



THE HENRY L.  
STIMSON CENTER

**HALTING WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC  
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS:  
MILITARY STRATEGIES &  
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS**

**A WORKSHOP REPORT**

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The meeting was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis to enable free discussion. This report draws heavily from the ideas and experiences of workshop participants, who deserve credit for the issues explored here. This report does not represent a consensus document, however, and the authors are solely responsible for any errors, misrepresentations, or omissions contained within.



## INTRODUCTION

*“The political direction needs to be more than ‘do something, General!’”*<sup>1</sup>

The idea of a “responsibility to protect” has grown dramatically since the concept was formally articulated in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.<sup>2</sup> Fundamentally, the ICISS argued that nations are responsible for protecting their own people from large scale loss of life, such as genocide and mass violence, and should be held to live up to this sovereign duty. When nations fail to meet their obligation, however, the international community has a responsibility to act. In extreme circumstances, when peaceful means are unsuccessful, this responsibility may require military action. Such actions may be in support of the national government or, if the government itself is complicit in the violence, without its consent.

In the past, notably in Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (1995), the failure to align calls to protect civilians with a political strategy and military capacity to do so resulted in horrific loss of life. The 2005 endorsement at the United Nations World Summit of an international “responsibility to protect” civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity marked a milestone towards preventing a repeat of these tragedies. Global political leaders essentially put their governments and military commanders on notice that they may be called upon to launch missions aimed at halting wide-spread targeting of civilians (see Box 1). The Security Council then recognized a “responsibility to protect” in 2006, with Resolution 1674.<sup>3</sup>

### THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The last decade has also witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of uniformed personnel serving in international peace operations where civilians face threats of physical violence. While in many peacekeeping mission areas such violence is more limited, or of a different nature, than that envisioned as a trigger for military intervention under the “responsibility to protect” rubric, these operations are increasingly charged to protect civilians. Since 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has authorized over a dozen UN-led peacekeeping missions and interventions to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” as seen in mandates for UN-led peace operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, Sudan, and Lebanon. The Security Council has further included civilian protection in mandates for missions led by regional organizations, individual nations, and coalitions, such as the Economic Community of West African States

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<sup>1</sup> General, workshop participant, 14 February 2007.

<sup>2</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, December 2001).

<sup>3</sup> The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, its first official reference to the “responsibility to protect” on 28 April 2006.

(ECOWAS) and France in Côte d'Ivoire, the European Union (EU) in the DRC, and the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur.

Peace operations are often on the front lines when violence escalates, and thus, demonstrate the challenges involved in using military means to protect civilians during crises. The struggle of peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan, for example, exhibits the urgency of identifying the appropriate role and capacity of peacekeepers in the prevention and cessation of such violence. A central question, then, is if prevention does not succeed, what role can military forces play in protecting civilians from mass violence?<sup>4</sup>

**Box 1**

**2005 UN WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT**

In the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document, heads of state from around the world for the first time endorsed the idea that state sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities to protect civilians:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

Source: United Nations, *World Summit Outcome Document*, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, paras. 138–139.

There also remain key questions about whether and how the international community should intervene to save lives: how can countries and international organizations successfully employ military force to protect civilians in another state?<sup>5</sup> What is known about military protection

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<sup>4</sup> Varied terms are used interchangeable in this report, including mass violence, genocide, and mass atrocities.

<sup>5</sup> Alongside the growth of civilian protection in mandates, the new UN *Capstone Doctrine* for peacekeeping recognizes protection as a cross-cutting issue, demonstrating that all elements of a UN mission need to consider their contribution to protection.



strategies for responding to mass atrocities or systematic violence against civilian populations?<sup>6</sup> What can those operations offer as strategies for future missions? Do military intervention forces have the doctrine and capacity to implement protection, and to coordinate their activities effectively with humanitarian protection agencies? The goal of this paper, and the workshop on which it reports, is to begin to address these questions.

## **DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CIVILIAN PROTECTION BY PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND BY MILITARY INTERVENTIONS**

While this paper is focused on peace operations, there are important distinctions between peacekeeping missions and operations launched expressly to halt mass atrocities and genocide, as suggested under the “responsibility to protect.” For most contemporary peacekeeping operations, there are presumed conditions, such as a pre-existing “peace to keep” or anticipation of a political agreement to enforce; the consent of the parties for the deployment of forces; and a (relatively) functional government or expected transition to one. Where peacekeepers have a civilian protection mandate, moreover, that task may be treated as one among a range of peace support activities, such as disarmament and security sector reform. UN-led peacekeepers are also expected to use minimal force, even when authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to recognize that the broad protection of the population is the responsibility of the host government. Peace operations nevertheless may face significant violence growing to extreme levels, where action by the peacekeeping force is warranted to physically protect civilian populations.

Few missions with military forces, however, are organized and deployed with a *primary* mission objective to prevent or halt mass killings, ethnic cleansing or genocide. In a “responsibility to protect” scenario, such a mission may be necessary where there is no viable peace agreement to enforce or it has collapsed (e.g., Balkans, Rwanda), where the national authorities have failed to protect the population, and where violence becomes extreme and civilians come under direct attack. Falling somewhere on the spectrum between peacekeeping (even “robust” Chapter VII missions) and traditional military operations, such missions pose distinct conceptual, operational and political challenges. In some cases, the distinction may be subtle, as the tactics used in both kinds of operations may be the same. At a strategic and operational level, however, the distinction may be more evident. An intervention to prevent or stop gross violence or genocide is likely to use all its tools—including the threat of force—to halt belligerents while simultaneously providing physical protection to the targeted population.

## **PURPOSE OF THE WORKSHOP & THIS REPORT**

The Stimson Center, in cooperation with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, organized a small workshop in 2007 to learn from past missions requiring protection of civilians at risk from genocide, massacre, or serious and systematic human rights abuses. The workshop grew out of research by the Stimson Center’s *Future of Peace Operations* that reviewed the preparedness of international organizations, namely the United Nations, AU, ECOWAS, EU, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and key nations to lead military

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<sup>6</sup> While this workshop focused on the military role, it was widely acknowledged that the military would not and should not operate in isolation from other actors.

operations to offer physical protection to civilians from genocide and extreme violence.<sup>7</sup> The findings, published in 2006 as *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect, and Modern Peace Operations* by Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, demonstrated that there is little evidence that the international community is prepared to use military forces in efforts to halt genocides or mass violence against civilians.<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of the workshop was to glean lessons from military leaders about the requirements, challenges, and operational realities that they faced in the field when carrying out such operations. The workshop aimed further to generate operational concepts and identify military roles and strategies in halting or mitigating large-scale attacks on civilians. It focused on developing an understanding of the operational challenges for two types of scenarios:

- Where civilian protection is an important, but not primary mission objective, through the execution of a set of tasks within a multidimensional peace operation; and
- Where protecting civilians is the primary mission objective for a military intervention aimed at preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing or mass killing.

The conference focus was on earlier operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and the DRC during the 1990s and 2000s, where missions faced the threat (or reality) of extreme violence against the local population. The workshop brought together leaders from these missions, including more than a dozen senior military officers (nine generals, seven colonels) with experience leading coalitions, nationally-led interventions and UN peace operations from more than a dozen countries. Participants also had experience within other international missions and multinational organizations that conducted these operations.<sup>9</sup>

The workshop first considered lessons from the field, based on the experiences of the former mission leaders, then used a scenario-based exercise to identify operational concepts for the protection of civilians. Finally, participants were asked to focus on lessons learned and offer recommendations, especially about appropriate tools for such missions: the concepts of operations, doctrine and training, rules of engagement, and force requirements and deployments.

The workshop had two main goals. First, it aimed to determine if selected leaders from past missions where civilians faced the threat of mass violence felt their operations were well-prepared for that challenge. Second, the workshop sought to identify ways to better plan, configure, and conduct future missions to protect civilians effectively. It was hoped that this effort could inform improved guidance, preparation, doctrine and training to enable international forces to both meet mandates to protect civilians and to serve in operations charged with fulfilling the “responsibility to protect.”

The workshop also was intended to strengthen thinking specifically about what roles military actors could take, and thus clarify the development of those roles and tools. Participants felt that

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<sup>7</sup> This project work began in 2004. For more information, see the *Future of Peace Operations* program website, [www.stimson.org/fopo](http://www.stimson.org/fopo).

<sup>8</sup> Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

<sup>9</sup> See Annex III for a full list of participants.

integration with non-military actors within the humanitarian and human rights, political and policing communities was central to successful strategies. This workshop purposely isolated the question of a military role, however, to better clarify what the range of actions *should or could be*, and in turn, to enable better future integration with non-military efforts to prevent and halt high levels of violence.

This report identifies major themes and recommendations that emerged from the workshop. It focuses on the challenges faced by mission leaders when confronted with the threat of large-scale violence against civilians; tries to identify and to synthesize the major issues raised, especially the gaps that are likely to face future missions charged to protect civilians under imminent threat; and identifies potential strategies to address these challenges. This report does not offer a history of the participants' missions or review each point discussed. But by analyzing this issue from the perspective of those who have served in the field in situations where civilians faced the threat of genocide and/or mass violence, this report attempts to illuminate useful ways to improve readiness for such missions in the future.



## REFLECTIONS ON PAST OPERATIONS & EXPERIENCE

*“There was no focus on protection [in the operation]...  
I really welcome this discussion.”<sup>10</sup>*

Since few military operations are organized expressly to halt physical violence against civilian populations, the workshop looked at multinational missions that had an intent to protect civilians or that experienced large-scale violence against the population. Primarily, the missions had international forces deployed in environments where civilians at some point were at risk of mass atrocities and systematic attacks, including genocide. Missions included:

- The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia;
- The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), its successor (UNAMIR II), and the United States Joint Task Force *Support Hope* in Rwanda and Zaire;
- The UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET);
- The NATO deployment into Kosovo (KFOR);
- The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Kingdom’s Operations *Palliser* and *Barras* in Sierra Leone; and
- The UN peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

Short presentations by the senior leaders from these operations launched discussions and observations about and across operations. This approach established common grounds for considering the elements needed to protect civilians and for the simulation exercise.

Participants were asked fundamental questions about their operation(s), their role in protecting civilians, and the challenges they faced.<sup>11</sup> First, force commanders and mission leaders acknowledged grappling with how to address civilians under threat. Second, participants identified factors that limited or enabled their ability to protect civilians under attack. They shared experiences that illustrated the challenges. The discussion laid out the ways that missions needed to understand their role *vis a vis* protection and identified common characteristics and challenges.

The former commanders and mission leaders in the workshop stated that civilians *were* at some recognizable risk of imminent, physical danger during their operations. While civilians are “always in danger” in conflict areas, as one general pointed out, the potential for (and occurrence of) large-scale violence varied across the missions represented at the workshop. Some populations experienced extreme and systematic violence, such as in Rwanda in 1994 and in the

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<sup>10</sup> General at workshop, who served as a UN force commander in a place which he described as “the most destroyed nation on earth.”

<sup>11</sup> See Annex I for the full list of questions that guided the first half of the workshop.

Balkans in 1995. Other operations were launched after or in response to outbreaks of mass atrocities and violence (e.g., the US-led humanitarian mission in Rwanda in 1994; the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL; and the UN operation in East Timor, UNTAET).

### **PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS: A ROLE FOR MILITARIES**

Agreement emerged in a few key areas. First, there was strong consensus that military forces do, in general, have a role to play in the protection of civilians. Second, participants recognized a distinction between providing direct protection to civilians versus protection resulting as a byproduct of creating a stable environment. Third, while acknowledging that humanitarian organizations and civilian elements (such as police) are important actors in situations characterized by mass displacement and attacks against civilians, participants agreed that the military is the actor most capable of physically protecting civilians from direct attack by armed groups.

