zambia	80	72	86	+6	94	95	92	-2	89	90	89	0
Zimbabwe	74	58	88	+14	79	80	84	5	78	80	90	+12

*Note:* Change is the difference between 2005 and 2000 proportions.

### Satisfaction and Patience with Democracy

Though many Africans exhibit support for the principle of democracy, they express less than full satisfaction with the actual workings of democratic governance in practice. Bare majorities (57 percent and 52 percent respectively) expressed satisfaction with democracy circa 2000 and 2002. By 2005, satisfaction with democracy had become a minority sentiment, dropping 12 points to a new low of 45 percent. In spite of this waning satisfaction, a majority of Africans is still willing to allow time for democratic regimes to resolve the numerous challenges they face. In both 2002 and 2005, a steady 56 percent expressed patience with democracy. Specifically, declining popular satisfaction is with democracy is a result of declines in eight out of 12 countries, notably Nigeria (down 58 percentage points), Zambia (down 32 points) and Malawi (down 31 points) (Table 7<sup>C</sup>). And although the mean country score for patience with democracy remained stable over time, Zimbabwe (down 21 percentage points), Zambia (down 16 points) and Namibia (down 12 points) registered real reductions over time.

**Table 7<sup>C</sup>: Satisfaction and Patience with democracy by country**

	Satisfaction with democracy				Patience with democracy			
	Circa	Circa	Circa	Change	Circa	Circa	Circa	Change
	2000	2002	2005		2000	2002	2005	
Botswana	75	58	59	-16	-	43	56	+13
Ghana	54	46	70	+16	-	79	80	+1
Lesotho	39	48	40	1	-	51	50	-1
Malawi	57	47	26	-31	-	34	46	+12
Mali	60	63	57	-3	-	68	73	5
Namibia	63	69	69	+6	-	63	51	-12
Nigeria	84	35	26	-58	-	58	55	-3
South Africa	52	44	63	+11	-	54	64	+10
Tanzania	63	63	37	-26	-	54	60	+6
Uganda	62	60	51	-11	-	54	58	+4
Zambia	58	55	26	-32	-	62	46	-16
Zimbabwe	18	37	14	-4	-	52	31	-21

**NB:** Change is the difference between 2005 and 2000 proportions.

### Implications of Corruption and Trust for Democratic Development

To what extent do public perceptions of official corruption and institutional trust shape these democratic developments? As tests, we hypothesize that institutional trust improves support for, and satisfaction and patience with democracy. By contrast, corruption does otherwise. As a first step, we run simple correlation analysis to establish the linkage between dimensions of democratic development and trust and corruption. As expected, trust correlated positively with all dimensions of democracy and corruption was negative for satisfaction and patience. But, against the grain, corruption registered a positive correlation with support for democracy (Table 7<sup>D</sup>).

**Table 7<sup>D</sup>: Pearson correlation analysis between dimensions of democratic development and selected variables and indices**

	SUPPORT SATISFACTIO PATIENCE					
	N					
	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
<b>Political Factors Comprise</b>						
Trust For Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	0.111**	0.108**	0.331**	0.472**	0.163**	0.234**
Perceived Corruption Index	0.026**	0.051**	0.144**	0.171**	0.060**	0.085**
Adherence to Democratic Principles (Interaction term)	0.145**	0.198**	-	-	0.166**	0.144**
Ability to Influence Government's Decisions (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	0.123**	0.181**
<b>Economic Factors</b>						
Unfavourable Assessment of General Economy Index	-0.092**	0.058**	-	-	-	-
Unfavourable Assessment of Living Conditions Index	-0.053**	0.026**	-	-	-	-
General Economy Rated Good (Dummy)	-	-	0.234**	0.299**	-	-
Living Conditions Rated Good (Dummy)	-	-	0.152**	0.164**	-	-
Satisfying Economy and Living Conditions (Interaction term)	-	-	-	-	0.074**	0.083**
Economic Optimism (Interaction term)	-	-	-	-	0.142**	0.169**
<b>Performance Factors</b>						
Personal Security and Safety (Interaction term)	0.112**	0.050**	0.213**	0.235**	-	-
Easy Access to Public/Social Services Index	0.053**	0.050**	0.141**	0.208**	-	-
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance Index	-0.099**	0.063**	-	-	-	-
Approval of Government Performance Index	-	-	0.344**	0.391**	0.150**	0.175**
<b>Social Background Factors</b>						
Education	0.029**	0.111**	-0.046**	0.020**	-0.053**	0.035**
Age	0.051*	-0.001	0.022**	0.057**	0.054**	0.040**

*Note: \*\* and \* Pearson correlation coefficient significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (1-tailed test) respectively. Adherence to Democratic Principle comprises of respondents who believe leaders should be elected and parliament be responsible for making laws. Economic Optimism is composed of individual who are optimistic about the future of both the general economy and personal living conditions. Personal Security and Safety represents those who never feared crime, theft and physical attack and also believe safety from crime and violence has improved. Satisfying Economy and Living Conditions is composed of respondents who rated both the general economy and personal living condition as good.*

Next, we developed a multivariate regression model for each dimension to examine the influences of trust and corruption after controlling for the effects of other political, economic, performance and social background factors.<sup>20</sup> Being mindful of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables (in this paper, support, satisfaction and patience are all measured on binary “yes” or “no” scales), we applied logistic regression methods. All three models performed creditably in terms of the anticipated signs and significance of the independent factors. In all three models of democratic attitudes, institutional trust has the expected positive effects (Tables 7<sup>E</sup> to 7<sup>G</sup>). In other words, people who trust the key executive and legislative institutions of the land are also likely to support democracy and be satisfied and patient with democracy's performance. If they think that public officials are corrupt, however, their satisfaction and patience with democracy are likely to decline. For the most part, therefore, trust and corruption have their respective predicted (positive and negative) effects on democracy's development as measured by public opinion.

