

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 34

**AFROBAROMETER ROUND 2:
COMPENDIUM OF
COMPARATIVE RESULTS
FROM A 15-COUNTRY SURVEY**

by the Afrobarometer Network

Compilers: Michael Bratton, Carolyn Logan,
Wonbin Cho, and Paloma Bauer

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



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March 2004

The Afrobarometer Network is a consortium of social scientists from 16 African countries and the United States that conducts periodic public opinion surveys, engages in mutual capacity building for survey research, and disseminates survey results to a wide array of users. The National Investigators, in country alphabetical order are: in Botswana, Mpho Molomo; in Cape Verde, Francisco Rodriguez; in Ghana, E.Gyimah-Boadi; in Kenya, Jeremiah Owiti; in Lesotho, Thuso Green; in Malawi, Stanley Khaila; in Mali, Massa Coulibaly; in Mozambique, Joao Pereira; in Namibia, Christiaan Keulder; in Nigeria, Etannibi Alemika; in Senegal, Babaly Sall; in South Africa, Robert Mattes; in Tanzania, Amon Chaligha; in Uganda, Robert Sentamu; in Zambia, Chileshe Mulenga; and in Zimbabwe, Annie Chikwana. E.Gyimah-Boadi and Robert Mattes are also co-founders and co-Directors of the Afrobarometer.

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OVERVIEW

The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan, survey research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in sub-Saharan Africa.

On average, across the 15 countries in Afrobarometer Round 2 (2002-2003):

- **Economically**, the present mood is somber, but people are optimistic about the future;
 - Africans do not distinguish clearly between personal and national economic circumstances;
 - They define poverty less in terms of shortages of income than in terms of getting enough to eat;
 - Feeling trapped between state and market, Africans say they prefer a mixed economy;
 - Even so, their policy preferences tilt toward state intervention and away from free markets; and
 - After two decades of economic reform, people are more dissatisfied than satisfied.
-
- **Culturally**, Africans value equality but also express an emergent individualism;
 - Stirrings of citizenship are evident, but Africans still see themselves as the clients of “big men”;
 - People worry about being victims of crime and having nowhere to turn for help;
 - Africans abhor violence and attribute social conflict to causes other than ethnic differences;
 - More than half of all adults interviewed complain of health impairment, including AIDS; and
 - On the people’s development agenda, unemployment is the top problem requiring attention.
-
- **Politically**, Africans continue to prefer democracy and reject authoritarian rule;
 - They are still learning about the functions of democratic institutions, especially political parties;
 - People trust the executive branch of government more than its representative institutions; and,
 - While only moderately satisfied with the way democracy actually works, they presently intend to stick with it.

Regarding **the state**:

- Africans express an overly rosy view of the diminished capacities of the African state;
- Even under democracy, they find state institutions to be largely unresponsive to their needs;
- People continue to perceive more official corruption than they actually experience; and
- While they say they respect the law, they doubt that political elites do so.

In terms of **institutional performance**:

- Africans view the management of the national economy in a moderately positive light;
- Government performance on education is regarded as better than its record on food security;
- Most African presidents, but less so legislators, receive enviable approval ratings;
- Most people think they are better off politically since transition to a competitive electoral regime.

INTRODUCTION

Africans have begun to reform their governments and national economies. But these initiatives have usually been led by elites. All too often, the orientations of the general public towards political and economic change are unknown, undervalued, or ignored. How do Africans understand democracy? Which aspects of good governance and structural adjustment do they support or reject? And how do they behave as citizens and as actors in civil society?

The Afrobarometer seeks to answer these, and many other, related questions. It gives voice to African citizens, including minority groups within society. Afrobarometer results enable Africans and interested outsiders to educate themselves about public opinion on the sub-Saharan sub-continent and to influence policy makers accordingly.

The Afrobarometer

The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in sub-Saharan Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries are systematically compared and trends are tracked over time.

The Afrobarometer is dedicated to three main objectives:

- to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa;
- to strengthen capacity for survey research in African institutions; and
- to broadly disseminate and apply survey results.

Afrobarometer results are used by decision-makers in government, non-governmental policy advocates, international donor agencies, journalists and academic researchers, as well as average Africans who wish to become informed and active citizens.

Because of its broad scope, the Afrobarometer is organized as an international collaborative enterprise. The Afrobarometer Network consists of three Core Partners who are jointly responsible for project leadership and coordination: the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana (CDD-Ghana), and Michigan State University (MSU). The Afrobarometer Network also includes National Partner institutions – university research institutes, independent think tanks, or private polling firms – who conduct the surveys.

Afrobarometer research methods are summarized in technical notes below. In every country, our surveys are based on face-to-face interviews in local languages with a randomly selected representative sample of the national population.

Round 1 of the Afrobarometer, completed in September 2001, covered 12 countries: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A preliminary overview of results is published as *Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 11*, “Compendium of Comparative Data from a Twelve-Nation Survey.” See www.afrobarometer.org. A fuller analysis of Round 1 results will appear in Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming September 2004).

Round 2 Surveys

The present paper updates the Afrobarometer by presenting results for Round 2. Conducted in 15 countries between June 2002 and November 2003, Round 2 covers 11 of the original 12 countries (all except Zimbabwe*) plus four new entries: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal. The purpose of this paper is to describe and catalogue the main features of the Round 2 data. Wherever relevant, cross-national comparisons are featured. At this early stage, however, interpretation of results and comparisons with Round 1 are kept to a minimum.

For further analysis of Round 2 results, including incipient trends, readers may wish to consult:

- *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 9*: “Democracy and Electoral Alternation: Evolving African Attitudes”
- *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 10*: “Africa’s Unemployment Crisis: Evolving Public Attitudes”
- *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 11*: “Lived Poverty in Africa: Desperation, Hope, and Patience”
- *Afrobarometer Briefing paper No. 12*: “Public Opinion and HIV-AIDS: Facing Up to the Future”

Round 2 of the Afrobarometer was implemented according to the following schedule:

Country	Date	N	Funding Agency
Cape Verde	May/June 2002	1268	Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon
Mozambique	Aug/Oct 2002	1400	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
Uganda	Aug/Sep 2002	2400	Donor Technical Group (Consortium)
Ghana	Aug/Sep 2002	1200	Sida
South Africa	Sep/Oct 2002	2400	USAID/South Africa
Mali	Oct/Nov 2002	1283	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA)
Senegal	Nov/Dec 2002	1200	NMFA
Lesotho	Feb/Apr 2003	1200	USAID/Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA)
Malawi	Apr/May 2003	1200	USAID/RCSA
Zambia	Jun/Jul 2003	1200	NMFA
Botswana	Jul/Aug 2003	1200	Sida/USAID
Tanzania	Jul/Aug 2003	1200	NMFA
Kenya	Aug/Sep 2003	2398	Sida/NMFA
Namibia	Aug/Sep 2003	1200	Royal Dutch Embassy, Namibia
Nigeria	Oct/Nov 2003	2400	USAID/ Nigeria

Several points about the coverage and timing of specific surveys are worth noting:

- In Uganda, a resurgence of political violence necessitated the exclusion of six northern districts (together accounting for 8.3 percent of the population) from the national sample. To partially compensate, we over-sampled those randomly selected northern districts that were accessible.
- In Senegal, because parts of the countryside in Casamance region were closed to survey research due to rebel activity, the sample was adjusted to interview refugees from combat zones who had assembled in the populated centers of Ziguinchor.
- In Lesotho, the survey was conducted within a year of the May 2002 election. A new, more proportional electoral system appears to have had a moderating effect on the strong sentiments of political alienation expressed by Basotho in Round 1.

* A short version of an Afrobarometer Round 2 survey will be conducted in Zimbabwe during 2004.

- In Kenya, the survey was conducted within a year of the December 2002 election, which brought about the country's first peaceful electoral turnover of top leaders and ruling parties. Hence the results from Kenya are infused with a (perhaps momentary) spirit of public euphoria.
- In Nigeria, the survey was delayed at the request of the principal donor on two occasions: first in January 2003 to allow for elections and again in July 2003 to allow for the swearing-in of the president.

Improving on Round 1, the Round 2 surveys used an identical instrument in all 15 countries. The base questionnaire was "indigenized" to adapt to local nomenclatures and translated from the original English, French, and Portuguese versions into various indigenous languages. The interviews were conducted in the language of the respondent's choice by teams of trained interviewers.

Technical Notes

To understand and interpret the results presented in the text and tables, the reader should bear the following considerations in mind:

- In each country, the Afrobarometer Network interviewed a representative sample of the adult population (i.e., those over 18 and eligible to vote). A random sample was developed based on a multi-stage, stratified, clustered area approach, which aimed to give every eligible adult in each country an equal chance of being selected. Across 15 countries, a total of 23,197 respondents were interviewed. The sample size in each country, ranging from 1200 to 2400, is listed in the table on the previous page.
- A sample size of 1200 is sufficient to yield a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3 percent at a confidence level of 95 percent. All of the figures presented, except where noted, can be assumed to have this maximum margin of sampling error. In the four countries with sample sizes of approximately 2400, the margin of sampling error decreases to plus or minus 2 percent.
- The percentages reported in the tables only reflect *valid responses* to the question, i.e., unless otherwise noted, they include responses such as "don't know," but missing data, refusals to answer, and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded from the calculations. Except where noted, the share of missing data is small and does not significantly change the sample size or margin of error. In the isolated cases where a significant proportion of non-valid responses was encountered, caution must be used in interpreting results, as the proportions of respondents appearing to have various substantive opinions will be artificially inflated, and the margin of error may be increased.
- All percentages have been rounded to whole numbers. This occasionally introduces small anomalies, so that the sum of total reported responses does not equal 100 percent.
- In many cases, we have combined response categories in the figures reported in the tables. For example, "satisfied" and "very satisfied" responses are added together and reported as a single figure. Rounding was applied only after response categories were aggregated.
- Several questions allowed respondents to give open-ended responses, which were initially recorded verbatim. These responses were then coded into categories. Every effort was made to standardize post-coding categories, but some coders in some countries may have inserted a few of their own categories or interpretations.

- A “<1” reported in a table indicates that responses totaled less than 0.5 percent of all responses. On open-ended questions, a “0” is recorded for those categories in which *no* respondents volunteered a given response, while “<1” again indicates that this response was offered by at least one, but less than 0.5 percent of respondents.
- Generally, country samples are self-weighting. In six countries, however, statistical weights were used to adjust for purposive over-sampling of minorities (Cape Verde, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda). Weights were also employed to correct for inadvertent deviations from the planned sample during fieldwork (Mozambique and Zambia). The frequency distributions reported in the tables reflect these within-country weights.
- The country data sets are pooled into an overall Afrobarometer Round 2 data set. We report 15-country Afrobarometer mean statistics in the last column of each table. These means include the within-country weights described above, plus an across-country weight to standardize the size of each national sample. Afrobarometer mean scores treat every country sample as if it had 1200 respondents. That is, each country carries equal weight in the calculation of Afrobarometer means, regardless of its sample size or overall population.
- While Afrobarometer samples accurately represent national, voting-age populations in each country surveyed, the countries selected cannot be considered fully representative of the sub-Saharan continent as a whole. Non-English speaking countries remain under-represented, though one additional francophone country (Senegal) and two lusophone countries (Cape Verde and Mozambique) were added in Round 2. The Afrobarometer continues to focus on countries that have undergone a measure of political and/or economic reform, and to exclude countries experiencing serious political conflict or state collapse. When we generalize about “Africans,” therefore, we have a limited populace in mind.
- Given a partial lack of questionnaire standardization in Round 1, as well as lessons learned from fieldwork about optimal question wording, there are unavoidable differences between the Round 1 and Round 2 survey instruments. It is therefore not always easy or accurate to make exact comparisons between Round 1 and Round 2 results, even on similar questions. Sometimes, therefore, comparisons over time from the two surveys must be handled cautiously.
- Even in the many instances where results are exactly comparable, it is important to bear in mind that two observations do not make a trend. While differences in results between Round 1 (1999-2001) and Round 2 (2002-3) on the same questions may suggest the existence of a trend in attitudes, these differences may also be attributable to random variation in poorly formed “non-attitudes,” to the momentary influence of some salient event, or to a counter-directional “blip” in a longer-term trend that actually runs in another direction. As a result, all inferences about trends in African public opinion should be treated as provisional until such time as Round 3 data become available.

The results presented in the text and tables that follow cover 145 variables out of a total of 247 items asked of respondents in the Round 2 data set. Basic demographic indicators are excluded, as are items completed by the interviewer (which increase the total number of variables in the Round 2 data set to 330).

The results are presented in five sections, which focus on popular attitudes toward:

- economic life;
- social and cultural issues;
- the quality of democracy;
- the governance of the state; and
- the performance of governments and regimes.

SECTION 1: ECONOMIC ISSUES

1.1. National Economic Conditions

Generally speaking, **the economic mood among Africans is somber.** When asked in 2002-3 to describe “the present economic condition of (their) country,” an average of almost half of all Afrobarometer respondents (48 percent) say that it is either “fairly bad” or “very bad.” Only one third (33 percent) find prevailing economic conditions “fairly good” or “very good.” From a popular perspective, therefore, many more people perceive the persistence of a national economic crisis than consider that recovery of the macro-economy is underway.

Even so, by a narrow margin, **people estimate that their own country is faring better than its neighbors.** When asked to compare the economic status of their own nation with that of adjacent countries, more people report relative prosperity (42 percent) than relative deprivation (35 percent). But they are hardly endorsing their own country’s economic take-off, since one in ten people see conditions as being much the same across the region (11 percent), and another one in ten don’t know enough about neighboring nations to hazard an opinion (12 percent).

Africans are split on whether national economic conditions have recently improved. With reference to the previous twelve months, roughly the same proportions of citizens think the economy has improved (37 percent see it as “better” or “much better”) as think it has degenerated (35 percent see it as “worse” or “much worse”). Almost as many (25 percent) detect no change, one way or another.

Nevertheless, **the average person is optimistic about the economic future.** Reflecting a strong bias toward hope, the Africans we interviewed are primed for economic advancement. Whereas more than half expect that their national economy will get “better” or “much better” in the year ahead (53 percent), fewer than one fifth anticipate economic decline (19 percent see conditions getting “worse” or “much worse”).

Some Africans are more economically upbeat than others. Namibians and Mozambicans are more positive than most other Africans about current national economic conditions. The residents of Botswana and South Africa correctly identify their own countries as economic leaders in the Southern Africa region. And rightly or wrongly, Kenyans celebrate the recent political change in their country by also estimating an economic change for the better during 2003.

But Malawians and Basotho are economically despondent. Bringing up the rear on all these indicators of national economic well-being are Lesotho and Malawi. Perhaps because Basotho make invidious comparisons with neighboring South Africa, very few have a positive view of their country’s present, past, or future economic conditions. Because Malawians have recently experienced drought and food shortages, they also display a deep despair about national economic conditions. Remarkably, just one quarter of the adult residents of these countries is hopeful about the economic future.

Table 1.1: National Economic Conditions

In general, how would you describe:		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
The present economic condition of this country	Fairly/Very Good	45	10	31	45	11	19	25	54	57	32	22	30	33	45	32	33
	Neither Good nor Bad	24	45	7	23	6	4	10	19	26	8	27	12	22	10	6	17
	Fairly/Very Bad	26	40	59	31	82	74	64	19	15	60	50	56	41	43	62	48
	Don't Know	5	5	3	1	2	3	1	7	2	1	1	2	3	2	1	3
In general, how do you rate:																	
Economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighbouring countries	Better/Much Better	75	51	33	48	9	17	35	39	68	40	48	64	28	41	35	42
	Same	7	11	10	18	3	4	11	14	17	9	14	12	17	9	10	11
	Worse/Much Worse	10	18	40	18	84	67	44	31	9	45	25	20	37	34	42	35
	Don't Know	8	20	17	16	5	12	10	17	5	6	12	5	18	16	12	12
Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago:																	
Economic conditions in this country	Better/Much Better	33	35	36	51	21	25	41	50	47	35	33	33	36	41	38	37
	Same	41	34	24	24	29	17	14	21	35	15	18	27	25	22	25	25
	Worse/Much Worse	20	23	37	23	46	53	43	21	15	49	49	37	33	35	34	35
	Don't Know	6	8	4	2	3	5	2	8	3	1	1	3	6	3	2	4
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:																	
Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time	Better/Much Better	49	81	61	80	24	26	58	57	76	61	51	41	39	50	44	53
	Same	13	4	11	7	16	13	6	13	15	9	10	18	16	10	12	12
	Worse/Much Worse	18	7	12	4	35	33	11	9	5	22	21	31	20	25	26	19
	Don't Know	20	8	17	9	25	28	25	21	4	8	17	10	25	14	18	17

1.2. Personal Economic Conditions

In general, **people worry about personal living conditions**. Exactly half say that their present living conditions are “fairly bad” or “very bad,” a similar proportion to those that hold this negative opinion about the national economy. Now, less than one third (30 percent) have a positive outlook.