This consensus is significant. Participants suggested an expanded understanding of military responsibilities and recognition of the changing face of modern military activity. Where once armed forces were dedicated to traditional warfighting, with an emphasis on defeating recognizable enemies and occupying territory, many military leaders today acknowledge a much more diverse set of military tactics and goals, including those related to protecting civilians. This understanding goes beyond notions of avoiding “collateral damage” or respecting international humanitarian law and instead envisions an active military role in civilian protection.

A final important consensus to emerge from the discussion is that operations to halt genocide or mass atrocities could be cast as a new type of mission—one that lies somewhere between traditional warfighting and peacekeeping operations. Even when halting genocide is linked to the aims of missions—such as peace and stability operations—it is a special problem that needs clarity.<sup>12</sup> A mandate to stop genocide or mass atrocities, therefore, should be considered differently from a mandate for peace operations. Whereas most peace operations have long-term security and stability as their goal, that approach can be inadequate to deal with immediate and well-organized violence against a civilian population. If mandated to protect civilians, such missions may need to shift to a “coercive protection” posture, where an immediate goal is physical protection and may require the use of force, either to defend civilians or to compel belligerents to no longer threaten a population.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, peace operations with Chapter VII mandates may take forceful action to halt such threats of violence and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, but it can not be presumed that they will do so without specific direction.

The United Nations is currently ill-prepared for leading missions that anticipate intervening in full-scale genocide, however, as UN operations presume general consent of the parties and impartiality. Missions to halt large scale atrocities, as suggested by the “responsibility to protect,”

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<sup>12</sup> One general argued for a clear distinction, pointing out that for NATO, for example, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not the same.

<sup>13</sup> See, Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, and Background* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001), 178-203; Holt and Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate*, 50-56.

may also require coercive protection capabilities, led by those able to use a greater level of cohesion and force than UN peacekeepers generally can muster.

## GENERAL CHALLENGES FOR PROTECTION MISSIONS

Many challenges identified in the workshop for protecting civilians are common to peacekeeping and military operations in general. These include limited capacity, unclear mandates, and breakdowns in command and control. For some participants, there remains a “disheartening” gap between the demands of UN mandates for peace operations and their capacities, such as a lack of sufficient troops and other personnel; inadequate training and language skills; insufficient or poor equipment; little or no back-up support; and a lack of intelligence assets. Peacekeepers therefore can lack baseline capacities that are requirements for a mission to meet its objectives, in addition to more specific capacities needed for missions charged with protecting civilians.

Beyond the standard all-too-familiar challenges for peace operations, workshop participants identified the following hurdles that hamper the protection of civilians specifically.

## INTERPRETING MANDATES

*Protection in Mandates: From Implied Task to Explicit Task.* Participants pointed to the challenge of interpreting Security Council mandates authorizing missions, which can be unclear—often intentionally. Most felt that their mandates did not address their direct role in protection. Only two UN peace operations represented at the workshop—in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo—operated under mandates directly calling for peacekeeping forces to protect civilians.<sup>14</sup> Starting with the UNAMSIL mandate in October 1999, followed closely by the mandate for MONUC in February 2000, the Security Council began including language “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” for UN-led peacekeeping missions with Chapter VII authority.<sup>15</sup>

In missions without explicit mandate language on protection, the military leaders reported that they still understood that the physical well-being of civilians was an implied goal or task of their operation, as noted earlier, and viewed protection as the expected result of their mission. In Rwanda, for example, the UNAMIR leadership made an effort to protect civilians as violence escalated, even without a clear UN mandate or ROE to do so, as that was something they could “deduce from what you are to do.” In KFOR, mission leaders interpreted their mandate to “establish a secure environment” and ensure “public security and order” as being inclusive of protecting civilians from attack, despite no specific reference to protecting the population. The other missions were more clearly aimed at longer-term security, and inadequate for providing immediate physical protection. In Bosnia, for instance, mandates for UNPROFOR focused on protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid, not the direct protection of the population. Likewise, in East Timor, the mission was mandated to “provide security” and “ensure...the delivery of humanitarian aid.” Similarly, the US-led humanitarian operation in Rwanda sought to assist in the

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<sup>14</sup> A participant with recent experience in Sudan pointed out that the AU force originally deployed with a mandate only to protect the AU observers, not the population. While the mandate was strengthened regarding protection of civilians, that change was not clearly conveyed to the peacekeepers and was undermined by capacity shortfalls as well.

<sup>15</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999. UN Security Council Resolution 1291, S/RES/1291, 24 February 2000.

delivery of humanitarian aid, but did not cite physical protection of vulnerable civilians as a component of its mission.

*Ambiguities in Protection Mandates.* Participants identified challenges in interpreting caveats in mandates that call for protection of civilians and the importance of clarifying these clauses within a mission. The Security Council typically includes three caveats in its resolutions directing operations to protect civilians, which leaves their meaning open to interpretation. First, as seen in mandates for UN operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC, the UN tasked the peacekeeping mission to protect civilians within its “areas of deployment.”<sup>16</sup> This caveat recognizes that UN-led missions cannot protect all civilians, especially within a large country such as the DRC. Yet the peacekeepers must understand what constitutes an “area of deployment,” and whether that means within view or easy access—or within one, ten, or one hundred miles away. Such questions appear to be left to the mission leaders to interpret, without consistent (if any) guidance from the sending nations, Security Council or the UN Secretariat.

A second UN caveat is to protect civilians “within its capabilities.” Certainly UN missions often operate with limited personnel and resources that constrain their ability to respond to all situations. Yet participants noted that this frame could be interpreted variously by military commanders and troop contingents even within the same mission. The result could be widely differing levels of response to attacks against civilians.

Finally, UN mandates often charge the operation to protect civilians “without prejudice to the responsibility of” the host country. The principle of host-nation sovereignty is fundamental to how a mission is conducted and its role in protection understood. UN operations are rarely deployed as part of a transitional administration, such as in Kosovo and East Timor; most UN operations are designed to support the government and to reinforce its capacity to provide protection to the population. Yet in many environments, states are weak, corrupt or failing and are unable to do so. In some cases, such as the DRC, government forces can be a source of violence, not protection, against the population.<sup>17</sup> As a result, UN-led missions must balance how they deal with governments, government forces, and protection strategies, a difficult task when protection mandates require the consent of the government.

## **PREPARING FOR THE FIELD: ESTABLISHING A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND GUIDANCE**

To establish the goal and approach of the mission, and its role in protecting civilians, mission leaders typically have available a concept of operation and other guidance tools. A concept of operation is used to help translate a mandate into an operational strategy in the field. Participants agreed that a concept of operation can help establish the priority of civilian protection as part of

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<sup>16</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270, 1999; UN Security Council Resolution 1289, S/RES/1289, 2000. In the case of MONUC, the mandate specified that the force should protect civilians within “the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions” (S/RES/1291, 2000) and, later, of “areas of deployment of its armed forces” (S/RES/1493, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> In the DRC, the lack of credibility and the behavior of the national military (the FARDC) is a challenge for MONUC, which is mandated to work with them. The FARDC has little experience, equipment, or preparation, for example, and their own welfare is not taken care of. They were viewed as “hardly an army” in one participant’s view, and not a source of protection for the population.



the mission's objectives and approach, and guide choices that impact impartiality, credibility, and strategy and tactics.

*Concept of Operations and Mission Guidance.* A concept of operations is a “verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation.”<sup>18</sup> Military leaders in the field have, in the past, been given little concrete guidance as to how they should interpret and carry out mandates to protect civilians.

Without clear mission guidance, it can be difficult for mission leaders and troops to translate mandates into action. Multiple concepts of protection and potentially conflicting ideas about military roles to halt violence against civilians may need sorting out. Traditional military views of civilian protection are related to international humanitarian law (e.g. the Geneva Conventions) and to working with humanitarian and civilian groups in their efforts to support civilians.

Yet the mission leaders reported that they did not have a concept of operation that addressed the protection of civilians, either when they originally deployed or as the mission evolved. This deficit made it difficult to devise appropriate operational strategies. As one participant noted, “When things go wrong in the field is the worst time to come up with a strategy...there is no time to think.” One general urged that it must be “very, very clear policy all through” the mission. In Bosnia, for example, the Security Council directed UNPROFOR to establish safe areas, but did not offer explanation of what safe areas *were*, or how the force was to protect in broader terms. Such decisions had to be made in the field.<sup>19</sup>

When UN mandates have directed peacekeepers “to protect civilians,” leaders have not always understood what it meant. Even when protection language was added to an existing operation's mandate such as UNAMSIL and MONUC, leaders did not recognize a shift. For MONUC, it took mission leaders in the eastern DRC a few years before they understood that the mandate directed that protection was a central part of the operation. In Sierra Leone, the UNAMSIL mandate was not seen as a radical change on the ground or as “taking into account” the problems that civilians faced.<sup>20</sup> One UNAMSIL force commander, however, sought to translate the UN mandate to protect civilians into “action,” he recounted, and asked UN headquarters about what protection meant: was it to protect every town? “No, no, no,” he reported being told, the broad concept of operations would ensure protection. Given no other guidance, he determined his own strategies for providing protection, directed his staff to develop an approach, and then they “sold” it to his UN-led troops by visiting every unit.

Participants agreed that a potential “responsibility to protect” operation needed a clear concept of operations and the tools to implement it, including a suitable mandate and ROE, along with a capacity for the mission, troops and leaders to act. One former force commander added that

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<sup>18</sup> US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 22 March 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Workshop discussion. For details, see United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549, 15 November 1999.

<sup>20</sup> UNAMSIL was replacing the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (July 1998–October 1999), which was terminated when the UN authorized the more significant and larger UNAMSIL force.

civilian protection should be put in strategic guidance provided to commanders, with specific tasks to fulfill the “responsibility to protect”, rather than let them guess whether it is implied.<sup>21</sup>

*Impartiality and Trade-Offs.* The concept of operations, and the strategies identified for the mission, should also address how the operation is conducted. One key issue is the degree to which military force should take action on behalf of civilian populations and against belligerents. In past missions, tensions have arisen between a mission’s mandate to protect civilians and its being seen as impartial by the parties to the conflict. Military leaders in the field are acutely aware of the risks that accompany taking forceful action in defense of civilians, including the potential to become embroiled in the conflict and viewed as an enemy by armed groups on the ground. One general pointed out that repercussions from using force are likely; if the mission used air power in the Balkans, for example, it was expected that a UN headquarters would be shelled as well.

*The Importance of Credibility.* A common theme among mission leaders from both UN and non-UN missions was the significance of establishing credibility in the early phase of a deployment. If belligerents believe that a mission is willing and able to respond forcefully to attacks against civilians, participants argued that such attacks can often be deterred in the first place. Examples where such credibility was established effectively included the United Kingdom’s deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000, which made highly visible demonstrations of its superior firepower (including low altitude fly-bys of attack aircraft) to persuade militia groups to surrender and disarm. Likewise, in East Timor, the well-organized and equipped International Force (INTERFET) deployed quickly and aggressively; rampaging militia groups largely disintegrated. Finally, the EU’s French-led mission in eastern DRC in 2003 also demonstrated an early willingness to use force, warning militia that the operation would “shoot to kill” anyone with a visible weapon trying to enter the town of Bunia in the Ituri region. When the EU withdrew and handed control back to MONUC, militia groups immediately challenged MONUC’s new “Ituri brigade,” resulting in two days of battle over control of Bunia.

In contrast to multinational missions which have deployed quickly and robustly, most UN missions deploy slowly and in low initial numbers. For this reason, participants argued that the UN missions under discussion had struggled to establish credibility in the eyes of belligerents during their early stages. In the DRC, the Security Council increased the size and mandate of MONUC slowly from its beginning in 1999 as a monitoring mission with only 3,400 troops to protect UN personnel. A long build-up or deployment can result in belligerents taking advantage of the UN mission early on, especially if it gives the impression of weakness. Once this impression is established, military leaders agree, it can be hard to overcome.