But, confirming earlier correlation analysis – and even with other considerations held equal – perceptions of official corruption do *not* undermine an individual's support for democracy. We interpret these unexpected results to mean that people will still support democracy even if it is associated with a modicum of corruption. Either they think the benefits of democracy outweigh the costs of corruption or they think that they, or their identity group, stand a better chance of drawing benefit from corruption under a democratic dispensation.

<sup>20</sup> We constructed two more scales: approval of government's performance and easy access to public/social services as well as dummies/interaction terms. Apart from the 2002 Cronbach Alpha value for easy access to public/social services index, which is close to our conventional 0.600, all the others in both periods are quite high (appendix Tables 7<sup>A</sup> and 7<sup>B</sup> for details).

**Table 7<sup>E</sup>: Logistic regression estimates of Support for Democracy**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
CONSTANT	-0.262*	-0.744***
<b>Political factors</b>		
Trust For Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	0.123***	0.150***
Perceived Corruption Index	0.055***	0.057***
Adherence to Democratic Principles (Interaction term)	0.671***	0.859***
<b>Economic factors</b>		
Unfavourable Assessment of General Economy Index	-0.014	-0.041**
Unfavourable Assessment of Living Conditions Index	0.007	0.037
<b>Performance factors</b>		
Personal Security and Safety (Interaction term)	0.137***	0.073***
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance Index	-0.073***	-0.022
Easy Access to Public/Social Services Index	0.058**	0.001
<b>Social Background Factors</b>		
Education	0.003	0.504***
Age	0.071	0.003
<b>Initial -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>12164.2</b>	<b>10740.2</b>
<b>Model -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>11643.7</b>	<b>10094.2</b>
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.051</b>	<b>0.068</b>
<b>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.072</b>	<b>0.099</b>

*Note: All coefficients are rounded off to 3 decimal places. Wald's statistic significance: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.*

**Table 7<sup>F</sup>: Logistic regression estimates of Satisfaction with Democracy**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
CONSTANT	-0.685***	-2.440***
<b>Political factors</b>		
Trust For Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	0.279***	0.497***
Perceived Corruption Index	-0.086***	-0.027**
<b>Economic factors</b>		
Personal Living Conditions Rated Good (Dummy)	0.251***	0.159*
General Economy Rated Good (Dummy)	0.397***	0.507***
<b>Performance factors</b>		
Personal Security and Safety (Interaction term)	0.169***	0.138***
Easy Access to Public/Social Services Index	0.113***	0.077***
Approval of Government Performance Index	0.363***	0.361***
<b>Social Background Factors</b>		
Education	-0.083	0.357***
Age	-0.002	0.003
<b>Initial -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>12238.5</b>	<b>10378.1</b>
<b>Model -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>10193.2</b>	<b>7857.8</b>
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.203</b>	<b>0.284</b>
<b>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.274</b>	<b>0.380</b>

*Note: All coefficients are rounded off to 3 decimal places. Wald's statistic significance: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.*

**Table 7<sup>G</sup>: Logistic regression estimates of Patience with Democracy model**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
CONSTANT	-0.694***	-0.849***
<b>Political factors</b>		
Trust For Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	0.087***	0.154***
Perceived Corruption Index	-0.054***	-0.023*
Adherence to Democratic Principles (interaction term)	0.449***	0.620***
Ability to Influence Government's Decisions (Dummy)	0.467***	0.390***
<b>Economic factors</b>		
Satisfying Economic and Living Conditions (Interaction term)	0.041	0.100
Economic Optimism (Interaction term)	0.436***	0.388***
<b>Performance factors</b>		
Approval of Government Performance Index	0.126***	0.153***
<b>Social Background Factors</b>		
Education	-0.156**	-0.250***
Age	0.006**	0.002
<b>Initial -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>7254.9</b>	<b>7332.8</b>
<b>Model -2 Log likelihood</b>	<b>6820.7</b>	<b>6644.9</b>
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.078</b>	<b>0.119</b>
<b>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.105</b>	<b>0.161</b>

*Note: All coefficients are rounded off to 3 decimal places. Wald's statistic significance: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.*

To determine the importance of institutional trust and corruption we conducted a likelihood ratio test. The test confirmed that institutional trust and corruption are *both* important determinants of democratic development.<sup>21</sup> For example a unit change in institutional trust increases the odds that an individual will feel patient with democracy by 9 percent circa 2002. In the same year, a unit change in perceived corruption perception reduces the odds of satisfaction with democracy by 8 percent.

To compare the relative importance of trust and corruption in explaining the formation of pro-democratic attitudes, we standardized the logistic coefficients by ensuring that they assume same unit of measurement (Table 7<sup>H</sup>)<sup>22</sup>

**Table 7<sup>H</sup>: Derived standardized logistic coefficients estimates**

	SUPPORT		SATISFACTION		PATIENCE	
	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
<b>Political factors</b>						
Trust For Democratic Institutions/Processes	0.486***	0.068***	0.855***	0.601***	0.564***	0.175***
Perceived Corruption	0.251***	0.046***	-0.305***	-0.058**	-0.408***	-0.046*
Adherence to Democratic Principles	0.720***	0.107***	-	-	0.794***	0.193***
Ability to Influence Government's Decisions	-	-	-	-	0.720***	0.119***
<b>Economic factors</b>						
Unfavourable General Economy Assessment	-0.064	-0.023**	-	-	-	-
Unfavourable Living Conditions Assessment	0.020	0.013	-	-	-	-
Personal Living Conditions Rated Good	-	-	0.327***	0.050*	-	-
General Economy Rated Good	-	-	0.203***	0.163***	-	-
Satisfying Economy and Living Conditions	-	-	-	-	0.061	0.026
Economic Optimism	-	-	-	-	0.759***	0.124***
<b>Performance factors</b>						
Personal Security and Safety	0.391***	0.025***	0.373***	0.125***	-	-
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance	-0.255***	-0.009	-	-	-	-
Easy Access to Public/Social Services	0.141***	0.000	0.212***	0.078***	-	-
Approval of Government Performance	-	-	0.847***	0.329***	0.622***	0.131***
<b>Social Background Factors</b>						
Education	0.003	0.062***	-0.068	0.117***	-0.270**	-0.077***
Age	2.321	0.012	-0.048	0.031	0.314**	0.019

*Note: the significance of the unstandardized coefficients is maintained for standardized counterparts.*

According to this transformation, *institutional trust is revealed as the most important factor overall in explaining satisfaction with democracy*. This explanatory primacy was evident in both circa 2002 and 2005. In explaining democratic satisfaction trust was followed, closely circa 2002, by approval of government performance.

