

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**



**After Two Wars:  
Reflections on the American  
Strategic Revolution  
in Central Asia**

**Professor Stephen Blank**

**April 2005**

# **After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia**

**Professor Stephen Blank**

## **Key Points**

- \* For the first time in history externally based naval and air military power has successfully been projected and sustained in/against Central Asian forces and targets.
- \* These military capabilities can also be projected from Central Asia throughout Asia (including the Middle East), Europe and vice versa, making the Transcaspian literally a pivotal Eurasian theatre.
- \* It does not suffice to be able to deploy and sustain long-range strike forces in the theatre, the theatre itself must be cooperatively reordered by the US, its other partners, and host governments, working together to stabilise it and legitimise US presence and a political order that has a genuine chance to evolve in a liberal, democratic direction enjoying popular support.
- \* America must also develop an appropriate long-term and multi-dimensional strategy for retaining permanent access to the area. Military engagement must be part of this inter-agency strategy that embraces the use of all of America's and its partners' instruments of power: economic, political, informational, etc.
- \* Continuing US military success closely correlates with the transformation of its partners' and allies' military forces so that they too can maximise their defence potential in contemporary conditions.
- \* America's interest in projecting military power into or from the Transcaspian must also be seen as an interest in enhancing the joint capabilities of all arms of its military as well as in extending the possibility for combined operations with allies and partners from within the area or from outside it.

## **Contents**

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>The Geostrategic Revolution in the Transcaspian &amp; the Transformation of Security</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>The RSA &amp; The Transcaspian</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>The Transcaspian &amp; the Spectrum of Conflict</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>The Need for Military Adaptation</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>US Forces in Asia, the RSA, &amp; the Global Posture Review</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Issues of Access &amp; a Global Basing System</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>The Need for Comprehensive Engagement</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Set 1</b>	
<b>Set 2</b>	

# **After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia**

**Professor Stephen Blank**

## **Introduction**

Today Central Asia and the Caucasus are epicentres of international rivalry. The visible rivalries among Moscow, Washington, Beijing, and even Brussels (home of the EU and NATO) for influence in either or both of these areas is now the stuff of headlines. But the competition for great power influence in these areas is hardly brand new. Even before September 11, 2001 American interests in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus were growing. But the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have triggered a commensurate and enormous growth of US interests in those two adjoining regions. Today those interests loom so large that some elements of the US military were or reportedly are seeking permanent facilities or so called operating sites there while local and Russian newspapers openly state that US forces are building such bases or advocate their presence.<sup>1</sup> Although these articles are often fabrications since US officials continue to deny the intention to establish permanent bases there, have not announced the final results of the Global Posture Review, and must work out legal arrangements concerning overflight and rights and status of forces currently with all the host countries involved; America's expanding strategic presence and interests in the Transcaspians are taken for granted and closely tied to the lessons of its two recent wars.<sup>2</sup> These articles carry an inflammatory edge that distorts their meaning because they tend to leave the reader with the notion that old-fashioned imperialist bases are at issue when an altogether different concept is being discussed. In fact the concept under discussion in Washington did not agitate the Russian government once it was presented to the leadership in Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

As Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld recently testified, it is important that US forces be located in places in places where they are "wanted, welcomed, and needed". Building new relationships with states that are vital to the war against terrorists, e.g. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and behind them Georgia and Azerbaijan as logistical staging areas, is a critical part of our evolving defence strategy. Similarly, leaders of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), like former Combatant Commander US retired General Tommy Franks openly recognized the importance of access to the Caucasus and Central Asia as possible bases and staging areas in both the war against Al Qaeda and against Iraq.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the United States is interested in acquiring permanent access to what Rumsfeld calls operating sites, not permanent bases as they are traditionally understood.<sup>5</sup>

The geostrategic lessons and consequences of these wars in Afghanistan and Iraq point strongly to the strategic importance of permanent access to these areas in future contingencies. Therefore there is an equally important need to establish agreements with local governments for a mutually acceptable form of permanent US military access. That need, in turn, presupposes a comprehensive engagement with

those states so that agreements facilitating access can be negotiated on the basis of common understandings of the threats to both parties and the specific circumstances where and when access will be granted. Indeed, those agreements allowing transit, overflight and access rights, and defining the status of forces there can be essential instruments of support in the event of threats to these governments' security, by no means a unlikely event. As Secretary Rumsfeld and many others have often stated, we must be able to move troops rapidly to presently unforeseeable contingencies against extremists or other enemies at short notice. At the same time, those troops must be flexibly configured, able to gain access to a wide variety of areas, enjoy a welcoming or hospitable attitude from the host country/ies involved, and be able to operate under whatever circumstances may arise.

Insofar as these desiderata apply to the deployment of troops in and around the Caspian basin which is a landlocked area, we must also update the legal bases for these troops' deployment there should they have to deploy abroad rapidly. These legal arrangements should also encourage interoperability and burdensharing among our partners and ourselves while giving troops the necessary legal protections. As part of this new strategy, Rumsfeld observed that we are transforming our global posture so that in Asia, as elsewhere, "our ideas build upon our current ground, naval, and air access to overcome vast distances while bringing additional naval and air capabilities forward into the region".<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, the purpose of this essay is to provide the strategic justification of this need for access by examining what the advent of globally capable US forces into these regions has meant and to recommend programmes and/or principles that might help obtain both permanent access to the Transcaspian region (Transcaucasus and Central Asia) and reliable strategic partners, if not allies, from among local governments.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq signify the fundamentally altered strategic importance of the Transcaspian region. US operations in these wars conjoined two simultaneous revolutions: the revolution in military affairs (RMA) - the application of information technology to military operations - and a concurrent revolution in strategic affairs discussed below (RSA) as well as their lessons. The ensuing geostrategic consequences resonate particularly forcefully insofar as the Transcaspian - hitherto a relatively inconsequential strategic theatre - is concerned.

Four linked strategic lessons have emerged from these wars. First, by projecting and sustaining long-term naval, air, and land power to the Transcaspian US forces achieved a strategic revolution there. For the first time in history externally based naval and air based military power has successfully been projected and sustained against Central Asian forces and targets. As Graham Chapman wrote recently, invoking Sir Halford Mackinder, "The Americans have also now built bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and so the maritime powers have penetrated the heartland for the first time ever."<sup>7</sup> Indeed, Norman Friedman calls the war in Afghanistan a littoral war, highlighting the sustained strategic projection of offshore or externally based power into this theatre.<sup>8</sup>

Second, these capabilities can also be projected from there to all of Asia, or Europe (including the Middle East) and vice versa making the Transcaspian literally a pivotal Eurasian theatre. But this capability obligates the United States to engage this entire area with more strategic purposefulness in order to maintain permanent access to it and to help ensure its security and stability.<sup>9</sup> This must also include

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

purposeful US actions to help these countries surmount the numerous challenges to their own security that they face on a daily basis.

However an equally critical third consideration arises from these two lessons of war. America has successfully projected and sustained force into this area, but it has yet to give those capabilities the legitimacy that alone can make this sustainment successful.<sup>10</sup> An order based to some degree upon force (and that is also true for many of the local governments) still awaits its transformation into a legitimate order based on freely given consent. Since “power projection activities are an input into the world order,” Russian, European, Chinese and American force deployments into the Transcaspian represent potentially competitive and profound attempts at effecting a long-term restructuring of the regional strategic order.<sup>11</sup> Therefore to build the relationships it desires after having projected force into the area, Washington must understand the strategic stakes inherent in its achievement and then find a way to resolve one of the oldest questions of political theory, i.e. how to create a legitimate political order based on consent out of that force’s deployment. In other words, the acquisition of access must reflect a prior harmony of interests and threat assessments on the part of all the partners rather than being merely a bribe against expected future political payoffs or something coerced out of a reluctant host government.<sup>12</sup> Without the conversion of an order based upon the deployment of forces to the Transcaspian into one based on legitimacy, Central Asia and the Caucasus, notoriously unstable areas with numerous pathologies and potentials for instability, could descend into that instability, at least in selected places if not collectively. Then neither the US nor local governments will be able to exploit the opportunities provided by the strategic revolution to achieve America’s paramount interests of enhancing their security, independence and sovereignty.

This necessity of transforming force into consent and legitimacy is another reason for a robust American engagement with host governments and their militaries since their territories’ importance has grown and their stability and security are vital to ours in the war on terrorism. The third lesson, then, is that it does not suffice to be able to deploy and sustain long-range strike forces in the theatre, the theatre itself must be cooperatively reordered by the U.S., its other partners, and host governments, working together to stabilize it, and legitimize US presence and a political order that has a genuine chance to evolve in a liberal, democratic direction enjoying popular support. Otherwise we will have merely paved the way for the opening of another front in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

Creating that legitimacy becomes all the more urgent a task because our success has already alarmed those with whom we must work within the GWOT but who regard our presence there as deeply threatening to their vital interests: Iran, Russia and China. Their earlier concern and that of local governments that local US facilities and assets might be used against Iraq, a war from which they mostly recoiled, indicates the great scope of the strategic revolution and transformation of regional military capabilities that we effected in 2001-04 and their consciousness of its implications for them. Similarly their public opposition to our military presence in the area, and in Russia’s case to any foreign presence there, has become louder and more insistent. This is the case even though Russia sees no threat in the projected global restructuring of US bases.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, conditions for building that legitimacy have become more auspicious because European and Asian security - ie Eurasian security - including much more than energy security, is now clearly understood to be greatly influenced by conditions of security in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. In no small measure, this is due to the fact that the meaning of security has undergone a transformation that not just analysts but

even military officers acknowledge. Therefore the European Union (EU) and NATO are coming to accept that their own interests mandate greater activity to help stabilize the Transcaspian.<sup>14</sup> The success of the elections in Afghanistan and the development of a political order based on something more than warlordism would also have a tremendously positive and reverberating effect across Central Asia. This consideration partly explains the growing European presence in Afghanistan because safeguarding those elections' occurrence and legitimacy are also now acknowledged as key strategic tasks for the NATO partners in Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup>

The coincidence of these strategic trends that have transformed the region already influences state policies throughout the Transcaspian. This revamped and expanded definition of security feeds into the fourth lesson of this strategic revolution. That lesson is that in order to maximize the value of this Revolution in Strategic Affairs for the advancement of American interests we must also develop an appropriate long-term and multi-dimensional strategy for retaining permanent access to the area. Military engagement must be part of this multi-dimensional and inter-agency strategy. Such access also need not entail a permanent forward presence there, or permanent bases in the traditional sense of such facilities, as in Germany. But it does require both a comprehensive engagement with governments and armed forces on both sides of the Caspian Sea and permanent access to military bases there in times of crisis or a so called forward operating location (FOL). Essentially this requires that the US devise a comprehensive strategy of security cooperation and regional state-building activities that foster this permanent engagement with local governments. Likewise, the armed forces cannot evade the tasks of so called nation building in these states if this engagement strategy is to succeed. Instead those tasks are increasingly an intrinsic part of their power projection mission in peacetime to shape the potential military theatre for future contingencies. In other words, US military strategy and policy here must be part of a larger macrostrategy that embraces the use of all of America's and its partners' instruments of power: economic, political, informational, etc.

The concept of a FOL denotes an austere or stripped down base or facility with few US or host country troops there but which could quickly be readied for use in case of an emergency.<sup>16</sup> This concept corresponds to emerging US thinking about foreign military bases and access and coincides with the need for comprehensive engagement with local militaries so that they can operate at a compatible standard instead of or with us as the situation requires. US military leaders explicitly and generally invoke the strategic importance of continuing security cooperation that represents a form of that engagement as a vital strategic interest and not just in this region.<sup>17</sup> Because of their stripped down nature these projected FOLs are quite distinct from bases as traditionally understood or as personified by Ramstein and Rhein-Main Air Force Bases. Since the Pentagon and State Department have ruled out a permanent base in the Transcaspian in conjunction with the new Global Posture Review announced by President Bush in August 2004, the quest for permanent access as needed, rather than a permanent base, fully comports with stated US policy.<sup>18</sup>

## **The Geostrategic Revolution in the Transcaspian & the Transformation of Security**

America's Afghan and Iraqi victories in major combat operations invalidated the current strategic argument among some defence intellectuals that geography and geographical considerations no longer matter much to strategy.<sup>19</sup> Allegedly

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

globalization and the RMA have so compressed or shrunk the world that holding ground and geographical or geostrategic concerns no longer matter much in an age where information is trump. But America's victories also show that strategic victory is inconceivable without holding and controlling ground and without effecting a lasting transformation of the local political orders from which war has sprung.<sup>20</sup> And in order to achieve those goals we must find ways to overcome the "tyranny of distance" and sustain short and/or long-term deployments in the Transcaspiian when needed. Those conclusions confirm the increased importance of every form of power projection capabilities and the increased ability of air and naval assets to project and sustain meaningful military power onto the land. Not surprisingly, a whole school of thinking now sees naval warfare as entailing not so much combat at sea as much as littoral warfare, pushing beyond the littoral area well into the interior.<sup>21</sup> Such transformations are forcing armies, especially the US Army, into an ever more joint posture because other forces can plausibly claim to take over responsibilities hitherto associated solely with the Army or the Marines, such as the provision of organic fire support and long-range artillery.<sup>22</sup> They can relieve burdens that used to be placed on those forces and allow them to concentrate on fighting for and holding ground further inland. Thus technological changes in weaponry affect force structures, packages and missions.

But technology is not the only driver of transformation nor does technological change occur in a vacuum. The geostrategic revolutions revealed by these campaigns are also among the drivers of the current transformation of US armed forces and the overall global strategic environment. They confirm Paul Bracken's observations that one of the most important results of the application of Western military technology to Asia was that it reorganized geopolitical space. That is happening again today.<sup>23</sup> Today the application of military (and civilian) technology throughout Asia whether through military campaigns, arms sales, or the normal pattern by which military technology diffuses is radically transforming Asia's strategic geography and our understanding of it. Our response to this technological and geostrategic transformation must also undergo an appropriate transformation. To understand this technological transfer in all its strategic ramifications, we must contextualize it.

