

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 77

**SUPPORT FOR COMPETITIVE
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE: PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN
SENEGAL**

by Leonard Wantchekon, Paul-Aarons
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Support For Competitive Politics And Government Performance: Public Perceptions Of Democracy In Senegal

Abstract

The 2000 presidential election in which Abdoulaye Wade defeated Abdou Diouf demonstrated that multiparty politics has created meaningful competition between incumbents and opposition political parties in Senegal. Moreover, this alternation suggests that political competition is sustainable and that citizen's commitment to democracy is strengthening as demonstrated by their willingness to eject undesirable governments from office. Previous analyses of citizens' perceptions of democracy in Senegal have largely focused on elite views. This study seeks to present perspectives of democracy from the point of view of ordinary Senegalese citizens. We examine the relationship between general trends in satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of government performance using two rounds of Afrobarometer data. The results for the round of data collected in 2005 indicate that satisfaction with democracy is a function of government performance and that economic factors and partisanship remain strong predictors of how people assess satisfaction with democracy as in other African countries. Other studies have found no evidence of a gender or geographical location gap, yet find that education is a key determinant of satisfaction level (Bratton and Mattes 2001b). Yet in Senegal, we find that the educational level is not a determinant of satisfaction with democracy, while geographical location (urban-rural gap) is. Finally, our results indicate a significant gap in satisfaction between the ethnic majority (Wolof and Pulaar) and ethnic minorities (Soninke and Diola). While the ethnic minorities display large increases in satisfaction between 2003 and 2005, the satisfaction level decreases for the two major ethnic groups between 2003 and 2005.

INTRODUCTION

Senegal is widely considered as one of the few stable democracies in Africa. The 2000 presidential election, in which Abdoulaye Wade defeated Abdou Diouf, the successor of the previous President, further consolidated democratic process in the country. Wade's electoral success further demonstrated that multiparty politics in Senegal has created meaningful competition between the incumbents and opposition parties. The success of the opposition signals that democracy in Senegal allows voters to effectively change government leadership (Galvan 2001). Indeed the mere fact of electoral alternation suggests that political competition is sustainable. In addition, periodic dismissal of undesirable governments signals the strengthening the commitment of the general public to democracy.

Previous analysis of this commitment in the context of Senegal does not capture how the majority of voters view democracy, but instead, focuses on the elite's perception of democracy and a description of the process of Senegal's democratic transition. (Beck 1997; Vengroff and Magala 2001). This study seeks to present the perspective of democracy from the point of view of ordinary Senegalese citizens. The analysis will indicate the relationship between general trends in satisfaction with democracy and perception of government performance. We will explain how changes in general public opinion may impact views on democracy and governance. The study uses evidence from two rounds of Afrobarometer surveys carried in 2002 and 2005, respectively. Participants in both surveys were drawn from nearly identical methods of random sampling. Since the surveys were collected at two different points following the competitive 2000 Presidential election, the survey results will indicate how perceptions of democracy have changed in the years following democratic consolidation. The analysis of these results will determine if commitment to democracy and satisfaction with government performance has changed or remained constant in the years following the first competitive election.

The analysis of the survey results addresses two main questions. We first address the issue of how the Senegalese evaluate democracy and multiparty competition. In the study, we establish whether or not most citizens view democracy as their most preferred form of government. We also determine if views of democracy differ or remain constant across different social dimensions like age, gender, region, urban-rural residency, ethnicity, and educational attainment. The second question refers primarily to government performance and satisfaction with democracy. We investigate the relationship between how people evaluate the current government's performance and their overall satisfaction with democracy. We also evaluate the effect of partisanship on democratic satisfaction, and specifically analyze the correlation between partisan identification and satisfaction with democracy. Throughout the analysis of the survey results, "democracy" refers to a particular mode of political arbitration, in which contending parties vie for control of a public office. Given the importance free and fair elections for this conception of democracy, analysis of popular opinion in regards to multiparty elections will indicate voters' overall evaluation of democracy. Is it their preferred mode of selection of political office holders? How satisfied are citizens with the way the political process operates?

The findings indicate that satisfaction with democracy remains significantly high among citizens as their preferred form of government. Nevertheless, the survey results reveal a sizeable decrease over time in the magnitude of citizens' views of democracy's effectiveness. Satisfaction with democracy also decreased by age, and to some extent, by educational attainment. The findings for other socio-demographic variables are more nuanced. For example, while satisfaction with democracy markedly increased in rural areas, popular discontent rose in urban areas. This indicates a strong correlation between area of residence and the magnitude of satisfaction with democracy.

The evidence on ethnicity is more ambiguous. We observe a decrease in satisfaction with democracy for over half of the ethnic groups surveyed. It is unclear whether this can be attributed to a specific group effect based on endogenous perceptions of how the group is treated. The evidence suggests that ethnic

identity does not seem to be a key determinant of political behavior in contrast to the cases of Kenya and Nigeria, two other African democracies.

