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**MARGINALISATION IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: TRANSFORMATION FROM
BELOW?**

by Anthony J. Leysens

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



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MARGINALISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: TRANSFORMATION FROM BELOW?

Background and Purpose¹

During the last two decades of the 20th century, a significant change to the underlying principle of the world economy has been brought about. At the Bretton Woods conference (held in New Hampshire, 1944) the soon to be victorious allies agreed that the re-occurrence of the protectionist trade policies and speculative capital flows which characterised the 1930s, had to be avoided in the post-war economic order. The principle on which the new order would be based was the Keynesian compromise or “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982). At the core of the Bretton Woods system was the goal to create an open international trade system coupled to stable and fully convertible currencies. However, this openness at the international level was linked to the acceptance of state autonomy over macroeconomic and industrial policy. It was agreed that the collective responsibility of the state and the individually-driven needs of the market would have to be balanced.

Since the demise of the gold/dollar fixed exchange rate system in 1971, the world economic order has, however, gradually embraced a new idea, the principle of which is deregulation and “openness.” This process has affected the balance between the state and the market that underpinned the Bretton Woods system. States have become “outward orientated” in the sense that their policies are geared to meet the challenges of the global market. Cox (1987) talks about the “internationalisation of the state” and calls this the “hyperliberal” form. Although the idea and its practical consequences have drawn much criticism,² it has also grown to be widely accepted. This is very much evident in the TINA (There Is No Alternative) reaction, which state policy makers often proffer in defense of policies which are usually accompanied by substantial short-term social costs.

In addition to the maintenance of an open international trade system, the idea of openness also requires states to implement a number of policies that have come to be known as the “Washington consensus” and have become part and parcel of the prescriptions for developing states that apply for IMF loans. They have become a prerequisite for the twin goals of economic growth and competitiveness. The most important components of the neo-liberal policy prescriptions are the deregulation of financial markets (this requires the eradication of capital and exchange controls), the privatisation of state assets (for example, by the establishment of public-private partnerships), the deregulation of the labour market, and “sound” monetary and fiscal policies. The latter requires states to cut spending in order to reduce the budget deficit and to restrict the supply of money (by raising interest rates) as a measure to reduce inflation (Cornia and Court, 2001:5; Galbraith, 2002:24; and *World Development Report*, 2001:49).

But what have been the results of the shift to greater openness and the reduction of the role of the state in key aspects of macroeconomic policy? This is an issue which has been hotly debated,³ but some recent studies on the link between economic growth, poverty and inequality have found that the effect of increased economic growth on the reduction of poverty is very much dependent on the level of inequality⁴ which prevails at the time. *The World Development Report* (2001:35) points out that “While economic growth is systematically associated with poverty reduction, the rate at which growth translates into lower poverty depends on the initial level of inequality in the distribution of income and how that distribution changes over time.” Cornia and Court (2001:1, 5), in a study for the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER), argue that the neo-liberal approach’s emphasis on increasing economic growth rates ignores the fact that there is a link between growth and inequality. They point out that “...the persistence of inequality at high levels or its further rise have made it much more difficult to reduce poverty. The higher the level of inequality, the less impact economic growth has in reducing poverty – for any rate of economic growth.”

Significantly, comparative research on inequality shows that levels of inequality within states have increased over the last 20 years. This coincides with the period during which states have gradually implemented policies centered on the principle of openness. The results of the UNU/WIDER paper are based on the development and analysis of a new database on inequality that attenuates the Deininger and Squire World Bank data set. This database, the World Income Inequality Database (WIID),⁵ indicates generally declining levels of income inequality for the period from 1950 to early 1970s. However, out of 73 sample states for which “high-quality” data was available in the WIID database, 48 showed an increase in inequality during the last two decades. Only nine states experienced a decline in inequality, while inequality levels remained constant in 16 (Cornia and Court, 2001:5-9).

Reporting on the work of the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), which calculated the Theil T Statistic for the United Nations International Development Organisation’s (UNIDO) industrial variables set, Galbraith (2002:22) finds that “...when the global trend is isolated, we find that in the last two decades, inequality has increased throughout the world in a pattern that cuts across the effect of national income changes.” Significantly, he adds that “*During the decades that happen to coincide with the rise of neoliberal ideology, with the breakdown of national sovereignties, and with the end of Keynesian policies in the global debt crisis of the early 1980s, inequality rose worldwide.*” (own italics)

Galbraith (2002:23-24) and Cornia and Court (2001: 17-22) conclude that the causes of increasing inequality can only partially be explained by technological changes and trade liberalisation. In fact, the impact of the latter is regarded as being small. Instead they point to the (anti-inflationary) reduction of budget deficits that is accompanied by decreasing public redistributionist spending on the poor, the deregulation of labour markets, anti-progressive taxation systems and the deregulation of the domestic and global financial systems. This deregulation has led to an increase in capital’s share of income and a decrease of labour’s share (in the form of wages). These are all the policies of a new (hyper-liberal) form of state. Finally, although greater openness can be “helpful” it is the “...scope and speed of the liberalization approach, often in the absence of adequate regulatory capacity” which “have had a negative impact on distribution” (Cornia and Court, 2002:22).

From the background sketched above, indications are that the principle of openness and the application thereof, in the form of policies enacted by the hyper-liberal state, may in the short and medium term have led to a worldwide increase in inequality, poverty and marginalisation. The World Bank’s (1990) prediction that the numbers of the poor would be reduced from 1125 million to 825 million between 1985 and 2000 has not been realised. Current estimates are that the total number of people living in poverty (existing on less than \$1 per day) is slightly above 1200 million.

Income inequality is particularly prevalent in southern Africa, where the marginalised form a large proportion of the regional population. It is estimated that, on average, approximately half of the regional population subsists on less than \$1 per day. Of particular importance here are the potential political implications of inequality in seven southern African states represented in the Afrobarometer series of public attitude surveys.⁶ The Gini coefficients for states in the region are consistently high (see Table 1, below), reflecting serious disparities in the distribution of income. The premise informing the argument of this paper is that the majority of southern Africans are not (directly) integrated into the contemporary global economy, because that economy is driven by the organisation of production and finance on a level that transcends the boundaries between states. However, the traditional local economy – e.g., regional inter-state trade and those sections of the domestic economy that continue to function at a distance from the global economy – co-exists with the global economy. In this local economy one would find “sunset” (textiles and clothing) manufacturers who produce for local and regional markets with local inputs, as well as subsistence producers in the rural areas of developing states (Cox, 1999:11-12).

Table 1: Socio-Economic Indicators for the Seven Afrobarometer States (Round 1, 1999-2000)^a

	GNP per Capita (1999, US\$)	Population: Projected Total, 1999 (in millions)	HDI ^b 2000	HDI Ranking 2001	Gini Coefficient 2000	Life Expectancy 1999
Botswana	3280	1.6	.57	114	.54	46
Lesotho	560	2.1	.54	120	.56	55
Malawi	180	10.8	.40	151	.62	42
Namibia	1890	1.7	.61	111	N/A	54
RSA	3170	42.1	.70	94	.58	55
Zambia	330	9.9	.43	143	.46	45
Zimbabwe	520	11.9	.55	117	.63	51
Average	1419	80.1 (total)	.54	117 (median)	.57	50

^a The data for this table was drawn from: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2001. *The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community*. Johannesburg: IGD and the UNDP's 2001/2002 human development indicators, which are available on their website: <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001> and <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002>

^b The Human Development Index (HDI) reflects the average combined score (between 0 and 1) of three quantitative indices of development. They are life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) plus the primary, secondary and tertiary educational enrolment ratio (one-third weight), and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (adjusted and in US\$).