As Randall Collins' study of Max Weber's sociology concluded with regard to military innovation in world history,

*But the crucial aspect of the development, its being made "socially real" by becoming part of a form of organization, generally seems to happen in areas of greater geopolitical importance. In general, then, although elements of innovations may occur because of geographical particularities of where certain natural resources are most easily available, it appears that the geopolitical centers are where they become organized into effective military technologies.*<sup>24</sup> (italics in the original)

From this perspective it becomes clear that US power projection capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed unprecedented strategic possibilities by illustrating the enhanced strategic importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Using those forms of power projection, which can project ground forces into the theatre and sustain them for a long time, it is now possible to leverage military power in and throughout Central Asia and from there throughout Eurasia in hitherto unforeseen ways. Not surprisingly, both Central Asia and Transcaucasia now enjoy heightened analytical and policy interest. Security professionals increasingly realize the importance of addressing the Black Sea and Transcaucasia as well as Central Asia



in order to complete the stabilization of Europe or to help stabilize the “Broader (or greater) Middle East” or a reconceptualized Eurasia.<sup>25</sup> Many writers emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia and/or the Caucasus to the current geopolitical order.<sup>26</sup> Frequently they see new geographical and even strategic unities between the two halves of the Transcaspian and areas like South Asia or Europe. For example, even before the war in Iraq, Sir John Thomson, a former British High Commissioner to India wrote that,

The geographical definition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any doubt before, September 11 has made it clear that we have to take into account Afghanistan and its neighbours: Iran to the west; all the former Soviet republics to the north; and China to the east. The geographical context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say - sincerely, I believe - that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiralling disaster in Israel-Palestine.<sup>27</sup>

Brahma Chellaney of India sees those linked regions as constituting an integral arc of threat that should bring together governments in a common threat perception and hence shared strategic interest.<sup>28</sup> In 2003 Indian Foreign Secretary Kinwal Sebal similarly told an US audience that,

Asia has traditionally been seen in terms of its sub-regions, each with its own dynamics and its own problems. Traditionally, we deal with them as unconnected compartments. However, lines that insulate one region from the other are increasingly getting blurred by proliferation deals that link the east to the west, by the chain of terror network(s) across West, South, and Southeast Asia, by the concerns about the safety of commerce from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, by the challenge of connecting major consumers of energy to its sources in West and Central Asia.<sup>29</sup>

Most tellingly, Bracken writes that

The arc of terror cuts across the military and political theatres into which the West conveniently divided Asia, essentially for the purpose of fighting the Cold War: the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. The ballistic missile once launched, does not turn back at the line that separates the territory of one State Department desk from another. Thus the Gulf War (of 1991) brought the troubles of the Persian Gulf to Israel, linking theatres that had once been considered separate. Israel, for its part, sends up spy satellites to spy on Pakistan, 2000 miles away, spooking Islamabad into seeing an Indian-Israeli squeeze play against it. Chinese and Indian military establishments plot against each other, making East and South Asia one military space.<sup>30</sup>

It is noteworthy that both Bracken and Chellaney relate technological changes in weaponry - the increasingly easy or ready availability of ballistic missiles (and other new technologies or weapons) - to changes in strategic geography or more precisely to a new understanding of it. Given the Transcaspian region's proximity to the centres of contemporary terrorism, it is hardly surprising that both US

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

policymakers and foreign analysts see enhanced US attention to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus as essential.<sup>31</sup> But while technological change in armaments drives much of this revolution, technology cannot substitute for strategy or geography. Its contribution to warfare is mediated through geography and geostrategic factors which are then themselves transformed but not negated by technological change. Technological change occurs within discrete strategic territories even if it transforms the definition of geostrategic space and leads to new geostrategies by the major powers. In this way, technological change is contextualized.

Collins' conclusion leads us to consider two points that are critical to a future discussion. Given the Transcaspian's enhanced strategic importance, to project effective and lasting military power into it, innovative technologies, organizational forms of military power, and state policies become necessary. US security cooperation policies, broadly conceived, embody these innovative organizational changes insofar as the armed forces in former communist lands are concerned and NATO's enlargement to date proves this point.<sup>32</sup> Those innovations could serve as a precedent or at least as a point of departure for future changes throughout the Transcaspian region. Nor does the strategic revolution end here. Many observers contend that East Asia's dynamism is propelling it too into ever greater strategic prominence and the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) openly embraced that view.<sup>33</sup> And we have already postulated the essential fungibility of military force between Central and East Asia.

Second, based on Collins' argument, innovative American military operations over the last generation have largely succeeded not least because they created appropriate forms of social and military organization to maximize their potential (at least relative to all other competitors). The RSA accompanied and was more fully realized by our ability to maximize the potential of the RMA, namely to move from technological innovation to appropriate operational concepts and organizational forms of military power. The current programme to transform US military forces explicitly seeks to leverage technological change to induce organizational change and altered behaviour, ie a change in military organizations' culture.<sup>34</sup> America has hitherto followed the path of successful adaptation because transformations in its military-technological capability drive both the renovation of its concepts of operations and innovative experiments in force structure. Studies of other nations' force structures and operational concepts suggest they are being forced to adopt at least some of the innovations made in the United States.<sup>35</sup> Thus continuing US military success closely correlates with the transformation of its partners and allies' military forces so that they too can maximize their defence potential in contemporary conditions. This consideration justifies a priority effort to engage partners and allies and through them their armed forces, including those in the Transcaspian, in such combined undertakings. Again, the course of NATO enlargement in which applicants had to restructure their entire militaries to enter NATO represents a highly useful precedent.

Accordingly, the organizational changes that emerged from the RMA and RSA affect all the branches of the US military, particularly as they increasingly must fight in distant, often inaccessible theatres which previously seemed to have little or no strategic significance for the United States. Indeed, the drive to reorganize forces toward greater jointness is closely tied to the need for responsive expeditionary forces with a real and fast-moving global strike capability across the entire spectrum of conflict.<sup>36</sup> Since America cannot count on direct unmediated access to battlefields, even in less distant and remote regions than Afghanistan, it must

pioneer in creating new joint, expeditionary fighting organizations that can project power to distant theatres and gain access to them in both peacetime and wartime.<sup>37</sup> And, if possible, it must urgently find a new basis for operating in new areas as well, eg the Transcaspian. As the Lexington Institute recognized in early 2001,

The Air Force is heavily dependent on overseas bases for its wartime effectiveness. But the number of foreign bases to which that service has access has declined over 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, and all of the thirty or so bases that remain are subject to political constraints on their use. In many areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and southern Africa, the Air Force does not have assured access to a single nearby base. The base-access issue is likely to grow worse in the future as the interests of the US and its allies diverge. Indeed, experience suggests the prepackaged presence of US forces at foreign bases can contribute to such a divergence by becoming a political embarrassment for the host government.<sup>38</sup>

The war in Iraq forcefully confirmed these and earlier warnings about the very limited reliability of America's base and access structure for military operations in Southwest Asia. As Robert Harkavy has written,

Planners can no longer count on anything close to such access. A large portion of the troops and aircraft once in Europe have since returned to the continental United States. Access to, and transit rights over, such states as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia are problematic, depending much more than before on the nature of the crisis, despite a much larger "permanent" presence in several of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Even Europe could be in question if the political divide between the United States and the European Union over Middle Eastern policies should widen. Hence, worst-case scenarios have envisioned the United States in a tough situation, attempting to intervene in the Gulf area mostly from bases in the continental United States and from carrier battle groups and amphibious formations.<sup>39</sup>

Thus the importance of theatres like Central Asia, US strategic access to them, and the need for joint warfighting and power projection entities are linked and increasingly important, if not vital, issues. But that linkage also mandates working with partners and allies to create enduring coalitions enabling us and them to achieve common strategic goals.

These conclusions tally with those of Owen Cote in his 2000 study of access issues and the Navy and with a recent Rand study. Cote observes that,

The need to avoid or reduce dependence on assured access to (fixed) bases ashore is the one common link between the near and distant security environment that can be seen clearly today, and it is therefore the dominant measure of effectiveness that US political and military leaders should use in fashioning their military forces to meet the demands of the new security environment. In responding to this imperative, they will need to find ways of making land-based force less dependent on fixed bases, and of assuring that naval forces can simultaneously maintain access to the sea and project more power from it.<sup>40</sup>

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

Although much of the Transcaspian is landlocked, these observations pertain equally to the need for resolving the problem of air access so that land-based forces can be inserted into the area. Similarly the Rand Study concluded that in peacetime our aims are threefold: enhancing regional security and stability by reassuring partners, deterring adversaries, and developing new options. One such option is to expand the “portfolio” of available bases and infrastructure needed for military operations through a series of both formal and informal understandings. This means we must work with as many countries as possible to devise ways of reducing our vulnerability to anti-access threats that would bar us from this or other critical theatres. This means exploring ways to reduce the need for large fixed bases and enhancing capabilities for the forcible seizure of ports, airbases and other infrastructure.

In wartime we and our partners will strive to defend those ports, bases and critical infrastructural nodes to facilitate a buildup of forces as needed and simultaneously protect our own and coalition forces. We should also protect leadership and population targets that might be attacked to drive a wedge between us and partners or allies or that would coerce them into reducing or curtailing access.<sup>41</sup>

### **The RSA & The Transcaspian**

The Transcaspian is increasingly important to the pursuit and attainment of those objectives because that region lies at the heart of the instability that plagues the world and threatens US and allied interests. As such its importance is rising.<sup>42</sup> The attacks of September 11, 2001 showed that threats to vital US (or other states’) interests could come from anywhere on the globe and achieve total surprise against their intended targets. Those attacks confirmed earlier trends in the Central Asian and larger Asian contexts that had already heightened those areas’ strategic importance. Consequently today, as Robert Cooper, the assistant to the EU’s Foreign and Defence Policy Chief, Javier Solana, observes, “homeland defence now begins with Afghanistan and Iraq”.<sup>43</sup> Eurasia’s strategic destiny is inseparable from that of the Transcaspian area. And this consideration too should guide NATO and the EU to take a larger role throughout the former Soviet Union as its leaders have said they would do but as too often is not realized in reality.<sup>44</sup>

At the same time, a counter-trend is already manifesting itself. The US’ success in projecting power into the Transcaspian and overcoming the tyranny of distance and the threat of so called Anti-Access and Area Denial strategies, including terrorism, against it or its allies, has also galvanized that counter-trend intended to revitalize those threats and deny America or other powers access to Central Asia and other adjoining theatres. Even if our forces can now gain access with *relative* ease, there are good reasons to believe that the capability of potential enemies to employ more successful Anti-Access and Area Denial strategies will rise in the coming decade.<sup>45</sup> These counter-trends or strategies combine both conventional and unconventional warfare to include the simultaneous use of both insurgency and terrorism coupled with nuclear threats or deterrence coupled with classical conventional threats.<sup>46</sup> If two or more states having vital interests in this region and/or non-state entities like Al Qaeda come to perceive our presence there as a threat to their vital interests, they could form an overt or concealed alliance or at least a community of interests to exclude us from the Transcaspian and other adjacent areas. After all, such exclusion is Al Qaeda’s overriding strategic priority. Certainly there were signs of this desire for an anti-American bloc and presumably discussions about it in Chinese, Russian, and Iranian policy before September 11, eg in the creation of the

Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) or the Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).<sup>47</sup>

These alternative strategies represent what Thomas Christensen calls a “counter-revolution” in military affairs that would threaten our presence throughout Asia as rivals increasingly come to possess long-range precision strike capabilities using either conventional or nuclear weapons and cruise and/or ballistic missiles.<sup>48</sup> In geostrategic terms that particular response to US military power aspires to imitate our success in projecting power into or from Central Asia to or from the rest of Asia or to prevent us from doing so again. A similar process is happening in the Middle East, where proliferation could threaten more and more of Europe with direct military strikes, including ballistic and cruise missiles and even potential nuclear strikes. This development would mark the first time in many centuries that a direct threat to Europe could come from the Middle East.<sup>49</sup> Here too technologically driven transformations are revising the existing strategic geography, or our conception of it, and the nature of war and of threats to security throughout the area.

Meanwhile the increasingly visible strategic linkage of the Middle East and Eurasia with the Transcaspian allows us or others to conceive of this expanse of territory as a single theatre of strategic military operations (this concept is taken from the Soviet term *Teatr' Voyennykh Deystvii* - Theatre of Military Operations, or TVD).<sup>50</sup> This perception of an overarching strategic unity would constitute one aspect of the RSA. Indeed, other writers now assert that

Military globalization in the international system can be regarded as a military relation [that is an] interactive outcome of political institutions and a procession of increasing extension. After a long development, military globalization has changed the world to a single geographical strategic space. Thus the first aspect of this strategic revolution is the transformation of the geostrategic space or battlespace of Central Asia.<sup>51</sup>

Thus it is now possible to achieve strategic effects in theatres that are quite distant, eg from assets based in Central Asia or to achieve them in Central Asia from distantly based assets. This ability to achieve distant effects through local means is becoming a distinguishing hallmark of contemporary warfare.<sup>52</sup> The traditional idea that war occurs solely between mutually exclusive spatial entities, either states or blocs, no longer holds. Permeable boundaries and shifting alliances mark the struggles of local militias and the local political economies of warfare in specific places. Enemies no longer so obviously control territories; violence is often constrained to particular places but its connections spill over the territorial boundaries of conventional geopolitical categories.<sup>53</sup>

In this light the attacks of September 11 might also be understood as an internal Arab or Muslim civil war that is centred upon or in Saudi Arabia over the future trajectory and destiny of that country or world. Osama Bin Laden can then be seen as one of many Saudi or Arab diaspora political figures fighting to impose a specific definition of that future trajectory upon the Muslim world by attacking the United States.