As for support for democracy, institutional trust was the second ranked explanatory factor in both periods. After adherence to democratic principles, it explained more variance in support for democracy than any other factor in both 2002 and 2005.

By comparison, corruption was far less influential, being ranked between 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> positions in both satisfaction and patience models in both years.

In sum, when it comes to building a popular mass constituency for democracy, institutional trust's positive effects are both more consistent and of greater magnitude than corruption's

<sup>21</sup> The computed Chi-square statistics turned out to be larger than their respective critical values (see appendix Tables 9<sup>A</sup> to 9<sup>C</sup>)

<sup>22</sup> Following Pampel (pp.32-34), we first derived the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable. Second, we ran correlation between the dichotomous dependent variable and its predicted probabilities to estimate the correlation coefficient ( $r$ ), which we then squared ( $r^2$ ). At the third step, we took the natural log of the predicted probabilities multiplied by one minus the predicted probabilities [i.e.  $\ln P*(1 - P)$ ] to derive the predicted logits and subsequently estimated standard deviation alongside that of the independent variable of interest. Next, we calculated the standard deviation of the dichotomous dependent variable ( $SD_Y$ )<sup>22</sup> as the ratio of the standard deviation of predicted logits to the correlation coefficient squared ( $r^2$ ). Finally, we derived the standardized logistics coefficient as the product of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the variable's standard deviation to that of the dependent variable [i.e.  $\beta = b * (SD_X / SD_Y)$ ] (see appendix Tables 10<sup>A</sup> to 10<sup>C</sup>).



corrosive effects. In other words, in judging democracy, Africans place greater reliance on the trustworthiness of political institutions than on the perceived levels of corruption among state officials.

How can these results be interpreted? The first thing to note is that, in judging the quality of African democracies in practice, ordinary citizens follow a consistent pattern of reasoning: if they perceive official corruption, they lose trust in political institutions, and in turn reduce their satisfaction and patience with democracy. As such, we have shown that control of corruption has clear negative ramifications for the perceived supply of democracy and that the process of democratic decline runs through the weakening of political institutions.

But, when it comes to the abstract principle of democracy – the form of government that, ideally, Africans say they prefer -- Africans in Afrobarometer surveys seem to regard it as compatible with a degree of corruption. One possible interpretation of this puzzling result is that the survey respondents are thinking not so much of nepotism or extortion, but patronage. This informal political practice – distributing material rewards in return for political loyalty – is present to differing degrees in every political regime around the world, including in advanced democracies. But it is especially prevalent in Africa. According to informal norms, rewards to constituents are rarely seen as a violation, either, “according to rule” or “against the rule.” Instead, patronage is the form of corruption that Africans are most likely to regard as “understandable.” As such, they can tolerate – even demand – patronage while, at the same time, still supporting democracy.

But the key point to take away is that ordinary Africans will not commit themselves to democracy unless they feel they can trust the institutions of the central state. To judge that political leaders are delivering a high quality democracy, citizens require assurance that institutions such as the presidency, the parliament, the electoral commission and their local government council are “trustworthy.” Future research is required to unpack the concept of “trust”: does it refer to the constitutionality, representativeness, responsiveness, transparency, or accountability of political institutions? But the very fact that we now need to explore such questions is evidence that Africans wish to put their nascent democracies on a sound institutional footing.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

### Summary of Results

This study set out to examine the effects of corruption on trust in political institutions. It further explored the implications of corruption and trust for democratic development. Based on Afrobarometer data, the analysis established that:

1. Africans overwhelmingly disapprove of unethical conduct by public officials.
  - Nearly eight in every ten Africans think nepotism is wrong and punishable (i.e. for public official to give a job to an unqualified relative);
  - A similarly large proportion disapproves of extortion (i.e. public officials who request favors or extra payment for official services).

In sum, most African citizens recognize corruption when they see it, condemn it as morally wrong, and seek legal redress against corrupt officials.

2. Broadly speaking, Africans appear to be relatively more tolerant of public officials who locate development projects in areas where they have their supporters and friends. Thus, even in democracies, many Africans seem to accept political patronage for the parochial benefits it brings.
3. Corruption has corrosive effect on popular trust in the institutions of the African state. It is the ***strongest factor explaining institutional trust***, both circa 2002 and circa 2005.
4. In turn, African demands for democracy – whether expressed as support for the democratic ideal or rejection of authoritarian alternatives – is greatly influenced by trust in institutions.

To an even greater extent, the perceived supply of democracy – whether measured as satisfaction or patience with democracy – is driven by considerations of institutional trust. To repeat a major finding: *institutional trust is the most important factor overall in explaining popular satisfaction with democracy.*

### **Conclusion: Policy Implications**

Over the past two decades, Africa's development partners have encouraged transitions to democracy, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and reforms to improve the quality of democratic governance. These concerns continue to feature prominently in the agendas of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies with development and policy reform programs in Africa.

Whether directly with African governments – or indirectly through international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local civil society organizations (CSOs) – donors have allocated major portions of aid resources towards programs aimed at building the capacities of democratic institutions, entrenching the rule of law, promoting free and fair political processes, strengthening civil society, supporting decentralization of governmental functions, and improving accountability within the public sector.