In most of the countries surveyed, **Africans do not distinguish clearly between personal and national economic circumstances**. Of all the popular attitudes discussed here, evaluations of present personal and national economic conditions are among the most strongly correlated (Pearson’s $R = .555^{***}$). This suggests that people use a common logic to arrive at assessments about prevailing conditions facing *both* their own families *and* their entire country.

But there are **interesting exceptions**. In Botswana, Uganda, and Mozambique (all countries with respectable recent economic growth rates), people think that the national economy is doing much better than they are as individuals. In these places, therefore, some ordinary folk see themselves as being left behind as growth occurs. By contrast, in Cape Verde, Nigeria, and South Africa, individuals tend to think that their personal economic conditions are superior to those of under-performing national economies. These opinions are surely inflected by the large proportions of Cape Verdians who receive remittances from relatives abroad (e.g. in Europe and North America) and by the presence of privileged racial minorities in South Africa who tend to doubt the capacity for economic management of African governments, including their own.

When it comes to the living conditions of others, **people now tend to make unfavorable comparisons**. This time with reference to other citizens within their *own* country, they display classic symptoms of relative deprivation. To be sure, many Africans consider that mass welfare is much the same across their entire country (28 percent). But slightly more think that individuals are *worse off* (35 percent) than their fellow citizens (31 percent). Again, residents of Lesotho and Malawi are most likely to see themselves as lagging behind others economically; they are well over twice as likely to feel relatively deprived as Cape Verdians, Namibians, Kenyans, and South Africans.

In the aggregate, an individual’s **past and future living conditions are seen in a similar light** as the past and future conditions of the national economy. As before, people are split about recent improvements or declines (35 percent versus 32 percent). And, just as at national level, they are very – perhaps even unreasonably – optimistic about personal economic prospects: 56 percent expect them to get “better” or “much better” in the year ahead.

Cape Verdians, Kenyans, and Nigerians are the most optimistic populations among all Africans interviewed, with three quarters or more thinking that their living conditions will improve over the next twelve months. But it is worth noting that unusually large claim that they “don’t know” what the economic future holds minorities – perhaps for fear of tempting fate. This cautious view is especially prevalent in countries with predominantly rural populations, for instance Mali and Tanzania.

*** indicates statistical significance at $p \leq .001$

Table 1.2: Personal Economic Conditions

In general, how would you describe:		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Your own present living conditions	Fairly/Very Good	25	15	27	39	8	19	24	40	49	45	26	37	25	35	33	30
	Neither Good nor Bad	23	56	9	26	6	7	14	27	24	15	30	17	26	15	9	20
	Fairly/Very Bad	51	29	64	35	86	75	63	31	27	39	44	46	48	50	57	50
	Don't Know	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
In general, how do you rate:																	
Your living conditions compared to those of other (people in your country)	Better/Much better	32	22	34	34	12	24	26	34	46	46	19	49	24	31	38	32
	Same	27	43	19	38	26	12	37	28	29	20	49	24	31	19	18	28
	Worse/Much worse	38	22	39	24	61	60	35	32	22	30	25	23	40	45	36	36
	Don't Know	3	13	8	4	1	3	3	5	3	4	6	3	5	4	8	5
Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago:																	
Your living conditions	Better/Much better	29	34	35	44	18	29	42	39	36	46	35	33	33	38	42	35
	Same	43	47	25	35	34	21	18	32	45	23	22	37	32	27	28	31
	Worse/Much worse	28	18	39	21	46	49	38	27	19	31	43	29	33	34	30	32
	Don't Know	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	1	2	2	1	1	1
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:																	
Your living conditions in twelve months time	Better/Much better	52	84	64	77	22	36	57	47	65	74	54	42	41	51	50	54
	Same	15	7	11	9	21	13	7	20	25	9	11	24	17	13	13	14
	Worse/Much worse	16	4	11	4	32	29	12	11	5	11	18	24	19	22	18	16
	Don't Know	18	5	14	10	25	22	24	22	5	6	17	11	23	14	19	16

1.3. The Experience of Poverty

In order to gain further insight into African economic worldviews, the Afrobarometer asks, “**in your opinion, what does it mean to be poor?**” The responses to this open-ended question – to which people answer in their own words with up to three responses – indicate that poverty is not seen exclusively, or even primarily, in monetary terms. Instead, as Amartya Sen and Robert Chambers have noted, poverty is a multifaceted and mutually reinforcing set of vulnerabilities.

Among the Africans we interviewed, the most common popular interpretation of poverty is **lack of food**, which is mentioned by 47 percent of all respondents (table not shown). The connection between poverty and hunger is made by more than two-thirds of all adults in places like Nigeria and Mali. It is no accident that large parts of these two West African countries fall in the unreliable rainfall zone of the Sahel. **Lack of money** is the next most common response, mentioned by 36 percent of all respondents, especially in countries like Ghana and Uganda that have experienced significant recent transitions toward a market-based economy. **Lack of employment** (23 percent) infuses the meaning of poverty in South Africa and Cape Verde, and **lack of shelter** (22 percent) is important in South Africa and Botswana.

Africans are more likely to regard themselves as poor than rich. Table 1.3 reports Africans’ self-perceptions of where they stand on a livelihood ladder with eleven steps, where zero is “poor” and ten is “rich.” Strikingly, there is no African country in which the adult population places itself even half way up the ladder. All aggregate country scores fall below the mid-point (5), in a range from 1.9 in Malawi to 4.8 in Nigeria, with an average country score of 3.6.

Each generation is seen to occupy a different rung on the livelihood ladder. In 13 out of the 15 countries studied, adults consider themselves worse off today than their parents were ten years ago (mean score for all 15 countries = 4.1). Only in Botswana and Tanzania do people see themselves as better off than the previous generation, a telling indictment of persistent crisis and continuing economic decline in the rest of the continent. Because hope springs eternal, however, respondents in every country expect their children to climb out of poverty onto the higher end of the livelihood ladder (mean score for all 15 countries = 6.6). By a large margin, Nigerians (9.1) are again the most optimistic about the economic prospects of the next generation.

Turning from subjective perceptions to experiential indicators of poverty, we ask people to catalogue the shortages of basic goods and services they actually encountered over the previous year. **Fully three quarters reported shortages of cash income** (calculated by adding those who encountered such shortages “once or twice/several times” with “many times/always”). By the same formula, 58 percent ran short of medicines or medical treatment (especially in Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia) and 53 percent ran short of food. Fewer people encountered deficits of clean water (46 percent) and cooking fuel (42 percent), though almost half of all adults sometimes ran short of these necessities as well.

These data suggest that **poverty is a daily reality for many Africans**, even in middle income countries like Botswana and South Africa. But, on a continent that is not yet fully integrated into the global cash economy, Africans themselves continue to define poverty less in terms of shortages of cash income than in terms of getting enough to eat.

Table 1.3: The Experience of Poverty

On a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 are "poor" people and 10 are "rich" people, which number would you:		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Give yourself today	Mean rating	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.8	2.7	1.9	4.0	2.6	4.0	4.8	4.0	4.6	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.6
Give your parents 10 years ago	Mean rating	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.1	3.7	2.5	4.7	3.2	4.2	5.2	5.3	6.0	3.5	3.9	4.9	4.1
Expect your children to attain in the future	Mean rating	7.2	7.4	7.2	7.6	4.0	4.1	7.5	5.2	7.0	9.1	6.8	7.6	5.6	5.5	6.7	6.6
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without:																	
Enough food to eat	Never	49	69	60	44	20	17	47	44	57	55	59	64	55	48	22	47
	Once or Twice/Several Times	32	21	32	42	36	42	30	28	32	38	28	28	31	43	58	35
	Many times/Always	19	10	8	14	44	41	23	28	11	7	12	9	13	9	20	18
	Don't Know	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enough clean water for home use	Never	68	40	58	55	49	52	63	60	61	36	47	72	52	50	54	55
	Once or Twice/Several Times	21	29	28	31	30	23	21	21	27	42	34	15	25	32	31	27
	Many times/Always	11	31	15	14	21	24	16	18	11	22	19	12	23	17	15	18
	Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medicines or medical treatment	Never	71	51	45	32	21	25	45	34	52	41	38	66	46	30	27	42
	Once or Twice/Several Times	20	28	39	50	51	45	29	32	37	45	36	24	37	49	55	38
	Many times/Always	9	21	15	18	28	30	26	33	11	14	25	9	17	21	17	20
	Don't Know	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enough fuel to cook your food	Never	55	54	73	56	37	44	69	66	66	36	56	72	69	56	50	57
	Once or Twice/Several Times	33	29	20	35	42	40	18	17	28	47	29	20	22	34	39	30
	Many times/Always	12	18	7	8	21	16	13	14	6	18	14	7	8	10	10	12
	Don't Know	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
A cash income	Never	32	34	30	15	8	6	21	31	31	29	21	52	25	9	13	24
	Once or Twice/Several Times	34	32	40	52	30	42	31	22	46	53	39	32	41	45	54	39
	Many times/Always	33	34	29	33	61	53	48	41	23	18	40	16	34	46	33	36
	Don't Know	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

1.4. Attitudes to a Market Economy

In a quest for economic recovery, African governments have experimented over the last two decades with market reforms recommended by international donors and lenders. Do local producers and consumers understand what is at stake in these reforms? And do they **support or reject a market economy**?

When posed with a choice, Afrobarometer respondents are somewhat more likely to **opt for a “free market economy”** rather than a “government-run economy” (44 percent versus 37 percent). In ten out of the 15 African countries studied people prefer a market system to central planning though, in Mali and Zambia, public opinion is essentially split on this issue. Importantly, too, one out of every five respondents is either uninformed about (7 percent), or indifferent to (13 percent), the “state versus market” debate. In fact, our interviewers report that questions about alternative economic regimes (especially the abstract concept of a “free market”) prove difficult for many respondents to comprehend and answer.

When regime preferences are probed with more concrete questions, the level of detachment declines. But, as public opinion comes into focus, we discover that **popular economic attitudes are highly contradictory**.

Take a first example. On one hand, a clear overall majority agrees with an approach to economic management in which “**government** plans the production and distribution of all goods and services” (59 percent), a view consistent with popular preferences for “a government-run economy.” On the other hand, an even larger proportion prefers that “**individuals** decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell,” (69 percent), a view that is consonant with a more market-oriented approach.

Take a second example. On one hand, a clear overall majority approves of economic **self-reliance**, insofar as “people go back to the land and provide mainly for their own needs as a community” (68 percent). On the other hand, a majority also expresses **dependence** on economic patrons, agreeing that wealthy people should “provide for the needs of their own communities” (52 percent). The tension between self-reliance and dependence is further reflected in the divided opinion about whether “economic experts (should) make the most important decisions about the economy” (41 percent approve, 39 percent disapprove).

It is possible to construe these contradictory findings in a negative or positive light. A hard-headed interpretation would attribute mass attitudes to economic illiteracy and popular confusion about the tough choices confronting African economies. From this perspective, **Africans apparently feel trapped between state and market**. A more generous interpretation would point to an emerging popular consensus that the contrast between state and market is a forced choice that people and policy makers should not have to make. Perhaps **what Africans are trying to say is that they prefer a mixed economy** in which an active state guides and regulates a vibrant market economy but does not control or stifle it.

We leave it to readers to arrive at their own conclusions on this matter.

Table 1.4: Attitudes to a Market Economy

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A: A free market economy is preferable to an economy run by the government.	24	43	51	43	26	54	41	52	39	50	42	37	53	57	46	44
B: A government-run economy is preferable to a free market economy.	58	24	31	48	55	32	44	27	29	33	44	28	27	33	41	37
C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of economic system we have.	12	14	11	5	11	11	13	8	28	13	12	23	9	8	11	13
Don't Know	6	19	8	5	8	3	2	14	4	4	2	12	11	2	3	7
There are many ways to manage an economy. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?																
The government plans the production and distribution of all goods and services.	19	24	37	27	25	15	24	31	11	45	31	34	28	37	31	28
Individuals decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell.	6	8	9	7	4	4	10	6	13	13	12	15	13	6	4	9
People go back to the land and provide mainly for their own needs as a community.	72	51	49	62	66	81	62	48	73	41	55	44	55	57	65	59
Wealthy (people from this country) provide for the needs of their own communities.	3	18	5	4	6	1	3	16	3	2	2	7	4	1	1	5
Economic experts make the most important decisions about our economy.	13	16	23	25	16	14	20	12	5	25	26	17	15	19	35	19
	7	9	10	8	6	5	9	10	11	15	14	17	11	6	5	10
	79	68	65	65	77	80	70	70	83	60	59	62	71	74	59	69
	1	8	3	3	2	1	1	8	1	1	1	3	3	0	1	3
	13	23	24	27	17	11	13	12	9	28	19	22	15	21	17	18
	7	10	11	10	6	7	7	13	14	21	12	23	11	9	4	11
	80	62	62	60	76	82	79	60	74	50	67	51	69	69	78	68
	1	5	3	3	1	1	1	15	2	1	1	4	5	1	1	3
	60	34	22	38	33	17	23	34	27	37	22	30	39	35	29	32
	6	10	11	8	4	6	12	13	21	17	7	24	14	10	6	11
	32	49	62	51	60	77	62	35	48	44	70	39	39	54	63	52
	2	7	4	3	3	1	3	18	3	2	2	8	8	1	2	5
	47	29	32	48	40	21	43	29	34	42	49	35	31	42	56	39
	6	8	9	9	4	7	10	11	20	18	13	23	12	10	5	11
	41	48	46	34	50	66	42	32	40	35	35	31	45	41	36	41
	7	15	13	9	6	6	6	28	6	5	3	11	12	6	3	9

1.5. Economic Policy Preferences

Even if Africans desire a mixed economy, their vision favors **state intervention above market forces**. We reach this judgment from survey responses to questions about particular economic policies. Out of six such policies, Afrobarometer respondents choose a market approach in two cases and a controlled approach in four other cases.

On the free market side:

First, **people call for the protection of property rights** under a rule of law. Four out of five respondents (82 percent) insist that, “the government must abide by the law in acquiring any property, including paying the owner.” Ugandans, perhaps remembering the expropriation of Asian properties under Idi Amin, are most insistent on this score. There is some sympathy for uncompensated property seizures in Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, countries that border on Zimbabwe and where, in the past, white settlers set a precedent of expropriating property (notably land). Everywhere else, however, land grabs are roundly rejected.

Second, as long as educational standards improve, **a clear majority is willing to pay fees for education** (59 percent, versus 37 percent opposed). This sentiment prevails in 13 of the 15 Afrobarometer countries, including even in some countries (like Uganda and Malawi) that recently introduced free primary education. In Kenya, however, where the new government took on a full school subsidy in 2003, a majority presently considers that “it is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low.”

On the side of state intervention:

First, **most people want the government to remain involved in agricultural marketing** (58 percent, versus 32 percent opposed). This policy preference prevails in every country studied, by the largest margins in Malawi, South Africa and Botswana. In these places, people agree that, rather than allowing private traders to handle agricultural marketing, “it is better for government to buy and sell crops, even if some farmers are served late.”

Second, by a larger margin, **public opinion also favors international trade barriers** (64 percent, versus 29 percent opposed). Especially in Botswana, Kenya and Zambia, people think that “we must protect producers within our own country by imposing tariffs.” There is no country where the general public prefers the importation of affordable goods from abroad, especially if “some of our own producers are forced out of business.”

Third, by a large margin in Ghana, among other places, there is **widespread popular resistance to public sector reform**. Wherever Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted, more people think that “civil servants should keep their jobs” than favor the downsizing of the public bureaucracy. The margin of this pro-state, anti-market sentiment is very wide (70 percent versus 23 percent) and must be understood in the context of the desperate shortages of paid employment in African economies (see Section 2.5 below). Only in Tanzania – famous for its bloated and politicized bureaucracy – is there any significant minority support for public sector reform.