One of the defining elements of the dominant (globalised) mode of production is the input of high technology (e.g., in IT and telecommunications goods and processes) and the extra-territorial outsourcing of aspects of the production process to high skill workers (Lawton and Michaels, 2000; and Phillips, 2000). Using Cox's (1999) conceptualisation of the marginalised which emphasises employment status (not employed in the formal economy), low or no education/skills, base occupations and irregularity of, or no cash income, the majority of southern Africans (see Table 3, below) are not involved in the dominant global mode of production, nor even in the national "sunset" manufacturers. Their (indirect) link to this mode approximates the form of a "non-producer" and a lower end of the scale potential consumer, as in the vendor/hawker or subsistence farmer who owns or aspires to own a mobile telephone.

Out of the seven southern African states listed in Table 1, four are ranked below the median of the total number of states which the *Human Development Report 2001* categorises as reflective of "medium human development" and two (Zambia and Malawi) reside in the "low human development" category. Put differently, the income share of the richest 20 percent (1987-1998) in Botswana is 59 percent (compared to 4 percent for the poorest 20 percent). Comparative figures for other southern African states are, respectively: Lesotho (60 percent and 3 percent), South Africa (65 percent and 3 percent), Zambia (55 percent and 4 percent) and Zimbabwe (62 percent and 4 percent). Although the region has had an average annual growth rate of 1.7 percent (1994-1998), the benefits of this growth have gone to some workers in the formal sector and not to the marginalised (*The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community*, 2001:36-37, 39-40, 58-100). Rates of 6 to 7 percent would be required to halve poverty by 2015.

Is marginalisation and inequality, both generally, but more particularly in southern Africa, sustainable in the longer term? Do the marginalised form a potential force of political protest that can bring about a change towards greater equity, perhaps through a more development-orientated state form? The political economist and historian, Robert Cox, predicts that such a “bottom-up” driven change is indeed latent among the marginalised. Other political economists, such as Sandra MacLean (2004:2) argue that inequality has become a threat to human security and is now a “functional” issue of public policy because “...people whose needs are not met are less likely to be productive economically and/or *they are more likely to become militantly aggressive in protesting their condition.*” (own italics) I will attempt to address this question by using Cox’s theory of transformation in conjunction with the survey data of the Afrobarometer Round 1, conducted from 1999-2000.

Robert Cox’s Theory of Transformation

Cox’s theory of transformation suggests that one of the ways in which increasing levels of inequality can be observed and analysed is to determine how people are related, in terms of their economic status, to the dynamics (via their national economies) of the contemporary world economic order (more specifically, to its system of production). The strength of Cox’s explanatory framework lies in its holistic view, which incorporates the dynamic interaction and mutual influence between three levels of analysis: social forces, forms of state, and world orders. It is a theory that focuses on social forces as a catalyst for change in forms of state, and world order. Cox has emphasised consistently over many years the importance of change from the “bottom-up” which, according to him, will emanate from those social forces who are “excluded” or “marginalised” from the global economy.

In Cox’s framework (1981, 1983, 1987) collectivities of agents (social forces) are not viewed as “captives” of structures. Structures constrain the actions of agents, but they can also be changed or manipulated by agents. By focusing on the nature of the relations of social forces (labour, capital and the state) to production, he emphasises the importance of modes of production in society: “Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life” (Cox, 1987:1).

Production, however, is not ontologically viewed in a deterministic manner, even though it can enhance state power. The relationship is one of reciprocity: “It has no historical precedence, indeed, the principal structures of production have been, if not actually created by the state, at least encouraged and sustained by the state” (Cox, 1987:5). In contemporary terms, and as foreseen by Cox (1981, 1987), the state’s autonomy over “what is produced, by whom, where and by what means” (Strange, 1988) has been much reduced by the “internationalisation of production” (today, the globalisation of production). Contrary to Marxism, however, Cox does not predict the demise of the state. Instead, he focuses on the development of various *state forms* (for instance, liberal and hyper-liberal) in response to changes in the way social forces relate to production, and in response to changing world orders. Forms of state, in turn, influence production modes and social forces, as well as world orders.

To restate, social forces related to production are viewed as important (collective) agents of change. This is where the explanatory and prediction potential in Cox’s approach is located. Historical structures and hegemony⁷ (both at state and world order level) are created by agents and can be changed by them. The flexibility of this approach lies in the combination of the synchronic (problem-solving theory) and diachronic method for studying change. The synchronic approach can best be described as a “snapshot” of reality at a given moment in time. It attempts to give a contextual and in-depth description and explanation of a social phenomenon. Once this exercise has been undertaken, however, the diachronic approach leads the analyst to focus on change and the potential for change within a particular historical structure: “This diachronic moment seeks out the contradictions and conflicts inherent in a social structure

and contemplates the *characteristics of emerging social forces* and the nature and extent of structural change that is *feasible* (own italics)” (Sinclair, 1996:8).

Finally, historical structures are described by Cox in terms of three “forces” which dynamically interact in a non-deterministic manner: ideas, institutions and material capabilities. Actors can either accommodate themselves to these forces or resist. How these forces are configured is not a matter of abstraction but is determined by a study of the particular historical phase within which they are located. Secondly, it also requires a focus on tensions that can lead to the emergence of “rival structures.” *Ideas* are divided by Cox into inter-subjective meanings (a shared understanding about, for instance, the nature of the state) and different perceptions by social groups about the “legitimacy of prevailing power relations” which he terms “collective images of social order.” *Institutions* are used to maintain a specific order. They reflect power relations and promote “collective images” which are in tandem with these power relations. *Material capabilities* include technology, wealth, industries, armaments, and the capacity to build organisations (Cox, 1981:136-137). It is within historical structures that the three levels (social forces related to production, forms of state and world orders) can be viewed (explained) in terms of the configuration between ideas, institutions and material capabilities. The manner in which ideas, material capabilities and institutions relate to one another helps to explain whether a world order is hegemonic or whether it is in hegemonic decline and vulnerable to a counter-hegemonic challenge.⁸

To conclude this section, it is useful to quote Falk’s (1997:53) interpretation of Cox’s emphasis on social forces, because it points to the source from which the predicted impetus for change will come:

...critical realism in a period of historical transition has become for Cox not only a tool for understanding and interpretation, but also a source of guidance for action, not in an immediate or concrete sense, but as an orientation that could achieve specificity in concrete settings of struggle between social forces aligned to the global market and those connected with more limited human communities of local, national and regional scope. Cox sees the potential for the transformation of forms of state and world orders as lying within these more limited human communities.

It is important to note that Cox’s theory of transformation does not attempt to explain *individual* political behaviour. It attempts to explain how “social forces” shape state forms and world political economic order. Social forces consist of *groups* who are conceptualised in terms of their relation to what and how material and non-material goods are produced, and to the state that attempts to manage the environment within which this takes place. According to Cox, social change (transformation) at the state and world order levels can be expected to emanate from the group which is excluded from the benefits of the dominant system of production. One of his particularly powerful illustrations of the theory at work (Cox, 1987) is the challenge of the industrial classes in 19th century England and how this had an impact on that country’s state form and also on the world order of that time (*pax britannica*). These social forces were part of and crucial to the dominant mode of production, a fact that enabled them to organise and to transform their economic status into political power. The marginalised, however, are excluded from the contemporary dominant mode of production. My hypothesis, therefore, is that they are not likely to be a force for transformation, precisely because they are excluded and concomitantly, powerless and apathetic.

Conceptualising the Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated

Cox identifies three categories according to which people are related to the contemporary political economic world order:

- Those who are *integrated*. They are the dominant class who are in managerial positions (state and civil society) and decide “what is produced, where and by whom” in the *dominant* production mode of the global economy.
- Those who find themselves in a *precarious* position. These are workers who can easily be replaced because of low skill levels, demand for a particular product, and the ability of capital to relocate production to where cheap and flexible labour regimes exist.
- Those who are *excluded* or *marginalised* from global production. They include people who are not formally employed in sectors of the economy integrated into global production. For instance, vendors, casual labour, subsistence farmers and those who have no means of permanent income whatsoever (Cox, 1999:9).