Understood in these terms the attack on America can be read as a strategy to involve the Americans in the struggle in the Middle East more directly in a classic strategic move of horizontal conflict escalation where an impasse triggers a strategy of broadening the conflict.<sup>54</sup>

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

By widening the front and projecting an “inter-Arab or intra-Saudi” war into the United States, thereby globalizing the Islamic or Arab civil war to erode the alliance to Saudi Arabia and thus the stability of the Saudi regime, Bin Laden forced a broader appreciation of the Transcaspian’s strategic significance and validated Cooper’s insight. Cooper’s telling observation also accords with the insight that throughout the former Soviet Union it is now increasingly difficult, if not analytically misguided, to separate internal instability within a state from a broader regional or even global instability. Accordingly the Transcaspian now comprises an enlarged but flexibly definable battlespace or TVD for current and future strategic level operations. It is, or can be, a front or several fronts in its own right or in a global strategic war. The term strategic battlespace is defined by Professors Steven Metz and LTC Raymond Millen (USA) of the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College as

... a mode of war in which the operational and technological aspects of armed conflict are placed within their broader, political, economic, social, ecological, legal, normative, diplomatic, and technological contexts.<sup>55</sup>

Asia’s strategic space normally transcends any single battlespace or number of them. However, the fungibility of strategic capabilities across its breadth allows us to view Asia simultaneously as either a single enormous theatre or as multiple theatres, depending on the contingency/ies being considered. Threats as well as the means to counter them can increasingly exploit the fact that technology enhances the porosity of borders. Thus the presence of capable forces in and around Central Asia and the Caucasus makes the Transcaspian region a pivotal theatre or zone from where those capabilities can strike at belligerents in any one of numerous potential theatres from Eastern Europe to the Pacific.

Neither are these facts confined to Central Asia or the Transcaspian. Indeed, they apply to all of Asia. A study of the West Pacific Islands chain argues that the region’s political geography with its open maritime borders that facilitate easy movement across them allows separatist movements in one state to move freely back and forth to neighbouring Southeast Asian or West Pacific Island states and draw them into the network of destabilized areas. The means for doing so include not only arms shipments but also increased attacks on commercial shipping and outright piracy in these waters and were already discernible even before September 11, 2001.<sup>56</sup> Assets in one part of Asia can now easily project power to at least one or two other formerly discrete strategic theatres of Asia (and even beyond them to America or Europe, eg North Korean missiles) either for offensive or defensive purposes, if not to Asia as a whole. American force packages designed for power projection and for national security strategies as a whole are becoming ever more fungible or, to use the vogue word, modular, with regard to the theatres in which they can be located and/or used.

For America the rising importance of the Transcaspian is now self-evident. Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s security have become important US interests, for reasons far beyond access to energy. Today they are vital logistic bases where America has access and overflight rights that enable the US military to support its forward bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the war against terrorism. And even that cause hardly exhausts the reasons for their strategic importance.<sup>57</sup> But beyond the heightened importance of these two former Soviet zones lie the areas adjacent to them: Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea area, the Middle East, South and even East Asia. As contemporary wars even before September 11

showed, US and other foreign forces are already either being projected or optimized for purposes of future projection into these zones because of the long-term crises that are taking place throughout them. In fact, as the author has noted elsewhere, the Transcaspian is already undergoing a process of increasing external and internal militarization because of the proliferation of threats and a resulting sense of insecurity.<sup>58</sup> Therefore permanent access, if not forward presence, to, from and within these areas, will and should remain fundamental precepts and goals of US defence strategy for a long time.

## **The Transcaspian & the Spectrum of Conflict**

But beyond having the requisite capabilities to project forces into the Transcaspian or adjoining theatres, our military-political leadership must also embrace the strategic requirements attached to those missions. These strategic requirements apply to both the military capabilities involved as well as the ensuing political and strategic need for the reconstitution or reshaping of a legitimate security order. Militarily these expeditionary and power projection forces must, as required in numerous US official documents, dominate throughout the *entire* spectrum of conflict and the entire battlespace, including both terrestrial space and cyberspace.<sup>59</sup> And, as the Pentagon has belatedly had to acknowledge, that spectrum of conflict can no longer omit the various types of stability and reconstruction or peace operations that follow upon the termination or alleged termination of force upon force operations as was the case earlier. Indeed, we now see the Pentagon trying to restructure US expeditionary forces to develop and deploy a “social intelligence” capability so they can better perform the tasks of state building (a better term than nation building) and reconstruction.<sup>60</sup> And as a result, Secretary Rumsfeld is now instructing the Pentagon to reconsider the entire nature of the range of threats that may be directed against US forces, including irregular, disruptive, conventional and catastrophic threats.<sup>61</sup>

But this evolving strategic concept also must include the political and strategic challenge of building legitimacy, ie a legitimate political order, or working with host governments to do so. Despite substantial political-bureaucratic resistance in the past to the idea that US forces must help reconstruct states as an essential part of strategic operations, the US government has had to accept that “full spectrum dominance” means just that. Failure to provide for that requirement in our strategy dooms our military efforts to enormous prolongation and a high risk of failure. US armed forces both in wartime and in peacetime must help assure security in areas like Central Asia. Any concept of US victory in America’s current wars that does not also insist that those forces dominate not only the combat but also “pre and post combat” phases of operations to achieve strategic victory is intrinsically wrong. Therefore if crises break out in areas of important interest like the Transcaspian, our forces may well be involved and must be duly prepared for whatever ensues there.

For example, if future contingencies necessitate the presence of US combat forces in former Soviet republics, their peacetime and wartime mission could include engagement in protracted peace and support operations. US forces there can perform missions to help modernize their armed forces and render them increasingly interoperable with those of NATO. In any case, using all the instruments of power, we will help these states expand their governing capacities and make them more capable of defending themselves against threats as well as fostering an end to their isolation from the West. These tasks and goals include

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

military missions to help achieve interoperability and to conduct priority operations such as anti-terrorist operations, peace support operations, counter-drug, counter-proliferation operations, border security, etc. Security professionals active in these areas already embrace this expanded mission. They know that security includes virtually the entire range of activities necessary to reconstruct viable states and societies.<sup>62</sup> As R Craig Nation of the US Army War College wrote in 2002,

Disappointments notwithstanding, the capacity to project forces into combat zones to enforce peace when diplomatic mechanisms fail, maintain peace in the wake of negotiated ceasefires, and ensure a safe and secure environment within which a process of post-conflict peace-building can go forward remain vital attributes of any effort to contain and reverse a proliferation of low and medium intensity conflicts in the Adriatic-Caspian corridor. What the poor track record of the past decade makes clear is that the means to carry out these tasks effectively are not yet in place.<sup>63</sup>

However, as we suggested above, the advent of US and NATO forces into these areas and Afghanistan has triggered a process that could reverse Nation's pessimistic conclusion and offer the capabilities for achieving success in this security and state-building process. Given the foreseeable consequences of failures in these theatres, America, as the main strategic actor today, and the only actor with a global projection capability and responsibility, cannot walk away from the strategic revolution of our times. America's global interests and the obligations stemming from the GWOT and the war in Iraq compel its military and government to devise an enduring and stable way to project its power and influence into these crisis zones and stay there until the mission is truly completed. But completion means leaving behind a legitimate and secure order, not a country or region racked by new threats and wars. Ideally, US forces should be able to engage in security cooperation with those states and armies to help ensure that when necessary we can obtain the requisite access.<sup>64</sup> Therefore US forces must gain reliable access to these theatres during peacetime and wartime. It may well become necessary for them to conduct, with host nation support, a series of missions that embrace the expanded concept of security that includes what we now call Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and that are now openly embraced by the Pentagon and such commands as the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and USCENTCOM.<sup>65</sup>

Gaining wartime access to these or other theatres is therefore not merely an issue of overcoming the Anti-Access or Area-Denial wartime threats, including terrorism, to our forces which many commentators and military leaders have discerned over the recent past.<sup>66</sup> It is not enough to argue, as did General John Jumper, the current Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, when he commanded US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) that, "Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely an issue."<sup>67</sup> It is also not enough to think we need do this only in time of crisis or actual conflict. The Clinton Administration's shaping strategy, though derided by its successors, was essential to facilitating US entry into Central Asia and Afghanistan within a month of September 11.<sup>68</sup> It was a wise and productive strategic investment and should be continued if not expanded.

Local governments value this long-term engagement because they correctly perceive the internal integrity, security, independence, sovereignty, and external security of their states to be permanently at risk either from internal or external threats, or a combination of them.<sup>69</sup> They also benefit materially from our presence, as in



Kyrgyzstan.<sup>70</sup> Local governments will also invoke the new strategic situation to enhance their own importance and attract a favourable foreign involvement. The US involvement will probably grow not just because the war on terrorism will be protracted or because bases once established generate their own constituencies and arguments in favour of preserving them. The Transcaspian region's importance to Washington will also grow because of the plethora of domestic pathologies and misrule that offer ideal breeding grounds for terrorism, variants of radical anti-western Islam, and failed states and because of the area's proximity to major Asiatic strategic actors: Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan, and beyond that the broader Middle East and Europe. This would be the case even if they were energy poor. The presence of large energy deposits only enhances an already transformed strategic interest. Given those considerations, local governments have every reason to draw the United States into a deeper involvement with them to ensure, or so they believe, their own domestic and external security against the many threats confronting them. And that involvement certainly includes a deeper bilateral military relationship with the United States.

Under the circumstances, engaging them comprehensively as potential host states and partners in both peace and war necessitates a profound and permanent involvement in their affairs by all organs of the US government, including the military. While local governments may ultimately come to resent our emphasis on democratization, this engagement is necessary lest their own policies undermine the stability upon which both they and us depend. If we seek to optimize the RSA in the Transcaspian and adjoining theatres and obtain the necessary access to them, we cannot avoid permanent civil and military involvement in their affairs and security.

Indeed, geopolitical changes since September 11 indicate that the capacity whose absence Nation lamented now exists even if policy (not only in America) has not yet caught up with strategic reality. NATO now plays an active role in Afghanistan and many, including its Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, think it should play a broader long-term role throughout the entire Middle East.<sup>71</sup> As pressure upon NATO and EU for greater involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia grows, those organizations will also probably respond positively to that pressure and deploy increased capabilities for providing security.<sup>72</sup> These considerations alone justify a profound Western involvement and investment in all aspects of Afghanistan's reconstruction.

## **The Need for Military Adaptation**

We and our enemies have both been forced into cycles of permanent transformation and adaptation. Since we cannot pre-plan enough capability to ensure global and multi-dimensional readiness against every conceivable threat, and because we visibly failed to plan sufficiently for a post-conflict scenario in either Afghanistan or Iraq, the evolving nature of the threat environment has driven the Pentagon to develop force-sizing and training concepts that relate not only to our vulnerabilities and the capabilities we need across multiple dimensions and venues to meet them but also to the need for forces tailored to SASO and to irregular or unconventional war.<sup>73</sup>

Contemporary warfare's multidimensionality requires not only traditional reactive strategies but a shift in emphasis to proactive and preventive activities to thwart terrorism or WMD usage, or, as Australia has shown in its intervention into Papua

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

New Guinea, even humanitarian intervention to prevent a situation from deteriorating into one conducive to terrorism.<sup>74</sup> While all US forces would have to possess a power projection, rapid deployment capability, the Army would bear the greatest burden of this broad range of missions. That burden is so great because so much of the current SASO must be fought on land. But beyond that, and bearing the Australian example in mind, a Rand study observes that one broad strand of Army activities will have to encompass SASO.<sup>75</sup> This conclusion accords with that of other military thinkers, eg General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret), former Commander in chief of USCENTCOM.<sup>76</sup> Traditional military assistance or security cooperation will expand to other states and to new dimensions like training indigenous forces in new states, eg a large amount of special forces operations through Foreign Internal Defence missions (FID). This has already fostered a heavy reliance on Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) for such purposes in host countries, given their special role in counter-terror operations.<sup>77</sup> All these operations are costly in terms of money, time, and manpower and are often protracted operations. But they are also inevitable and essential not least and not only in the Transcaspien. They are among our most productive investments in regional security and not just because they upgrade local forces' professionalism and ability to work with us as needed.

Yet at the same time, neither the Army nor the other services can turn their backs on conventional theatre battles or operations, for those are no less likely to occur, as Operation Anaconda suggested.<sup>78</sup> In Asia, numerous efforts are underway to achieve both the requisite power projection capabilities discerned by other governments but also more traditional, albeit high-tech capabilities for major warfare. Let us remember that the QDR of 2001 clearly warned against trouble throughout Asia and with China and that some of this trouble would look very much like a classic naval and air war over Taiwan or a similar high-end conventional contingency.<sup>79</sup> A Korean war would probably be another example of a theatre-level conventional war. Therefore we must also constantly consider the possibilities for high-end conflict in Asia and the military trends that are plainly discernible there. A US military configured to dominate as much of the spectrum of conflict as is humanly possible (how does one dominate nuclear war?) must be ready to deal with incredibly diverse threats and forms of conflict.

Failure to master any one form of operations will mean more than that we are precluded from being able to claim dominance over the entire spectrum of conflict, let alone claim strategic victory. Failure to be so prepared means that we shall almost certainly find ourselves trapped in an open-ended, protracted, and potentially inconclusive conflict. Failure to achieve a durable and legitimate peace after victory magnifies the difficulties we will face, and lengthens the duration of our engagement. Failure here ultimately substitutes strategic defeat for operational victory and displays an inability to adjust means to ends or to adopt a policy that can be carried out by military means.