Finally, again consistent with mass joblessness, **Africans overwhelmingly favor full employment at low wages** over a smaller number of better-paying jobs (83 percent versus 14 percent). In Cape Verde and Lesotho, the population is virtually unanimous (94 percent) in opposing a free market in wages.

Table 1.5: Economic Policy Preferences

Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A: The government must abide by the law in acquiring any property, including paying the owner.	83	92	87	87	89	88	78	54	56	89	89	68	83	95	86	82
B: In order to develop the country, the government should have the power to seize property without compensation.	11	4	10	9	9	8	14	20	33	9	8	17	12	3	9	12
Do not agree with either	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	9	7	1	2	7	2	1	2	3
Don't know	5	2	2	3	2	0	4	17	5	1	1	8	3	1	3	4
A: It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low.	43	27	24	54	57	40	28	46	31	33	19	26	41	44	41	37
B: It is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees.	52	69	71	43	39	56	70	48	68	64	71	67	54	55	54	59
Do not agree with either	4	2	4	2	3	3	2	3	1	2	10	5	3	1	4	3
Don't know	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
A: It is better for private traders to handle agricultural marketing, even if some farmers get left out.	27	34	28	27	32	25	30	38	27	43	38	30	39	47	19	32
B: It is better for government to buy and sell crops, even if some farmers are served late.	65	47	63	64	58	73	66	42	60	50	53	46	51	50	77	58
Do not agree with either	5	8	8	5	5	2	4	8	9	6	8	13	7	3	4	6
Don't know	3	12	1	4	5	0	1	13	4	1	1	10	3	1	0	4
A: It is a good idea to import affordable goods from other countries, even if some of our own producers are forced out of business.	15	26	26	20	39	37	29	34	23	35	28	23	39	35	23	29
B: We must protect producers within our own country by imposing tariffs that make imported goods more expensive.	77	62	66	75	52	59	69	49	71	61	66	60	54	63	74	64
Do not agree with either	4	6	5	2	3	2	2	4	4	3	5	8	3	1	2	4
Don't know	4	7	3	3	6	2	0	13	2	2	0	9	4	1	1	4
A: All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.	66	73	79	75	79	81	68	57	66	80	74	54	51	69	76	70
B: The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off.	26	16	15	20	15	17	28	21	28	17	19	30	40	29	22	23
Do not agree with either	6	6	3	4	3	2	4	9	4	2	6	9	5	1	1	4
Don't know	2	5	2	2	2	1	1	14	2	1	1	7	4	1	1	3
A: It is better for everyone to have a job even if this means that average wages are low.	76	94	88	87	94	74	87	69	79	85	87	76	69	88	82	83
B: It is better to have higher wages, even if this means that some people go without a job.	21	5	8	11	5	24	11	18	20	13	10	11	23	11	16	14
Do not agree with either	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	7	1	2	3	10	6	0	2	3
Don't know	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	1

1.6. Satisfaction with Economic Reform

After two decades of economic liberalization, the general public in most African countries has **yet to embrace a reform agenda**. Reasons are not hard to find: the initiative for structural adjustment came mainly from abroad; African leaders rarely implemented market reforms in full; and ordinary citizens were seldom consulted in the policy-making process.

Mass ambivalence to partially implemented, donor-mandated reforms is well illustrated in the general public's expressed dissatisfaction with "the government's reduced role in the economy." **Slightly more people are dissatisfied than satisfied** (48 versus 43 percent). In only 4 countries in 2002-3 is a majority satisfied with reform outcomes: Ghana (54 percent), Tanzania (57 percent), Namibia (58 percent), and Kenya (67 percent). Everywhere else, dissatisfaction is the order of the day, for example in Cape Verde (only 19 percent satisfied), Senegal, and Nigeria (both 34 percent).

Growing social inequalities are a driving force for popular dissatisfaction with market-oriented economic reforms. Overall, twice as many of the Africans interviewed think that "the government's economic policies" have "hurt most people" (61 percent) than have "helped most people" (31 percent). While many have suffered, reforms have "only benefited a few." This view is most strongly held in Nigeria, Zambia, and Uganda, where three times as many people think that economic reform incurs more costs than benefits. Only in Mozambique does a slim majority believe that "the government's economic policies have helped most people."

Under these circumstances, one might expect that Africans are ready to abandon a package of policies designed to introduce a market economy. But – against the grain of all the attitudes reported so far – Afrobarometer respondents display **a remarkable degree of economic patience**.

The facts are as follows: overall, almost twice as many people are willing "to accept some hardships now...in order for the economy to get better in the future" (57 percent) as call for the government to "abandon its current policies" because "the costs of reforming the economy are too high" (31 percent). Kenyans, Ghanaians and Batswana are the most patient (all above 70 percent), whereas Malawians (40 percent) and Mozambicans (37 percent) are the least so.

Perhaps this unexpectedly widespread sense of **forbearance arises from the high expectations** that people harbor for the future economic success of their own and their children's generations. This conjecture is only weakly confirmed by the modest positive correlation between economic patience and popular evaluations of the future condition of the national economy (Pearsons' $R = .094^{**}$). Or maybe they recognize the continuing desperate need for economic reform even as they reject several of the specific structural adjustment measures that have been tried so far. Whatever the reason, and notwithstanding the years of hardship they have already faced, ordinary Africans appear willing to wait still longer for better economic times to arrive.

**indicates statistical significance at $p < .01$.

Table 1.6: Satisfaction with Economic Reform

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
As you may know, the government has reduced its role in the economy. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way this policy works?	9	5	19	15	8	10	16	13	15	5	8	5	16	7	7	11
	34	14	35	52	17	22	28	35	43	29	26	27	41	42	31	32
	21	40	20	16	28	24	22	25	22	28	20	31	18	26	28	25
	28	28	13	8	26	35	27	17	13	31	41	23	14	20	23	23
	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	4	3	1	2	2
	6	12	12	7	19	7	6	9	4	4	3	10	8	3	8	8
Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)																
A: The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered.	39	27	28	23	41	26	33	42	45	24	25	25	35	25	24	31
B: The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few.	53	58	60	67	47	71	58	38	46	73	69	64	56	73	73	61
Do not agree with either	4	6	6	4	4	1	5	6	6	2	4	6	5	1	2	4
Don't know	4	9	6	6	8	2	5	13	3	1	2	5	4	1	1	5
A: The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies.	21	25	16	13	32	55	35	31	30	40	36	31	30	36	39	31
B: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.	72	53	72	78	56	40	57	37	60	53	55	45	58	59	50	57
Do not agree with either	4	5	5	3	4	2	3	12	3	4	6	13	6	2	9	5
Don't know	4	17	6	6	8	3	6	20	2	2	2	10	5	3	3	7

SECTION 2: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

2.1. Cultural Values: Social

Public opinion in African countries is bound to bear the stamp of the continent's distinctive cultural values. But what are these? Do Africans, as reputed, elevate the community above the individual? Do they also insist on social equality, even if this involves sharing poverty?

First, let us consider the place of the individual in the community:

Just as Africans straddle state and market, so **they struggle to reconcile collective and individual values**. Almost exactly equal proportions think, on the one hand that, “the government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people” (49 percent) and, on the other hand, that “people should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life” (48 percent). One can hardly imagine a starker illustration of people torn between two worlds. This tension recurs in all of the countries surveyed, especially in Ghana. The exceptions are Lesotho, where individualists predominate, and Uganda, where collectivists do.

A similar breakdown of opinion occurs between those who think that, “each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own interests” (46 percent) and those who think that, “everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals” (50 percent). There is more cross-country variation here than on the previous item, with Cape Verdians and Batswana evincing strong individualism, but Malians and Senegalese praising the values of traditional village life. Yet, reflecting social change, one might speculate from these data that **attitudes of individualism are beginning to edge ahead**.

Second, we find that a spirit of egalitarianism is alive and well:

For example, **Africans affirm that they are uncomfortable with wide wealth differentials**. More people wish to “avoid large gaps between the rich and the poor” (56 percent) than find acceptable “large differences of wealth” (38 percent). This positive bias toward economic equality holds even though people are asked to consider that hard work deserves to be recognized. Perhaps they doubt the connection between hard work and just reward under conditions of pervasive poverty. Or perhaps with reference to corruption, they judge the risks of “jealousy and conflict” to be simply too high. Namibians and Kenyans are the most egalitarian in this regard and Basotho are the least so.

We also detect **a clear popular preference for gender equality**, even if this challenges customary norms. More than two-thirds of all respondents consider that “women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men”, compared to under one third that avers that, “women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.” Values of gender equality are most widespread in Tanzania, Namibia and South Africa, not least because of the enforcement of constitutional provisions to this effect. Mali is the only country to buck the trend: a clear majority (59 percent) in this male-dominated Muslim society wishes to perpetuate the subordination of women.

Lastly, Afrobarometer respondents assert **a very strong commitment to political equality**. Whereas 78 percent think that, “all people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not understand all the issues in an election,” just 17 percent insist that “only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.” This pattern is highly consistent across countries and especially marked in Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia. But, even in Nigeria – where “only” 71 percent opt for a universal franchise – a significant majority favors political equality.

Table 2.1: Cultural Values: Social

Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A. People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.	48	56	47	41	63	48	51	45	43	43	52	50	51	34	48	48
B. The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people.	50	40	47	57	34	50	47	48	55	56	41	42	45	65	51	49
Do not agree with either	2	3	5	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	7	6	3	1	1	3
Don't Know	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	5	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
A. Each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own interests.	28	20	61	52	47	42	68	41	35	47	78	31	48	44	42	46
B. Everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals.	68	71	34	46	50	52	31	45	63	51	19	62	49	55	52	50
Do not agree with either	2	2	3	2	2	4	1	6	2	2	3	4	2	1	5	3
Don't Know	2	6	2	1	1	1	0	8	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	2
A. It is alright to have large differences of wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded.	38	36	43	30	54	41	46	31	29	40	34	35	32	40	42	38
B. We should avoid large gaps between rich and the poor because they create jealousy and conflict.	54	58	50	66	43	52	49	53	67	57	58	50	62	58	56	56
Do not agree with either	5	2	6	3	2	5	3	5	3	2	7	11	4	1	2	4
Don't Know	2	4	2	1	1	2	3	12	1	1	1	4	2	0	0	2
A. Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.	20	19	20	27	45	30	59	32	15	29	47	13	14	36	33	29
B. In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.	78	78	76	71	53	68	39	62	84	70	48	83	84	63	65	68
Do not agree with either	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	5	3	2	1	1	2
Don't Know	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	4	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
A. All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.	81	85	81	90	81	80	77	63	73	71	88	63	75	76	84	78
B. Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.	12	13	14	8	9	13	21	26	21	27	10	21	19	24	15	17
Do not agree with either	6	1	4	2	8	5	1	7	5	1	1	12	4	1	1	4
Don't Know	1	2	1	0	2	2	1	4	1	0	0	4	2	0	0	1

2.2. Cultural Values: Political

We now turn to the political dimensions of inherited cultural values. By what processes do Africans prefer to make decisions? How do ordinary people view their relationships with political leaders? Do they seek patronage or do they demand political accountability? On the basis of expressed political values, we wish to discern whether Afrobarometer respondents see themselves as **clients or citizens**.

Africans are divided on whether political decisions should be made by consensus.

Just half say that, “in order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees” (50 percent). The other half embraces a more competitive style of decision-making: “since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion” (46 percent). An inherited, deliberative style is still favored in Senegal, Mali and Tanzania, whereas a more adversarial approach is now accepted in Uganda, Namibia and Kenya. One supposes that, if multiparty elections ever become institutionalized in Africa, people will increasingly learn to live with vigorous political pluralism.

Following an era of one-party and military rule, **people now want to influence the decisions taken by political leaders**. Many more assert that, “as citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders” (68 percent) than defer to the view that “in this country these days, we should show more respect for authority” (28 percent). This pattern holds across almost all countries surveyed, suggesting the emergence of a general norm favoring citizen involvement in decision making. The only exception in 2002-3 is Namibia, where a clear majority (58 percent) is apparently willing to delegate decision-making to a strong leader.

Afrobarometer respondents **favor electing ordinary people**, rather than wealthy elites, into positions of political power (67 versus 26 percent). Even Namibians now agree.

And by an even larger margin, most Africans think that, once in office, **leaders should treat all groups equally** rather than favoring their own home areas. This unexpected finding holds everywhere but Cape Verde, where people find it entirely legitimate that representatives should service their home “communities” (see note to Table 2.2). Even Mozambicans, who find this question especially hard to answer, come out slightly in favor of leaders serving everyone.

Taking all the above responses together, one might be tempted to conclude that there is evidence of the **stirrings of citizenship** among African populations. They want to be involved in decision making, to elect ordinary people into office, and to give and receive equal treatment. It therefore appears contradictory when we discover that they **still see themselves as the clients of “big men”**. In a stunning reversal, a clear majority thinks that “people are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent” (58 percent). Just over one third hold the opposing, citizen-oriented view that “government is an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government” (36 percent).

It is difficult to interpret these cross-cutting currents in African political values. Perhaps people are just beginning to form their opinions on these important issues. Or, maybe, in countries in transition, ordinary folk feel genuinely ambivalent about their own place in the political system. They clearly want cleaner and more accountable governance than has been delivered by previous post-colonial rulers. But they also want a benevolent parental hand at the helm of the national state that will address problems of public welfare and perhaps even absolve them from the burdens of active citizenship.

Table 2.2: Cultural Values: Political

Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A. In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees.	39	59	48	41	55	52	66	50	39	46	71	41	56	40	44	50
B. Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community.	57	35	48	58	42	47	32	33	59	52	28	47	40	59	55	46
Do not agree with either	3	0	2	1	2	1	1	4	1	2	1	7	2	0	1	2
Don't Know	2	6	2	1	1	0	1	13	1	1	0	5	3	1	0	2
A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.	62	63	80	75	76	82	70	51	36	66	71	67	73	82	73	68
B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority.	35	27	15	23	21	17	24	35	59	32	25	24	23	17	25	27
Do not agree with either	2	2	3	1	3	0	1	4	2	1	4	5	2	0	1	2
Don't Know	2	9	2	0	1	1	5	10	3	1	1	4	2	1	1	3
A. It is better to have wealthy people as leaders because they can help provide for the community.	24	11	26	15	21	29	27	35	37	29	29	17	28	24	37	26
B. It is better to have ordinary people as leaders because they understand our needs.	66	82	66	80	76	62	67	47	56	66	61	75	68	73	59	67
Do not agree with either	8	2	7	5	2	7	4	8	5	4	9	6	4	2	3	5
Don't Know	2	4	2	0	1	1	2	10	2	1	0	2	1	0	1	2
A. Since everyone is equal under the law, leaders should not favor their own family or group.	77	23	68	86	84	89	66	42	72	78	83	77	74	68	87	72
B. Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their own family or group. ¹	19	72	28	11	14	10	28	35	23	20	16	12	23	31	9	24
Do not agree with either	2	1	3	3	1	0	5	9	4	2	0	7	2	1	3	3
Don't Know	2	5	1	1	1	0	1	14	1	0	1	3	2	0	1	2
A. People are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent.	47	69	61	44	55	69	63	60	63	68	51	44	60	59	60	58
B. Government is an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government.	46	23	29	52	42	28	35	30	32	29	42	38	35	40	37	36
Do not agree with either	5	4	8	4	2	2	2	4	3	1	7	14	4	1	2	4
Don't Know	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	7	1	1	1	4	1	0	1	2

¹ In Cape Verde (as well as in Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda) option B was worded as "help their own home communities."

2.3. Social Conflict

Is Africa a continent of ethnic violence? Certainly the Western mass media selectively portray it as such. The results of Afrobarometer Round 2 cast doubt on this stereotype, while also documenting pockets of armed conflict – and their perceived causes – when and where these do occur.

By an overwhelming majority, respondents to our surveys report that **violence “rarely” or “never” arises within their own families** (79 percent). While incidents of domestic violence are reportedly highest in Zambia, Uganda and Botswana, such events are said to occur very infrequently in Cape Verde and Senegal. More than half of all respondents – notably in Malawi and Mozambique – also report peaceful conditions within the local communities where they live. Major exceptions include Lesotho and Uganda, where more than half of the Africans interviewed indicate that social strife breaks out, at least sometimes, within their village or neighborhood.