The recommendations that arise from this study assume that the donor community will continue to grant high priority to programs to promote democratic governance. These programs include:

1. Building the capacity of the judicial branch of government, with emphasis on judicial independence and legal reform to improving the transparency, efficiency and fairness of legal procedures;
2. Upgrading the quality of elections, especially by strengthening the independence and capability of election management bodies, as well as the coverage of local election observer groups and voter education programs;
3. Creating anti-corruption agencies, processes and campaigns, along with requisite reforms to ensure independence, transparency and accountability, all built on a foundation of participation of stakeholders.
4. Continuing to defend and expand the ability of civil society organizations to gather and publicize data on public opinion, encourage open debate on public policy, and demand accountability from public officials.

According to Devra Moehler (2002),<sup>23</sup> political legitimacy is crucial to the stability and institutionalization of fragile new African democracies. She argues that the popular legitimacy of the state, and hence the level of voluntary citizen compliance with state commands, is founded on a basis of institutional trust. And a recent study by Freedom House<sup>24</sup> identified entrenched corruption as the principal obstacle to further democratization in transitional countries throughout the world. The report noted that even credible elections never automatically guarantee the deepening of democratic institutions. Instead, democracy builders must continuously search for institutional reforms that increase transparency of official procedures and introduce measures to hold public servants accountable.

The results of this study suggest several emphases and amendments to programs to promote clean and legitimate governance in new African democracies. The recommendations that follow derive from two main findings of our research:

1. There is popular demand among African citizens to put good governance on a firmer *institutional foundation.*

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<sup>23</sup> See Devra C. Moehler (2005) "Free and Fair or Fraudulent and Forged: Elections and Legitimacy in Africa" Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 55, [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

<sup>24</sup> See Freedom House (2006) "Entrenched Corruption Undercuts Democratic Development in Transitional Countries" in *Countries at the Crossroads*

2. African citizens will *support anti-corruption* reforms, especially if these focus on moral disapproval of violations of the public trust (such as nepotism and extortion).

We therefore suggest that international donor agencies provide backing to the following policy and program initiatives:

1. To develop a legitimate framework for democratic governance, encourage meaningful public participation in any and all efforts to write or revise national constitutions. Citizens are most likely to trust institutions that they have given to themselves;
2. As a high priority, continue to pursue measures to improve the administration of justice. But emphasis should be placed on reducing the gap between elite judicial institutions and mass preferences for local dispute resolution mechanisms;
3. Also as a high priority, continue to promote anti-corruption initiatives. But provide further insulation for anti-corruption bodies from executive branch manipulation and more emphasis on public awareness and self-policing of acts of official corruption.
4. Engage civil society organizations in mass anti-corruption campaigns. Require political parties to make campaign commitments to anti-corruption. Focus public awareness campaigns on nepotism and extortion, not patronage.

## Appendix

**Table 1: Dates of fieldwork and sample sizes in the 12 countries over the three rounds of survey**

	Round 1 (Circa 2000)	Sample Size	Round 2 (Circa 2002)	Sample Size	Round 3 (Circa 2005)	Sample Size
Botswana	Nov-Dec 1999	1200	Jun-Jul 2003	1200	May-June 2005	1200
Ghana	Jul-Aug 1999	2004	Aug-Sep 2002	1200	March 2005	1197
Lesotho	Apr-Jun 2000	1177	Feb-Apr 2003	1200	July-Aug 2005	1161
Malawi	Nov-Dec 1999	1208	Apr-May 2003	1200	June-July 2005	1200
Mali	Jan-Feb 2001	2089	Oct-Nov 2002	1283	June-July 2005	1244
Namibia	Sep-Oct 1999	1183	Aug-Sep 2003	1199	Feb-Mar 2006	1200
Nigeria	Jan-Feb 2000	3603	Sep-Oct 2003	2428	Aug-Dec 2005	2363
South Africa	Jul-Aug 2000	2200	Sep-Oct 2002	2400	February 2006	2400
Tanzania	Mar-Sep 2001	2198	Jul-Aug 2003	1223	July-Aug 2005	1304
Uganda	May-Jun 2000	2271	Aug-Sep 2002	2400	Apr-May 2005	2400
Zambia	Oct-Nov 1999	1198	Jun-Jul 2003	1198	July-Aug 2005	1200
Zimbabwe	Sep-Oct 1999	1200	Apr-May 2003	1104	October 2005	1048
<b>Unweighted Total Sample</b>		<b>21,531</b>		<b>18,035</b>		<b>17,917</b>
<b>Weighted Total Sample</b>		<b>14,397</b>		<b>14,401</b>		<b>14,400</b>

**Table 2: Trends in African perceptions of corruption (proportions for all response codes reported)**

		Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
<b>Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians</b>	None corrupt	9	14	16	+7
	Some corrupt	24	42	39	+15
	Most corrupt	20	18	20	0
	All corrupt	13	8	7	-6
<b>[National] Govt. Officials/Civil servants</b>	None corrupt	-	10	12	+2
	Some corrupt	-	41	38	-3
	Most corrupt	-	25	24	-1
	All corrupt	-	9	8	-1
<b>President &amp; his officials</b>	None corrupt	-	20	20	0
	Some corrupt	-	36	36	0
	Most corrupt	-	14	15	+2
	All corrupt	-	8	8	0
<b>Police</b>	None corrupt	-	8	9	+1
	Some corrupt	-	35	32	-3
	Most corrupt	-	29	31	3
	All corrupt	-	17	18	+1
<b>Judges &amp; Magistrates</b>	None corrupt	-	18	17	-1
	Some corrupt	-	13	38	+24
	Most corrupt	-	19	20	+1
	All corrupt	-	10	9	-1
<b>Teachers &amp; School Administrators</b>	None corrupt	-	25	30	+5
	Some corrupt	-	44	40	-4
	Most corrupt	-	13	14	+1
	All corrupt	-	5	4	0
<b>Border Officials</b>	None corrupt	-	8	-	-
	Some corrupt	-	29	-	-
	Most corrupt	-	22	-	-
	All corrupt	-	15	-	-
<b>Local Govt. officials</b>	None corrupt	-	-	13	-
	Some corrupt	-	-	37	-
	Most corrupt	-	-	24	-
	All corrupt	-	-	9	-