The results indicate that evaluation of government performance does indeed affect satisfaction with democracy. Respondents evaluated the government's performance with respect to management of the economy, job creation, and maintenance of price stability. Respondents who positively evaluated the performance of the government show higher levels of satisfaction with the government. Evaluation of government performance is also correlated with partisan identification. Respondents who align themselves with the ruling party (Senegalese Democratic Party) tend to have a higher approval rating of government performance. In contrast, respondents close to the Socialist party that ruled before Abdoulaye Wade was elected President in 2000 tend to have lower approval ratings of government performance. These results hold even when controlling for level of educational attainment, area of residence (urban versus rural), and gender.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II and III present descriptive statistics on popular perceptions of democracy, focusing on satisfaction with democratic governance and multiparty competition. Section IV investigates trends in public opinion on government performance, with a special focus on incumbents. In the last part of the paper (section V), we go beyond the descriptive statistics of second part and test two statistical models of the relationship between evaluation of governance and overall satisfaction with democracy.

SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

As we indicated above, the data set originates from two rounds of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Senegal in 2003 and 2005. The sample size was 1147 for the 2003 survey and 1200 for the 2005 survey. The sample covers respondents from all ten regions of Senegal and the nine major ethnic groups. The basic demographic information includes gender, geographic location (rural versus urban), age, level of educational attainment, religion, and ethnic group. Tables 1.1 through 1.7 present the descriptive statistics of both samples. We will use these descriptive statistics to illustrate how the key dependent variables (like satisfaction with democracy and government performance) vary across social groups.

Table 1.1: Gender	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
Male	567	49.5	619	51.6
Female	580	50.5	581	48.4
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.2: Location	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
Urban	507	44.2	496	41.3
Rural	640	55.8	704	58.6
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.3: Age	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
18-30	481	42	452	38
31-45	322	28.2	415	35
46-60	215	19	210	17.5
61-99	99	8.6	105	8.8
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.4: Education	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
No Formal Schooling	333	30	301	25
Informal Schooling only	298	26.7	305	25.5
Some Primary Schooling	142	12.7	160	13.5
Primary School Completed	70	6	79	7
Some Secondary/High School	172	15.5	214	17.83
Secondary/High School Completed	35	3.2	38	3.2
Post Secondary	26	2.3	20	1.7
Some University	25	2.2	44	3.6
University Completed	7	.6	23	1.9
Post-graduate	0	0	5	.4
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.5: Region	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
Dakar	270	23.5	296	24.7
Diourbel	92	8	120	10
Fatick	72	6.2	64	5.3
Kaolack	155	13.5	144	12
Kolda	92	8	88	7.3
Louga	63	5.5	80	6.7
Saint-Louis	96	8.3	80	6.7
Tambacounda	60	5.2	64	5.3
Thies	184	16	168	14
Ziguinchor	63	5.5	48	4
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.6: Religion	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
None	7	.6	4	.3
Christian	65	5.7	39	.3
Muslim	1069	93.6	1152	93.4
Total	1147	100	1200	100

Table 1.7: Ethnic Group	2003		2005	
	Count	Percent weighted	Count	Percent Weighted
Wolof	478	43	581	48.6
Pulaar	316	28.4	300	25
Serer	153	13.7	144	12
Mandinka	56	5	40	3.3
Diola	57	5.1	56	4.7
Soninke	19	1.7	18	1.5
Manjack	0	0	17	1.5
Bambara	0	0	34	2.8
Bainouk	0	0	3	.2
Others	34	3	3	.2
Total	1147	100	1200	100

The following section will investigate satisfaction of democracy in Senegal and how these perceptions have changed from 2003 to 2005 across gender, geographic location, age, educational level, region, religion, and ethnicity.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

How do Senegalese view and assess democracy? The survey addresses this question by asking the respondents the following question, “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Senegal?” The possible responses were as follows: (1) Senegal is not a democracy; (2) not at all satisfied; (3) Not very satisfied; (3) fairly satisfied; (4) very satisfied; and (5) Don’t know. Table 2 presents these results.

Table 2.1 Evolution in Satisfaction with democracy (percent fairly / very satisfied)

	2002	2005	Difference
Total	57.1¹	53.3	-3.8
Age			
18-30	55.8	50.7	-5
31-45	58.2	55.1	-3
46-60	58.4	55.5	-3
61 and above	58.7	57.1	-1.5
Urban-Rural			
Urban	57.8	42.3	-15.5
Rural	56.6	61.1	+4.3
Gender			
Male	61.2	56.7	-4.5
Female	53.1	49.7	-3.3
Education			
No formal schooling	51.2	49.1	-2.1
Informal schooling only	58.6	61.3	+2.7
Some primary schooling	58.1	59.3	+1.2
Primary school completed	64.3	69.6	+5.3
Some 2ndary/high School	63.9	51.4	-12.5
Secondary School completed/high school	61.1	42.1	-19
Post-secondary ²	55.5	40	-15.5
Some University	60	34	-26
University Completed	28.5	13	-15.5
Region			
Dakar	47.9	31.5	-16.4
Diourbel	57.6	63.7	+6.1
Fatick	48.5	57.8	+9.2
Kaolack	55.2	61.8	+6.6
Kolda	74.4	79.5	+5
Louga	59	37.5	-21.5
Saint-Louis	64.5	43.7	-20
Tambacounda	55	71.8	+16.8
Thies	57.9	46.4	-11.4
Ziguinchor	59.6	79.1	+19.5
Ethnic Group			
Wolof	56.8	50.1	-7
Pulaar	60.1	51.8	-8
Serer	51.6	52	+4
Mandinka	65.4	70	+4.5
Diola	60.7	76.7	+16
Soninke	26.3	55.5	+29.2
Manjack	Not Reported	64.7	
Bambara	Not Reported	64.7	

¹ In 2002 38.7% and 18.4% were respectively fairly satisfied and very satisfied while in 2005 28.6% and 24.7% were fairly satisfied and very satisfied.