The marginalised in urban areas are unskilled workers (no formal job training and limited or no education). They are usually unemployed (in the formal economy) and earn an irregular cash income. This income is sourced through temporary, short-time jobs such as casual labour, sidewalk vending and hawking. In the rural areas, the marginalised are represented by subsistence farmers who have limited contact with the cash economy. Their income is usually supplemented through wage reparations from relatives in urban areas, the pension earnings of the elderly, and income earned from the sale of cash crops in times of surplus.

The precarious economic group is mainly found in urban areas. They are semi-skilled (with some job training and basic education). They have low status full-time jobs (in cleaning, maintenance, security, the clothing, textile, footwear and mining industries) or are temporarily employed as contract workers. The latter form the major component of the precarious and are looking for full-time work without being able to find it. Some workers in this category are not unionised. Cox (1987:52-55) also includes certain kinds of self-employment in this category (“...most forms of self-employment are precarious in the long term”). These are: commercial farmers, shopkeepers, craft market peddlers and any other form of non-professional self-employment with a regular income.

The integrated category refers to those managers and workers who find themselves in a sector of the economy that is outwardly orientated and directly connected to the global economy. They are directors and upper level management staff of globally integrated (export focused) manufacturers, financial services and information technology companies. The integrated also include the “state class” (civil service managerial positions) in developing countries, particularly those who work for state agencies that are directing the process aimed at becoming globally competitive (for instance; finance, trade and industry, foreign affairs, and the prime minister or president’s office). Established full-time workers who are employed by these companies and state agencies are also included in this category. They are highly skilled or skilled (usually with post-secondary education and/or training) and are found in information technology related work, research and development, and technical supervision and support. Also included are self-employed professionals such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, accountants and engineers (see also Cox, 1993a; Cox, 1996:26-27; Cox, 1997a: 247-248; and Cox, 1999:9).

For Cox, the transformative potential of state forms and a world order is located in the marginalised, because:

- “...a very large part of the world’s population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy, having no employment or income, or the purchasing power derived from it. A major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to neutralize the effect of this marginalization of perhaps one-third of the world’s population so as to prevent its poverty from fueling revolt” (Cox, 1981:113).

- “Possibly the potential for revolt arising out of the social relations in the production process is greater in the Third World than in the advanced capitalist countries” (Cox, 1987:387).
- “...whole regions of Africa belong to the bottom level...” (Cox, 1996:26-27).
- The marginalised “...are a continuing source of anomic and potentially concerted violence” (Cox, 1997a:248).
- The results of globalisation-friendly macroeconomic policies have brought about a state of affairs which can result in “open revolt” or a “passive withdrawal of obedience” (Cox, 1997b:248).
- “If we are to assume that power is grounded in human communities, and if we take a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on world order, then *we need to ask about the condition of public affinity or comfort with the political authorities* (own italics) of the entities that formally constitute world order – the states and multilateral institutions and processes. That affinity seems to range from the tenuous to the hostile throughout the world” (Cox, 2000:33).

It is clear that Cox regards the developing world (and Africa) as being particularly conducive to transformation from below. For Africa, he relies on the work of Fantu Cheru to generate predictions on the behaviour of the marginalised. Citing Cheru’s (1989) notion of a “silent revolution” in Africa, he concludes that the marginalised are “...dropping out of the world market, and the formal structures of national economies, to seek their survival in the informal sector” (Cox, 1992:527-529). He also refers to and quotes Cheru’s “exit-option” in several other publications (cf. Cox, 1993b and 1999). For example, “One finds [in Africa] the striving of countless individuals and collectives towards new types of self-organization – perhaps one should say self-defense – aimed in one way or another at operating outside the bureaucratic centralism of the neocolonial state.” This phenomenon is seen as indicating a loss of state legitimacy. Furthermore, Cox (1993b:41) notes that there is a “...spreading *attitude* (own italics) that states and governments are anti-people, that they are merely transmission belts for dominant forces in the global political economy, and that the only salvation lies in local self-help and severance of links to formal authorities.”

However, Cox regards this potential challenge (from the marginalised) as a world of mystery: “The marginalized and excluded remain a world of mystery because they do not seem to participate in the ‘rationality’ of the center” (Cox, 1997b:247). They remain a mystery, it is argued in this paper, because for all its emphasis on the importance of social forces related to production as a source of contradictions in society, as well as possible transformation, Cox never investigated the (aggregated) motives of those who he sees as a (potential) threat to the established order. His theory, in the context of southern Africa, argues that the major challenge facing states in the region is to be found in the exclusion of the marginalised. But this is a question that needs to be investigated. Does this vast underclass have the potential to act as a force for the transformation of state forms? And how do they view the state?

Hypotheses and Comparative Base

Based on Cox’s theory, a main hypothesis and a number of subsidiary hypotheses can be derived. The main hypothesis claims that position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group’s propensity to challenge the political and economic status quo. Those who are marginalized or excluded are more inclined to pose such a challenge than the precarious and integrated. Several subsidiary hypotheses revolve around the expectation of the main hypothesis: (a) being marginalised correlates with being more inclined to political protest (Cox, 1997a:248); (b) being marginalised correlates with being more dissatisfied with the political economic system (Cox, 1987:403); (c) being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy (Cox, 1991:207 and Cox, 1992:527-529, 532-534); (d) being marginalised correlates with decreased political efficacy (Cox, 1991:207); (e) being marginalised correlates with belonging to “self-help” associations (Cox, 1991:207 and Cox, 1996:26-27); (f) being marginalised

correlates with increased civil society participation (“exit option”) (Cox, 1993b:41); (g) being marginalised correlates with low perceptions of state legitimacy (Cox, 1993b:41, Cox, 1997b:250, and Cox, 1999:13, 24-25); and (h) being marginalised correlates with negative perceptions of international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) (Cox, 1999:24-24). To determine whether there is support for the main hypothesis, this paper focuses on the subsidiary hypotheses dealing with political and economic dissatisfaction, political protest and legitimacy.

The seven southern African states, whose political economic profiles are listed in Table 2 below, provide us with considerable variation and sufficient similarities to serve as a base for comparison. In terms of Freedom House’s Index, three states (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) are rated as “free” and score high in terms of their political and civil liberties indices. It is noteworthy that these states also have the highest per capita GNP. Namibia’s civil liberties score was recently downgraded because of attempts by the government to restrict press freedom. Namibia and South Africa’s economies are categorised as “capitalist-statist,” which means they have a large market-orientated sector but also a large sector that is controlled by state or parastatal companies. Zambia is the only state that has a “mixed-statist” economy, meaning that the economy is primarily government-directed but with a significant presence of private enterprises.

Out of the seven states, four (Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have “partly free” status. Lesotho is regarded as “in transition” to a competitive multiparty system, while Zimbabwe scores the lowest on the civil and political liberties indices. Within this sample of southern African states there are also two with “dominant party” polities (Zambia and Zimbabwe). Here, although political challengers are allowed to compete, the governing party will not allow an effective transfer of power. This group is representative of countries that experience medium levels of development (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) according to the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), but also includes two states that fall into the low level of development category (Malawi and Zambia) (see Table 1). All experience high levels of income inequality (see Table 1) and have populations in which the marginalised form the majority (with the exception of South Africa, which approximates 50 percent, see Table 3).