Any protracted conflict where we fail to achieve our postulated strategic outcome will soon be perceived here and abroad first as a quagmire and then as an American strategic defeat with unpalatable global consequences. When we consider that Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Osama Bin Laden, Chinese generals and elites, as well as other Arab terrorists have all publicly stated that the United States is intrinsically weak because it cannot stand casualties or protracted warfare based on what they saw in Lebanon and Somalia, our potential enemies evidently still think that they can defeat us by bleeding us, despite what Iraq now shows and

despite the defeats administered to Iraq, Serbia and the Taliban during the 1990s and in 2001-2003. Thus, as Christensen wrote in 2001,

It is difficult to assess Chinese perceptions on this score, especially from open sources, but it is clear that at least one important strand of thinking in Beijing elite circles suggests that the United States cannot withstand many casualties. In fact, several of my interlocutors and the colleagues to whom they refer in my interviews seem to differ not on whether the United States can be compelled to back down over Taiwan, but how quickly and at what cost to China. A minority seem to believe that the United States can be deterred from entering such a conflict at all; others believe that a small number of American casualties would lead the Americans to withdraw; still others believe that it would require hundreds and perhaps as many as 10,000 American casualties to drive the United States out.<sup>80</sup>

While it might seem callous to say so, 10,000 casualties is not a lot. But to foreign elites who cannot understand the United States and are imbued with an authoritarian, extreme nationalist, and even quasi-Fascist point of view, episodes like Lebanon and Somalia outweigh other military realities. Indeed, their perception of what happened in those places often radically differs from the perceptions of those who were in official positions in Washington then.<sup>81</sup> Certainly our ongoing failure to secure peace and victory in Iraq has quickly generated pressures to withdraw at once lest it become a quagmire akin to Vietnam. Moreover, the perception of an intrinsic US weakness of fibre clearly seems to be a “professional deformation” of these adversarial elites and movements insofar as democracies are concerned.

Therefore we must master all the forms of SASO however they are called - small wars, or small scale, or low-intensity, or protracted conflicts, as well as peace support operations - or suffer repeated exposure to them. This mastery is essential because the conflicts that could break out in the theatres in question here will largely showcase those kinds of warfare and threaten our forces or interests even as they involve more classically conceived engagements. Such conflicts must engage our attention because protracted asymmetric conflicts are increasingly our enemies' chosen form of war. Bitter experience also shows that no region or failing state can simply be written off as being too far away or too obscure a conflict to merit our attention. While we always need a discriminating approach to policy, there are no longer any intrinsically non-strategic regions from which our vital interests cannot be threatened. If we wish to avoid being either surprised or overextended, extensive peacetime engagement with like-minded foreign militaries in the Transcaspian and elsewhere so that in wartime we can fight with them and gain access to those theatres must come to be seen as critical factors of our strategy.

Alternatively robust military-political engagement with those states helps reduce the likelihood of insurgencies breaking out or succeeding. This is particularly true if our overall engagement strategy, including but going beyond military relations with these states, fosters reform and evolution over time towards more liberal, democratic, socio-political, and economic forms of governance in them. Working with local armed forces, not only to enhance interoperability, but to bring them as well to a western standard in civil-military relations is an essential component of this strategy. This strategy has been indispensable in expanding Europe to include the former Soviet bloc and in finally bringing visible signs of pacification to the Balkans.<sup>82</sup> Even as we take account of individual conditions in these states, there

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

is no a priori reason why this strategy should not be employed. After all, many states in the Caucasus and Central Asia have already indicated their desire to work with NATO, or even join it, among them Ukraine, Kazakstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia.<sup>83</sup> And even those states that have not expressed a desire to work with NATO regard the Western and US military presence as an indispensable part of their overall security strategies.

### **US Forces in Asia, the RSA, & the Global Posture Review**

The flood of articles that stated that Georgia and Russia were at the brink of war in August 2004 due to Tbilisi's efforts to pressure Moscow to abandon support for South Osetia and Russia's resistance to that pressure only underscores how perilously close many situations in these areas are to conflict and how little it might take to start a real war among local states. The recurring Chechen attacks in the late summer of 2004 also show how easily the entire North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus could be engulfed by violent conflicts. These and other examples highlight the rising importance of the Transcaspian as an area where the local states, major Asian and European powers, including NATO, EU, Russia and China now invest serious security resources and with good reason.

Equally importantly, advanced weapons and information technologies, if not other innovative systems, are increasingly available to local and external states, not to mention non-state actors like criminals and/or terrorists. This virtually ensures that any conflict could cross state and regional borders and engage non-state actors. Thus the RMA both abets and parallels a commensurate and corresponding RSA. As Lawrence Freedman wrote in 1998,

The link between the military and political spheres is the realm of strategy. If there is a revolution, it is one in strategic affairs and is the result of significant change in both the objectives in pursuit of which governments might want to use armed forces, and in the means that they might employ. Its most striking feature is its lack of a fixed form. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies that might be followed. In this context, the issue behind the RMA is the ability of Western countries, and in particular the US, to follow a line geared to their own interests and capabilities.<sup>84</sup>

Hence the heightened importance to the United States of secure bases in and around the Indian Ocean and of India's strategic role there as the United States considers the idea of an Asian NATO with India, Australia, Singapore and Japan.<sup>85</sup> As the availability of bases for power projection into Asia decline, the possibility of new ones becomes all that more critical a factor. This trend predated the current war against Iraq, but that crisis highlighted just how unreliable and harmful the process of securing base access and overflight is to the effective prosecution of the war effort. This consideration also helps drive the Pentagon's parallel development of a new concept for US bases abroad. And it also enhances America's natural interest in obtaining permanent access through one or more "operating site" in the Transcaspian.<sup>86</sup>

Our presence in these areas has triggered immense speculation as to the nature, purposes and duration of our military presence. Even if we do not intend to retain those bases or sites permanently under agreement with the host states as now

seems to be the case, we evidently want to be able to return to and use them if necessary. Meanwhile US intervention into Central Asia has transformed the strategic equation there and beyond. As Robert Legvold observed, by committing troops to Central Asia, the United States has dramatically transformed the regional security equation in three ways.

First, the United States' new dramatic but incidental military involvement in Central Asia added a Central Asian dimension to the US-China relationship. Whether Washington fully appreciated it or not, the two countries were now no longer engaged only in East Asia; the new American role and the old Chinese concern created an Inner Asian front in the relationship. Second, Central Asia became a far more salient factor in the evolution of US-Russian relations. The interaction of the two within the region would have a good deal to do with whether the post September 11 détente deepened or ran aground. And in turn, this outcome would decisively affect international politics within the region.<sup>87</sup>

Thus this intervention has accelerated Legvold's first and second consequences by which Central Asia increasingly can be seen as a venue for local and international strategic rivalry beyond our relations with Moscow and Beijing. The third way in which the US presence transformed the regional security structure is that it also altered the region's political makeup. Uzbekistan's strategic significance and regional standing as America's ally was greatly enhanced, as are US obligations with regard to these states' security. Likewise our enhanced presence accelerated a tendency that was discerned already in 2000 for competitive projects of regional integration where a pro-Russian set of structures competed with a pro-Western or pro-American series of structures in economics and security.<sup>88</sup> Temur Basilia, Special Assistant to former Georgian President Edvard Shevarnadze for economic issues, has rightly written that in many CIS countries, eg Georgia and Ukraine, "the acute issue of choosing between alignment with Russia and the West is associated with the choice between two models of social development".<sup>89</sup> The aptness of this observation transcends Georgia and Ukraine to embrace the entire post-Soviet region, since it is clear that Moscow opposes "exporting democracy" to it. Indeed, it regards the idea with contempt. Moreover, both Moscow and Beijing would be happy to perpetuate undemocratic, authoritarian regimes and elite networks to enhance their local influence.<sup>90</sup>

But there is a fourth consequence that must also be considered. US victories have blazed a path that others are now following of preparing forces to be ready for all forms of war in the GWOT or other conflicts, including those in Central Asia. We may also expect that in keeping with these states' broader military strategies and doctrines they will also strive for dominance of as much of the spectrum of conflict as they can to gain the ability to interfere with US or our partners' interests by the threat of force when and if they deem it necessary to do so. Iran's nuclearization and support for international terrorism, and the Chinese and Russian efforts to upgrade their military influence throughout these regions, Pakistan's support for terrorism against India, and Al Qaeda's global campaign originating in Afghanistan and its environs all embody this trend in one way or another.

We should resist leaving the Transcaspian and indeed the entire former Soviet area because others are trying to oust us from it to ensure their own monopoly there. Indeed, that is precisely why we should stay. Withdrawal at the behest of Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, or under pressure from terrorists will correctly be seen abroad as a

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

sign of weakness. And it will trigger a series of long-term, probably intractable crises with profound, if unforeseeable consequences.

Instead the United States is already being drawn into a deeper involvement with the larger Transcaspian region, as is already the case with USEUCOM.<sup>91</sup> Since September 11, there is also ample evidence of a intensified US concern for gaining access to distant theatres and a parallel quest for lodgments, access, basing, port rights, overflight rights, and the like throughout Asia.<sup>92</sup> This also entails a growing search for allies or at least robust strategic partnerships with like-minded states, hence the interest in an as yet undefined "Asian NATO".<sup>93</sup> In this context US officials clearly want to retain access to Pakistani, Indian and Indian Ocean bases and ports given to us after September 11, from which to refuel or to gain overflight rights, if not necessarily permanent facilities, as well as greater access to all of Asia to fulfil the requirements outlined in the QDR and subsequent foundation documents of US strategy and policy. In fact, even before September 11 the United States, was seeking broader access to bases throughout Asia.<sup>94</sup>

Administration officials openly spell out the rationales for obtaining new bases throughout Asia. Basing himself upon the QDR, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Peter Brookes told Congress in 2002 that

Distances in the Asian theatre [note the singular – author] are vast, and the density of US basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. Moreover, the US has less assurance of access to facilities in the Asia-Pacific region than in other regions. The QDR, therefore, identifies the necessity of securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and developing military systems capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimal theatre-based support. The QDR also calls for a reorientation of the US military posture in Asia. The US will continue to meet its defence and security commitments around the world by maintaining the ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping time frames. As this strategy and force planning approach is implemented, the US will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. Over time, US forces will be tailored to maintain favourable regional balances in concert with US allies and friends with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement.<sup>95</sup>

Subsequent testimony to the House by Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs Peter Rodman fully explained the Administration's thinking regarding overseas basing in Asia. Rodman stated that the Administration's goals entail tailoring our forces abroad to the particular conditions of those regions and strengthening US capabilities for prompt global response anywhere. He observed that since threats are not confined to a single area and because we cannot anticipate where the next one will be even though an immediate response is often warranted, we need a capabilities based strategy, not one based on force levels. Forces are not expected to fight where they are based and mobility and speed of deployment are the critical factors.<sup>96</sup> Rodman then laid out the working assumptions behind the transformation of our basing structure and a consideration of Administration objectives, taken in conjunction with these assumptions, immediately tells the reader why an Asian NATO with India is now a priority. India as an ally or area where bases may be located meets virtually every criterion laid out in Rodman's testimony. But the implications for the rest of Asia are no less evident. These working assumptions are as follows:

- US regional defence postures must be based on global considerations, not regional ones
- Existing and new overseas bases will be evaluated as combined and/or joint facilities as befits the new emphasis on combined and joint operations
- Overseas stationed forces should be located on reliable, well-protected territory
- Forces without inherent mobility must be stationed along major transport routes, especially sea routes
- Long-range attack capabilities require forward infrastructure to sustain operations
- Forward presence need not be equally divided among all the US regional commands in order to reduce the “seams” that separate them from each other
- Expeditionary forces and operations require a network of forward facilities with munitions, command and control, and logistics in dispersed locations.

All these requirements are ways to increase US forward forces’ capability for deterrence and operations, and allow for reinforcement of other missions by reallocating forces. Rodman observed that we intend to accomplish this by increasing precision intelligence and strike capabilities on a global basis and exploiting our forces’ capability for superior strategic mobility.<sup>97</sup> Therefore changes in US basing policies aim to strengthen defence relations with key allies and partners and respond more effectively to unforeseen contingencies. These changes entail

- Diversifying the means of US access to overseas bases and facilities to obtain military presence closer to combat regions and offer our forces a broader array of options
- Posturing the most flexible forces possible for overseas missions so that they will be capable of conducting a wide range of expeditionary operations, and
- Promoting greater allied contributions and establishing more durable defence relationships with those allies and partners.<sup>98</sup>

## Issues of Access & a Global Basing System

The demand for such bases obviously aims to meet a perception of greatly expanded and diversified threats to US interests. Equally, if not more importantly, the transformation and increased number or types of threats to security for all the relevant players across Asia is not just an order of magnitude of those threats’ destructiveness. The interaction of technology and geography also has transformed the predictability, number, and range of threats as well as their point of origin. Accordingly US strategists cite an American geopolitical imperative “to retain control - the ability to use and to deny use of the sea line of communications between the Middle East and East Asia”.<sup>99</sup> They also cite the vastly expanded mission and capabilities of the US Navy in this connection, specifically:

The US Navy can be considered a *globalized*, as well as a global navy - delivering the security of access function across the entire world system. It is this security function that requires the primary contribution of naval power (as an element of sea power) to peacetime globalization. During periods of conflict, this access function allows the United States

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

(and the globalized world) to project power into contested and otherwise inaccessible regions.<sup>100</sup>

Given this transformation in international security, especially in Asia, many Asian military figures increasingly view naval power and power projection as the way to defend national security before threats reach the mainland. Thus energy security can be assured, territorial waters can be defended against rival claimants, and power can be projected. This line of reasoning applies to both US allies and potential adversaries.<sup>101</sup> In other words, America's interest in projecting military power into or from the Transcaspian must also be seen as an interest in enhancing the joint capabilities of all arms of our military as well as in extending the possibility for combined operations with allies and partners from within the area or from outside of it. These considerations also extend to the real possibility that we may have to act preemptively in the Transcaspian or in other Asian theatres with allies and partners if they are available.

As a result, American planners fully understand their need for a global presence and rapidity of access to threatened theatres. General Gregory Martin, the former Commander of US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), advocates a comprehensive global peacetime and wartime military presence that he calls *geopresence*.<sup>102</sup> He defines the achievement of this *geopresence* as entailing a comprehensive series of policies with key states in peacetime, to include the full range of bilateral military-military relationships, exercises, training missions, etc. As all this occurs in tandem with the Pentagon's mandated transformation policy, the result should be conditions "that will enable us to define the battle space on our terms anywhere in the world", i.e. global hegemony.<sup>103</sup> Martin's concept of *geopresence*, fostered by the conscious deployment of every instrument of power available to us, is clearly a response to the perception of the transformation of both strategic space and weapons' capabilities, particularly those owned by the US Air Force.