<b>Local Councilors</b>	None corrupt	-	-	16	-
	Some corrupt	-	-	38	-
	Most corrupt	-	-	21	-
	All corrupt	-	-	8	-
<b>Tax Officials</b>	None corrupt	-	-	12	-
	Some corrupt	-	-	31	-
	Most corrupt	-	-	25	-
	All corrupt	-	-	12	-
<b>Health workers</b>	None corrupt	-	-	25	-
	Some corrupt	-	-	41	-
	Most corrupt	-	-	16	-
	All corrupt	-	-	5	-

**Table 3: Chi squares statistics and p-values for cross-tabulation of corruption perceptions by location, gender and age (Circa 2005)**

	Urban-Rural Diff.	P - value	Male-Female Diff.	P - value	Youth-Elderly Diff. & Youth-Mid. Age Diff.	P - value
President	137.3	0.000	47.2	0.000	211.3	0.000
Elected Leaders/Parliamentarians	153.7	0.000	72.4	0.000	229.9	0.000
National govt. officials	167.1	0.000	61.8	0.000	222.7	0.000
Local govt. councilors	135.2	0.000	68.3	0.000	233.2	0.000
Local govt. officials	138.0	0.000	55.0	0.000	243.4	0.000
Police	208.4	0.000	64.3	0.000	281.4	0.000
Tax officials	151.6	0.000	58.6	0.000	275.3	0.000
Judges and magistrates	131.7	0.000	83.3	0.000	180.5	0.000
Health workers	102.8	0.000	28.9	0.000	167.7	0.000
Teachers & school administrators	181.4	0.000	32.1	0.000	243.6	0.000

**Table 4: Chi squares statistics and p-values for cross-tabulation of experience with corruption by location, gender and age (Circa 2005)**

	Urban-Rural Chi square statistics	p-value	Male-Female Chi square statistics	p-value	Youth-Elderly Chi square statistics	p-value
Bribe for ID document	54.9	0.000	75.8	0.000	54.0	0.000
Bribe for school placement	54.0	0.000	6.3	0.389	169.5	0.000
Bribe for household service	144.3	0.000	30.2	0.000	34.9	0.003
Bribe for medical attention	44.0	0.000	6.5	0.368	85.1	0.000
Bribe to avoid problem with police	75.7	0.000	95.7	0.000	70.5	0.000

**Table 5: Chi squares statistics and p-values for cross-tabulation of experience with corruption and perceived corruption index (Circa 2005)**

	Chi square statistics	p-value
Bribe for a document or permit	246.3	0.000
Bribe for school placement for a child	120.8	0.000
Bribe for household services	105.8	0.000
Bribery to avoid problem with the police	201.9	0.000
Bribe for medicines/medical treatment	211.8	0.000

**Table 6: Chi squares statistics and p-values for cross-tabulation of trust in democratic institutions/processes by location, gender and age (Circa 2005)**

	Urban - Rural Chi square statistics	p-value	Male - Female Chi square statistics	p-value	Youth - Elderly Chi square statistics	p-value
Trust President	220.5	0.000	11.6	0.021	242.4	0.000
Trust Electoral Commission	221.4	0.000	66.6	0.000	187.7	0.000
Trust Parliament	205.5	0.000	50.0	0.000	201.0	0.000
Trust Local Govt. Councilors/ Body	476.0	0.000	38.3	0.000	154.4	0.000
Election results credible	49.4	0.000	132.0	0.000	199.5	0.000

**Table 7<sup>A</sup>: Factor and Reliability analysis descriptive statistics (Circa 2002)**

	Initial Eigenvalues			
	Unrotated Factor Loadings	Total	% of explained variance	Cronbach Alpha
<b>Perceived Corruption index</b>	-	3.947	56.4	0.8570
1. <i>Presidency corrupt</i>	0.714	-	-	-
2. <i>Elected leaders corrupt</i>	0.788	-	-	-
3. <i>Government officials corrupt</i>	0.818	-	-	-
4. <i>Police corrupt</i>	0.793	-	-	-
5. <i>Border officials corrupt</i>	0.794	-	-	-
6. <i>Judges and magistrates corrupt</i>	0.744	-	-	-
<b>Trust in democratic institutions/processes index</b>	-	3.043	60.9	0.8386
1. <i>Trust President</i>	0.772	-	-	-
2. <i>Trust Parliament</i>	0.754	-	-	-
3. <i>Trust Electoral Commission</i>	0.821	-	-	-
4. <i>Trust Regional government body</i>	0.815	-	-	-
5. <i>Trust Local government body</i>	0.736	-	-	-
6. <i>Teachers and school administrators corrupt</i>	0.578	-	-	-
<b>Improved civil liberties index</b>	-	2.796	69.9	0.8506
1. <i>Freedom to say what you think</i>	0.850	-	-	-
2. <i>Freedom to join any organization</i>	0.851	-	-	-
3. <i>Free from unjust arrest</i>	0.781	-	-	-
4. <i>Freedom to vote without fear</i>	0.860	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable assessment of the general economy index</b>	-	2.934	36.7	0.7435
1. <i>Country's present economic conditions bad</i>	0.594	-	-	-
2. <i>Country's economic condition vs. 12 months ago bad</i>	0.549	-	-	-
3. <i>Country's economic condition in 12 months worse</i>	0.567	-	-	-
4. <i>Economic policies hurt most</i>	0.339	-	-	-
5. <i>Govt. performance at managing economy bad</i>	0.741	-	-	-
6. <i>Govt. performance at creating jobs bad</i>	0.676	-	-	-
7. <i>Govt. performance at keeping prices stable bad</i>	0.670	-	-	-
8. <i>Govt. performance at narrowing income gaps bad</i>	0.624	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable assessment of personal living conditions index</b>	-	2.303	57.6	0.7539
1. <i>Present living conditions bad</i>	0.776	-	-	-
2. <i>Living conditions vs. others worse</i>	0.804	-	-	-
3. <i>Living conditions vs. 12 months ago worse</i>	0.755	-	-	-
4. <i>Expected living conditions in 12 months worse</i>	0.696	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable social policy performance Index</b>	-	2.272	45.4	0.6931
1. <i>Govt. performance at reducing crime bad</i>	0.651	-	-	-
2. <i>Govt. performance at improving health services bad</i>	0.765	-	-	-
3. <i>Govt. performance at addressing educational needs bad</i>	0.748	-	-	-
4. <i>Govt. performance at delivering household water bad</i>	0.559	-	-	-
5. <i>Govt. performance at fighting corruption bad</i>	0.625	-	-	-
<b>Media consumption index</b>	-	1.664	55.5	0.5964
1. <i>Access to news from radio</i>	0.639	-	-	-
2. <i>Access to news from television</i>	0.794	-	-	-
3. <i>Access to news from newspapers</i>	0.791	-	-	-
<b>Easy access to public/social services index</b>	-	1.691	42.3	0.5426
1. <i>Easy to get ID document</i>	0.721	-	-	-
2. <i>Easy to get school admission</i>	0.588	-	-	-
3. <i>Easy to get household service</i>	0.665	-	-	-
4. <i>Easy to get police help</i>	0.618	-	-	-
<b>Approval of government performance index</b>	-	2.226	55.7	0.7328
1. <i>Economy well managed</i>	0.724	-	-	-
2. <i>Creating jobs well managed</i>	0.766	-	-	-
3. <i>Keeping prices stable well managed</i>	0.760	-	-	-
4. <i>Narrowing income gaps well managed</i>	0.733	-	-	-