Table 2: Political Economy Indicators of the Seven Afrobarometer States^a

	FH Polity Category ^b	FH Civil Liberties Score ^c	FH Political Rights Score	FH Status	FH Economy Category	Capital
Botswana	Parliamentary democracy + traditional chiefs	2	2	Free	Capitalist	Gaborone
Lesotho	Parliamentary democracy + traditional chiefs (transitional)	4	4	Partly Free	Capitalist	Maseru
Malawi ^d	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	3	3	Partly Free	Capitalist	Lilongwe
Namibia	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	3	2	Free	Capitalist-statist	Windhoek
RSA	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	2	1	Free	Capitalist-statist	Pretoria
Zambia	Dominant party	4	5	Partly Free	Mixed-statist	Lusaka
Zimbabwe ^e	Dominant party	5	6	Partly Free	Capitalist-statist	Harare

a. The data and explanatory comments for this table were drawn from Freedom House's website at:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/methodology5.htm> and

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>

b. This category describes the “dominant centres of freely chosen or unelected power in each country or territory.” The “parliamentary democracy plus traditional chiefs” category refers to a government that is appointed by an elected legislature, with a ceremonial head of state (optional) and substantive political power in the hands of traditional leaders. The “presidential-parliamentary democracy” consists of a government appointed by an elected legislature and a president who possesses executive power beyond ceremonial duties. The “dominant party” category describes a polity where one mass-based party dominates the government. Other parties are nominally allowed to organise and compete, but are not allowed to replace the governing dominant party.

c. Civil liberties include freedom of expression and belief, association and organisational rights, rule of law and human rights, and personal autonomy and economic rights. Political rights include free and fair elections (head of state and legislature), a competitive political party system, effective and “challenger” opposition parties, absence of domination/repression, effective power for elected representatives and effective rights for minority groups. A score between 1 and 7 can be obtained for each category, with 1 representing most free and 7 least free.

d. Malawi's political rights rating has since been downgraded to 4, because of a crackdown on the opposition party.

e. Zimbabwe's civil liberties rating has since been downgraded to 6 and its status changed to “Not Free” because of continued repressive measures to restrict citizens' freedom of expression and organisation.

Method and Limitations

The data used to test these hypotheses was generated by surveys conducted during Round 1 of the Afrobarometer, from 1999-2000. Although essentially an instrument designed to poll the extent of democratic consolidation in southern Africa, the items in the questionnaire⁹ cover a wide range of issues that are relevant to the main and subsidiary hypotheses of Cox's theory of transformation.

The seven national research partners that conducted these Afrobarometer surveys are; the University of Botswana, Sechaba Consultants of Lesotho, the Centre for Social Research at the University of Malawi, Research Facilitation Services in Namibia, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia, and the University of Zimbabwe. A multi-stage, stratified area cluster probability sample was used for the surveys.¹⁰ The following nationally representative samples were drawn (target sample sizes are given in brackets) for a total target sample size (N) of 9400 respondents:

- Botswana: November 1999 (1200)
- Lesotho: March-April 2000 (1200)
- Malawi: December 1999 (1200)
- Namibia: September-October 1999 (1200)
- South Africa: July-August 2000 (2200)
- Zambia: November 1999 (1200)
- Zimbabwe: October-November 1999 (1200)

Based on Cox's conceptualisation of what it means to be economically marginalised, precarious, or integrated, an "economic position" measure was constructed, the MPI (Marginalised, Precarious, Integrated) Index. Cox emphasises four aspects that determine where an individual will be located in these categories: regularity of income, skills (education), occupation and status of economic activity (employment). These economic profile items all appear in the questionnaire (the item corresponding to skills is education) and were recoded to reflect Cox's conceptualisation. Based on factor analysis, the index was constructed with the inclusion of occupation, employment status, and education. The factor analysis showed that there was a strong underlying dimension (commonality) that is responsible for the covariation among these three variables.¹¹ The results also confirm the expectation that, based on Cox's conceptualisation of economic position, the selection of these variables and their grouping into a single index was theoretically and statistically justifiable.¹² The subsequent analysis consisted of running correlations and cross-tabulations (using SPSS[®], version 10) between the MPI Index and selected questionnaire items and indices (see Mattes, et al., 2000; and Mattes and Bratton, 2001) that are related to the hypotheses of Cox's theory of transformation.

Table 3: The Marginalised, Precarious, and Integrated in the Seven Afrobarometer States (Round 1, 1999-2000) (percent)

MPI Index	LES	BOTS	MAL	NAM	ZAM	ZIM	SA	Total
Marginalised	82.6	58.6	77.9	67.0	59.1	57.3	48.4	62.9
Precarious	16.0	32.3	15.5	22.4	28.6	32.5	40.4	28.1
Integrated	1.4	9.1	6.6	10.6	12.3	10.2	11.2	9.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Total N=9368, Valid N=8618 (92%), Missing N=750 (8%).

It must, again, be noted that the survey instrument was not specifically designed to answer the hypotheses that were deduced from Cox's theory. Furthermore, the results of the survey were subject to a one year embargo, in order to give the principal researchers the opportunity to publish their findings. Finally, the results presented here are a synchronic "snapshot." They have not been contextualised within Cox's diachronic method of analysis, which focuses on the interaction between ideas, institutions and capabilities in historical structures.

Analysis of Results

This section focuses on the results of the data analysis. The method of analysis involved two stages. First, a correlation matrix was created between the MPI Index and selected items in the questionnaire that are related to attitudes towards regime type, the economy, political protest potential and legitimacy. Only those correlations of .160 or stronger were selected.¹³ Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) ranges between -1 and $+1$. A positive correlation indicates that an increase in the value of one variable is associated with an increase in the value of the other variable. A negative correlation means that an increase in one variable is associated with a decrease in the value of the second. The correlation matrix that was constructed correlates the MPI Index (independent variable) with the selected questionnaire items (dependent variables). Secondly, a cross-tabulation (between the MPI Index and the appropriate items) analysis was run on all the correlations of .160 or stronger.¹⁴

The first category, *regime type*, deals with attitudes towards the political system and facilitates an evaluation of the subsidiary hypothesis which states that being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political system. The questionnaire includes a number of items that attempted to measure attitudes towards and understandings of democracy. Meaningful correlations were discovered on four items. The first item (*rejection of non-democratic alternatives*) is a scale (1-5) that reflects how willing people are to consider authoritarian options, or in other words, how strongly they are committed in their expressed support of democracy as a form of governance. The scale is constructed from a question that reads as follows:

Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [this country] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following [six] alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?

Some of the alternative options listed were: "If only one political party, or candidates from only one political party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office?"; "If the army came in to govern the country?"; and "If all important decisions about the economy were made by economic experts rather than an elected government or parliament?" Table 4 shows the results of the correlations and resultant cross-tabulations between this item and the MPI Index. The range of responses to the various alternatives have been collapsed into three categories: strongly disapprove and disapprove appears as "disapprove," strongly approve and approve as "approve," and neither approve nor disapprove as "unsure."

Correlations were run for all seven states (every respondent in the data set), for each state separately (all respondents, i.e., rural and urban together), and for rural and urban respondents separately (across all states and within each state). Where all states are included in correlations or cross-tabulations, they are referred to collectively as "southern Africa." The tables below report only on those states and/or the region when meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and selected items were found. "Marginalised," "precarious" and "integrated" have been abbreviated to M, P, and I. While "all," "urban" and "rural" appear as A, U and R respectively. All percentages have been rounded off.

Table 4: The MPI Index and Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives¹⁵

Attitudes to Non-Democratic Alternatives	MPI Index											
	Malawi (U) r =.187			Namibia (A) r =.188			Zambia (R) r =.182			Zimbabwe (A) r =.172		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Approve	2	1	0	10	5	3	6	4	0	6	2	1
Unsure	16	8	0	29	25	14	18	21	19	16	15	11
Disapprove	82	91	0	61	70	84	76	75	81	79	83	88
N	N=304 (99%)			N=899 (76%)			N=698 (73%)			N=915 (76%)		

The second item is a scale (1-5) that attempts to measure the opinion of respondents toward anti-democratic actions by government. Are they strongly opposed to such actions, or not? The scale incorporates the responses – “support,” “unsure,” or “oppose” – to four potential anti-democratic actions by government. The anti-democratic actions include: shutting down media who are critical of government, dismissing judges who rule against government, banning political parties, and suspending parliament and cancelling the next elections.