Some Africans even claim national harmony. For example, more than half of all adult Zambians, Cape Verdians, and Malawians consider that inter-communal violence “rarely” or “never” surfaces between “different groups in this country.” Instead, social clashes are reported more frequently in places where political leaders have mobilized ethnic followings, including armed militias. Perhaps recalling the atrocities by Lord’s Resistance Army or the Odu’a People’s Congress, Ugandans and Nigerians report the most inter-communal violence (three quarters say it happens at least “sometimes”). And Kenyans also make reference to incidents like the Moi government’s sponsorship of ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley.

It is noteworthy, however, that fewer than one in five Africans thinks that violent social conflict is a regular or permanent feature of national politics (19 percent).

Moreover, people tend to blame political leaders for stirring up conflict rather than seeing violence as an innate feature of African societies. When asked to identify the sorts of problems that give rise to conflict, people point first and foremost to **struggles for political leadership**. The object of these struggles may be the national presidency or a local chieftaincy, but the trademark characteristic is that ambitious leaders mobilize support by dividing ordinary people against each other.

Again counter to conventional wisdom, Africans are more likely to attribute social conflict to **economic causes rather than ethnic ones**. They speak about “land,” “boundaries,” “natural resources,” and “poverty” before they mention “tribalism.” And group differences arise no more often than problems of personal behavior (“lack of respect”) or interpersonal exchange (“disagreements”).

This having been said, **countries have distinctive profiles of social conflict**. Whereas Malawians are likely to accuse political leaders of stirring up trouble, Nigerians are just as likely to think that conflict represents real ethnic divisions. Predictably, land disputes lead the way in Kenya, whereas problems of poverty and inequality are cited as uppermost in Mozambique. While alcohol abuse sparks social conflict in Namibia and Cape Verde, disputes over traditional chieftaincies are central to local politics in Botswana and Ghana. Only in Nigeria, however, where Christians and Muslims have clashed violently over the introduction of *sharia*, is religion an important source of social conflict.

Finally, we note that, like people anywhere, **Africans abhor violence**. Even in support of a just political cause, a mere 20 percent think that violence is ever acceptable. Only in former Portuguese colonies do almost one third continue to favor liberation movement tactics. Otherwise, a clear majority (73 percent, but 82 percent without Mozambique and Cape Verde) thinks that the use violence is *never* justified in the politics of their country.

Table 2.3: Social Conflict

In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between people:		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Within your own family	Never/Rarely	71	92	79	74	82	86	80	77	78	84	90	85	74	69	66	79
	Sometimes	22	5	16	21	9	9	14	13	18	13	8	12	20	25	29	16
	Often/Always	7	3	4	5	9	5	5	7	3	3	2	3	6	5	4	5
	Don't know	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Within the community where you live	Never/Rarely	47	56	63	51	36	66	64	66	56	59	65	65	58	35	44	55
	Sometimes	32	23	28	39	33	21	22	15	31	31	25	22	29	48	41	29
	Often/Always	18	19	7	10	29	12	11	16	11	10	8	11	12	16	14	14
	Don't know	4	2	2	0	2	1	3	3	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	2
Between different groups in this country	Never/Rarely	46	66	39	34	29	63	51	55	55	25	52	44	48	20	69	47
	Sometimes	30	13	39	42	24	16	23	10	27	42	28	26	30	45	23	28
	Often/Always	14	12	15	21	37	14	19	18	14	32	13	22	19	30	8	19
	Don't know	10	9	8	2	10	7	7	17	4	1	7	7	2	5	0	6
Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts most often arise between groups in the country?																	
Politics/Political Leadership		10	12	12	19	16	23	7	17	7	16	11	20	22	20	18	16
Resource/Boundary/Land Disputes		12	<1	20	29	15	7	20	4	5	21	13	8	12	14	13	15
Economic Problems/Poverty/Economic Inequality		3	11	3	8	4	5	18	25	13	7	10	9	12	16	8	10
Ethnic/Tribal Differences		19	<1	5	9	1	9	4	4	8	14	9	9	6	7	11	8
Personal Behaviours (lack of respect, etc.)		16	21	6	5	12	9	7	7	13	3	11	3	10	5	9	8
Poor Communications/Disagreements		4	10	12	2	9	14	9	6	8	1	8	7	3	5	5	7
Interpersonal/Family Matters		1	1	6	3	5	6	11	2	7	1	8	4	4	9	5	5
Alcohol/Drugs		2	15	1	1	14	9	0	3	19	<1	<1	3	4	5	4	5
Religion		<1	1	3	1	3	2	1	1	1	24	2	2	7	3	1	4
Traditional Leadership Disputes		15	0	16	0	<1	2	<1	<1	<1	2	<1	1	<1	<1	5	3
Discrimination/Inequality		8	8	2	1	<1	2	2	4	4	2	3	5	3	3	3	3
Crime		2	4	1	2	9	5	2	5	5	<1	3	5	3	3	3	3
Animals/Livestock		<1	0	0	14	2	0	10	0	1	<1	0	0	2	1	0	3
Other		8	18	13	8	9	7	9	24	10	8	22	26	13	11	16	12
Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)																	
A. The use of violence is never justified (your country's) politics.		83	53	82	80	81	84	70	47	67	73	80	73	75	73	75	73
B. In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.		11	31	11	18	16	14	23	27	26	22	17	15	22	25	17	20
Do not agree with either		3	4	5	1	2	1	3	10	5	2	3	7	3	1	4	4
Don't know		3	12	2	1	2	1	4	16	3	2	1	5	0	2	4	4

2.4. Safety and Security

Do individuals feel safe in their surroundings? For people to attain a sense of personal security, deviant social behavior must be controlled, either by cohesive communities or by the agencies of an effective state. But state and society are breaking down in many parts of Africa. Thus crime has become a harsh daily reality, a reality that the Afrobarometer seeks to describe, especially in its variations across countries.

We start by asking: Have you ever feared a crime in your own home? Had something stolen? Been physically attacked? The responses to these items cohere into a single syndrome that can be thought of collectively as **fear of crime**.

One-third of all respondents (34 percent) say they worry about being a victim of crime while in their own homes. This fear is especially pronounced in Kenya (59 percent) and South Africa (52 percent). Almost three out of ten respondents (29 percent) report a theft of property in the past year, most notably in Kenya and Zambia (both 40 percent). And an extraordinary **12 out of every 100 Africans interviewed reveal that they were physically attacked** during the same period. This kind of violent crime is most frequent in Nigeria (where 20 percent report attacks) and Kenya (18 percent), but it is frequent also in South Africa and Uganda (both 16 percent).

By contrast, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali and Malawi are havens of relative security.

All too often, **victims of crime have nowhere to turn**. Especially in Africa's urban areas where community ties may be weak and the police force is often corrupt, it is not clear how ordinary people can defend themselves. The survey asked: "if you were the victim of a violent crime" what would you do? Would you "turn to the police for help?" Or would you "find a way to take revenge yourself?" It is somewhat reassuring to discover that, although the police are one of the most distrusted public institutions, people would nonetheless refrain from taking the law into their own hands. Across 15 countries, fully 86 percent would call for police assistance, especially in Botswana, Kenya, and Uganda (over 90 percent). The least law-abiding countries in this regard are Namibia, Mali and Nigeria, where – at least in Nigeria's case – vigilante groups are filling the void left by an incompetent and thoroughly corrupted police force.

There is a **glimmer of good news** in many African countries regarding popular assessments of **government performance at crime control**. Unlike in Russia, where the relaxation of strong government led to spiraling crime, the general public in African countries does not seem to place blame for security problems at the feet of newly elected governments. In 10 of 15 countries surveyed, at least a plurality of people consider that safety from crime and violence has improved, not worsened, since the introduction of multiparty rule during the 1990s. Only in South Africa and Malawi do strong majorities (of 60 percent or more) think that personal and public security has recently worsened.

Table 2.4: Safety and Security

Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family:		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Feared crime in your own home	Never	75	73	71	41	52	84	79	76	76	62	73	49	51	59	56	65
	Once or twice/Several times	20	15	25	38	18	13	14	14	20	34	18	32	32	28	29	23
	Many times/Always	6	11	4	21	30	2	7	9	4	4	9	20	16	13	15	11
	Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Had something stolen from your house	Never	71	78	75	60	78	75	75	78	70	65	72	70	66	73	60	71
	Once or twice/Several times	26	18	22	36	16	23	18	18	26	32	20	27	31	25	38	25
	Many times/Always	3	3	3	4	6	2	6	4	4	3	8	3	3	2	2	4
	Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Been physically attacked	Never	88	92	91	82	87	93	92	92	88	81	90	84	89	85	89	88
	Once or twice/Several times	10	7	7	16	11	6	5	7	11	17	6	14	9	15	10	10
	Many times/Always	2	1	2	2	2	1	3	1	1	2	4	2	2	1	0	2
	Don't Know	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Which of the following statements is closest to your view; A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)																	
A. If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would turn to the police for help.		92	90	89	93	89	90	69	79	77	81	79	84	87	92	91	86
B. If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would find a way to take revenge yourself.		6	7	7	5	10	8	17	15	21	16	10	11	11	7	5	10
Do not agree with either.		1	2	4	2	1	1	12	4	1	2	11	3	2	1	3	3
Don't know.		0	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Comparing our present system of government with the former system of government, ² are the following things worse or better:																	
Safety from crime and violence.	Better/Much Better	22	36	52	63	51	25	53	45	65	36	50	25	44	68	48	45
	Same	44	15	22	25	12	8	10	12	13	26	23	13	18	11	17	18
	Worse/Much Worse	31	42	20	10	31	66	32	30	22	36	24	60	36	19	27	32
	Don't Know	3	8	6	2	6	1	6	13	0	2	3	2	3	3	9	4

² "The former system of government" referred to the following: in Botswana, the Masire government; in Cape Verde, the system before 1991; in Ghana, the Rawlings administration; in Kenya, the Moi government; in Lesotho, the former military government; in Malawi, Dr. Muluzi's first term (1994-1999); in Mali, the former one-party system; in Mozambique, the system before multiparty elections; in Namibia, the former system of South African rule; in Nigeria, the former system of military rule; in Senegal, the system before alternance; in South Africa, the former system of apartheid rule; in Tanzania, the former system of one-party rule; in Uganda, the system of government under the old Constitution (i.e., before 1995); in Zambia, the former one-party system under UNIP.

2.5. Public Health

Since the onset of the AIDS pandemic in Africa during the 1980s, **public health has steeply deteriorated**. Faced with declining life expectancy and rising infant and child mortality, Africans have every reason to view with alarm the prospects for their own and their families' well being. The Afrobarometer is not designed as a demographic or epidemiological survey, but it can cast light on public perceptions of critical public health issues.

At the end of the interview, respondents are asked “**how many close friends or relatives do you know who have died of AIDS?**” Despite the sensitive nature of the question, just 3 percent refuse to answer. But many people say they “don't know,” ranging from 6 percent in Mozambique and Lesotho to 65 percent in Nigeria. These responses can mean that respondents don't know anyone who died, know victims but don't know how many, don't know what caused others to die, or don't wish to reveal their true experiences.

Bearing these caveats in mind, we find considerable variation in popular perceptions of the extent of AIDS across Africa's regions and countries. Consistent with known rates of HIV prevalence, **fewer West Africans** (e.g. 12 percent in Nigeria, 14 percent in Senegal, 17 percent in Mali) **than East Africans** (60 percent in Tanzania, 66 percent in Kenya, 86 percent in Uganda) know anyone who has died of the scourge. Alarming, 7 percent of Ugandans report personally knowing 20 or more AIDS victims.

Despite high HIV prevalence in their countries, **South Africans and Batswana appear to under-report the extent of AIDS** (19 and 36 percent respectively, though these figures represent increases since 1999). One explanation is that, although HIV infection has spread rapidly, South Africa is still quite low on the death curve. In this country, too, political leaders may have misled citizens by denying the gravity of the problem, misdiagnosing its causes, and resisting the delivery of treatments.

Rather than ask respondents about their own HIV status, which raises ethical quandaries, the Afrobarometer estimates approximate levels of public health by asking generic questions about **physical and mental well being**. More than half of all respondents (53 percent) report that, at least once or twice, their “physical health (has) reduced the amount of work (they) normally do inside or outside the home.” Even more people (56 percent) say that, at least once or twice, they have “been so worried or anxious that (they) have felt tired, worn out, or exhausted.”

Across countries, our estimates of physical and mental health are highly correlated (Pearson's $r = .569^{***}$), both being highest in Namibia and lowest in Uganda. But this measure is not a good proxy for the spread of AIDS since it also captures the effects of other debilitating diseases like malaria and tuberculosis that are even more widespread. Whatever the exact causes, the unavoidable conclusion is that **more than half of all adult Africans complain of health impairment** that limits their productivity and participation in social and political life.

Finally, what priority do Africans grant HIV-AIDS as a problem requiring scarce budgetary resources? Should the government “devote many more resources to combating AIDS, even if this means less money is spent on things like education?” Or are there “many other problems facing this country besides AIDS...the government needs to keep its focus on solving other problems?” **Africans are undecided about the importance of AIDS**, with equal proportions advocating either spending more (45 percent) or spending less (46 percent). This pattern holds constant across most countries, with only Ugandans, Mozambicans, Cape Verdians and Basotho advocating a higher budgetary priority for AIDS-control programs, but with Ghanaians, Namibians, Kenyans and Zambians preferring a focus on other developmental challenges.

Table 2.5: Public Health

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	MEAN
How many close friends or relatives do you know who have died of AIDS?	0/Don't know any	60	50	17	76	24	59	70	17	20	52	55	3	6	13	37
	1 - 5	28	10	15	15	38	14	--	42	11	10	16	44	40	48	25
	6 - 10	5	<1	3	2	14	1	--	17	1	1	3	12	27	19	8
	11 - 20	2	0	<1	1	3	1	--	9	<1	0	<1	4	12	6	3
	More than 20	1	2	<1	2	2	1	--	3	0	3	0	<1	7	1	2
	Yes, do have friends or relatives who have died. ³	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	22	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Refused	1	0	1	5	0	5	0	3	4	4	0	4	7	2	3	3
Don't know	32	28	30	12	6	14	25	5	8	65	34	22	29	7	11	22
In the last month, how much of the time:																
Has your physical health reduced the amount of work you normally do inside or outside your home.	Never	51	54	39	48	43	43	45	69	38	44	58	52	28	41	46
	Once or twice	25	19	37	27	35	32	21	17	42	37	26	30	42	40	31
	Many times	20	22	19	23	19	19	28	11	18	15	11	14	27	16	19
	Always	3	4	4	3	3	6	4	3	2	3	3	2	4	3	3
	Don't know	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	0
Have you been so worried or anxious that you have felt tired, worn out or exhausted.	Never	45	36	36	59	56	36	45	67	39	38	50	54	13	31	43
	Once or twice	20	19	32	22	24	26	19	17	30	34	26	24	34	32	26
	Many times	28	38	24	18	15	27	27	12	28	23	19	17	41	30	25
	Always	7	6	5	1	4	9	5	4	3	5	4	2	12	6	5
	Don't know	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	0	1	1	1	2	0	1	1
Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)																
A. The government should devote many more resources to combating AIDS, even if this means that less money is spent on things like education.																
	47	53	35	36	57	47	46	56	35	44	44	40	47	52	33	45
B. There are many other problems facing this country besides AIDS; even if people are dying in large numbers, the government needs to keep its focus on solving other problems.																
	47	30	57	59	36	43	47	28	59	47	47	43	43	47	64	46
Do not agree with either																
	5	7	5	3	2	8	5	8	5	8	7	12	8	1	2	6
Don't know																
	1	11	3	2	5	2	2	8	1	2	2	5	2	0	1	3

³ In Mozambique, respondents were asked, "Do you have any close friends or relatives who have died of AIDS?"

2.6. Most Important Problems

What, then, are the priorities on **the people's development agenda**? Afrobarometer respondents were asked to identify up to three of "the most important problems facing the country that the government should address." Except where otherwise noted, the figures reported here are percentages of the 50,194 total valid responses made to this question.

In general, economic problems (55 percent of all problems cited) are seen as more pressing than social or political ones (39 and 5 percent respectively).

At the top of the list is unemployment, which alone constitutes 17 percent of all the development problems that are mentioned. Exactly half of all Afrobarometer respondents include job shortages within their lists of up to three problems. Predictably, lack of wage employment is the greatest preoccupation in economies with developed industrial sectors like South Africa and Namibia and in migrant labor economies like Lesotho and Cape Verde. People are much less likely to cite joblessness as their main concern in economies traditionally based on self-employment in small-scale agriculture, like Mali, Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania.