The results quite clearly indicate that satisfaction with democracy decreased significantly (by 3.8%) between 2002 and 2005. The levels for Senegal are below the average satisfaction level across Sub-Saharan Africa (64%) (Bratton and Mattes 2001 b p.456). This may be due to the timing of the surveys, given that the surveys in Senegal were conducted more recently than those of many other countries. The levels of satisfaction for these years are in line with other recent figures for other African democracies, like Ghana, which had a satisfaction level of 54% in 2001 (Bratton and Mattes 2001 a 109).

Senegal's decline in satisfaction varies in degree across social groups. This figure is modest in comparison with Kenya, where satisfaction with democracy decreased by 26 percentage points (Logan, Wolf, and Sentamu 2007). A closer analysis across different modalities indicates the source of decline in satisfaction. Respondents who were fairly satisfied decreased by 10 percent, while those who were very satisfied increased by 6 percent. The overall decline in satisfaction is driven by the decrease in the number of respondents who said they were fairly satisfied. This decline may be explained by a "honeymoon" effect given the timing of the surveys.

Satisfaction decreased across all age groups, but this decline was most pronounced for the youngest bracket, those respondents ages 18-30. The oldest group, those respondents over 60 years old, exhibited the smallest decline in satisfaction. This may be related to the implementation of the 'sesame' healthcare program for the elderly. This generous program provides healthcare free of charge to all persons above 70 in all public hospitals nationwide in Senegal.

The results indicate a sharp contrast between rural and urban areas, regarding satisfaction with democracy. The figure indicates a 16 percent decrease in urban areas and a 4 percent increase in rural areas. While satisfaction with democracy decreased from 2003 to 2005 for both men and women in the sample, the decline is slightly more pronounced for males (- 4.5) than females (- 3.3). The figure is more nuanced with respect to educational attainment. On the one hand, people with primary school education and informal schooling² appear to be more satisfied in 2005 than they were in 2002 (+2.7, +1.2, and +5.3 points). On the other hand, more educated respondents tend to be more dissatisfied with the democracy over time. For example, the satisfaction declined by 26 percentage points among those with some university education and 19 points among respondents with secondary education. By the same token, the decline in satisfaction was also large (-15.5%) for people with post secondary education and those who completed university.³

The data indicates strong regional disparities especially in Dakar, Saint-Louis, and Louga. Satisfaction with democracy decreased by 16.4, 20, and 21.5 points in these respective, mostly urban areas. The results for Louga may be attributable to the fact that Louga is the stronghold of the opposition party, the Socialist Party of Senegal, led by Mrs. Aminata Mbengue Ndiaye.⁴

² This includes people with some primary school education and those who have completed primary school. Informal schooling in Senegal refers to popular programs designed to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills to participants.

³ This result is perhaps not surprising. In a study on the impact of formal and informal education on political participation in rural Senegal, Kuenzi (2006) reports that while formal and informal education tend to have similar effects on political behavior in rural Senegal, the impact of the latter is often much stronger.

⁴ Likewise, the variation in Saint-Louis may be an indication of dissatisfaction with local leaders' performance and not with democracy per se because the local political establishment in Saint-Louis is generally perceived to be disconnected with local realities. In Ziguinchor (Casamance), we would expect a significant dissatisfaction with institutions because of a longstanding low intensity conflict in an area here a separatist group is still active. But the involvement of local politicians who actively campaigned for the incumbent president and broad support for a recent peace agreement may explain the positive variation between 2002 and 2005. One may speculate that the low level of

The results also indicate that satisfaction with democracy varies across ethnic groups. The level of satisfaction declined for the two dominant ethnic groups, the Wolofs and Pulaars, which make up 61% of the sample. For the other, smaller ethnic groups, satisfaction increased quite significantly. For instance, the satisfaction increased by 16 and 29 percent for the Diola and Soninke groups.

The following section will offer a more detailed analysis of differences in satisfaction between respondents in urban versus rural areas and male versus female respondents.