Table 5: The MPI Index and Attitudes to Anti-democratic Actions by Government¹⁶

Attitudes to Anti-Democratic Actions by Government	MPI Index								
	Namibia (A) r =.142 ^a			Zambia (A) r =.170 ^b			Zimbabwe (A) r =.231 ^c		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Support	7	7	7	2	1	0	5	6	1
Unsure	32	20	14	7	6	3	26	18	4
Oppose	61	73	79	91	93	97	69	76	95
N	N=1072 (91%)			N=1033 (86%)			N=997 (83%)		

^a Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.171); ^b Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.232); ^c Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.254).

Again, there is an association between being marginalised, precarious or integrated and tolerance for anti-democratic behaviour by government. In Namibia there is no difference between the MPI categories and support for anti-democratic behaviour (levelling out at 7 percent each). There is, however, a large proportion of respondents who are uncertain. The largest proportion resides in the marginalised category (32 percent), declining to 20 percent for the precarious, and to 14 percent for the integrated.

The majority of respondents in Namibia oppose anti-democratic actions by government, but they form a smaller majority than in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Additionally, there is a tendency for the proportion of those who oppose such policies to increase, depending on economic position. In the marginalised category, 61 percent oppose anti-democratic behaviour, while the proportion increases to 73 percent for the precarious and to 79 percent for the integrated. The vast majority of Zambians pronounced themselves against authoritarian policies (above 90 percent for all three categories), but again there is a tendency for

the proportion to increase as one moves along the spectrum from the marginalised to the integrated. In Zimbabwe, as in Namibia, there is a substantial proportion of respondents who are unsure about their reaction to anti-democratic behaviour. Again, the larger proportion is found among the marginalised (26 percent), decreasing to 18 percent for the precarious, and 4 percent for the integrated. When it comes to rejection of anti-democratic behaviour, 95 percent of the integrated in Zimbabwe are on board, declining to 76 percent for the precarious, and 69 percent for the marginalised. Those who are integrated are, therefore, less tolerant of anti-democratic actions by government than the marginalised.

In the next item (which resulted in five meaningful correlations with the MPI Index) respondents were asked how they would *actually* react (“what if anything would you do about it?”) if the government were to undertake the anti-democratic actions which they were asked to respond to in Table 5. Based on the responses, a behavioural defence of democracy scale (1 to 5) was constructed, with 1 representing the lowest possible form of active defence of democracy (“do nothing”), and 5 the highest (most intense) form (“join a march or demonstration”).

Table 6: The MPI Index and Behavioural Defence of Democracy¹⁷

Behavioural Defence of Democracy	MPI Index														
	Southern Africa (A) r = .173 ^a			Botswana (A) r = .243			Malawi (A) r = .141 ^b			Zambia (A) r = .194			Zimbabwe (A) r = .227 ^c		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
1	44	30	21	41	26	19	45	30	16	21	14	11	49	32	18
2	26	31	30	24	23	13	20	27	32	37	32	23	26	30	37
3	14	19	23	13	18	21	13	19	21	16	19	29	11	19	16
4	11	12	15	13	21	33	17	18	26	18	21	16	7	10	14
5	5	8	11	8	12	15	5	7	5	8	13	21	6	10	16
N	N=8166 (87%)			N=904 (75%)			N=1161 (96%)			N=982 (82%)			N=968 (81%)		

^a Strongest correlation for rural respondents, ^b Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.171), ^c Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.184).

This is the first item where a meaningful correlation occurred for the whole (southern African) data set, more specifically among rural respondents. On the 1-5 scale, in order to simplify the analysis, the scale can be divided into three components; 1+2=low propensity to act, 3=average propensity to act, and 4+5=high propensity to act. When it comes to willingness to actually do something about anti-democratic government actions there is, again, a discernible pattern between the marginalised, precarious and integrated. Furthermore, *across the board (M+P+I), the majority of respondents exhibit a low propensity to behaviourally defend democracy*: southern Africa (66 percent), Botswana (58 percent), Malawi (63 percent), Zambia (52 percent) and Zimbabwe (69 percent).

Focusing on the marginalised, precarious and integrated there are notable differences when it comes to the intended intensity of behaviour to defend democracy. *Generally, the integrated are more inclined towards more intensive acts, while the marginalised and precarious are more inclined to do nothing*. For southern Africa the proportions for those with a low propensity to engage in high profile acts are as follows: marginalised (70 percent), precarious (61 percent) and integrated (51 percent). Moving to higher intensity behaviour, the proportions are 14 percent for the marginalised, 19 percent for the precarious and 23 percent for the integrated. Lastly, out of those who would consider high intensity behaviour (e.g. “join a march or demonstration) only 16 percent of respondents are found among the marginalised, increasing to 20 percent among the precarious and to 26 percent among the integrated. The highest proportion of those

among the integrated who indicate that they would consider high profile acts are found in Botswana (48 percent) and the lowest proportion in Zimbabwe (30 percent). Among the marginalised, the lowest proportion who find themselves at the bottom end of the intensity scale is in Zambia (58 percent) and the highest in Zimbabwe (75 percent).

The next items attempt to measure attitudes related to satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the *economy*. A question on personal economic satisfaction produced weak correlations with the MPI Index. In other words, the marginalised were not more dissatisfied than the precarious or integrated. The question reads as follows: “At the moment are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in [this country]?” Generally, substantial majorities in all the states (except Namibia, at 30 percent) indicated that they were “very dissatisfied/dissatisfied” with economic conditions (for instance, 94 percent in Zimbabwe and 68 percent in South Africa) (Mattes and Bratton, 2001:6).

A question on how respondents view their government’s management of the economy, when correlated with the MPI Index produced weak correlations. Overall, therefore, there were no differences between how the marginalised, precarious and integrated rated their governments’ performance in this area. Nevertheless, the weak correlations for both Namibia and Zimbabwe are presented in Table 7, below. The relevant index incorporates four issues (out of nine in the questionnaire) about which respondents were asked to evaluate their government’s performance. Optional responses were “not at all well,” “not very well,” “fairly well,” and “very well.” The items included in the index are: “creating jobs,” “building houses,” “ensuring that prices remain stable,” and “managing the economy.”

In both states, the integrated tend to be more critical of government’s management of the economy related to the selected issues. The differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated are, however, relatively small. In Namibia, when we add the “not at all well” and “not very well” responses, 46 percent of the marginalised, 49 percent of the precarious, and 55 percent of the integrated are not satisfied with their government’s performance. On the approval side (“fairly well” plus “very well”), the respective proportions are 54 percent, 50 percent, and 45 percent. The disapproval rate in Zimbabwe is much higher. Here, 88 percent of the marginalised, 84 percent of the precarious, and 95 percent of the integrated are not satisfied. The proportions of those (across the spectrum) who are satisfied is, subsequently very small, but the marginalised (13 percent) and precarious (16 percent) still tend to be more satisfied than the integrated (5 percent).

Table 7: The MPI Index and Government Economic Performance¹⁸

Government Management of the Economy	Namibia (A) r = .124			Zimbabwe (A) r = .112		
	M	P	I	M	P	I
Not at all well	4	5	8	36	31	28
Not very well	42	44	47	52	53	67
Fairly well	45	40	39	12	15	5
Very well	9	10	7	1	1	0
N	857 (72%)			891 (74%)		

Next, we turn to a question that focuses on how people view their economic position in relation to their fellow citizens (individual relative deprivation). The question reads: “Now let us speak about your

personal economic conditions. Would you say that they are worse, the same, or better than other [citizens of the country]?” Possible responses to this question were “much worse,” “worse,” “about the same,” “better,” or “much better.” Meaningful correlations between this item and the MPI Index were obtained for three states.