<b>Experience with corruption index</b>	-	2.676	53.5	0.7814
1. <i>Bribe for identity document/permit</i>	0.751	-	-	-
2. <i>Bribe for school placement</i>	0.703	-	-	-
3. <i>Bribe for household service</i>	0.755	-	-	-
4. <i>Bribe to cross a border</i>	0.700	-	-	-
5. <i>Bribe for to avoid problems with police</i>	0.747	-	-	-
<b>Official tolerance for criminal acts index</b>	-	2.062	68.7	0.7702
1. <i>No enforcement of law if someone like me commits crime</i>	0.780	-	-	-
2. <i>No enforcement of law if someone like me evades tax</i>	0.860	-	-	-
3. <i>No enforcement of law if someone like me steals utilities</i>	0.844	-	-	-

*Note: Two components were derived for unfavourable assessment of the general economy. However, we used the first components because it has a larger percentage of variance.*

**Table 7<sup>B</sup>: Factor and Reliability analysis descriptive statistics (Circa 2005)**

	Initial Eigenvalues			
	Unrotated Factor Loadings	Total	% of explained variance	Cronbach Alpha
<b>Perceived Corruption index</b>	-	5.676	56.8	0.9096
1. <i>Presidency corrupt</i>	0.734	-	-	-
2. <i>Members of Parliament corrupt</i>	0.801	-	-	-
3. <i>Local government councilors corrupt</i>	0.801	-	-	-
4. <i>National government officials corrupt</i>	0.835	-	-	-
5. <i>Local government officials corrupt</i>	0.827	-	-	-
6. <i>Police corrupt</i>	0.715	-	-	-
7. <i>Tax officials corrupt</i>	0.764	-	-	-
8. <i>Judges and magistrates corrupt</i>	0.728	-	-	-
9. <i>Health workers corrupt</i>	0.662	-	-	-
10. <i>Teachers and school administrators corrupt</i>	0.641	-	-	-
<b>Trust in democratic institutions/processes index</b>	-	2.870	57.4	0.8103
1. <i>Trust President</i>	0.822	-	-	-
2. <i>Trust Parliament</i>	0.816	-	-	-
3. <i>Trust Electoral Commission</i>	0.813	-	-	-
4. <i>Trust local council</i>	0.718	-	-	-
5. <i>Elections free and fair</i>	0.593	-	-	-
<b>Improved civil liberties index</b>	-	2.950	73.8	0.8750
1. <i>Freedom to say what you think</i>	0.865	-	-	-
2. <i>Freedom to join any organization</i>	0.891	-	-	-
3. <i>Free from unjust arrest</i>	0.795	-	-	-
4. <i>Freedom to vote without fear</i>	0.880	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable assessment of the general economy index</b>	-	3.239	40.5	0.7862
1. <i>Country's present economic conditions bad</i>	0.678	-	-	-
2. <i>Country's economic condition vs. 12 months ago bad</i>	0.579	-	-	-
3. <i>Country's economic condition in 12 months worse</i>	0.595	-	-	-
4. <i>Economic policies hurt most</i>	0.497	-	-	-
5. <i>Govt. performance at managing economy bad</i>	0.758	-	-	-
6. <i>Govt. performance at creating jobs bad</i>	0.644	-	-	-
7. <i>Govt. performance at keeping prices stable bad</i>	0.670	-	-	-
8. <i>Govt. performance at narrowing income gaps bad</i>	0.637	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable assessment of personal living conditions index</b>	-	2.411	60.3	0.7791
1. <i>Present living conditions bad</i>	0.822	-	-	-
2. <i>Living conditions vs. others worse</i>	0.798	-	-	-
3. <i>Living conditions vs. 12 months ago worse</i>	0.748	-	-	-
4. <i>Expected living conditions in 12 months worse</i>	0.734	-	-	-
<b>Unfavourable social policy performance index</b>	-	2.389	47.8	0.7214
1. <i>Govt. performance at reducing crime bad</i>	0.666	-	-	-
2. <i>Govt. performance at improving health services bad</i>	0.777	-	-	-
3. <i>Govt. performance at addressing educational needs bad</i>	0.759	-	-	-
4. <i>Govt. performance at delivering household water bad</i>	0.608	-	-	-
5. <i>Govt. performance at fighting corruption bad</i>	0.629	-	-	-