But this redefinition of strategic space and the other consequences that flow from the two interactive revolutions cited above, the RMA and RSA, does not only include the new capabilities of the US or other navies. As defined by Edward Luttwak, other American writers like Benjamin Lambeth, and by British observers, air power is the driving factor in the current transformation of strategic space. It should be understood not as a service capability but as a generic form of military power that amalgamates both the hardware and the less tangible but other vital ingredients of airpower's effectiveness: doctrine, concepts of operations, training, tactics, etc.<sup>104</sup> Second, in this understanding "Air power is functionally inseparable from battlespace information".<sup>105</sup> Third, airpower is not any one service's attribute but rather an activity in which all the services play a critical role.<sup>106</sup> Accordingly Martin's concept of global presence is not a service presence but a joint one, especially as ground forces may be needed to protect forward deployed air bases or operating sites while the need for long-range sea-based strike power also grows.

Thus airpower, as understood here, becomes a tremendously flexible asset in strategic, operational and tactical terms that allows for power projection by all the services. This is clearly a lesson of the 1990-91 Gulf War, but its full significance has only made itself felt since the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan. This technological-strategic trend also allows all military forces, be they land, sea, air, informational or space-based, to use airpower thus defined to strike directly at enemy centres of gravity and critical targets on a globalized basis, or to move forces into position from where they can perform that mission. This also suggests that any future facilities in the Transcaspian will most likely be air bases but that they



will also provide the capability of expansion to allow for the insertion of ground forces as needed.

## **The Need for Comprehensive Engagement**

The transformation of the Central Asian and overall Asian battlespaces forces us to address the domestic pathologies of local governments that make the Transcaspian a breeding ground for perennial instability. These domestic pathologies are well known in the policy and analytical literature but it is worth citing a capsule list of them so that they are constantly kept in mind. Throughout the area that Nation called the Adriatic-Caspian corridor we encounter the following signs of state fragility and weakness.

Fragility of institutions and politico-administrative apparatus; democratic deficit, absence of civil society and legal mechanism for orderly transfer of power; crisis of identity owing to religious or ethnic rivalry; inter-state, ethnic, tribal, and clan tensions; ethnic separatism; competitive involvement of major power, mechanisms for organizing and controlling aid; incomplete modernization; relative underdevelopment; social disparities; corruption; crime; founding of psuedo-states; [and] weakness of the State.<sup>107</sup>

Worse yet, these factors often interact with and affect each other, thereby creating a vicious circle.<sup>108</sup> Some analysts argue that they combine the pathologies of "big man" rule visible in Africa with a hangover of Soviet structures. Therefore state failure in one or more states is virtually a certainty even if we cannot predict how or when this will happen.<sup>109</sup> Such possibilities place a great responsibility upon policymakers. As countless observers and scholars have constantly warned, to ensure any kind of security throughout this region and throughout the so called arc of crisis, policymaking must be holistic, utilizing all the instruments of power and to the greatest possible extent. Equally importantly, security management, to be successful, must also leverage the capabilities of all those allies and international organizations who now have a growing stake in security there.<sup>110</sup> Therefore failure to develop cooperation among all those working for Transcaspian stability and security raises the likelihood of persistent local crises and the possibility of our unilateral intervention into them. In that case, absent structural reform, American involvement will ultimately serve to secure some other government's interests, not Washington's.

America's overall objectives for this region remain unchanged. They include defence of the independence, sovereignty, security and integrity of the new post-Soviet states; their freedom from reintegration into a new imperial scheme whether by Russia, China, Iran or terrorists; open markets guaranteeing equal access to foreign interests, especially oil and gas, and support for evolutionary moves towards democracy that ensures these states' gradual political and economic integration into the Western world.<sup>111</sup> In the context of the GWOT certain missions become priorities insofar as work with their armed forces are concerned. Those include first of all counter-terrorism as a vital objective or interest. After that come the important interests of counter-proliferation, counter drug or border security (both of these are also conceivable as subsets of a more broadly conceived mission of counter contraband operations, including WMD capabilities, drugs, or illicit trafficking in people for sexual, terrorist or other purposes), and energy security

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

(defence of pipelines). These translate into specific missions of counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-drug, and littoral security.<sup>112</sup>

This list of priorities translates into specific operational objectives, the most important of which is permanent access in both peacetime and wartime. The point here is to work with local regimes and their militaries to shape the local environment, establish relations of mutual trust, confidence and interoperability, and to raise local capabilities. All of these aspects translate into operational objectives of modernizing local forces' capability to meet threats to security and to work with us and our allies and partners. In so doing we pave the way for a third set of objectives, namely facilitation of their ultimate integration into the Euro-Atlantic political and military current, a process that can also provide leverage to help foster more democratic internal military structures and civilian democratic controls of the armed forces in these countries. Thus the hierarchy of operational goals starts with access and descends through modernization and its components to Westernization or integration and its components.<sup>113</sup>

To attain this access and realize our other objectives entails continuing cooperation with the new states' entire security sector. We must work with regular armed forces, border forces, intelligence, police (often in the Ministry of Interior). To gain trust, mutual confidence, and to raise the capacity of these forces to carry out these missions requires a broader engagement than in the past with all these different members of the security sector. This broader engagement grows out of and is fully compatible with our efforts to integrate these states with the Euro-Atlantic security community.

For instance, our continuing concern to stabilize Georgia and make it more compatible with NATO to defend it from coercive threats from Russia or from its own internal pathologies in the wake of its recent revolution is only the most visible or recent example of a policy whose roots began in the Clinton Administration's doctrine of shaping the environment.<sup>114</sup> Since September 11, the wisdom of this perception reasserted itself so that now we are engaged in state building on a massive scale in Iraq, Afghanistan, and putatively in the West Bank. All these are missions that have been enthusiastically embraced by the Administration as essential aspects of its security profile.

Therefore US forces are already operating and will operate even more in a new and larger "operating perimeter" than was the case previously. This term does not necessarily refer to a location where US forces confront an adversary and a military threat or single out a likely site for war. Instead it refers to the locations where US forces will be regularly conducting operations in peace, crisis and war. But it could also mean expanded cooperation with host nations' security sectors. Most of these operations will be conducted in peacetime for purposes of promoting engagement, integration and stability. The key point is that the US operating perimeter may be enlarging even when no immediate threat exists or is expected. It may be enlarging for broader purposes that transcend planning for wars, ie to facilitate the integration of hitherto isolated areas into a broader Euro-Atlantic stream.

Thus in the Transcaspian as in the adjacent theatres of Europe, the Persian Gulf and Asia our forces must continue to pursue operations and objectives beyond purely theatre conflicts. But if conflict should ensue, "Defence planners will therefore need to contemplate how to modify today's US overseas presence by developing an altered posture, an outlying infrastructure, and better-prepared allies and partners".<sup>115</sup> Indeed, US exercises and activities with the Transcaspian

governments' armed forces represent both a basis for future combat operations as in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan or Operation Iraqi Freedom or for deterrence against future threats to those states' vital interests and to threats in regions from which American power with host government consent can be projected to the threatened area.

Roger Barnett, writing before September 11 and focusing upon the Navy, clearly demonstrated the importance of such relationships for both deterrence and the transition to combat. His words apply with equal force to all the services, not just the Navy. US military analysts even then were quite frank in how they saw the kinds of activities contained under the rubric of engagement and PfP (Partnership for Peace), not only in Europe or Central Asia, as essential aspects of the US strategy of "extraordinary power projection". Our engagement programmes took and still take the form of joint exercises, staff visits, training, increasing interoperability, and so forth.<sup>116</sup> These are precisely activities that also facilitate transition to war and if necessary participation in its initial stages. For example, as Barnett wrote,

It is often the action and activities of these forces that provide the dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to shape regional security environments. Multinational exercises, port visits, staff-to-staff coordination - all designed to increase force interoperability and access to regional military facilities - along with intelligence and surveillance operations, are but a few examples of how naval forces [and the same undoubtedly applies to other services - author] engage actively in an effort to set terms of engagement favorable to the United States and its allies. These activities are conducted at low political and economic costs, considering the tangible evidence they provide of US commitment to a region. And they are designed to contribute to deterrence.

Deterrence is the product of both capability and will to deter a nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or others to whom it has provided security assurances, ... deterrence of other undesirable actions by adversaries or potential adversaries is part and parcel of everything naval forces do in the course of their operations - before, during, and after the actual application of combat force ...

That the United States has invested in keeping these ready forces forward and engaged delivers a signal, one that cannot be transmitted as clearly and unequivocally in any other way. Forward-deployed forces are backed by those which can surge for rapid reinforcement and can be in place in seven to thirty days. These, in turn, are backed by formidable, but slower deployed, forces which can respond to a conflict over a period of months.<sup>117</sup>

Thus the United States and/or NATO use these operations to prepare either for peace, or for short or protracted military operations in crucial security zones, and point to the Transcaspian's rising profile as one of these zones. Undoubtedly Central Asia and the Transcaucasus will look increasingly appealing to Pentagon planners confronted with the daunting strategic requirements of ensuring sufficient US presence in and around Asia to deter and prosecute any contingencies that may threaten important or vital US interests there or in contiguous theatres in the future.<sup>118</sup> But this fact obliges us to grasp clearly the nature of contemporary war

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

and contemporary threats to stability, peace and US interests throughout these regions (and those are not all the same).

Based on the foregoing analysis we now turn to the task of recommending programmes of engagement with Transcaspian militaries in order to secure our objectives of encouraging democracy - in this case most prominently in civil-military relations - increasing security and reassurance, and upgrading local capabilities so that those forces can become more interoperable with American forces and that relationships of trust are built which would allow for access pending future contingencies and host country agreement.

It is also clear that America needs local partners if not allies and that it must seek either to reinvigorate old alliances like NATO to support it in the former Soviet areas, or to find ways to forge enduring connections with new partners who share our interests and goals. On the one hand we need to invigorate and make our security cooperation with former Soviet states more comprehensively strategic. And on the other hand we need to forge productive relations with major alliances or interested major powers insofar as these areas are concerned. Regarding security cooperation with local governments, we need to investigate what the goals of these programmes are (and we confine ourselves here to military programmes), while with regard to major alliances or governments we need to define common interests and build upon them.

## Recommendations

The first set of recommendations pertains to the search for partners from outside the Transcaspian in descending order of desirability of working with the governments listed here. The second set of recommendations pertains to working with local governments.

### Set 1

Despite the undoubted inter-allied tensions in NATO, the fact remains that NATO is becoming a venue of choice for an expanding commitment in Afghanistan. France commands the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there as of December, 2004 and NATO has also accepted that securing Afghanistan is its priority mission.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, it is also a priority security organization of choice for most post-Soviet states. Even Armenia is significantly upgrading its military ties to the West and NATO.<sup>120</sup> The new states seek to identify as Western, recognize that adherence to the PfP programme provides meaningful enhancement of their security through affiliation, if not membership, in a non-predatory, multilateral and cooperative security arrangement.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, it is the only effective organization that provides a standard of measurable activity and security against contemporary threats of terrorism, proliferation, etc.<sup>122</sup> Third, it has now demonstrated its ability to provide security for Afghanistan's elections and to work on behalf of a broader security stabilization than simply a conventional peace support operation. These trends were already visible in the PfP exercises in Eurasia before September 2001, but those attacks only reinforced that trend. The Afghan experience should add considerably to NATO's reputation in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

So despite the numerous security deficits that plague the post-Soviet expanse, PfP signifies a positive way to foster multilateral security cooperation of a non-predatory type.<sup>123</sup> The programmes that function under its rubric enhance local military

capabilities, foster cooperation among local militaries and governments, and also provide a lasting foothold for Western military presence and influence.<sup>124</sup> Since the PfP is NATO's main instrument for providing all these security benefits and gaining local visibility, it is essential for Washington to support it financially, use all the diplomatic instruments at its hand to galvanize NATO to upgrade both bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation with Central Asian and Caucasian governments to work with local militaries, and use these programmes as a basis for reaching a new strategic consensus about current and future threats and responses to them. Because no one power can unilaterally overcome the enormous security deficits throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is also essential that these discussions help narrow the gaps between American and European perceptions of threat emerging from the Transcaspian and thus approach common solutions to those threats.

NATO's Istanbul Initiative of 2004 clearly articulates a commitment to do so but ways must be found to actualize it.<sup>125</sup> Local Transcaspian governments must be able to utilize the past experience of new members, e.g. of the Baltic and Balkan countries and their armed forces, as they moved into NATO and that experience can and should be made available to them.<sup>126</sup> One way to do so is to change the way NATO funds missions like Afghanistan. Essentially each state sending troops today must fund its participation through its own exchequer, a process that obviously magnifies the domestic political costs of participation. If NATO's guidelines were revised so that it pays for operations like Afghanistan through a common fund, that could spur more funding and more programmes, hence more opportunities for programmes bringing together local and Western militaries.<sup>127</sup> The same procedure can be employed subsequently for operations like PfP and other activities with local governments.

Another possibility is expanded expert conferences among NATO and EU members since the two organizations are largely coterminous. There are also numerous signs of an enhanced EU interest in this area, especially the Transcaucasus.<sup>128</sup> These conferences would deal with the modalities of using the EU's and/or NATO's military instrument, the Common European Security and Defence Programme (CESDP) in the Transcaspian or of suggesting ways to internationalize the peace support operations currently taking place in the Caucasus. The EU would be able to go about its economic and political business in these areas either as part of this common strategy or on its own accord, but at least there would be a real possibility for cooperation among these organizations. Doing this would not only signify a genuine step even beyond the expanded interests of European security agencies in the Transcaspian. It could relieve the pressure on Russia and the tension between it and its neighbours, especially but not only, Georgia. This is another possibility as well towards reducing the likelihood of a revival of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. European models of conflict resolution have long been discussed for these conflicts but in the absence of a real European interest, tangibly expressed; in conflict resolution the discussion has remained academic. The likelihood of some real political and military muscle being brought to bear here might galvanize the participants and external mediators to seek real and innovative answers to unblocking those frozen conflicts and moving to resolve them, thereby forestalling greater opportunities for terrorist penetration into the Caucasus.<sup>129</sup> It is also clear that enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU or between America and Europe in an area increasingly recognized by all parties as a security priority would also contribute materially to easing intra-alliance and EU-American tensions. Common threat perceptions and responses to them would have a tonic effect on the

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

sorely tried alliance and enhance both its self-confidence and capability for action beyond Europe's traditional borders.