Table 8: The MPI Index and Individual Relative Deprivation¹⁹

Individual Relative Deprivation	Botswana (A) r =.161 ^a			Malawi (A) r =.160 ^b			Namibia (A) C=.232		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Much worse	22	23	5	20	17	6	13	9	5
Worse	37	34	23	37	28	22	33	24	8
About the same	23	25	33	17	19	25	22	21	27
Better	15	14	34	23	29	42	28	39	50
Much better	4	3	6	4	6	5	4	7	11
N	887 (74%)			1201 (99%)			1047 (89%)		

^a Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.174), ^b Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.307).

The results for the three states in Table 8 indicate that *in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia, the marginalised, more so than the precarious and integrated, tend to see themselves as worse off (compared to other citizens)*. If we add the “much worse” and “worse” categories, we see that in Botswana, 59 percent of the marginalised regard themselves as much worse/worse off, 57 percent of the precarious do, and only 28 percent of the integrated. The Malawian figures are comparable, except that the proportion of the precarious that thinks so drops to 45 percent. In Namibia, only 13 percent of the integrated think they are much worse/worse off (compared to 46 percent of the marginalised and 33 percent of the precarious). Between the three states, Namibia also has the highest number of integrated (61 percent) who feel that they are in “better/much better” position compared to other Namibians.

Political protest is the most active/extreme form of political participation. The relevant questionnaire item operationalises this concept in the following form: “Here are a number of different actions people might take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.” “Yes” responses were sub-categorised under “Once or twice,” “A few times,” or “Often.” “No responses” under “No, would never do this,” and “No, but would do it if I had the chance.” The following activities were listed: “attend a demonstration or protest march,” “participate in a boycott of rates, services or taxes,” “take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices,” and “use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property).” Only two states, Botswana and Zambia, correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index.

The vast majority of respondents (marginalised, precarious and integrated) fall into the “no” category, but approximately one-third in both states would undertake some form of protest action if given the chance. The integrated are more inclined to do so. In Botswana, 54 percent fall into the “no, but would” category, as opposed to 31 percent of the marginalised and 36 percent of the precarious. Also in Botswana, 6 percent of the integrated fall into the “yes” category and in Zambia, 11 percent. The comparative numbers for the marginalised are 2 percent in both these states. Few people have engaged in protest activities, *but, in these states, the integrated (followed by the precarious) are more inclined to do so or to have done so.*

Table 9: The MPI Index and Political Protest²⁰

Political Protest	Botswana (A) r = .156 ^a			Zambia (A) r = .154 ^b		
	M	P	I	M	P	I
No, never	67	58	40	72	60	58
No, but would	31	36	54	27	36	31
Yes, once or twice	2	6	6	2	3	9
Yes, a few times	0	0	0	0	1	2
N	865 (72%)			997 (83%)		

^a Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.203), ^b Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.173).

The next table looks at whether there are any differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated when it comes to the issue of *legitimacy*. Mattes, *et al.* (2000:30) associate legitimacy with the consent or compliance of the governed to be governed: "...state and government legitimacy can be seen as the sense that there is no alternative set of structures or institutions" which people view as having the right "to make authoritative, binding societal decisions."

Only two items correlated weakly with the MPI Index. The first item attempts to measure attitudes towards government and the constitution and consists of a question and four statements. A legitimacy scale (1-5) was constructed, with 1 being an indication of extremely low legitimacy and 5 an indication of high legitimacy. The question reads: "Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree?" (The interviewer was asked to probe for strength of opinion). The statements are; "our government was elected to power by accepted procedures," "our government exercises power in an acceptable way," "our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the [insert country] people" and "our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them."

The only somewhat meaningful correlation was for the Zimbabwean national sample. On the 1-5 scale, 1+2="low legitimacy," 3="unsure, and 4+5="high legitimacy." The large number of missing cases is due to the "don't know" responses, which were treated as missing cases. On the legitimacy scale, Zimbabwe ranked the lowest²¹ among the seven southern African states, while Namibia and Botswana ranked the highest. *Overall, the legitimacy scores for the seven southern African states tend to level out towards the mid-point, indicating an average accordance of legitimacy to southern African governments by all respondents* (Mattes, *et al.*, 2000:31).

The negative correlation reflects a pattern that occurred for all the correlations that were run between the MPI Index and other legitimacy related items in the questionnaire. *As can be seen from the Zimbabwean sample, the marginalised tend to attribute more legitimacy to government than the precarious and integrated.* Therefore, moving towards the more integrated, in terms of economic position, we can observe a decline on the legitimacy scale. By way of comparison, southern Africa and South Africa (with low correlations) indicate a repetition of the same pattern, albeit with smaller percentage differences between the marginalised, precarious, and integrated. Only 5 percent of the integrated in Zimbabwe lie on the upper end of the legitimacy scale, compared to 38 percent in southern Africa, and 40 percent in South Africa.

Table 10: The MPI Index and Governmental Legitimacy²²

Governmental Legitimacy	MPI Index								
	Zimbabwe (A) r = -.158 ^a			Southern Africa (A) r = -.077			South Africa (A) r = -.135		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Low	56	60	75	21	23	28	13	16	25
Unsure	27	30	20	30	35	34	36	38	35
High	17	10	5	49	41	38	52	46	40
N	807 (67%)			7259 (78%)			2007 (91%)		

^a Strongest correlation for urban respondents (-.163)

The second legitimacy related item that correlated meaningfully with the MPI index attempts to measure respondents' willingness/unwillingness to obey some selected fundamental laws related to, *inter alia*, the payment of taxes and payment for services. A scale (1-5) was constructed, based on the answers pertaining to four hypothetical actions. The question reads: "We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not." The actions listed are: "claim government benefits to which you are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment)," "avoid paying a development levy or property tax," "avoid paying income taxes," and "get services like electricity or water without paying for them."

Taking into account the qualifying note at the bottom of Table 11, *the numbers for rural Namibians and urban Zimbabweans do illustrate a tendency for the marginalised to be more inclined to consider disobeying government laws (tax avoidance, fraudulent benefit claims, and non-payment for basic services) than the precarious and integrated. The southern African data is included to illustrate that this tendency (the more integrated are less inclined to disobey) holds for the region, but with much smaller percentage differences between the three categories.* In Namibia 83 percent of the integrated, against 63 percent of the marginalised, indicated that they have never undertaken such actions. Only 10 percent of the integrated state that they would take these actions if given the chance, compared to 24 percent of the marginalised and 16 percent of the precarious. This pattern repeats itself in Zimbabwe. If we add the various "yes" responses (those respondents who admit to having broken the law) the differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated become even more pronounced. Among the Zimbabwean marginalised, 12 percent admit to having transgressed, as do 12 percent of the precarious, compared to only 3 percent of the integrated.

Table 11: The MPI Index and Inclination to Disobey²³

Inclination to Disobey	MPI Index								
	Southern Africa (A) <i>r</i> = -.035			Namibia (A) <i>r</i> = -.166 (rural) ^a			Zimbabwe (A) <i>r</i> = -.170 (urban)		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
No, never	82	82	86	63	74	83	67	70	82
No, but would	14	14	10	24	16	10	21	18	15
Yes, once or twice	3	3	2	7	4	6	7	6	1
Yes, a few times	1	.9	.7	3	3	1	1	2	0
Yes, often	1.3	1.2	.9	3	2	1	4	4	2
N	6583 (70%)			927 (78%)			850 (71%)		

^a For both Namibia and Zimbabwe correlations for the whole national sample were not meaningful. Meaningful correlations were found among rural Namibians and urban Zimbabweans. However, a selection of only these respondents would have (considering the large number of missing cases) made the *N* too small.