## **IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FIELD: ROE AND WILLINGNESS**

Implementation of a mission mandate, concept of operation and strategy rely on capable troops being willing to act. On paper, the rules of engagement determine the parameters of using force, but external practical and political factors will impact military and peacekeepers’ willingness to actually do so.

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<sup>21</sup> This guidance is not meant to limit their flexibility to respond appropriately, but to make clearer their objectives.

*Understanding Rules of Engagement.* Where the mission ROE allow for the use of force in defense of civilians “under imminent threat,” numerous reasons are cited for why peacekeepers do not threaten or use force to do so. Constraints on ROE include national restrictions prohibiting such action; fear of violating the mission’s impartiality between belligerent factions; and candidly, personnel not wanting to get shot at or not knowing how to identify the belligerents. Military leaders may also be outnumbered and outgunned by armed groups on the ground. Unlike many national military forces, UN peacekeepers have little recourse to call for back-up if overwhelmed in the field. The situation in Sierra Leone in 2000, when 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage, was offered as an example. Another key point is that ROE *allow* the use of force to protect civilians—so peacekeepers can legally take action—but they *do not require* that they must or will do so. These and other limitations (discussed further below) mean that robust ROE are a prerequisite, but not a guarantee that military force will actually be employed when civilians are at risk.

*National Caveats and Command Authority.* On a practical basis, mission leaders recognized national command authority and caveats imposed by some troop contributing countries as further hindering troops from defending civilians. Some mission leaders experienced difficulty in directing military personnel who were conscious of differing guidance from their home capitals. One general reported that a battalion deployed to Bunia in the eastern DRC could not use force because they needed both their national, presidential approval, as well as parliamentary consent. So a whole reserve force could not use, or threaten to use, force when civilians came under direct attack.

At least one participant raised the point that national caveats are likely to be an enduring reality in multinational operations. For the United Nations, there are simply not enough troops on offer for its missions to allow them to reject peacekeepers with national caveats. One solution is to organize troops in the field so that those with restrictions are not deployed where force might be needed to defend civilians. Another option is to consider past experience of contingents to guide future deployments. In the DRC, for instance, nationally-based brigades from India and Pakistan were deployed in the Kivus, which allowed the mission to maximize their cohesion and common ability to take action; other contingents with more restrictions or less experience were posted in less volatile areas. Contingents in MONUC that have some experience in protecting civilians could be useful for similar missions elsewhere.

## **NEED TO PREPARE: DOCTRINE AND TRAINING**

In the past, military leaders took action to protect civilians, but they often lacked prior preparation, pre-deployment training or advance mission planning for such roles. Participants felt that improved preparation is needed to support future missions to protect civilians from mass violence and genocide. Further, workshop members agreed that clarity about what “protection of civilians” means for military actors and what it then requires of the military force is needed.

The former leaders reported a lack of specific military doctrine—at the multinational and national level—on how to prevent and halt mass killing, either as part of a larger mission or as a stand-alone operation. This gap in doctrine reflected a paucity of thinking about the strategies, tactics,

and trade-offs involved in civilian protection missions, and a failure to codify ways for military forces to more readily protect civilians in the field.

Participants also recognized the need to identify the signs of impending mass killing, genocide, and ethnic cleansing to understand their role to halt such actions. There is a natural tension between political and military leadership, and who goes first in identifying the need to act. An early warning system could support this aim, and also give needed information to both political and military leaders. Some participants argued both for militaries to advise their governments on these issues, while others called for military leaders to accept responsibility for taking action.

## CONCEPTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS EMERGING FROM THE SIMULATED EXERCISE

*“When things go wrong in the field is the worst time to come up with a strategy [for protecting civilians]...there’s no time to think.”<sup>22</sup>*

The workshop used a simulation exercise to generate thinking about civilian protection missions and a viable concept of operations for such missions. Participants were given various scenarios involving escalating violence against civilians. The exercise separated participants into two groups, one acting as if under UN leadership and one acting as if led as a coalition effort. The first group, comprised mainly of former UN force commanders, planned the deployment of a UN-led peace operation with protection tasks clearly written into its mandate. The other group included military officers with experience in nationally-led missions as well as in UN operations (referred to here as the protection intervention force), and planned for deployment of a multinational, Western-led force to intervene for the primary purpose of protecting civilians. Each group worked to develop potential concepts of operations and “game out” options for responding to mass violence. The objectives of the simulated exercise were to:

- Think about possible operational and tactical options for protecting civilians at risk;
- Explore the impact of “peacekeepers” using force to protect human beings and human rights;
- Look at the necessity for commanders to continually anticipate civilian protection tasks, and to advise superior authorities when they may have underestimated what may be required or what is possible.

In addition to generating ideas to inform future mission planning, the simulation aimed to test several assumptions. First, did officers know of any “off the shelf” operational plans for protecting civilians from physical violence on a mass scale? Did they consider such plans to be needed?<sup>23</sup> Second, did participants believe that there were unique operational challenges for missions with military forces to protect civilians, distinct from standard peacekeeping and/or war-fighting? Finally, how did they view the trade-offs in how a mission supports protection, as a goal or task?

The exercise involved a hypothetical situation of increasing violence against civilians that evolved into ethnic cleansing and widespread attacks after the breakdown of a peace agreement.

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<sup>22</sup> General, workshop participant.

<sup>23</sup> Previous research by Stimson found little evidence of such plans among international, regional, and national institutions; the simulation offered a way to verify this finding. Had participants agreed quickly on the proper military concept of operation for the hypothetical mission, it would suggest that significant effort has already gone into devising appropriate military responses to mass violence.

The groups assumed roles of a planning staff preparing for deployment, and used the same scenario (Atlantis Operational Environment; see Annex II for details.)

While the exercise highlighted some distinctions between UN-led and coalition missions in terms of approach, capacities, and constraints, it also helped identify common elements that apply to both types of missions in attempting to protect civilians. This chapter describes critical pre-deployment issues, challenges and dilemmas, and mission-critical requirements for protection missions. Some issues explored are clearly related to operations whether or not aimed at protecting civilians from extreme violence, and but the simulation challenged participants to examine their unique implications for civilian protection.

### **CRITICAL PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING ISSUES FOR PROTECTION MISSIONS**

The simulation allowed both groups, the UN and non-UN planning teams, to assess the importance of elements related to the pre-deployment stage of an operation, including mission mandates, ROE, concepts of operations and coordination.

*Understanding Mission Mandates.* The exercise established that participants viewed the mandate as critical. The Security Council mandate establishes the mission goal and identifies key tasks to support it, but the Council does not usually tell mission leaders or their forces how to prioritize their tasks. Each group's first step was to clarify and spell out a shared understanding of the mandate.<sup>24</sup> Where the mandate language implied assumptions about the situation on the ground, the force commander and mission leaders recognized that the options to address such assumptions should be identified before deploying.<sup>25</sup>

For clarity in mandates, participants discussed whether Security Council resolutions authorizing robust Chapter VII missions to prevent or halt mass atrocities, either for UN-led or UN-authorized, should specifically cite the "responsibility to protect" terminology. Some saw this as a means of distinguishing such missions from peacekeeping and stability operations with broader mandates. Security Council mandates authorizing short-term interventions with the objective of preventing or halting mass violence against civilians should clearly define civilian protection as a primary goal of the mission, they argued. In such cases, use of "responsibility to protect" terminology could be specific. One group tried to define potential language for future mandates by drafting a possible Security Council resolution. Their resolution was modeled on Resolution 1484 authorizing the 2003 Interim Emergency Multinational Force (*Operation Artemis*) and included reference to the "responsibility to protect" in its preamble (see Box 2).

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<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, the UN group did not focus on the process of mission planning during the exercise, whereas the intervention group heavily focused on the planning aspect. (Participants noted that pre-deployment planning is often a shortcoming for the UN, particularly when the leadership appointment process occurs after initial deployment).

<sup>25</sup> For example, participants suggested numerous questions that will arise, such as whether humanitarian agencies, local non-governmental organizations (NGO) workers or other internationals fall within the category of "civilians" that forces are to protect or what the geographical region covered in the mandate is. Force commanders will have to seek permission to act in areas not specified. A mandate that calls only for protection of civilians from threat of "physical violence" can also be insufficient to address harm indirectly inflicted, such as by destruction of food sources or supply chains.

**Box 2****SIMULATION EXERCISE: DRAFT COUNCIL RESOLUTION LANGUAGE****Authorizing a Protection Intervention Force:**

*Reaffirming* the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Authorizes* the deployment of an Emergency Multinational Protection Force...

*Strengthening Rules of Engagement.* Participants affirmed that the rules of engagement must be clear and appropriate for all missions, especially in operations authorized to take action to protect civilians against belligerents. They highlighted that ROE need to a) offer adequate authority for missions to provide protection; b) be interpreted and understood as providing such authority; and c) fit with the national authorities and capacities of the sending state.

As with mandates, interpretation of ROE matters greatly, since they define legitimate action. ROE that allow for a deterrent posture but not for a reaction against challenges may be ineffective. Indeed, sometimes ROE should allow troops to take assertive action after proper warning has been issued—but before belligerents use violent force. As one participant noted, it may be too late if personnel wait to come under attack or for a belligerent to actually point their weapon, for example. ROE can also offer guidance to troops faced with controversial questions, such as whether ambush—a technique described to be effective by some—is permissible. In one mission, participants recalled, permissive ROE allowed peacekeepers to defy road blocks set up by belligerents in an attempt to restrict their movement. UN forces “cleared” the roadblocks by engaging with their opponents.

*Prioritizing Protection.* Participants stressed the importance of having a clear understanding of the mission approach to the protection of civilians. As demonstrated in the exercise, leaders need to recognize civilian protection as the central goal and thus as the key driver of planning and operations. They emphasized the need for mobility in response to perceived threats, in coordination with humanitarian and military actors. This approach can be developed as a concept of operation, statement of commander’s intent or other means that communicate the core goals and strategies of the mission.

The UN planning team did not specifically outline a concept of operations. Participants in the protection intervention force team drafted a statement of commander’s intent, a tool used to distill the key elements of the concept of operation (See Box 3).

**Box 3****SIMULATION EXERCISE:  
SAMPLE STATEMENT OF COMMANDER'S INTENT DRAFT LANGUAGE**

I intend:

- 1) to immediately stop wide-spread attacks against civilians by [date] through rapid deployment of robust and credible military force on the ground and by establishing an effective weapons-free zone and deterring negative forces through extensive day and night area domination patrols, check points, search and cordon operations.
- 2) IDP and refugee camps will be physically protected and security to humanitarian access will be assured.
- 3) Our robust physical presence on the ground will ensure promotion of safety and security to civilian populations, UN personnel and humanitarians.

*Coordinating between UN and Intervening Forces.* The groups identified the need to develop doctrine and guidance for effective coordination between a UN-led mission and an outside intervention force, especially when that force is sent to prevent or halt large-scale violence against civilians. Where a lead-nation or coalition intervention arrives into an area with UN agencies or a UN peacekeeping mission, effective communications and coordination between them is vital.<sup>26</sup>

Even with more co-deployments of UN missions and operations led by other actors (coalitions, regional organizations, or individual nations), regular mechanisms and lines of communication to facilitate coordination between UN-led and non-UN forces, both prior to and during co-deployments, are lacking. Communication and coordination is likewise essential for successful handover of security (or divided) responsibilities between missions, especially if an intervention force is withdrawing and transitioning security responsibilities to a mission configured to provide wider security and support peacebuilding efforts. Coordinating this division of labor effectively requires joint planning and communication between the two forces, another reason for developing doctrine and practice in this area.

*Determining End-State versus End-Date.* Previous lead-nation interventions deployed in support of an ongoing UN mission, such as *Operation Artemis* and EUFOR in the DRC, had time-limited mandates, some with exit dates specified in the UN resolution. Those interventions were linked to a specific event (i.e. DRC national elections in the case of EUFOR) or an anticipated transition of leadership at the conclusion of a mission (such as turning responsibility from Artemis back to MONUC on 1 September 2003).