In this connection it also merits considering whether NATO or the United States should expand their programmes of educational exchanges with former Soviet governments. Obviously this includes the IMET programme that funds attendance at institutions like the Marshall Center or NATO's Defence College in Rome. But it also can lead to the creation of a Transcaucasian and/or Central Asian Defence College, modelled after the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia which has been very successful in training and educating a new generation of officers.<sup>130</sup>

Turkey's likely entry into the EU also raises the need for intense discussions between Washington, Ankara and Brussels as to how Turkey could contribute to the military and broader political objectives we have postulated here through NATO, the EU, or in bilateral ties to Transcaspian regimes. The demarcation and definition of the ways in which this aid can most effectively be channelled cannot be postulated from outside or from above or a priori, but the need for a trilateral diplomatic initiative is obvious and would be highly productive. Since Turkey has already begun such activities on its own, finding a satisfactory method of reconciling all these partners' interests in expanding such programmes certainly merits sustained discussion and investigation. Turkey, as an Islamic country that has embraced republican and democratic government will have a profound impact on the Transcaspian once it joins the EU. It would be throwing away a golden opportunity to refrain from stimulating this discussion. Thus there is an urgent need and opportunity for Turkish-American-EU talks on how Turkey could materially contribute to the EU's rising interests in the post-Soviet area and how, as a member of NATO, it can do so as well while reconciling its obligations and responsibilities to both the EU and NATO.

Another potentially valuable partner with whom we could work, particularly in Central Asia, to gain access through bilateral, trilateral and multilateral military engagement is India. India's interests in Central Asia are large, strategic and growing. It already has an air base in Tajikistan and is engaged in buying weapons from and selling weapons to Central Asian governments. India's commercial profile in the area is equally large and growing.<sup>131</sup> And it has a very long tradition of a highly competent military with experience in SASO and a robust tradition of strict democratic control over the armed forces. But perhaps most importantly, India has a millennium or more of contact with Central Asia. But whereas Central Asian rulers like the Moguls have conquered India, India has never conquered Central Asia or harboured any such interest, a fact that is very well known throughout the area.

Inasmuch as Indo-American relations are currently better than ever and there is a growing and comprehensive programme of bilateral military engagement with exercises and exchanges throughout all the services, there is no reason why discussions should not commence at once on upgrading India's participation in the modernization and westernization of Central Asian forces. Those forces could also be introduced to the bilateral Indo-American exercises now being conducted among all the services so as to build up strong trilateral working relationships based on experience and trust. The same applies to educational exchanges and expert dialogues. Certainly New Delhi and Washington share many critical interests in Central Asia, prevention of terrorism, stabilization of Afghanistan, etc. These fora would be ways to reinforce activities towards those ends and towards the larger end of helping to stabilize the Central Asian region as a whole. Admittedly, probably

any programme undertaken with India would anger Pakistan, especially if it embraced the new Afghan army. However, the initial scale of such activities could remain relatively small, be confined to the five former Soviet republics and take place under a primarily bilateral Indo-Central Asian umbrella. If it is successful, it could then even expand to bring Pakistan into the programme as a confidence-building measure. In time its participation could help further integrate its military with Western democratic notions of conduct and provide a lasting institutional mechanism by which to influence it. Such fora could also stimulate a regional dialogue with India and the Central Asian militaries or governments that would be beneficial to all parties. It should be pointed out here that all these possibilities require both intergovernmental agreements and also intense detailed participation in them by all the services of those countries and the United States. Thus the US Army, Navy (where appropriate) and Air Force all have roles to play in making such programmes work.

China is not considered here despite the undoubted importance of its rising military and other interests in Central Asia. While China has recently begun a dialogue with NATO on Central Asia, its bilateral military programmes with the United States have not progressed to anything like the mutual trust needed for it to be taken into Washington's confidence in such a programme. Nor is it likely that Central Asian states that are very wary of China would warm to the idea. Even though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has upgraded its military profile considerably through combined exercises, its platform remains an avowedly and openly anti-American one and China's perception of the US military's presence in Central Asia is openly hostile, seeing it as a real threat and opposing its continuation.<sup>132</sup> Since our level of cooperation with China does not even approach the level of cooperation we have in intelligence sharing or as regards Afghanistan with Russia and bearing in mind all these existing factors that inhibit bilateral military cooperation, it would be premature to approach China at present with such a proposal.

Finally there is Russia. The September 2004 incident at Beslan has led the Russian government to appeal for international support against international terrorism even though the Chechen insurgency is largely homegrown. Nevertheless it has stimulated some experts to call for increased bilateral cooperation, to the point of collocating American and Russian Central Asian or other bases in the CIS so that American and Russian troops would be conducting joint missions together.<sup>133</sup> However, the Russian Defence Ministry and government, despite calls for NATO assistance in reforming the Army back in 2002 and 2003, has generally shunned cooperation programmes proposed by the US military and shows no sign of being willing to change that posture.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, according to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, it is on the verge of collapse because of large-scale draft evasion.<sup>135</sup> This fact alone makes cooperation difficult and it does not begin to include the enormous and well-founded regional suspicion of Russian policies and objectives or the Russian elite's equally profound suspicion of US objectives and atavistic attachment to an imperial outlook regarding the former Soviet Union. These considerations limit the scope for cooperation as they have in the past.

But they do not close that window. It would be possible to propose a bilateral or NATO-Russian programme to share intelligence, training and perhaps after those, missions of an anti-terrorist nature in order to gain a wedge for cooperation with Russian forces. Not only would such cooperation be useful in and of itself, it would also provide a basis, if achieved, from which planning for future cooperation could advance. At the same time this proposal tests Russian intentions as to whether or not calls for Western help are for real.

**Set 2**

In considering how to approach local regimes we must take care to tailor US programmes to the individual needs of each country. At the same time those programmes should reinforce each other as part of a coordinated overall strategy for that country and function as part of a larger regional strategy. For instance, we must avoid future situations such as has occurred with Uzbekistan where the State Department was legally obliged to suspend aid to the military - one of the more Westernizing institutions there - because of the government's anti-democratic policies, while shortly thereafter the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (USAF) visited Uzbekistan, praised the government as an American ally and transferred weapons to it.<sup>136</sup> While one can defend each of these actions on their own merits, it creates an impression that our policies are incoherent, not truly interested in Uzbekistan's democratization, and that the Uzbek regime can disregard calls for democratization because of our alliance with it, leading them to think that we are not serious and can therefore be played.

Hence the need for well-conceived inter-agency and multi-dimensional strategies of engagement. They should assign priorities to our engagement with local governments and make them known to avoid further such embarrassments. Furthermore, all those agencies which are disbursing funds for one or another form of assistance and security cooperation to these countries should ensure that pledged and allocated funds are quickly disbursed and their programmes implemented. As one recent article observed, "Experience shows that Tajikistan actually receives a fraction of what has been pledged".<sup>137</sup> The same kinds of delays have plagued our reconstruction efforts in Iraq and have to be accounted as contributing to the serious insurgency there now. Because we are at war for now and the foreseeable future, it may turn out to be the case, and justifiably so, that military assistance is the current priority, to be replaced over time with democratization and good governance. While undoubtedly that position will arouse criticism, it certainly is an eminently defensible and readily understandable one in wartime.

Thus what we are about in these countries with respect to security cooperation is *defence development* - otherwise known as defence-sector reform, or more broadly security-sector reform.<sup>138</sup> Particularly in wartime such comprehensive defence development is essential to securing goals of access and interoperability, not to mention the goals of more stable and secure regimes who confront internal and external threats.

Too often "underdeveloped" defence sectors - incapable, bloated, corrupt, opaque - endanger neighboring states, contaminate domestic politics and markets, engage in transnational crime and even fail in their assigned mission: to provide adequate national security. Countries with militaries that detract from security, squander scarce resources, and cannot be trusted by their own leaders or citizens are countries with three strikes against them. Such consequences cannot be ignored. With the globalization of economics, interests, and threats, damage to development and to security in the South can harm the West.<sup>139</sup>

Hence the need for comprehensive approaches that encompass all sectors of government which provide security, not just the regular military, but the police, intelligence, border troops and even arguably the criminal justice system.<sup>140</sup> While defence development is a long term-goal that far transcends the immediate goals of



security cooperation, access and influence, the effort to shape partner military establishments which wish to do so to the highest standards of military conduct, which are today Western standards, must be the long-term objective that we keep firmly in mind, even if we make temporary compromises, particularly in wartime.<sup>141</sup> While our immediate objectives in the military sector pertain to the immediate needs of the GWOT, our strategy must constantly be informed by the objective of helping to stabilize these countries, and modernize their military establishments in a cooperative manner according to the highest standards of military proficiency and conduct that are available to them.

Consequently with regard to bilateral military engagement with each country in order to achieve access, we need to enter into serious discussions with these governments to assure them of our support in return for that access and the conditions of threat that will trigger such support in return for the access. As a Rand study on gaining access observes,

To the extent that allies conclude that their overall security interests are best served by a direct relationship with the United States, additional cooperation of various kinds can be expected, including plans to provide access to US forces under various circumstances. To the extent that their relationship with the United States is increasingly seen as a liability, cooperation might be reduced. Thus the antecedent for increased security cooperation - including access - will be some harmonization of threat perceptions and in calculation of which policies and position will best enhance overall security in the face of internal and external threats.<sup>142</sup>

One essential requirement is an institutionalized strategic dialogue with these states among both uniformed officers and experts to work out this harmonization.

Second, the Army, as part of its current transformation process needs to emphasize the rapid availability of those forces which could be used to gain access, forcibly if necessary. This entails three requirements, diversifying the “portfolio” of access options in the regions considered here and in adjoining ones, improving and enhancing those capabilities that pertain to gaining access to contested areas, and diversifying the flexibility of those capabilities that enhance aerial and maritime mobility.<sup>143</sup> This is particularly crucial in the Caucasus and landlocked Central Asia. Therefore, and building upon the expanded and broader conception of security mentioned above, it would be a shrewd investment for the services as a whole to invest in infrastructure, ports, air bases, road, rail and airports as well as communications and logistics infrastructure for water and petrol, oil and lubricants so that it becomes easier for us to gain access if needed. These investments would also substantially enhance these countries’ economic and political capabilities by helping to overcome the lack of transport assets and egress to the sea that have been profoundly instrumental in perpetuating their backwardness. Since we are necessarily going to have fight jointly if deployed to these areas, all the services have an equal stake in these security building and investment projects, as they are both wealth and force multipliers at the same time.<sup>144</sup>

Such programmes would also foster increased contacts and communications among neighbouring states that could also help build more mutual confidence and trust. For example demining Uzbekistan’s borders with its neighbours, in particular Tajikistan, might help foster more cooperation between them, ease their mutual security dilemmas, and increase travel and trade, particularly if good roads could

## After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

replace the mines.<sup>145</sup> They also serve as pointers to the kind of military interoperability and bilateral relationships we wish to emphasize and the kinds of operations we think will be preeminent for them in the foreseeable future.

Recent reports indicate the military priorities we wish to accomplish in security cooperation, prosecution of counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-drug operations etc.<sup>146</sup> Those reports also underscore the need, cited by Secretary Rumsfeld and by a recent Rand study on this subject, to overcome the many problems that currently afflict the Army's International Activities (AIA) and security cooperation in general.<sup>147</sup> While some of these reforms have been launched, it is still too soon to evaluate their success.<sup>148</sup> Nevertheless, the reform of the security cooperation programme in general and the AIA in particular should accompany the idea of focusing on a strategy based on priorities and on better inter-agency coordination of policy toward post-Soviet countries. It might be useful as well to review not just the Pentagon's programme but those of other departments to see whether they contribute to a unified strategy based on shared departmental priorities and if so to what degree. Such enhanced coordination would reduce the contradictions that appear in the policy as suggested above, but also impart a clearer strategic focus and set of priorities to all aid projects undertaken by the federal government, not just the Pentagon's programmes.

As we have indicated, because we are at war and will be for the foreseeable future, the Pentagon's security cooperation programmes should focus on those military capabilities that enhance our ability to gain access and to work with a responsive infrastructure and local forces to conduct combined operations. We need to emphasize those operations that are of most interest or priority to us in the GWOT, and also to expand all kinds of military exchanges and education programmes. This would also include focusing on the IMET programme, and continuing to use the Marshall Center and NATO Defence College as centres for Central Asian and Transcaucasian military students; use Central and East European governmental and military personnel who are so inclined to mentor these new governments; and third to set up comparable institutions. Just as the Army funds the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, it could also fund a Caucasus-Central Asian Defence College in a suitable venue to train officers in English, interoperability, and in a different form of civilian-military interaction than what they have known, as well as contemporary strategy and operations, especially peace support operations.