Urban-Rural Gap

The following table presents the gap for each level of satisfaction between urban and rural respondents and men and women between 2003 and 2005

	2003					2005				
	Urban	Rural	Male	Female		Urban	Rural	Male	Female	
Senegal is not a democracy	2.2	1.3	2	1		1.6	1.3	2	1	
Not at all satisfied	12.5	8.8	13	9		22.6	8.3	16	13	
Not very satisfied	22	15	17	18		26	11	19	15	
Fairly satisfied	42	36	38	40		29	29	30	28	
Very satisfied	16	20	23	14		15	32	27	23	

The percentage of respondents who do not believe that Senegal is a democracy remains fairly constant for the rural and urban areas in both 2003 and 2005. However, the number of urban respondents who claimed to be not at all satisfied with Senegalese democracy increased sharply, by 11.1% between these years. This figure remained nearly constant for the rural areas. Additionally, the number of urban respondents who are fairly satisfied with democracy significantly decreased by 13% between 2002 and 2005. This change was less pronounced for rural areas. The number of rural residents, very satisfied with democracy noticeably rose 12%. Therefore, we can conclude that the overall increase in satisfaction for rural residents was driven by the increase in the number of people who became very satisfied between 2003 and 2005, while the decrease in satisfaction for urban respondents can be attributed to the large number of respondents who became not at all satisfied with democracy.

Given the high level of discrepancy between respondents in rural versus urban areas, we tested the significance of these results using a chi-squared test. We find the differences to be statistically significant at the $p=.0000$ level. This suggests that the observed patterns of satisfaction with democracy by area of residence are not merely random occurrences.

What then may account for the discrepancy? High levels of unemployment and precarious living conditions may explain why urban areas seem so disillusioned with democracy. While sustained mobilization in urban areas led to alternation in 2000, the power shift did not result in more favorable living conditions. In contrast, the government expedited dividend disbursements to peasants involved in the groundnut sector. In all likelihood, dividend disbursements seem to have infused hope about the future

satisfaction may also reflect a stronghold effect. We explore possible factors that determine satisfaction with democracy in the third section of the paper.

in rural areas despite persistent hardship. In addition, presidents of rural communities received much needed equipment from the government thereby allowing them to visit their constituencies more frequently. In this case, frequent contacts with local communities may have increased perceptions of government responsiveness in rural areas.⁵

Gender Gap?

The figures reported in Table 2.2 point to differences in satisfaction with democracy by gender. At first glance, men seem more satisfied than women as shown below. In 2002, 61% of men were satisfied with democracy whereas 54% among women report satisfaction with democracy.⁶ The results also indicate strikingly similar levels of satisfaction for men and women for four of the six modalities. They differ significantly only for those who claim to be “Very Satisfied” or “Don’t Know.” Given that men in Senegal exhibit higher levels of political participation, it may be the case that political participation affects satisfaction with democracy, and more specifically level of political apathy. The higher level of non response for women versus men may also be due to the fact that women receive less direct benefits from the current governments. Higher levels of participation among women, along with government initiatives that directly benefit women may result in higher levels of satisfaction and lower levels of non-response. This result is consistent with observations in other African countries (Logan, Wolf, and Sentamu 2007).

MEANING AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY

The table below explains how individual respondents define democracy. While the respondents could choose any three meanings of democracy, the most popular meaning of democracy was “civil liberties or personal freedoms.”

⁵ These interpretations certainly need to be tested to validate these speculations. We do so indirectly in section V part using indicators on government performance. However, note that some responses to survey questions on living conditions and members of parliament visits to their constituencies add credence to these speculations. When respondents were asked how often members of parliament visit their areas, people in rural areas report visitation rates much higher than those in urban areas. Also people in rural areas generally say that their living conditions were improving.

⁶ These are percentages of people who said they were fairly satisfied or satisfied with democracy.

Table 3.1: Meaning of Democracy	% Response
Civil liberties/Personal Freedoms	36
Equality/Justice	12
Peace/Unity/Power Sharing	6
Social and Economic Development	5
Governance/Accountability/Rule of Law	3
Government by the People	2
Mutual Respect	2
Other Positive Meanings	1.5
Working Together	1
National Independence	1
Vote/Elections/Multiparty Competition	1
Other Neutral Meaning	3
Don't Know	28

Although data are not available on this item (meaning of democracy) for 2003, the evidence for 2005 is quite compelling. It indicates that civil liberties and personal freedoms (possibly civil rights) are pivotal aspects of popular perceptions of the meaning of democracy alongside equality and justice (36% and 12% respectively). These results are quite similar to those obtained in other African countries. In other African countries, 34% of respondents listed “Civil liberties” as a primary meaning of democracy, nearly equal to Senegal’s figure of 36% (Bratton and Mattes 2001 a).

Obviously, the protections afforded by the legal infrastructure of democracy and the promise of equality may account for why these aspects are salient in popular representations of the meaning of democracy. The focus on civil liberties may also suggest that Senegalese value freedom from undue government interference in their lives. Hence it is not surprising that Senegalese strongly reject authoritarianism plausibly because it severely restraint civil liberties that feature prominently in the meaning they attach to democracy. It implies that the commitment to democracy entails a strong opposition to unchecked rule, unfriendly to civil liberties. The following three tables present the extent of rejection of autocratic rule.

Rejection of Authoritarianism

Respondents were asked to state what they think about the following statement: “the army comes in to govern the country”. They were asked whether they would support (approve) or reject (disapprove) military rule. The percentage of respondents rejecting military rule is appreciably high with at least three out of four Senegalese firmly opposing it.