In these agrarian economies, people are much more likely to place **poverty and food insecurity** – ranked second and fourth overall – at the top of the list. Indeed, food shortages were seen as *the* most important problems in drought stricken Mali in 2002 and Malawi in 2003.

Among social problems, **health edges out education** as a cause for concern, especially in places like Zambia, Senegal, Mali, and Mozambique. This order of priority marks a break with the values of Africa's independence generation, whose members always placed an extremely high premium on securing education for youngsters in the extended family. Now that many school-leavers (even university graduates) cannot find jobs, the blush may be fading from the rose of education. And, as HIV-AIDS and other scourges reduce the life spans of the brightest and best in the younger generation, it now seems more rational for families to invest in health care. Ghanaians, however, still grant education a leading role (ranked second overall), though respondents in this country are probably drawing attention to the urgent need to restore the country's run-down school system to its earlier stellar standards.

Other important social and economic concerns include, in order of priority: agriculture (7 percent of all problems mentioned), water supply (6 percent), crime and economic management (both 5 percent), and HIV-AIDS (4 percent). Note that HIV-AIDS, while ranked relatively low compared to other *problems*, was mentioned by 10 percent of all *respondents*.

The only important political problems that enter the popular development agenda are **corruption and violence** (both 2 percent). Corruption is especially important in Nigeria, as is violence in Uganda; both are mentioned 8 percent of the time; and each ranks fourth in its respective country.

All told, however, we find that the Africans we interviewed view the challenges of development through the materialistic lens of economic livelihood and survival. Across the continent, they are deeply concerned about the shortage of wage-paying jobs and about the poverty, destitution, and shortages of food that often accompany unemployment.

Table 2.6: Most Important Problems (N for all responses = 50,198)

What are the most important problems facing the country that the government should address?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean	
Economic Problems	Unemployment	23	29	17	18	27	7	6	21	25	19	13	29	9	9	11	17	
	Poverty/Destitution	14	11	10	8	6	12	8	7	7	12	7	10	9	16	11	10	
	Food/Famine/Food Shortage	4	6	2	4	18	19	23	5	5	5	13	3	5	2	7	8	
	Farming/Agriculture	5	2	5	8	7	11	8	5	2	4	9	1	10	6	16	7	
	Management of the Economy	4	3	8	8	3	8	3	2	2	6	4	2	6	5	5	5	
	Wages, Incomes and Salaries	3	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	2	3	2	2
	Infrastructure/Roads	1	2	5	3	2	2	4	2	2	1	3	1	1	3	2	2	2
	Transportation	1	1	3	3	5	1	1	3	1	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	2
	Rates and Taxes	1	<1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	<1	1	1	2	3	1	1
	Loans/Credit	<1	<1	1	1	<1	3	2	1	1	<1	<1	1	<1	2	1	1	1
	Petroleum/Fuel/Petrol Problems	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	<1
	Other Economic Problems	0	<1	0	<1	<1	0	0	0	1	0	<1	0	0	<1	<1	<1	<1
	Social Issues and Services	Health	5	9	8	10	5	8	13	15	4	5	12	3	9	12	13	9
Education		8	8	12	9	5	6	9	11	8	9	6	5	9	9	11	8	
Water Supply		2	5	9	5	5	6	6	5	9	5	9	3	6	6	4	6	
Crime and Security		5	4	2	6	6	4	3	3	5	4	5	12	4	4	1	5	
AIDS		11	1	1	3	2	1	1	5	10	1	<1	9	5	3	1	4	
Housing		1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	8	1	<1	1	2	
Electricity		<1	2	5	2	1	<1	<1	1	2	4	4	1	3	2	<1	2	
Communications		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	<1	2	1	1	1	
Services (other)		1	2	1	<1	1	<1	<1	1	1	1	<1	1	1	<1	<1	1	
Gender issues/women's rights		<1	0	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	1	<1	1	<1	<1	<1	
Social Welfare		3	2	<1	1	1	2	<1	<1	1	3	<1	1	1	1	3	1	
Other Social Problems		<1	2	<1	<1	<1	0	0	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	
Political Problems		Corruption	1	<1	1	4	1	1	1	2	2	8	1	4	4	4	2	2
	Political Violence/Instability/War	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	8	1	2	
	Discrimination/Inequality	1	1	<1	1	<1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	<1	1	
	Democracy/Political Rights	<1	1	<1	1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	1	1	<1	<1	
	Other Political Problems	0	0	0	1	<1	0	<1	0	<1	<1	0	0	0	<1	0	<1	
Other	Drought	2	1	0	<1	1	<1	1	0	3	<1	<1	<1	1	<1	<1	1	
	Land	1	<1	<1	1	1	<1	<1	<1	1	<1	<1	<1	1	<1	<1	<1	
	Nothing/No Problems	<1	<1	<1	0	0	<1	0	<1	<1	0	<1	<1	<1	<1	0	<1	
	Don't Know	1	1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	1	<1	0	<1	<1	1	<1	<1	<1	
	Other Problems	1	1	2	<1	0	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	4	1	1	<1	1	1	

SECTION 3: DEMOCRACY

3.1. Demand for Democracy

Generally speaking, **Africans prefer democracy to other forms of government**. In 2002-3, almost two thirds (64 percent) of the people we interviewed expressed this view when asked the standard question listed at the top of Table 3.1. Only a handful of Africans consider that, in some circumstances, non-democratic forms can be preferable (13 percent). Of greater concern is the large minority (22 percent) that is evenly split between not knowing and not caring about the form of government that is most appropriate to their country.

In Afrobarometer Round 2, **support for democracy is high in Ghana and Botswana** (82 and 75 percent respectively), countries in which a multiparty system has been gradually putting down roots over time. (Note: the high scores for these two countries are inflated by the exclusion of “don’t know” responses; see footnote to Table 3.1). For the moment, support for democracy is also high in **Kenya** (80 percent), undoubtedly as a product of mass euphoria following the peaceful electoral alternation of December 2002.

Overt popular support for democracy is far **lower in Namibia, Mozambique, and Lesotho** (all under 55 percent), though for various reasons. In Namibia and Lesotho, one fifth of the population is willing to flirt with non-democratic alternatives; in Mozambique, one third of the population has little idea what kind of government to choose.

Apart from political democracy, what other kinds of political regimes are available? Africans have experienced at least three less-than-democratic alternatives in recent years: military rule, presidential dictatorship, and one-party rule. And, at the local level in rural areas, they continue to be familiar with traditional rule by chiefs and headmen. Do people accept or reject these alternatives?

By large majorities, people reject the authoritarian systems constructed by Africa’s post-colonial rulers: in 2002-3, 77 percent disapprove of military rule (“the army comes in to govern the country”), 76 percent disavow presidential dictatorship (“the president decides everything”), and 67 percent distance themselves from one-party rule (“only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office”). At this time, Zambians lead the way in rejecting military rule; Kenyans share the lead in rejecting one-man rule; and Nigerians are most dismissive of one-party rule.

People feel more sympathetic toward traditional rule, described in the survey as a national system of government in which “all decisions are made by a council of chiefs and elders.” Perhaps ordinary folk consider that traditional rule offers opportunities to reconcile democratic norms with customary practices. A majority actually approves of this option in Mali, and a plurality does so in Mozambique. But in Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, and South Africa, two-thirds of the population evinces no desire to go back to traditional rule in their modernizing societies.

If Africans reject one form of non-democratic rule, they are likely to reject all others. A single factor, which we call **rejection of authoritarian rule**, can be extracted from the data. As expected, this factor correlates quite highly with support for democracy (Pearson’s $r = .367^{***}$), forming a comprehensive measure of popular **demand for democracy**. This measure distinguishes deeply committed democrats (who *both* support democracy *and* reject authoritarian alternatives) – some 37 percent of the population – from Africans with shallower regime preferences.

Table 3.1: Demand for Democracy

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.		75	66	82	80	50	64	71	54	54	68	75	57	65	75	70	64
B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.		11	8	7	8	22	22	12	16	20	20	4	16	13	12	15	13
C. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.		14	12	10	5	13	10	15	10	20	11	7	18	10	7	10	11
Don't know ⁴		0	15	0	7	16	4	2	20	5	2	14	9	12	6	5	11
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?																	
The army comes in to govern the country.	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	79	75	83	92	85	84	65	53	51	69	76	77	86	85	95	77
	Neither approve nor disapprove	2	5	3	1	2	3	8	11	17	15	5	10	5	3	0	6
	Approve/Strongly approve	18	13	11	4	11	9	24	16	30	15	17	9	6	11	4	13
	Don't Know	2	7	4	2	3	3	3	20	1	1	3	4	2	1	1	4
Elections and the National Assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything.	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	85	67	82	90	82	78	66	41	58	72	77	73	86	90	90	76
	Neither approve nor disapprove	4	7	5	2	3	4	10	11	18	14	9	12	6	3	1	7
	Approve/Strongly approve	9	14	10	5	12	15	17	23	22	11	11	10	6	6	7	12
	Don't Know	2	12	4	2	3	4	7	26	2	3	4	6	2	1	2	5
Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	68	79	79	75	61	66	71	42	55	80	76	67	62	54	72	67
	Neither approve nor disapprove	3	3	3	2	3	4	7	5	7	8	7	9	8	5	2	5
	Approve/Strongly approve	28	12	15	21	34	28	19	45	37	11	14	20	29	40	24	25
	Don't Know	2	6	3	2	2	1	3	8	1	2	3	4	1	2	2	3
All decisions are made by a council of chiefs or elders. ⁵	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	50	--	69	59	49	49	34	29	46	61	45	63	72	48	72	53
	Neither approve nor disapprove	6	--	9	8	4	6	10	18	21	17	15	14	10	21	3	11
	Approve/Strongly approve	41	--	17	30	43	43	54	37	28	20	39	18	13	38	19	32
	Don't Know	3	--	4	3	3	2	2	16	5	2	1	5	4	2	5	4

⁴ The Afrobarometer protocol for asking questions about democracy requires that the word "democracy" is stated in an official national language: English, French, Portuguese or Swahili. In Botswana and Ghana, where this form of the word has not displaced local language terms, large numbers of don't knows were encountered. Hence in these countries, "don't knows" were excluded when calculating national frequency distributions (but not from the Afrobarometer mean).

⁵ This question was not asked in Cape Verde.

3.2. Support for Democratic Institutions

It is relatively easy for people to express a moral preference for something abstract called “democracy.” And it is easier for them to say what they are *against* (like varieties of authoritarian rule) than to specify precisely what they are *for*. A more rigorous test of regime preferences therefore involves popular **attachments to concrete democratic institutions**.

Africans clearly embrace free and fair elections. On average, almost four out of five want to “choose our leaders...through regular, open and honest elections.” Less than one in five considers that “elections sometimes produce bad results...we should adopt other methods.” Popular support for open elections is highest in countries that have recently transitioned to democracy (Kenya, 89 percent) or are beginning gradually to consolidate a democratic regime (Ghana, 87 percent). Support for open elections is also high in Uganda (83 percent), a country in which political competition is presently allowed among individual candidates but not between political parties.

People also demand presidential term limits. Recognizing that authoritarian systems make no provision for changing leaders, Africans now want to control how long a national president stays in office. Three quarters favor recent constitutional changes that restrict the number of terms that a president may serve (usually two), and only one quarter would leave the number of terms up to incumbents themselves (which risks a “life” presidency). Whereas Zambians and Nigerians are virtually unanimous in preferring term limits (both 86 percent), under half of all Mozambicans would insist on such restrictions.

Africans also prefer an independent legislature with real powers. Some 62 percent concur that “the members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the president does not agree.” But a minority of 19 percent still clings to the idea that “since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about the National Assembly.” Tellingly, just as many people cannot form an opinion about the unfamiliar notions of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers; and another one in five (more in Cape Verde, Botswana, and Mozambique) is either undecided or “doesn’t know.”

Finally, **Africans only tentatively support multiparty competition.** To be sure, a majority does so: 55 percent agree that, “many political parties are needed to make sure that people have real choices in who governs them.” But a sizeable minority (40 percent) avers that, “political parties cause division and confusion...it is therefore unnecessary to have many (of them) in this country.” Kenyans, South Africans, and Tanzanians are most supportive of party competition (67 percent or more). But in three countries – Uganda, Lesotho, and Senegal – a majority of citizens (55 percent or more) draws on recent experience to judge that the risks of party competition outweigh the benefits. Of all democratic institutions, there is least consensus in Africa about political parties.

By way of concluding this section, we note that – unlike demand for democracy as an overall system of government (see previous page) – popular support for a set of democratic institutions does not form a coherent syndrome. We are unable to find a valid or reliable scale of attitudes that we can label “support for democratic institutions”. In other words, people who support one democratic institution do not necessarily support all others; for example, those who favor term limits do not necessarily want competitive parties. As such, we conclude that **Africans are still learning** about the various functions of specialized political institutions within a democratic system, and are trying to decide which institutions fit best in their own contexts.

Table 3.2: Support for Democratic Institutions

Which of the following statements is closest to your own view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
A. We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	76	73	87	89	66	78	82	75	82	82	78	81	76	83	75	79
B. Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.	21	19	8	10	30	20	15	18	17	17	18	16	21	17	22	18
Do not agree with either	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	0	1	1
Don't know	2	7	2	1	3	1	2	5	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2
A. The president should be able to serve as many terms in office as he wishes.	24	10	19	18	11	20	16	42	29	12	20	19	22	19	12	19
B. The president must obey the law, including the constitution, for example by serving no more than two terms in office.	71	75	75	80	85	76	77	43	63	86	71	68	73	80	86	74
Do not agree with either	3	3	4	1	2	2	3	6	6	1	8	7	4	1	1	4
Don't know	2	11	3	1	2	1	4	9	2	1	1	7	2	0	1	3
A. The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree.	47	49	59	77	56	61	71	46	36	76	68	58	65	83	72	61
B. Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.	21	15	17	12	17	31	14	24	45	16	14	18	21	12	13	19
Do not agree with either	29	14	18	9	20	5	6	9	16	5	16	15	9	5	13	13
Don't know	4	22	6	3	7	3	10	22	4	2	2	10	5	1	1	7
A. Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in this country.	38	28	38	23	64	33	40	40	43	37	56	35	30	55	45	40
B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that people have real choices in who governs them.	59	62	56	74	31	64	55	44	62	59	40	67	67	41	52	55
Do not agree with either	2	2	3	1	3	2	2	5	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	3
Don't know	2	8	2	2	2	1	3	11	2	2	1	5	1	2	1	3

3.3. Trust in Political Institutions

To further explore these political distinctions, we ask about the level of confidence that people place in a range of state and civic institutions. How much do they trust – among other entities – the president, the army, the parliament, and political parties?

Generally speaking, **people place more trust in the executive branch of government than in the institutions of political representation.** In other words, the existing apparatus of the old authoritarian state is held in higher regard than the new channels of democratic expression.

On average, **a majority trusts executive agencies** either “a lot” or “a very great deal” (52 percent). For example, the presidency is the most trusted institution (56 percent), though in the survey people may be referring to its current occupant. The armed forces also enjoy a trustworthy reputation (54 percent), though now as defenders of the national territory rather than as coup plotters and military rulers. Indeed, people show greatest confidence in the army in places like Mali and Malawi, where the soldiers helped to remove the *ancien regime* and usher in a democratic transition. Of all executive agencies, however, levels of popular trust are lowest for the police (47 percent). In fact, most ordinary Africans are wary of police officers, presumably because of unrewarding face-to-face encounters with these front-line agents of the state.

Far fewer people place confidence in the institutions of political representation. Ruling parties muster the best record (but only 48 percent) perhaps because, especially in former single-party states, they are seen as part and parcel of the executive branch of government. Despite being elected, parliaments and local governments score less well; only a minority of adults trusts these representative bodies (44 and 39 percent respectively). The electoral commission – which supervises the conduct of national and local elections – is held in even lower regard (just 37 percent trust it “a lot” or “a very great deal”). Based on the mismanagement of recent elections, voters in Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia question whether the electoral commission is an honest broker, suspecting instead that it tilts the electoral playing field in favor of the ruling party.