Participants recognized advantages and drawbacks to establishing a clear end-date. Political leaders are more likely to commit troops to a protection intervention force without an open-ended commitment and thus with less fear of “mission creep.” A known timeframe may help serve to “focus the mind” of those taking control after the intervention force is withdrawn. The imminent approach of an interim force’s departure provides strong motivation to prepare rapidly for

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<sup>26</sup> In *Artemis*, lines of communication were established on an *ad hoc* basis in the field and liaison officers were pulled from other posts within MONUC (based mainly on French language capability).



handover of responsibility.<sup>27</sup> Some participants, however, questioned the viability of this approach as a model, stressing that conditions on the ground and readiness of the follow-on force should determine the handover timeline, not an arbitrary end date. Cases from the 1990s, such as the 1993 transition from the US-led Operation Restore Hope to UNOSOM II in Somalia, demonstrated the danger of premature handovers of responsibility (particularly in the area of security), when the follow-on force is not sufficiently established or the level of instability is beyond its capacity to manage.

Especially for the intervention force, timelines for deployment should be established in consultation with the UN and other actors, taking into account realistic assessments of the time required to secure the area, to generate a sufficiently prepared follow-on force, and to facilitate a smooth transition of authority. When politically feasible, preference should be given to basing the protection intervention force's exit on achievement of its mission, conditions on the ground, and readiness of follow-on force.

## CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS FACING PROTECTION MISSIONS

Both groups recognized challenges and dilemmas in working through the simulation, including different approaches to escalating physical violence against civilians, trade-offs in those approaches and in dealing with belligerents, and in coordination with other mission elements.

*Tensions Between Static (Defensive) and Dynamic (Offensive) Protection.* The simulation demonstrated relative advantages and disadvantages of employing defensive and offensive strategies to physically protect vulnerable populations. Static protection refers to putting the focus on the location of the civilian population, usually in fixed positions, and defending and protecting those demarcated areas, such as IDP and refugee camps, or a building or village.<sup>28</sup> Dynamic protection, on the other hand, involves a more offensive approach focused on halting belligerents before they can act or controlling where they may operate. Measures can include activities that take place beyond the immediate location of civilians and rely on offensive measures against perpetrators of violence.<sup>29</sup>

First, the simulation revealed that establishing civilian protection as the primary objective of a mission impacts commanders' calculus in choosing between static or dynamic protection strategies. The choice of strategy depends on which option offers the most effective protection to the most civilians given available resources. If resources do not suffice to allow both for defending civilians already gathered in a secure location and for going after belligerents to halt their behavior, the imperative to protect generally may require leaders to choose a static strategy. Alternatively, if a force is adequately equipped both to provide sufficient static protection and to halt militants who target civilians, the protection objective will obligate military leaders to take measures to stop the militants before they harm others.

<sup>27</sup> One participant argued that MONUC's set date to resume full responsibility for Ituri after the withdrawal of EU forces added increased urgency to the planning. Despite a Secretary-General request to extend the EU mission, the approaching handover drove UN planners (both in MONUC and New York) and troop contributors to work hard to ensure the Ituri Brigade would be ready and able to take control.

<sup>28</sup> For example, 270 UN peacekeepers tried to protect scattered pockets of vulnerable civilians at churches and schools during the Rwandan genocide. Another example is the creation of "safe areas" in Bosnia.

<sup>29</sup> MONUC in eastern DRC has increasingly conducted dynamic protection strategies since 2005, with patrols by foot and with armored vehicles, and raiding militia camps.

Second, there was no consensus over the personnel and resources required for different approaches. Some participants felt that static protection of a designated area (such as an IDP camp) required relatively few troops and minimal resources; others felt that it required a larger concentration of troops and more resources. Those in the UN group expressed a preference for halting belligerents, but they did not presume they had well-trained, equipped troops or good tactical mobility, and thus, saw the strategy as potentially risky. The actual requirements for static protection strategies would depend on matching the capacity of the force with the circumstances in the field (i.e. terrain, nature and level of threat, size of population at risk, size of area to be protected, etc.). Static defense may ensure that a particular group of civilians receives protection, for example, but leave civilians elsewhere vulnerable.

Further, some leaders viewed a mandate to protect civilians as being an *imperative* to defend civilians in safe zones or IDP/refugee camps, which precluded taking any action against potential belligerents unless they attacked those areas. In short, the explicit mandate to protect led some in the UN-led group to feel that it restricted their options on the ground, given their limited resources and likely force capabilities.

The discussion of protection strategies demonstrated the need for further analysis of the feasibility, trade-offs and operational requirements for static and dynamic protection strategies, part of the overall requirement to develop doctrine for such missions.

*Maintaining Security for IDPs and Refugees.* Participants discussed the importance of maintaining security within IDP and refugee camps, especially to prevent armed groups from using camps as bases for recruitment, extortion, or as safe havens while regrouping and preparing for attack.<sup>30</sup> If credible local police are unavailable, skilled UN or international police and formed police units (FPUs) could assist with law and order, distribution of aid, preventing emergence of armed groups, and de-escalating tension among ethnic groups. Police could co-deploy with a protection intervention force or as part of a UN contingent in areas where full-scale violence has not yet broken out or has already been halted.<sup>31</sup>

*Detaining Belligerents.* A related challenge is detaining belligerents who are captured or surrender.<sup>32</sup> Missions typically presume the ability to hand off captured or surrendered belligerents to local police/rule of law personnel, but this requires a credible government capacity that is present and not implicated in the violence. Where this is not the case, forces may need to temporarily house and guard detainees if local security capacities are dysfunctional, non-existent, or collaborating with detained militia members.

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<sup>30</sup> Examples include armed group infiltration of refugee and IDP camps in the DRC, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and Uganda, to name but a few.

<sup>31</sup> FPUs are armed contingents of approximately 120 police officers, specially trained in crowd control, public security, de-escalation of conflict, and community policing.

<sup>32</sup> In Kosovo, NATO troops struggled to define and apply a relevant legal code and lacked sufficient capacity to handle arrest and detention of belligerents while the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) attempted to establish its executive authority law and order systems and personnel. Similar challenges confronted the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor during its early months.

*Coordinating with Humanitarian Actors.* During the exercise, participants stressed the importance of having early and close coordination with humanitarian providers in the field.<sup>33</sup> Identifying the needs of displaced populations and coordinating delivery of assistance is vital to any mission. Civilians require food and medical assistance to survive, and missions must not run counter to humanitarian efforts. An intervention force could also be necessary to assist in the delivery of aid, such as through use of airlift capabilities, or to provide protection to humanitarian staff, distribution stations, airports, and/or convoys.

A natural challenge for an intervention that does not include a large civilian component, therefore, is determining how to utilize its limited resources and balance assisting humanitarian delivery and actively protecting civilian safety.<sup>34</sup> The groups recognized that the protection of civilians by military forces raises difficult questions for the management of “humanitarian space.” Some felt that humanitarian agencies and military forces need to rethink the traditional concept of non-militarized humanitarian space as well. Others argued that, where possible, responsibility for humanitarian delivery should rest with civilian agencies and NGOs (in collaboration with an intervention force), enabling intervention forces to focus on the primary mission objective of preventing or halting attacks on civilians.

## **CRITICAL CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROTECTION MISSIONS**

*Mobility and Flexibility.* Participants raised several issues related to the mobility and flexibility of a force attempting to protect civilians. Mobility is important for most operations, but participants stressed that the ability of troops to respond quickly is especially key for protecting civilians from mass atrocities. First, military forces must be able to deter or halt attacks against civilians. To maintain deterrence, challenges to the peacekeeping force must be rebuffed or the effectiveness of the mission will be further tested and undermined. A rapid reaction capability within missions can ensure that potential attacks against civilians are met with a timely response. This is especially important in environments where a lack of infrastructure makes transportation difficult and time consuming. In Bosnia, one participant noted that calling in air strikes by fixed wing aircrafts was an ineffective response to attacks against civilians: during the time required for air strikes to commence, combatants fled the area, which minimized their reprisal effect in response to offensive actions by belligerents.

Second, mobility can assist with patrolling and offering presence among vulnerable populations, which can reassure civilians and deter potential attacks. In some situations, mobility will enable international forces to remain unpredictable to the belligerents and increase their caution if they do not know the precise location of the peacekeepers. Past UN missions have also grappled with the logistics of sending peacekeepers on patrol for extended periods of time. Peacekeepers would conduct daytime patrols and return to their bases at night, leaving militias free to reign once the sun sets. In situations where civilians are at risk, such a posture is not effective.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> One participant noted that protection is a key element of “human security.”

<sup>34</sup> For example, do commanders devote assets to protecting a humanitarian convoy if it means that fewer troops are available to conduct forward-leaning operations to discourage, disrupt, and/or defeat the perpetrators of violence?

<sup>35</sup> In MONUC, one participant noted, aggressive foot patrolling was more useful at scaring militias than patrols conducted in heavy vehicles that separated peacekeepers from the population. Troops in missions with civilian protection mandates (be they UN-led or not) may need to be on “forward deployment” in the field, rather than confined to centralized bases. This strategy will not work, however, if forces are vulnerable themselves. MONUC’s innovative use of mobile operating bases has attempted to overcome this challenge.

Finally, in cases of mass violence against civilians, perpetrators take many shapes. They may not be formal military contingents, but loosely-grouped bands of militia, for example, who can use attack-and-scatter campaigns. International efforts must be able to identify, pursue, and engage such militia, even in tough (and potentially unfamiliar) terrain, making mobility extremely important. Helicopters, for example, can help track perpetrators and increase mission mobility (particularly in areas with inhospitable terrain and few roads, such as the DRC), as well as support surveillance and potentially intimidate belligerents.

Missions attempting to protect civilians from extreme violence need sufficient equipment and resources to be mobile and flexible in responding to threats. Participants recognized potential key capacities, such as helicopters (i.e., attack and transport), as well as forward operating bases, special forces, and rapid reaction capacities. Strikingly, the UN group members, however, did not presume they could have access to such specialist capabilities unless there was a change of approach. This was in contrast to those in the European-led scenario who presumed no such challenge.

*Establishing a Credible, Early Threat of Force.* As noted earlier, participants stressed the importance of establishing early on the mission's credibility by demonstrating both capability and willingness to use force to deter attacks against personnel and/or against vulnerable civilians. This credibility can be demonstrated by non-lethal means or may require military engagement.

Participants offered primarily non-UN missions as examples, such as the EU-led *Operation Artemis* in the DRC and the United Kingdom's intervention in Sierra Leone, which demonstrated a robust posture, ability and a willingness to use force against belligerents, thereby discouraging attacks against both civilians and the international forces as well. Establishing such credibility and a willingness to use force *may not* require actually engaging against belligerents, just a clear demonstration of capabilities. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the UK conducted flights above Freetown with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as ran a series of live fire exercises aimed at dissuading the RUF rebels from advancing on the capital.

The leaders also urged that a future intervention force should be prepared to use psychological and non-traditional means to communicate this message. Such tactics could include intimidating perpetrators through massive displays of capabilities (such as the British using low-flying attack helicopter exercises in Sierra Leone), convincing them that their actions are being monitored (such as demonstrating the force's ability to track their movements using night-vision technology), and convincing them that the operation has access to overwhelming force if required (for example, by advertising the existence of over-the horizon capabilities just beyond the periphery of operations).

If deterrence fails, missions may need to be authorized and able to take more forceful action to halt perpetrators of violence, and to demonstrate their ability and willingness to offer physical protection. In the DRC, *Operation Artemis* did not waste time demonstrating such willingness. Shortly after deploying, the mission killed two militia members in a firefight on 16 June 2003, which some participants credited with minimizing future attacks in Bunia on the French force and the local population.