Type of authoritarianism	Military rule		One man rule		One party rule	
	2003	2005	2003	2005	2003	2005
Strongly disapprove	52	50	53	49	44	46
Disapprove	24	31	24	37	33	31
Neither approve nor disapprove	5	4	8	2	7	2
Approve	11	9	7	4	10	14
Strongly approve	6	1	4	1	4	3

By and large, 52 % of respondents in 2002 and 50 % in 2005 strongly disapprove of military rule while 24% and 31% disapprove of it. Combined percentages of rejection of military rule yields a proportion of rejection at 76% in 2002, and 81% in 2005. The reported levels of rejection of authoritarianism are consistent with results from other African countries. Senegal’s rejection of one party rule is nearly identical to figures from Botswana (78%), Ghana (80%), Malawi (77%), and Zimbabwe (74%) (Bratton and Mattes 2001 a 109).

The uncompromising opposition to military rule sheds light on the fact that dissatisfaction with democracy does not imply that Senegalese would prefer another form of government. While people may express discontent with the performance of democracy they are also take a principled position against non-democratic rule.

In Table 3.2 we report additional responses to substantiate more robustly the claim that adherence to democracy in Senegal expresses an uncompromising commitment to a regime type for intrinsic reasons and not rather because it is expected to improve their conditions.

As shown above, respondents clearly reject one man rule. They were asked whether they would approve or oppose (disapprove) the following statement: “Elections and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.” In line with the outright rejection of military rule, most people dismissed one man rule in 2003 and 2005 as well. Percentages of rejection are respectively 77% and 86%. This figure is consistent with the rejection of military rule and averages from 15 other African countries (80% rejection level between 2001 and 2003) (Afrobarometer 2004).

Table 3.2 also reports results on the rejection of one-party rule to further substantiate the principled commitment to democracy. The results confirm the wholesale rejection of authoritarian forms of government. In this case, respondents were asked whether they would approve or oppose the fact: “Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.” Rejection rates of one-party rule are very high, 77% in both 2003 and 2005. Senegal’s rejection rate for one party rule is higher than the reported average level for 15 other African countries (67% rejection level between 2001 and 2003) (Afrobarometer 2004).

Support for Multiparty Competition

Even though overall rejection rates of one party rule are quite high, the approval ratings for one party rule are not negligible. In 2003, 10% of respondents approved of one party rule, while this figure rose to 14% in 2005. It is noteworthy that Senegalese recognize multiparty competition as a necessary and desirable dimension of democratic rule. The survey evaluates views on multiparty elections in Senegal, by asking respondents, whether “(A) [they] should choose their leaders through regular, open and honest elections; or that (B) since elections sometimes produce bad results, [they] should adopt other methods for choosing leaders.”

Table 3.3: Choice of leaders through elections vs. other methods	2002	2005
agree very strongly with a	48%	44
agree with a	21	44
agree with b	9	7
agree very strongly with b	10	3
agree with neither	2	1

The table above indicates a sharp increase in support for multiparty elections between 2003 and 2005, increasing by 19 percentage points from 69% in 2003 to 88% in 2005. At the same time, the proportion of those who agree that other methods must be used to select rulers declined starkly. For example, while up to 9% in 2003 did not opt for elections to choose leaders the figure declined by 2 percentage points in 2005. The most important decrease is among those agreed very strongly with option b above. While they were 10% in 2003, only 3 % of those surveyed in 2005 remained distrustful of elections as a means to select rulers. These results suggest that respondents reacted more favorably towards the premise of competitive elections after the successful alternation in 2002.

Attitudes Towards Political Parties

The table below presents the varying levels of support for multipartism in Senegal in 2003 and 2005. The people surveyed were asked what they think about the following statement: (A) “Many political parties are needed to make sure that Senegalese have real choices in who govern them”; (B) Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Senegal.”

Table 3.4: Divisiveness of political parties	2003	2005
agree very strongly with a	31%	34
agree with a	25	21
agree with b	18	15
agree very strongly with b	23	24
agree with neither	3	3

In both cases, a majority of respondents support the existence of many political parties (55% in 2003 and 56% in 2005). The survey results do not indicate any significant changes in support for multipartism between 2003 and 2005.

The commitment to multiparty competition is likely a direct consequence of an unprecedented turnover in the presidency in March 2000. After 40 years of domination, the socialist party was defeated by Abdoulaye Wade. Although some form of multiparty competition existed in Senegal under L.S. Senghor and Abdou Diouf, the ruling party never felt threatened and controlled power for much of Senegal’s post independence political life⁷.

⁷ By African standards, Senegal was quite liberal (Fratton 1987) and crafted an inclusive political system through clientelistic networks to facilitate entry into the political process of opposition groups without affecting the distribution of power.

Multipartism As a Source of Conflict?

Even though the majority of Senegalese support multiparty competition, they also believe that it is divisive and leads to conflict.