<b>Media consumption index</b>	-	1.664	55.5	0.5981
1. Access to news from radio	0.606	-	-	-
2. Access to news from television	0.822	-	-	-
3. Access to news from newspapers	0.786	-	-	-
<b>Easy access to public/social services index</b>	-	2.157	43.1	0.6691
1. Easy to get ID document	0.645	-	-	-
2. Easy to get school admission	0.653	-	-	-
3. Easy to get household service	0.649	-	-	-
4. Easy to get police help	0.634	-	-	-
5. Easy to get medical treatment	0.700	-	-	-
<b>Approval of government performance index</b>	-	2.213	55.3	0.7287
1. Economy well managed	0.722	-	-	-
2. Creating jobs well managed	0.755	-	-	-
3. Keeping prices stable well managed	0.750	-	-	-
4. Narrowing income gaps well managed	0.743	-	-	-
<b>Experience with corruption index</b>	-	2.837	56.7	0.8067
1. Bribe for identity document/permit	0.730	-	-	-
2. Bribe for school placement	0.758	-	-	-
3. Bribe for household service	0.785	-	-	-
4. Medical attention	0.759	-	-	-
5. Bribe for to avoid problems with police	0.733	-	-	-
<b>Official tolerance for criminal acts index</b>	-	1.864	46.6	0.6181
1. No enforcement of law if top official commits crime	0.818	-	-	-
2. No enforcement of law if someone like me commits crime	0.493	-	-	-
3. No enforcement of law if top official evades tax	0.828	-	-	-
4. No enforcement of law if someone like me evades tax	0.516	-	-	-

*Note: For perceived corruption, unfavourable assessment of the general economy and official tolerance for criminal conduct indices, two components were derived. Nonetheless, we used the first components because they have larger percentage of variance.*

**Table 7<sup>C</sup>: Descriptive statistics of variables and indices used in the various models (Circa 2002)**

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
<b>Political factors</b>					
Perceived Corruption Index	13487.5	0	7.0	5.1	2.1
Trust in Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	14113.1	0	5.0	2.0	1.8
Experience with Corruption Index	14358.5	0	5.0	0.4	1.0
Improved Civil Liberties Index	13352.5	0	4.0	3.0	1.3
Adherence to Democratic Principles (Interaction term)	12113.3	0	1.0	0.6	0.5
Ability to Influence Government's Decisions (Dummy)	10306.8	0	1.0	0.8	0.4
<b>Economic factors</b>					
Unfavourable Assessment of General Economy Index	14387.5	0	8.0	4.1	2.1
Unfavourable Assessment of Living Conditions Index	14156.6	0	4.0	1.5	1.3
Satisfying Economic and Living Conditions (Interaction term)	12320.5	0	1.0	0.2	0.4
Economic Optimism (Interaction term)	9591.8	0	1.0	0.6	0.5
Personal Living Conditions Rated Good (Dummy)	12161.9	0	1.0	0.3	0.5
General Economy Rated Good (Dummy)	12245.6	0	1.0	0.4	0.5
<b>Performance factors</b>					
Official Tolerance for Criminal Acts Index	12864.0	0	3.0	0.5	0.9
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance Index	14287.2	0	5.0	2.1	1.6
Easy Access to Public/Social Services Index	13963.9	0	4.0	1.7	1.1
Approval of Government Performance Index	14247.4	0	4.0	1.4	1.4
Personal Security and Safety (Interaction term)	11583.9	0	3.0	1.3	1.3
<b>Cognitive factors</b>					
Media Consumption Index	14382.2	0.0	3.0	1.7	1.0
<b>Social Background Factors</b>					
Age	14099.9	18.0	105	36.8	15.0
Education	14377.0	0	1	0.6	0.5
Gender (Female)	14401.1	0	1	0.5	0.5
Urban Population	14401.1	0	1	0.4	0.5
<b>Valid N (listwise)</b>	3698.2	-	-	-	-



**Table 7<sup>D</sup>: Descriptive statistics of variables and indices used in the various models (Circa 2005)**

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
<b>Political factors</b>					
Perceived Corruption Index	13553.6	0	10.0	7.1	3.2
Trust in Democratic Institutions/Processes Index	14334.1	0	5.0	2.9	1.8
Experience with Corruption Index	12208.3	0	5.0	0.6	1.1
Improved Civil Liberties Index	13303.9	0	4.0	0.7	1.2
Adherence to Democratic Principles (Interaction term)	12846.5	0	1.0	0.6	0.5
Ability to Influence Government's Decisions (Dummy)	10046.8	0	1.0	0.6	0.5
Indirect Vote Buying (Dummy)	13666.8	0	1.0	0.7	0.5
<b>Economic factors</b>					
Unfavourable Assessment of General Economy Index	14373.3	0	8.0	4.5	2.2
Unfavourable Assessment of Living Conditions Index	14066.7	0	4.0	1.7	1.3
Satisfying Economic and Living Conditions (Interaction term)	12328.8	0	1.0	0.2	0.4
Economic Optimism (Interaction term)	9703.2	0	1.0	0.5	0.5
Personal Living Conditions Rated Good (Dummy)	12034.0	0	1.0	0.3	0.5
General Economy Rated Good (Dummy)	12224.3	0	1.0	0.3	0.5
<b>Performance factors</b>					
Official Tolerance for Criminal Acts Index	14168.3	0	4.0	1.0	1.1
Unfavourable Social Policies Performance Index	14310.5	0	5.0	2.1	1.6
Easy Access to Public/Social Services Index	13945.8	0	5.0	2.4	1.5
Approval of Government Performance Index	14257.1	0	4.0	1.3	1.3
Personal Security and Safety (Interaction term)	11085.1	0	3.0	1.4	1.3
<b>Cognitive factors</b>					
Media Consumption Index	14397.6	0.0	3.0	1.7	1.0
<b>Social Background Factors</b>					
Age	14223.8	18.0	115	36.8	15.1
Education	14374.6	0	1	0.6	0.5
Gender (Female)	14400.1	0	1	0.5	0.5
Urban Population	14400.1	0	1	0.3	0.5
<b>Valid N (listwise)</b>	3364.0	-	-	-	-