This approach is in strong contrast to most UN missions, however, which often deploy slowly and in small increments—and send mixed messages about their ability and willingness to use force. Earlier in the DRC, for instance, the Security Council authorized MONUC in 1999 with 500 military observers and then gradually expanded its size and mandate. The mission was subsequently enlarged nearly every year, to a total authorized military strength of roughly 17,000. Partly because of this gradual expansion, spoilers had relative impunity in MONUC's early years and the mission struggled to gain credibility in the eyes of the civilian population as well.

*Intelligence.* Intelligence is uniquely important in attempting to halt widespread attacks on civilians. Without adequate understanding of the intent, capability, location, and actions of potential perpetrators of mass violence, intervening forces face immense challenges attempting to protect civilians from attack. Whether UN-led or not, missions that are responsible for protecting civilians should be able to anticipate and respond to possible attacks against the population.

The United Nations has struggled with information and intelligence needs in the field, hampered in part by member states' reluctance to provide the organization with data or a gathering capacity of its own. In recent years, however, UN Joint Mission Analysis Centres have been created to collect and analyze data from a variety of sources that is provided to decision-makers in UN peacekeeping missions. Participants suggested this capacity should be strengthened in future missions, as it is critical to effectively protecting civilians in the field.

Participants noted that a multinational mission deployed outside the UN had fewer potential restrictions than UN-led operations for intelligence gathering. Intervention forces could use dedicated intelligence assets (including units that could infiltrate belligerent groups or conduct covert operations) and information/intelligence gathering technology (satellites, phone intercepts, unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles, etc). Intervention forces should also establish coordination and information sharing procedures with Joint Mission Analysis Centres in areas where the UN is already operating. Participants stressed the importance of early deployment of liaison officers from an intervention force into the field to identify key actors and gather information from the various groups involved.<sup>36</sup>

*Public information.* In addition to establishing credibility in the eyes of belligerents, peacekeepers and third-party forces need to make their purpose and area(s) of authority known to the local population. Participants urged that robust UN operations and dedicated protection intervention forces should include a coordinated, multi-component information operation campaign. Messaging should be targeted at audiences both inside and outside the area of deployment, including: refugees and IDPs, the general population, the perpetrators of violence, and the international community at large. The general populace and local leaders need to understand the role of the mission if civilians come under attack and what they are prepared to do against those who target civilians or engage in fighting. Civilians might expect peacekeeping forces to provide protection in areas beyond where they have such capability, for example. This information also can be a deterrent to combatants and/or an impetus for militants to disarm.

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<sup>36</sup> In Kosovo, small teams (15–20) of military liaison officers were deployed to live amongst the civilian population, establish trust with key individuals, gather intelligence, and respond quickly to escalating tensions. One participant thought that these types of teams could serve as models for inclusion in future protection intervention forces.

Missions should be prepared to convey a unified message—and have the resources to do so—stressing that the mission is legal and necessary, is aimed at protecting civilians from mass violence, has robust ROE, is committed to using the minimum level of force required, and is a professional force abiding by international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Effective public dissemination of this information is critical, including through press, media releases, public broadcasts and consultations with community groups and the national and international media, in local languages to reach local communities.

## TOWARDS GUIDELINES AND CONCEPTS

*“If you look through a protection lens, that is different than security and stability, a different center of gravity. That’s a huge challenge.”<sup>37</sup>*

*“You can not do these interventions ad hoc. You need to plan and train and exercise, and have doctrine.”<sup>38</sup>*

Throughout the workshop, participants with experience in peace operations and military interventions stressed that they had little guidance or preparation for how to react in situations where civilians came under threat of wide-spread and systematic attack. Participants recognized that better support, such as clearer direction and more integrated planning, was needed for all mission leadership, especially force commanders, police and troop contingents, and for integrating with political and humanitarian strategies.<sup>39</sup> Leaders should be aware of the options available to them, as well as understand the benefits and drawbacks of various strategic and tactical responses. Thus, development of these concepts and ideas is essential to providing the guidance for future missions.

Workshop participants acknowledged that determining the content of that guidance would be challenging. They discussed common characteristics of their missions and identified similar means of protecting civilians. Yet they cautioned that there were substantive differences in scenarios and strategies of protection as well. Participants viewed halting large-scale violence against civilians as a role for militaries which needed greater clarity. Competing objectives, unique environments and the conflict’s characteristics meant that there was no one-size-fits-all approach to civilian protection. Two broad areas for further consideration and understanding emerged from the workshop. First, there are a range of potential strategies, each with choices and challenges, in missions to protect civilians from physical violence. Second, there is a need to differentiate more clearly between these potential scenarios, and to look at the division of labor between what peace operations can accomplish and what is a role for more robust, better-organized forces.

### **BROAD STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR HALTING WIDE-SPREAD ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS**

At the strategic level, the workshop demonstrated that *there is no single approach for protecting civilians from mass atrocities*. Broad strategies of protection depend on multiple characteristics, including the nature of the threat and which populations are threatened. Participants described numerous ways to address civilian vulnerability, by increasing security through physical presence

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<sup>37</sup> General, workshop participant.

<sup>38</sup> Colonel, workshop participant.

<sup>39</sup> Many leaders repeatedly raised the “integrated mission” approach as fundamental to their thinking and argued that they were most likely to act in concert with the political, humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts of a peace operation.

to using force to push back against spoilers and belligerents. Five basic strategies emerged, each with benefits and drawbacks.<sup>40</sup>

1) *Provide Presence (Deter)*. Many peace operations are established with the presumption that their presence will deter attacks on civilians, since there is an implicit expectation that peacekeepers will defend civilians or take action against spoilers. Belligerents may also anticipate or fear that peacekeepers will document their actions and they will be held accountable (e.g., report them to the media or war crimes tribunals).

The presence (or anticipated presence) of international forces is recognized as a basic approach for protecting civilians. Several force commanders viewed the presence of their peacekeepers in an area as a strategy for protection. Even unarmed and lightly armed peacekeepers have used this technique, both as a relatively passive posture and as a more active physical presence. The logic is that they deter perpetrators from conducting attacks, especially if potential belligerents believe that their actions may provoke a response or be witnessed and documented. One participant described their presence as “instrumental” in disrupting militias. Others cited more active presence strategies, such as daily patrols and other techniques.

Providing an international or regional military presence is insufficient, however, if there is no accompanying plan to respond in case presence alone falters, as seen by the failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and the DRC (before the latter two missions were strengthened). In short, presence may deter, but a successful deterrence strategy requires an ability to respond effectively should a crisis escalate. Thus, a peacekeeping force may be unable to offer more than presence, whereas a protection intervention force may be designed to take more active measures if presence fails.

2) *Offer “Static” Protection (Defensive)*. Another familiar strategy is for military forces to protect civilians at risk in a defined area, e.g., a church, refugee camp, village or other physically specific place. There are many examples of this strategy, such as establishment of “safe areas” (as the UN attempted in Bosnia), “safe havens” (as the US and its allies attempted in Northern Iraq), or a “safe humanitarian zone” (as the French-led *Operation Turquoise* attempted in Rwanda). Protected areas can also include weapons exclusion zones, such as used by the *Artemis* operation in Ituri, where visible weapons were banned. This approach requires that military actors protect these designated areas, supported by use of guards, patrols, and defensive measures to halt belligerents from attacking the defended sites.

This approach is often used when people come under immediate threat—and when violence occurs quickly—forcing militaries to react in real time. Physical defense of an area may be a necessity, if, for example, civilians move or flee to a location for protection, such as a church, hotel, or United Nations offices, as seen in Rwanda and the DRC. Thus protection actions are not always within the force’s control; there is a natural tendency when threatened for people to concentrate in any seemingly safe place.

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<sup>40</sup> While termed strategies, these categories overlap with tactical approaches as well.



**Box 4****AN ENDURING CHALLENGE:  
AN OPTION FOR ESTABLISHING SAFE AREAS**

*During the workshop, there was a discussion of the “safe area” concept for protecting civilians, especially given the complexities of organizing them effectively. Despite safe areas (and related safe haven concepts) being publicly cited as means of protection, participants identified many challenges in their use from their own experiences, primarily in the Balkans. Based on the discussion and work of a few participants, a potential approach emerged for further discussion.*

In the former Yugoslavia, the shift of targeted civilians from passivity to armed resistance was a problem for UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The town of Srebrenica was designated a safe area for Muslim Bosniacs to take refuge from attack by Serb nationalists, but the safety of the area diminished when Bosniac factions began attacks within the so-called haven to provoke a confrontation with Serbs on the outside. Serb retaliations jeopardized the security of the unarmed civilians caught in the middle. The fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 led to the mass murder of over 7,000 men and boys in a few short days. As noted in the 1999 Srebrenica Report:

*Protected zones and safe areas can have a role in protecting civilians in armed conflict, but it is clear that either they must be demilitarized and established by the agreement of the belligerents, as in the case of the “protected zones” and “safe havens” recognized by international humanitarian law, or they must be truly safe areas, fully defended by a credible military deterrent. The two concepts are absolutely distinct and must not be confused.*

The following concept for the establishment of a safe area arose from participants discussing how to provide protection when some members of a targeted civilian population become armed resisters in a conflict. The concept aims to prevent militant groups from taking root within a refugee population and imperiling the unarmed civilians. It assumes that an intervention force has negotiated a ceasefire among the groups in conflict and declared a specific area as a haven for civilians. By designating a progressive series of no-weapons zones around the haven, protection forces can better ensure civilian safety and prevent conflict escalation. The concept suggests:

- The first perimeter should be around the safe area itself. All weapons are prohibited from this territory, and forces take responsibility for ensuring the security of those living within it.
- A second perimeter, the “patrol area,” can then be established that extends from the safe area’s extremity to a distance equal to the shooting distance of any direct-fire weapon shot within a straight line of sight. (Note that the local terrain will impact the reach of direct-fire weapons.) The intervention force patrols within the second perimeter to ensure compliance with the demilitarization policy.
- From the edge of the second perimeter, a third perimeter can be established that spans from the safe area to the shooting distance of indirect-fire weapons. This is the “observed area.” The protection force will collect and remove all indirect-fire weapons found within this outermost perimeter.

This approach is resource-intensive, and depends on sufficient troops, supply and communication lines. The strategy also relies on consent from the parties to the conflict, although a strong force may be able to keep relatively small non-consenting factions from taking military action within the demilitarized areas.

The situation on the ground thus impacts strategy and viability. In Rwanda, for example, soldiers had no choice but to try to protect civilians in designated areas because *they could not fight*. Literally, UNAMIR was an unarmed mission—as well as under-resourced, understaffed and undermanned. This status led them to use the strategy of physical protection in a static way: They

had to take the civilians to a hotel or similar area because they could not confront those who threatened the civilians. Another UN force commander pointed out that after the peace accords were signed, civilians “weren’t going anywhere” and all the opposing groups stayed in their areas, including the forces and the United Nations. So “civilians were very much on their own.” They remained in danger with limited humanitarian access.

This defensive posture offers both major benefits and drawbacks.<sup>41</sup> Benefits include that the potential area of operation is defined and easier for forces to control; civilians may understand better the level of protection they will gain; and, depending on the area, it may reduce force requirements. Major drawbacks include the risks of inadvertently providing shelter to militants as well as enabling “ethnic cleansing” by supporting the exodus of civilians or their concentration in one location.

Static protection strategies may make people feel more secure, but may require substantial resources. Further, protection zones may draw increasing numbers of civilians in search of protection. The greatest drawback is that this strategy does not halt the action of belligerents; it merely is an effort to defend against them. (For more discussion, see Box 4, *An Enduring Challenge: An Option for Establishing Safe Areas*.) Further, this approach is time-limited, and will need to transition from static protection to a resolution at some point.

3) *Disrupt the Ability of Perpetrators to Act (Defensive/Offensive)*. Another strategy is to deny or disrupt the ability of perpetrators to carry out attacks. This approach will depend on understanding the potential tactics used by belligerents in mass violence and identifying ways to interrupt those means.