Table 3.5: When does party competition lead to conflict?	2003					2005				
	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Overall	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Overall
Never	4	9	6	7	7	5	7	7	5	6
Rarely	21	24	22	24	23	15	17	18	14	16
Often	45	53	52	47	49	57	52	52	56	54
Always	27	12	18	20	19	19	16	19	16	17

As the table above suggests, 68% of the respondents from the 2002 survey claim that elections fuel conflicts. This figure rose to 71% in 2005. In urban areas, the proportion of those who think competition for office often leads to conflict increased by 12 full percentage points while the figure for rural areas remained stable. Overall, combining the proportion of those who believe multiparty competition often leads conflict and those who believe conflicts always occur yields respectively 72% and 76% for urban areas, whereas figures for rural areas respectively 65% and 68% in 2002 and 2005.

The breakdown by gender does not suggest a gender gap in regards to the effect of multipartism on conflict. The evidence from Senegal contradicts previous findings that women more concerned than men about the divisive nature of party competition (Logan and Bratton 2006). In all the relevant response categories, differences are not significant. In 2002, 70% among men believed party competition leads to conflict. The corresponding figure for women is 67%. In 2005, 71% of men and 72% among women stated that party competition could lead to conflicts. There is a minor gap between men and women. For example, 52% of men states in 2002 that party competition leads to conflict while 47% of women held the same opinion. In 2005, 18% of men and 14% of women reported that party competition rarely leads to conflict. The variation is not high enough to support the view that a gender gap exists in Senegal on patterns of commitment to multiparty competition.

GOVERNANCE

Before we present public evaluation of government performance, we begin by offering analysis of the most important issues for the respondents. The question was open ended and Table 4.1 presents the results

Table 4.1: Most Important problems	2002				2005			
	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	Male	Female
Unemployment	37	15	27	25	20	10	17	16
Food Shortage	14	19	14	20	18	11	14	13
Agriculture	6	18	14	9	4	17	15	7
Health	6	5	7	7	11	15	13	14

Table 4.2: Government's Economic Performance	Managing Economy		Job Creation		Price Stability		Narrowing income gap	
	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005
Very badly	11	10	18	12	19	19	23	16
Fairly badly	31	27	42	36	50	47	45	43
Fairly well	54	50	36	40	28	25	29	27
Very well	5	5	4	4	3	2	4	3

The table 4.1 suggests that the concerns about food shortage and agriculture remained nearly constant between 2003 and 2005, while views on unemployment and health changed significantly. Unemployment was a major concern in 2003, especially in urban areas (37% of respondents against 15% in rural areas). Urban respondents tend to be more dependent on wage labor, which may explain the greater degree of importance they grant to the issue of unemployment. The figure decreased significantly across geographical location and gender. The number of respondents who list health as an important problem in Senegal increased between 2003 and 2005 from 6 to 11% in urban areas and 5 to 15% in rural areas. These increases are consistent for both men and women.

Government's Economic Performance

On the whole, ratings of government's economic policy performance exhibit a descending pattern as it appears in Table 4-2.

As the table above indicates, the government did not show significant changes in its narrowing of the income gap between rich and poor and its management of price stability. A majority of respondents believe that the government handled both of these issues badly in both 2003 and 2005. In terms of managing the overall economy, however, a majority of respondents say that the government does this well. The most noticeable changes in public perception of government economic performance can be seen in the government's role in job creation. In 2003, 60% of the respondents said that the government handled job creation badly. This figure decreased to 44% in 2005.

Government's Performance on Social Policies

The survey measures the government's performance on social policy issues by asking respondents to rate the government along several dimensions. Table 4-3 below summarizes the opinions recorded on social policy.

Table 4.3 Government's Social Performance	Crime		Corruption		Health		Education		HIV/AIDS	
	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005
Very badly	13	6	16	10	10	8	9	6	4	3
Fairly badly	32	19	32	28	30	25	30	22	13	9
Fairly well	47	54	44	32	50	56	50	57	55	47
Very well	8	13	8	6	10	7	11	9	29	28

The table above indicates little change in government's handling of corruption, health, and HIV/AIDS. A majority of respondents said that the government handles health and HIV/AIDS well, while the results for handling of corruption are inconclusive due to a high level of non-response in 2005. The government's performance in terms of crime prevention increased between 2002 and 2005 with the percentage of

respondents who viewed the government’s performance favorably increasing from 55% in 2003 to 67% in 2005. The government also improved in regards to education by 5 percent from 2003 to 2005.

Performance of Political Leaders

Do Senegalese see their leaders as competent? Survey respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way the president, their national assembly deputy and their local governor had performed their respective jobs over the past twelve months. Results are presented in table 4-4 below.

Table 4.4: Performance of leaders	President		Assembly Deputy		Local Government	
	2002	2005	2002	2005	2002	2005
Strongly disapprove	8	7	18	8	6	11
Disapprove	16	18	24	22	12	26
Approve	46	46	36	28	44	35
Strongly approve	28	22	11	9	18	12

A quick look at the table uncovers unusually high approval rates, especially for the president. But approval rates decreased for assembly deputies and governors at the local level. In 2005, only 47% of respondents viewed their local governor favorably, a figure down from 62% in 2002. By the same token, just 37% in 2005 thought their deputy was doing well, a percentage down from 47%.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

The evidence presented above suggests that Senegalese are quite satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. To further investigate the determinants of this satisfaction, we provide an econometric test of the relationship between popular support for competitive democracy and public evaluation of current government performance, controlling for key demographic characteristics.