Conclusions

Are the marginalised more dissatisfied with the political economic system than the precarious and integrated? According to the results from the data analysis and related to regime type (attitudes to democratic political systems) the marginalised are more inclined to approve of authoritarian alternatives. They are also more inclined to not oppose anti-democratic policies by government and to not wanting to actively defend democracy. Lastly, the integrated (in two states, Namibia and Zimbabwe) are more inclined to view democracy as the “only game in town” than the precarious and marginalised. One can conclude, therefore, that the marginalised seem to be (potentially) more willing to discard democracy. *This can be interpreted as a degree of “dissatisfaction” with regime type and support for the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political system.*

On economic dissatisfaction, the correlations with the MPI Index were weak. For the survey as a whole, respondents were inclined to not approve of their governments’ management of the economy and to also feel themselves to be relatively deprived compared to others. In three states (Botswana, Malawi and Namibia), the marginalised felt themselves to be more deprived than the integrated, whereas in two states (Namibia and Zimbabwe) the integrated were slightly more critical of government economic performance than the marginalised. *The overall results, therefore, are not supportive of the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised is correlated with greater economic dissatisfaction.*

The political protest item correlated (moderately) with the MPI Index in only two states. Again, the vast majority of respondents indicated that they had never engaged in this particular form of political participation. Among those who indicated that they would do so, if given the chance, the integrated have a higher protest potential than the precarious and marginalised. Nevertheless, there are significant proportions of the marginalised who would also protest (given the chance) but less so than the integrated. The fact that the MPI Index only correlated with political protest in two states means that there are no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in the region and the other states. *There is, consequently, no support for the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised means being more inclined to political protest (actual or potential).*

Do the marginalised accord less legitimacy to state and government institutions than the precarious and integrated? Overall, the correlation between the MPI Index and the items on legitimacy attitudes were low and there was little variance in the outlooks of the marginalised, precarious and integrated. This indicates that there is no or very little difference in outlook between the three economic position groups. In fact, the data show that the integrated are more inclined to not trust state and government institutions. However, although the correlations were low, the marginalised (in two states) are more inclined to want to “cheat” (take the “exit-option”) than the precarious and integrated. *The results, therefore, do not support the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised correlates with lower state legitimacy in comparison to the other economic categories in Cox’s hierarchy.*

Taking into account these conclusions and what they say about the subsidiary hypothesis, *the main hypothesis, which states that position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group’s propensity to challenge the political-economic status quo and that those who are marginalised are more inclined to pose such a challenge than the precarious and integrated, is also not supported.*

Namibia, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe emerged as the states that “react” consistently on the various items and the MPI Index. Botswana emerged with meaningful correlations for the items on political protest and relative deprivation, while South Africa did not feature at all (in other words, there were no significant differences between marginalised, precarious and integrated respondents). Except for the relative deprivation item (Botswana, Malawi and Namibia) and a higher tolerance among the marginalised for non-democratic alternatives (regime dissatisfaction) in Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the results were in the opposite direction of what Cox’s theory anticipates. This requires more in-depth research and national contextualisation, but it is interesting to note that Zambia and Zimbabwe are rated as dominant party polities by Freedom House (see Table 2) and “partly free” and “not free” respectively, while Malawi’s political rights rating has recently been downgraded. Political protest is more likely among integrated Tswanas (Botswana scores high on the freedom index), but also more likely among integrated Zambians. South Africa and Botswana (with the highest GNP per capita, albeit with high levels of inequality) reacted the least to the MPI Index.

The Zimbabwean results warrant some additional observations and re-capping, while bearing in mind that the survey was completed before the end of 1999 (before the 2001 elections and before Mugabe’s land redistribution policy started gathering momentum). At this stage, Zimbabwe’s legitimacy scale already fell below mid-point (Afrobarometer, Round 1). When it comes to undemocratic actions by government, 5 percent of the Zimbabwean marginalised indicated that they would support this and 26 percent were unsure. The analysis also shows that Zimbabweans (across the board) came out on top (69 percent) when it comes to not being willing to behaviourally defend democracy. However, 50 percent of the marginalised indicated that they would do nothing, as opposed to 18 percent of the integrated and 32 percent of the precarious. Finally, although the legitimacy scale is low overall, 17 percent of the marginalised bestow high legitimacy on the Mugabe government, while 27 percent are unsure.

These results may be an indication of the success of Mugabe’s ruling party’s (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) mixture of intimidation and support-building strategies among Zimbabwe’s poor. The continuing economic decline, which was already underway in 1999, has hit all segments of the population hard, but the regime has been careful to target some relief at its support base, particularly in the rural areas (for instance, through the storing and provision of external food aid). Speculating further, it could also be an indication that the Mugabe government will, in all probability, not be threatened by a popular revolt of Zimbabwe’s impoverished and marginalised population. Again, it seems that even under the most arduous of circumstances, being marginalised does not necessarily translate into being more inclined to push for political and economic transformation. It may mean, however, that one is more inclined to interact with the state on a tactical basis, in order to ensure daily survival. In other words,

sometimes using the “exit-option” and at other times “engaging.” This is an issue that requires further investigation.

The empirical analysis has provided us with a synchronic “snapshot” of the marginalised in seven southern African states. The results have shown that we cannot uncritically accept that the marginalised will act as a potential source of transformation “from below.” The explanation for this, I would submit, is that they are excluded or on the fringes of the dominant economic mode of production (globally and nationally). It is much more difficult to mobilise and organise for political transformation when every day is a struggle to meet one’s basic needs. This means that those who are justly concerned about equity and greater inclusiveness must take cognisance of the need to access the profile of the marginalised. A “bottom-up” explanation, therefore, also requires an empirical focus to determine whether a “push” for change is actually latent among the marginalised. This will enable practitioners who are interested in the mobilisation of broadly based social movements to work within the limits of the possible, but also to expand those limits.

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Notes

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² See for instance, Hertz (2001), Holm and Sorenson (1995), Scholte (2000) and William (1997).

³ This paper's does not participate in or pronounce on the outcome of the debate itself. Since the publication of Pritchett's (1997) article which argued that the income gap between developing and developed countries has consistently widened over the last one hundred years or so, the focus is now on whether globalisation has reduced poverty and inequality, whether it has made no difference, or whether it has made poor people worse off. Some argue that it all depends on how you present the numbers and what time horizon you use (a point well argued by Kanbur, 2001).

For the purposes of contextualising Cox's claims (which emanate from the assumption that globalisation or greater "openness" are systemic changes which can be associated with greater inequality) it is accepted that inequality has, indeed, increased and that this can be associated with systemic changes at the world economy level over the last fifty years.

⁴ The most common measure of summarising inequality in the distribution of income is the Gini coefficient. The value ranges between 0 and 1. One indicates perfect inequality and zero perfect equality. A value of .40 and above is accepted as a high indicator of inequality. Inequality can also include a skewed distribution of assets (for instance, land), as well as unequal access to health and education (Cornia and Court, 2001:6). Galbraith (2002:16-17) uses the Theil T statistic as a measure of inequality to focus on pay inequality in the manufacturing sector. Inequality can be measure at three levels, viz. global inequality which focuses on the comparison of all individuals, international inequality which looks at the differences between states and national inequality (the differences in income within a particular state) (Cornia and Court, 2001:6).

⁵ The WIID database can be found at the UNU/WIDER website: www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.

⁶ The Afrobarometer is a collaborative survey research project undertaken by social scientists from 15 African countries. It is coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) in Accra, Ghana, and Michigan State University. Round 1 surveys, conducted from 1999-2001, were conducted in 12 African countries, including the seven countries studied in this report. Round 2 was conducted in 2002-2003 in 15 countries. For more information, including reports with complete findings, see www.afrobarometer.org.