This strategy has a huge range in potential scale. Simple disruption efforts could be to break up roadblocks—or to establish them and checkpoints to prevent (or at least limit) perpetrators’ movements. Approaches could include interrupting supply lines, limiting access to equipment or transportation routes, and creating more reliable tracking and monitoring of air transport. More coercive stances and specified tasks involve disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), including forced disarmament; raiding of arms caches; upholding targeted sanctions (e.g., arms moratoriums, travel bans on individuals); and tightening control of border and transit points. Jamming communications could further disrupt a militia’s ability to coordinate, for example. More complicated still is establishing a blockade, or, in cases where aerial attacks are being used against populations, as in Iraq in the early 1990s and Sudan in recent years, enforcing a no-fly zone.

This strategy has perhaps the widest range of operations for military actors, from non-coercive to the use of force. The benefit is the flexibility it gives actors to try and halt violence often without engaging directly with belligerents, but it may also lead to escalation of hostilities. The drawbacks are that it may require more resources, the tactics involve a level of coercion not compatible with consensual peace operations, and effective action may require further response if disruption does not halt belligerents directly.

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<sup>41</sup> Not all strategies fit in a category. One participant suggested that KFOR used an “unfixing strategy” which did not ensure free movement. Without enough forces to allow full freedom of movement, KFOR had to protect scattered provinces, to allow people there to go out and return, and to ensure they survived despite interrupted supply lines.

4) *Coerce/Compel Perpetrators to Halt Attacks (Offensive)*. A broad strategy for protecting civilians is to compel the perpetrators to halt attacks. This strategy is likely to involve the escalation of force to dissuade belligerents from continuing a campaign of violence. Once the perpetrators cease attacks, the intervening force may also halt coercive action against them, while retaining the threat of renewed force should the attacks resume. This compellence strategy may not require use of force against perpetrators. The threat of force may be enough to alter the behavior of belligerents and bring a halt to attacks.

Participants noted that this strategy has often been pursued in tandem with a political process aimed at reaching a ceasefire or peace agreement, such as NATO's *Operation Deliberate Force* in Bosnia, in which air strikes were employed to pressure parties into signing the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. NATO's 78-day bombing campaign to coerce Slobodan Milosevic into pulling his military out of Kosovo provides another example of this strategy.

A few participants also described *an adaptive/mobile area protection*, e.g., using mobility and movement both to offer physical protection to those within a broader, designated zone and to deter those who would threaten the population by making it difficult for them to know where they may be challenged. This strategy could be used to offer protection across a generalized area (demilitarized zone, key roads) through the use of mobile forces, but also include coercive action. However, this approach requires good transportation capacity, intelligence, and an ability to offer a physical presence that deters as well as interdicts.

5) *Defeat Perpetrators (Offensive)*. A final strategy for halting widespread attacks on civilians is to defeat the perpetrators militarily. This approach could involve direct or indirect action, such as forcing them to surrender, to disarm, to relocate, or to endure an attack. This approach is most akin to traditional war-fighting, but with a distinction that militarily defeating the perpetrators is a *strategy* used to achieve the mission's primary *objective* of halting attacks and protecting civilians. In traditional war-fighting, defeat of the enemy *is* the primary objective.

In determining whether to pursue this strategy, a different set of factors is weighed than in traditional military operations, such as whether attempting to defeat perpetrators may put civilians at greater risk (thereby undermining the mission's objective) or whether other strategies offer a higher likelihood of successfully protecting civilians.

This approach, in general, is beyond the mandate and capacity of UN-led forces. While MONUC more recently has used some traditional combat techniques—including mobile operations, cordon and search, and use of force against belligerents—to provide greater protection for civilians, the means to sustain and support these strategies is not clear or presumed for other missions. The results in MONUC, furthermore, are still being assessed. Such approaches can run counter to the UN role (or that of other organizations) in supporting a peace agreement, providing humanitarian assistance, helping build rule of law capacity and supporting the disarmament of armed groups.

*Findings.* Missions aimed at preventing and halting cases of potential mass violence require clarity about their approach and strategy appropriate to the environment and nature of the threat. Operations are likely to involve some combination of these five broad defensive and offensive strategies (i.e., *presence, static protection, disruption, coercion/compellence, and defeat*).

Determining which of these strategies to employ should be based upon the capacities of the force and what is seen to be an effective strategy for a particular phase of the mission, given potential levels of violence, the vulnerability of civilians, the nature of belligerents, and the nation's capacity. As mentioned earlier, such strategies engaging the military in the threat or potential use of force for the protection of civilians defines the concept of "coercive protection" missions.

In light of the "responsibility to protect," further analysis of the capacities required for each of these strategies is required, along with a better understanding of what circumstances make each option more or less likely to succeed.

### **DIVISION OF LABOR: WHO IS PREPARED TO HALT WIDESPREAD ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS?**

Any consideration of the division of labor—who is prepared to protect civilians—is often oversimplified as asking the question "what capabilities are required to halt mass violence and who possesses those capabilities?" In reality, there are multiple factors that impact the approach. The answer will be depend on the circumstances on the ground, including the potential level of violence, the number of civilians at risks, the strength and nature of perpetrators of the violence, and the capacity and will of indigenous government to offer security and protection to its people.

*Matching Strategies and Threats by Belligerents.* Before deploying, mission leaders need information on the likely source(s) of threats to the civilian population, the abilities of the government to protect their population, and available strategies to either assist or to provide protection. Some countries have limited or no capacity to provide security to their people; others are complicit or supportive of the violence directed at them. For example, considerations include whether the government is:

- a failed state or non-existent and unable to protect the population;
- a weak government, such as one in a post-conflict environment with minimal control unable to defend civilians;
- a capable government that is unwilling to halt or is complicit in attacks against civilians;  
or
- a government directly responsible for attacks against population.

Consideration of belligerents should include understanding whether they are:

- comprised of government forces;
- rogue elements from the government forces; or
- militia and rebel actors, with possible support from the state or neighbor.

Belligerents also have varied capacities. They range from bandits and criminals with little capability to sustain escalated violence against large groups of people to government-backed military forces that can sustain violence against populations.

*Capacity and Roles.* At the heart of discussion about the use of military forces in situations of mass killing is the question of *which external actor/force has the capacity* to undertake such

missions. Early UN experiences in the 1990s taught hard lessons about the limited ability of UN-led peacekeeping missions to respond effectively when violence erupted, especially on a large scale such as in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. As starkly stated by the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”), the “United Nations does not wage war.”<sup>42</sup> In scenarios where violence against civilians escalates beyond the UN capacity to confront, interventions by an individual state, a coalition of states, or a regional organization present the best option for halting mass atrocities.

The posture and initial actions of the force impact protection strategies.<sup>43</sup> Over the past few years, however, the United Nations has strengthened its ability to respond effectively to violent “spoilers” to a peace process while remaining impartial, as demonstrated by MONUC. Better analysis and information—like that provided through a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)—should enable UN missions to coordinate and synthesize information on risks and potential spoilers. The UN deployment of single-nation, brigade-size units into operation—such as the 3,700-strong Pakistani Brigade deployed to South Kivu (DRC) in early 2005—offers better cohesion of command structures, interoperability of equipment, common training and language. This combination, however, is rare for the United Nations, which is dependent on countries being willing to offer skilled and coherent forces.

Thus the actions of MONUC since 2005 have demonstrated that the UN *can* mount forceful action against belligerents such as militia groups and spoilers to the peace. MONUC has addressed some threats to civilians where in the past the level of violence was seen as outstripping the UN’s ability to contain it. This operation offers a case where “coercive protection” tactics have been undertaken by a more capable UN-led mission.

*Strategic reserves and non-UN-led intervention forces.* UN peace operations can respond to escalating violence, depending on the nature of the threat and the capacities, concepts, and mandate of the mission. In general, however, an effective response to genocide or mass atrocities will require reinforcement of a UN-led mission. This potential situation deserves focused attention, however, as demonstrated by participants’ experience with operations where reinforcements to prevent or halt genocide and crimes against humanity came late, very late, or not at all.

Indeed, mass violence erupted in Rwanda, Bosnia, and the DRC while UN peacekeepers were already deployed. There are multiple examples of forces sent in *after* UN missions are overwhelmed and unable to contain the level of insecurity and violence against a civilian population. Such non-UN-led missions used robust capacities to halt violence and establish security prior to handing responsibility back to UN missions. Examples include the United Kingdom’s intervention in Sierra Leone (*Operation Palliser*) in 2000 and the French-led EU

<sup>42</sup> United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

<sup>43</sup> One general argued that to limit risk, an operation needs a strong and robust force, even in a small country such as Kosovo. The deployment of the forces impacts its ability to offer protection by presence. For some, protection was directly linked to the credibility of the mission; others argued that credibility was “the key to protection.” One general argued that *coercive protection* is linked to force credibility. Another pointed out that it is not always about force capabilities, however: there were capable forces in East Timor, but they cut themselves off from those that needed protection. Even in Bosnia, with 6,000 deployed to a very small country, one participant argued there were problems.

mission in Eastern DRC (*Artemis*) in the summer of 2003. In other cases, non-UN-led interim forces preceded UN peacekeeping missions, as demonstrated when the Australian-led INTERFET stabilized the situation in East Timor and then handed over responsibility to UNTAET in February 2000. Some workshop participants pointed to their desire and need for reinforcements—such as in UNPROFOR and UNAMIR—which did not arrive.

While high levels of violence in Rwanda and East Timor demonstrated how rapidly events can trigger the onslaught of attacks, mass killing seldom occurs without some warning signs and sporadic violence leading up to it. Even if UN-led forces are not the best-suited to halt full-scale genocide or mass atrocities, the fact remains that they are often present when such violence erupts. Enhancing the UN ability to respond to such crisis is therefore crucial, as is identifying ways to reinforce a peacekeeping mission that can not halt violence against civilians.

Participants considered a number of options. One proposal was developed within the United Nations for creation of a robust strategic reserve force, placed on standby in home countries for back-up should missions need an effective and rapid reinforcement. The idea is to create a “predictable and efficient strategic response to reinforce a peacekeeping mission in a crisis, such as a breakdown in the security situation, which is beyond the capacity of the mission to address.” Such a reserve capacity could be negotiated with a regional organization (such as the EU or the AU African Standby Force once it is established) or negotiated directly with troop contributing countries. This proposal has not been embraced by member states, but it could be an useful approach to reconsider. Another potential option is for the United Nations to secure commitments from one or two countries to keep a brigade on standby for rapid deployment should it be required, and in exchange the country would receive financial reimbursements from the United Nations. Such a capacity would give UN missions the back-up that they currently lack and could have a major impact on preventing the outbreak of mass atrocities against civilians.

A further option, one used several times this century, is deployment of a more robust mission (not led by the United Nations as a peacekeeping force) to take primary responsibility for halting attacks and protecting civilians. The UN mission could maintain responsibility for aspects of the operation that require less combat-readiness, such as policing, peacebuilding and support to humanitarian efforts. The United Nations may also be required to reinforce its military capacity during the deployment of the robust intervention in order to take over the provision of security when the intervention forces withdraw. As seen in East Timor and the DRC, coalition interventions may be followed by the deployment of a stronger UN capacity and the adoption of a more robust protection strategy by the UN mission.

*Findings:* Establishing a clearer and more effective “division of labor” between UN and non-UN forces in such instances should be a main goal in efforts to halt mass killings and genocide, as well as to operationalize the “responsibility to protect.” International capacity to respond to outbreaks of violence should be strengthened. The availability of a planned UN strategic reserve force is one option for UN-led missions, for example. In many situations, however, the demands of peace enforcement<sup>44</sup> required by “responsibility to protect” situations will outstrip the capacity

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<sup>44</sup> The 2007 draft of the UN Capstone Doctrine states: “Peace enforcement is undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (specifically, article 42), and may include the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the

of the United Nations to generate and place on standby an appropriate strategic reserve force. In these instances, a non-UN-led protection intervention force may be required to halt the attacks prior to handing responsibility/authority over to a follow-on UN mission once the situation is stabilized. Or, such an intervention force may be required to reinforce a UN mission that is already deployed and risks being overwhelmed by an outbreak of violence on the ground.