Strikingly, the **least trusted institutions are opposition political parties.** Less than one quarter of Africans interviewed (23 percent) thinks opposition parties can be relied upon. This sentiment is especially widespread in countries with dominant ruling parties – like South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Uganda, and Namibia – where incumbents have apparently succeeded in sowing doubts about opponents in the minds of voters. Indeed, the concept of “loyal opposition” remains largely alien to African politics. Only in Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania – where over one third of the electorate extends a measure of trust to these groupings of “outsiders” – has tolerance of opposition made any inroads into public opinion.

Beyond the executive branch and the institutions of representation lies civil society. Within civil society are found the various mass media. In the African countries surveyed, **mass media enjoy intermediate levels of public trust** (on average, 42 percent). Perhaps due to monopoly control in many countries, the government broadcasting service is deemed the most trustworthy of any media outlet (53 percent). Where alternatives exist, new FM radio or television stations are still treated with skepticism by African audiences (only 43 percent trust them). As for the print media, there is little difference between the levels of trust enjoyed by government and independent newspapers (37 and 36 percent respectively). Only in Senegal do newspaper readers – themselves an urban, educated minority – extend twice as much trust to independent print media as to official ones.

Table 3.3: Trust in Political Institutions

	How much do you trust each of following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: ⁶	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
The President	A lot/A very great deal	44	22	65	70	58	48	71	75	76	18	73	37	79	61	46	56
	A little bit/Not at all	51	69	30	28	33	48	21	22	23	80	24	59	17	38	50	40
The Army	A lot/A very great deal	60	35	54	58	50	72	79	49	50	21	82	32	72	51	51	54
	A little bit/Not at all	38	56	41	36	45	24	16	41	48	77	13	61	26	48	45	41
Government broadcasting service	A lot/A very great deal	57	36	53	47	51	59	80	61	47	26	64	47	63	57	48	53
	A little bit/Not at all	36	55	31	48	32	32	15	19	51	64	28	46	29	38	42	38
Traditional Leaders/Chiefs/Elders	A lot/A very great deal	54	--	54	49	58	68	78	62	42	31	79	19	55	47	51	53
	A little bit/Not at all	43	--	41	48	38	29	18	29	56	66	15	64	35	46	46	41
Courts of law	A lot/A very great deal	57	43	45	37	58	61	50	59	42	22	68	39	54	51	49	49
	A little bit/Not at all	39	49	49	58	37	34	42	33	56	74	26	55	43	46	49	46
The Ruling Parties	A lot/A very great deal	43	19	51	65	55	45	58	64	59	16	54	32	66	56	31	48
	A little bit/Not at all	55	71	42	33	40	52	32	28	40	81	39	60	33	43	66	47
The Police	A lot/A very great deal	57	36	51	28	51	64	63	50	48	11	70	35	51	43	42	47
	A little bit/Not at all	42	58	46	71	46	33	31	45	52	88	25	63	47	56	56	51
Parliament	A lot/A very great deal	37	22	48	53	49	38	62	54	47	11	52	31	69	48	40	44
	A little bit/Not at all	58	65	43	43	41	57	25	26	47	84	38	63	27	50	56	48
Independent broadcasting services	A lot/A very great deal	29	33	46	45	34	45	67	23	37	32	56	43	59	59	36	43
	A little bit/Not at all	35	56	29	34	28	36	22	21	60	56	26	45	31	36	44	37
Local government	A lot/A very great deal	34	18	38	36	49	33	51	42	31 ⁷	17	52	20	60	77	16	39
	A little bit/Not at all	62	65	49	59	37	60	29	33	65	79	33	70	35	22	76	51
The National Electoral Commission	A lot/A very great deal	27	16	49	51	46	38	46	51	41	12	49	31	60	20	21	37
	A little bit/Not at all	60	68	41	42	42	53	32	32	53	83	22	56	32	74	66	50
Government newspapers	A lot/A very great deal	49	25	35	--	30	34	47	30	--	38	19	36	59	46	31	37
	A little bit/Not at all	38	55	31	--	28	33	17	20	--	57	63	24	30	40	47	37
Independent newspapers	A lot/A very great deal	39	23	27	46	30	33	42	25	43	28	37	35	54	45	33	36
	A little bit/Not at all	43	57	36	35	30	34	24	21	54	54	23	56	36	39	43	39
Opposition Political Parties	A lot/A very great deal	14	22	28	16	19	34	39	24	15	16	37	12	36	16	15	23
	A little bit/Not at all	81	67	62	82	73	61	46	64	83	79	55	76	62	79	81	70

⁶ "Don't know" and "haven't heard enough" are not reported.

⁷ "Not applicable" responses (60 percent in Namibia) are not reported.

3.4. The Supply of Democracy

Perhaps reflecting modest levels of institutional trust, Africans are only **moderately satisfied with the “way democracy works”** in their countries. Whereas, on average, 54 percent express some measure of satisfaction (17 percent say “very satisfied”), 46 percent withhold any such endorsement (and 14 percent say they are “not at all satisfied.”)

Among the most satisfied democrats are Kenyans, Ghanaians and Namibians; among the least so are Nigerians. Indeed, over the course of three Afrobarometer surveys, satisfaction with democracy has **plummeted in Nigeria**, from 84 percent in January 2000 (soon after the restoration of civilian rule), to 57 percent in August 2001, to just 35 percent in October 2003 (in the wake of President Obasanjo’s re-election). The volatility of this indicator should give pause to governments in Kenya and Ghana, because it demonstrates that satisfaction with the performance of an elected regime today can quickly evaporate tomorrow.

How much democracy do Africans think they are getting? According to the Afrobarometer’s indicator of the extent of democracy, four out of five Africans think they live in a democracy, even if a poorly functioning one. Only 17 percent think their country has attained a fully consolidated democracy (30 percent in Mali and Namibia). Most people are more realistic, with 37 percent thinking theirs is a democracy “with minor problems” and 28 percent perceiving a democracy, “but with major problems.” Nigerians are appropriately pessimistic on this score; more than half see “major problems” with democracy in their deeply divided country.

Only in Malawi in 2002 does a significant proportion (19 percent) think that their country is “not a democracy.” Note however that twice as many Zimbabweans held this opinion (38 percent) during Afrobarometer Round 1.

Do Africans wish to **stick with democracy, warts and all?** To measure political patience, we ask respondents to choose whether “our present system of government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems” or whether, “if our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government.” A majority, though hardly an overwhelming one (56 percent), chooses to be patient. Only in Malawi, Cape Verde and (surprisingly!) Botswana does a majority want to try another form of government. We wonder whether, in Botswana, respondents understood that the question referred to a democratic system of government and not to the present occupants of public office.

Why do most Africans think that democracy should be allowed more chances at success? In earlier publications, we drew a distinction between *intrinsic* support for democracy (as an end in itself) and *instrumental* support for democracy (as a means to other ends, notably socioeconomic development) (See *Afrobarometer Working Paper* No. 1). In Afrobarometer Round 2, we test a question that explicitly addresses this distinction. Consistent with earlier analysis, but contrary to the conventional wisdom about African political logic, we find more evidence of intrinsic attachments than instrumental ones. More people think that “democracy is worth having simply because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions” (50 percent) than think that “democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic economic needs” (38 percent).

To be sure, the debate over the quality of support for democracy is not settled everywhere. In Lesotho, Mali and Senegal (and again, Botswana!) people tend to look to democracy to deliver material goods. But, taken together with widespread sentiments of political patience, the very existence of intrinsic attachments to democracy among mass populations suggests that elected regimes may enjoy a longer honeymoon in many African countries than observers usually dare to hope.

Table 3.4: Supply of Democracy

Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in (your country)?	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Very satisfied	19	11	30	19	21	23	28	16	25	6	18	10	18	13	14	17
Fairly satisfied	47	22	41	60	27	24	35	38	44	29	39	34	45	47	40	37
Not very satisfied	17	44	16	12	14	24	20	26	18	31	18	28	16	22	25	22
Not at all satisfied	15	16	10	4	21	25	12	8	7	31	11	19	9	10	13	14
Not a democracy	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
Don't know ⁸	0	7	0	5	15	2	4	11	5	2	13	7	10	7	6	9
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is (your country) today?																
Full democracy	20	7	29	12	19	17	30	29	30	7	17	13	12	10	10	17
A democracy, but with minor problems	50	33	47	64	29	21	33	38	30	25	41	34	51	43	38	37
A democracy, but with major problems	25	41	21	15	28	39	24	15	29	52	20	36	19	31	42	28
Not a democracy	5	6	3	2	5	19	5	4	2	13	6	7	7	7	4	6
Don't know/Don't understand ⁹	0	13	0	7	18	5	8	15	10	3	16	10	12	8	6	13
Which of the following statements is closest to your view, A or B? (percent agree/strongly agree)																
A. Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems	43	39	79	83	51	34	68	43	63	58	59	54	54	54	62	56
B. If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government	50	51	15	14	42	61	24	34	31	37	35	34	36	42	34	36
Do not agree with either	4	1	3	1	3	2	3	6	5	3	5	7	6	2	2	4
Don't know	3	9	3	1	4	3	6	16	1	2	1	5	4	2	2	4
A. Democracy is worth having simply because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions	44	69	67	55	30	53	37	63	56	56	37	51	62	55	51	50
B. Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone's basic economic needs	54	19	29	38	53	42	57	19	36	41	49	38	27	38	42	38
Do not agree with either	2	1	4	2	4	3	2	4	2	1	3	4	3	1	2	3
Don't know ¹⁰	0	10	0	5	14	3	4	14	6	2	11	6	9	6	4	10

⁸ See footnote 4 in Table 3.1

⁹ See footnote 4 in Table 3.1

¹⁰ See footnote 4 in Table 3.1

SECTION 4: THE GOVERNANCE OF THE STATE

4.1. State Capacity: Effectiveness

The first part of this paper showed that Africans wish to preserve a major role for the state in economic management and social development (see Section 1.5). But, on a continent characterized by state failure and decline, the general public may have an **overly rosy view of the diminished capabilities of the African state**.

Against evidence to the contrary, for example, more than half of Africans interviewed (52 percent) think that, “**the government can solve...all or most... of the country’s problems.**” A more pragmatic view prevails in Cape Verde, and to a lesser extent in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda. In these places, most people recognize that weak states can rectify only “some” or “very few/none” of a country’s developmental shortcomings.

Misplaced faith in the effectiveness of state institutions is reflected in popular judgments about the **capacity of the political authorities to reliably enforce the law**. The average African apparently thinks that “a person like (my)self” would likely be caught for “committing a serious crime” (87 percent), failing to pay income taxes (76 percent), or obtaining official “household services (like water or electricity) without paying for them” (73 percent). Given what we know about pervasive crime in many African countries (see Section 2.4 above), and the ineffectiveness of the police and court systems at bringing perpetrators to justice (see Section 4.3 below on corruption), these estimates seem wildly exaggerated.

Perhaps Africans, especially in rural dwellers, are reflecting informal cultural norms that constrain individuals from engaging in anti-social acts. In other words, people who value social harmony and who are respectful of authority are prone to attribute their own internalized restraints to a fear of external consequences. Alternatively, the mass media may play a role. By publicizing arrests for a few high profile crimes, media reports may help to convince risk-averse citizens that they are likely to be punished if they step out of line.

Even when pressed on the issue of state effectiveness, Afrobarometer respondents do not relent. When asked to **compare the old government** (prior to the democratic transition) with their country’s **new government**, they consistently report that the latter has as much or more capability to “enforce the law” and “deliver services” (73 and 84 percent respectively). By way of explanation, we can only suppose that perceptions of state strength derive more from political attitudes than from economic outlooks. Apparently, the widespread popular preference for democratically elected government has infused the general public with forgiving attitudes toward state performance. Certainly, this aspect of public opinion is not consistent with the public’s dissatisfaction with the reduced role of the state under structural adjustment (see Section 1.6).

Table 4.1: State Capacity: Effectiveness

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
What proportion of the country's problems do you think the government can solve?	All/Most of them	58	17	42	64	59	61	58	55	62	51	57	45	48	54	52
	Some of them	30	47	44	29	20	31	28	33	25	39	29	37	39	35	33
	Very few/None of them	10	32	10	7	19	7	9	12	12	9	13	16	12	10	12
	Don't know	3	4	5	1	2	2	5	0	0	1	2	3	2	1	2
How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like yourself:	Committed a serious crime	63	57	59	51	63	40	66	51	47	69	44	42	54	70	54
	Very likely	22	38	33	40	24	36	19	36	34	25	34	40	41	25	33
	Likely	6	2	3	5	8	8	5	11	11	4	7	10	3	3	6
	Not very likely	6	2	1	1	3	10	8	2	5	2	6	2	1	1	4
	Not at all likely	3	2	4	2	3	5	3	1	2	1	9	5	2	2	3
Did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned	Very likely	55	31	49	35	51	31	51	30	37	43	34	37	42	48	40
	Likely	23	45	39	43	22	39	24	37	34	39	35	41	43	29	36
	Not very likely	7	10	5	11	11	12	10	20	16	10	10	14	8	13	12
	Not at all likely	7	7	3	3	6	13	9	7	8	6	8	3	3	4	6
Obtained household services (like water and electricity) without paying	Don't know	8	7	5	8	5	6	5	7	4	2	13	5	3	6	6
	Very likely	55	39	47	38	50	29	43	38	39	50	32	34	35	52	40
	Likely	24	44	36	39	14	39	16	33	34	35	34	36	40	24	33
	Not very likely	7	7	6	8	10	11	9	14	15	8	12	13	8	9	10
Comparing the current government with the former system of government, is the one we have now more or less:	Not at all likely	9	5	4	3	5	11	14	10	8	3	10	7	4	9	7
	Don't know	5	5	8	11	14	10	17	5	5	3	12	10	14	7	9
	More/Much more	23	50	59	86	43	59	50	64	34	59	39	56	84	63	56
	About the same	50	13	18	11	12	10	17	12	26	23	17	23	7	14	17
Effective in the delivery of services	Less/Much less	24	19	15	2	41	25	18	23	38	14	41	16	8	19	21
	Don't know	3	18	8	1	5	7	16	2	2	4	4	5	2	4	6
	More/Much more	25	47	47	81	56	61	37	66	35	47	41	54	73	53	53
	About the same	49	17	28	14	13	16	23	19	30	29	20	21	12	18	21
Less/Much less	22	24	18	3	19	29	16	21	15	34	20	35	21	14	25	21
	Don't know	3	12	7	2	2	8	19	1	2	4	4	4	1	4	5

¹¹ See footnote 2 to table 2.4.

4.2. State Capacity: Responsiveness

A democratic state is a responsive state. At minimum, state officials in a democracy are required to acknowledge people's needs for basic services (like school places for their children) and to provide them with opportunities for citizenship (like registering to vote). Ideally, when popular demands are met, citizens come to see the state as their own. Obviously this is a tall order on a continent where, historically, states have been more extractive – even predatory – than responsive.

Respondents were asked to say whether certain state services were easy or difficult to obtain. Depending on the service in question, the Afrobarometer finds **great variation in perceived state responsiveness**. At one extreme, certain universal services, like **voter registration**, are relatively accessible: overall, 80 percent find it relatively easy (including “easy” and “very easy”) to obtain a voter's card, especially in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. Only in Nigeria do a majority of adults (53 percent) report difficulty in fulfilling this basic right of citizenship.

It is also relatively easy, at least for three out of four Africans interviewed (73 percent), to obtain **a place in a school** for a young child. Access to primary education is virtually universal in Botswana (89 percent), but it is rationed in Mozambique, Namibia (both 59 percent) and Nigeria (58 percent). Indeed, in about half of the Afrobarometer countries, more than 10 percent of the population reports that they “never try” to get a child into school.

Apart from voters' cards, other **identity documents** (like birth certificates, drivers' licenses, and passports) are much harder to come by. Just 41 percent report that it is easy to obtain these items from the relevant state agency, 44 percent say it is difficult, and 13 percent “never try.” Because of modest levels of state responsiveness in issuing essential papers, at least one third of the population in Malawi, Uganda, and Ghana remain “undocumented.”

Nor do people find the police responsive in providing desired levels of law and order. More people think it is difficult than easy to get **“help from the police when you need it”** (43 versus 32 percent). And 23 percent have given up trying (especially in Ghana and Mali), probably because they know that the police service, which is short of both transportation and an ethic of public service, will respond late or not at all.