Undoubtedly there is a great deal more we could do, because the integration of these former Soviet republics into the West is the work of generations, not of years and must be accomplished under both the current wartime conditions, and hopefully once peace returns to the area. Moreover, the importance of such forms of security cooperation, both military and non-military, is of increased importance and interest to security analysts here and abroad, testimony to its strategic significance and that of these territories in the modern world.<sup>149</sup> While it is clear that this work will not be finished soon, it is also clear that we are no longer exempted from taking that responsibility in hand and working with our allies to pacify the area and integrate it into the Euro-Atlantic community. For, in the final analysis and notwithstanding the current severe differences among the allies, this security community remains the paramount example of successful international security cooperation in our times and a shining example for all of the post-Soviet regimes. If we fail to exploit the revolutionary trends in regional and world affairs discussed above and these countries remain black holes of instability, the price that we and our allies pay may not be as high as that paid by the local regimes,. But as

shown on September 11, it will still be far too high a price to pay for past negligence after repeated warnings.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For example, Fariz Ismailzade, "US Troop Redeployment Sparks Speculation on Azerbaijani Base", *Eurasia Insight*, 23 August 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org>; Nathan Hodge, "Pentagon Eyeing An Air Base in Azerbaijan", *Defence Week*, 26 November 2001, p1; "Yankees in Baku", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, (henceforth *CDPP*), LVI, No 13, 28 April 2004, pp23-24; Peter Slevin, "US May Set Up Bases in Former Soviet Republics", *Washington Post*, 28 January 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; "Armenia Unhappy About US Plans to Deploy Military Bases in Azerbaijan", *Aravot*, Yerevan, *BBC Monitoring*, 28 September 2004; Alexey Lyashchenko, "Military-Political Overview: Toward World Leadership With a Reliance on Bases", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia*, (henceforth *FBIS SOV*), 8 April 2003; Anatoly Gordienko, "Georgia Rushes Into War: Experts Examine Georgian Airfields", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 2003, *FBIS SOV*, 28 March 2003, *Radio Free Europe*, *Radio Liberty Newsline*, 27 March 2003; "Mobility, Global Strike Will Be Key in Changed Posture Abroad", *Inside the Air Force*, 20 August 2004, p1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*; for other studies of US interests here see Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002; Idem, *Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004; Jacquelyn K Davis & Michael Sweeney, *Central Asia in US Strategy and Operational Planning, Where Do We Go From Here?*, Cambridge, MA and Washington DC, Institute for Foreign Policy Affairs, 2004; LTC Jon E Chicky, *USA A Military Strategy for Central Asia*, Student Research Project, US Army War College, 2004, passim; and the author's two earlier studies. Stephen Blank, *The Future of Transcaspian Security*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, August, 2002; and *US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000.

<sup>3</sup> "Bush Troop Redeployment Plan: A Threat to Russia", *CDPP*, LVI, No 33, 15 September 2004, pp1-5.

<sup>4</sup> Testimony of Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 23 September 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; General Tommy Franks, USA, Ret with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*, New York: Regan Books, Harper Collins Publishers, 2004, pp334, 350-352, 408.

<sup>5</sup> *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 26 February 2004, report of Rumsfeld's trips to Uzbekistan and Kazakstan; "US Relations with Central Asia: Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Briefing to the Press," Washington DC, 11 February 2002, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/7946.htm>; Roger N McDermott, "Washington Vague on US Basing Plans in Central Asia", *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, 6 August 2004; "Envoy to Azerbaijan Upholds USA's Regional Policy," *Zerkalo*, Baku, 11 September 2004, pp15-17, *BBC Monitoring*, 18 September 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>6</sup> Rumsfeld, Testimony; Federal News Service, *Testimony of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy to the House Armed Services Committee*, 23 June 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>7</sup> Graham Chapman, *The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear Age*, Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003, p267.

<sup>8</sup> Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War*, Annapolis, MD, US Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp157-250.

<sup>9</sup> Chicky; Wishnick, op cit; Davis & Sweeney, passim; Michel Hess, "Central Asia: Mackinder Revisited?", *Connections*, III, No 1, March 2004, pp97-99.

<sup>10</sup> Jeremy Black, "Force and Legitimacy in World History", *RUSI Journal*, August, 2004, pp52-60; Paul W Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp576-577.

<sup>11</sup> Henk Houweling & Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, "Introduction", Mehdi Parvizi Amineh & Henk Houweling, Eds, *Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development*,

International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2004, p15.

<sup>12</sup> Black, pp52-60; Schroeder, pp576-577.

<sup>13</sup> "Bush Troop Redeployment Plan: A Threat to Russia", pp1-5; "Russia Urges US To Remove Bases After Afghan War", *CCTV.com News*, 24 December 2001, <http://www.cctv.com/english/news2001122376870.html>.

<sup>14</sup> *Istanbul Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>, henceforth Istanbul Initiative; "Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Included in the European Neighbourhood Policy", <http://www.welcometoeurope.com/news>, 5 July 2004; Ahto Lobjaskas, "Azerbaijan: EU Keen To Get Involved In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process", *Eurasia Insight*, <http://www.eurasianet.org>, 18 May 2004.

<sup>15</sup> *Istanbul Initiative*.

<sup>16</sup> Statement of Douglas J Feith, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Before the House Armed Services Committee, 23 June 2004; Robert Burns "Pentagon to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases, Expand Network of 'Lily Pad' Bases", *Associated Press*, 23 September 2004. Burns lays out the entire three tier concept of bases to include main operating bases, forward operating bases, and cooperative security locations.

<sup>17</sup> United States Department of Defence, *Quadrennial Defence Review* (henceforth QDR), 30 September 2001, p11; see also Thomas Szayna, Adam Grissom, Jefferson P Marquis, Thomas-Durrell Young, Brian Rosen & Yuna Huth, *US Army Security Cooperation: toward Improved Planning and Management*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004, passim.

<sup>18</sup> Mike Allen & Josh White, "President Outlines Overseas Troop Cut", *Washington Post*, 17 August 2004, p1; Jim Mannion, "US Plans to Shift Troops Out of Germany: Rumsfeld", *Agence France Presse*, 15 August 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>19</sup> Hess, p96; Martin Libicki, "The Emerging Primacy of Information", *Orbis*, XL, No 2, Spring, 1996, pp261-273; Colin Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geography", *ibid*, pp247-260; and "A Rejoinder", *ibid*, pp274-276.

<sup>20</sup> Robert D Blackwill, "An Action Agenda to Strengthen America's Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region", Robert D Blackwill & Paul Dibb Eds, *America's Asian Alliances*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, p115.

<sup>21</sup> US Navy, *Naval Power 21: A Naval Vision*, Washington DC, US Department of Defence, 2002; Admiral William J Fallon, USN, "Fighting to Win in the Littoral and Beyond", *Armed Forces Journal international*, June 2001, pp66-68; Christopher J Bowie, Robert P Haffa Jr, and Robert E Mullins, "Trends in Future Warfare", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 35, 2004, pp129-133.

<sup>22</sup> F Stephen Larrabee, John Gordon IV & Peter A Wilson, "The Right Stuff", *The National Interest*, No 77, Fall, 2004, pp57-58.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power And the Second Nuclear Age*, New York: Perennial Publishers, 2000, pp6-36.

<sup>24</sup> Randall Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p93.

<sup>25</sup> *Istanbul Initiative*; Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Challenges", Muthiah Alagappa, Ed, *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p26; Radu Tudor, "Black Sea Emerges as Strategic Hub Following NATO Expansion", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 2004, [www://janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc\\_view.jsp?K2Doc](http://www.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2Doc); Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "A Broad View of the 'Broader Middle East'", *Russia in Global Affairs*, II, No 3, July-September 2004, pp130-133, Erdogan is the Prime Minister of Turkey.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>27</sup> Sir John Thomson, "Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections Between Global and Local", Michael R Chambers, Ed, *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002, pp17-18.

<sup>28</sup> Rajan Menon, "The New Great Game in Central Asia", *Survival*, XLV, No 2, Summer 2003, p201.

- <sup>29</sup> Kanwal Sibal, "Meeting Emerging Security Challenges", *Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal's Address at the Carnegie Endowment*, 4 February 2003, <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/events>.
- <sup>30</sup> Bracken, pp2-3.
- <sup>31</sup> Blackwill, pp125-127.
- <sup>32</sup> Charles M Perry & Dmitris Keridis, Eds, *Defence Reform, Modernization & Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, Herndon, VA: Brassey's, 2004, pxxxiii.
- <sup>33</sup> *QDR*, p4.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid*; General Richard H Myers (USAF), Chief of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington DC: Department of Defence, 2004.
- <sup>35</sup> Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Initiates Vast Project to Network Army", *Defence News*, 21 June 2004, p26; Megan Scully & Andrew Chuter, "Net-Centric Land Warfare, Euro Style", *Defence News*, 14 June 2004, pp1, 8.
- <sup>36</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books, 2004, p20.
- <sup>37</sup> "Air Force Lacks Basing Options for Airstrikes on Afghanistan", *Inside the Air Force*, 12 October 2001, p1.
- <sup>38</sup> Bowie, Haffa & Mullins, p130.
- <sup>39</sup> Robert Harkavy, "Strategic Geography and the Greater Middle East", *Naval War College Review*, LIV No 4, Autumn 2001, p45; Bracken, p163; Chris Donnelly, "Defence, Security, and Intelligence in the 21st Century: New Challenges and new Responses", *Acque & Terre*, No 2, 2003, pp57-60.
- <sup>40</sup> Owen R Cote Jr, *Assuring Access and Projecting Power: The Navy in the New Security Environment*, Cambridge MA. MIT Security Studies Programme, 2000, cited in Eric V Larson, Derek Eaton, Paul Elrick, Theodore Karasik, Robert Klein, Sherill Lingel, Brian Nichiporuk, Robert Uy, John Zavadil, *Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Towards a Long-Term Strategy*, Santa Monica, CA. Rand Corporation, 2004 p116n.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, pp115-126.
- <sup>42</sup> Celeste A Wallander, "Silk Road, Great Game, or Soft Underbelly? The New US-Russia Relationship and Implications for Eurasia", Shireen Hunter, Ed, *Strategic Developments in Eurasia After 11 September*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004, p98.
- <sup>43</sup> Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, p166.
- <sup>44</sup> *Istanbul Initiative*; "Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Included in the European Neighborhood Policy"; Lobjaskas, "Azerbaijan: EU Keen To Get Involved In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process".
- <sup>45</sup> See the Statement and Testimony of Andrew F Krepinevich, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 April 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>47</sup> "Russia Reportedly Seeking Strategic Axis, Military Production Cooperation", *BBC Monitoring*, 2 January 2001; "Foreign Minister Discusses Bilateral Ties With Chinese Official", *IRNA News Agency*, 20 February 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
- <sup>48</sup> Thomas J Christensen, "Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy", *International Security*, XXV, No 4, Spring 2001, p22.
- <sup>49</sup> Ian O Lesser & Ashley J Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1997.
- <sup>50</sup> For a discussion of this concept of a TVD see Stephen Blank, John H Lobingier, Kevin Stubbs & Richard E Thomas, *The Soviet Space Theatre of War (TVD)*, College Station, Texas: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experiment Station, Texas A&M University, September 1988.
- <sup>51</sup> Damien Cai, "Military Globalization of the US and International Security in East Asia Region", *Taiwan Defence Affairs*, II, No 3, Spring 2002, p58.
- <sup>52</sup> Michael Evans, "From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War", *Naval War College Review*, LVII, No 3, Summer 2003, pp132-150.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>54</sup> Mehdi Parvizi Amineh & Henk Houweling, "Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market", Mehdi Parvizi Amineh & Henk Houweling, Eds, p78.

- <sup>55</sup> Steven Metz & LTC Raymond Millen (USA), *Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003, p2.
- <sup>56</sup> Sam Bateman & Chris Rahman, "The Rise of the PLAN and the Implications for East Asian Security", *Taiwan Defence Affairs*, II, No 2, Winter 2001/2002, p47.
- <sup>57</sup> "Statement of Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States, Before the House International Relations Committee, 30 April 1998", *Turkistan Newsletter* Volume 98-2:089-06-May-1998 (henceforth Sestanovich, *Testimony*); and the statements by Ashton Carter & John Deutch in "Caspian Studies Programme Experts Conference Report: Succession and Long-Term Stability in the Caspian Region", Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1999, pp10-12 (henceforth Conference Report); Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "US Policy and the Caucasus", *Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter*, Berkeley Programme in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, Issue 5, Spring 1998, pp3-4.
- <sup>58</sup> For the author's earlier discussion of this trend see, Stephen Blank, "Central Asia's Strategic Revolution", *Regional Power Plays in the Caucasus and Central Asia, NBR Analysis*: National Bureau of Research, Asia, Seattle, Washington, 2003, pp51-76.
- <sup>59</sup> General Richard H Myers (USAF), Chief of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2004 (henceforth NMS); General Peter J Schoomaker (USA) Chief of Staff of the Army & Major Anthony W Vassalo (USA), "The Way Ahead", *Military Review*, March-April 2004, pp7, 11; Lt-General John M Riggs, Director, Objective Force Task Force, *The Army in 2020*, Washington DC Department of the Army, 2003, p10.
- <sup>60</sup> Bradley Graham, "Bush Plans Aid to Build Foreign Peace Forces", *Washington Post*, 19 April 2004, p1; James Dobbins, "Nation-Building Returns to Favour", *Financial Times*, 11 August 2004, p11; Jason Sherman, "Rumsfeld Reworks Pentagon Goals", *Defence News*, 10 May 2004, p4; Thomas E Ricks, "Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon", *Washington Post*, 3 September 2004, p1.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid*; Jason Sherman, "US Goals Sought on Battling the Unconventional", *Defence News*, 20 September 2004, p4.
- <sup>62</sup> General Charles F Wald, Deputy Commander, USEUCOM, *RUE Security Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities*, Briefing Presented to the IFPA Symposium on Security Cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, Washington DC, 23 July 2004 (henceforth Wald, Briefing).
- <sup>63</sup> R Craig Nation, "Military Contributions to Regional Stability", Stefano Bianchini & Susan L Woodward, Eds, *From the Adriatic to the Caucasus: Viable Dynamics of Stabilization*, Ravenna, A Longo Editore, 2003, p33.
- <sup>64</sup> Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military*, New York: W W Norton Inc, 2003, pp99-118; Sami G Hajjar, *US Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002, pp19-29; Thomas E Ricks, "An Unprecedented Coalition", *Washington Post Weekly*, 1-7 October 2001, p19, Thomas E Ricks & Susan B Glasser, "US Operated Covert Alliance With Uzbekistan", *Washington Post*, 24 October 2001, ppA1, 24.
- <sup>65</sup> Dobbins, "Nation-Building Returns to Favour", p11; Sherman "Rumsfeld Reworks Pentagon Goals", p4; Sherman, "US Goals Sought on Battling the Unconventional", p4; Ricks, "Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon", p1.
- <sup>66</sup> Lorenzo Cortes, "Surface Warfare Chief Identifies Primary Anti-Access Threats", *Defence Daily*, 9 July 2004, p2; Christopher J Bowie, *The Anti-Access Threat and Theatre Air Bases*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002; Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts & Robert Work, *Meeting the anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
- <sup>67</sup> "The Access Issue", *Air Force Magazine*, October 1998, p44.
- <sup>68</sup> Priest, pp99-118; Hajjar, pp19-29; Ricks, "An Unprecedented Coalition", p19, Ricks & Glasser, ppA1, 24.
- <sup>69</sup> This point is axiomatic in any study of Central Asia and the Caucasus' security environments, eg Olga Oliker & Thomas S Szayna, Eds, *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003, passim.
- <sup>70</sup> Davis & Sweeney, pp47-52, Wishnick, *Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War*, pp4-5.