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peace or act of aggression. ...Enforcement action has been undertaken to protect humanitarian aid, restore order and stability, guarantee freedom of movement, enforce sanctions, establish secure protected zones and demilitarised areas and separate belligerents. The UN has no standing army and does not have the command and control arrangements, intelligence systems or logistical and administrative support structures required to wage war effectively. Consequently, the UN Security Council has almost always entrusted enforcement action to military alliances and/or *ad hoc* coalitions of willing States.”





## NEXT STEPS / THE WAY FORWARD

*“I think that protection is the least addressed element of a mission by those who send us in to keep the peace. Even from a national military perspective, our purpose tends to be protecting our territory but not necessarily people. So we need to see that this becomes a strong point that gets institutionalized and implemented at all levels, and backed with adequate resources.”<sup>45</sup>*

The Accra workshop was a first attempt to identify specific conundrums, challenges, and strategies facing missions concerned with protecting civilians from physical violence and mass atrocities. The findings outlined in this report offer a basis for further thought and discussion, in civilian and military circles, about the means and strategies available to confront large-scale loss of life.

The workshop participants—experienced military leaders—reached a few fundamental conclusions. First, they agreed that there is an important military role in the protection of civilians from mass violence. While it is not a traditional task of armed forces, the nature of modern conflict requires international forces to better prepare for protecting civilians who come under attack. Second, participants agreed that improvements were needed in how militaries prepare for, plan, and conduct missions with civilian protection components, either as part of a broader peace operation or a stand-alone intervention meant to halt ongoing mass atrocities. Especially when operating under a mandate to protect civilians, missions need to be provided with the capacity, leadership, preparation and equipment necessary for this role. Ideally, such preparation should *precede* the deployment of forces: The less *ad hoc* the approach, the more likely is it that mission leaders and military personnel will work together successfully in crisis situations where time is precious and expectations high.

Overall, participants offered strong recommendations in three broad areas: 1) improving guidance on protection; 2) backing mandates with means; and 3) generating new thinking on protection strategies.

### IMPROVING GUIDANCE ON PROTECTION

Participants agreed that in the past, their missions had lacked guidance to leaders, troop-contributing countries, and military personnel on protecting civilians in extreme circumstances. Such guidance is necessary given the host of operational challenges and choices, which may at times conflict with other priorities of a peacekeeping operation.

*Clarifying Interpretations of Mandates.* Participants argued that there is a need to identify what, exactly, civilian protection means for military actors. They stressed that *how* the mandate is

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<sup>45</sup> General, workshop participant.

translated operationally is more critical than the precise language of a Security Council resolution. Participants highlighted key areas where the Security Council and DPKO needed to provide better direction, such as:

- Whether protecting civilians is the primary objective of the mission or one of many tasks, where other objectives were of higher priority;
- Whether, and to what extent, using force in defense of civilians is permissible, and in anticipation of or in response to what actions; and
- Whether the force is expected to take a defensive posture or is authorized to be more offensive in addressing potential threats to civilians.

Moreover, where Security Council mandates call for protection of civilians, the usual caveats need to be clarified or dropped – particularly the now common phrases “within the capacity” of the mission, within its “area of deployment” and “without prejudice to the government” of the host-nation. Some participants stressed the need to remove all caveats on protecting civilians from mandates to make the mission’s responsibility unambiguous. Others felt that such an option was not realistic as long as troops were sent into environments without full capacity and mobility, and without clear political support from the host nation. Nevertheless, such qualifying clauses need clearer explanation within the concept of operations and other guidance tools used by mission leaders, both within and across missions.

*Codifying Guidance in Doctrine.* Troop contributing countries need a better understanding of what their personnel may face in a mission with a civilian protection mandate. Where there is a likelihood that civilians could come under direct attack, participants felt that troop contributing countries should have explicit guidance on the requirements and risks associated with the mission. That understanding needed to include the potential requirement to threaten or use force. Some suggested that the national restrictions placed on troops deployed in UN missions by their capitals reflected a lack of understanding of the requirements or needs for protecting civilians. Others suggested such restrictions were purposeful, aiming to limit risks to sending nations’ personnel.

Participants therefore recommended addressing civilian protection in peacekeeping doctrine to remedy the “doctrinal deficit” that currently exists when it comes to protection.<sup>46</sup> Doctrinal development could be used across nations and by multinational organizations to help address these impediments to a more coherent mission strategy, its implementation and coherence.

The new UN *Capstone Doctrine*, meant to capture the overarching principles of UN peace operations, includes references to the protection of civilians and suggests that force may be required to protect civilians under threat of imminent violence when peaceful means fail. The need remains, however, to spell out how UN-led forces can and should go about protecting civilians when violence escalates. As the United Nations moves to develop more detailed operational guidance, specific attention should be devoted to the options available to force commanders and contingent commanders. Participants suggested including a section on

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<sup>46</sup> As one general recounted, “In my own case, there was no place to turn for guidance. That is why we need UN doctrine that can serve as a reference on what to do and not to do in these kinds of serious protection crises.”

protecting civilians from escalating violence in the reference manual given to force commanders in the field to serve as a quick reference if contingencies arise. The United Nations also could develop a handbook for protecting civilians across the range of UN departments and agencies working in the field, which could further address how military, police and civilian agencies work together.

Participants also felt it necessary for individual countries to develop doctrine and guidance on protection tasks.<sup>47</sup> Military training and preparation are based on national doctrine and training, yet few countries address physical protection of civilians by military actors. This results in few leaders and contingents being prepared for this role as part of international operations.

For missions explicitly aimed at halting genocide and/or mass atrocities, the need for doctrine is especially great since it is “not a routine operation.”<sup>48</sup> Several participants suggested that countries capable of launching interventions explicitly aimed at halting genocides or mass atrocities should develop guidance focused directly on this particular type of mission. Likewise, the multinational organizations that have the authority to halt mass killing—whether the AU or NATO—will also need to address this question more directly.

*Training for Protection of Civilians.* Participants stressed the need to “institutionalize the principles of protection in the training standards” of contributing countries. Currently, troop training is provided primarily by home nations. Training often focuses more on preventing harm to civilians as a consequence of military action than on actively protecting civilians from attack. Participants argued that training standards and modules should be developed to identify the types of tactics and strategies that can be employed in defense of civilian populations. Another recommendation is to see what training programs sponsored by Western nations, such as the US-led Global Peace Operations Initiative and the French-led Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities offer in this area. These programs impact a large number of peacekeepers, particularly in Africa, and would offer a venue for the inclusion of training specific to the challenges of protection of civilians.

Participants also identified pre-deployment training as critical and a primary means for conveying the expectations and priorities of the mission regarding civilian protection, both for mission headquarters as well as the general peacekeeping troops. For headquarters, such training, coupled with the concept of operations, offers mission leaders (military, police, humanitarian, political, etc) the opportunity to meet and work through potential challenges prior to facing them in the field. Such training can help ensure that the entire leadership is operating from a common understanding of the mission’s priorities. Pre-deployment training for peacekeeping troops is also a key part of translating the mandate throughout the chain of command from the force commander to individual troops, including police and political leaders. While the time allotted for such training is likely too short for thorough coverage of the operational issues and challenges

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<sup>47</sup> One participant pointed out that it is critical to focus on the preparation for the major UN troop contributing countries, which are developing nations such as India, Pakistan, and Jordan, who provide the greatest number of forces to UN missions and are willing to deploy to missions that require the use of force.

<sup>48</sup> One participant noted that the “African Union came up with a list of six scenarios it should be able to do by 2010, and stopping genocide was one of them. Yet there is absolutely no doctrine at all about how to do it.” Likewise, no participant cited any national doctrine or that of a multinational organization that addressed the particulars of such missions.

related to protection, it at least would allow the opportunity to convey to incoming contingents the importance of protecting civilians and the expectation that they should react when attacks are anticipated or occur.

For many UN-led missions, pre-deployment training is also the only real opportunity to instill incoming peacekeepers with the limits and authorities of the mission's ROE. Yet few training hours are devoted to ROE or protection of civilians in a typical UN mission. Given the importance of ROE in relation to defending civilians against mass violence, it is worth considering how to expand the time and energy devoted to the issue.

## **BACKING MANDATES WITH MEANS**

A recurring concern of workshop participants was the lack of capacity to accomplish missions. Simply stated, protecting civilians, whether as part of a peace operation or as a non-consensual intervention, is an ambitious and daunting task. Participants felt that it could require support above and beyond those typical for peacekeeping operations.

While there was broad consensus that military forces have a responsibility to protect local populations from widespread attacks, there was a general feeling that military forces often had mandates without the means to succeed. Nearly all participants stressed that in order to protect civilians effectively in the face of concerted attacks, military leaders and their troops must be given the political backing, operational capacity, legal authority, and resources required to carry out their mandate. The discussion underscored three elements as essential for implementation of a civilian protection mandate: combat-ready troops, intelligence and mobility capabilities, and a contingency plan.

*Combat-ready Forces.* Participants returned repeatedly to the need for well-trained, well-equipped, and well-prepared troops. This is a critical component of all military operations, whether protecting civilians or not. Yet, ensuring that troops are trained and reliable is especially necessary in situations with a threat of escalating violence. The costs of failure are high. It was suggested that missions mandated to “protect civilians under imminent threat” should require mission fitness tests of incoming troops to ensure their capacity to carrying out the required tasks, including the use of force in response to direct attacks on civilians.<sup>49</sup>

*Intelligence and Mobility.* Obviously, the equipment and tools for an operation are important. While past missions have lacked an array of critical support, participants identified two key types of equipment for missions attempting to protect civilians: intelligence assets and mobility. Both are needed to determine where civilians are at risk, to establish the sources of violence, and to respond. In environments with rugged terrain and a lack of infrastructure, it is a daunting task to maintain situational awareness of all potential perpetrators of violence and what they are planning. Increasing access to information through unmanned aerial vehicles or human intelligence, for example, helps track what is happening in the field. Mobility, in the form of helicopters and rapid reaction forces, is needed to support a variety of strategies to halt potential

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<sup>49</sup> The importance of different national contingents being able to operate together was reiterated, suggesting the need for more joint training programs that allow peacekeeping forces to interact and train together *prior* to deploying into the chaotic field environment.

or actual attacks against civilians. Ensuring that missions have these components is vital, especially for UN-led missions which often lack such support.

*Preparing for Things Falling Apart: Back up Capacity.* The United Nations has hitherto been ill-prepared and incapable of leading operations in situations of ongoing, widespread, and systematic violence. In such cases, halting violence requires a more robust and flexible operation to reinforce or replace an existing mission, or if no operation is on the ground, to launch efforts to protect civilians. It is essential that contingency plans be established so that a UN-led or similar peace operation can be reinforced if necessary. In addition, the Secretary-General should clearly distinguish in his recommendations to the Security-Council when a situation requires a robust force beyond what the United Nations can muster.<sup>50</sup>

The deployment of a non-UN-led “protection intervention force,” led by an individual nation or group of nations, is one option that must be considered when violence exceeds what the UN can effectively cope with. Participants recommended smooth coordination between the United Nations and such a force in the field. Several officers articulated the need for joint planning and joint training prior to such deployments to ensure interoperability and effectiveness.<sup>51</sup>

## GENERATING NEW THINKING ON PROTECTION STRATEGIES

While participants agreed on the need for better doctrine and guidance on protecting civilians, more work remains to identify strategies and tactics for military forces to respond effectively to large-scale attacks against civilians, whether as part of a multinational or UN peace operation, or as part of a military operation launched expressly to halt mass atrocities. Several concrete recommendations, presented below, were made as to how to go about generating new ideas (and capturing lessons from the field) relating to how best to protect.