The results presented Table 3.1 indicates that a relative majority of Senegalese (36%) associate democracy primarily with civil liberties and personal freedoms. In addition, Table 3.3 indicates that 88% of respondents support competitive democracy in 2005. These results show that Senegalese implicitly perceive democracy as a procedural mechanism to generate competition for public office.

In this section, we evaluate the extent to which satisfaction with democracy depends on perceived government performance. The independent variables include a set of indicators on government performance and other demographic parameters including gender and education. We also included a measure of political partisanship under the assumption that satisfaction with democracy may be related to partisan identification, assuming that those who identify with incumbents may tend to be less demanding than those who identify with opposition parties.

We estimate two models for each survey year, 2002 and 2005. The first models test the effect of three independent variables that capture specific dimensions of government performance (government performance of economic policy and government performance on social policy) on satisfaction with democracy. The second models include, in addition to the indicators of government performance, three control variables: the socio-demographic parameters of education, gender, and area of residence (urban vs. rural). It also includes partisan identification, which captures whether respondents identify with incumbents or opposition parties. The latter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when people identify with the incumbent and 0 otherwise.

Many variables in the survey relate to government performance⁸. We combine a set of correlated variables to create three indices of government performance, using factor analysis. The three indices measure government performance on economic policy (unemployment, price stability, and reduction of the income gap), public health policy (handling of HIV/AIDS and malaria), and social policy (water and food supply).⁹

The social policy measure is excluded for 2005 because this third factor was too weakly correlated with the relevant variables. In a sense the variable on government policy included in the models estimated on the corresponding data for 2005 is, to some extent, a bundle variable capturing many aspects of public policy (economic aspects and some measure of social policy). Regression results are displayed in Table 5.1.

⁸ Merely including all the variables on government performance into the regression would have resulted in multicollinearity and bias the results.. Extracting adequate measures using factor analysis provides more precise estimates.

⁹ The full factor analysis results are reported in the appendix. For 2003, the first factor out 7 retained initially explains 84% of the variance among all the items on governance and exhibited an Eigenvalue of 4.6, much greater than the conventional threshold of 1. Overall we retained 3 factors for 2002 because they are appreciably correlated with the items of interest. For 2005, the first factor explains 96% of the variance among the items on governance and was accordingly retained. The three variables based on rotated factors include items on performance on economic policy and social policy (government handling of economy, price stability, health, crime reduction, corruption, gap between rich and poor, educational needs, combat against HIV/AIDS).

Table 5.1: Regression Results: Satisfaction with Democracy by Government Performance

DV = Satisfaction with Democracy	2003		2005	
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Economic Policy	.36*** (.046)	.34*** (.047)	.56*** (.043)	.43*** (.043)
Public Health Policy (& education for 2005)	.10** (.043)	.11** (.043)	.15** (.050)	.13** (.048)
Social Policy	.11* (.058)	.011* (.059)		
Age		-.000 (-0.77)		.000 (.000)
Education		-.02 (.019)		-.004 (.008)
Area (Urban/Rural)		.08 (.07)		.49*** (.076)
Gender		.002 (.07)		.068 (.069)
Partisan		.14** (.072)		.35*** (.074)
Constant	2.71	2.56	2.75	1.86
Observations	714	714	721	721
Adjusted R ²	0.11	0.11	0.23	0.31
R ²	0.10	0.12	0.23	0.32

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

- $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.
- Cell entries display unstandardized OLS regression coefficients

The results indicate that all three indices are significant, although the first two (economic and public health policy) show the strongest relationships. The measure of social policy is significant only at 90% level. The inclusion of socio-demographic controls does not alter the results. Age, education, and gender are not significant. We find here that area of residence is not significant in the first model but significant in the second model, which confirms (at least partly) our previous results pointing to a rural-urban gap for satisfaction with democracy.

The education variable is insignificant, most likely because level of education does not affect perception of economic/social problems. As we indicated earlier, respondents affiliated with incumbents tend to be more supportive of current government performance. Interestingly, the estimate of partisanship is significant in all models thereby suggesting that party affiliation with the governing party positively affects perceptions of incumbent performance.

By and large, the results for 2005 indicate that satisfaction with democracy is a function of government performance. Although both age and education do not predict satisfaction with democracy, all indicators of government performance are very significant. Also, the results for 2005 suggest a net impact of area of residence on satisfaction with democracy, in contrast to 2002. This confirms a noticeable pattern in 2005 showing strikingly low levels of satisfaction with democracy in urban areas while those living in rural areas exhibited much higher levels of satisfaction. Not surprisingly, partisanship remained in 2005 a strong predictor of how people assess satisfaction with democracy.

The results for age, gender, and partisan identification are consistent with results from other African countries, while Senegal differs in terms of the results for area of residence (Bratton and Mattes 2001 b).