**Table 8: Perceived corruption signs and significance in the “jack-knife” and country-specific estimates**

	JACK-KNIFE ESTIMATES				COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ESTIMATES				
	Circa 2002		Circa 2005		Circa 2002		Circa 2005		
	Sign	P-value	Sign	P-value	Sign	P-value	Sign	P-value	
<b>Botswana (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Botswana</b>	-ve	0.307	-ve	0.016
<b>Ghana (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Ghana</b>	-ve	0.215	-ve	0.058
<b>Lesotho (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Lesotho</b>	-ve	0.303	-ve	0.073
<b>Malawi (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Malawi</b>	-ve	0.023	-ve	0.139
<b>Mali (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Mali</b>	+ve	0.235	-ve	0.039
<b>Namibia (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Namibia</b>	+ve	0.483	-ve	0.113
<b>Nigeria (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Nigeria</b>	+ve	0.688	-ve	0.000
<b>South Africa (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>South Africa</b>	-ve	0.669	-ve	0.000
<b>Tanzania (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Tanzania</b>	-ve	0.003	-ve	0.000
<b>Uganda (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Uganda</b>	-ve	0.376	-ve	0.000
<b>Zambia (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Zambia</b>	-ve	0.249	-ve	0.000
<b>Zimbabwe (out)</b>	-ve	0.000	-ve	0.000	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	-ve	0.476	-ve	0.000

**Table 9<sup>A</sup>: Test of significance of institutional trust and corruption in the preference model**

	Trust Excluded		Corruption Excluded		Both Trust & Corruption Excluded	
	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
	<b>Nested Model -2 log likelihood</b>	11781.9	10180.9	12038.6	10535.7	12209.3
<b>Initial Model -2 log likelihood</b>	11643.7	10094.2	11643.7	10094.2	11643.7	10094.2
<b>Chi-square</b>	<b>138.2</b>	<b>86.7</b>	<b>394.9</b>	<b>441.5</b>	<b>565.6</b>	<b>520.9</b>
<b>Degrees of freedom</b>	1	1	1	1	2	2
<b>Critical value (<math>\chi^2_{0.05}</math>)</b>	<b>3.841</b>		<b>3.841</b>		<b>5.991</b>	

**Table 9<sup>B</sup>: Test of significance of institutional trust and corruption in the satisfaction model**

	Trust Excluded		Corruption Excluded		Both Trust & Corruption Excluded	
	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Nested Model -2 log likelihood	10589.8	8655.5	10583.4	8254.0	11090.7	9130.6
Initial Model -2 log likelihood	10193.2	7857.8	10193.2	7857.8	10193.2	7857.8
Chi-square	<b>396.6</b>	<b>797.7</b>	<b>390.2</b>	<b>396.2</b>	<b>897.5</b>	<b>1272.8</b>
Degrees of freedom	1	1	1	1	2	2
Critical value ( $\chi^2_{0.05}$ )	<b>3.841</b>		<b>3.841</b>		<b>5.991</b>	

**Table 9<sup>C</sup>: Test of significance of institutional trust and corruption in the patience model**

	Trust Excluded		Corruption Excluded		Both Trust & Corruption Excluded	
	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Nested Model -2 log likelihood	6873.9	6709.5	6970.5	6858.4	7041.1	6939.6
Initial Model -2 log likelihood	6820.7	6644.9	6820.7	6644.9	6820.7	6644.9
Chi-square	<b>53.2</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>149.8</b>	<b>213.5</b>	<b>220.4</b>	<b>294.7</b>
Degrees of freedom	1	1	1	1	2	2
Critical value ( $\chi^2_{0.05}$ )	<b>3.841</b>		<b>3.841</b>		<b>5.991</b>	

**Table 10<sup>A</sup>: Estimating standard deviation of the dichotomous preference for democracy dependent variable**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Variance of predicted logits	0.04739	0.07571
Square root of variance of predicted logits (i.e. standard deviation)	0.21769	0.27515
Correlation coefficient for predicted probabilities and actual dependent variable (r)	0.22591	0.26504
Correlation coefficient squared ( $r^2$ )	0.47530	0.07025
<b>Estimated standard deviation (Square root of variance + <math>r^2</math>)</b>	<b>0.45801</b>	<b>3.91694</b>

**Table 10<sup>B</sup>: Estimating standard deviation of the dichotomous satisfaction with democracy dependent variable**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Variance of predicted logits	0.16052	0.19400
Square root of variance of predicted logits (i.e. standard deviation)	0.40066	0.44046
Correlation coefficient for predicted probabilities and actual dependent variable (r)	0.46139	0.54732
Correlation coefficient squared ( $r^2$ )	0.67925	0.29956
<b>Estimated standard deviation (Square root of variance + <math>r^2</math>)</b>	<b>0.58986</b>	<b>1.47036</b>

**Table 10<sup>C</sup>: Estimating standard deviation of the dichotomous patience with democracy dependent variable**

	Circa 2002	Circa 2005
Variance of predicted logits	0.02167	0.03611
Square root of variance of predicted logits (i.e. standard deviation)	0.14722	0.19003
Correlation coefficient for predicted probabilities and actual dependent variable (r)	0.28016	0.34860
Correlation coefficient squared ( $r^2$ )	0.52930	0.12152
<b>Estimated standard deviation (Square root of variance + <math>r^2</math>)</b>	<b>0.27814</b>	<b>1.56375</b>

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