*Simulated Exercises.* For most participants, the Accra workshop was the *first time* they had taken part in a simulated exercise focused on protecting civilians from mass violence with other former mission leaders. They found the simulation useful for considering different strategies and plans for responding to violence. Several participants urged that such simulations or similar exercises should be used more often. They would also assist military planners and political leaders to develop policies and concepts relating to protecting civilians in a range of different scenarios.

*Protection-Focused Case Studies.* Development of focused analyses on how missions have attempted to protect civilians in the past would be useful. Participants knew of relatively few case studies explicitly on the military’s role in preventing and responding to attacks against civilians. Case studies could focus on past missions where civilians faced the threat or reality of large-scale violence (i.e., assess the various tactics employed by international forces and their impact in Eastern DRC since 1999). Such reviews could also look at strategies or tactics that military forces

<sup>50</sup> The Secretary-General has proven increasingly willing to follow the Brahimi Report’s admonition to tell the Council “what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.” For instance, several of the Secretary-General’s reports have reiterated that the situation in Somalia is not conducive to a UN-led mission, despite repeated requests from the Security Council to prepare for a deployment there.

<sup>51</sup> The EU-led missions in DRC (*Artemis* and EUFOR) and the authorized EU-UN missions in Chad suggest the need to more formally institutionalize the EU-UN relationship and coordination. One option would be to incorporate DPKO staff and UN troop contributors with the EU crisis management training programs, such as the VIKING exercise for the Nordic Battlegroup in 2008.

might support or use, such as the establishment of safe areas, coercive disarmament against belligerents, or demilitarizing an IDP or refugee camp.

*Capturing Best Practices.* An important source of knowledge is the mission leaders who took part in missions that faced large-scale violence against civilians. One of the most striking features of the workshop was the number of participants who suggested that they rarely, if at all, had discussed their experiences in attempting to protect civilians. Participants said it was unusual to be asked about their experiences and how their operations had dealt with threats against or attacks upon civilians. Their firsthand experience can help identify areas for new thinking on military responses to mass violence. Serious treatment of the issues identified requires a better understanding of the decision-making process of mission leaders in the field.

It was proposed that oral histories of former commanders and mission leaders could capture lessons learned and best practices to inform the development of new thinking on policy, strategy, doctrine, and training on protecting civilians. The United Nations, NATO, the EU, AU and ECOWAS, as well as troop contributing countries could incorporate questions specifically focused on civilian protection in their after-action debriefing process for missions that face wide-scale violence. Interviews could help identify the challenges military leaders faced in attempting to protect civilian populations, the strategies they employed in the effort, the approaches which proved effective or not, and the repercussions of particular actions.

## **CONCLUSION**

This report, and the workshop discussion that it synthesizes, is an attempt to unravel the complex issues and challenges associated with the role of military forces in attempting to halt large-scale and systematic attacks against civilians. In many ways, the workshop generated more questions than answers by helping to illuminate the areas where current knowledge falls short. Clearly, numerous issues here require further analysis and reflection. As this report has highlighted, there is a critical need for increased attention and preparedness for military missions attempting to protect civilian populations.

A troubling finding to emerge from the workshop was that too often uniformed personnel have been sent to missions without sufficient capacity, clear guidance and doctrine, adequate training, or a solid concept of operations to uphold mandates to “protect civilians.” They and the international community are not well-served by this stance. Neither is the local population that hopes to find security with the deployment of such personnel.

Addressing the gaps identified through this workshop is essential to ensuring that when the world decides to take action against “conscience-shocking” levels of atrocities, it has the information, capacities, and strategies necessary to do so effectively. When those efforts are made, then the emerging norm of an international “responsibility to protect” will be much closer to fulfillment, a goal all participants at the meeting could applaud.

# ANNEX I:

## WORKSHOP QUESTIONS

*For the first day of the workshop, discussion was prompted by a series of questions that had been sent to participants in advance. While participants did not answer each directly, the questions demonstrate the areas that the panel moderators sought to explore.*

### **SESSION I: YOU WANT US TO DO WHAT?**

#### **Protection Elements of Mission Mandates and Resultant Operational Challenges**

1. Were civilians in imminent, physical danger within the Area of Operations? Was that potential for violence large-scale?
2. How did the mission mandate address (or not address) the protection of civilians from large-scale attacks?
3. How was this translated, if at all, into a concept of operations? If it was not in the original concept of operations, was it integrated at a later point?
4. Were the force leadership and troop contributing countries given guidance in this area as part of mission preparation?
5. Was protecting civilians seen as the goal of the operation, as a central task for the military, or only as the longer-term outcome of the operation (if at all)?
6. If so, what strategies were used to address their vulnerability?
7. What were the limitations on the forces in protecting civilians? e.g., rules of engagement (ROE), national caveats, physical capacity, interpretation of legal authority, lack of clarity on tasks or strategies, lack of understanding of the use of force, lack of understanding of the definitions of within capacity, within vicinity or with all due respect to the government of XX?

### **SESSION II: UNPACKING THE ISSUES**

1. What was the overriding goal of the mission, and did it encourage or conflict with the robust/effective protection of civilians?
2. What strategies and tactics were employed in the effort to protect civilians? Did they originate with Department of Peacekeeping Operation, the SRSG,<sup>52</sup> and the Force leadership—or simply emerge from contingent leaders/specific troop contributing countries? Which of these methods proved successful? Which failed? Why?
3. What were the challenges that hampered efforts to protect civilians? How were these challenges overcome? How might they be overcome in the future?
4. Were mandates, rules of engagement, and mission tasks clear to the civilian and military actors in the field? Were they adequate for the mission? How could they be further clarified and improved in future operations?
5. What type of preparation (training, doctrine, standard operating procedures, etc.) did troops have in relation to the civilian protection component of the mission? Was there

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<sup>52</sup> Special Representative of the Secretary-General

- any appropriate pre-deployment training or in-mission training? Was it adequate? How could preparation for such missions be improved?
6. Did the force have sufficient means to implement the mandate? Was the troops-to-task ratio realistic? If not, what was done about this?
  7. Did the Force, or elements of the Force, have the will to fight?
  8. How was the mission impacted by its operational capacities (e.g., communications, transportation, enabling support, military equipment)? How was the mission impacted by civilian and military perceptions of the mission's goals? Of the physical risk to the forces deployed? How was information collected and analyzed as to the presumed and actual risks to civilians?



## **ANNEX II:**

### **OVERVIEW OF EXERCISE SAVIOUR**

The exercise involved a hypothetical situation of increasing violence against civilians that evolved into ethnic cleansing and widespread attacks after the breakdown of a peace agreement. The groups assumed roles of a planning staff preparing for deployment, and used the same scenario (Atlantis Operational Environment). One group, comprised mainly of former UN force commanders, planned the deployment of a UN-led peace operation. The other group, which included military officers with experience in nationally-led missions as well as in UN operations, planned for a multinational force led by the United Kingdom and authorized by the European Union. The two groups offered a chance to demonstrate potential differences that characterize both UN-led and multinational-led missions.

The scenario involved the signing of a peace agreement following a brief invasion by one country (Redland) into neighbors (Blueland and Orangeland). To oversee implementation of the peace agreement and monitor a buffer zone between the countries, the United Nations has already deployed a small Chapter VI UN observer mission to the area.<sup>53</sup> Despite the presence of the UN force, widespread attacks, tacitly supported by the government against a minority indigenous group, continue in the northern sector of Redland in an attempt to force the group to flee to neighboring countries. The violence escalates until an estimated 300,000 civilian “Easterlings” have been displaced (and are amassed in IDP and refugee camps along the borders) and 50,000 have been killed. In response to the ongoing carnage, the Security Council authorizes a Chapter VII mission to respond. At this point the scenario diverges into two separate hypothetical deployments: a UN-led multi-dimensional mission tasked with protecting civilians as a component of its overall mandate and a UK-led coalition intervention with the primary objective of halting violence against civilians. The details of each mission are explained below.

#### **UN PLANNING TEAM COMPOSITION AND RESOURCES**

For the team composed primarily of military leaders who had served in UN-led operations, the simulation was based on a Security Council resolution authorizing a “United Nations Peace and Reconstruction Mission” (UNPRO) to:

- a) Ensure implementation of a peace accord;
- b) Provide security and assist local authorities in the maintenance of law and order;
- c) Help investigate human rights violations;
- d) Facilitate DDR;
- e) Facilitate the return of displaced persons and the delivery of humanitarian aid; and
- f) Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

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<sup>53</sup> Missions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which focuses on peaceful resolutions of disputes, are, in theory, operations deployed with the full consent of all parties (usually dedicated to monitoring) that only allow the use of force by peacekeepers in self-defense.

The mission was composed of 10,000 troops, 1,100 police officers, and a large civilian component. The mission's rules of engagement allowed for the "use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance."

### **MULTINATIONAL PLANNING TEAM COMPOSITION AND RESOURCES**

For the second planning team, the assignment was to plan for the imminent deployment of a UK-led, EU mission to protect civilians from on-going attack and to establish a secure environment in order to hand over to a reinforced multidimensional UN peacekeeping force. The mission, known as the Protection Intervention Force (PIF), was to deploy for a limited time period, approximately three months, with the following Security Council mandate to:

- a) Ensure the protection of internally displaced persons, particularly in camps including ensuring access for humanitarian assistance and, if the situation requires, contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the Forces area of responsibility;
- b) Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights with special attention to violence committed against women, children, and minorities;
- c) Facilitate where appropriate disarmament in accordance with the broader UNPRO plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R).

The PIF had 3,500 troops, with 1,800 from the United Kingdom, and included signals, helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, engineering, medical, and special forces assets. The rules of engagement for the PIF included authority to use force, "up to and including deadly force, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance..."

# ANNEX III:

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS



### INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS WORKSHOP

#### Halting Widespread or Systematic Attacks on Civilians: Military Strategies and Operational Concepts

AT THE KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE  
Accra, Ghana  
14–16 February 2007

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**Victoria K. Holt** is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where she co-directs the *Future of Peace Operations* program. Her recent publications include studies on the protection of civilians by military forces, African peacekeeping capacity, and rule of law aspects of peace operations. She serves as an Expert Group Lead with the Genocide Prevention Task Force, co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Ms. Holt joined the Center in 2001, bringing policy and political expertise from her professional experience within the State Department, Congress, and the NGO field. She previously served as Senior Policy Advisor at the State Department (Legislative Affairs), focusing on peacekeeping and UN issues. As Executive Director of the Emergency Coalition for US Financial Support of the United Nations, she directed a bipartisan coalition of leading statesmen and non-governmental organizations. Ms. Holt previously worked as a senior Congressional staffer for seven years, focusing on defense and foreign policy issues for members of the House Armed Services Committee. In addition, she has worked for other Washington-based policy institutes on international affairs. A graduate of the Naval War College, Ms. Holt also holds a BA (with honors) from Wesleyan University.

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# ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM

The *Future of Peace Operations* program builds a broader public dialogue on the role of peace operations in resolving conflict and building lasting peace. Peace operations comprise peacekeeping, the provision of temporary, post-conflict security by internationally mandated forces, and peacebuilding, those efforts undertaken by the international community to help war-torn societies create self-sustaining peace.

The program's goals are to advance, through research and analysis, the capacity of international peace and stability operations to promote the rule of law, protection of civilians, and regional security; enhance US peace operations policy by building bridges between the Administration, Congress, international organizations, governments, and NGOs; and advance reforms for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to bring those reforms to the attention of key public and policy audiences.

The program is directed by Stimson Senior Associates Victoria Holt and William Durch and supported by researchers Katherine Andrews, Alix Boucher, and Joshua Smith. To learn more about the program, read our publications or to offer comments on our work, please contact us at 202-223-5956 or visit our website at [www.stimson.org/fopo](http://www.stimson.org/fopo).

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