Standards of state responsiveness only decline further for **household services** like piped water, electricity, and landline telephones. Just 22 percent regard these services as easy to obtain; 48 percent perceive them as difficult, and 25 percent “never try.” The inability of the state to respond to popular demands for these items is largely attributable to resource constraints, but it also reflects a casual disregard for customer service in African public utility corporations.

At the bottom extreme, very few people (just 10 percent) have an easy time obtaining a **business loan or welfare payment**. Only in South Africa is there a functioning welfare system that responds to the needs of the indigent, disabled and elderly. Everywhere else, people know that they will get a better reaction from their families and communities – or even from the marketplace – than from the agencies of the state.

It therefore comes as little surprise that very few Africans think that, “elected leaders...look after the interests of people like (me)” or “listen to what people like (me) have to say” (both just 19 percent). Fully three quarters acknowledge that the agents of the state are unresponsive to popular needs. So, **while the regime may have democratized, the state has yet to do so.**

Table 4.2: State Capacity: Responsiveness

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services:																
A voter registration card for yourself	81 4 12 2	67 20 11 2	81 10 7 3	87 8 4 1	86 9 1 4	86 9 4 1	77 12 9 3	80 12 3 5	84 10 6 1	41 53 6 1	77 12 10 1	86 10 3 2	88 10 0 2	92 6 2 0	80 10 9 1	80 13 6 2
A place in primary school for a child	89 8 2 1	68 20 11 2	64 20 12 3	79 15 6 1	82 14 1 3	78 13 9 1	74 16 10 1	59 36 3 2	59 25 15 2	58 26 15 1	66 20 13 1	78 13 6 3	86 12 1 2	88 5 7 0	64 25 11 1	73 18 8 1
An identity document (such as a birth certificate, driver's license, or passport)	71 26 3 1	73 24 2 1	26 37 32 6	33 60 6 1	17 81 1 1	15 40 39 6	60 26 12 2	39 55 4 2	42 56 2 0	36 42 19 3	49 47 3 0	70 28 2 0	23 59 10 8	27 38 33 2	29 40 31 1	41 44 13 2
Help from the police when you need it	59 36 4 1	35 34 29 2	17 36 42 5	23 63 12 1	44 47 6 3	36 41 20 3	20 24 51 4	34 28 29 9	32 49 18 1	17 46 34 3	19 41 38 1	41 45 12 2	32 60 5 3	35 46 18 1	39 42 17 1	32 43 23 3
Household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone)	40 53 6 2	38 44 17 1	14 49 30 7	10 60 28 2	10 61 21 9	22 43 28 7	20 42 35 3	12 35 33 20	26 45 26 4	16 59 23 3	25 50 24 1	54 35 8 2	21 64 11 4	8 45 42 5	16 41 41 2	22 48 25 5
A loan or payment from government (such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant)	11 56 27 6	10 37 49 4	5 40 49 6	6 54 35 5	5 43 40 12	10 55 31 4	14 38 43 5	7 30 44 19	8 34 54 4	8 45 43 2	9 45 43 2	23 33 32 13	10 67 17 6	6 50 42 2	13 47 38 1	10 45 39 6
How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like National Assembly members, State Governors or Local Government Councilors, try their best:																
To look after the interests of people like you	24 72 4	9 85 7	20 72 8	13 85 1	17 76 7	7 88 5	55 40 5	27 66 8	17 81 2	11 87 3	36 59 4	12 85 2	21 72 6	12 87 1	10 88 2	19 76 4
To listen to what people like you have to say	25 71 4	10 82 8	19 73 8	13 85 2	18 72 10	8 87 5	58 37 5	28 63 10	11 86 3	11 86 3	37 59 4	11 86 3	20 74 7	13 86 1	9 88 3	19 76 5

4.3. State Legitimacy: Corruption

To operate at full effectiveness, a modern state requires an elusive and intangible gift from citizens: political legitimacy. Yet we know from previous research that **official corruption corrodes the perceived right to rule.**

Round 2 of the Afrobarometer confirms that **the general public perceives widespread corruption** among state officials. On average, about one in three adults thinks that “most” or “all” officials are engaged in corrupt acts. To be sure, perceptions vary by the type of official: people are twice as likely to perceive extensive corruption among the police (43 percent) as in the office of the national president (19 percent). In between, people deem immigration officers and other government officials (38 and 31 percent respectively) to be somewhat more corrupt than officers of the court system or elected representatives (28 and 23 percent respectively).

There is also considerable variation in perceived levels of corruption across the continent. In general, **West Africans are least charitable about the honesty of leaders.** For example, **Nigerians** consistently observe the highest levels of corruption: more than half charge corruption among “most” or “all” of the officials in the presidency, parliament, and civil service. And almost three quarters (70 percent) criticize the Nigeria Police Force on this score! They say they are sick and tired of the behavior of wayward NPF officers who stop them at roadblocks or accost them on the street in order to extort payments for real or imagined offenses.

When it comes to judges and magistrates and to border guards, however, **Malians** are even more cynical than Nigerians. Well over half of Malian respondents associate “most” or “all” of these officials with corrupt acts. Perhaps Malians lack trust in the court system because they regard it as an arcane and culturally inappropriate vestige of colonial rule and because they suspect that plaintiffs with money can buy favorable judgments.

But there are exceptions to the rule of perceived corruption in West Africa: the residents of **Cape Verde** generally give their leaders high marks for honesty, though more than half of them consistently report that they “don’t know enough” about the inner workings of state agencies to hazard an informed opinion. And, as of 2002, **Ghanaians** thought that the presidency of John Kufuor was abiding by high ethical standards. Otherwise, citizens in **Southern Africa** – notably from Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique – tend to see low levels of corruption in their countries.

Round 2 Afrobarometer results also confirm that Africans **perceive more corruption than they actually experience.** We asked how often in the past year respondents had to “pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials” (table not shown). On average, just 9 percent report engaging in any such illicit transaction. Experiences of corruption are distributed as follows: 13 percent had to pay a bribe to get an identity document or permit; 8 percent to get a young child into school; and 7 percent to get a household service or to cross a border. Moreover, the average of 10 percent who had to offer an inducement to a police officer in order to pass a checkpoint or avoid a fine was greatly inflated by the 26 percent who experienced this sort of shakedown in Nigeria (and in Kenya).

A person’s experience of corruption does, however, influence their perception of corruption. These variables are positively correlated, though perhaps not as strongly as one might expect (e.g., for police corruption, Pearson’s $r = .129^{***}$). So there are other factors – perhaps promises of reform by new leaders, perhaps media coverage of corruption cases, perhaps popular rumor – that also raise popular perceptions of embedded corruption within many African states.

Table 4.3: State Legitimacy: Corruption

How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
The President and officials in his office	None/Some of them	45	37	68	77	51	45	48	47	76	47	61	69	54	53	66	56
	Most/All of them	16	6	9	8	11	35	37	14	15	48	15	13	10	28	19	19
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	39	57	24	16	39	20	16	40	9	4	23	18	36	19	15	25
Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councilors	None/Some of them	49	38	65	75	50	46	47	44	69	43	57	66	55	63	64	55
	Most/All of them	21	8	13	15	14	36	38	18	22	53	21	22	17	27	27	23
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	30	54	22	10	36	18	15	39	10	5	21	12	28	10	10	22
Judges and magistrates	None/Some of them	52	40	46	60	55	44	33	41	68	48	50	65	51	50	59	51
	Most/All of them	14	6	35	28	15	36	57	16	22	42	33	15	28	38	28	28
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	34	55	19	12	30	19	10	44	9	10	17	20	21	12	12	22
Government officials	None/Some of them	50	43	56	62	52	36	43	43	64	42	52	63	54	44	61	51
	Most/All of them	25	6	23	30	27	45	47	20	30	55	30	27	23	47	28	31
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	25	51	21	8	20	19	9	37	6	3	18	10	23	9	11	18
Border officials (e.g., customs and immigration)	None/Some of them	47	38	34	40	46	26	23	36	62	35	37	47	38	32	47	39
	Most/All of them	24	12	48	36	29	48	66	30	28	57	48	28	34	46	40	38
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	29	51	17	24	24	26	11	34	10	8	14	25	28	22	14	22
Police	None/Some of them	52	46	36	37	55	37	35	44	60	28	45	56	42	29	44	43
	Most/All of them	23	8	53	59	28	48	55	33	37	70	41	38	44	67	47	43
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	25	46	11	4	17	16	10	24	3	2	14	7	14	5	9	14

4.4. State Legitimacy: The Rule of Law

Given the view that corruption is widespread, it is perhaps surprising that Africans grant the state as much legitimacy as they do. Contrary to expert opinion, ordinary people apparently think that the state in Africa operates according to the rule of law.

Certainly, **most Africans consider the state to be legitimately constituted**: on average, fully 60 percent agree that, “our constitution expresses the hopes and values of the people.” Even in Kenya, where checks on executive power were widely debated in an election campaign, two thirds of the population still considers the existing, Moi-era legal framework to be legitimate. Overall, however, 18 percent disagree and 14 percent “don’t know.” This latter figure includes many folk, especially in Mozambique, who do not know what a constitution is or what their country’s founding document contains.

Generally speaking, in Africa’s leading reformist regimes, people also accept the legal rulings of the state as **binding on their own behavior**. Three quarters think that the police have the right to make people obey the law; 70 percent take this view about the courts; and 65 percent say the same about the tax agency. Even in Nigeria, where most people condemn the police as corrupt, a large majority also acknowledges that their orders should be obeyed. And, while people may evade taxes in many places, only in Lesotho do they dispute the principle that the state has a right to collect such revenues.

Public opinion is uncertain, however, about whether political elites respect the law. On the positive side, a slim majority (55 percent) thinks that, “the president...rarely or never...ignores the constitution.” Rightly or wrongly, President Nujoma in Namibia is held to be especially law-abiding (77 percent) but President Obasanjo is seen to be deficient in his respect for the provisions of the federal constitution of Nigeria (34 percent).

On the negative side, the general public harbors doubts about whether citizens can obtain equal treatment under the law. While a plurality thinks they can (47 percent), almost as many think they cannot (42 percent). In our view, the fact that two out of five Africans interviewed thinks that the state **“always” or “often” treats citizens unequally** is evidence of a troubling deficit in the rule of law. Consistent with what we found earlier about perceived corruption, such popular concerns are greatest in Nigeria and Mali.

Finally, to probe the **effects of regime transition** on perceptions of state legitimacy, the Afrobarometer asks respondents to compare “the current government with the former government” and to say which is more or less “corrupt” and more or less “trustworthy.” For all countries taken together, there is no statistical difference in the perceived corruption levels of old and new regimes, though Kenyans think the new regime is much less corrupt and Ugandans think it is much more so. Overall, however, democratization is neutral for this aspect of state legitimacy.

On institutional trust, however, democratization has positive effects, with 47 percent finding the new regime more worthy of trust and only 20 percent finding it less so. Among other interpretations, this result suggests that citizens who have elected their own leaders are willing to discount concerns about corruption in arriving at judgments about whether state institutions can be trusted.

Table 4.4: State Legitimacy: The Rule of Law

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree:																
Our constitution expresses the values and hopes of (people in this country).	57 8 30 5	51 7 16 25	65 8 10 17	64 7 20 10	74 1 13 12	57 4 29 9	61 9 13 17	48 9 18 25	77 10 10 3	56 15 23 6	53 11 16 19	61 16 14 9	58 10 14 18	64 5 17 13	56 5 25 15	60 8 18 14
The police always have the right to make people obey the law.	62 6 30 1	81 4 12 2	85 3 9 3	67 8 23 2	75 3 20 3	79 6 13 3	87 4 7 2	73 8 9 9	76 13 10 1	70 14 16 1	87 5 7 1	67 12 19 2	66 14 16 3	88 3 9 0	78 2 20 1	76 7 15 2
The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.	63 9 24 4	83 4 6 4	70 5 18 7	66 8 21 5	63 2 30 5	64 6 24 5	70 12 11 6	71 10 8 11	76 15 8 1	70 13 15 2	66 12 19 3	68 12 17 3	68 14 14 4	80 5 14 2	69 2 27 2	70 9 17 4
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes.	58 7 28 6	72 7 11 11	80 5 7 8	64 7 21 7	42 4 44 10	48 6 39 6	78 7 13 2	67 9 9 15	55 20 16 9	67 15 15 3	63 14 22 2	60 14 16 10	57 14 23 5	87 3 9 0	70 3 21 7	65 9 20 7
In this country, how often:																
Does the President ignore the constitution	20 57 23	16 48 36	14 61 25	29 55 15	22 37 41	31 57 13	17 60 23	12 54 34	14 77 9	53 34 13	25 54 21	20 57 22	13 65 22	30 56 15	21 58 21	23 55 22
Are people treated unequally under the law	44 46 11	45 41 14	28 55 17	44 48 7	50 36 14	36 53 11	60 32 8	31 48 22	22 75 3	61 34 6	51 41 8	45 47 9	34 56 10	45 48 7	36 49 15	42 47 11
Comparing the current system of government with the former system of government ¹² , would you say that the one we have now is more or less:																
Corrupt	24 44 22 2	25 14 29 32	22 18 47 13	12 11 74 3	46 14 14 27	51 7 34 7	32 21 36 11	46 11 22 21	30 16 52 2	48 26 24 2	17 26 46 11	53 18 24 5	38 19 36 7	60 11 24 6	50 11 33 6	37 18 34 11
Trustworthy	19 45 32 4	36 16 30 18	52 20 18 10	78 15 4 3	65 9 17 9	43 12 42 3	54 15 20 10	31 13 21 35	67 15 16 2	32 31 36 2	55 24 16 5	32 27 34 7	43 22 28 7	51 14 32 3	39 17 38 5	47 20 26 8

¹² See footnote 2 to Table 2.4.

SECTION 5: ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

5.1. Economic Performance

From a popular perspective, then, **how well or badly are African governments doing?** In this final section we ask about the government's handling of a range of economic, social and political issues such as the management of the macro-economy, the control of crime, and the protection of civil liberties.

All told, at least in 15 reformist countries in 2002-3, **Africans view the management of the national economy in a moderately positive light.** To the extent that they understand the issues at hand, just over half (52 percent) say that the government is handling macroeconomic affairs "fairly" or "very" well. Some 39 percent disagree. This favorable mood evaporates, however, when people are asked about specific economic policies. Less than one third think that the government is doing well at keeping prices stable (32 percent), creating jobs (31 percent), and "narrowing gaps between the rich and the poor" (27 percent). South Africans are most concerned about the government's failure to generate jobs, Malawians about inflation, and Nigerians about inequality.

The general public is clearly able to distinguish among various aspects of government performance at economic reform. They are somewhat satisfied with some reform outcomes, but very dissatisfied with others. On the positive side, twice as many people think that **the availability of goods has improved** rather than worsened since the days of a government-run economy (55 versus 28 percent). Perhaps remembering the days of policy-induced shortages of consumer goods, Ugandans, Zambians and Tanzanians are especially happy with this aspect of economic reform.

However, **people cannot decide whether mass living standards have improved or worsened** since the adoption of economic structural adjustment (40 versus 42 percent). While Namibians, Ugandans, and Mozambicans look on the bright side, others (especially Basotho) see living standards in decline.

Africans largely agree, however, that **economic reform has reduced the availability of job opportunities.** Over recent years, only 23 percent see the employment situation as having gotten better, whereas 60 percent regard it as having gotten worse. Again, South Africans and Basotho, who are more dependent on wage employment than other Africans, are the most alarmed. Malians and Namibians are the only Africans who think that economic reform has improved the job outlook.

Confirming results reported earlier (See Section 1.6), **Africans also strongly concur that economic reform leads to inequality.** Just 19 percent see the gap between the rich and the poor as recently closing; three times as many (58 percent) see it as widening. Some of this orientation is no doubt attributable to perceptions of official corruption. Popular concern about growing wealth and income gaps is palpable everywhere except Namibia, and it strongly informs public opinion toward market reforms in Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia.