⁷ Cox (1977, see also 1982) uses Gramsci's concept of hegemony and applies it to the international level. He is well aware of the fact that this was not Gramsci's intention: "Not surprisingly, Gramsci did not have very much to say directly about international relations" (Cox, 1983:124). Despite Gramsci's use of the concept at the state-society level, Cox feels that his ideas should not be frozen in time, but utilised to enhance understanding of contemporary developments. Also, Gramsci himself considered the link between state-society and international relations: "Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow" (quoted by Cox, 1983:133).

⁸ The dynamic interaction between social forces, forms of state and world orders is described in rich historical detail in Cox's seminal volume, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987), and is related to three historical structures; *pax britannica*, rival imperialisms, and *pax americana*. For instance, the rise and incorporation of the industrial working class in England (social forces) led to a new form of state; welfarist-nationalist. This change in the form of state led to a world order, which was characterised by increased rivalry (military and industrial), between the major European powers. World orders also influence forms of state. The bipolar order, a characteristic of the Cold War, contributed to the rise of the military industrial complex in the

former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the USA. Forms of state (based on the interests of the dominant social forces) influence the power relations between contending social forces related to production (Cox, 1981:100-101).

To extend the example, the interaction between ideas, material capabilities and institutions, as well as the relations between social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be illustrated by the historical structure of the *pax britannica*. The liberal form of state in 19th century England was founded upon the attainment of middle class hegemony. The 1832 Reform Act, gave the middle class representation in parliament and excluded the working class, thereby thwarting attempts to create an alliance between the two. In 1846, the repeal of the Corn Laws signalled the triumph of industrial over agrarian interests. The functions of the liberal state were centred on the creation of an unregulated economy. A “pure” labour market was created (based on supply and demand), poverty became a personal responsibility (1834 Poor Law Reform), and employers-worker relations were based on bipartism. The *ideas* (ideology) underpinning the liberal state form were based on the separation between politics and economics (*laissez-faire*). Ironically, the de-regulation of the market, was accompanied by the growing centralisation and bureaucratisation of state power.

At the world order level, hegemony was maintained by England’s *material capability* (technology, industrialisation and military and maritime domination) to manage the balance of power in Europe. The same capability was also used to assure freedom of commercial access and an open trade order. Although there were no *institutions* comparable to the IMF and World Bank (created at the outset of the *pax americana*), the City of London was responsible for maintaining a gold exchangeable currency (the gold standard). The contradictions in the liberal state form arose from the social costs (unemployment, poverty, starvation, child labour, appalling work conditions) which accompanied the functioning of the unregulated market. As a result of pressure by the social forces of organised labour and sympathetic industrialists (e.g. Chamberlain), new social safety net laws were passed, the market was re-embedded into society, and a change in the form of state (welfarist) was brought about (Cox, 1987:123-147).

⁹ A complete copy of the Zambian version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B of Leysens (2002). Other questionnaires are available on the Afrobarometer website at www.afrobarometer.org.

¹⁰ The sample design protocol is set out in Appendix C of the SAB’s *Memorandum of Understanding* (IDASA, 1999).

¹¹ Using the principal component analysis method of extraction, the results of the factor analysis showed that occupation accounted for 49 percent of the variance explained by the common factor, followed by employment (21 percent), education (18 percent) and regularity of income (12 percent). A factor analysis without the income variable resulted in 59 percent for occupation, 24 percent for employment and 17 percent for education. Subsequently, these items were used in the construction of the MPI Index.

¹² The Alpha reliability analysis for the three items is .6473, which George and Mallery (2000:279) regard as not strong, but acceptable.

¹³ There seems to be no general “rule of thumb” as to what should be reported as a meaningful correlation and what should be left out. Most publications on research methodology and social data analysis avoid making clear cut recommendations on this issue. One South African social survey analyst, Hennie Kotzé, in discussion, commented that some researchers will even report a .150 correlation because it indicates that “something is going on.” With Pearson’s correlation coefficient ranging between –1 and + 1, .150 is a rather weak sign that there is indeed, “something going on.” The correlations between the MPI Index and various selected items were, generally, low. Therefore, as a rule of thumb in this study, all correlations which could be rounded off to .200 and above were regarded as meaningful enough to warrant cross-tabulation.

¹⁴ The level of measurement or scale which was used to measure the attitudes of respondents in this study technically lies at the ordinal level. This means that we cannot conclude that a respondent who scores high (3) on a political discussion scale of three (1 = “never discusses politics,” 2 = “occasionally discusses politics” and 3 = “frequently discusses politics”) discusses politics three times as much as someone who scores low (1). The difference in degrees of discussion can be explained in terms of “more, less and no” discussion, but not in terms of

the “exact distance between each of the observations.” The measurement of income, however, allows us to specify *exactly* how much one respondent earns more than another. This level of variable measurement, which is rare in the social sciences, is called the interval level (Fielding and Gilbert, 2000:14-15 and Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:158-163).

Generally, books on statistical analysis recommend that gamma (γ) should be used to determine the association between ordinal variables and Pearson’s r for determining the association between interval variables (Dometrius, 1992:308-309; Fielding and Gilbert, 2000:215 and Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:421). However, Baker (1988:129) points out that ordinal scales are effectively “...often treated as continuous variables such that the *average* score of all respondents to [an] item might be given as 2.3...In this way a variable with an ordinal scale of measurement is actually treated like an interval scale.” Furthermore, she notes that Borgatta and Bohrnstedt (1980, cited by Baker, 1988) make out a strong case for treating ordinal variables as “imperfect” or “weak” interval variables because they “are generally described with statistical measures that assume continuous numerical scales.”

Knoke and Bohrnstedt (1994:21-22) confirm that this point of departure is, in fact, widely accepted and used in statistical social analysis. Therefore, although an attitude scale which offers several response items is technically an ordinal variable, one can assume that these items “effectively represent points along an intended continuum.” The reason underlying this assumption is “that ‘strength of attitude’ is fundamentally a continuous property that our measuring devices only crudely tap.” Consequently, the use of Pearson’s r to determine the association between the variables of the SAB survey, is acceptable. Furthermore, Pearson’s r has also been utilised as a measure of relations between variables in other analyses of the data set (cf. Mattes and Bratton, 2001).

¹⁵ The Pearson’s correlations in this table and all subsequent tables are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 4 are: Southern Africa (.106), Botswana (.065), Lesotho (.068) and South Africa (.080).

¹⁶ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 5 are: Southern Africa (.066), Botswana (.099), Lesotho (.062), Malawi (.083) and South Africa (.057).

¹⁷ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 6 are: Lesotho (.104), Namibia (.140) and South Africa (.115).

¹⁸ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 7 are: Southern Africa (-.032), Botswana (.014), Lesotho (.073), Malawi (-.061), South Africa (-.087) and Zambia (.062).

¹⁹ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 8 are: Southern Africa (.123), Lesotho (.095), South Africa (.053), Zambia (.138) and Zimbabwe (.111).

²⁰ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 9 are: Southern Africa (.114), Lesotho (.062), Malawi (.084), Namibia (-.029), South Africa (.053) and Zimbabwe (.107).

²¹ The Zimbabwean survey was completed towards the end of 1999, before the parliamentary elections of 2001, and before the occupation of white farms by Zimbabwean war veterans started gathering momentum. On the legitimacy scale (1-5), Zimbabwe’s mean of 2.51 falls below the midpoint of three. This figure indicates that the Zimbabwean government is perceived as not being legitimate. The other scores are: Namibia (3.72), Botswana (3.61), Lesotho (3.53), South Africa (3.51), Zambia (3.35), and Malawi (3.25) (Mattes et al, 2000:32).

²² The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 10 are: Botswana (-.138), Lesotho (-.028), Malawi (-.053), Namibia (-.063) and Zambia (.014).

²³ The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 11 are: Botswana (-.026), Lesotho (-.036), Malawi (-.024), South Africa (.009) and Zambia (.028).