71 Istanbul Initiative.

72 *Ibid*; "Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Included in the European Neighborhood Policy"; Lobjaskas, "Azerbaijan: EU Keen To Get Involved In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process".

73 Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, LXXXIII, No 5, September-October 2004, pp34-56; James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad", *Atlantic Monthly*, January 2004, pp52-74; S Frederick Starr, *US Policy in Afghanistan: It's Working*, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, 2004; Sherman, "Rumsfeld Reworks Pentagon Goals", p4; Sherman, "US Goals Sought on Battling the Unconventional", p4; Ricks, "Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon", p1.

74 Ian Bostock, "Australia Pledges to Target Terrorists Offshore", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 September 2004, [www://janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc](http://janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc).

75 James Dobbins, "Nation-Building Returns to Favour", *Financial Times*, 11 August 2004, cited in <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/efiles/s2004081131121.html>.

76 Tom Clancy with General Tony Zinni (USMC Ret) & Tony Klotz, *Battle Ready*, New York: G P Putnam & sons, 2004, pp432-438; Thomas E Ricks, "Shift from Traditional War Seen At Pentagon", *Washington Post*, 3 September 2004, p1; Will Dunham "US Weighs Methods of Dealing With Rogue States, Terrorists", *San Diego Union Tribune*, 4 September 2004, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040909318487.html>; Andrew Koch, "US Seeks Keepers of the Peace", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 May 2004, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiless20040427279499.html>.

77 Major General Kenneth R Bowra & Colonel William H Harris, Jr, "Regional Engagement: an ARSOF Approach to Future Theatre Operations", *Special Warfare*, Fall 1998, pp2-23; William H Lewis & Edward Marks, *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Papers, No 58, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1998, pp105-107, 123.

78 Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defence Policy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies institute, US Army War College, 2002.

79 QDR.

80 Christensen, p17.

81 Jeffrey Record & W Andrew Terrill, *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004.

82 Remarks by Dr Jeffrey Simon of the National Defense University delivered at the Conference "Changing Security Dynamics in Eurasia", Fort MCNair, Washington DC, 7-8 September 2004 (henceforth Simon, Remarks).

83 Niklas Swanstrom, "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, XXIII, No 1, March 2004, pp41-53; Charles Fairbanks, S Frederick Starr, C Richard Nelson, Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, Washington DC: the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Nitze School of Advanced International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, 2001, pp33-71.

84 Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Papers, No 318, London, Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998, pp9-10.

85 "India To Play Prominent Role in US-led 'Asian NATO'", *Press Trust of India*, 18 July 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Stephen Blank, "Inherent Dangers in an 'Asian NATO'", *Asia Times Online*, 19 September 2003, <http://www.atimes.com>; "Pentagon Keen To Make India A Strategic Partner", *SAPRA India Bulletin*, June 2003, pp27-28.

86 Harkavy, p45.

87 Robert Legvold, "Introduction: Great Power Stakes in Central Asia", Robert Legvold, Ed, *Thinking Strategically: the Major Powers, Kazakstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, p37.

88 Svante Cornell, "Uzbekistan: a Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics", *European Security*, IX, No 2, Summer 2000, p122.

89 Temur Basilia, "Eurasian Commentary", Jan H Kalicki & Eugene K Lawson, Eds, *Russian-Eurasian Renaissance?: US Trade and Investment in Russia and Eurasia*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p166.

- <sup>90</sup> "Putin Speaks Out Against "Exporting Capitalist Democracy", *ITAR-TASS News Agency*, 11 April 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; for an example from Turkmenistan see Gennady Sysoev, "Saparmyrat Niyazov Seeks Protection", Moscow, *Kommersant*, in Russian, 11 April 2003, *FBIS SOV*, 11 April 2003.
- <sup>91</sup> Wald, Briefing.
- <sup>92</sup> QDR; Federal Document Clearing House, "Testimony by Peter T R Brookes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Affairs", House Resources Committee, 17 July 2002; *Statement to the House Committee on International Relations by Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs*, 26 June 2003, [http://www.house.gov/international\\_relations/108/rod0626](http://www.house.gov/international_relations/108/rod0626).
- <sup>93</sup> "India To Play Prominent Role in US-led 'Asian NATO'"; Blank, "Inherent Dangers in an 'Asian NATO'", "Pentagon Keen To Make India A Strategic Partner", pp27-28.
- <sup>94</sup> "India May Allow US Access to Military Bases: Jaswant", *The News*, 23 June 2001, <http://www.jang.com/pk/thenews/jun2001-daily/23-06/2001/main/main1.htm>.
- <sup>95</sup> Brookes, *Testimony*.
- <sup>96</sup> Rodman, *Testimony*.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>99</sup> Douglas E Streusand, "Geopolitics Versus Globalization", Sam J Tangredi, Ed, *Globalization and Maritime Power*, Washington DC: Fort Lesley J McNair, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, 2002, p53.
- <sup>100</sup> Sam J Tangredi, "Globalization and Sea Power: Overview and Context", *ibid*, p6.
- <sup>101</sup> John Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations", *India Review*, I, No 4, October 2002, pp9-21 shows this with regard to Sino-Indian naval rivalry.
- <sup>102</sup> General Gregory S Martin (USAF), "US National Security Strategy and the Imperative of 'Geopresence'", *Air & Space Power Journal*, XVII, No 2, Summer 2003, pp35-48.
- <sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, p39.
- <sup>104</sup> Edward N Luttwak, "Air Power in US Military Strategy", Richard H Shultz Jr, Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Eds, *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, Maxwell AFR, Alabama: Air University Press, 1992, p20, cited in Chung Min Lee, "East Asia's Awakening from Strategic Hibernation and the Role of Air Power", *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, XV, No 1, Spring 2003, pp227-228; "The British Perception of Air Power", *Military Technology*, No 7, 2003, p65.
- <sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>106</sup> Lee, pp221-234.
- <sup>107</sup> Stefano Bianchini, "Conclusions", Stefano Bianchini, Ed, *From the Adriatic to the Caucasus: The Dynamics of (De)Stabilization*, Ravenna: A Longo Editore, 2001, p239.
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, pp239-242.
- <sup>109</sup> Richard Giragosian, "Dead-End Politics in the South Caucasus", *Marco Polo Magazine, Supplement to Acque et Terre*, No 3, 2004, pp18-19.
- <sup>110</sup> Max G Manwaring, "Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere", *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, XI, No 1, Spring 2002, pp55-76.
- <sup>111</sup> Apart from terrorism, this was already the Clinton Administration's agenda, Sestanovich, *Testimony*.
- <sup>112</sup> Chicky, pp3-20; Wishnick, op cit.
- <sup>113</sup> Philipp H Fluri & M Eden Cole, "Security Sector Governance and Reform in Southeastern Europe - A Brief Study in Norms Transfer", *Polaris: Nato Defence College*, I No 2, Summer 2004, pp15-35; see also the essays in Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati & Ambassador Theodor Winkler, Eds, *Post-Cold War Defence Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, foreword by Lord Robertson Secretary-General of NATO, Washington DC: Brassey's 2002; Larry Watts & George Christian Maior, Coordinators, *International conference: Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform, and Security*, Bucharest: Encyclopedica publishing house, 2002.
- <sup>114</sup> "USA to Increase Military Assistance to Georgia", *The Russia Journal*, 28 September 2004, <http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=45662>.
- <sup>115</sup> William D O'Malley, "Central Asia and South Caucasus As An Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints", Oliker & Szayna, Eds, pp241-306.



- 116 Roger W Barnett, *Extraordinary Power Projection: An Operational Concept for the US Navy*, Strategic Research Development Report 5-96, US Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers, Newport RI, 1996, pp7-8.
- 117 Ibid.
- 118 O'Malley, pp241-306.
- 119 *Istanbul Initiative*.
- 120 "Armenian, British Defence Ministries Sign Cooperation Memo", *Mediamax News Agency, Yerevan, BBC Monitoring*, 24 September 2004; "Armenian Defence Minister Discusses Military Ties With German Envoy", *Public Television of Armenia, BBC Monitoring*, 23 September 2004; "Armenia Set to Expand Ties With NATO, Foreign Minister Says", *Mediamax News Agency, BBC Monitoring*, 22 September 2004; *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline*, 27 April 2004.
- 121 Joshua Spero, "Paths to Peace for NATO's Partnerships in Eurasia", in James Sperling, Sean Kay & S Victor Papascoma, Eds, *Limiting Institutions?: The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2003, pp170-180.
- 122 *Nation*, pp34-45.
- 123 *Ibid*; Perry and Keridis, Eds, passim; Simon, Remarks.
- 124 *Ibid*; *Istanbul Initiative*.
- 125 *Ibid*.
- 126 Perry & Keridis, Eds, passim; Simon, Remarks.
- 127 Radek Sikorski, "How It's Going, Three Years After Invasion/Liberation", *American Enterprise Organization*, 24 September 2004, <http://www.aei.org/include/news>.
- 128 "Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Included in the European Neighborhood Policy"; Lobjaskas, "Azerbaijan: EU Keen To Get Involved In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process".
- 129 Bruno Coppetiers, Michel Huysseune, Michael Emerson, Nathalie Tocci & Marius Vahl, "European Institutional Models as Instruments of Conflict Resolution in the Divided States of the European Periphery", *CEPS Working Document*, No 195, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, July 2003; Dov Lynch, Ed, *The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, Chailot Papers*, No 65, 2003; Svante E Cornell, Roger N McDermott, William O'Malley, Vladimir Socor & S Frederick Starr, *Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO*, Washington DC; Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2004.
- 130 The Baltic Defence College's capabilities and its goals may be seen in its semi-annual publication *The Baltic Defence Review* and the following articles: Peter Foot, "European Military Education Today", *Baltic Defence Review*, No 5, 2001, pp23-25; Brigadier General Michael H Clemmesen (Denmark), "Integration of New Alliance Members: The Intellectual-Cultural Dimension", *Defence Analysis*, XV, No 3, 1999, pp261-272. General Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.
- 131 I have recently discussed India's policies in Central Asia in Stephen Blank, "India Joins the Great Game: Indian Strategy in Central Asia", Indranil Bannerjee, Ed, *India and Central Asia*, Middlesex, UK: Brunel Academic Publishers Ltd, 2004, pp261-301.
- 132 Jonathan Eyal, "Why China is Making Overtures to NATO", *The Straits Times*, 25 November 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Jonathan Marcus, "China Seeks Dialogue With NATO", *BBC News*, 18 November 2002.
- 133 Pavel Zolotarev, "The New Bases of the US Are Tied to the Regions of Instability", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 20 August 2004, *FBIS SOV*, 20 August 2004; *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline*, 10 July 2003.
- 134 Author's conversations with US military officials involved in trying to facilitate such cooperation, Washington DC, 28 September 2004.
- 135 "Russian Defence Minister Voices Concern About Army Draft", *RIA Novosti*, 1 October 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
- 136 "US Increases Military Aid to Uzbekistan", *Associated Press*, 12 August 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
- 137 Svante E Cornell & Regine A Spector, "Central Asia: More Than Islamic Extremists", *Washington Quarterly*, XXV, No 1, Winter 2002, p203.
- 138 David C Gompert, Olga Oliker, Anga Timilsina, "Clean, Lean, and Able: A Strategy for Defence Development", *Occasional Paper Op-101-RC*, 2004, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004, pp5-6.

- 139 *Ibid*, p2.
- 140 *Ibid*, pp5-8.
- 141 *Ibid*, pp8-9.
- 142 Larson, et al, p119.
- 143 *Ibid*, pp115-126.
- 144 *Ibid*.
- 145 Erica Marat, Said Diloarov, "Uzbek De-Mining Pledge Strives to Mollify Neighbours", *Eurasia Insight*, 16 July 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org>.
- 146 Chicky, pp3-20.
- 147 Szayna, Grissom, Marquis, Young, Rosen, Huth, passim. Sherman, "Rumsfeld Reworks Pentagon Goals", p4.
- 148 *Ibid*.
- 149 Wald, Briefing.

## **Want to Know More ...?**

See: US Department of Defense *National Defense Strategy of the United States*, Washington: DOD, 2005

General Richard H Myers, *National Military Strategy*, Washington DC: DOD, 2004

Alexei Bogaturov, *International Relations in Central-Eastern Asia: Geopolitical Challenges and Prospects for Political Cooperation*, Working Paper, Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Washington DC, 2004

Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002; *Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed*, idem, 2004

Jacquelyn K Davis & Michael Sweeney, *Central Asia in US Strategy and Operational Planning, Where Do We Go From Here?*, Cambridge, MA and Washington DC, Institute for Foreign Policy Affairs, 2004

LTC Jon E Chicky, USA *A Military Strategy for Central Asia*, Student Research Project, US Army War College, 2004

Stephen Blank, *The Future of Transcaspian Security*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, August, 2002; *US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia*, idem, June 2000

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed are those of the  
Author and not necessarily those of the  
UK Ministry of Defence or the US Army, Defense Department, or  
the Government

ISBN 1-905058-15-2

**Published By:**

**Defence Academy of the**  
**United Kingdom**

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**

Haig Road  
Camberley  
Surrey  
GU15 4PQ  
England

Telephone: (44) 1276 412995

Fax: (44) 1276 686880

Email: [csrc@da.mod.uk](mailto:csrc@da.mod.uk)

<http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc>

**ISBN 1-905058-15-2**