CONCLUSION

The reported results put Senegal in line with many other African countries in terms of rejection of authoritarianism, overall satisfaction with democracy, and the importance of civil liberties. Additionally, economic factors and partisanship prove to be strong and robust indicators for satisfaction with democracy in Senegal, as is the case in other African countries (Bratton and Mattes 2001 b). Nevertheless, several interesting discrepancies exist. Other studies have found no evidence of a gender or geographical location gap, yet find that education as a key determinant of satisfaction level (Bratton and Mattes 2001 b). Educational level is not a determinant of satisfaction with democracy in Senegal, while geographical location is. Although the gender gap disappears in the multivariate analysis, it is still useful to note the differences in the raw data for satisfaction of men and women. As mentioned earlier, these differences may be explained by the higher level of non-response and lower levels of participation among women. The urban-rural gap may be explained by the introduction of agricultural subsidies, which may have increased level of satisfaction in rural areas. Future policies directed toward both women and people in urban areas may serve to increase the level of satisfaction for these groups. Higher level of political participation among women may also reduce the level of non-response and increase satisfaction.

Finally, despite previous research, claiming that ethnicity is a negligible factor in Senegalese politics, the survey results indicate a significant gap in satisfaction between the ethnic majority (Wolof and Pulaar) and ethnic minorities (Soninke and Diola). While the ethnic minorities displays large increases in satisfaction between 2003 and 2005, the satisfaction level decreases for the two major ethnic groups in these years.

Appendix B: Factor Analysis Results

The corresponding factors are provided below. Indicators appearing in bold in the tables are matched with the relevant labels.

Factor Analysis 2002.

Principal factors; 7 Factors Retained			Rotated Factor Loadings (Varimax)			
Factor	Eigenvalue	Proportion	Var	1	2	3
1	4.60*	0.84*	q45a	0.46	0.15993	0.34
2	0.95	0.17	q45b	0.56	0.11262	0.21
3	0.36	0.06	q45c	0.64	0.07448	0.08
4	0.25	0.04	q45d	0.64	0.07865	0.27
5	0.19	0.03	q45e	0.54	0.16694	0.07
6	0.11	0.02	q45f	0.35	0.27335	0.21
7	0.00	0.00	q45g	0.31	0.25615	0.22
8	-0.04	-0.00	q45h	0.24	0.25461	0.46
9	-0.08	-0.01	q45i	0.37	0.19160	0.53
10	-0.14	-0.02	q45j	0.35	0.28744	0.16
11	-0.16	-0.03	q45k	0.34	0.31631	0.00
12	-0.17	-0.03	q45kl	0.11	0.75352	0.08
13	-0.20	-0.03	q45l	0.05	0.73570	0.10
14	-0.23	-0.04	q46	-0.09	-0.10965	0.01

*Extremely robust Eigenvalue (over 4 times the conventional satisfactory threshold of 1) and proportion of the variance explained by the factor (84%). Bold figures indicate in shaded cells indicate correlations between variables and the relevant factors.

Factor Analysis 2005

(principal factors; 6 factors retained)			Rotated Factors Loading (Varimax)		
Factor	Eigenvalue	Proportion	Variable	1	2
1	4.42*	0.96*	q65a	0.68	0.23
2	0.52	0.11	q65b	0.69	0.22
3	0.19	0.04	q65c	0.72	0.21
4	0.12	0.02	q65d	0.64	0.23
5	0.08	0.01	q65e	0.26	0.37
6	0.06	0.01	q65f	0.36	0.61
7	-0.03	-0.00	q65g	0.34	0.64
8	-0.09	-0.01	q65h	0.41	0.43
9	-0.13	-0.02	q65i	0.58	0.28
10	-0.14	-0.03	q65j	0.55	0.32
11	-0.18	-0.04	q65k	0.04	0.28
12	-0.21	-0.04	q66	-0.18	-0.06

* Extremely robust Eigenvalue (over 4 times the conventional satisfactory threshold of 1) and proportion of the variance explained by the factor (96%)

Bold figures indicate in shaded cells indicate correlations between variables and the relevant factors.

Factors are as follows: Government managing the economy (45a, 65a); government handling creating jobs (45b, 65b); government handling keeping prices stable (45c, 65c); government handling narrowing income gaps (45d, 65d); government handling reducing crime (45e, 65e); government improving basic health services (45f, 65h); government addressing educational needs (45g, 65g); government handling delivering household water (45h, 65h); government ensuring enough to eat (45i, 65i) government handling fighting corruption (45j, 65j); government handling conflict resolution (45k; not in 2005); government handling fighting malaria(45k1, not in 2005); government handling combating HIV/AIDS (45l, 65k); government handling resources to combat AIDS Vs other problems (46, 66).

Indicators of Government Performance after Factor Construction

(Based on rotated factors; 4 scorings not used for 2002 dataset and 3 not used for 2005)

1. 2002

Economic Policy: (Government managing the economy; government handling creating jobs; government handling keeping prices stable; government handling narrowing income gaps; government handling reducing crime

Public Health Policy: government handling fighting malaria; government handling combating HIV/AIDS

Social Policy: government handling delivering household water (45h); government ensuring enough to eat.

2. 2005

Economic Policy: (Government managing the economy; government handling creating jobs; government handling keeping prices stable; government handling narrowing income gaps).

Public health Policy (& education): government improving basic health services; government addressing educational needs; government handling delivering household water

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