Table 5.1: Economic Performance

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Managing the economy	Fairly/very well	60	33	67	83	40	29	55	48	73	32	51	38	68	59	50	52
	Fairly/very badly	31	45	25	13	45	66	36	31	23	67	46	56	23	39	46	39
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	9	22	9	4	14	5	9	21	5	1	3	6	9	3	4	8
Keeping prices stable	Fairly/very well	29	29	57	49	17	11	39	20	40	16	26	17	53	56	22	32
	Fairly/very badly	64	54	37	46	72	87	57	67	58	84	70	80	39	43	76	62
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	8	17	5	5	10	1	5	13	2	1	3	3	8	2	2	6
Creating jobs	Fairly/very well	30	22	45	52	28	16	51	20	46	23	36	9	39	29	19	31
	Fairly/very badly	68	68	47	43	67	82	41	71	54	76	62	90	54	69	79	65
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	3	10	8	5	5	3	7	9	1	1	2	1	6	2	3	4
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	Fairly/very well	30	21	36	38	20	15	38	21	37	14	28	19	38	25	19	27
	Fairly/very badly	65	59	54	54	72	82	57	57	59	85	67	75	55	72	78	66
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	5	20	10	8	8	4	5	23	4	1	6	7	7	3	3	8
Comparing our present economic system with the economic system a few years ago, are the following things worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same:																	
Availability of goods	Better/Much better	60	56	63	56	13	46	54	63	74	33	39	40	74	82	78	55
	Same	17	15	18	30	8	10	8	11	16	20	14	21	10	6	9	14
	Worse/Much worse	20	21	17	13	76	43	35	22	9	47	47	35	15	12	13	28
	Don't know	2	8	2	1	4	1	2	4	1	1	1	4	1	0	1	2
People's standard of living	Better/Much better	46	44	36	47	9	29	48	54	67	27	26	32	49	55	30	40
	Same	15	19	23	32	9	8	11	17	19	16	32	14	18	9	10	17
	Worse/Much worse	37	31	38	20	82	62	38	25	13	57	41	53	31	34	59	42
	Don't know	2	6	3	1	1	1	2	5	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	2
Availability of job opportunities	Better/Much better	18	26	25	32	7	12	45	21	47	19	24	8	23	22	13	23
	Same	14	16	25	30	4	6	12	11	24	17	16	6	11	8	6	14
	Worse/Much worse	66	52	45	34	87	79	36	62	29	63	58	85	61	67	79	60
	Don't know	1	6	4	4	1	3	6	7	0	1	2	1	5	3	2	3
Gap between rich and poor	Better/Much better	21	17	20	22	6	11	31	16	41	14	19	13	20	19	14	19
	Same	16	29	26	34	14	6	11	15	26	15	21	19	16	9	7	18
	Worse/Much worse	60	42	47	38	75	79	55	51	30	71	57	64	56	70	77	58
	Don't know	2	12	7	5	4	4	4	19	3	1	3	4	8	2	2	5

5.2. Social Performance

We now examine more closely the public's view of government performance on the social aspects of development. How well or badly are policies of social development being implemented?

On education, which Africans continue to value highly, **most people express satisfaction with government policy performance**: two out of three respondents (68 percent) think that educational needs are being addressed (only 29 percent demur). This high average partly reflects the popularity of the recent introduction of free primary education in Kenya (94 percent!) and Uganda (83 percent). Note, however, that Malawians are now split over the advisability of this policy, perhaps as they realize the trade-off between the quantity of public schooling and the quality of instruction. In Nigeria, where families invest considerable personal resources in education, a majority is clearly impatient with the lackluster performance of state governments.

Surprisingly for a sector that has collapsed in many countries, **people also give African governments good grades for health care delivery**. They think the government is doing a decent enough job at combating malaria (66 percent) and HIV-AIDS (65 percent) and at providing basic health services (63 percent). As with education, we suspect that positive results for health care delivery are influenced by the preponderance of rural respondents in the Afrobarometer's nationally representative samples. As we found in Round 1, rural dwellers have much lower expectations than urban residents regarding the quality of health and education services. As a consequence they are more easily satisfied.

In South Africa, however, where the government has dragged its feet on policies to address the rampant spread of HIV-AIDS, half of the adult population think that their government is doing "fairly badly" or "very badly" in handling this issue.

South Africans also consider that their government is performing poorly at "**resolving conflicts between communities**" (only 38 percent give good grades), probably with reference to ethnic and race relations. This finding stands in stark contrast to the high marks that Tanzanians, Malians and Ghanaians give to their governments (at least 70 percent) for maintaining social peace.

The South African government again brings up the rear in **controlling crime**, with a 23 percent positive assessment. In the public's opinion, the Ugandan government does three times better (72 percent). Overall, though, Africans are split on how well their government's are doing in managing this growing problem.

Finally, consistent with popular views about the nature of poverty and priorities for development, **Africans think governments could be doing much better in "ensuring that everyone has enough to eat"** (just 38 percent give positive ratings overall). That South Africans and Nigerians rank their governments lowest of all on this policy dimension gives great cause for concern. In the public's opinion, the government's of the continent's two largest states have failed to adequately address the most fundamental of basic human needs. The food challenge may take different forms – in Nigeria it concerns agricultural production, in South Africa the need for even distribution – but in both countries it lies at the heart of persistent poverty.

Table 5.2: Social Performance

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Addressing educational needs	Fairly/very well	79	54	64	94	77	51	73	65	83	38	59	61	78	83	68	68
	Fairly/very badly	19	36	31	6	21	48	25	27	17	60	40	37	21	16	30	29
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	2	11	5	1	3	1	2	9	0	2	1	3	1	0	1	3
Combating malaria	Fairly/very well	82	-	72	80	11	61	71	55	77	61	79	41	80	79	78	66
	Fairly/very badly	10	-	16	16	7	36	25	39	21	33	19	28	16	20	21	22
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	8	-	12	4	82	3	4	6	2	7	1	32	3	0	2	12
Combating HIV/AIDS	Fairly/very well	75	56	77	79	48	49	70	48	66	63	76	46	78	75	66	65
	Fairly/very badly	21	24	13	17	26	48	18	43	33	28	13	48	20	23	31	27
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	4	20	11	5	26	3	12	9	1	9	11	6	2	2	2	8
Improving basic health services	Fairly/very well	78	50	63	75	56	52	73	59	83	48	59	54	72	74	59	63
	Fairly/very badly	20	39	32	23	41	47	25	34	16	51	40	45	27	26	40	34
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	2	11	5	2	3	1	3	7	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	3
Resolving conflicts between communities	Fairly/very well	60	33	70	76	48	39	71	52	64	45	61	38	71	64	52	56
	Fairly/very badly	30	35	19	16	38	51	21	27	33	51	28	46	21	31	27	32
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	10	32	11	8	15	10	8	20	4	3	11	16	9	6	21	12
Delivering household water	Fairly/very well	71	45	56	41	47	60	58	40	54	31	48	60	46	56	45	50
	Fairly/very badly	27	42	37	53	51	37	38	53	46	68	50	37	52	43	51	46
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	2	13	7	6	2	3	4	7	1	2	2	3	2	1	4	4
Reducing crime	Fairly/very well	49	29	65	75	50	22	52	47	62	38	52	23	57	72	53	50
	Fairly/very badly	50	56	29	23	48	76	43	43	38	61	44	76	41	26	43	47
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	2	16	6	2	2	2	5	9	0	1	4	1	2	1	4	4
Ensuring everyone has enough to eat	Fairly/very well	49	33	55	35	32	39	37	40	41	22	43	21	45	40	40	38
	Fairly/very badly	46	52	37	60	66	59	61	53	57	76	54	74	50	58	58	58
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	5	14	8	5	2	2	3	6	2	2	3	5	5	3	2	4

5.3. Performance of Political Leaders

The Afrobarometer employs a standard method of tracking the performance of elected leaders. It asks a cross-section of eligible adult voters: “do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months (or haven’t you heard enough about them to say)?”

Perhaps out of popular deference to “big men,” **most African presidents receive enviable approval ratings**. On average, 70 percent of adults approve of presidential performance, 24 disapprove, and 6 percent “don’t know” enough to say. The most highly rated presidents are Mwai Kibaki of Kenya (as measured in September 2003, nine months after his election), Sam Nujoma of Namibia (in August 2003), and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania (in July 2003). The most unpopular presidents are Pedro Pires of Cape Verde (measured in June 2002) and Olusegun Obasanjo (in October 2003), though both still perform better than Robert Mugabe (who obtained a 21 percent approval rating in October 1999).

Though still in positive territory, **legislators in national and regional assemblies receive lower approval ratings** (an average of 52 and 56 percent respectively). The representation gap that separates MPs from their constituents is widest in Nigeria and Zambia, where only about a third of citizens praise their representatives’ performance. Instead, MPs in these countries are regularly accused of failing to deliver development benefits and of visiting their constituencies only during election campaigns. It is noteworthy between 13 and 19 percent of citizens are so unfamiliar with their elected representatives that they cannot judge their performance.

Local government councilors tend to live closer to the grassroots than Members of Parliament, but they too are not well known. While councilors are deemed to perform well in Mali and Tanzania (both 67 percent), they are criticized for poor performance in places like Zambia (31 percent). And only half of all Africans interviewed rate them well overall.

Popular approval of leadership performance depends in part on perceptions of corruption. On balance, our African interlocutors think that **government is doing “badly” rather than “well” at fighting official corruption**, though the difference is not great (46 versus 42 percent). The mismanagement of corruption (for example, the failure to prosecute guilty officials) appears to drag down leadership approval ratings in about half of all countries, including important ones like South Africa and Nigeria. By contrast, the approval ratings of leaders in Kenya and Ghana seem to benefit from the honeymoon that voters grant to new governments that are at least rhetorically committed to an agenda of anti-corruption.

As the next section will explore, **political performance also hinges on the perceived openness of the political regime**. To measure the atmosphere for free speech, we asked: “how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?” Somewhat reassuringly, a few more Africans said “never” or “rarely” (49 percent) as said “often” or “always” (45 percent), at least in the 15 liberalized countries that we studied. Respondents feel cautious about contradicting their leaders in Mali and Botswana (both 73 percent) but liberated from a culture of silence in Malawi and Cape Verde (23 and 24 percent respectively). Objectively, cross-national differences in the openness of the political atmosphere may not be as wide as these figures suggest. But, subjectively, Botswana recognize that a single dominant party has always held power in their country, whereas Malawians are still celebrating a recent transition to lively multiparty pluralism.

Table 5.3: The Performance of Political Leaders

Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't heard enough about them to say?		BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
The President	Approve/Strongly approve	64	37	74	92	68	65	82	82	91	39	71	51	85	81	71	70
	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	30	41	19	6	24	32	8	11	8	59	23	42	13	18	24	24
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	7	22	7	2	8	4	10	7	2	2	6	7	2	1	5	6
Representative to Parliament or the National Assembly	Approve/Strongly approve	55	40	57	66	50	41	69	60	61	32	44	45	58	63	35	52
	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	37	34	31	30	34	54	11	10	26	60	37	44	36	34	59	36
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	7	25	12	5	16	5	20	30	13	8	19	11	6	3	7	13
Regional government official or representative ¹³	Approve/Strongly approve	--	--	53	58	35	--	65	76	56	52	55	43	76	74	25	56
	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	--	--	27	22	24	--	11	10	34	46	16	41	18	20	58	27
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	--	--	20	20	41	--	24	13	11	2	29	16	5	6	17	17
Local government councilor or representative	Approve/Strongly approve	54	40	53	64	15	43	67	53	50	39	54	33	67	92	31	50
	Disapprove/Strongly disapprove	38	30	30	28	11	52	12	17	36	53	16	50	29	7	58	31
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	8	30	16	9	74	4	20	30	14	9	30	18	4	1	10	19
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?																	
Fighting corruption in government	Fairly/Very well	49	24	63	85	35	25	40	27	53	26	42	29	52	30	53	42
	Fairly/Very badly	40	40	23	11	46	68	51	53	43	71	42	63	41	65	38	46
	Don't know/Haven't heard enough	11	37	14	5	19	6	10	21	4	3	17	8	7	5	9	12
in this country, how often:																	
Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics	Never	13	40	24	17	45	42	14	18	36	11	12	41	11	17	14	24
	Rarely	9	30	31	41	17	28	9	22	20	27	29	19	29	35	33	25
	Often	12	15	20	20	14	11	21	22	22	29	27	18	35	27	14	20
	Always	61	9	17	17	19	12	52	24	20	29	29	16	20	20	35	25
	Don't know	5	6	8	4	6	7	4	14	2	3	3	6	6	2	3	5

¹³ The question was worded as follows: in Ghana, your Regional Minister; in Kenya, your District Commissioner; in Lesotho, your District Development Councilor; in Mali, L'Haute Commissaire de votre region; in Mozambique, your Provincial Governor; in Namibia, your Regional Councilor; in Nigeria, your representative to the State Assembly; in Senegal, le Gouvernor de votre department; in South Africa, the members of the Provincial Legislative Assembly; in Tanzania, your Regional Councilor; in Uganda, your District (LCV) Chairman; in Zambia your District Administrator. The question was not asked in Botswana, Cape Verde, and Malawi.

5.4. The Performance of Political Regimes

Finally, we shift the focus of evaluation from individual political leaders to whole political regimes. Comparing the new democratic regime with the previous authoritarian one, are political conditions better or worse now than they used to be?

The answer is clear: Africans consistently report that they are **better off politically since their country made a transition to a competitive electoral regime**. On average, fully three quarters of Afrobarometer respondents think that conditions have improved with respect to a range of basic civil liberties and political rights (including free speech, free association, and open voting). Large majorities perceive political gains in every country except Botswana, which has not experienced regime change since independence forty years ago. Accordingly, most Botswana report that the political atmosphere has remained unchanged in recent years.

But the salutary effects of regime transition are obvious everywhere else. For example, an overwhelming majority of Africans feels that, compared with the previous regime, they now have **more freedom of speech**. Namibians (92 percent), Malians (91 percent) and Zambians (87 percent) are especially likely to feel this way. In the same three countries (plus Malawi), they also subjectively enjoy **more freedom of association**, that is, “to join any organization you want” (all over 90 percent). People also feel more secure against the threat of arbitrary arrest and detention, now including Uganda and Ghana.

Turning from civil liberties to political rights, a large majority of Afrobarometer respondents reports enjoying more “**freedom to choose who to vote for** without feeling pressured.” Malians, Malawians and Namibians share this sentiment to the greatest extent (over 90 percent). Moreover, people are firm in their opinions about all the liberties and rights discussed here, because they often report that political conditions are “much” better and they very rarely say that they “don’t know.”

In sum, **the political climate has brightened considerably** in those African countries that have managed to make a transition to some form of democratic rule. In most places, people no longer have to look over their shoulders before expressing a political opinion. They can join independent voluntary associations and political parties that were previously banned or nonexistent. And they can exercise a real measure of choice among a variety of candidates and parties at the polls. These innovations constitute meaningful steps forward in the evolution of African politics.

This is not to say that all is well with Africa’s new democracies. **At least two areas of institutional development require further attention**: responsiveness to popular demands and equal treatment under the law.

First, people are far less fulsome in their praise of democratic transition when it comes to “**the ability of ordinary people to influence what the government does**.” Only 55 percent think things have recently become better. Nigerians, resentful of the high-handedness of the Obasanjo administration and its reported unwillingness to take sound advice, are very dubious on this score (41 percent).

Second, even fewer Africans think that, since the wave of democratization in the 1990s, gains have occurred in “**equal and fair treatment for all people by the government**.” Only 48 percent think things have recently become better. Again, Nigerians (34 percent) are very likely to wonder whether the institutions of political democracy can bridge deep social and economic divisions in their tenuous federation.

Table 5.4: The Performance of Political Regimes

	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	Mean
Comparing our present system of government with the former system of government, are the following things worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same? ¹⁴	21	80	69	84	68	88	91	80	92	63	77	76	75	85	87	76
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
		Worse/Much worse														
Freedom to say what you think	3	3	5	2	5	0	2	5	1	1	2	2	4	1	1	2
		Don't know														
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
Freedom to join any political organization you want	24	80	68	81	78	91	92	73	92	68	74	80	81	62	92	76
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
		Worse/Much worse														
Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent	3	7	4	3	4	1	3	7	1	2	2	2	4	6	1	3
		Don't know														
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent	13	65	69	69	62	76	82	49	75	53	63	59	59	67	66	62
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
		Worse/Much worse														
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured	4	12	7	3	8	2	7	14	3	3	6	9	7	3	8	6
		Don't know														
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	24	81	68	81	77	91	93	74	91	63	74	77	77	80	88	76
		Better/Much better														
		Same														
		Worse/Much worse														
Equal and fair treatment for all people by government	3	5	17	6	17	3	10	23	4	3	8	14	6	6	13	10
		Don't know														
		Better/Much better														
		Same														

¹⁴ See footnote to Table 2.4.

